In Confidence

Office of the Minister of Civil Defence

Chair
Cabinet Committee on Canterbury Earthquake Recovery

REVIEW OF CIVIL DEFENCE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT RESPONSE TO THE 22 FEBRUARY CHRISTCHURCH EARTHQUAKE

Proposal
1. This paper seeks Cabinet agreement to proposals that respond to the findings of the independent report Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake (the report). The paper proposes:
   - a Government response to the six key recommendations in the report;
   - that the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management report back to Cabinet in November 2012 on the development of a Corrective Action Plan to address the 108 recommendations in the report; and
   - that the report is publicly released, along with this paper and minute, accompanied by a press statement.

Executive Summary
2. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) is a business unit of the Department of Internal Affairs. Following a Cabinet directive [CAB Min (11) 41/9], MCDEM commissioned an independent review of the civil defence emergency management (CDEM) response in the period immediately following the 22 February 2011 earthquake. The report concludes that, overall, the emergency response worked very well. The response showed the resilience of the Christchurch community and the strengths of New Zealand’s emergency services and CDEM framework.

3. The report, however, also identifies issues that need attention to improve future emergency responses and community resilience. These include management and control of the response, and gaps in training, capability and communications. The report makes 108 recommendations. Six of these are highlighted as major recommendations, as follows:
   - that territorial local authorities no longer have power to control the response to emergencies, but that they still retain the power to declare them;
   - that a ‘cadre’ of highly trained emergency managers from organisations across the country be established to lead and control emergency responses;
   - that new structures be developed to modify the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS)\(^1\) so as to better link the response to emergencies with the community and community organisations;
   - that the preservation of business and jobs be made a higher priority during response to emergencies, and links between the response and businesses be improved;

\(^1\) CIMS is the incident management concept and processes that all emergency services in New Zealand must use in accordance with the National CDEM Plan Order 2005.
that consideration be given to MCDEM being located within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet; and

that MCDEM continue to promote a culture of preparedness for major disasters amongst all sectors.

4. In response to the report’s six key findings and recommendations, I propose that MCDEM:

- works with regional CDEM Groups\textsuperscript{2} needing to improve their response capacity to major emergencies;
- explores options for a ‘cadre’ of highly trained managers to enhance the ability of local authorities and CDEM Groups to control large-scale emergency responses;
- develops systems to better connect the community with operating structures for an emergency response;
- reviews operational arrangements to prioritise the preservation of businesses and jobs after an emergency;
- remains a business unit in the Department of Internal Affairs; and
- continues to promote a culture of preparedness among all sectors.

5. The report’s 102 other recommendations will require relatively straightforward modifications to operational systems and preparedness activities. I propose that MCDEM report back in November 2012 on an interagency Corrective Action Plan to address all 108 recommendations.

6. Because the report is of public interest, I propose to publicly release it along with this paper, the minute, and a press statement. My statement will acknowledge the New Zealand Police (Police) and the New Zealand Fire Service (the Fire Service) do not agree with the report’s findings regarding incident control at the CTV building rescue site, but also that the report is largely positive about their performance and that of other emergency services.

Background

\textit{Previous Cabinet decisions}

7. In November 2011, Cabinet agreed to the terms of reference for an independent review of the CDEM response in the period immediately following the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake (\textit{CAB Min (11) 41/9}). It is standard practice, after significant emergency responses, to review the response to identify lessons for the management of future emergency events.

8. The purpose of the review was to identify, from an emergency management perspective, the practices that should be reinforced and the processes and policies that need improving. It was to focus on CDEM response and how well the National CDEM plan worked. The outcomes of the review were to identify any changes that need to be made to emergency management arrangements. The agreed objectives and scope of the review are attached as Appendix 1.

\textit{Royal Commission of Inquiry}

\textsuperscript{2} A CDEM Group comprises elected representatives from the local authorities (city, district and regional councils) in a region. Each Group maintains operational staff from local authorities, emergency services and lifeline utilities.
9. The terms of reference for the review specify that it would not duplicate or interfere with the Royal Commission Inquiry into Building Failure Caused by Canterbury Earthquakes (the Royal Commission). The Royal Commission Inquiry was completed in June 2012 and Volumes one to three of its final report were released on 23 August 2012. The Royal Commission will deliver the balance of its final report on 12 November 2012 or before if possible.

