The writer is a trained communication professional with practical responder, training and safety skills training experience.

I propose that with regard to communicating risk information and building risk literacy for prevention and to enable more effective resilience, that New Zealand applies some lessons learned by Walmart and creates a specialist media topic and creates media specialisation among personnel to cultivate social norms.

1. The media education/training and private sectors of the media engaged and or guided (a discussion on whether or not this be voluntary, consultative guidance or compulsory requires media legislative input (there being facility to command with regard to public safety under broadcasting legislation but not for print or new media) and is not discussed herein but differing motives and governing legislation require some consideration) to have a civil defence column, segment and specialist reporters as a law enforcement/crime reporting sub topic.

2. That academic discourse regarding Civil Defence, as a semi-subtopic of crime news reporting, be supported to take place, this in turn supports the creation of specialisation. Judy McGregor’s¹ ‘Crime News as Prime News’² is an example of such a study.

3. A study of a Civil Defence section in print and online, be undertaken.

Discussion

The Honorable Graeme Lee’s history of Civil Defence, written in his time as a minister, is a historical account of the formalisation of specific legislative instruments of Civil Defence, rather than a history of the concept in government or for the public. It is also not a history of relevant actions undertaken by any New Zealand Government or public or private interest in any era. Two primary instruments guide the concepts by which civil defence is now understood, the Public Safety Conservation Act 1932³ and the CDEM Act 2002. Sometimes, without formalisation and, for some parties, without reward, Civil Defence functions as they were known to be defined in both 1932 and contemporary legislation, were deployed by colonial settlers. In fact⁴ it was the press of the era and the public that urged the Government to form a small corps of men picked especially for their familiarity with the bush, and associated skills, to hunt out ‘marauders.’ The specially selected men went on to undertake missions that included

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¹ [https://www.aut.ac.nz/profiles/judy-mcgregor](https://www.aut.ac.nz/profiles/judy-mcgregor)
² Legal Research Foundation, Publication number 36, 1993
³ Preservation of peace and order for serving and regulating the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, light and other necessities to the maintenance of public safety and order and life of the community (or any substantial portion) ….
intelligence gathering, preservation of life (both Maori and Pakeha), conduct psychological warfare operations, investigate, retrieve stolen items, track the lost or those hiding and provide welfare. Irrespective of the side of any given land war skirmish one’s ancestors were on in the era of the forest ranger, comparing the 1863, or thereabouts, expectations of those performing Civil Defence functions then to Graeme Lee’s assessment of the inception of Civil Defence as the nuclear threat and war, to those of today and there are little differences in analogies, yet the push and pull dynamic between media, public and government has changed. Today little consultation takes place between public and media for purposes of effecting changes in government that are outside of organised group press releases, save for ratings observations as analytic clues to what the public wants or needs and practices abound (I refer to an recent instance of a man trapped under scaffolding in Auckland and photographed by NZ media and posted to social media rather than have his dignity or his family’s dignity preserved, I also refer to fact checking in the age of social media, others may have additional examples) that are divisive or potentially alienating and require some governance that appears not to be provided in all cases.

Cultivating Social Norms Through Governance Changes

Craig Fugate⁵ points out that we ‘must be sure to plan for what can happen, rather than what happened in the past.’ He further advises to, ‘consider all areas of the private sector in your planning, not just big box stores.’ Craig strongly advises against planning and exercising for what we are capable of handling and hoping we can scale up. Relatedly, while some base knowledge of human behavior seems common sense, Craig suggests not trying to make data models fit your capabilities as a method of facing alternatives and solutions that are not merely scaling up current systems or practices, this, Craig recognises, forces change to ways of thinking to accommodate changing threats. Craig’s advice speaks loudly to carrying out step three of the recommendations. What is intended to be understood is that media analysis relationships are built, solidified and actively engaged with for policy purposes but any one NZ study of hits on a Civil Defence segment or article does not inform policy regime change, rather the system of communicating is overhauled in the same manner WalMart overhauled an entire physical classification of grocery and equipment offerings⁶ to better communicate relevance, and enable and prepare an entire demographic for disasters and disaster recovery. While true impact of doing so cannot be known as yet, one can see clearly that potential benefits for those with a sector based interest are noteworthy. As the risk information/literacy conversation takes place and the resilience plan is and includes private sector media as stakeholders in the quest for section and specialisation reform I know the first resistance related question one might ask is related to how to fill up a section and justify a specialist when there isn’t a current emergency. I

⁶ https://www.walmart.com/ideas/preparing-for-emergencies/create-an-emergency-preparedness-plan/4253
would suggest that if this question is asked then you haven’t taken on Craig Furgate’s advice, if Civil Defence is now a specialisation and a segment, the question is, where/who from/how will I find news today? A section and specialisation for Civil Defence has potential to lower the need for ACC claims, save lives, empower people with the skills to fend for themselves and bring reactions and actions that are rarely exercised to the forefront of daily living in New Zealand and optimised to create positive behavioral change.
Thank you for an interesting read. I have a comment. We believe that the M&E Phase should include as "input" a priority to ensure that the infrastructure of the road systems provide for multiple "escape" routes. Living in the Greater Wellington area, we are regularly reminded of our vulnerability with respect to access and egress in emergencies. Kind Regards.

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Kim Lund
Chris Paulin

NEW ZEALAND
I’ve been involved in Emergency Welfare Centre preparations here in Golden Bay for a number of years now. While the situation has improved here, there is an obvious need to have a community-wide drill involving the schools so that students and family members who are available can be exposed to the procedures and placement of Welfare Centres. This would enable them to engage appropriately in the event of a real emergency. The second advantage would be to get emergency services and volunteers practiced for the real thing and would allow for inadequacies in preparedness and procedure to be recognised and addressed. These kind of drills are standard procedure in other parts of the world and should be accepted practice nationally here. With that in mind, there are doubtless lessons to be learned from examining other nation’s programmes as they might be relevant to New Zealand. I am dismayed at the slow pace of progress heretofore.

Michael Delceg
Tēnā koē Jo

I received an email a few days ago regarding Submission on National Disaster Resilience Strategy Submission. I am unable to make a submission due to lack of time but I do have a couple of things that I would like to offer if at all possible to make them via email:

1. Our iwi have offered a number of disaster resilience options to our local district council - Kapiti Coast District Council. These policy suggestions are all explained in a document called Te Haerenga Whakamua and there is a section of this publication that could be of interest to your people if they interested in getting input from Tangata whenua.

2. We have removed ourselves (and our Marae) off the regional list of venues for use in a disaster. We learned that in a certain disaster event the government would take our Marae for public use. We are opposed to that and therefore have made our Marae unavailable to disaster relief efforts - instead we will take control of our Marae on such occasions and will run our own support centre.

Any comments or suggestions would be welcomed.

Thanks,
Pātaka
I would like to make a comment on Appendix 3 of the Strategy, in particular Strength number 5 about NZ’s level of insurance penetration. I have written a paper and sent it to Treasury in response to their Discussion Paper in the Living Standards Series, Number 18/05, entitled Resilience and Future Wellbeing. I repeat the first few paragraphs of this paper below and would be happy to discuss this subject more fully with you or send you the entire paper.

I write as the ex-CEO of the Earthquake Commission, with over forty years’ experience in the insurance market in NZ.

Here is the extract from my paper:

1. The Treasury report states that well-functioning insurance markets are critical to enabling New Zealanders to adapt to financial shocks. The insurance industry is a cornerstone of financial resilience, and nowhere more so than in New Zealand. This can be illustrated by the proportion of the total economic cost of an earthquake contributed by the insurance market:

   - Northridge (USA) 1994 < 40%
   - Kobe (Japan) 1995 3%
   - Taiwan 1999 5%
   - Chile 2010 < 30%
   - Canterbury 2010-2012 70%
   - Fukushima (Japan) 2011 < 20%
   - Italy 2012 10%

   Source: Aon

2. The insurance market for physical damage caused by natural disasters in New Zealand is changing rapidly. The conditions that have been common in many countries for decades are now being applied in this country, with the same result: insurance for homes is becoming unaffordable and many homeowners will have no alternative but to let their insurance cover lapse. Without an insurance policy, homeowners also do not have EQC’s natural disaster protection (unless they apply for it direct from EQC).

3. New Zealand’s version of what other regimes such as California, Florida, France and Turkey have been forced to enact in response to insurance market failure – EQC – is being marginalised, with its coverage becoming decreasingly meaningful. The very perils EQC covers are the cause of insurance company withdrawal or punitive pricing in some areas of the country.

The point of my paper to Treasury is to make a case for substantial reform of EQC’s insurance cover, in particular to adjust the maximum amount claimable to reflect construction industry inflation since the “cap” was first set in 1993. This would mean an EQC “cap” on cover of $400,000. The present plans are to increase EQC’s maximum to $150,000 next year. MCDEM and Treasury are right that insurance penetration is a key to resilience, both in the commercial and domestic areas. EQC is a potentially vital part of maintaining the high level of penetration for residential property that the Strategy lists as a strength. I hope MCDEM, through its Natural Disaster Resilience Strategy, will support this realignment of EQC’s role.

Yours Faithfully,
David Middleton, ONZM
9 November, 2018

National Disaster Resilience Strategy - Public Consultation Feedback

Feedback on behalf of Resilient Organisations Ltd., 188 Durham St. South, Christchurch Central, 8001
Corresponding Contact: Joanne Stevenson, Ph: 

To Jo Horrocks - Principal Advisor Emergency Management - and Team at the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management:

Thank you for giving us the opportunity to review the most recent version of the Draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy. We are aware of the tremendous effort that has gone into making this document inclusive and reflective of the vast and complex societal efforts needed to build a more resilient New Zealand. The Strategy will be a useful guide to agencies, organisations, and households for years to come.

Our team at Resilient Organisations Ltd. has reviewed the Strategy and provided detailed comments in the pages below. We have paid special attention to the section in the appendix geared toward Businesses and Organisations.

If you have any questions or would like further clarification of the following points do not hesitate to get in touch with our team.

Best Wishes,

The Resilient Organisations team
Major comments

- There are slightly different descriptions of the term resilience on page 2 and page 5. The explanation on page refers to the ability to “anticipate, minimise, absorb, respond to, adapt to, and recover from disruptive events.” The definition of resilience (derived from Stevenson 2015) does not include the term anticipate. This term should be integrated into the definition on page 5 as it captures the element of risk reduction.

- It would be good to see more clearly how this strategy fits in a wider legislative context. Perhaps a diagram linking international strategy, national legislation/strategies, and a range of local legislation etc. There are some references on P10 to the National Security System and emergency management arrangements at the local, regional, and national level. P13 refers to the Sendai Framework, the Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. P. 18 refers to the Treaty of Waitangi. P. 27 “This Strategy supports other key policy and programmes in emphasising the importance of infrastructure resilience.” P43 Local Government Act. It also will influence District Plans, Infrastructure and Asset Management Plans and so on.

- P21 It feels like there is an important element missing from this discussion of risk and that is the phenomena of risk transfer. If a construction firm builds a home that doesn’t cope well in a disruption the life-safety risk is borne by the occupants and the financial risk is borne by the insurer. It is only through code enforcement and often through the court system that risk is transferred back to the construction firm. Perhaps a statement about the fact that risks created by one segment of society may be borne by another segment of society would be a useful reminder. Not everyone knows the risk they are “accepting” and therefore it is important to treat it as an all-of-society issue.

- P28 While social capital (connectedness), culture, and infrastructure are singled out clearly in the objectives and the economy and governance are implied in objectives 14 and 16 respectively. There is no mention of the natural environment in the objectives. This feels like a good place to mention the importance of considering planning and stewardship of the natural environment as part of local, district, and regional resilience planning. Perhaps even something about a goal of aligning the national strategies for the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris agreement with the Sendai Framework. Perhaps this relates back to the Managing risks (objective 4) “Address gaps in risk reduction policy (particularly in the light of climate change adaptation.”

Comments on the Business and Organisations Appendix (p.37)

- Understand your risk section is a bit wordy. Here is a suggested revision: *Be aware of the hazards or disruptions you could experience, how your assets (people and capital) might be impacted and the strengths and resources available to manage those disruptions.*

- Invest in organizational resilience – I wonder if adaptive capacity is a bit theoretical (especially if read out of context of rest of document). Suggest changing this to “ability to respond to the unexpected”

- Keep the long term in mind – some people might read this and think they can’t do anything about climate change. So suggest rewording: *Consider the longer-term changes in your environment, for example the impact of climate change, and how you can position your organisation to see these changes as an opportunity.*

- First paragraph (Understand your risk): have previously used ‘…’ to signal that text is a continued sentence from the heading
• Under the heading “Invest in organizational resilience” saying “contributing to your risk” would be better to say than “causing your risk”
• Under the heading “Benefit today, benefit tomorrow” the term “by-product” sounds a bit offhand (i.e., don’t be intentional). Perhaps reword to “Try to find crisis/disaster preparedness solutions that have everyday benefits for your organization.”
• Under the heading “Consider your social impact” the reason ‘or because there are benefits for you’ sounds a bit flippant. Suggest changing to “as well as helping your community, you will also be reducing the risks to your organization of being disrupted.”

Comments on the Cities and Districts Appendix (p.38)
Understand your risk section, I think needs to include understanding of your communities capacity to cope with disruptions as well as their risk tolerance. So I suggest: “Identify and understand hazards and disruptions you could face, and the willingness and ability of your community to cope with disruptions”

I think there is a section missing here around education and risk literacy. I cannot see these risks being effectively managed if residents are not informed to engage in the process. So I suggest a section titled: Create risk literacy and awareness. The content could be something like this: “Create informed communities that can actively engage in risk management processes”

Comments on the Cities and Districts Appendix (p.38)
The thing I think is missing here is around policy and legislation. Perhaps as an add-on to ‘Make resilience easy’ include “Create policies and legislation that enable and encourage resilient behaviours.”

Minor/Editing comments
• P2. Change “Resilience is our- or a system’s…” to “Resilience is the …”. The original wording feels clunky.
• P4. Your definition of exposure is reads as though the people, infrastructure etc are the exposure rather than are exposed. The UNISDR definition is clearer, “The situation of people, infrastructure, housing, production capacities and other tangible human assets located in hazard-prone areas.”
• I like the definition of Recovery that you’re using
• P7. Possibly reword “The Strategy sets out what we as New Zealanders expect in respect of a resilient New Zealand…” to “The Strategy sets out what we as New Zealanders expect of a resilient New Zealand…”
• P10 (Section 2.2) Possibly reword “Safety and security are integral to securing wellbeing and prosperity. People’s wellbeing is dependent on having secure living conditions, personal safety, and trust and confidence in authorities, and their ability to manage threats and dangers.” TO “Safety and security are integral to attaining wellbeing and prosperity. People’s wellbeing is dependent on having secure living conditions, personal safety, trust and confidence in authorities, and an ability to manage threats and dangers.”
• P11 (Global economic growth and productivity) It’s unclear whether the reference to the state is referring to the ‘nation state’ or to the state of the economy. Resilience is a steady state description and a process – so the sentence seems quite circular.
• P12 Paragraph two is one long complex sentence. Suggest separating.
• P 15-16 I like the definitions of resilience and accompanying elaboration in section 4.2.
  o P16 I would further clarify in section 4.2.2 that “resilience is our tolerance for disruption – how much disruption, in the form of hazards, that we, or the system, can cope with before it becomes a significant negatively impacts on our wellbeing”.
• P21 – words along the bottom. “range of action” should be “range of actions”
• P28 – Item 14. “practise” is a noun. It should be replaced with the verb “practice”
• I really like Appendix 2. What can I do? It is keeping with the claim that this strategy is applicable to and executable by all of society.
• P37 – Missing period after the “Keep the long term in mind” item.
Good afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to offer a submission on the Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

I understand the thought process which has driven the prioritisation used to form this document. However, I am concerned at overarching Top Down approach to community resilience.

I believe a more holistic approach starting at the community level would aid national resilience, locally, regionally and nationally. The strategy acknowledges the importance of 'grassroots' actions on only three occasions. The remainder of the document reads as if community level social collateral is in need of assistance from a higher power.

I note the Strategy mentions a series of workshops around the country over a two year period, but as a community level responder, I am left to wonder who the audience at those was, and if in fact they had any awareness of the resilience a strong community can provide.

I would like to see a strategy which works across existing community agencies (e.g. Neighbour Support) to build and strengthen a culture of resilience. Good Neighbours are the background of social recovery.

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment.

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Regards Shaz
Sharon Cousins-O’Donnell
Effective Administration Systems Included (EASI) Ltd
EASI Ltd - Business Capability made EASI!

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Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail.
Hi after reading the new proposed emergency management strategy I would like to add that a review if staffing and activity of officers at a council level is an urgent requirement. You currently have staff sitting effectively doing nothing in areas of low risk and no activations. And less staff run off their feet in areas of high risk and multiple activations, Whanganui, Taranaki, Ruapehu need at least one more staff member. Funding could be spread across all councils in that catchment to employ a floater to assist in prep and planning and activations as needed.

Sent from my iPhone
The Christchurch earthquakes demonstrated the lack of preparedness of emergency services and government, at both national and local levels, to deal sensibly with issues relating to the retention and conservation of cultural heritage, particularly buildings. I suggest that more emphasis be placed in the strategy on appropriate responses to threats to tangible cultural heritage (buildings, structures, collections) in the event of a disaster.

In particular, emergency services and agencies should be required to establish and maintain links with national and international sources of expertise and assistance, such as the International Council for Monuments & Sites (ICOMOS), the International Council of Museums (ICOM), Museums Aotearoa, and major museums, libraries and archives in the principal cities, all of which have personnel with expertise in the management of cultural heritage in the event of disaster. The attached link to a recent publication by ICCROM (the International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property) demonstrates some possibilities.

My name is Mike Lomax, of [redacted]. I am 82 years of age. I wish to make a submission, based on local experience, but I am sure it is relevant to other areas of New Zealand. It is both a criticism and a suggestion. I have previously made these comments to our local CD/CCC with no acknowledgement or comment.

Costal Christchurch has Tsunami Warning Sirens in place and well tested, so everyone knows what they are about. On the occasion of the Kaikoura Earthquake, November 2016, the tsunami alarms were sounded, all-be-it two hours later. The coastal population knows the general advice to either head for higher ground or inland. The result? 20,000 or 30,000 people jump into their cars. 40% head for the hills. 40% head inland. The remaining 20% car-less people put on ear muffs and ignore 4 hours of the mindless cacophony. The result for those in their cars - gridlock. Had there been a tsunami, we would have drowned in our cars like trapped rats. Personally, I managed to get about 2k northwards in my car, but no further away from the coast. At which point I turned around and returned home to bed.

My suggestion is gleaned from my knowledge of Capetown, South Africa. In Capetown, there is a costal Nuclear Power Plant (think Fukushima) which has a siren emergency warning system in a 10 kilometre radius surrounding it. Although their concern is more Plant failure, rather than tsunami, I think their planning offers a lot of ideas. Every year, every household within that area receives a Calendar to hang up on back of toilet door, refrigerator, or wherever. The inside cover gives specific instructions as to which streets and direction the people of that household should take to evacuate. There is also space to enter the neighbour(s) who can assist you or whom you can assist with transport. (A kind of Neighbourhood Watch) Evacuation Streets on each plan are designated as ‘One Way’ for the duration of the emergency, thus doubling the traffic volume capacity and avoiding gridlock.

This is all a long way from 1956, when a ‘Tidal Wave’ warning was given on the local radio (3ZB) and everyone rushed down to Brighton to stand on the sand dunes to watch.

Thanks,

Mike Lomax
I belong to neighbouring hood watch/crime watch and there is 90 volunteer basic trained with 3 support vehicles kitted out like police cars, with radios etc. Have you set up a data base of these, have you got their contact details. Have you got on data base of skilled plumbers electricians, whom have generators, water pumps etc. Contractors with diggers and earth moving equipment. Our local community of Maraetai beach after a tidal surge took out the boat ramp damaged property's and without civil defence or council help used our Facebook Grapefine help and in 3 hours had 200 persons on beach working. Within 24 hours we fixed a smashed boat ramp in 4 hours that we estimated council would have taken 6 months to do costing $60,000 this was featured in our local news paper. There is around NZ motorsport rescue marshals and teams trained in first aid and firefighting have you got them on your data base? I think you advise in go to high ground is dumb advice, it should be followed up with a picture of a power pole showing go inland 1km and to at least height of a power pole (plus 6 meters) High ground means nothing to our multicultural society.

Regards John Seccombe
Aquahort Ltd
Consultation questions

1. Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors. Answer: Yes, do agree fully.

2. Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors. Answer: Yes, do agree.

3. Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors. Answer: Yes, do agree. No further comments.

4. Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim? We would also appreciate your views if you disagree with this proposition. Answer: Yes, do agree. The problem will be getting all the (laudable) aims achieved. Will be very hard to do that I think. It is so very easy (for governments, organisations and the public) to put off till (far too late) tomorrow the (excellent) suggestions to improve tomorrow when the problems of today are so very pressing (and to the forefront of decision makers) and resources (time and money) are often so stretched. Certainly any (public)
reviews of progress will help push progress.

5. Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on? Answer: No comment.

6. Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy current strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy? Answer: Do not know the previous strategy well-enough (in practical terms) to be able to comment.

Regards
Trev

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Trev Margolin (Not "Trevor" thanks)
Ph: [redacted]
Email: [redacted]
National Disaster Resilience Strategy Submission

Several years ago my family and I living in Warkworth were caught at home in a serious storm. Following the storm we were stuck at home for nearly 3 days with no power. However, nearby Orewa where the local radio station is based suffered little effect from the storm. This meant that for 3 days in order to get even the smallest amount of useful information I had to listen to hours of commercial drivel, literally! Furthermore, I had one radio that required 2 AA batteries to operate. The supermarkets and hardware stores sold out of batteries within hours. So now I had to try and save my batteries but not miss the completely random broadcast of important messages. This is a ridiculous scenario for a civil defence emergency. People need to know exactly when to tune to the radio for important messages. Part of your plan should include a specific time when all important messages are broadcast. For example they commence every hour at quarter to the hour. This time should then be advertised/ published/ promoted and used as the national official CD radio watch time. Such an approach was used by shipping for years where all radio transmissions were ceased at 5 past and 35 past the hour so the frequencies were silent for emergency calls to cut through the traffic. SOS signals were always repeated at those times. Makes sense, doesn’t it?

Regards
Gerald Walker
It is really good to see effort being put into improving the resilience of NZ to disasters. The Strategy should go further than just “improving” and “assessing”. There needs to be some compulsory aspects to addressing our Lifelines infrastructure (with associated funding from Central Govt). Otherwise organisations will just focus on short term business goals. We should have a Central Govt dictated Importance Level of certain structures. At present it comes down to individual organisations to choose….which results in many communities having only a few structures that will withstand significant events. There needs to be better planning and preparation for a mega disaster that affects more than just one city.

Regards

Nga mihi

Don Clifford

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Submission – DRAFT National Disaster Resilience Strategy 2018

27 November, 2018

Marie McCarthy – Member of the Resilience to Nature’s Challenges Team; Social Researcher/Scion; Member of the Te Arawa Climate Change Working Party

The following comments have been further developed following our conversation

1. Ring-fencing the scope of the Strategy
   - It is problematic to separate out the social and economic factors from resilience (i.e. per section 1.3) – in very many cases they are the driving factor in the resilience of people and communities
   - For impoverished communities these are the most significant factors in determining their resilience
   - For Maori there are a range of factors that compound in times of disasters- low SES, low educational attainment levels, high health risks, poor housing etc. Maori are confronted with a multi-risk environment, as a consequence of history.
   - To ring fence, neglects to include Maori as a community given the current demographics. Essentially the document becomes and/or only speaks to those who can afford to be resilient and in this way could be viewed as privileging certain sectors of the community. The reference to insurances and business recovery in absence of concern for Maori communities contradicts the Treaty of Waitangi statement and also supports the position of concern being located in a sector of society that does not necessary equate to Maori communities
   - Notably, the ring fencing statement outlines reasons for not extending the strategy as the issues are the portfolio of other government agencies. This would then assume that within the strategy would be specific outputs that align with other agencies making links and contributions to resilience.

2. Resilience needs to be a multi-faceted approach- our Kaikoura case for example viewed resilience to be a multi-faceted plan that was based on the strengthening and further development of their own community (Maori). This development was centred on the marae and as such based on cultural constructs and values. The marae, the whanau and hapu as a social/cultural/economic/political mechanism were viewed to be the strength. As such, development should also include the strengthening of this mechanism

3. The Kaikoura case study illustrated that the marae as an institution was pivotal to the over 1000 tourist and impacted community members survival. Reported reasons for the marae’s success was based on cultural investment into collectivism and cooperative modes of operating, established networks and economic capital of the Ngai Tahu Runanga and leadership

4. The Kaikoura case study illustrated that the cultural cooperative and collective ways of operating were a strength to resilience development and operation

5. Key drivers towards resilience
   - Having a stable economic base (savings) – in order to buy out of a disaster
   - Leadership development within communities that has developed extensive networks
   - Cultural understanding developed within communities – the Kaikoura case study for example identified that cultural competencies and Treaty of Waitangi development programmes were necessary for local government (Council)
- The further strengthening of the marae and whanau – the marae whanau is viewed as an investment in a collective that can mobilise quickly and can operate in ways to respond to disaster. Finding common ground within the community, is one key factor. This for example could be rolled out as a marae, church group, school group etc. The advantage of the marae is not only the facilities but also the group is likely to comprise of a core group of people who are united under forms of commonality
- The cultural institution of the marae, whanau and hapu can be viewed as a resilience mechanism that needs to be strengthened and developed
- Strengthening of local and central government networks – networks (social capital) is recognisably pertinent
- Relationship building needs to also occur between CD and Aid Organisations – there is anecdotal evidence of how Aid Organisations, Council and CD had weak relations with the community to the extent that there existed ‘varying levels of discomfort working with the Maori community’ – there were a range of issues that intersected, however, the need for relationships to be developed and strengthened with Maori communities remains central to resilience.
- Participatory planning processes with Maori communities
- Establishment of strong communications plan
- Plans that take into consideration the inequities
- Learning/educative approaches adopted
- Resilience needs to be viewed beyond the 4rs to include a multi-faceted approach to community development, an approach that seeks to not only develop those who maybe considered privileged but further a plan that lifts the levels of those communities/sub-communities that lack the resources to prepare, to recovery, to regain their lives. For some Maori communities the emphasis on insurances and home mortgages is so far from their own reality, that we need to be thinking about how the government may intend a response.

- Unequal inputs for equal outcomes - policies need to be developed that take cognisance of the unevenness that exists within society – this would impact resource distribution, the nature of good governance that has Maori representation, local and central government relationships, what safe affordable housing looks like, development of educative processes, what environmental security looks like, how health care will respond, whether the resources allocated in disaster scenarios are distributed according to need; what effective information sharing looks like and with whom, nature of institutional partnerships, Maori representation at the decision making table; and ways in which cultural knowledge is included. The above needs to be linked into the success measures.

6. Section on Te Ao Māori and integration into success factors
   - Section 4.3 is theoretically fine, but on its own it is a bit conceptual
   - There is a need to provide more than a description of a Maori worldview – how does this worldview coupled within a contemporary context translate in terms of resilience success measures
   - Doesn’t reflect the reality of some Māori communities, many of which are impoverished (as above, noting that the average personal income of Māori is approximately $22k – versus $30-37k for NZ European; median age of Māori is 24yr, versus NZ European at 41yr)
Would like to see some of this page (and issues relating to social and economic factors, as above) translate through to the objectives and success factors in an explicit way.

Research shows that key factors are: access to and participation in decision-making processes; knowledge and access to learning and resources.

7. Definition of resilience

- The inclusion of ‘absorb’ is potentially problematic (from the point of view of absorbing impacts, taking on damage and disruption). This is a lot to take for an already-impoveryished community. That is, absorbing disruption would equate to the compounding of prior inequities with the current disaster and what entails.
- Some definitions refer to “moving through, moving beyond” – might be more preferable.
- “Recover functionality” is also somewhat problematic – assumes there is functionality to recover, that there was a functional relationship, or a good standard of living to recover. Doesn’t translate well to people who don’t have anything. Functionality also assumes the position that there are functional relationships between the council and Maori community; functionality assumes that Maori communities have a good social network; functionality also assumes that Maori communities are in a position to ‘buy themselves’ out of a disaster event. In our case studies, there was a clear link between social, cultural and economic capital and the capability/capacity to respond.
Submission

To: National Disaster Resilience Strategy submissions
Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
NationalStrategy@dpmc.govt.nz

By: Northland Civil Defence Emergency Management Group

On: The Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy

Introduction

1. The Northland Civil Defence Emergency Management Group (the Group) appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy (Strategy). This submission is made in the interests of promoting safe and resilient communities in Northland and with the Groups functions and roles under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (the Act) in mind.

Background

2. The area covered by the Group and includes the Far North, Whangarei and Kaipara Districts and the coastal marine area to the seaward boundary of 12 nautical miles. The Northland region covers around 5% of the country’s total land area. It is a 260-kilometre-long narrow peninsula, 80 km across at its widest point and just 10 km wide at its narrowest point with over 3,000km of coastline made up of rugged cliffs, sandy beaches and sheltered harbours.

3. Northland is one of New Zealand’s least urbanised region, with around 50% of the population living in urban areas and an average density much lower than the NZ average. As a consequence of this dispersed and often isolated population, the general approach to Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) is one of centralised coordination with localised delivery. The Northland region has a current Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan in place for the period 2016-2021. The plan was developed in accordance with the Director’s Guideline for CDEM Group Plan Review and sets out how the Group will deliver on its functions and roles in relation to the National CDEM plan and the Act.
Submission

4. The Group supports the intent of the Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy but provides the following comments for consideration.

5. **Purpose, visions and goal**: We support these as stated in the Strategy and consider this to be an improvement on the previous 2015 version.

6. **The Sendai Framework**:  
   6.1. We support use of the Sendai Framework in the Strategy and use of clear and measurable targets and timeframes (Page 13). However, if it is anticipated that regions are to compile data to inform reporting against these measures, it would be useful if some guidance was developed for this purpose. For example, targets 2 and 4 would appear to require some form of criteria or measure to ensure consistent data collection. We would also expect a strong link between the Sendai targets and the indicators used to measure progress toward objectives as set out in Section 8.3 and Figure 4. For example, Sendai targets 2 and 4 could be better represented – indicators under ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ in figure 4 could include:
   - the number of / increase in early warning systems developed (such as drought, flood and tsunami warning systems)
   - Resources committed to hazard identification (such as flood and coastal hazard mapping at a regional scale).
   6.2. We understand the indicators in Figure 4 are indicative and will be refined in light of the resilience index. We recommend the Ministry work closely with stakeholders and CDEM groups in particular to develop a clear and practical monitoring and evaluation regime that uses easily measurable indicators (see examples above). We look forward to further consultation on this.

7. **Managing risks**:  
   7.1. We support objectives 1-6 and the associated measures of success (page 24). The Group is especially supportive of a standardised methodology for assessing and managing risks – this could take the form of national and regional risk registers and associated plans / measures for risks with high likelihood and impact. This would bring greater consistency and ability to identify gaps in assessments and or response capacity.
   7.2. One area that could be developed further (probably under Objective 3 or 4) is identifying an ‘acceptable level of risk’ in collaboration with communities particularly those in hazard prone areas – this will be a fundamental element in responding to the effects of sea level rise and we should be as transparent as possible about the limitations on mitigating such risks (E.g. the costs of defending built development from coastal inundation).

8. **Effective response and recovery**:  
   8.1. The Group considers local awareness is vital in response and recovery. We think this should be embedded in the objectives and / or success measures
(probably in Objectives 12, 14 and 15). A measure of success could be added to the effect that: Increased awareness of risk by communities and how to respond to a variety of local disasters / hazards (a measure of this could be the increase in public awareness as measured by repeatable targeted surveys).

9. **Strengthening societal resilience:**

9.1. The Group supports the objectives and measures of success in Section 7 of the Strategy. However we suggest that community vulnerability assessments (using a consistent suite of resilience criteria) at a regional or district scale could be completed by 2025 would be a useful outcome for objective 16. This would identify those communities that are particularly vulnerable to hazards and are a priority for resilience ‘building’ and hazard management planning (this is similar in nature to Objective 18 that relates to infrastructure).

10. **Timeframes for objectives**

The Group consider the measures of success for a number of Objectives could be more ambitious in terms of the target timeframe – most aim for a completion date of 2030. We consider that the sector is sufficiently advanced that many of these could be brought forward. Our recommendations are as follows:

- Objective 1: we consider an agreed standardised methodology for assessing disaster risk could be developed by 2025 and widely used by 2030.
- Objective 2: this measure could be brought forward to 2025 as there are no significant impediments to the development of governance / organisational structures.
- Objective 3: 2030 seems an inordinately long timeframe for development of a plain English lexicon for risk. There is enough knowledge / expertise to start this immediately with a completion date of 2020.
- Objective 4: The climate change debate is urgent and should be progressed as a priority. We note in many places this has already started and the Ministry for the Environment has developed a range of guidance on the subject – we therefore suggest a completion date of 2025 for this objective.
- Objective 7: Again we consider elements of this measure could be brought forward, particularly those relating to engagement with iwi. A goal to implement this measure by 2022 seems realistic.
- Objective 8: we see strengthening national leadership as a priority. A date of 2025 seems overly slow given much implementation of the other objectives will rely on this happening (E.g. developing national standards for emergency management). We strongly recommend this be achieved by 2020 and be prioritised.
- Objective 9: A target date of 2025 seems too long given the importance of this objective and that much of the expertise / knowledge to achieve this objective is available now. Clarifying roles and functions will be critical to effective
response and it should therefore be prioritised and the completion date brought forward to 2020.

- Objectives 13 – 16: The Group consider the timeframes for these objectives could be brought forward to 2025 on the basis there has been good progress to date and the capability is available at regional and district levels.

The other objectives tend to be ongoing and in the nature of continuous improvement and the 2030 date seems appropriate.

**Conclusion**
Subject to the comments above, the Group supports the Proposed Strategy. However, we note it is high-level and much more detail will be required for effective implementation, particularly in relation to the actions needed and clear allocation of roles. We see leadership and clear, practicable implementation planning as the key to an effective emergency management system.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Proposed Strategy and look forward to working with the Ministry on implementation.

Signed_______________________  Dated________________

On behalf of the Northland CDEM Group
21 November 2018

National Disaster Resilience Strategy submissions
Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6145

NATIONAL DISASTER RESILIENCE STRATEGY SUBMISSION

Introduction

1. The Dunedin City Council (DCC) welcomes the opportunity to provide feedback on the new National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

2. The DCC, recognising its responsibilities under Section 64(1) of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 to plan and provide for civil defence emergency management within its district, carry out and promote effective and integrated emergency and risk management that covers all phases of emergencies.

3. The Dunedin City Council is a member of the Otago Civil Defence Emergency Management (Otago CDEM) Group, which covers the areas of the Central Otago District Council, Clutha District Council, Dunedin City Council, Queenstown-Lakes District Council and Waitaki District Council. The DCC has communicated with Otago Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, who have confirmed their overall support for the new strategy.

4. Much of Dunedin’s land area is hilly, resulting in geographical separation of the many communities and the possibility of their isolation in emergencies. Dunedin city also has significant low-lying suburbs, with high groundwater levels that are highly susceptible to surface water build-up during prolonged rainfall and experience a higher probability of liquefaction during Earthquakes.

5. The DCC supports the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy in its entirety and notes that, through the Dunedin Community Boards the DCC has already begun a community driven, ground-up approach to emergency management and resilience.

6. The submission questions as stated by the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management are set out below, followed by the DCC’s response.

Submission

7. Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

The DCC agrees with the proposed purpose, vision and goals set out in the draft strategy. The proposed vision and goal provides a high-level statement that fits with the purposes of emergency management plans and Council strategies and plans. The DCC also supports aligning the strategy with the four wellbeing capitals as it supports the framework of the four capitals.
8. Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

The DCC agrees with the proposed priorities.

9. Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

The DCC agrees with the proposed objectives and success factors set out in the strategy. The DCC recommends linking the final strategy (Appendix 1) and objectives back to the wider context and the four capitals of the LSF. This would clarify how the strategy itself, and the 18 deliverables, are supporting the disaster response preparedness as well as the New Zealand’s wellbeing. This would also allow alignment and integration with other national strategies, government priorities and initiatives.

The DCC notes certain objectives will impact on local councils, for example objectives 5 and 18.

10. Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim? We would also appreciate your views if you disagree with this proposition.

The DCC agrees with having a broad range of stakeholders involved in governance and is already encouraging and supporting broad stakeholder involvement in disaster resilience.

11. Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?

The DCC and Otago CDEM have been working with local communities of interest to develop relevant and practical community response plans. Community board areas have existing plans that are being reviewed and will align with the strategy. We are already seeing benefits in terms of the level of engagement in planning and preparedness. The DCC also supports the move to refocus on the wellbeing. This aligns with the DCC’s strategic framework.

12. Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy current strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?

None were identified.

Conclusion

13. The DCC looks forward to reading the finalised National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

Yours faithfully

Dave Cull
Mayor of Dunedin
Submission to;
The Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
On the;
Draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

From; The Mayor and Councilors of the Thames Coromandel District Council.

Thames Coromandel District Council is one of the most affected regions in New Zealand when it comes to primarily weather related events that impact on the Council, residents and visitors to the Peninsula.

Since 2013 the District has experienced 27 weather related emergency events, of these 26 have been non declared with one declaration.

Council has its own Emergency Management Unit and is the administrating authority to a three Council (TCDC, Hauraki, Matamata/ Piako) Civil Defence activity (Thames Valley Emergency Operating Area)

Community resilience in an emergency is a high priority for the Council and to date, out of the 30 ‘vulnerable’ communities located mainly within the coastal environment on the Peninsula, 17 Community Response Plans have been completed or commenced with 12 planned for implementation by 2020.

Thames Coromandel District Council welcomes and supports the draft strategy and contributes the following submission:

Submitted on behalf of the Mayor Sandra Goudie

Garry Towler
District Manager
Emergency Management
TCDC Civil Defence Controller
Thames Coromandel District Council
1- Thames Coromandel District Council supports the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy.

The experiences New Zealand has had in recent times, the introduction of the global Sendai Framework and the overall maturity of emergency management this country has achieved necessitates a revised and broader national strategy be implemented.

2- TCDC agrees with the priorities of the proposed strategy in principal

Priorities as referenced in section 5, page 23 refer to planning documents such as District and Long Term Plans. To influence these and make it a priority of the strategy will need to involve many partners; Local Government, SOLGUM, infrastructure industry and a number of Ministries.

The objectives as outlined on page 24 describe a 12 year timeframe for community and partner discussion and acceptance.

Thames Coromandel District Council believe this timeframe, at acceptance level only, will lead to another decade of debate before formal implementation of the priorities is imbedded in the Council and Government planning processes.

The strategy states in objective; 16 page 28 that by 2030 local authorities have adopted strategic objectives aimed at building resilience. This is inconsistent with the objectives as outlines on page 24

Council recommend the Strategy bring this priority forward and engage much earlier with all partners in order to better align with existing initiatives and discussions already taking place.

The draft strategy refers to types of resilience on page 17 and comments at the base of the page reflect a number of comments that follow on pages 21, 23 and 27 that relate directly to core council infrastructure asset management as it relates to community well being and resilience/recovery.

The strategy states that measures need to be in place to monitor this broad area yet none are presented, even as a guide for Councils to understand the thinking behind this.

Council also believe this draft strategy has overtures of the introduction of ‘League Tables’ as a form of measuring council performance, if so, Thames Coromandel District Council is concerned that a global measuring table to determine poverty and infrastructure assets at a local level is not appropriate.

Council seeks to see a draft suite of measures be included in the strategy to provide clarity to the social resilience section.

Thames Coromandel District Council supports all of the objectives as presented on page 26. A professional, well trained and well resourced emergency management system is vital.

Overall Thames Coromandel District Council supports the draft strategy.
Marlborough CDEM Group

Response to the Draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy

Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback on the draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy: Rautaki Manawaroa Aituā ā-Motu (the Strategy). As one of the smallest CDEM Groups, and one that has been engaged in response and recovery from the November 2016 earthquake and other events, we believe that our views will add value to the development and implementation of the Strategy.

General comments

We welcome the development of the Strategy and the broad focus it takes on resilience, with the need for active engagement of organisations, communities and individuals. Having said this, we consider that the Strategy would benefit from a stronger emphasis on the fact that resilience is not an end-point or a static state. We also suggest a degree of caution in implying that resilience means that people should aim to ‘thrive’ in a crisis and continue to do so thereafter. It is unreasonable to expect all affected people and systems to be resilient to all events.

We note the change in language from the currently-used ‘emergency’ to ‘disaster’ and have some concerns about use of this term. The word ‘disaster (irrespective of how it is defined in the Strategy), carries with it implications of a catastrophic event. Many of the events we are involved in at a local level are not disasters, but nonetheless test the resilience of people, systems and structures.

If the Strategy is designed for the CDEM sector, it is important that this is reinforced throughout the document. At present, the document repeatedly refers to ‘we’ without necessarily being clear who that is. In addition, the broad focus on a range of social and economic factors could be construed as indicating that CDEM is intended to be responsible for those aspects of resilience.

The Strategy would benefit from robust editing; as currently worded it is repetitive, contains tortuously long sentences and considerable jargon (e.g. ‘probabilistically’, ‘risk savvy’) that limits its accessibility beyond a very limited audience. Terms such as ‘directive leadership’ need to be explained, and a rationale provided for their use.

The Strategy makes statements that are apparently factual (e.g. page 41, item 11) but does not provide evidence to support those statements. For example, the statement that people will accept increased cost for long-term benefit (i.e. reduced risk) is tenuous at best.

Finally, while the vision, goal and priorities of the Strategy are laudable, there needs to be considerable financial and social investment to achieve these goals/priorities. The commitment to the Strategy needs to come from all government sectors.

Our response to the consultation questions, and a table of more detailed comments, are attached.
Please feel free to contact me if you would like to discuss any of the issues raised in this response.

Yours sincerely

Brian Paton  
*Group Manager*  
Marlborough CDEM Group
Consultation questions

Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

We question the extent to which this document is in fact a strategy. A strategy is defined as a ‘plan of action’, but much of the document is commentary and description, and aspirational rather than focused on action. Although the Strategy clearly sets out its desired outcomes and outcome measures, there is no plan of action by which those outcomes can be achieved.

Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

As worded, it is hard to disagree with the priorities of the proposed Strategy. Our concern is that the priorities are presented at such a high (i.e. aspirational) level, that they risk being ineffective outside a very narrow context.

Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

See specific comments below.

Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim?

We would also appreciate your views if you disagree with this proposition.

We support a broad range of stakeholders as part of a governance structure for the Strategy’s implementation, bearing in mind the challenges in gaining broad representation within a workable structure. It is, however, critical that a governance structure has the ability to be effective and is not limited to government agencies.

Having said this, the Strategy is unclear about exactly what is being governed. The way in which the draft Strategy is written provides little indication of why governance is needed. This could result in increased reporting requirements for CDEM Groups, without achieving the desired change.

Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?

It is good to see a focus on resilience and the acknowledgment that this involves all of society.

Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?

The draft resilience strategy should support the national CDEM strategy by recognising that resilience is an evolving process that is impacted by, and impacts on, each of the 4Rs.
### Specific comments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td></td>
<td>Define ‘risk’. Stakeholders commonly confuse risk and hazard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.2 para 2</td>
<td>The statement that ‘we have reached a level of maturity’ should be supported by evidence. How has this been assessed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.2 para 8</td>
<td>We recommend qualifying the statement ‘we will have all the information we will need to make the smartest choices’. Often we will not have all the information we need, and in hindsight our choices may not have been the best. We will continue to make the smartest choices at the time based on what we know (despite that information being incomplete) and the resources available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.3 para 1</td>
<td>The ring-fence is important and is well-stated. However, the Strategy would benefit from repeating the ring-fence throughout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Para 3</td>
<td>Include ‘wellbeing and prosperity’ for consistency with previous statements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Suggest caution in being seen to imply that wellbeing is CDEM responsibility alone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>This figure is overly-simplistic. A community that is perceived as highly resilient may in fact be severely impacted and may not recover well, just as a community that is not considered resilient may in fact function well in recovery. The diagram also suggests a similar start point; some individuals or communities go into a disaster event already ‘in crisis’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Para 11</td>
<td>The Strategy asserts the usefulness of a particular model without being convincing or giving any indication of the costs / benefits of using this model, or of its applicability across communities and cultures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Model</td>
<td>We recommend that spirituality be included in cultural resilience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Para 6</td>
<td>The statement that various sectors need to be ‘joined up’ has been a catchphrase in central government for at least a decade (e.g. whole-of-government, all-of-government, joined-up thinking, cross-agency). It is unclear whether this statement is directed primarily at MCDEM in terms of working with other government organisations; at government organisations needing to work with MCDEM and CDEM Groups, or towards CDEM Groups. The way in which the need for collaboration and cooperation is presented in the draft Strategy, suggests that the CDEM sector is lagging behind the rest of government. CDEM Groups already need to work collaboratively to achieve</td>
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<tr>
<td>Para</td>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<td>------</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>This section could be strengthened by including a focus on the dynamic nature of risk and resilience; we are constantly learning. Further, we are unlikely to reach an endpoint where we can say that we have achieved all that is set out here – we’re not starting from a blank slate, with all parties on an equal footing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Objective 5</td>
<td>We are cautious about the apparent assumption that communities will accept the cost of reducing risk. Not all communities will see this as a priority, particularly those that have immediate socio-economic needs, or where risk-reduction conflicts directly with cultural values.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Para 3</td>
<td>The reference to the 4Rs should note that FENZ also work within the 4Rs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Para 5</td>
<td>We note the reference to maintaining pace with social media. The necessary constraints on social media use by government organisations mean that we are not operating in the same environment as the news media and influential private individuals. These constraints should not, however, prevent us from effectively using social media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Objective 7</td>
<td>We support this statement and would like to see it reflected across government. However, the definition of ‘success’ fails to recognise that not all people are receptive to information before / during an emergency, and CDEM Groups are not the only source of information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Objective 8</td>
<td>This objective needs both clarification and a definition. Directive leadership is only one style of leadership; where is the consensus that this is the most appropriate leadership style for MCDEM and/or CDEM Groups? How will directive leadership result in a consistent standard of care?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Objective 9</td>
<td>Objective 9 relates primarily to the public sector, and would benefit from reflecting the fact that the government policy and planning is more effective when it also reflects the dynamics of the private and community sectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Para 3</td>
<td>It’s great to see the acknowledgment that not everyone has the same capacity to engage, prepare or become resilient to the same level. It may be also useful to reflect that fact that some people will choose not to engage or be prepared, or will be unfamiliar with emergency management in New Zealand. Emergency planning should not discriminate against those individuals.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
| 27   | Para 4    | For some people an emergency will become a disaster and will threaten their prosperity and/or their wellbeing. We are concerned that this goal seems to be directed towards removing all vulnerability, without acknowledging that we are all
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Final para</td>
<td>The phrase ‘build back better’ does not sit well with the working definition of resilience on page 15, which refers to adaptation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Objective 14</td>
<td>There is a significant difference between people who thrive amidst change and those who thrive through a period of crisis. We are concerned that statements such as this will act to decrease resilience, by sending a message that struggling to get through in a crisis is somehow shameful. This may reduce the ability of people to seek support, impact on their recovery and ultimately reduce resilience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>8.1 para 3</td>
<td>We feel some caution about the statement that stakeholders can demand greater accountability and responsiveness from authorities and service providers. Simply demanding accountability and responsiveness do not necessarily result in better outcomes or response. In addition, demands are not necessarily realistic nor informed; perhaps what we are seeking is for people and organisations to be able to make informed demands. Further, CDEM Groups and their partners are unlikely to be able to provide the level of response that will be demanded by some in a large scale event (e.g. an Alpine Fault event).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Para 8</td>
<td>It is inaccurate to refer to social media as providing a new generation of engagement; social media has been in use for between 20 and 40 years (depending on definition).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>8.3 para 1</td>
<td>The statement about the desired impact of government policy needs to be supported by a reference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Outputs</td>
<td>The number of networking events is a poor example of an output indicator. Frequency, attendance or location may be more useful examples. The example of ‘grab and go’ kits distributed raises the expectation that CDEM Groups are responsible for this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Outcomes</td>
<td>For a useful example of outcomes in recovery (closely linked to resilience) see the Canterbury Wellbeing Index. <a href="https://www.cph.co.nz/your-health/canterbury-wellbeing-index">https://www.cph.co.nz/your-health/canterbury-wellbeing-index</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Future proof</td>
<td>This paragraph makes no sense without further explanation of ‘future proofing’ in relation to new purchases. Although the words ‘wherever possible’ are used, it is likely that this is an option only available to those with reasonable levels of...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Para 2</td>
<td>As currently worded, this statement simply asks that a new ‘buzzword’ (i.e. resilience) be included in organisational plans. There is little point in requiring ‘resilience’ to be part of organisational planning, unless those plans include action. We suggest that this be referred to as ‘disaster or emergency resilience’ or similar, to focus back on the purpose of the Strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Understand your risk</td>
<td>This section could usefully refer to the local CDEM Group Plans. Without that reference, we are potentially asking communities to repeat work that has already been undertaken, on their own. Issues such as long-term planning for communities could suggest using local / regional authority planning documents as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Item 11</td>
<td>Check the fit of this statement with page 19 (para 6) in reference to silos. This statement should be supported by a reference to evidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Item 1</td>
<td>We understand the need to significantly increase personal, community and organisational resilience. This paragraph fails to account for the fact that some people will be less resilient (in terms of preparedness) as a result of factors such as age, disability, poverty and their resilience may be better served by knowing how to seek help in an emergency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Item 2</td>
<td>It is good to see the acknowledgment that building community resilience is resource intensive. It may be helpful to include the importance of this as a multi-agency effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Item 1</td>
<td>Social uses of technology are important but we do need to acknowledge that for some people, and in some situations, this is not the best way to engage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Item 4</td>
<td>The term ‘radical transparency’ needs to be defined and an explanation offered as to why this particular approach is recommended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Item 7</td>
<td>This statement needs to be clarified. Accountability is not simply achieved by increased reporting mechanisms, which often lead to perverse incentives. Unless accountability is implemented in a way that is meaningful to stakeholders, it is no more than jargon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>General</td>
<td>Is it useful to include a major emergency event as a wild card? An Alpine Fault quake or similar event would dramatically change the world in which we operate, so fits into the ‘wild card’ definition.</td>
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</table>
National Disaster Resilience Strategy submissions
Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6145