Reviewing the response

10. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management commissioned Ian McLean Consultancy Services Ltd to conduct an independent review. A draft report was provided in April 2012, with the final report completed on 29 June 2012.

11. The review deals with the civil defence emergency management response from the time of the 22 February earthquake until 30 April 2011, when the response phase officially ended and the recovery process began. The review included the range of agencies and organisations involved in the response. As part of data gathering, the review team (led by Ian McLean) interviewed more than 200 people, some as individuals but the majority in their capacity as a member of an organisation or community group.

12. The review team sought feedback on its April 2012 draft report from a number of the key contributing agencies such as the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, New Zealand Defence Force, Police, Fire Service, Ministry of Social Development, Ministry of Economic Development, Department of Building and Housing and the Ministry of Transport. Several agencies did not agree with all the reviewers’ findings. The significant concerns are dealt with from paragraph 42.

The Review Report

Positive findings of the report

13. Overall, the review found that the emergency response was effective, confirming the resilience of the Christchurch community and the strengths of New Zealand’s emergency services and CDEM framework. The report states that:

- the strategy during the first 48 hours was sound, with a focus on saving life;
- emergency services responded rapidly and worked together well, including the Police, Fire Service, the co-located Police and Fire Communications Centre, Fire Service Urban Search and Rescue, New Zealand Defence Force personnel, ambulance service and health sector;
- most of the lifeline utilities serving Christchurch were well prepared, and all responded well after the earthquake. Some, like Orion (the energy distribution company for the affected area), the port company and the airport company were organised for such an eventuality. Christchurch City Council competently managed the task of restoring water, wastewater services and roads;
- voluntary groups provided major assistance, greatly reducing the level of hardship in the community, particularly in the early days of the response;
- the technical aspects of inspecting damaged buildings were performed well;
- the decision to provide a subsidy for wages was highly effective and successful; and
• the communication between Ministers, departments, the Officials’ Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination and the National Crisis Management Centre ran well.

**The report’s recommendations**

14. The predominant theme of the report is the need to be better prepared to respond to major disasters. The report identifies six key findings and makes six key recommendations. In addition, the report makes a further 102 recommendations relating to specific sectors with responsibilities for the February response. The report’s six key recommendations concern:

A. **The emergency management response**: territorial authorities should no longer have power to control the response to emergencies, but that they still retain the power to declare them;

B. **Location of MCDEM**: consideration is given to MCDEM being located within the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet so as to provide a better platform for launching responses;

C. **Enhance professionalism in emergency management**: a ‘cadre’ of highly trained emergency managers from organisations across the country should be established to lead and control emergency responses;

D. **Link the response more closely with the community**: new structures should be developed to modify the Coordinated Incident Management System to better link the response to emergencies with the community and community organisations;

E. **Give higher priority to business and jobs**: the preservation of business and jobs be made a higher priority during responses to emergencies, and links between the response and businesses be improved; and

F. **Improve preparedness**: MCDEM continues to promote a culture of preparedness for major disasters amongst all sectors and is resourced appropriately to do so.

15. The remaining 102 recommendations are organised by theme (emergency services; lifeline utilities; health and welfare; buildings and central business district; logistics, information and science; and the community). These mostly entail operational changes to improve community preparedness, strengthen and build new connections between government agencies and other stakeholders, and address gaps in pre-planning, policies, and training.

**Government’s proposed response to the Report’s key recommendations**

16. Each of the report’s six key recommendations is discussed more fully below and my proposed response provided.
A) The emergency management response

17. Christchurch City Council and the Canterbury CDEM Group both ran Emergency Operations Centres, which the report found duplicated control and created inefficiencies and risks to the public and property. Relationships between the CDEM Group in Christchurch and the territorial authorities involved in the CDEM Group had not improved since the 4 September 2010 earthquake. The review considers that similar problems could arise in other regions of New Zealand in future major emergencies.

18. The review recommends that territorial authorities no longer have the power to control the response to emergencies. They would, however, retain the power to declare states of local emergency.

Proposed response

19. I propose that MCDEM continue to work with regional CDEM Groups to strengthen, rather than diminish, the role of territorial authorities. The ongoing commitment of territorial authorities is crucial to the success of CDEM responses. Most emergencies are short, localised events that are best dealt with at the local level without needing the CDEM Group to formally lead the response.

20. A key issue is the ability to rapidly scale up a CDEM response following a sudden major emergency. Scalability and seamless integration of local and national responses is a key concept of advanced CDEM frameworks internationally. The CDEM Group Controller has the legal power to control the response to emergencies during a state of local emergency. The report states that the Group in Christchurch had a “legal but ineffectual power to direct the Christchurch City Council Controller”. The failure to implement the Group’s powers in a cohesive manner was therefore not due to any lack of legislative mandate, but to situational and local political factors at the time of the 22 February earthquake. The relationships between Councils in the Canterbury CDEM Group have improved markedly since the earthquakes and since the report was prepared.

21. MCDEM monitors and evaluates CDEM Groups’ performance in terms of structure, authority arrangements and capability to manage through emergencies. In contrast to what the reviewers found in Canterbury at the time of the earthquakes, monitoring shows that most CDEM Groups work well, as there is sufficient engagement and leadership by the territorial authorities. This ensures an agreed understanding of the Group’s common objective.

22. Partly as a result of MCDEM’s ongoing work with Groups, many local government leaders are acknowledging and tackling their joint responsibilities within the CDEM Group context. MCDEM reports that 14 out of 16 Groups already have, or are working towards, arrangements that structure emergency responses effectively. MCDEM will continue to work with the remaining Groups.

B) Location of MCDEM

23. The report considers that MCDEM’s location, as part of the Department of Internal Affairs, did not provide MCDEM with sufficient prominence in the response. The reviewers concluded this hampers MCDEM’s relationships with major government departments in preparation for and during emergencies.

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3 The regulatory system is designed so that incident control can be scaled up from incident point coordination to local level coordination, to the regional (Group) level, and to the national level.
24. The reviewers instead thought the location of MCDEM should be determined by what is operationally efficient during emergencies, rather than what they consider is administratively convenient under ‘business as usual’. The report recommends the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet should host MCDEM because that Department is already responsible for leading the Officials’ Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination.

Proposed response

25. I have considered the suggested relocation of MCDEM and have concluded that such a move would not be warranted. The problem raised by reviewers of a lack of recognition of MCDEM’s role could be mitigated by increasing agencies’ awareness of MCDEM’s lead role in a major emergency. In MCDEM’s experience with the response, agencies that were unfamiliar with civil defence arrangements did not always recognise that MCDEM was the lead agency with an overall management responsibility that they needed to engage with.

26. I agree that MCDEM should be based in a location that is operationally efficient for emergency responses. The Department of Internal Affairs can provide support services such as information and communications technology, finance, facilities and supplementary staff. During the response, the Department quickly reprioritised its resources to give full support to MCDEM and the response.

C) Enhance professionalism in emergency management

27. The review found that many of the people who were called upon to manage or staff the Emergency Operations Centres had neither the training nor the capability to lead during a major emergency. The problem was compounded by the fact that New Zealand has relatively few large scale emergencies and managers do not get sufficient experience to sustain a high level of skill.

28. The review recommends that a ‘cadre’ of highly trained emergency managers from organisations across the country be established to lead and control emergency responses. These could be made up of staff from the New Zealand Defence Force, Police, the Fire Service, CDEM Groups and private sector organisations.

Proposed response

29. Incident Command Teams have been established in the United States with a similar intention to enhance skill levels needed for control of major emergencies. MCDEM will explore options for a ‘cadre’, or Incident Command Team, to enhance our capacity to manage large scale emergencies while not diminishing the responsibilities councils and CDEM Groups have for managing local emergencies using their resources. An enhanced capacity could be available to assist the management of any type of emergency.