To whom it may concern,

Please find attached a submission from the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group concerning the draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

Yours sincerely

Tom Cloke
Taranaki CDEM Group Chair
# Taranaki CDEM Group Submission, National Disaster Resilience Strategy Draft for Consultation

## General comments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comment</th>
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<tr>
<td>The front end of the document is very wordy – the key vision, strategy and objectives should be right at the front of the document, but the clear and simple overview is relegated to Appendix 1.</td>
<td>This strategy is the ‘song-sheet’ that everyone in the CDEM sector needs to be singing from so put it up front. Everything else is just explanation and expansion upon that so belongs afterwards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We agree with the three priorities laid out in the plan of managing risks, effective response and recovery, and strengthening societal resilience.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| There are four different articulations of the strategic vision throughout the document.  
   1. 2. Our vision: a safe and prosperous nation (page 9)
   4.1 Vision of a resilient nation (page 14)
   Vision of a resilient New Zealand (page 21)
   5. Our Vision: New Zealand is a disaster resilient nation that acts proactively to manage risks and build resilience in a way that contributes to the wellbeing and prosperity of all New Zealanders (page 34 – Appendix 1)  
Which vision is the correct one?  
Our suggestion is the fourth iteration and shortened where necessary to A Disaster Resilient Nation | Clarity and conciseness. |
| There is also more than one articulation of goals. This needs to be clarified. Page 14: Goal – a resilient future  
Page 34: Our goal - To strengthen the resilience of the nation by managing risks, being ready to respond to and recover from emergencies, and by empowering and supporting individuals, organisations and communities to act for themselves and others, for the safety and wellbeing of all.  
This goal is actually three goals in one sentence – why not separate them into three goals? | Clarity and conciseness |
Where are the four R’s? only risk reduction, response and recovery are mentioned in any detail in the strategy. Is resilience now the replacement R for readiness? The draft strategy refers to disaster planning and preparedness in relation to section 7 – strengthening societal resilience. There is no mention of the special challenges faced by the rural sector with regards to disaster resilience either in the Appendix 3 Analysis of our current state as a baseline for this strategy nor anywhere else in the document.

Clarify whether the readiness element of the four Rs is being dropped.

There is a tendency in this document to focus on urban resilience at all levels of planning and decision making. The voice of isolated rural communities and the lack of ability of small councils to pay for and maintain resilient infrastructure is not mentioned anywhere.

Funding mechanisms need to be adjusted to enable disaster resilience work to take place equitably across both rural and urban areas.

### Comments by section

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Section number</th>
<th>Paragraph heading</th>
<th>Original text</th>
<th>Suggested change</th>
<th>Reason for change</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Intended audience and use of the Strategy</td>
<td>There is no mention of MCDEM as a user of this strategy and how it relates to your work programmes etc, or how regional CDEM groups need to take this strategy into account when making decisions etc.</td>
<td>It should be recognised that the key users of this strategy are MCDEM and the CDEM Groups around the country, but they are not mentioned in this section.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Our vision: a safe and prosperous nation</td>
<td>The Living Standards Framework and the four capitals should be referred to but not sit in front of the strategy as it confuses things.</td>
<td>This should sit in appendix or further back in the document in a place where the Disaster Resilience Strategy is linked to and contributes to the government’s broader strategies such as this. The four capitals would sit nicely as a focus for strategic recovery planning.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Resilience: a working definition</td>
<td>We really like this explanation of resilience</td>
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<td>Page</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Managing Risks</td>
<td>What we want to see: New Zealand is a risk savvy nation.....</td>
<td>What we want to see: New Zealand is a risk intelligent nation.....</td>
<td>Suggest substituting intelligent for ‘savvy’ as don’t think the informal language is appropriate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Managing Risks</td>
<td>By 2030, communities value and accept having resilience as a core goal for all development, recognising that this may involve higher upfront costs though greater net benefits in the long term; plans, policies and regulations are fit for purpose, flexible enough to enable resilient development under a variety of circumstances, and can be easily adapted as risks become better understood; developers aim to exceed required standards for new development, and may receive appropriate recognition for doing so; earthquake prone building remediation meets required timeframes and standards.</td>
<td>By 2030, communities value and accept having resilience as a core goal for all development, recognising that this may involve higher upfront costs though greater net benefits in the long term; plans, policies and regulations are fit for purpose, flexible enough to enable resilient development under a variety of circumstances, and can be easily adapted as risks become better understood; developers aim to exceed required standards for new development, and may receive appropriate recognition for doing so; earthquake prone building remediation meets required timeframes and standards and the level of remediation required is proportional to the risk.</td>
<td>Small district councils are facing very tough financial decisions due to the requirement for EQ remediation. Important and useful public buildings requiring EQB remediation are now being vacated permanently with no plans for replacement due to a lack of ratepayer funds to remediate or rebuild. Losing public buildings in small communities does nothing to improve community resilience so the decision stop using a building must be entered into carefully. The Taranaki CDEM Group are mindful of other dominant causes of death in the region that far outweigh the potential loss of life from an earthquake induced building collapse (e.g. cardiovascular disease, cancers, suicide, road accidents). These also need positive spending programmes from district councils in order to improve the statistics. With that in mind it is requested that Earthquake Prone Building remediation is treated sensitively and takes into account relative risk.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Page</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Strengthening Societal Resilience</td>
<td>Objective 18 Address the capacity and adequacy of critical infrastructure systems, and upgrade them as practicable, according to risks identified</td>
<td>We believe this objective should be strengthened to: Improve the resilience, capacity, and adequacy of critical infrastructure systems; upgrade them as practicable according to risks identified</td>
<td>To strengthen the objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>8.3.1</td>
<td>Inputs and outputs will be guided by the roadmap of actions that will accompany the National Disaster Resilience Strategy</td>
<td>Where is the roadmap of actions as referred to as accompanying the Disaster Resilience Strategy? Should that be consulted on too?</td>
<td></td>
<td>Clarity</td>
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National Disaster Resilience Strategy
Submission from Regional Hazards Special Interest Group

Response to consultation questions

Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

GENERALLY AGREE

Yes, we broadly agree with the purpose, visions and goal of the proposed strategy. However, a safe and prosperous nation taken at face value would possibly preclude leaving nature to take its course (managed retreat or not rebuilding after disaster) which is not well articulated in the strategy. i.e. under this strategy would a person be encouraged to engineer their way out of coastal erosion?

There are also four different articulations of the strategic vision throughout the document.

- 2. Our vision: a safe and prosperous nation (page 9)
- 4.1 Vision of a resilient nation (page 14)
- Vision of a resilient New Zealand (page 21)
- Our Vision: New Zealand is a disaster resilient nation that acts proactively to manage risks and build resilience in a way that contributes to the wellbeing and prosperity of all New Zealanders (page 34 – Appendix 1)

We suggested that this is clarified, and a single vision statement is adopted. Our suggestion is to use the fourth iteration and shorten where necessary to A Disaster Resilient Nation.

Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

AGREE

Agree with content and order – but they are not clearly stated. They appear to be:

- Identify and monitor risks
- Reduce existing risk levels
- Minimise new risk
- Everyone gets the data and knowledge

Recommend these are extracted and clearly stated at the start of chapter 5 (page 23)
National Disaster Resilience Strategy
Submission from Regional Hazards Special Interest Group

Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

AGREE

Yes we agree with the proposed priorities. We have the following detailed comments to make on the following objectives.

Objective 1

The RHRM SIG agree with this objective.

We would like to see a risks aggregated and viewed at a national level by a designated and accountable ministry or department.

We note that it will require significant investment across smaller and less wealthy territorial authorities to improve their level of hazard information and disaster risk assessment. This is required in order to reach any uniformity or standardisation of methodologies in a useful manner. For example, the recent government decision to provide funding from the Provincial Growth Fund to support the acquisition of LIDAR data across the country was a great decision but it may not have nationwide uptake due to the 50:50 ratio of central to local government funding still creating a significant funding burden on less wealthy local authorities.

Objective 3

The RHRM SIG agree with this objective and believe there needs to be strong central government leadership by a designated and accountable ministry or department on this issue to develop a common language and common operating picture for risk communication. Achieving this objective is reliant on developing common levels of information about risk across the country which will not occur until the issue of regional inequities are addressed. New Zealand is a small nation with a small taxpayer base. The collection of information pertaining to many hazards needs to be led and funded nationally to create economies of scale and to ensure compatibility of data.

Objective 5

The RHRM SIG agree with this objective. We support the intention of developing plans, policies and regulations that enable resilient development. We do note that this objective does not contemplate the treatment of existing development to reduced risks other than for earthquake prone building development. What about managed retreat in the face of sea-level rise or other hazards such as landslide? National legislation and regulation is needed to clearly enable territorial authorities to extinguish existing use rights where necessary in order to save communities from exposure to unacceptable levels of risk.

Additionally we suggest a slight word change. Objective 5 uses phrase “risk-sensitive”. A suggested alternative is “risk-aware”. The basis of the comment is that in analysis “sensitivity” is an undesired property, it means big swings in outcome for small swings in inputs or conditions.
National Disaster Resilience Strategy
Submission from Regional Hazards Special Interest Group

Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim? We would also appreciate your views if you disagree with this proposition.

AGREE

Yes, we agree that a broad range of stakeholders need to be involved in the implementation and governance of the strategy. However, it is also very important to have a clear leading agency with ultimate responsibility for encouraging and supporting other agencies with their implementation and holding them publicly to account if they choose not to keep up with their efforts.

It should be recognised that the key users of this strategy are MCDEM and the CDEM Groups around the country, but they are not mentioned in this section.

Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?

The definition of resilience has merit. Having this strategy now is a very positive step.

Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy current strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?

GAP identified

The devolved model of civil defense planning and implementation has one fatal weakness: Regional resources available do not match regional risk (or national risk arising within each particular region). It is always the nation that pays (insurer of last resort) when a region is overwhelmed by a disaster. A national level disaster reduction funding regime must be developed if the resilience strategy is to have any real world meaning and impact.
GAP identified

Ref Chapter 4.2.4 - Models
When held against the stated key capitals in Chapter 2 (Natural - Social - Human and Physical/Financial) this page 17 model over-represents Social Capital (3 blocks - being Social, Cultural, Governance) and under-represents Human Capital (0 blocks). A more consistent representation can be achieved in this way:

- Rename block 1 to **Human Resilience** (From social) and reword slightly to reflect this
- Rename block 2 to **Social Resilience** (from Cultural) and rework slightly to reflect this

An additional suggestion is to colour code the Page 17 blocks to match the colours in the Four Capitals model.
4 December 2018

Submission on the draft ‘National Disaster Resilience Strategy’

By email to: nationalstrategy@dpmc.govt.nz

Introduction
1. This is a submission from Water New Zealand on the Government's draft ‘National Disaster Resilience Strategy’, hereafter NDRS.

2. Water New Zealand is a national not-for-profit sector organisation comprising approximately 1900 corporate and individual members in New Zealand and overseas. Water New Zealand is the principal voice for the water sector, focusing on the sustainable management and promotion of the water environment and encompassing the three waters: drinking water, waste and storm waters.

3. The Association represents those with an interest in 3 waters infrastructure in New Zealand. Although our submission represents the views of the Association, it may not necessarily reflect the views of all of its members.

Background
4. The traditional characterisation of civil defence processes in New Zealand distinguishes between risk reduction, community readiness, emergency response, and long term recovery. The Ministry of Civil Defence (MCDEM) has progressively adopted a relatively narrow interpretation of its role in implementing the 2002 Act with a focus on community readiness programmes and response aspects. After the Christchurch and Kaikoura earthquakes central government quickly intervened through necessity, as it was obvious MCDEM had no operational capability. This situation led in turn to the 2017 Ministerial Review (Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand), which sought to find a better approach to civil defence and emergency management.

5. Water New Zealand is a member of the Engineering Leadership Forum, which made an extensive and carefully researched submission to the ‘better responses’ enquiry. That submission argued that better responses can be achieved by developing new ‘surge’ support processes to quickly support TLAs and utilities in a disaster; that the MCDEM should be tasked and funded to deliver a national CDEM training programme for both CDEM professionals and prospective volunteers; that minimal requirements on TLAs and utilities for compliance with the Act were essential; and that detailed consideration of a wider range of risk reduction programmes was needed. The submission argued that new approaches were needed to deal with reducing impact – being more resilient, but that otherwise all that was needed was that the Act be implemented properly.

6. In August 2018, the government responded to the 2017 review by announcing five new broad CDEM objectives, but without providing any information on how these would be achieved, nor any associated timelines.
   - Putting the safety and wellbeing of people at the heart of our emergency response system.
   - Strengthening the national leadership of the emergency management system.
   - Making it clearer who is responsible for what, nationally and regionally.
• Building the capability and capacity of the emergency management workforce, including particular focus on development of emergency event controllers.
• Improving information and intelligence system that supports decision making in emergencies.

7. The November 2018 NDRS cabinet paper explains that the CDEM Act (2002) requires the National CDEM Strategy to be regularly updated – with the next refresh due by April 2019. The paper also directs the updated National CDEM Strategy to contain a greater focus on community resilience and be guided by the vision statement ‘New Zealand is a disaster-resilient nation that acts proactively to manage risks and build resilience in a way that contributes to the wellbeing and prosperity of all New Zealanders’.

8. The current National CDEM Strategy has four objectives – awareness and preparedness, reducing risk, enhancing CDEM capability, and enhancing recovery capability. Although being more resilient features everywhere in the plan, the concept has in our view been put into the too-hard basket, while the Treasury Infrastructure Unit started to look more closely as to what being resilient actually meant. In our view, the proactive extension of the plan to specifically include building resilience or to being more resilient is a significant new step as is now discussed.

CDEM Strategy and Resilience Building

9. The New Zealand engineering community has been researching and implementing resiliency-building programmes for decades. The 300 page ‘Wellington after the Quake’ (1995) and the Centre for Advanced Engineering’s major report into Christchurch vulnerability ‘Risks and Reality’ (1997) set out a clear pathway for communities to assess and mitigate in this case earthquake risk. There have been numerous reports since then including extensive review of the volcano hazard in Auckland. Recently there has been a significant increase in our knowledge of historic tsunami events along the east coast and this has informed new initiatives in Napier and elsewhere.

10. These reviews all demonstrate that an effective CDEM system, and an effective community response to disaster, is significantly dependent on the performance of lifeline utilities and critical infrastructure systems. Lifeline utilities include 3 waters, electricity distribution and supply, and telecommunications, and critical infrastructure includes roads, key bridge crossings, harbour facilities and airports.

11. The revised Act (2002) therefore contained obligations on lifeline utilities, as did the National CDEM Plan Order 2015 and associated guide, and the Director’s Guideline for Lifeline Utilities and CDEM Groups 2014. Specifically, the CDEM Act at S59, 60 requires lifeline utilities to ensure they are able to function during and after an emergency to the fullest possible extent, albeit at a reduced level – and to plan for it. The new National CDEM Plan (2015) sets parameters at S57 to 61 for the role of lifeline utilities including the obligation to plan co-operatively, address dependencies and reduce vulnerability. The Act has everything covered, but there has been an unwillingness to enforce its implementation.

12. However, utility performance in disaster can be extremely variable as has been extensively documented. Utility resilience can be impacted by poor governance and thin management capability in a disaster, constraining commercial arrangements, the poor condition of assets, and constraints created by the way the emergency response system deals with complex utility interdependencies. Utility resilience is difficult to predict (or police) without formal independent audit, but this level of oversight has never been considered. The variable performance of utilities was dramatically demonstrated in the Christchurch earthquake. The city’s 3 water system was significantly damaged – as it had never been strengthened to deal with liquefaction of local soils – despite endless advice from experts over prior decades (including the findings of the Risk and Reality report noted previously).
The Orion Energy electricity network had been strengthened and performed extremely well.

13. Complicating the situation is that risks from natural hazards vary significantly across New Zealand and within regions so that resiliency strategy development is therefore inherently a local activity undertaken by TLAs on the basis of local risk assessments and impact analysis. In some areas, for example, tsunami risk is the predominant threat – leading to particular response and resilience building programmes. In some areas it will be the threat of utility disruption leading to recovery and response issues. In other cases, building damage and the threat to life is the predominant issue.

14. Concerns have been expressed about the fragmented ownership and oversight of the infrastructure sector, the lack of any control of standards and technology implementation, and the disparate methods of infrastructure management and operational skills in organisations in both Local Government and privately owned utilities. Best practice infrastructure management depends on the preparation and interpretation of detailed long-term asset plans that are underpinned by accepted standards, practices, and methodologies, and prepared by asset management specialists along with well trained and competent operational staff.

15. Asset management planning can facilitate the identification of critical infrastructure resiliency investments. These are measures taken to save repair costs and minimise economic disruption after earthquake or other natural hazards, and can be quite different from routine maintenance. However, notwithstanding the CDEM Act requirements as discussed, and that resilience building technologies are widely understood by engineers, little effort has been made by infrastructure owners to build more resilient utilities. Instead efforts tend to be focused on critical maintenance, and service expansion. This has created a vast legacy issue across the infrastructure sector – but especially in water supply, sewage and stormwater systems. The state of 3 water systems is such that even in moderate earthquakes, significant delays will be experienced in returning businesses to normal.

16. Up until recently businesses were able to purchase business interruption insurance, but on current trends, and as a result of Christchurch and Kaikoura, most businesses will be unable to afford this in future. The economic impact of disasters will therefore rapidly escalate and may threaten the very survival of cities and communities. We are therefore wholly in favour of the proposed extension of the scope of the NDRS to finally deal with resiliency issues.

17. To assist with this situation, we propose that there needs to be a new focus on the implementation of good engineering practice and conformity of standards across the infrastructure sector in all aspects of infrastructure investment, operation and maintenance and, if necessary, by regulation or statute. In addition, Government needs to develop the capability, perhaps in a new organisation like the proposed Infrastructure Body, to start assessing the situation at a national level, prioritising threats to the economy, develop mitigation strategies to deal with the most serious situations, and to oversee their implementation. This may also include consideration of how to fund resilience building investments. It may also include consideration of how to prioritise a national approach to the rapidly increasing demands from TLAs for assistance in dealing with rising sea levels and the retreat from the coastline.

Conclusions and Recommendations

18. The consultation seeks feedback on the proposed strategy, and whether there are any gaps or challenges not properly addressed.
19. The good performance of lifeline utilities and infrastructure in disaster is the key to an effective response to and recovery from disaster. However, we believe this issue is dealt with in passing and superficially in the NDRS.

20. Our view is that there are numerous ways that utility and infrastructure governance and management can be improved and strengthened.

   a) In the interim, the intent of the CDEM Act 2002 in regard to utilities and infrastructure being as resilient as possible needs to be proactively implemented by TLAs and asset owning utilities.

   b) Proposals for the creation of the new Infrastructure Body are currently being developed by Treasury. A role of the new Body could be the setting of standards for the management and operation of utilities and infrastructure and the proactive development of asset management skills capability in the infrastructure sector generally.

   c) The government also has a major role to play in co-ordinating the understanding of risk and to facilitate the investment in resiliency in utilities and critical infrastructure. The oversight of this activity could also sit within the new Infrastructure Body, or be an emergent new organisation base on the Treasury Infrastructure Unit but separated from Treasury.

21. MCDEM should in our view be funded and resourced to develop a community-focused NDRS with a particular focus on preparedness and response, and in the preparation of materials and programmes for regional CDEM groups to implement.

22. In conclusion, the draft NDRS sets out 18 objectives under three headings - managing risks (surely identifying risks is what is meant), effective response to and recovery from emergency, and strengthening societal resilience. We propose that these be repackaged into three separate programmes:

   a) Risk and Resiliency – potentially part of the new Infrastructure Body

   b) Utility and Infrastructure Governance and Management – potentially part of the new Infrastructure Body

   c) Improving Societal Resilience – MCDEM.

John Pfahlert
Chief Executive
4 December 2018

Via email to: NationalStrategy@dpmc.govt.nz

National Disaster Resilience Strategy Submissions
Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6145

Dear Sir / Madam,

NATIONAL DISASTER RESILIENCE STRATEGY – RAUTAKI MANAWAROA AITUĀ-Ā-MOTU

Thank you for the opportunity to present our submission on the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

We support the Strategy’s vision and goal, and the three main action areas – Manage Risks; Effective Response to and Recovery from Emergencies; and Strengthening Societal Resilience – are a useful framework for the work we are undertaking at the Queenstown Lakes District Council (QLDC) around risk management and building community resilience. Some of the indicators of success are also useful, particularly around community and hapu planning, business continuity, and personal preparedness.

We would, however, like to suggest that the Strategy promote the role of “Citizen Responders”; that is, the contribution of ordinary people during a disaster.1

There are two key opportunities in acknowledging and developing the citizen responder role:

- Citizen responders as engaged participants: many people caught up in a disaster situation have the ability to take on a participatory rather than a passive role. Active participation can potentially reduce the impression that emergency services will be available as soon as, and for as long as, they are needed. This assumption is an issue in developed countries, such as New Zealand, where heavy reliance on formal responders and their affiliated volunteers has developed.

With the growing likelihood of disasters occurring, particularly with climate change impacts, formal response agencies are likely to be overstretched. The Strategy could provide the opportunity for communities and individuals, who are usually the first on the scene, to develop an understanding of how they might respond in a coordinated manner. This is the rationale behind the QLDC’s Community Response Plans. Effectively, these plans provide a framework in which local individuals and households, agencies, organisations, vulnerable populations, and formal responders will work together during and after a crisis.

• Citizen responders as effective support: Citizen responders can be a valuable and skilled resource for formal responders who may not always be on ground immediately. The Strategy could take a broader view of “informal volunteerism” to include the role of “digital volunteers” who are in a position to deliver effective “real-time” communications during emergency situations.