D) Link the response more closely with the community

30. The review found that communication with community groups needed to be better structured and linked to the Coordinated Incident Management System. The review recommends that new structures be developed to modify the Coordinated Incident Management System to better link emergency response operating structures with the community and community organisations.

31. The report notes the important role that voluntary groups played in the communities affected by the emergency. It suggests developing a systematic approach to using volunteers, particularly for gathering information about the
needs of individuals in affected areas and to ensure communities receive needed information.

Proposed response

32. The Coordinated Incident Management System Guidelines are currently under review. MCDEM will direct the Coordinated Incident Management System Steering Committee to note and address this recommendation in that review. MCDEM will emphasise to all CDEM Groups that the focus of any response is the affected community, and that there is value to be derived from involving the community deeply in developing readiness, including arrangements for the community to contribute information and services during the response. In addition, a review of the emergency welfare arrangements (with a view to the lessons from Christchurch) is included in the MCDEM work programme for this year.

E) Give higher priority to business and jobs

33. The review found limited systems were in place to connect the business community with the Christchurch Response Centre, both in the pre-planning stage and the response phase. Consequently, the information provided to businesses was inadequate and some businesses were unaware of the assistance available to them. The review recommends that the preservation of business and jobs is made a higher priority during responses to emergencies, and links between emergency management and businesses are improved.

Proposed response

34. MCDEM will identify ways to ensure a higher priority is given to preserving business and jobs in responses. MCDEM’s review of emergency welfare arrangements will also consider how these can better respond to the needs of the business community.

F) Improve preparedness

35. In examining the response, the reviewers clearly found organisations that were well-prepared in advance responded much better than those who were not. The review recommends that MCDEM continue to promote a culture of preparedness for major emergencies among all sectors and should be resourced accordingly.

Proposed response

36. MCDEM recognises the importance of individual, family and organisational preparedness. The intent of this recommendation is at the core of several of MCDEM’s current outputs – the Public Education Programme, the New Zealand ShakeOut campaign, the Business Continuity Project and the National Exercise Programme.

Other actions responding to the report’s other recommendations

37. The report’s 102 other recommendations will require relatively straightforward modifications to operational systems and preparedness activities, without requiring changes to high-level policy or legislation. To address these other recommendations (but also the six key recommendations), MCDEM has been developing an interagency action plan with other government agencies.

38. The actions identified so far will involve modifications to operational systems and guidelines, enhanced integration between agencies, addressing gaps in pre-
planning, and increasing capacity and capability in the CDEM sector. Some of the actions are already part of government agency work programmes.

39. Once the action plan is finalised, it will become an interagency Corrective Action Plan. I propose that Cabinet direct MCDEM to report back to the Cabinet Committee for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery with the Corrective Action Plan, for noting, by November 2012.

40. If Cabinet agrees to publicly releasing the report (refer paragraph 55 onwards), MCDEM will engage with non-government organisations referred to in the report to see how they may wish to contribute to the Corrective Action Plan. MCDEM will coordinate implementation of the Corrective Action Plan and advise the Officials’ Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination of any outstanding issues.

Other Issues Raised in the Report

41. In addition to the above major issues, the report notes a number of specific issues:

Management of the response

42. The report, for the most part, commends the work of Police, the Fire Service and other emergency services. However, the review considers that incident management could have been better on at least one major rescue site (the CTV building) as it had been unclear to the reviewers who the Incident Controller was. The report notes, however, that the Senior Station Officer (Fire Service) and the Police Sergeant at the site were highly capable and well qualified for their task.

Comment

43. The structure of the report and its presentation of the issue could make it difficult for readers to interpret the findings. Moreover, the Fire Service and Police disagree that incident control was ineffective, stating that the reviewers have not provided evidence to support their statement.

44. The report recommends that incident control responsibilities using the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) are clarified. In response to this recommendation, MCDEM, Police and the Fire Service will incorporate any clarification in the updated CIMS manual into their training.