Emphasising the role of citizen responders will strengthen the National Disaster Resilience Strategy by acknowledging the time, knowledge, skills and resources that ordinary people can contribute in times of crisis. It can reduce reliance on formal emergency responders, and build community confidence and resilience.

Please note that this submission reflects the position of officers and has not been ratified by full Council.

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment.

Yours faithfully,

Mike Theelen
Chief Executive
Queenstown Lakes District Council
Engineering Leadership Forum
Submission on the draft ‘National Disaster Resilience Strategy’
5 December 2018

Introduction
1. This is a submission from the Engineering Leadership Forum on the Government’s draft ‘National Disaster Resilience Strategy’, hereafter NDRS.

2. The Forum comprises the CEOs of New Zealand’s professional engineering associations, including Engineering New Zealand, the Association of Consulting Engineers New Zealand, Water New Zealand, Civil Contractors New Zealand, the Institute of Public Works Engineering Australasia (New Zealand Division), the Electricity Engineers’ Association and Concrete NZ. These organisations represent well over 40,000 professional engineers. We would appreciate an opportunity to meet with the DIA/DPMC to discuss our comments.

3. Although our submission represents the views of the Forum, it may not necessarily reflect the views of all of its member organisations on individual issues. In this consultation, several members of the Forum are making their own submissions with a focus on their own areas of speciality and interest.

Background
4. The traditional characterisation of civil defence processes in NZ distinguishes between risk reduction, community readiness, emergency response, and long term recovery (the 4 Rs, for example see the MCDEM Act). The Ministry of Civil Defence (MCDEM) has progressively adopted a relatively narrow interpretation of their role in implementing the 2002 Act with a focus on community readiness programmes and response aspects. After the Christchurch and Kaikoura earthquakes central government quickly intervened through necessity, as it was obvious MCDEM lacked operational capability. This situation led in turn to the 2017 Ministerial Review (Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand), which sought to find a better approach to civil defence and emergency management.

5. The Engineering Leadership Forum made an extensive and carefully researched submission to the ‘better responses’ enquiry. Our submission argued that better responses can be achieved by developing new ‘surge’ support processes to quickly support TLAs in disaster, that the MCDEM should be tasked and funded to deliver a national CDEM training programme for both CDEM professionals and prospective volunteers, that minimal requirements on TLAs and utilities for compliance with the Act were essential, and that detailed consideration of a wider range of risk reduction programmes was needed. The submission argued that new approaches were needed to deal with reducing impact – being more resilient, but that otherwise all that was needed was that the Act be implemented properly.

6. In Aug 2018 the government responded to the 2017 review by announcing five new broad CDEM objectives, but without providing any information on how these would be achieved, nor any associated timelines.
   • Putting the safety and wellbeing of people at the heart of our emergency response system.
   • Strengthening the national leadership of the emergency management system.
   • Making it clearer who is responsible for what, nationally and regionally.
   • Building the capability and capacity of the emergency management workforce, including particular focus on development of emergency event controllers.
• Improving information and intelligence system that supports decision making in emergencies.

7. The November 2018 NDRS cabinet paper explains that the CDEM Act (2002) requires the National CDEM Strategy to be regularly updated – with the next refresh due by April 2019. The paper also directs the updated National CDEM Strategy to contain a greater focus on community resilience and be guided by the vision statement ‘NZ is a disaster resilient nation that acts proactively to manage risks and build resilience in a way that contributes to the wellbeing and prosperity of all NZer’s’.

8. The current National CDEM Strategy has four objectives – awareness and preparedness, reducing risk, enhancing CDEM capability and enhancing recovery capability. Although being more resilient features everywhere in the strategy the concept has in our view been put into the too hard basket, while the Treasury Infrastructure Unit started to look more closely as to what being resilient actually meant. In our view a significant new step in the draft strategy is the specific and proactive inclusion of building resilience and to being more resilient.

CDEM Strategy and Resilience Building

9. The NZ engineering community have been researching and implementing resiliency-building programmes for decades. The 300 page ‘Wellington after the Quake’ (1995) and the Centre for Advanced Engineering’s major report into Christchurch vulnerability ‘Risks and Reality’ (1997) set out a clear pathway for communities to assess and mitigate in this case earthquake risk. There have been numerous reports since then including extensive review of the volcano hazard in Auckland. Recently there has been a significant increase in our knowledge of historic tsunami events along the east coast and this has informed new initiatives in Napier and elsewhere.

10. These reviews all demonstrate that an effective CDEM system, and an effective community response to disaster, is significantly dependent on the performance of lifeline utilities and critical infrastructure systems. Lifeline utilities include 3 waters, electricity distribution and supply, and telecommunications, and critical infrastructure includes roads, key bridge crossings, harbour facilities and airports.

11. The revised Act (2002) therefore contained obligations on lifeline utilities, as did the National CDEM Plan Order 2015 and associated guide, and the Director’s Guideline for Lifeline Utilities and CDEM Groups 2014. Specifically, the CDEM Act at S59, 60 requires lifeline utilities to ensure they are able to function during and after an emergency to the fullest possible extent albeit at a reduced level – and to plan for it. The new National CDEM Plan (2015) sets parameters at S57 to 61 for the role of lifeline utilities including the obligation to plan co-operatively, address dependencies and reduce vulnerability. The Act has everything covered, but there has been an inability to enforce its implementation.

12. However utility performance in disaster can be extremely variable as has been extensively documented. Utility resilience can be impacted by poor governance and thin management capability in disaster, constraining commercial arrangements, the poor condition of assets, and constraints created by the way the emergency response system deals with complex utility interdependencies. Utility resilience is difficult to predict (or police) without formal independent audit, but this level of oversight has never been considered. The variable performance of utilities was dramatically demonstrated in the Christchurch earthquake. The city’s 3 water system was almost completely destroyed – as it had never been strengthened to deal with liquefaction of local soils – despite endless advice from experts over prior decades
The Orion Energy electricity network had been strengthened and performed extremely well.

13. Complicating the situation is that risks from natural hazards vary significantly across New Zealand and within regions so that resiliency strategy development is therefore inherently a local activity undertaken by TLAs on the basis of local risk assessments and impact analysis. In some areas, for example, tsunami risk is the predominant threat — leading to a particular response and resilience building programmes. In some areas it will be the threat of utility disruption leading to recovery and response issues. In other cases building damage and the threat to life is the predominant issue.

14. Further, the engineering profession has concerns about the fragmented ownership and oversight of the infrastructure sector, and especially the lack of control of standards and technology implementation, and the dissipation of infrastructure management and operational skills in asset owning organisations including in Local Government. Best practice infrastructure management depends on the preparation and interpretation of detailed long-term asset plans that are underpinned by accepted standards, practices, and methodologies, and prepared by asset management specialists.

15. More robust new building design requirements and active asset management of existing infrastructure can reduce the impacts of natural hazards and facilitate the identification of critical infrastructure resiliency investments. These are measures taken to save repair costs and minimise economic disruption after an earthquake or other natural hazards, and can be quite different from routine maintenance. However, notwithstanding the CDEM Act requirements as discussed, and that resilience building technologies are widely understood by engineers, little effort has been made by building and infrastructure owners to build more resilient buildings and utilities. Instead efforts tend to be focused on short term economics, critical maintenance, and service expansion. This has created a vast legacy issue across the building and infrastructure sector — but especially in water supply, sewage and stormwater systems, ports and harbour facilities, electricity distribution lines, and in non-structural building components. The state of these systems is such that even in moderate earthquake and/or tsunami, significant delays will be experienced in returning businesses to normal. To mitigate this undesired outcome and reduce the impacts of the known risks to society a fundamental rethink on building design provisions needs to be considered to restrict building designs that do not achieve resiliency objectives.

16. Up until recently businesses were able to purchase business interruption insurance, but on current trends, and as a result of Christchurch and Kaikoura, most businesses will be unable to afford this in future. The economic impact of disasters will therefore rapidly escalate and may threaten the very survival of cities and communities. We are therefore wholly in favour of the proposed extension of the scope of the NDRS to finally deal with resiliency issues.

17. To deal with this situation we propose that there needs to be a new focus on the implementation of good engineering practice and conformity of standards across the infrastructure sector in all aspects of infrastructure investment, operation and maintenance, and if necessary by regulation or statute. In addition Government needs to develop the capability, perhaps in a new organisation like the proposed Infrastructure Body (IBody), to start assessing the situation at a national level, prioritising threats to the economy, develop mitigation strategies to deal with the most serious situations, and to oversee their implementation. This may also include consideration of how to fund resilience building investments. It may also include consideration of how to prioritise a national approach to the
increasing demands from TLAs for assistance in dealing with rising sea levels and the retreat from the coastline, and to put in place procedures to control wasteful expenditures.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

18. The consultation seeks feedback on the proposed strategy, and whether there are any gaps or challenges not properly addressed.

19. The good performance of buildings, lifeline utilities and infrastructure in a disaster is the key to an effective response to and recovery from disaster. However we believe this issue is dealt with in passing and superficially in the NDRS.

20. Our view is that there are numerous ways that utility and infrastructure governance and management can be improved and strengthened.

   a) In the interim, the intent of the CDEM Act 2002 in regard to utilities and infrastructure being as resilient as possible needs to be proactively implemented by TLAs and asset owners.

   b) Proposals for the creation of the new Infrastructure Body are currently being developed by Treasury. A natural and core role of the new IBody could be the setting of standards for the management and operation of utilities and infrastructure and the proactive development of asset management skills capability in the infrastructure sector generally.

   c) The government also has a major role to play in coordinating the understanding of risk and to facilitate the investment in resiliency in buildings, utilities and critical infrastructure. The oversight of this activity could also sit within the new Infrastructure Body, or be an emergent new organisation base on the Treasury Infrastructure Unit but separated from Treasury.

21. MCDEM should in our view be funded and resourced to develop a community - focused NDRS with a particular focus on preparedness and response, and in the preparation of materials and programmes for regional CDEM groups to implement.

22. In conclusion, the draft NDRS sets out 18 objectives under three headings - managing risks (surely identifying risks is what is meant), effective response to and recovery from emergency, and strengthening societal resilience. We propose, that these be repackaged into three separate programmes:

   A. Risk and Resiliency – potentially part of the new Infrastructure Body

   B. Utility and Infrastructure Governance and Management – potentially part of the new Infrastructure Body

   C. Improving Societal Resilience – MCDEM

23. We would be pleased to meet with the DPMC/DIA to discuss our submission further.

**Engineering Leadership Forum**

Contact: Richard Bentley, Secretary
Ph/Email at ___________________________

or Neil Miller at Engineering New Zealand
Ph/Email at ___________________________
5 December 2018

Submission on the Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy

First of all, I would like to congratulate the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management on the draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy document. I am very impressed with the way that it incorporates the priorities of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in a New Zealand context and ties in with the Living Standards Framework and our existing CDEM structure and legislation.

Before I make one suggestion for what I believe could be a potential “gap or challenge” to be addressed in the national strategy, I would like to take the opportunity to briefly introduce myself. My name is Paul Cull and I am originally from Christchurch. I have been living overseas for most of the past twenty-four years, having participated in community development and disaster risk reduction projects during this time. Since 2003 I have been actively involved with the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) programme, and have taught or supervised over 30 CERT and Teen CERT courses in five different countries which have trained more than 600 participants. In 2013 I had the opportunity to complete the FEMA CERT Train-the-Trainer and Programme Manager courses in Emmitsburg – MD, and I am also a Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) through the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM). At the beginning of this year I returned to Christchurch to work full-time on a master’s in emergency management through Massey University, and was awarded a scholarship towards this by the IAEM. Currently I am undertaking research for my thesis, which will focus on the implementation of Community-Based Disaster Response Teams (CBDRT), such as the CERT programme, with a focus on vulnerable groups and communities in developing nations.

Section 6 of the draft strategy discusses the need for “managing whole of society response”, which aligns with the Sendai Framework’s fourth priority of “enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response”, and objective 10 describes the building of the “capability and capacity of the emergency management workforce”, which includes ensuring that “volunteers are appropriately trained, recognised and kept safe in the system”. Section 7 of the strategy highlights the need to integrate “bottom-up grassroots endeavours with top-down policy and programmes that empower, enable and support individuals and communities”, with the corresponding objectives 14 and 15 highlighting the need for community and individual preparedness and mutual help.

As I have had the opportunity to work with grass-roots Community-Based Disaster Response Teams in countries including Belize, Brazil and Guatemala, and have seen the interest expressed in this concept by local communities following such diverse events as the 2017 landslide in Freetown, Sierra Leone and Hurricane Harvey in Corpus Christi,
Texas, I have become convinced that such programmes offer many benefits in the areas of community preparedness, psychosocial resilience, disaster risk reduction education, and the strengthening of existing community groups and activities. I have also seen first-hand how such teams and their members have applied the training that they have received through basic-level 24-hour courses to save lives in situations ranging from traffic accidents to landslides in Rio de Janeiro state.

However, so far in my research I have not found evidence of a similar programme here in New Zealand. I was a member of a Civil Defence / Red Cross Suburban Light Rescue Team in Christchurch back in the 1980s and have watched with interest as these teams have evolved into the highly-trained and dedicated Response Teams of today. It is apparent that the Response Teams will continue to professionalise and become an even more valuable resource for regional emergency management authorities in the future. I have also been interested to see the development of Community Emergency Hubs in the Wellington Region and in Christchurch, although such groups are not trained or equipped to be involved in response activities such as search and rescue or emergency medical or psychosocial care.

Consequently, it does appear that there is a need for grass-roots CBDRTs which are prepared for immediate response following a major disaster, as outlined in the Sendai Framework in article 33 item (d), which refers to the stockpiling of equipment in community centres for immediate rescue and relief, and item (f), which includes the training of disaster response volunteers. Both international and local experience has shown that bystanders will respond immediately and attempt to provide assistance to those around them during a disaster, and it is therefore imperative that basic-level training, similar to that provided by the 24-hour CERT course, is made available to diverse segments of society in both urban and rural communities, including the priority groups specified under item (a) of article 36 of the Sendai Framework.

I do wonder, however, if the widespread adoption of basic CBDRT training throughout New Zealand will require something of a “culture shift” among the emergency services and emergency management authorities, where the emphasis over recent years has been on increasingly higher levels of professionalisation for both full-time and volunteer first responders. The wholesale implementation of Community-Based Disaster Response Teams, which have minimal levels of training, entry criteria and time commitment, could appear to be a move in the opposite direction, although overseas experience, such that of the Los Angeles Fire Department, has proven that such teams can successfully integrate with and augment the capabilities of the professional emergency services and also provide an essential response resource in the event of a major disaster.

It is for these reasons that I would like to propose that consideration be given to including a specific mention of the importance of Community-Based Disaster Response Teams in the National Disaster Resilience Strategy, possibly under objectives 10, 14 or 15 or in the accompanying text.

Yours faithfully,

Paul Cull, CEM
Tena koe

Te Runanga o Nga Wairiki – Ngati Apa is the Post Settlement Governance Entity (PSGE) for the Nga Wairiki and Ngati Apa people whose ancestral lands stretch across three districts, namely Manawatu, Rangitikei and Whanganui. We have three Marae all in the Rangitikei District. All of these Marae were badly flooded in 2004, and our Iwi responded with a significant effort, and we worked with the Government at that time to implement a number of task force green teams that helped across Rangitikei with the clean-up. We learnt a lot from this experience, and the more recent flooding in 2015 saw a stronger pan Iwi approach with a coordination point based at Te Oranganui in Whanganui. We have effectively built a ground up response to the increasing number of flooding events. Since 2015, we have supported the efforts of Chris Kumeroa and Whanganui Iwi to consolidate these learnings and build an Iwi response system that integrates with the formal Civil Defence system. Through this pathway, I am hopeful that the role of Iwi in responding to crisis in our communities will be better recognised and supported by central government. We believe we have a lot to offer in this space, and better systems that are inclusive of our potential contribution, and resourcing so that we can be as prepared as possible for future disaster events would be helpful and beneficial for our communities.

I attended the presentation that was led by Nga Tangata Tiaki o Whanganui, and Chris Kumeroa, on 29 November in Whanganui, which was attended by the DPMC. This presentation outlined the aspirations of Whanganui Iwi, supported by other Iwi including Nga Wairiki – Ngati Apa, for the role of Whanganui Iwi to be recognised and supported. It was presented in collaboration with the CD leadership based in Whanganui. I am aware that this presentation has been submitted as part of a submission to the national strategy, and we strongly endorse this.

In direct response to the strategy, from our own Iwi perspective, we will always state that we want Iwi to have a role in the co-design of important strategies that are a priority to our whanau, hapu and Iwi. We can see that there is substantial “Maori” content in the strategy, that our practitioners and advocates can work from to increase the influence that we can have in this space, however genuine co-design remains our firm aspiration, and there is no evidence of this in the document. We have forums now like the Iwi Chairs Forum which is the best collective voice for our Iwi groups in Aotearoa, which seeks to engage with the Crown advocating for the exclusive role of Iwi and hapu as the Treaty partner. We are quite cynical of the Crown’s approach to group us as “Maori” as this is consistently telling us that the Crown will exercise full and exclusive control, and will choose which “Maori” voices to listen to. We therefore do not trust and support this approach to characterising the Treaty relationship, and we want to be clear on this as an Iwi group. This is our political stance.

On the ground, we will continue to work within our pan Iwi system, and with leaders like Chris Kumeroa, to develop our Iwi disaster response system. There is a compelling bottom up process going on here that will continue to grow and integrate at the local level in response to the increasing number of flooding events, and we will continue to support this growth and integration. However, it would be good to see adequate resourcing coming into this system from government sources sooner rather than later to expedite its growth and development, with the object being to be as prepared as possible before the next event.

Heoi ano
Kia ora

We are writing to you, to clarify officially that Community Networks Aotearoa fully support the submission on the National Disaster Resilience Strategy made by our membership group SEWN (Social Equity and Wellbeing Network) from Christchurch and we ask that you officially note that support for their submission.

Best regards

Ros Rice

Ros Rice

Executive Officer

Community Networks Aotearoa

Te Hapori Tuhononga o Aotearoa

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“A Collective Voice Supporting Local Communities”
To: Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
   NationalStrategy@dpmc.govt.nz

Subject: PROPOSED NATIONAL DISASTER RESILIENCE STRATEGY

Submission from: Ruapehu District Council
   Private Bag 1001
   TAUMARUNUI 3964

Point of Contact: Janelle Coradine
   STRATEGIC ANALYST
   Email: info@ruapehudc.govt.nz
   Phone: 07 895 8188

Council does not wish to speak in support of its submission.

1 INTRODUCTION
The Ruapehu District Council (RDC) thanks the Minister of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, and the Ministry for the opportunity to make a submission on the Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

1.1 Background of Ruapehu District
The Ruapehu District is one of New Zealand’s largest districts by land area of which, 36% is Crown owned. It has a small and dispersed population base with many diverse settlements that are scattered throughout a wide geographical area of 6,730 square kilometers (673,019ha). The area is predominantly rural and includes the Tongariro and Whanganui National Parks, a large portion of the Whanganui River and many tributaries.

2 COMMENTS
RDC commends the Government on the work undertaken thus far and the overall direction of the proposed strategy.
2.1 Communities throughout New Zealand have become increasingly challenged by natural events as recognised in the proposed strategy, and a holistic approach to preparedness, resilience, recovery and ultimately survival is paramount.

2.2 Structure
Whilst resilience is a vital element in reducing the impact of disasters, the overarching principle of recovery, (the speed at which a community recovers for example) remains at the core of disaster related thinking. RDC therefore believes the title of the strategy should more appropriately reflect this.

2.2.1 The document is extensive in content. RDC feels though that the strategy itself is not initially identifiable, and the document is at times prescriptive and thus blurs the distinction between a strategy and a plan.

2.2.2 RDC recommends reviewing the content of the strategy and ensuring a clear distinction is made between the strategic intent and planning. Additionally, an overview of the strategy such as that at appendix 1 on page 34, should be at the forefront of a strategic document.

2.3 Application
Resilience is pivotal in reducing the impact of disasters. RDC wishes to highlight that funding of local authorities has traditionally been focused on recovery.

2.3.1 Meaningful resilience building will require meaningful resourcing. This is especially the case for small authorities challenged by low rate payer bases, limited internal resources, widely dispersed populations and large territorial land masses.

2.4 Communities, whanau, individuals
Whilst RDC commends the aspirational and inclusive nature of the proposed strategy, the strategy in its current form is not easily accessible for many sectors of society.

2.4.1 The document is relatively sizable and academic in nature. It is 46 pages long and includes for example, logframes and theories of change under sections 8. As articulated in the strategy, it is hoped that “individuals, households and whanau” will be able to “use it to prompt thinking” as per section 1.4 of the strategy, in its current iteration, this will be a significant challenge.

2.4.2 RDC encourages the Ministry to give consideration as to how the strategy will become practical and realisable in light of the capabilities of all individuals, households and whanau.

3 RECOMMENDATIONS
RDC acknowledges the work that has resulted in the proposed strategy and commends the aspirations it sets forth for a safer more resilient New Zealand.

3.1 RDC encourages the Minister and Ministry to give consideration to the practical application of the strategy to ensure its aspirations are realisable. This includes, but is not limited to, resilience funding, ensuring the strategy is engaging and appropriate for each target audience - especially at the individual, household and whānau levels, and clearly delineates between its strategic and planning aspirations.

3.2 RDC also recommends that ‘National Resilience and Recovery Strategy’ would be a more appropriate name.
In the Matter of
The National Disaster Resilience Strategy
Draft for Consultation

Submission by
Waimakariri District Council

7 December 2018
Person for Contact: Geoff Meadows, Policy Manager
General Submission

The Waimakariri District Council welcomes the opportunity to submit on the draft-for-consultation National Disaster Resilience Strategy. As a key local government respondent to the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, this Council is well placed to comment on minimising risks and response capabilities following natural disasters.

The draft Strategy proposes a three-pronged approach (pages 2, 7, and 34) of i) managing risks, ii) effective response and recovery, and iii) strengthening societal resilience. This three-pronged approach is sensible and supported by this Council.

The Strategy then goes on to be internally inconsistent with itself by ring-fencing the scope of the Strategy (1.3 on page 8) with the statement that “while acknowledging broad societal resilience is desirable….this Strategy is confined to the disaster aspects of resilience”, confining the Strategy to focus on building a culture of resilience. This reads as though there is a two and a quarter-pronged strategic approach, and that one of the forks of the three prongs is broken.

It would be better not to have the statements throughout the document of a three-pronged approach if patently one of the prongs is half-hearted and piece-meal. Alternatively the National Strategy should include measures and directions towards strengthening societal resilience so that there is a truly three-pronged approach.

Specific Points of Submission

- Key terms on pages 4 provides a different definition for the term “hazard” from that of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 (section 4 (c)). It is recommended the Strategy uses common definitions with its parent Act.