Intelligence sharing

45. The report recommends that the Police Emergency Operations Centre ensure its situational awareness and intelligence material are fully shared with other Emergency Operations Centres. I have consulted with the reviewers, who clarified their view that Police officers shared very accurate and comprehensive Police intelligence, but that there may be capacity during future events for Police to share a wider spectrum of information relating to issues such as welfare,

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4 These include lifeline utilities such as telecommunications, power and rail services and ambulance (via the National Ambulance Sector Office).

5 It should be noted that the reviewers did not speak to either individual. In addition, the report does not link its findings on incident control to the causes of deaths in the CTV building. The Coronial Inquest into the deaths of victims of the earthquake will resume following the conclusion of the Royal Commission of Inquiry. The Fire Service has also completed an internal review of its response in August 2011, and has begun a second review to look at management aspects in more detail. This is expected to be completed during August 2012 and publicly released in September or October 2012.

6 The incident is discussed on pages 12, 38, 39, 42, 44, 77 to 79 and 185 to 187.
lifelines, and local business activity, which Police may become aware of in the course of their duties. This could enhance the overall intelligence provided to the central response centre. Police have indicated that they would and could have shared this information, had the Christchurch Response Centre asked for it.

Comment

46. Police consider that they were sharing intelligence material with the Christchurch Response Centre. It now seems that internal processes in the Christchurch Response Centre did not allow it to make the best use of the information provided by Police. Accordingly, the report’s recommendation will not be adopted in the Corrective Action Plan.

Alternative communications centre

47. The report recommends that Police and the Fire Service consider the merits of an alternative communications centre being identified in Christchurch. I have consulted with the reviewers, who reasoned that the location of the communications centre in Christchurch enabled better situational awareness, oversight of calls and despatch on the ground, and utilisation of local knowledge.

Comment

48. This recommendation appears to be based on a misunderstanding. In fact, the back-up arrangements for managing emergency calls worked well, and resilience will be further enhanced with the establishment of another centre in Auckland in 2013. Accordingly, the report’s recommendation will not be adopted in the Corrective Action Plan.

49. The Justice and Emergency Service Precinct planned for Christchurch central city will help the emergency services coordinate service delivery. It will include a joint emergency services communications centre to support the various functions of the Fire Service, St John Ambulance, Police and Civil Defence.

Recovery

50. The review considers that a lack of suitable legislation in place for recovery from major events caused delay in setting up the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) and hence extended the response period beyond what was desirable.

Comment

51. CERA was established by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 on 18 April 2011, only eight weeks after the 22 February earthquake**. It took responsibility for leading the recovery, in partnership with other agencies, on 1 May 2011, immediately after the state of emergency ended. The experience of the Canterbury earthquakes, however, has highlighted that the legislative framework for civil defence emergencies was not adequate for long-term recovery on a large scale. One of my priorities for 2012-15 is to strengthen the legislative framework for recovery to ensure New Zealand is better prepared for future major emergencies, and I have asked my officials to begin work on this.

** While CERA received additional powers on 18 April 2011, it came into being on 29 March 2011 with the State Sector (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority) Order 2011. This footnote has been added to the original paper.
Community welfare

52. The report found that, overall, the welfare response to the earthquake was very good but there were significant gaps. Information about the safety and needs of people in badly affected areas needed to be gathered sooner and more systematically, and the official response gave little support to self-activated welfare centres. The report recommends, where temporary accommodation is no longer provided, centres should continue providing other assistance as needed (e.g. meals, water and information).  

53. The review also identified that up-to-date local information was not conveyed to badly affected suburbs, particularly before electricity was restored.

Comment

54. MCDEM, in conjunction with the Ministry of Social Development, is reviewing emergency welfare arrangements. It has identified a need for a greater focus on the delivery of welfare services, better integration of services and sharing of information, clarity of roles and responsibilities, and training. These actions will also include enhancing the systems for supporting self-activated community-based welfare centres and volunteers.

Management of buildings and the Central Business District

55. The report found inadequate notice was given before the demolition of buildings, which hindered owners’ and tenants’ ability to recover property or obtain a second opinion. On a separate but related matter, cordon management was found to be generally effective but hampered by an absence of pre-planning which caused considerable tensions with those seeking access.

Comment

56. The Royal Commission is due to make its final report in November 2012 and is likely to make a number of recommendations regarding arrangements for evaluations of buildings in emergencies. MCDEM and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment will address the Royal Commission’s recommendations as well as including the development of a demolition protocol in their work programmes for 2013/14.

57. MCDEM and Police will include the development of cordon management guidelines in their work programmes for 2013/14.

Publicity

58. Because the report is of public interest, I propose releasing it, along with a press statement. The statement would be a high-level Government response to the report based on the overview and commentary in this paper.

59. In response to the findings regarding incident control at the site of the CTV building collapse (paragraph 42), I propose the press statement acknowledges that Police and the Fire Service disagree with some of the findings of the report. However, the statement will note that Police and the Fire Service will be taking on board the recommendations by clarifying incident control responsibilities and incorporating this into emergency response training.

60. I propose that this Cabinet paper and its associated minute are released at the same time as the report, and posted on the MCDEM website. Immediately prior to the public release, embargoed copies of the report and press statement will be

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7 Some welfare centres were closed for public health reasons.
provided to the Christchurch City Council, Environment Canterbury (the Regional Council), the Canterbury CDEM Group, Canterbury District Health Board, and a limited number of other organisations involved in the response. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade will brief officials from countries whose citizens died in Christchurch.

Consultation
61. The following agencies were consulted on this paper: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Treasury, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, the Ministries of Social Development, Health, Transport, and Foreign Affairs and Trade, the State Services Commission, New Zealand Police, New Zealand Fire Service, New Zealand Defence Force, the New Zealand Transport Agency and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority.

Financial Implications
62. Individual agencies are still assessing actions in response to the review and the costs of implementation. However, it is anticipated that the costs would be relatively minor and would be met from within existing baseline resources.

Legislative Implications
63. Any legislative implications for the CDEM Act 2002 will be considered as part of a proposed review of the recovery related provisions of that Act. A small number of recommendations may entail changes to the National CDEM Plan. The National CDEM Plan is subsidiary legislation under the Act, delegated to the Minister of Civil Defence. MCDEM is currently reviewing the National CDEM Plan and will consider all recommendations as part of that review.

64. The report recommends that building evaluation during an emergency be given a legal mandate (Recommendation 83). The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment will consider this recommendation after the Royal Commission of Inquiry has reported its findings in November 2012. The Royal Commission's recommendations could point to the need to amend the Building Act 2004.

Regulatory Impact Analysis
65. There are no regulatory impacts from the recommendations in this paper. A regulatory impact analysis would be required for any future decisions to amend the CDEM Act or the National CDEM Plan.

Human Rights, Gender Implications and Disability Perspective
66. The proposals in this paper are not inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the Human Rights Act 1993 or the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. Some of the actions may improve preparedness for caring for the frail and people with disabilities. There are no gender implications.

Recommendations
67. The Minister of Civil Defence recommends that the Committee:

1. note that the independent report: Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake has been completed and is generally positive about the response;
2. **note** that six of the report’s 108 recommendations for improving New Zealand’s preparedness for future major emergencies are key recommendations; *The emergency management response*

3. **note** the report recommends that territorial authorities should not retain the power to control the response to an emergency, but that they still retain the power to declare a state of local emergency;

4. **agree** that, rather than diminish the role of territorial authorities, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management will work with regional Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups that need strengthening;

*Location of the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management*

5. **note** the report recommends that consideration is given to relocating the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet;

6. **agree** that the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management remain a business unit within the Department of Internal Affairs;

*Addressing other recommendations of the report*

7. **agree** that, in response to the report’s four other key recommendations, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management will:
   
   7.1 explore options for a ‘cadre’ of highly trained managers to enhance the ability of local authorities and CDEM Groups to control large-scale emergency responses;