- The paragraph at the top of page 9, stating that New Zealand holds up well in most categories over the past decade in global indices, is not consistent with the OECD Environmental Performance Review for New Zealand (2017), which points out this country’s increase in Green House Gas emissions, freshwater contamination, and widespread biodiversity decline. Similarly, New Zealand’s productivity remains well below that of most other OECD nations, and has continued to decline steadily in the 20 years from 1995 to 2015 (source: OECD (2017), Economic Policy Reforms). It is suggested that this first paragraph is redrafted to use more realistic language;

- The reference to the Living Standards Framework (2.1 on pages 9 and 10) is supported. It is a sensible framework for good public policy, linking risk and resilience and future well-being to the four capitals;

- It is pleasing to see that the Sendai Framework has been a key influence in the development of the Strategy, particularly in acknowledging Sendai’s 3 key ideas of building resilience into everyday processes, reducing the underlying drivers of risk, and that everyone has a role of reducing risk;

- The overarching goal of resilience (chapter 4), and the attempt to come up with a working definition (4.2 on page 15), is supported. The model of a Resilient Nation to protect the four capitals from shocks and stresses is sound, except for the generally accepted distinction between social resilience and cultural resilience. This distinction
is hard to understand; every social system has a cultural underlay, and all cultural impacts are a sub-set of social impacts;

- The hierarchy of priorities (4.4 on page 19, and expanded in appendix 2 and 3 on pages 35 to 40), places individuals and families at the base of the hierarchy, which is a sensible approach in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. Households need to be in functional order before businesses, organisations and communities start to become functional;

- In Managing Risks (Chapter 5 on page 23-24) it is pleasing to see the recognition that poor development, land-use, and building choices have inadvertently contributed to the national risk profile. The potential to significantly reduce disaster costs in the future needs a far more strategic vision than that which is outlined in chapter 5. For example the current Building Code and land-use planning framework need significant overhaul, and a National Disaster Resilience Strategy requires much greater imagination and specific recommendations as a blueprint for reform in these two important fields;

- The Effective Response to and Recovery from Emergencies (chapter 6 on pages 25-26) has responded to the 2017 Ministerial Review only recently, and it is appropriate that these responses are given the opportunity to bed down;

- As mentioned in the general remarks above, the chapter on strengthening societal resilience (Chapter 7 on pages 27-28) is necessarily broad and platitudinous. As a prong of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy, it better sits as compendium information, rather than as one of three major planks of the Strategy. Alternatively the strategy could provide specific measures and strategic direction in this area;

- It will be important to hold to the formal reporting (8.3.4 on page 32) to monitor progress of the Strategy. The Commitment to Action section (pages 30 and 31) is highly commendable.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit to the draft-for-consultation National Disaster Resilience Strategy.
PREPARED BY K. WAIRAMA
ON BEHALF OF HBCDEM
GROUP

SUBMISSION ON THE NATIONAL DISASTER RESILIENCE STRATEGY
Summary

- We support the National Disaster Resilience Strategy holistic approach to strengthening resilience by connecting with a range of agencies and sectors to deliver improved outcomes for New Zealanders.
- We advocate for a much more systematic, scaled and long-term approach to implementing key systems and cultural changes including a long-term and multi-agency work programme.
- As part of developing an implementation plan we would also encourage resourcing be identified to ensure the vision can be achieved.
- We recommend an increased focus on building resilient communities and responsiveness to Māori.
- We also identify the need for measures and accountability within the strategy.
**Purpose, vision and goal of the strategy**

We believe there is a lack of clarity in the vision of the strategy. We advocate for a clearer statement of intent such as “A resilient and responsive nation”. We advocate for a much more systematic, scaled and long-term approach to implementing key systems and cultural changes. This will influence the CDEM groups and our communities’ behaviours and choices towards a more sustainable and equitable emergency management system.

Māori concepts and frameworks of resilience are underutilised within the strategy. We advocate for inclusion of other Māori frameworks such as Mahi a Atua, Te Pae Mahutonga and the Meihana model.

**Objectives and success factors**

- We agree that ensuring the safety and wellbeing of people is at the heart of the emergency management system. Greater emphasis needs to be applied within the strategy of how this is delivered to inequitable communities. “People don’t care how much you know until they know how much you care” – Theodore Roosevelt.
- The strategy needs to increase the importance of how communities build resilience and respond in an emergency as opposed to how emergency management responds.
- There is a lack of clear measures of the effectiveness of resilience strategies for people. We recommend clearer outcomes-based accountability and measurements for the sector.
- While the vision is admirable we see this as the very start of the process and the Government needs to develop a long term multi-agency work programme to ensure the outcomes sought are achieved. This would include resourcing.

**Strengths**

- The strategy appropriately highlights a more directive leadership of the emergency management system, including setting national standards for emergency management, so there is a consistent standard of care across the country.

**Gaps and challenges**

- Moving forward will require us all to think and act differently. The strategy needs to have a focus on people, how to engage better in building resilient communities and how to better understand people’s needs.
**Name of Group**

Te Urunga o Kea (Te Arawa Climate Change Working Group)

Established by Te Arawa hapū and īwi with the support of the Te Arawa Lakes Trust

**Address**

C/- Te Arawa Lakes Trust
1194 Haupapa St
Rotorua 3010

**MATTER - National Disaster Resilience Strategy – Submissions**

**Brief details of Organisation**

The Te Arawa Climate Change Working Group known as Te Urunga o Kea was established following feedback from Te Arawa hapū and īwi that they were concerned about the impacts and implications of their changing environment as a result of Climate Change.

As Te Arawa, we can liken the challenge of Climate Change to the journey of the Te Arawa waka; an impending crisis affecting our way of life is upon us and we must seek a new way of life to ensure the survival of our ancestral line. Te Korokoro o Te Parata – a swirling whirlpool represents the urgency and immediacy of the situation which requires a call for action for our survival.

Te Urunga o Kea is the voice of the people and the appropriate movement to motivate, facilitate and support the current and future generations to find the solutions and opportunities that ensure the survival of our people for generations to come.

**Group Establishment**

Te Urunga o Kea was established as a call a call to action from hapū and īwi and was endorsed by the Te Arawa Lakes Trust AGM in December 2017.

**Aims**

The aim of the Te Urunga o Kea - Te Arawa Climate Change Working Group is to provide a mechanism for a Te Arawa response to the threats and opportunities of Climate Change.
Membership

Representatives of Te Arawa hapū, iwi, land Trusts and organisations that have an interest in Climate Change.

See attached list

Structure

The Te Arawa Lakes Trust acts as a secretariat and umbrella organisation to support the Working Group to meet and to access funding and support from other organisations.

Small work teams made up of the members convene when issues need to be addressed and members work on matters where they have expertise and commitment.

Authority

The Group has been mandated at a Te Arawa Lakes Trust AGM and members are there for their particular interest group.

Te Urunga o Kea speaks for its members and advocates for Te Arawa on matters of general interest.

Consultation Group Number 46

Consultation Region Te Rohe o Te Arawa
SUMMARY

Recommendations
Te Ao Maori

I. Te Ao Maori inclusive of tangata whenua and mana whenua be recognised, respected and included within the framework. Measureable success factors should also be interwoven.

II. That the 4 capitals Living Standards Framework have at its heart, Te Ao Maori the 5th Capital.

III. Include acknowledgment of Maori as tangata whenua with mana whenua rights. This should be demonstrated in mana whakahaere (governance, authority) and kaitiaki rights and responsibilities of their ancestral lands

IV. Maori should
   • Be resourced appropriately to respond to resilience development and maintenance
   • Be central to decision making (local and central government),
   • Be provided with the opportunity to learn, have access to western science knowledge
   • have their own indigenous knowledge validated as a contributor to resilience
   • not be subsumed by dominant NZ approaches and views

Recommendations
CDEM

I. That CDEM (Local Council) training at Marae level, informs the grass roots workings of a Marae and at the same time upholds Maori traditions and identity.

II. That a CDEM Plan is developed and is consistent throughout all Marae within Te Arawa to address the likelihood of a disaster.

III. The CDEM plan include who is responsible for covering costs during a disaster and how this will be managed immediately with the inclusion of succession planning for marae and all other agencies that will be involved. (Morgan, K. (2018)).

IV. That marae as relief centres be negotiated with those concerned, with strong relationships between the CDEM, FENZ, Aid Organisations, social workers, health professionals, infrastructure workers, navy, army, police, Search and Rescue and local/central government etc be established prior.
V. That inter-tribal assistance be included in planning contingencies, with recognition and prioritisation of such be adopted by CDEM, FENZ and other agencies central to resilience development

Recommendations

INTERNATIONAL CULTURES

I. That the term cultural/ culture be changed to Ethnic (exclusive of Europeans and Maori) (Also Refer to Recommendation 1 for Maori Component)

II. That ethnic groups be included in planning
   67.5 percent of people belong to the European ethnic group
   37.5 percent of people belong to the Māori ethnic group (In this document refer to Maori as The Indigenous people of Aotearoa – not to be included with other cultures.
   14.9 percent belong to other cultures.
   (Exceeds 100% - More than 1 culture may be chosen)

   That Pacific Islands relationships be developed – Refer to Tavalu and Global Warming.

III. Communication may be a huge problem with multi-cultural languages, should there be a disaster. Seek inter-regional specific ethnic support –

IV. Action – consult with individual groups for guidance.

V. That a stocktake be established as to how many tourist on average visit the Te Arawa region and that these numbers are taken into consideration in disaster resilience planning and action. This would include who will care for tourists and who will pay for this care and who will coordinate such activities.

Opportunities

1. Develop Te Ao Maori Marae emergency procedures with local government and iwi

2. Immediate introduction of resilience strategies into schools – Kohanga, primary, secondary and tertiary - grow our future scientists, guardians and champions. This should be a compulsory class.

3. Evacuation Process developed Local / Regional / National / International
Indigenous Partnerships – Inter-tribal alliances are resourced and recognised. That the CDEM, FENZ, government agencies and Aid Organisations establish and strengthen relationships with iwi. There is a recognisable strength in unity. Anecdotal evidence from the Christchurch and Kaikoura disasters suggests that poor relationships between iwi and government agencies and Aid Organisations negatively impacted the site (see Kenney & Phibbs, 2015; Lambert, 2015)

CDEM Plan templates are developed for marae. These template could be flexible enough to be adjusted to include individual marae tikanga and kawa and other contextual factors pertinent to that area.

Maori to participate at all levels of decision making (locally and nationally)

Maori knowledge and their institutions are represented in the strategy and are strongly validated and valued. Consideration in conjunction with other knowledge forms, as resilience measures, and as an integral component of strategy development. That the definition of what resilience means for Maori is further investigated to include a Te Ao perspective and developed as an inclusionary statement and overlaid onto the Living Standards Framework with defined success measures that are resourced

That disaster resilience is viewed as an integral component of climate change and as such works in alignment with other such activities
Review of National Disaster Resilience Strategy
Submissions
Purpose of the Strategy

General Comment

A very informative and comprehensive document. Written with so much thought and care, The document generally reads well, however, in places a disconnection exists between sections with the use of footnotes.

- We acknowledge and refer to the Indigenous Peoples Statement UNISDR Global Platform 2017. The statement calls for the recognition of indigenous knowledges and ways of being are important effective risk reduction tools.

- These tools need to be recognised alongside and in conjunction with other forms of knowledge. Incorporation of these tools into local and national disaster risk reduction strategies is viewed as pertinent.

- We acknowledge that the statement also calls for indigenous people to have a voice in the reduction of risk and vulnerability.

- The statement further explains that the imposition of centralised solutions to local problems is inadequate.

- To this end, the statement strongly articulates the need for indigenous people to be at the decision making table. Importantly, the statement also highlights that definitions, concepts and standards must include both indigenous and non-indigenous perspectives.

- To this end, resourcing indigenous people to develop their own strategies without any exemption to participating and benefitting from national and international policies is tabled.

However, your strategy explains further that resilience comes after all the work of eliminating or reducing risk. Then recovering.

Congratulations on your document, there is enough information to guide the development of processes to reduce risks, hazards, manage in a disaster and remain resilient.

Comment on Resilience

We disagree with the simplification of the definition of resilience. Particularly, the implication that resilience is our tolerance for disruption.

Historically, our disruption with the crown began during the period of colonisation in the 1860s, 24 years after the signing of The Treaty of Waitangi. The brutality of war, the near
annihilation of Maori, and land confiscation, has left our people culturally disenfranchised.

We are still recovering from this brutality in various ways, loss of social organisation, fragmentation of hapu groups, imposed ways of being and operating, educational underachievement, unaffordable housing options, and negative health statistics to name a few.

In this contemporary context, demographics highlight that many of our people live in poverty stricken conditions, references to the minimisation of adverse impacts neglects our current position.

Resilience needs to capture the historical complexities as generated by a colonial past with the integration and inclusion of factors that take account of the inequities with proactive responses to the various sectors of society including that of Maori.

Importantly, articulating the responsibility of the government to ensure that wellbeing and resilience development needs to include a plan for those who are represented by inequities is utmost.

We also note that the strategy explains that resilience is achieved following the completion of risk elimination or reducing risk. Given such, what then of those who are currently at risk in absence of a disaster?

Maori are already occupying a multi-risk environment that has been the result of historical processes. A disaster not only illuminates inequities between sub-sections within the community, but further, brings to bear the extent to which impoverishment is further disadvantaged.

**Living Standards Framework**
The Living Standards Framework covers 4 capitals -

a. We view that the Maori-Crown relationship is integral to all four Capitals – (Page 9).

b. We note that culture as a form of capital is integral to the ways in which relationships are facilitated, the way in which resources are prioritised and distributed, and the way in which decisions are formed and implemented.

c. We strongly recommend that the strategy acknowledges that Maori cultural ways and being is integral to Treaty partnership and as such extend the Living Standards Framework through the overlay of an additional capital form – Indigenous capital which in this case should be a Te Ao Maori viewpoint.

d. To this end, the Living Standards framework for the purposes of the strategy will have a fifth dimension, Te Ao Maori.
e. This we propose will contribute to a case for the tribal inclusion of indigenous knowledges and ways of knowing and being as a mechanism for resilience. These tribal cultural attributes will consequently inform the interaction required to create a community with a more acceptable form of Maori environmental resilience.

f. We strongly recommend a firm view be established within the document that Maori to be resourced, included in decision making processes and all other pathways forward. Further, that Maori as a Treaty partner is not excluded from other forms of knowledges, resources and assistance.

g. The allocation of resources as a ‘self-management approach’ in ways that are devoid of further assistance from government agencies is viewed as the government opting out of responsibility. The government is viewed as having a responsibility in ensuring that Maori communities are developed in ways to meet adversity and to forge ahead given the economic, social and political context.

h. We congratulate your team on the simple design of the framework which cleverly uses the raranga weaving to unite the four capitals. Raranga is the weave that best survived colonisation. Weaving is endowed with the very essence of the spiritual values of Maori.

II. We appreciate the writers acknowledgment of the incomplete state of the framework

III. We thank you for the opportunity to input a Maori focus into the design of the framework

**Recommendations – Te Ao Maori**

V. Te Ao Maori inclusive of tangata whenua and mana whenua be recognised, respected and included within the framework. Measureable success factors should also be interwoven.

VI. That the 4 capitals Living Standards Framework have at its heart, Te Ao Maori the 5th Capital.

VII. Include acknowledgment of Maori as tangata whenua with mana whenua rights. This should be demonstrated in mana whakahaere (governance, authority) and kaitiaki rights and responsibilities of their ancestral lands.

VIII. Maori should

- Be resourced appropriately to respond to resilience development and maintenance
- Be central to decision making (local and central government),
- Be provided with the opportunity to learn, have access to western science knowledge
- have their own indigenous knowledge validated as a contributor to resilience
- not be subsumed by dominant NZ approaches and views

Maori Worldview

The section describing a Maori worldview could also refer to the following:

Jim Williams (2013)\(^1\) for example outlines two main dimensions, the metaphysical and the temporal:

(i) The metaphysical is concerned with the existence and the nature of things that exist. The acknowledgement of the interconnectedness between the natural world and the inhabitants is viewed to be sourced through whakapapa. This view facilitates a relationship with the environment.

(ii) It refers to the various ways in which Atua are manifest to support the present generation;

(ii) Each Atua are associated with a domain of the environment.

(iii) On the practical level, the practice of kaitiakitanga requires the Mana Whenua be linked with resources in a particular locality to mirror the kaitiakitanga of Atua for the good of the entire descent group.

(iv) Sustainability is key to the concept of kaitiakitanga.

This view is represented in the National Civil Defence Strategy (2008,7). As stated:

“The role of Maori as an important community stakeholder. The Maori World view incorporates a special relationship with the environment, expressed inter-generationally through kaitiakitanga. The environment forms the base from which cultural, spiritual, emotional, and physical sustenance flows. Because of this perspective, Maori have a particular interest in the management of hazards and associated risks, including risks that may be posed to wahi tapu sites and other sites of significance. It is important that whanau, hapu, iwi and the wider Maori community are involved in CDEM planning. In addition, Maori communities often have important resources for response and recovery, such as marae for use as emergency shelters, and Maori welfare and support services” \(^2\)

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\(^1\) Williams, J. 2013. Ngai Tahu Kaitiakitanga – MAI Journal 1,2. pp99-100; The Maori Plan for Tamaki Makaurau (see section 3.2.6)

\(^2\) National Civil Defence Strategy (2008, 7)

Te Arawa National Disaster Resilience Strategy Submission 7/12/2018
Review Group – Thia Paerata Priestly / Wendy Rapania / Marie McCarthy/ Sylvia Tapuke
General comment

a. Throughout the document there is reference to ‘Maori Identity’. Frequently referencing Maori as a non-identity, (ie) lost amongst all other cultures. We do not think that we should be couched in this manner.

b. There is an assumption that Maori are “ready to go” and will open their Marae for any emergency situation. The assumption that there will be enough space to accommodate multitudes and food readily available to feed the people is incorrect. (Page 18 – 4.3.3)

c. Contingency planning and resourcing will be essential. Marae do not have a stockpile of resources. Food is not readily available, bedding is unavailable on sites other than mattresses. Where will the manpower come from and who will cover the cost of food and other resources? Planning will need to include people, that is, marae organisers, marae workers (to set up meeting house) health workers, welfare services, social worker, cooks and cleaners to name but a few.

d. We note that Hau Kainga (workers who belong to a specific Marae) are spread out across the region, NZ and/or the world. These are the people who do the main work on the Marae (Morgan, K. (2018)). Plans need to include how to mobilise marae workers and organisers

e. We do acknowledge reference recognising possible shortfalls Ref 5. Page 18

f. We acknowledge your reference to “develop financial mechanisms that support resilience activities” p34. Thank you

Recommendation

VI. That CDEM (Local Council) training at Marae level, informs the grass roots workings of a Marae and at the same time upholds Maori traditions and identity.

VII. That a CDEM Plan is developed and is consistent throughout all Marae within Te Arawa to address the likelihood of a disaster.

VIII. The CDEM plan include who is responsible for covering costs during a disaster and how this will be managed immediately with the inclusion of succession planning for marae and all other agencies that will be involved. (Morgan, K. (2018)).
IX. That marae as relief centres be negotiated with those concerned, with strong relationships between the CDEM, FENZ, Aid Organisations, social workers, health professionals, infrastructure workers, navy, army, police, Search and Rescue and local/central government etc be established prior.

X. That inter-tribal assistance be included in planning contingencies, with recognition and prioritisation of such be adopted by CDEM, FENZ and other agencies central to resilience development

Other Cultures: Resilience (section 4.2.4. p16)

We support and acknowledge that special consideration needs to be given towards other cultures, recognising that each culture have their own values and beliefs and communication issues.

Recommendation

VI. That the term cultural/ culture be changed to Ethnic (exclusive of Europeans and Maori) (Also Refer to Recommendation 1 for Maori Component)

VII. That ethnic groups be included in planning

67.5 percent of people belong to the European ethnic group
37.5 percent of people belong to the Māori group
14.9 percent belong to other cultures.
(Exceeds 100% - More than 1 culture may be chosen)

VIII. Communication may be a huge problem should there be a disaster. Seek inter-regional specific ethnic support –

IX. Action – consult with individual groups for guidance.

X. That a stocktake be established as to how many tourist on average visit the Te Arawa region and that these numbers are taken into consideration in disaster resilience planning and action. This would include who will care for tourists and who will pay for this care and who will coordinate such activities.

Types of Resilience (Page 17)

Excellent – Generates excitement and eagerness to get started! No nonsense, checklist and reference Data – easily understood....Those responsible for developing working documents would find this information very useful and easy to follow. Thank you

We would recommend that the success measures as related to these types of resilience are interwoven for Maori
Opportunities

9 Develop Te Ao Maori Marae emergency procedures with local government and iwi

10 Immediate introduction of resilience strategies into schools – Kohanga, primary, secondary and tertiary - grow our future scientists, guardians and champions. This should be a compulsory class.

11 Evacuation Process developed Local / Regional / National / International

Pacific Islands relationships are developed to support people requiring re-location temporary or permanent, due to global warming issues. Refer to Tuvalu.

“As climate change impacts rainfall patterns, and rising sea levels increase the salinity of groundwater, the water that lured Polynesians to Tuvalu can now be a reason that drives their descendants away from their ancestral lands”

12 Indigenous Partnerships – Inter-tribal alliances are resourced and recognised. That the CDEM, FENZ, government agencies and Aid Organisations establish and strengthen relationships with iwi. There is a recognisable strength in unity. Anecdotal evidence from the Christchurch and Kaikoura disasters suggests that poor relationships between iwi and government agencies and Aid Organisations negatively impacted the site (see Kenney & Phibbs, 2015; Lambert, 2015)

13 CDEM Plan templates are developed for marae. These template could be flexible enough to be adjusted to include individual marae tikanga and kawa and other contextual factors pertinent to that area.

14 Establish NZ based registration of International cultural groups – Determine number of ethnic groups in each city. Establish a support and advisory centre

15 Maori at all levels of decision making (locally and nationally)

16 Maori knowledge and institutions are represented in the strategy more strongly as valid. Consideration in conjunction with other knowledge forms as resilience measures and as an integral component of strategy development

17 That the definition of what resilience means for Maori is further investigated to include a Te Ao perspective and developed as an inclusionary statement
and overlaid onto the Living Standards Framework with defined success measures that are resourced

18 That disaster resilience is viewed as an integral component of climate change and as such works in alignment with other such activities
# Te Urunga o Kea (Te Arawa Climate Change Working Group)

## Members list

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Te Arawa National Disaster Resilience Strategy Submission 7/12/2018

Review Group – Thia Paerata Priestly / Wendy Rapanan / Marie McCarthy / Sylvia Tapuke
National Disaster Resilience Strategy Submissions
Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
PO Box 5010
WELLINGTON 6145

Email: NationalStrategy@dpmc.govt.nz

Dear Sir / Madam

CONSULTATION: RAUTAKI MANAWAROA AITUĀ Ā-MOTU | DRAFT NATIONAL DISASTER RESILIENCE STRATEGY

Thank you for the opportunity to submit on the draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

The New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 requires the Hawke’s Bay District Health Board (HBDHB) to improve, promote, and protect the health of people and communities of Hawke’s Bay. The HBDHB is also required to foster community participation in health improvement, and in planning for the provision of services and for significant changes to the provision of services. A representative of the HBDHB Chief Executive is also a member of the Co-ordinating Executive Group for the Civil Defence Emergency Management Group as required under the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002. For these reasons the HBDHB clearly has an interest in a strategy that sets the national direction for growing New Zealand’s resilience.

General Comments

HBDHB supports the overall approach set out in the draft strategy. We agree that building resilience or “tolerance to disruption” will require society wide action. We also agree with the approach of linking to both the NZ Living Standards Framework and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. The draft strategy notes that society wide efforts to grow the four capitals (natural, social, human and financial and physical) will contribute to growing resilience but does not attempt to provide a comprehensive strategy covering these broader efforts. Rather, the strategy focuses specifically on those aspects that are particularly relevant to reducing the impacts of disasters.

Nevertheless, it is important to note the actions taken specifically under this strategy should be synergistic with wider efforts. Actions to grow “tolerance to disruption” caused by natural disasters, and other emergencies, should contribute to the growth of the four capitals in everyday life. For example, when CDEM groups work with local communities to develop local emergency response plans the work needs to take into account the broader context of the communities and their strengths and weaknesses. Community emergency response planners also need to work alongside other agencies such as education, social and health service providers who may be working with the community to grow.
At the regional level it will be critical to link disaster resilience strategies to existing regional and local planning, in particular regional economic planning. Many regions have regional social planning and these can be excellent leverage points for preparation and cross-sector coordination support from social service agencies. For the Hawke’s Bay region, this is the Social Inclusion Strategy.

We also have many local community plans where a diverse group of community and government agencies meet to discuss and plan for community wellbeing and resilience.

**A Focus on Māori and Other Disadvantaged Groups**

The draft strategy specifically includes the concepts of resilience for Māori. We suggest that while providing a useful starting point, a more comprehensive kaupapa Māori approach will be needed at the programme and action level recognizing particular issues such as: resilience of Marae, the need to work with hapū to develop responses, and the need for a whānau approach. Post-treaty settlement groups will be key partners in the growth of resilience for their communities.

There must also be an acknowledgement that people in high deprivation communities will have the greatest need and will be likely to have lower levels of resilience across multiple dimensions. Any actions taken to build economic resilience at the regional or national level must recognize that family economic resilience is already weak for many families and strengthening the overall economic resilience of communities will inevitably require a focus on families that are already financially stressed.

We recommend that consultation to include vulnerable groups and those with disabilities is vital, to ensure their needs in terms of risk and disaster preparedness. These groups currently face significant barriers to services and any disaster will only compound these barriers.

**Strategy Timeframe**

We are concerned that the timeframe (“by 2030 set up for the six objectives to progress the priority of managing risks”) is not ambitious enough. A recent UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report warned that based on current models, only 12 years remain for action in order to keep global warming at a maximum of 1.5C. Urgent and unprecedented changes are needed to reach the target.

**Resilience and Public Health Emergencies**

Chapter 3 of the draft strategy lists a range of “devastating events”. Most of these listed are natural disasters, including earthquakes and floods, and others such as; the Pike River mine disaster, fires, transport disasters, and biosecurity (M.Bovis). We recommend that the Havelock North Campylobacter Outbreak 2016 be included, as it is an example of a public health devastating outbreak. There were many learnings from the government inquiry in this event that would be valuable to include in the National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

**Need For a More Detailed Implementation Plan**

This draft strategy is high level and discusses concepts and big overall objectives of building national disaster resilience without getting into the detail of how objectives will be achieved. An example of this is Objective 13: How to Strengthen Societal Resilience (p. 28) — “Build a culture of resilience, including a ‘future-ready’ ethos, through promotion, advocacy, and education.” There is clearly a need for more work to identify specific actions and programmes that will achieve this culture change. As noted above, these will need to be given effect through other plans such as regional economic development strategies.

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Literacy Issues and Communication

We believe communication is a key component of national disaster resilience. It is important that everyone is prepared for an emergency, knowing what to do during and after an event. There appears to be conflicting information around current messaging promoted by various agencies. Hawke’s Bay DHB recently developed their own resources with health information for the public on how to respond to a variety of emergencies (e.g. how to clean up after a flood). We strongly believe and recommend the establishment of a process to create nationally consistent emergency messaging covering key areas of advice from all agencies.

For example, consistent advice needs to be provided around drinking water in an emergency. It is vital that information is technically correct and agreed by all agencies. Messaging also needs to be health literate and easily understood by the general public. This was a learning from the government inquiry in Havelock North drinking water.

Responses to Specific Questions in the Consultation Document

1. Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.
   - The proposed vision seems limited. Rather than aiming for a “safe and prosperous nation” we recommend a vision where “All communities and groups have capacity to absorb and adapt to disaster”. This would provide more focus on wellbeing and equity
   - The 10 year timeframe for building and supporting resilience seems unambitious in regard to urgent actions but also too short. A longer timeframe would allow for the planning needed now to avert the risks of runaway climate change that could be seen in the next 20-30 years
   - We agree that the Living Standards Framework and this draft strategy need to work together to reduce risk and promote resilience for all four capitals stocks
   - We agree the need to shift focus from managing disasters to managing risk, including the reduction of the underlying drivers of risk (exposure and vulnerability)
   - We agree with the stated goal and like the sense of collective action for all
   - We agree it is all of our responsibilities to build resilience and to involve communities as part of a collective and inclusive approach
   - On page 7 the draft strategy states “It (the strategy) explicitly links resilience to the protection and growth of living standards for all New Zealanders”. We suggest that instead of growing living standards for all efforts to grow living standards should be focused on people who are most vulnerable
   - Resilience and Te Ao Maori – we support this approach. We also support the principles of the Treaty being a key consideration in this framework

2. Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.
   - Priorities for areas of resilience need to be balanced. Our concern is that economic resilience (for some) or built environment (for some) gets elevated in importance over social resilience or natural resilience. Care should be taken so that we do not trade-off one resilience against another. As an example, a real risk is that we live in some high-risk areas and continuing to build in high-risk areas (e.g. low lying coastal areas threatened by sea level rises - see p.42) because the true costs associated with building high risk homes are not accurately priced into development costs
   - Strengthening societal resilience is a very important area that needs focused attention. We agree that processes need to be inclusive, but it also needs a level of investment, resource and skilled facilitation to avoid tokenism
The actual processes of engagement can materially disadvantage already marginalized communities if they are expected to participate in their own resilience from a starting point of vulnerability. It is likely that these communities will require extra levels of support (including risk literacy) and longer timeframes for engagement.

3. Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

- Objective 1 and 3 should feed very close into each other as there is likely to be a low level of understanding in the population at large. The more vulnerable communities should be prioritized in regards to building risk awareness.
- Global economic growth and productivity is and should be considered a risk. It comes at a price in increasing disasters e.g. through climate change – not just about whether we can afford to mitigate.
- Objective 4 – we believe there is a large need to increase risk literacy especially in relation to climate change, sea level rises etc.

4. Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim? We would also appreciate your views if you disagree with this proposition.

- Agree to broader representation, however, requires clarity on lead agency and responsibilities. This should not absolve agencies of their core leadership responsibilities.

5. Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?

- A focus on communities and learning from experiences of disasters in New Zealand with tangible examples of recovery success factors e.g. Lyttelton Timebank - post Canterbury earthquake and Havelock North Campylobacter Outbreak. It should also be recognized that the experience of a disaster in itself can lead to increased resilience within a community.

6. Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defense emergency management strategy current strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?

- The structure of the national civil defence emergency management has historically been well structured for response (command and control) but less so for resilience preparedness, and recovery (collaboration and community engagement - social sciences). This should be taken into account when considering the National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

Thank for the opportunity to provide input into Draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Dr Kevin Snee
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
National Disaster Resilience Strategy: Rautaki Manawaroa Aituā ā-Motu
Submission of the Community Language Information Network Group (CLING)

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<tr>
<th>Contact Name</th>
<th>Dr Lesley Campbell</th>
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Organisation description:
CLING is a multi-agency group that seeks to disseminate advice and resources on best practices for engagement and communication between government and community agencies and Culturally and Linguistically Diverse Communities (CALD). Currently CLING comprises members from Interpreting Canterbury, the Christchurch City Council, Citizens Advice Bureau, Pegasus Health, Community and Public Health, Christchurch Resettlement Services, Immigration New Zealand, New Zealand Red Cross, Lebern and Associates and Plains FM 96.9 Community Access Radio.
Submission Content

Introduction and General Feedback:

1. The Community Language and Information Network Group congratulates the New Zealand Government on producing the draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy, Rautaki Manawaroa Aituā ā-Motu. CLING welcomes the opportunity to contribute to this consultation process and offer a submission on the contents of the Draft Strategy.

2. Overall CLING supports the purpose, vision, goal and priorities of the proposed Strategy. The proposed Strategy aligns with international disaster risk reduction frameworks and has been developed with reference to an evidence base.

Specific Feedback

Forward (page 2)

3. CLING notes that reference is made variously to the ‘Christchurch’ earthquakes and the ‘Canterbury’ earthquake series. People we have consulted during a range of research projects following the Canterbury earthquake series state that they prefer this event to be referred to as the Canterbury earthquake series. This reference to the Christchurch earthquake series needs to be applied consistently throughout the Strategy document.

4. The Strategy focuses largely on natural disasters, with limited mention of other types of disaster. CLING notes that disasters can be natural as well as human induced so we suggest that this wider reference to disasters be included in the Strategy so that the reader can identify with the wide range of disasters that occur. Natural disasters can include geophysical disasters (earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis, volcanic activity), hydrological disasters (e.g. avalanches, floods), climatological disasters (e.g. extreme temperatures, droughts, wildfires), meteorological (cyclones and storms/wave surges) and biological (disease epidemics, insect/animal plagues). Man-made disasters include conflicts, famine, displaced populations, industrial accidents, transport accidents, terrorism and war. CLING recommends that the Strategy reference the various types of disaster in the Foreword.

Risks to Our Wellbeing and Prosperity (page 11)

5. CLING suggests that the Strategy’s comments on population trends and how they might impact on future risks needs to be strengthened. For

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1 SAMHSA retrieved from https://www.samhsa.gov/find-help/disaster-distress-helpline/disaster-types
example, New Zealand society is becoming younger and more ethnically diverse and this could be emphasized by including some graphs that illustrate this significant trend. This societal trend had implications for the way in which DRR is approached.  

6. Youth, and youth from refugee communities in particular, have a lot to offer disaster risk reduction approaches.  

Resilience and Vulnerable Groups

7. The description of vulnerability does not mention certain groups are more vulnerable than others, during and following disasters (e.g. people with disabilities, pregnant women, children, elderly persons, prisoners, certain members of Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) communities, people with language barriers and those experiencing poverty). For example, one of the core factors contributing to resilience is being connected to others in your community, and yet people from CALD communities are more likely to experience social isolation and information barriers before, during and after disasters. The Strategy needs to include an objective that provides for adequate preparation and response to safeguard the welfare of such vulnerable groups.  

8. In particular, CALD communities need to be identified and have increased resources applied to them to build on their resilience. For example, CALD communities appreciate being invited to be involved to co-create and contribute to building resilience in their communities and beyond before, during and after disasters.  

9. Moreover, the Strategy needs to include clear and specific targets for communities known to experience health inequities (e.g. Māori, Pacific Peoples, CALD communities, etc).

Language Barriers

10. CLING notes that more needs to be done to ensure a national project is undertaken to translate key messages about preparation for, responses to,
and recovery from disasters. In the past, this role of translating materials has been undertaken on an ad hoc basis resulting in translated materials of variable quality and an inequitable distribution of such materials. Moreover, translated materials need to be distributed via a range of mechanisms (i.e. audio, video, social media, text messaging, Community Access Radio, etc).

The more recent work undertaken by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management in relation to people with disabilities is an example of good practice that CLING would like applied within CALD communities.

Moreover, there is a need to consider the complexities of delivering disaster-related messages with different CALD communities. Marlow (2018) suggests applying a disaster risk reduction approach with CALD communities that incorporate the concepts of reach, relevance, receptiveness and relationships.

Priorities for Improved Resilience (page 22)

12. Object 5 includes reference to a ‘plain English’ lexicon to describe risk awareness, risk literacy and risk management. CLING suggests that more is needed to expand on this especially in light of the use of social media during and after disasters.

13. In paragraph 2 on page 27 it is noted that an inclusive approach will be taken that includes those who are disproportionately affected by disasters. CLING supports this inclusive approach but suggests that more is needed to explain which groups will be included in this more inclusive approach. Moreover, ensuring first responders and those involved in emergency response also need to be included.

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management are trained on ways to reach and work with each of these groups is essential. 11

14. Objective 17 refers to the ‘importance of culture to resilience’ but this needs expansion. For example, the resilience of CALD communities before and after disasters is enhanced by their participation in co-creating the preparedness materials and their participation in the response. 12 However, they are reluctant to participate unless invited to do so. CLING recommends that reference is made to the Best Practice Guidelines for Engaging with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) Communities in Times of Disaster: Findings of Action Research. 13

Governance (8.2)

15. There is the proposal that Governance be managed by existing governance mechanisms. CLING suggests that community groups make a significant contribution to such governance arrangements as they work closely with communities and know their strengths and vulnerabilities. 14

Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in the governance of the Strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim?

16. CLING agrees with the proposal to have a broader range of stakeholders involved in the Governance of the Strategy.

17. It is recommended that a representative from CLING or another equivalent group elsewhere be included in the Strategy’s governance group.

Appendix 3: Analysis of our current state as a baseline for this Strategy (page 41)

18. The Strategy notes that New Zealand is one of a handful of super culturally and linguistically diverse countries. CLING believes that CALD

communities bring an added dimension to our understanding of resilience and that the implementation of the Strategy would benefit from drawing on their knowledge and experience.  

19. CLING supports your quest to develop business cases that espouse the benefits of investing in resilience. CLING suggests that reference to made to the findings from a CLING-initiated project found in Wylie, S. (2012). Best Practice Guidelines for Engaging with Culturally and Linguistically Diverse (CALD) Communities in Times of Disaster: Findings of Action Research.

20. In the context of developing the capability of leaders to understand the role of culture in DRR, CLING believes that it is important to develop the capability of the MCDEM staff and first responders involved in responding to disasters.

Appendix 4: Two Key Opportunities (page 45)

21. CLING agrees with your assessment of the triple dividends of investing in disaster risk management and resilience. There are multiple health, mental health and wellbeing benefits from building resilience in communities. The simple act of making social connections, like connecting with neighbours, has been correlated with increased longevity, lower rates of anxiety and depression, better emotional regulation skills, stronger immune system, etc. Thus, making connections with CALD communities before an emergency occurs has the potential to realise these societal benefits.

Further References:


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New Zealand National Disaster Resilience Strategy
Rautaki Manawaroa Aituā ā Motu
Agency: Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management

Overview

The purpose of this document is to provide a brief response to the National Disaster Resilience Strategy – Rautaki Manawaroa Aituā ā Motu. It contains my views and throughout this response it focuses on Māori participation (will from time to time include reference to Pasifika communities). I have also included a number of recommendations.

Please also note this is a personal response and not aligned to any particular iwi or Maori organisation.

I found the National Disaster Resilience Strategy a very technical document due to the number of guiding principles and trying to see where Maori might fit in, and how they might contribute to further development. It’s a challenging strategy to grasp because it attempts to capture and cover a wide range of potential disasters and articulates an all of community/population need for readiness and awareness. Looking for links to other current or earlier emergency documents is a bit of a task due to it broadness and the need to identify and manage risks before they expand to become something larger or manage global impacts even when the origins are internationally based.

Note:

I support the need for community and the development of preparedness for a range of potential disasters and to create awareness amongst members.

Due to Aotearoa New Zealand being an isolated set of islands, some 3 hours by air from its nearest neighbouring nation, and Wharekauri even further east, developing a resilience to disasters is a positive move.

You should also note my recommendations in this response.

Building resilience is about building the capabilities of communities to identify, manage and minimise or illuminate potential disaster or its impacts. Managing risk is a challenge for example when dealing with the impact of introduced plants ‘gone wild’, windblown plant disease and crop pests and diseases. In their initial sightings they probably are more localised, but as time passes, they spread freely and wildly and now present significant challenges in sites of significance and land interests particularly where there are strong
cultural and environmental interests. Pests gone wild are also a risk to the country’s economy.

Once established the following plants ‘gone wild’ are examples which now present bigger challenges. Wilding Pines¹, Boneseed² and Clematis Vitalba³ are infesting both islands, and a real threat to existing native and exotic plants. Like rats, mice possums etc, they are likely not to be eradicated.

The layout of this new strategy covers a broad range of potential disasters (economic, social, physical and environmental) and attempts to recognise or highlight where the strategy can present a resilience framework that can:

- build awareness, adaptability and capability to manage a broad range of disasters and
- have a range of responses and recovery plans to include New Zealand communities, organisations as a whole.

Disasters such as earthquakes, tidal and tsunami, storms etc can be seen and felt and generally their shocks impact on specific regions. What is known is the psychological, social and cultural affects for the whole of the country.

Economic failures such as the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) while impacting on the wider national interest, may have some lead in time but may leave little warning for the wider community until it begins to impact on their daily lives and capabilities to cater for their families.

I also note that significant challenges for Māori (and Pasifika) during emergencies are twofold;

- to be able to meet their day to day needs
- continue with their day to day activities yet be expected to provide for affected communities and
- secondly contribute to recovery where they have capability.

**My initial thoughts for Māori (and Pasifika) having read the proposed strategy?**

Initially I asked myself:

- Does this strategy reflect the needs of Māori and why is this strategy not inclusive of Pasifika communities when they are significant citizens of Auckland, Hamilton and other centres?
- How can Māori, Iwi and Pasifika contribute to the National Disaster Response and particularly utilising Māori community collectiveness, resources such as Marae and kainga complexes to support communities?

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¹ Wilding conifers, also known as wilding pines, are invasive trees in the high country
² Aggressively invasive woody plant species originating from South Africa
³ Old Man’s Bread (Clematis Vitalba)
• How much inclusive interaction, is taking place to engage and involve Māori and iwi in the building this strategy or any final publication?
• How is this strategy entwined with an organisation such as the Greater Welling Regional Council’s emergency relationships with mana whenua in its region?

I am also of the opinion;

a) Māori and Pasifika need to see themselves in this strategy. The visual is extremely important. Reinforcing that they are part of the bigger picture, not just another small community group lost in the bigger picture.

b) It may mean writing two separate reports, each targeting specific communities, for Māori, and for Pasifika.
   • Detailing the advantages of preparedness and responsiveness and the need to consider a wider range of potential disasters, what is missing (and this might be the next level of detail) are examples as to how Māori and iwi might prepare themselves
   • For example, the Rena disaster in the Bay of Plenty, the Edgecumbe earthquake subsequent reports have raised a number of matters relating to initial response protocols and practices, arrangements for the use of and various types of clean up equipment, containment of contaminants and importantly environmental recovery issues for Maori communities

   c) Whānau Hapū National Disaster Awareness Fund:

      That in the Māori specific report there should be a proposal for the preparation for funding a Whānau Hapū National Disaster Awareness Fund to be managed by a central organisation (Ministry of Civil Defence) and each regional disaster agency is responsible for identifying iwi, Māori organisations and their civil defence, disaster response projects

   d) Show these communities they are an important part of the broader community, not ones that are left out because they are too difficult for middle class bureaucrats to communicate with

   e) With limited resources within Māori communities indicate how they may contribute by initiating community/hapū /whanau national disaster training awareness and real-life activities

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4 On 5 October 2011 the Mediterranean Shipping Company-chartered, Liberian-flagged container ship Rena astonished local mariners by grounding on the clearly marked Astrolabe Reef in the Bay of Plenty while approaching Tauranga Harbour. Three months later the vessel broke in half.

5 1987 Edgecumbe earthquake measured 6.5 causing significant damage in the Bay of Plenty At that stage it was the most damaging earthquake New Zealand had experienced since the Inangahua earthquake 1968. Maori communities in the Bay of Plenty were affected, have also been affected by significant flooding.
f) Show them what is available in the area of funding (funding is usually a problematic term), how that might be sourced to support their communities through a Whānau Hapū Disaster Awareness Fund.

g) Indicate or show examples how Maori and iwi may be able collectively and practically contribute if there is a global crisis and it effectively requires internationally nations and their government responses.

Recommendations:

- Write a Maori specific report focusing on preparedness and responsiveness and the need to consider a wider range of potential disasters and examples as to how Māori, iwi might prepare (build resilience) themselves for future impacts.
- In the report, show detail about developing a government/local government Whānau Hapū National Disaster Awareness Fund to be managed by a central organisation (Ministry of Civil Defence) and detail how each regional disaster agency will be responsible for identifying iwi, Māori and their civil defence, disaster response projects and guidelines as to how this funding will be distributed.
- Through a series of nationally coordinated hui a iwi, hui a rōpū show how Māori might be able to contribute to a National Disaster Strategy and how and where they fit in the bigger picture.
- In this process ask how they were able or not able to respond effectively (Rena grounding, East Coast storms and slash damage, past and recent earthquake disasters, if possible, the impact of the Global Financial Crisis).

Managing Risk - Whanau Hapū National Disaster Fund

Managing risks, preparation and awareness is a key component within the strategy. The strategy says: a crucial part of understanding and managing risk is understanding the full range of costs involved in disasters including tangible and intangible costs.

Having a Whanau Hapū Disaster National Awareness Fund, a new and a separate funding source, separate to the traditional Whanau Ora within Te Puni Kōkiri (Ministry of Māori Development) is one innovative opportunity to managing risk. Whanau Hapū Disaster National Awareness Fund which will provide the basis to creating an awareness and preparedness for potential disasters. This awareness training will not meet all disaster requirements but will prepare Marae and kainga to better respond to major disasters in their area. A network of preparedness for Māori communities is one way of returning communities to normalities. Psychological, social matters must be supported by a network of support agencies and skilled persons who can quickly mobilise to help communities.

Slow responsiveness means further expense, further pain, interventions need to be effective and inclusive and able meet the needs of the most difficult to reach peoples, even the homeless is critical.
Preparation may include:

- Marae/helicopter landing, recovery sites
- Marae training – supporting isolated First Aid and First Responder training
- Specific coastal Marae are set up to recover, receive survivors, injured from off shore accidents or disasters
- Marae areas where mobile hospitals can be set up and sourced by air and road
- Identify which Marae may accommodate heavy machinery and recovery vehicles and their staff, may include defence staff and equipment.
- Mobilising skilled people to support Marae to cater for communities in need.

Māori and Iwi

The Crown has an important relationship under the Treaty of Waitangi and it is important to articulate those relationship and commitments made by the Crown and the settlement arrangements cementing the Crown and Iwi under any policy, strategic developments.

In some areas there is a strong relation between Iwi and the Crown, however that relationship may leave groups who are not mana whenua out in the cold. Wellington Regional Council meets with mana whenua, not tangata whenua. For example, the Wellington region is made up of significant numbers of tangata whenua/mataawaka who do not participate in regional council matters, such as regional disaster matters.

The CDEM 2002\(^6\) requires local authorities to coordinate reduction, readiness, response and recover activities through regional groups. Coordination across iwi and Māori organisations should be seen in this new strategy. In many situations Māori and Iwi will be an important part of the process of reducing risk, increasing readiness and awareness.

Financial Crisis

The financial crisis of 2007–2008, also known as the global financial crisis (GFC) is considered by many economists as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930.

It began in 2007 with a crisis in the subprime mortgage market in the United States, and developed into a full-blown international banking crisis with the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008.

In New Zealand the government moved to implement strategies to both soften the impact of the global crises and protect New Zealand’s fragility in the world economic environment. A number of New Zealand lending and banking institutions were bailed out by government to prevent national financial melt downs

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The learnings from the last Financial Global Crisis suggests that Māori communities are not in a position to contribute to any intervention but those with the least ability to absorb financial disasters will just have to find their own way along the pathway to recovery.

If we have a high performing economy, there is a suggestion that the fact we have a relatively manageable debt, suggests in reality, we are able to withstand some level of disaster, however a global down turn will be a different challenge.

The learnings from the last Financial Global Crisis suggest that many Māori communities may not be in a position to contribute to any intervention. Yet when there is a social crisis such as meeting the immediate needs of the homeless, Māori communities and their marae (as in South Auckland) front up with little support from Central Government.

If we have a high performing economy, there is a suggestion that the fact we have a small o and relatively manageable debt, suggests in national emergency or global down turn we will not have the depth of resources to support recovery.

Māori (and Pasifika) are lost in the technologies and inabilities to understand the implications of trade and financial issues and any role opportunities they may be part of.

- What might be the implications of a global technology melt down (failure) and how might this affect Maori communities
- How do Maori communities build resilience to global melt down and further how do you build resilience to economic disasters when many within Maori communities are already vulnerable?

**Emergency Events (examples)**

**a) Big Weather Events**

The aftermath of a number of big weather events have left significant damage to rural, coastal and forestry communities.

Weather events such as Cyclone Bola (1988)\(^7\) and recent Kawerau/Bay of Plenty flooding from ex-cyclone Debbie (2017) has led to unprecedented river levels throughout the Bay of Plenty, and slash and debris\(^8\) washed down both rivers and in the case of East Coast, destroying everything in the river’s path.

Families and more importantly Māori whanau in these areas were devastated.

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\(^7\) Cyclone Bola, March 1988., bringing torrential rain for more than three days to east coast of North Island. Worst affected was the hill country behind Gisborne, more than 900 mm of rain fell in 72 hours, and one area had 514 mm in a single

\(^8\) The forestry slash — scrap timber, branches and off cuts left behind in a felling area
b) Potential Tsunami, Severe Tidal

A more localised earthquake triggered tsunami hitting Wellington is a real threat. A significant threat to coastal communities of Lyall Bay, Rongotai/Kilbirnie, Island Bay, Petone with the potential for major damage and injury/loss of life to a significant sector of the city’s population.

Areas such as these coastal communities and coastal areas around the country where Māori are likely to be living or working, or children attending school, college etc will be vulnerable. Māori children are wholly reliant on public transport and while there will be disruption, Māori are more likely to rely on public transport, not private means.

Local Government Act 2002 (LGA)

In many of local government Māori and iwi (generally iwi) participate in local decision making or in interest areas where they may be a Treaty of Waitangi settlement and legislation requirement or an ‘All of Agency Accord’.

The Local Government Act 2002 (LGA) requires councils to consider and promote the current and future well being of communities. It also introduced new responsibilities and opportunities for engagement and cooperation between councils and Māori.