   7.2 link emergency response systems (for example, guidelines and protocols) more closely with communities;

   7.3 review arrangements to ensure a higher priority is given to preserving businesses and jobs following a major emergency; and

   7.4 continue to promote a culture of preparedness for major emergencies amongst all sectors (community, business and government);

8. **direct** MCDEM to report back to the Cabinet Committee for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery with the Corrective Action Plan in response to the report’s 108 recommendations, for noting, by November 2012;

*Publicity*

9. **agree** to the Minister of Civil Defence publicly releasing the report *Review of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake*;

10. **agree** that the Minister of Civil Defence makes a press statement announcing the Government’s high-level response to the report when the report is released; and
11. agree that, when the report is released, this Cabinet paper and subsequent minute are also released, with appropriate deletions under the Official Information Act 1982 if required.

Hon Chris Tremain
Minister of Civil Defence

/   / 2012
APPENDIX 1

Excerpt from the Terms of Reference for the Review of the Response to the 22 February 2011 Christchurch Earthquake [CAB Min (11)41/9]

Objective

The objective is to undertake an independent review of the response to the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake from an emergency management perspective, to identify the practices that should be reinforced, and identify the processes and policies that warrant improvements.

This is not a whole of government review, but focuses on the Civil Defence Emergency Management response and how well the National Civil Defence Emergency Management plan worked. The outcomes of the review will be used to identify any changes that need to be made to Civil Defence Emergency Management arrangements.

The review is to address the period from the time of the initial earthquake on 22 February 2011 through to 30 April 2011 when the state of national emergency was terminated and the responsibility for recovery activities was transferred to the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority.

The review will consider the management of the overall response across the range of agencies and organisations that were involved. It will focus on Civil Defence Emergency Management aspects of the response, coordinated by local level Civil Defence Emergency Management, the Christchurch Response Centre, and the National Crisis Management Centre. Other agencies and organisations will be part of the review only to the extent that their activities contributed to the Civil Defence Emergency Management led response.

The review is not to duplicate or interfere with the Royal Commission established to investigate the collapse and loss of life in the Pyne Gould Corporation (PGC) building and the Canterbury Television (CTV) building, or with any other official reviews in relation to the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. The review is also not to address recovery issues, including the establishment and activities of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission. Although not part of the response, the review team will consult with the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, particularly with respect to item (m) below.

Terms of reference

The review will deal with the following:

a) The mobilisation and management of the initial response in Christchurch during the period from the onset of the earthquake until the establishment of the CRC.

b) The declaration of the state of national emergency.

c) Roles and responsibilities in the response under a state of national emergency.

d) The coordination of response activities in Christchurch, via the Canterbury Response Centre or otherwise, of:
   - The emergency services, including Urban Search and Rescue;
   - Welfare agencies and services;
Medical and health services;
Lifeline utilities and restoration of services;
The New Zealand Defence Force; and,
Managing spontaneous volunteers.

e) The coordination of national support by the NCMC in Wellington.
f) Management of the international dimension and offers of support.
g) Management of logistics, in terms of procurement and distribution as well as coordination between the Christchurch Response Centre and the National Crisis Management Centre.
h) Management of building safety evaluations. This will include the effectiveness of the colour based building classification system, public understanding of these classifications, the collection of assessment data and how this data was used for the purpose of needs assessment and welfare support. It will not include how this data related to the recovery process, nor any aspects related to land zone classifications or re-building in any areas.
i) Management of building demolitions and cordoned areas. This will include the process for the deconstruction and demolition of buildings, the establishment and management of cordons, including public safety issues. It will not include the longer term planning for the recovery of the red zone.
j) Information management.
k) Management of information to the public and businesses during the response.
l) Coordination of public messages between the National Controller, NCMC, departments and their Ministers.
m) The restoration of commercial activity as part of the response, including managing the impact from closure of the Red Zone and damaged buildings, and managing support and reestablishment to affected businesses.
n) CDEM arrangements at the community level including preparedness and business continuity.
o) Provision and coordination of science advice.