Recommendations:

In a Maori specific report:

- Detail how the national disaster strategy integrates the work of WREMA’, and National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015 with Ngāti Kahungunu ki Wairarapa and what that will look like post Treaty of Waitangi settlement for Ngāti Kahungunu ki Wairarapa Tāmaki Nui ā Rua⁹, and
- How Māori contribute in part to the local body, local authority disaster strategies but also how is the national disaster strategy is linked and allows Māori (and Pasifika) to contribute to resilience and other elements noted in this document?’

Resilience - the ability to bounce back following a major incident, event or disaster. If this is the definition or meaning (see various meanings or definitions (Meriam-Webster, Collins, Cambridge English, The Free Dictionary.com) then that presents a problem for the poorest of our communities (of which Māori and Pasifika make up the majority).

The ability of Māori to absorb financial downturns (financial crisis) is limited or to be blunt non-existent. Māori communities also have limitations to good health, poor health outcome (diseases, infections etc) is well documented, to the point that if they make up a marginalised community at the bottom of the ladder, this group will receive very little support.

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Manawhenua, tangata whenua, mataawaka

What appears to be missing is a to the work already being developed by regional councils to include iwi (manawhenua partners) in regional emergency and national responses.

- Indicate what has been done to explore the opportunity to include tangata whenua/mataawaka alongside manawhenua in the development of this document.

Regional council has an obligation to engage with their manawhenua partners, what about tangata whenua/mataawaka who may not have an agreement or opportunity to work with or advise in a range of ways with council?

Māori living in vulnerable coastal communities, cities and town and likely to be classified as in the lower socio-economic areas, preparing for potential disasters is the least item on their minds. They will have the enthusiasm and commitment to help their peoples and others, but may not have the depth of resources that may be part of other urban centres or pākeha farming communities.

However, for some communities which may have a marae, serve a number of supportive roles – there needs to be a solid government backed resource to support marae. They may initially have to rely on their membership for supply of food and other resource, but supporting the wider community in their area, this may not be enough.

For this strategy, it needs to reach out to iwi, hapū and marae. Māori need to see themselves in the strategy.

This may require a project team to talk with and number of marae:

- About their networks
- Marae capability and what might be needed during an emergency/disaster and how might government resources support them
- Facilities that might be utilised by emergency services
- Being the centre point, reporting and distribution point for the wider community
- Communications centre – utilising Māori network radio

Making Resilience, Readiness and Awareness a Strategic Objective

Cooperation across private operators, private organisation such as earthmoving, demolition army and others. This would include cultivating an environment of connectedness and a cultivation of networked Marae organisations. This is important for Māori living in the urban environment as the number of current Marae in the urban setting is small and the facility have limitation to the number of peoples it can support.
One issue that rises for me, is the importance of smaller populations (Māori and Pasifika for example) and the danger of having policies and strategies that engineer restrictions and exclusion either intentional or non-intentional.

**Māori statistics**

New Zealand has a small population 4.794 million across two large islands\(^{10}\).

At 30 June 2017: New Zealand's estimated Māori population approximately 15%; 734,200. (Stats NZ, Nov 14, 2017)

**Pasifika Communities**

Pasifika population statistics estimated around 7.4% of New Zealand’s population (295,941) identified with one or a number of Pacific identities.

These figures show the vulnerability of smaller populations when the dominant Pakeha population is around 74%.

It's vitally important to ensure that when these strategy proposals are promoted, they must also be seen to be more inclusive of the smaller populations in this country. Otherwise Māori and Pasifika communities feel further and further isolated from the broader population.

**Treaty Settlement**

It’s important that Māori, iwi and their Treaty of Waitangi settlement with the Crown, should not place a responsibility on iwi to take a Crown role, the role of the Crown to meet its citizen outcomes is a role that sits within the constitutional function of the Crown.

In general iwi settlement plans will focus on:

- facilitating knowledge transfer and capturing mātauranga Māori
- providing a framework to articulate values, aspirations and issues
- identifying specific natural resources and/or sites of cultural significance
- ensuring iwi/hapū interests are recognised in the resource consent application process
- providing a template for others developing iwi planning documents.
- relationship agreements and protocols, joint redress and cooperation,
- commercial redress

As part of the relationships and protocol requirements, this is a good starting point for consultation as the relationship protocol will involve both central government agencies and local government bodies.

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\(^{10}\) There are a number of islands which make up the lands known as Aotearoa New Zealand, for this report it concentrates on the North and South Islands.
REFERENCES AND DOCUMENTS

1. Wellington Regional Response structures

DPMC, MCDEM, TPK
- Seeking new funding for 2019/20 financial year
- If successful, likely to be allocated to CDEM and TPK to distribute
- If so, TPK may request CEG membership
- Ohu (up to three iwi reps) to be appointed by Ara Tahi and funded by Te Hunga Whiriwhiri

Iwi & Marae Working Group (Agencies)
- Te Pae Urungi Te Upoko o Te Ika (TBC)
- TPK regional reps (TBC)
- CDEM – WREMO staff

Engagement (Iwi & Marae)
- Te Pae Urungi Te Upoko o Te Ika - works with marae trustees in own council area (TBC)
- Marae trustee’s mana whenua and mātāwaka
- TPK regional rep (TBC)
- CDEM – WREMO staff


This section in the civil defence plan is also known as the 4 Rs consisting of:

(a) reduction (identifying and analysing risks to life and property from hazards, taking steps to eliminate those risks if practicable, and, if not, reducing the magnitude of their impact and the likelihood of their occurrence to an acceptable level); and

(b) readiness (developing operational systems and capabilities before an emergency happens, including self-help and response programmes for the general public and specific programmes for emergency services, lifeline utilities, and other agencies); and

(c) response (actions taken immediately before, during, or directly after an emergency to save lives and property, and to help communities recover); and

(d) recovery (the co-ordinated efforts and processes used to bring about the immediate, medium-term, and long-term holistic regeneration and enhancement of a community following an emergency) Act means the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 agency means a government or non-government organisation or entity (other than a CDEM Group) with responsibilities under this plan building has the same meaning.

It does set a basis of the idea for preparedness which permeates the National plan.
3. Settlement (example)

I very much applaud the shift in emphasis from risk towards resilience. Overall the Draft Strategy makes a great deal of sense and covers most issues I would want to see included.

However, I have two areas of concern. The first is that the relationship between risk and resilience is insufficiently clear. The second, though perhaps less important, is that there is insufficient precision of language and concept throughout the document, which limits its usefulness.

Regarding the relationship between risk and resilience, the two are significantly different even to the extent that a resilience approach requires a very different underlying attitude.

Risk approaches, including risk management, are effective and well-understood. However, they have significant problems and limitations which are less generally understood, and these give a reason for moving towards resilience\(^1\). Six issues are that:

1. There is a problem with quality and completeness of information. Lack of precise information means that likelihood and consequences have to be estimated, so the information is vulnerable to biases and its quality can be uncertain.
2. There is a serious problem of completeness in risk models, where omissions can lead to serious consequences. Unexpected events, sometimes called “black swans”, abound. The completeness issue has been called the “Achilles heel” of risk management\(^2\). Even known risks are often disregarded in planning despite having a similar level to those taken into account – coronal mass ejection events, for example, are known but generally not considered.
3. The conjunction of very small probabilities and major consequences can lead to unreliable and dubious quantitative results.
4. Unlike resilience, risk approaches focus on the occurrence of specific events and do not take recovery time into account. This might be one reason why emergency management has until now primarily emphasised response rather than subsequent recovery.
5. In practice risk management is often done poorly, with focus on box-ticking rather than principles. I have seen examples in practice so bad that the whole exercise has been useless. The problem seems to arise from the prescriptive nature of the Risk Management Standard. For this practical reason, risk management is unreliable.
6. Finally, for historical reasons there are several usages or meanings of “risk”, so that it is easy to be subtly confused as to the intended meaning. It can lead to woolly thinking.

A resilience approach deals easily with the completeness problem of item 2 above insofar as resilience is a property of the artefact or system being considered, rather than being associated with a particular threat. Thus a bridge designed for resilience should be expected

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to deal with not only a multiplicity of known threats such as earthquakes, floods, landslips and so on but also, importantly, with unexpected and unanticipated events. Resilience also addresses recovery time, as noted in item 4 above.

Three other points to make regarding resilience are that

1. It can include time-related effects such as buffering. The Draft Strategy mentions one positive effect of buffering, but there is another, which is that buffering can buy time, so helping response and recovery.

2. The idea of a tipping point is an important resilience concept, where the initial impact is so great that the system is overwhelmed and can never recover. A resilience strategy should ensure tipping points are rarely reached. I would recommend that the Strategy includes some reference to this issue.

3. Perhaps because resilience is a relatively recent discipline and does not yet have the well-developed mathematical and philosophical ideas that underpin risk, there is no commonly-accepted metric for resilience even though there have been many proposals. The difficulty is that if one wants to improve resilience, it is necessary to have some metric for measuring the improvement.

Given the limitations of risk approaches, it is thus easy to make an argument for shifting the emphasis in disaster management from risk to resilience. I would encourage those writing the Strategy to include a clear statement giving the rationale for the shift.

I am concerned that despite its title, the Draft National Strategy gives the implication that it is concerned only with societal resilience, leaving the effects of a disaster on physical assets and infrastructure to be dealt with by risk management. This is wrong: it is just as important to apply resilience ideas to physical assets. In fact, both may well interact with each other. A recent report on improving infrastructure resilience for the West Coast (and CDEM was one of the clients) used community resilience to provide measures by which infrastructure resilience improvement could be categorised. The report is readily available on the Web. A forthcoming paper explains its resilience strategies in more detail. I realise that “Resilience of the built environment” is included in section 4.2.4 of the Draft Strategy, but the idea is not integrated into much of the rest of the document.

Furthermore, the three-pronged approach outlined in the Draft Strategy’s Foreword confines resilience to “a deliberate effort to strengthen our wider societal resilience.” The document should also introduce resilience thinking into the other two prongs.

There is a possibility that the Sendai Framework may be mistaken in confining its thinking to risk and not introducing the need for resilience. The problem may of course lie with the

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confusion in the use of “risk” alluded to in point 6 above. Using one sense of risk, with the meaning of “threat”, resilience may be seen as a contribution to managing risk.

Finally, I would like to reemphasise the very first statement in this submission and say that although I have raised what I think are some serious issues, nevertheless the Draft Strategy makes a great deal of sense and covers most issues I would want to see included. I appreciate the effort that went into it.

DGE
November 2018
Thank you for the opportunity to provide comment on the Draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

I’m heartened to find the strategy has an opportunities focus, and is rooted in the recognition that importance of recovery has been underestimated, and that vulnerability is all-important in determining impact.

Similarly the careful explanation of the four capitals / well-beings frameworks, emphasis on integration, collaboration and whole of society responsibility and mention of intentions to trust-creating transparency, and to imbed a collective impact approach and Theory of Change to measuring and monitoring progress, are all elements of a strategy that shows a commitment to embrace the latest in disaster resilience thinking.

The objective of embedding strategic objectives for resilience in key plans and strategies at district and region level (16, p28), alignment with living standards and wellbeing measures, and reference to the need for measures/comment on all three aspects of the Triple Dividend to be key elements of better business cases (p43) are but a few examples from the Strategy that illustrate very real, rather than token intention to excellent strategy-focussed leadership, and ‘joined up government’ to achieve disaster resilience.

I do have some concerns though. These fit into five broad areas that I summarise as follows:

- The core of the strategy and its objectives (what is currently Appendix 1) should be located at the beginning of the document.
- The objectives as currently draft lack the ‘measureable’ element of being ‘SMART’ – at the very least links to the intended future document(s) containing these measures currently buried on p32 should be added to the ‘one-pager’ currently in Appendix 1.
- Some language used in the document is not consistent with creating a ‘culture of resilience’ and building trust through transparency and openness.
- The emphasis on identifying hazards and risk modelling that pervades this document occurs at the expense of resilience building effort.
- Given this is a strategy rather than review document any reference to the results of review even in an Appendix should be linked to /illustrate the inclusion of an objective.
1. The core of the strategy and its objectives need to be more easily located - i.e. Appendix 1 should be upfront in the document. The days of writing lengthy justification or argument followed by conclusion are over. The surrounding context (what precedes and follows pages 24, 26 and 28 or the summary currently in Appendix 1) is valuable – however not everyone has time to read 45 pages. The strategy and objectives must be able to stand alone, first up in the document. Clear and concise communication provides the essence first and only then links to, or provides the explanation or detail.

2. The objectives as currently drafted are arguably essentially SMART ones – however, given the emphasis in section 8 on social accountability and transparency (p30) I’d expect the objectives to be far more obvious as to measures. In the absence of explicitly stated measures it would be relatively easy for a review in 2030 to create a narrative of success that does not match current intention or expectation of a diverse society.

The excellent background and summary on measures provided on p32 is buried in the document. I’ve found the phrase “Definitions scope and baseline data for these monitoring mechanisms will be produced in a separate supporting document.” Can that document at the very least be named in advance?

Cynically, one might find point 7 on p44 not only to be a slightly strange combination of topics/issues, but an ‘excuse’ for the absence of measures in the objectives as opposed to taking a little more time to complete the work of setting the objectives.

Perhaps more important than the reference to measuring impact (point 7 p44) is measuring value, and assessing cost versus benefit in ways that the assumptions made in the assessments are truly transparent.

3. Creating a “culture of resilience” within a truly participatory democracy should not require “promotion” or even “education” per se (cf. objectives 13 -15 p28). “Promotion” or “public information management” and an emphasis on the “right advice” (p26) is the language of a “PR-focussed communications team” in contrast with an ‘honest broker’, organisation or society that truly values providing information to achieve informed decision-making (p23) and truly recognises and respects transparency (p30), and individuality (Whanaungatanga kotahitanga p14) without expectation of an ‘ignorant public’ or fearing a ‘shift of power to individuals’ or ‘radical transparency’ as inclusion of the latter two phrases as ‘wildcards’ might be taken to imply (p44).

3a) p13 – use of the terms ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom up’ is out-dated. The stated intention is for meaningful consultation in relation to institutional changes, policies and strategies. It would be transformative to aim instead for, and refer to ‘integrated’ or ‘integrative’ approaches that achieve ‘co-production’ of information/knowledge.

3b) Transparency (p30) and openness and responsiveness (p44) are arguably preconditions for success – however, unless I’ve missed them (due to getting bogged down in 45 pages of detail?) none of the objectives relate directly to how these are to be achieved, let alone measured with respect to building resilience.

4. A pervasive emphasis on identifying hazards and risk modelling at the expense of resilience building effort. That there is so much white space on p23 “Managing Risks” highlights this point. Why are only financial instruments mentioned (and a brief mention at that)? Do we really want to limit ourselves to being a ‘risk savvy nation’ (p23) or is being a resilience savvy nation more aspirational and better aligned with the strategy? Do we really want to spend more on trying to ‘influence’ risk perception, or focus instead on co-producing
knowledge about the countless ways one can build resilience to all hazards and all risks through ‘business as usual’ activities?

Given this is a resilience strategy and in a world where we tend to work through lists in order I question why the first objective has a risk rather than resilience focus, though the scenario-based approach referred to is preferable to a probabilistic one.

In Objective 3 mention of risk awareness and risk literacy should be replaced with reference to awareness of resilience-building options and resilience literacy. Building risk awareness is not as empowering as creating awareness of risk management options, and research shows that action follows empowerment.

This topic lies at the heart of my research and consultancy – very briefly, and perhaps not as eloquently as I would like given the time available:

4a) Much of what is described in the strategy as our ‘incredible wealth of resilience-related research’ (3. in “congratulatory review” on p43 - is in fact focussed on hazard identification and prioritisation of risk (cf. emphasis - the order of wording - on p23).

My own research has shown that globally, and NZ is no exception, research about risk-management techniques and practice (research about the solutions) is far outweighed by research into identifying the problems – identifying hazards and modelling risk.

Furthermore, “connecting the pieces of the jig-saw” (p43) is indeed vital and that cannot occur when much of the research is (as I can show) based on single events or single issues, and certain disciplines are under-represented.

4b) Token mentions of empowerment do not suffice. The absence of true empowerment is a key ‘barrier to resilience’ not mentioned on p42. The limited set of risk management options provided in Appendix 2 is, in my view seriously disempowering.

“Ensuring that everyone has the data, information, knowledge, and tools they need to be able to make informed decisions about resilience” (p23) will require all parties recognising far more risk management options than are currently mentioned in Appendix 2. (As an aside is the Appendix intentionally not referred to in the body of the document?)

Rather than being a comprehensive resource of what is possible Appendix 2 seems to be a ‘do minimum’ because “the public don’t prepare as it is”. I’d suggest it should be more visionary as to what is possible – the more options provided the more likelihood that individuals and organisations find actions that resonate with them.

In particular on p36 – the conversation / narrative / framing around individuals and families is disappointingly risk- and ‘preparation’ rather than wider resilience-focussed – though this is unsurprising given the framing of DRR in the public sphere over the past 10+ years. It’s as if there’s an assumption of an ‘ignorant public’.

Leadership is critical to building resilience – but is not mentioned as an individual ‘pursuit’.

There are examples of organisations turning resilience theory into action; it is important that these are communicated (point 8. p42) however this document does not illustrate or perhaps more appropriately link the reader to where they might locate a list of such examples.

4c) In a similar vein on p16 – Underpinning knowledge – ‘information about risks", is mentioned before “information about effective resilience practices”. This may seem a pedantic observation on my part. However, since implicit ‘framing’ through emphasis is very real and
powerful I would recommend that someone reviews the document for other such perhaps
previously unnoticed ‘subtle’ messaging.

4d) I am relieved to see (on p12) acknowledgment that:

\[
\text{Risk} = (\text{Hazard Exposure} \times \text{Vulnerability}) - \text{Capacity}
\]

rather than a probability x consequence ‘equation’.

However I wonder about the emphasis on ‘hazard’, followed by ‘likelihood’ and ‘chance’ as
all-important - bracketing as these words do, the beginning and end of section 3.4.

My research has shown and is showing that the research focus is mirrored by a
communication focus on hazard identification as opposed to risk management and/or
resilience.

I suggest that the headlined reference to taking all practicable steps to identify and prioritise
risks (5. Managing Risks p23) should be amended to taking “all practicable steps to
managing risks” would properly shift the conversation / culture to solutions and opportunity-
foocussed resilience.

In my experience a probabilistic paradigm and resultant framing has led many risk or risk
management (resilience) conversations in New Zealand to ‘bog down’ in arguments about
hazard-focussed relative risk, rather than being focussed on solutions- (risk management
opportunities). ‘Might never happen’ (p42) is a consequence of a probabilistic framing.

Tying in with comment 4a) to my knowledge no-one has assessed the implications of New
Zealand’s choice of a probabilistic versus deterministic approach to disaster risk. Has this
strategy been written in the knowledge of the subtleties that a ‘pervasive probability
paradigm’ likely creates?

5. There are examples throughout the document where the results of review are presented
without linking to the objectives. For example the reference on p46 to New Zealand ‘needs
to learn’ – begging the question how? A strategy should look forward to close identified
gaps; there is still much to be done. I suggest that if such statements are left in the
document, even if in an Appendix summarising review, they should be linked to the
objective that will enable them to be achieved.

I now quickly list some other unrelated observations before closing.

A selection of some other brief comment on the draft for public consultation

i). Re “Our vision and goal” (p6) – I struggle to understand why the words “Risks to our
wellbeing and prosperity’ have been included– is this a typo?

ii). p11 – each of the changing risks listed in section 3.2 represent risk and opportunity (not only
digital connectivity and technological change)

iii) p14 having defined so many other terms a definition of subsidiarity – might be useful – mana
whakahaere?

iv) p15 - section 4.2.1 - suggest alternative wording is required

“While focussing on risk places most attention on negative consequences and uncertainty…

v) Objective 2 p24 – should ‘resistence’ read as ‘resilience’?
vi) p26 - The term ‘emergency management’ even when followed by ‘system’ emphasises urgent crisis interventions (response) rather than recovery. Listing recovery planning as the last of six objectives in this section – essentially an afterthought - and repeatedly listing recovery second - “response and recovery” - is likely to perpetuate what has been a historical focus on response at the expense of attention to recovery. To ultimately achieve equitable focus emphasising “recovery, not only response” is more likely to improve resilience.

vii) Ensure that sources of all pre-existing theories are properly acknowledged – e.g. (not wishing to detract from that excellent work in any way) Figure 3 Theory of change is not something created by the work-stream noted in footnote 7.

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Once again I thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft; I trust that my comments are helpful and do influence further revisions of the document in the true spirit of participatory democracy.

Sincerely,

Vivienne Bryner, PhD MInstD
Independent Researcher & Advisor
Risk & Opportunities Management & Science Communication
National Disaster Resilience Strategy

A submission prepared by the Waikato CDEM Group

Authorised by: Cr Hugh Vercoe – Chair Waikato CDEM Joint Committee
7 December 2018
1. **Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.**

The Waikato CDEM Group agrees in part with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy, but would like to see the vision amended to “a safe and resilient nation” to reflect the strategy and its sphere of influence (prosperous is a broad and subjective term). The strategy is aspirational and it is hard to disagree with the vision presented however there may be challenges, including financial, in implementing the strategy, particularly if the local government focus is maintained. We would like to see a greater recognition of the Partnership between Māori and the Crown and an affirmative statement in the vision that recognises the need for the Māori World View to be incorporated into our understanding of resilience.

2. **Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.**

Yes, The Waikato CDEM Group agrees with the priorities of the propose strategy but given the broad scope of this strategy we would like to see broader legislation referenced on page 10, to include examples such as the Health Act and the Biosecurity Act.

3. **Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.**

The Waikato CDEM Group agrees in part with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy, but would like to see the following amendments:

The Waikato CDEM Group agrees there is a need for an agreed, standardised, and widely used methodology for assessing disaster risks at a local government, large organisation, and central government level as set out in the success factors for objective 1, and would like to see assurance that the recommendations of the Sendai Framework on traditional knowledge will be incorporated, specifically “ensure the use of traditional, indigenous and local knowledge and practices [Mātauranga Māori], as appropriate, to complement scientific knowledge in disaster risk assessment and the development and implementation of policies, strategies, plans and programmes of specific sectors, with a cross-sectoral approach, which should be tailored to localities and to the context”.

Objective 2 requires amendment to governance of risk and resilience rather than risk and resistance as written.

The Waikato CDEM Group supports the use of appropriate benchmarking to measure progress on risk management as proposed in the success factors for objective 2, but would like to see fit-for-purpose measurements used. The Group request that we are consulted during the development of these measurements. Whilst it is difficult to extrapolate the implications for the Group of the Strategy in its present form and in the absence of a roadmap, the logframe example given on page 32 doesn’t appear to flow easily through the phases. The text given in section 8.3.1 seem to suggest monitoring and evaluation will largely be confined to CDEM Group plans and local government activities. Whilst the large contribution necessary from these entities to deliver the strategy is acknowledged, there should...
be monitoring and evaluation at a whole of local government and central government level as well. We support the development of a resilience index as proposed in section 8.3.2.

The Waikato CDEM Group offer strong support for the success factor offered for objective 4 – there is a very pressing need for a national conversation, including with affected and potentially affected communities. As a minimum this conversation needs to include a discussion around funding/financial policies. Conversations around managed retreat (as proposed by Ministry for the Environment in their climate change guidance) will require this supporting information.

The Waikato CDEM Group supports the recognition in Objective 7 that iwi are a partner in emergency management, reflective of the obligations of the Treaty of Waitangi on government. The Group also supports the full objective and success measures as a recognition that despite our best efforts to build resilience in our communities there will still be a level of “residual vulnerability” that requires our support to address in an emergency.

Better recovery processes will contribute positively to the resilience of communities and recovery is insufficiently covered in this strategy. Possible options for increasing recovery efforts would be the inclusion of development of a recovery framework or recovery management doctrine as a success factor for objective 9 – (improve policy and planning to make it clear who is responsible for what, nationally, regionally and locally, in response and recovery), and expanding the success factors for objective 10 (build the capability and capacity of the emergency management workforce for response and recovery) to include a goal of all recovery managers being trained and accredited by 2030.

Objective 16 needs to be expanded to include a focus on emergency services and welfare services agencies (as a minimum) in the success factors and not be confined to local government in its success factors.

The Waikato CDEM Group supports the sentiment and success measures of objective 17 as we believe culture has a strong role to play in resilience, and there are strong benefits to the formation of multi-cultural partnership approaches to disaster planning and preparedness.

4. Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim? We would also appreciate your views if you disagree with this proposition.

Yes, the Waikato CDEM Group agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy. The strategy currently seems to place a large emphasis on local government, CDEM Groups and the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management and needs this broadened. The strategy will need to involve many partners; and interact with the likes of Local Government, SOLGM, infrastructure industry and a number of Government and Non-Government Organisations.

For good governance participation the Waikato CDEM Group would like the strategy elevated in legislation – that is a requirement for relevant central government entities and local government to give effect to the strategy, rather than the present requirement to not be inconsistent with. We would also like to see a regulatory impact statement developed.

The Waikato CDEM Group request consultation be undertaken during the development of the roadmap for implementation of this Strategy. This would ideally take the form of co-creation. The developed roadmap should clearly articulate the role of each stakeholder and, in particular, distinguish the responsibilities of the Joint Committee.
5. **Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?**

The resources provided in appendix 2 are particularly useful.

6. **Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy (current strategy) that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?**

No comment made.

**General statements**

Influencing the housing shortage or the affordability of homes in New Zealand is beyond the scope of the CDEM Act and cannot be influenced by the parties bound by this Act. Given that this strategy is empowered by the Act, the content referring to contributing to building resilience in New Zealand should describe only areas the Act can influence how it intends to contribute by working with New Zealanders collectively and individually.

There are many broad statements in the document. We submit that a bibliography giving information sources would give more weight and mana to the strategy.

We would like to see more consistency in the terms used in the document. Where a key term is defined in policy or legislation we would like this used as the definition rather than a new definition supplied. The definition of hazard on page 12 is inconsistent with the definition of hazard under the key terms section.
RESPONSE TO PROPOSED NATIONAL DISASTER RESILIENCE STRATEGY

Introduction
The Manawatu-Wanganui Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group appreciates the opportunity of providing feedback on the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy (the Strategy).

The CDEM Group is generally supportive of the Strategy noting however that individual members of the Group may be providing their own agency feedback.

Comment
The Strategy was discussed at length by the CDEM Coordinating Executive Group (CEG) in conjunction with officers from the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management (MCDEM) on the 28th November 2018 with the general consensus being that the Group generally supported the Strategy as written. Feedback was however provided to MCDEM.

The feedback below is additional to that provided at the CEG meeting.

Feedback
- **Clarity of document:**
  On first reading the Strategy it is not abundantly clear what the Strategy is about and its intent. It is not until reaching Appendix 1 at page 34 that a clear picture of what the Strategies Vision, Goal, and supporting Objectives actually are.

  **Recommendation** – Consider bringing the contents of Appendix 1, or an abbreviated version, forward to the start of the document. This would help provide useful context to readers/users early in their reading.

- **Title of the Strategy:** – National Disaster Resilience Strategy
  The use of the term “Disaster” conjures up an image that the Strategy is only for catastrophic events. Obviously resilience is important regardless of the scale of the event/emergency. Disaster is also not a term commonly used in CDEM legislation. Whilst those in the CDEM sector can understand and appreciate the context of the term “Disaster”, this may not be so obvious for those outside of the sector.

  **Recommendation:** - consider the appropriateness of using the term “Disaster”. For example the title and purpose of the Strategy could be described as:

  National Emergency Resilience Strategy – readying New Zealand for Emergencies, Disasters or Adverse Events.

- **Purpose of the Strategy:**
  The scope of the Strategy (serial 1.3 p.8) notes the scope of the Strategy being confined to the disaster aspects of resilience and that other issues such as health, education, and social deprivation are well catered for by other policies and programmes across government and through society. It notes that those other policies and strategies will not be duplicated in the Strategy.
The scope of the Strategy being confined to areas of disaster resilience is supported however it would be useful to show how the Strategy links to those other policies and programmes as referred.

**Recommendation** – Consider a mechanism to articulate the connection between the Strategy and those other policies and programmes, particularly those of Central Government. This would then provide those users of the other policies and programmes with an understanding of the connectivity between their areas of operation and that which the Strategy seeks to achieve.

- **Wellbeing's:**
The inclusion of and reference to “wellbeing” throughout the Strategy is supported.

- **Priorities:**
Sections 5, 6, and 7 outline the 18 Objectives and identify target dates for achieving each objective. Of the 18 Objectives, 4 have year 2025 as a target date for achieving with the remaining 14 having a target date for achieving by year 2030.

**Recommendation:** whilst appreciating that changes in legislation (e.g. TAG Review outcomes) maybe needed to help achieve some of the Objectives it is believed that a bolder vision in regards to timelines in achieving all Objectives should be considered.

- **Appendix 4: Two key opportunities**
Appendix 4 illustrates the 'Collective Impact' methodology and notes that the Strategy aims to emulate the intent and conditions of Collective Impact.

The ‘Collective Impact’ approach is supported however given that the Strategy is primarily aimed at disaster resilience it is unclear how wellbeing, and in particular the Four Capitals (Natural, Human, Social, and Financial/Physical) will be threaded into the ‘Collective Impact’ methodology.

**Recommendation:** provide commentary to outline how the ‘Collective Impact’ approach will take account of other influencers such as wellbeing (Four Capitals).

IAN LOWE
MANAGER EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICE
7 December 2018

National Disaster and Resilience Strategy Submissions
Ministry of civil Defence and Emergency Management
P O Box 5010
Wellington 6145

Sent by email: NationalStrategy@dpmc.govt.nz

Submission on the DRAFT National Disaster and Emergency Strategy

Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission in respect of the draft National Disaster and Resilience Strategy 2018.

**Background**

Coastal shipping is a vital part of New Zealand’s transport infrastructure. Recent events have shown that the coastal network is important for New Zealand economic, environmental and social welfare and vital during emergencies when road links are disabled.

New Zealand depends on coastal ships. For example:

- for delivery of important goods such as fuel oil and cement.
- for provision of a bridge for freight and passengers between Picton and Wellington.
- for moving containerised and bulk cargo around the coast
- when other modes of transport are not useable because roads or railways are broken

Central and local government decisions as well as port decisions affect the performance of the coastal network.

In the last 24 months, 4 new ships have joined the coastal fleet reflecting investments of over $150million in the New Zealand economy.

The Federation is committed to working with decision-makers to ensure that the best policy settings are in place for the benefit of all New Zealanders. We are happy to work proactively to bring sector knowledge to support the policy-making process.

The Federation remains committed to safe, secure and clean shipping.
The New Zealand Shipping Federation began in 1906 and is the key representative body for New Zealand’s coastal shippers. Members of the Federation are:

- **Coastal Bulk Shipping**: www.coastalbulkshipping.co.nz  
  Anatoki  
  Bulk cargo

- **Coastal Oil Logistics (COLL)**: www.coll.co.nz  
  Buffalo  
  Cement

- **Holcim**: www.holcim.co.nz  
  Aratere  
  Kairarahi  
  Kaitaki  
  Cement

- **InterIslander**: www.interislander.co.nz  
  Aratere  
  Kaitaki  
  Cook Strait ferry

- **NIWA**: www.niwa.co.nz  
  Tangaroa  
  Kaharoa  
  Research

- **China Navigation**: www.pacship.co.nz  
  Aoteaora Chief  
  Spirit of Canterbury  
  Cement

- **Silver Fern Shipping**: www.sfsl.co.nz  
  Kokako  
  Matuku  
  Fuel

- **Strait Shipping**: www.strait.co.nz  
  Straitsman  
  Strait Feronia  
  Cook Strait ferry

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**DRAFT National Disaster and Emergency Strategy**

The Federation appreciates that the draft strategy is written at a very high level of generality and principle. We appreciate that this the scope has been tailored to ensure that it is focussed on the disaster aspects of resilience and we agree that this is necessary in order to make the document meaningful. That said, the audiences for this document include central and local government as well as businesses, organisations and iwi. It is not just about individual readiness.

The Federation endorses the document’s goal of New Zealand being a risk savvy nation (page 23). This is about identifying the real risks and addressing them.

Even at the very high level at which the document is addressed, the Federation believes that there is a need to address the impact of the unique geography of New Zealand and the way that transportation and supply systems have evolved to meet the challenges created by our geography. Specific risks that have been apparent after recent earthquakes include:

- two main islands with significant supply dependency between the islands,
- on-going reliance on just-in-time supply chains (referred to at page 11 in the document),
- many coastal cities, towns, villages and individual dwellings that have the potential to be isolated by land slips,
- dependence on international shipping for both imports and imports.
Many lessons were learnt in the Kaikoura earthquake but we are concerned that these lessons may have been quickly forgotten. We cannot solely rely on the same level of good luck that got us through that emergency. For that reason, we recommend that the role of transport resilience should be acknowledged explicitly as being as important as:

- social resilience
- cultural resilience
- economic resilience
- resilience of the built environment
- resilience of the natural environment, and
- governance of risk and resilience.

The Federation believes there are considerable risks if it is just assumed that transportation will get picked up as an aspect of other issues.

The document needs to acknowledge that there are situations where there is a gap between the commercial interests of a single operator and the costs of putting system-wide resilience measures in place. A risk savvy nation would identify how such gaps can be filled and would fill them in readiness. Alternative mooring points on both islands for the Cook Strait ferries is an example of this as the operators cannot be held responsible for the provision of such emergency stand-by readiness.

The role of port infrastructure generally needs to be acknowledged as part of the strategy. A laissez faire approach to port infrastructure, effectively looking at them as a stand-alone business, ignores the critical role that ports play in every aspect of the life of the people that rely on them as a means of incoming and outgoing supply.

To be resilient, coastal communities need to consider what maritime alternatives they may be able to use in the event that they are cut off by land and what needs to be put in place to enable this.

The Federation is happy to assist in the further development of this draft so that it is comprehensive.

Annabel Young
Executive Director

P.O. Box 10739, The Terrace, Wellington 6143
Email [omitted]
www.nzsf.org.nz
Hi Amanda,
I haven't got the hard copy. This is part my Submission with out knowing what is in there.
If there is anything you like to know or needs to be changed just email me.
I can not open the link on my computer so I hope I have this submission right
Under the Disability Dog should Be added
Health Act 1956 under 120.
Health and safety Act 2015.
Animals Protection Act 1960 and Police.
Please make sure all of your team learn about all Disability Dogs in NZ under the
GOVT Dog Control Act 1996 up dated 2006 under 2 will give you all the six
Disability Dogs organisation in New Zealand that can certify dogs for legal public
access which means the dog can go with the owner into areas where most dogs
can't. These laws mean that with our companion we can go into areas most dogs
can't so you may see these dogs in places such as:
Shops, Doctors, Hospital, library, court house, or cafes and restaurants, movie
theatres, supermarkets, Council just to name a few.

All Disability Dogs and their Recipient safety come first for us under Civil Defence emergency.
Sometimes we can not get the jackets in time but most of our Disability Dogs
have a Civil Defence Tag on our Dogs and we have ID if we can get it in time.
I am on the local community Civil Defence emergency Team Tokoroa. We are the
spoke person for the Hearing Dogs for Deaf and Hearing Impaired People of NZ.
Stuart Aston is our CD officer.
You can click the hearing dogs link below.

Many thanks.
Roger & Naomi Drower
Man On A Mission

Roger is hard of hearing TXT ONLY.
Naomi

We Sponsor & Recipient of Hearing Dogs for Deaf and Hearing Impaired People of NZ
Email: info@hearingdogs.org.nz
www.hearingdogs.org.nz
7th of December 2018

Attention: The Office of the Minister of Civil Defence and Emergency Management

RE: proposed MCDEM Disaster Resilience Strategy

This submission contains feedback from New Zealand Red Cross in regard to the proposed MCDEM Disaster Resilience Strategy released on the 12th of October 2018.

Thanks for the opportunity to provide feedback on the Strategy and congratulations on its development.

In reviewing the Strategy, along with your consultation questions listed on the website, we have used this IFRC Checklist on Disaster Risk Reduction Law to provide a bit of a framework for the review.

Our feedback is in two forms:

Part 1 – summarised feedback

Part 2 – detailed feedback contained marked up PDF proposed MCDEM Disaster Resilience Strategy

List people who have contributed to the review:

- Angela Sutherland, Disaster Risk Manager
- Jamuna Rotstein, Disaster Readiness and Resilience Manager
- Andrew McKie, Disaster Response Manager
- Michael Donoghue, Disaster Recovery Manager

Regards,

Angela Sutherland
General Manager Disaster Risk Management
New Zealand Red Cross

Feedback from New Zealand Red Cross on the proposed MCDEM Disaster Resilience Strategy
### Recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Clearer policy context</strong></th>
<th><strong>Overview of NZRC feedback on the Strategy</strong></th>
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<td></td>
<td>Excellent to see the MCDEM Strategy has not been written in isolation, and that resilience of the nation is being linked to other policies, especially the Living Standards Framework used by Treasury – especially if the framework is embedded into the <em>Public Finance Act 1989</em>. Be good to have the connection more clearly presented upfront and perhaps an opportunity to incorporate the appended frameworks Collective Impact and Triple Dividend for Resilience, as it relates to the <em>Living Standards Framework</em> (perhaps in section 2.2)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>More clearly highlight the policy context in Section 1.2 (page 7) to the international policy links upfront (e.g. Sendai, Paris Agreement, Sustainable Development Goals) currently in section 3.6 on, as well as the Treaty of Waitangi (not mentioned until page 12) and 4.3 Resilience and Te Ao Maori. Also be good to see 4.2 and 4.3 swapped, to ensure that the 4.3 does not reflect a tokenistic application of the Treaty of Waitangi.</td>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Review the glossary</strong></th>
<th><strong>Overview of NZRC feedback on the Strategy</strong></th>
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<td></td>
<td>Within the Strategy there are inconsistencies in use of language throughout the document (e.g. resilience/disaster resilience; disaster/emergency/crisis/shocks/stressors/serious long-term effects/disruptive event; ready Vs prepared), and providing sources for the definitions in the glossary would be helpful (where possible) to indicate if they are standard terms from elsewhere or NZ specific terminology.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Suggestion to use consistent terminology for resilience in this context, “disaster resilience” (MCDEM Disaster Resilience Strategy) throughout the document to avoid confusion with broader contributions to community resilience, as per page 27. Resilience is defined differently on page 15 and 16 in the blue circles.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Great to see the terms many terms in the glossary align with Sendai and/or the Living Standards Framework as it will make reporting and benchmarking easier. Including references for terms will enable practitioners to use the document more easily.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Suggested to add terms to the glossary including: wellbeing (<em>including psychosocial dimensions</em>), absorption, adaptation, disaster resilience, recovery, social capital, natural capital, human capital, financial/physical capital.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The definition of <em>vulnerability</em> on page 12 is limited to &quot;assets&quot;, which does not describe the social and human aspects of vulnerability very well. The Red Cross Red Crescent movement uses the following definition of vulnerability</td>
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*Feedback from New Zealand Red Cross on the proposed MCDEM Disaster Resilience Strategy*
"the conditions determined by physical, social, economic, environmental and political factors or processes, which increase risk and susceptibility of people to the impact of hazards.” IFRC, Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment Guide. This is similar to the UNISDR definition “the conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards.”

Section 4

We support the proposed goal in section 4. The section clearly outlines a whole-of-society approach to holistically building resilience of communities that takes into account scales of time and space. Fantastic to see the IFRC’s Community Resilience framework included, and to see it adapted to the context in Aotearoa.

The links between resilience and wellbeing could be presented more clearly, perhaps using a diagram.

Objectives and measures of success

We broadly support the vision, goal, priorities and broadly the objectives. Specific feedback is provided within the Strategy, especially for objectives and measures of success within the attached marked up PDF – part 2.

Clearer roles and responsibilities for non-government actors before, during and after disasters

While the Strategy refers to a whole-of-society approach, much of the wording is appears at times to be Government-centric. Having clearer roles and responsibilities across 4Rs for all stakeholders would be helpful leverage full potential of the whole sector, including civil society, not only Government agencies.

Clarity about the Roadmap Action Plan

Excellent that the Strategy outlines that a Roadmap Action Plan will be developed. It is not clear within this framework how the Strategy will be coordinated and resourced (e.g. earmarking % of annual budgets at national/local level disaster resilience funding; establishing dedicated funds and support to support communities to holistically plan for resilient futures).

Clarity about the baseline

Appendix 3 provides some useful information about the current situation about it is unclear what the methodology for the “baseline” was and how that relates to future measurements for disaster resilience – which don’t fully reflect the model for measuring progress proposed in sections 8.

Part 2 – detailed feedback contained marked up PDF MCDEM Strategy (attached)
Feedback from New Zealand Red Cross on the proposed MCDEM Disaster Resilience Strategy
National Disaster Resilience Strategy

Rautaki Manawaroa Aituā ā-Motu

We all have a role in a disaster resilient nation
He wāhanga tō tātau katoa i roto i te iwi manawaroa aituā

DRAFT FOR CONSULTATION
New Zealand enjoys a relatively high standard of living, regularly coming high in global prosperity rankings with qualities such as an open market, free people and strong sense of society.

Not all is perfect. We have areas we need to work on, including to address inequalities in the distribution of living standards, and improve areas of weakness or decline, such as housing availability and affordability.

We also face risks to that standard of living. Increasingly complex and uncertain risks that represent a threat to our way of life, and to our prosperity and wellbeing. If realised, these risks can be extremely costly. Globally, the economic cost of disasters has increased steadily over the last 40 years, in large part because of the expansion to the built environment: damage to infrastructure and buildings cause huge cost – public and private – when impacted.

It is the impact on wellbeing that can have the most profound effect. In 2011 New Zealand suffered one of its worst ever natural disasters in the 22 February Christchurch earthquake. New Zealand Treasury in 2013 estimated the capital costs to be over $40 billion, the equivalent of 20% of gross domestic product. Beyond the tangible costs of damage and rebuild, lay a web of social and economic disruption and upheaval: flow-on effects to business and employment, psychological trauma, dislocation of communities, creation or exacerbation of existing social issues, disruption to normal lives and livelihoods, and uncertainty in the future.

Many of the risks we face both now and in the future can be readily identified. However, we also need to recognise that the future is uncertain; major, unexpected, and hard-to-predict events are inevitable. Moreover, the further we probe into the future, the deeper the level of uncertainty we encounter. Within this uncertain future environment, resilience is an important requirement for success.

Resilience is our – or a system’s – ability to anticipate, minimise, absorb, respond to, adapt to, and recover from disruptive events. In essence, it’s about developing a wide zone of tolerance – the ability to remain effective across a range of future conditions.

Given our risk landscape, and the uncertainty of the wider domestic and global environment, it is important for us to take deliberate steps to improve our resilience and protect the prosperity and wellbeing of New Zealand – of individuals, communities, businesses, our society, the economy, and the nation as a whole.

This Strategy proposes a three-pronged approach to improve our nation’s resilience to disasters – what we can do to minimise the risks we face and limit the impacts to be managed, building our capability and capacity to manage emergencies when they do happen, and a deliberate effort to strengthen our wider societal resilience.

The Strategy promotes a holistic approach to strengthening resilience that connects with a range of agencies and sectors to deliver improved outcomes for New Zealanders. Disaster risk and disaster impacts reach all parts of society; so, to the greatest degree possible, disaster resilience should be integrated into all parts of society. Disaster resilience therefore requires a shared approach between governments (central and local), relevant stakeholders, and the wider public – a collective approach to a collective problem. The goodwill, knowledge, experience, and commitment of all parts of society are needed to make a difference.
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Key terms
Ngā kupu hira

**Capacity**
The combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available within an organization, community or society to manage and reduce disaster risks and strengthen resilience.

**Disaster**
A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, leading to one or more of the following: human, material, social, cultural, economic and environmental losses and impacts.

**Disaster risk**
The potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets which could occur to a system, society or a community in a specific period of time, determined as a function of hazard, exposure, vulnerability and capacity.

**Disaster risk management**
Disaster risk management is the application of disaster risk reduction policies and strategies to prevent new disaster risk, reduce existing disaster risk and manage residual risk, contributing to the strengthening of resilience and reduction of disaster losses.

**Disaster risk reduction**
Disaster risk reduction is aimed at preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience.

**Emergency management**
The application of knowledge, measures, and practices that are necessary or desirable for the safety of the public or property, and are designed to guard against, prevent, reduce, recover from, or overcome any hazard or harm or loss that may be associated with any emergency, including the planning, organisation, co-ordination, and implementation of those measures, knowledge, and practices.

**Exposure**
People, infrastructure, buildings, the economy, and other assets that are exposed to a hazard.

**Hazard**
A process, phenomenon or human activity that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation.

**National risk**
A national risk is an uncertain, yet conceivable, event or condition that could have serious, long-term effects on New Zealand’s security and prosperity, requiring significant government intervention to manage.

**Readiness**
The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, response and recovery organisations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to and recover from the impacts of likely, imminent or current disasters.

**Reconstruction**
The medium and long-term rebuilding and restoration of critical infrastructures, services, housing, facilities and livelihoods required for the full functioning of a community or a society affected by a disaster, aligning with the principles of sustainable development and “build back better”, to avoid or reduce future disaster risk.

**Recovery**
The coordinated efforts and processes used to bring about the immediate, medium-term, and long-term holistic regeneration and enhancement of a community following an emergency.

**Response**
Actions taken immediately before, during or directly after a disaster to save lives and property, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected, and to help communities recover.

**Residual risk**
The disaster risk that remains in unmanaged form, even when effective disaster risk reduction measures are in place, and for which emergency response and recovery capacities must be maintained.
**Resilience**

The ability to absorb the effects of a disruptive event, minimise adverse impacts, respond effectively post-event, maintain or recover functionality, and adapt in a way that allows for learning and thriving, while mitigating the adverse impacts of future events.

**Risk assessment**

An assessment of the nature and extent of risk by analysing potential hazards and evaluating existing conditions of exposure and vulnerability to determine likely consequences.

**Risk transfer**

The process of formally or informally shifting the financial consequences of particular risks from one party to another, e.g. via insurance.

**Vulnerability**

The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards.
Our vision and goal
Tā mātau matakitenga me te uaratanga

Purpose of this Strategy
Our vision: a safe and prosperous nation
Risks to our wellbeing and prosperity
Our goal: a resilient future
1. Purpose of this Strategy

Te kaupapa o tēnei Rautaki

1.1 Delivering on the intent and purpose of the CDEM Act 2002

The purpose of this Strategy is to outline the vision and long-term goals for civil defence emergency management (CDEM) in New Zealand. CDEM in New Zealand is governed by the CDEM Act, which:

• promotes the sustainable management of hazards in a way that contributes to safety and wellbeing;
• encourages wide participation, including communities, in the process to manage risk;
• provides for planning and preparation for emergencies, and for response and recovery;
• requires local authorities to co-ordinate reduction, readiness, response and recovery activities through regional groups;
• provides a basis for the integration of national and local planning and activity; and
• encourages coordination across a wide range of agencies, recognising that emergencies are multi-agency events affecting all parts of society.

This reflects an overarching intent for a resilient New Zealand.

This is important because New Zealanders are, and will continue to be, at risk from a broad range of hazards.

We can do much to reduce our risks, through both a risk management approach, and by building broader societal resilience. We can also ensure we have effective processes in place for responding to and recovering from emergencies and other types of disruption when they do happen.

The Strategy sets out what we as New Zealanders expect in respect of a resilient New Zealand, and what we want to achieve over the next 10 years. It explicitly links resilience to the protection and growth of living standards for all New Zealanders, and promotes a wide, whole-of-society, participatory and inclusive approach.

The Strategy provides the vision and strategic direction, including to outline priorities and objectives for increasing New Zealand’s resilience to disasters. The detail of how those objectives are to be achieved sits in a roadmap of actions, alongside other related key documents including the National CDEM Plan and Guide, the National Security Handbook, CDEM Group Plans, and a range of other supporting policies and plans.

1.2 This is the third Strategy made under the Act

The first Strategy was made in 2003; the second in 2007. They were aimed at embedding the (then) new approach to emergency management in New Zealand, which was to take a comprehensive and integrated approach, utilising the ‘4Rs’ of risk reduction, readiness, response, and recovery.

In 2018 we have reached a level of maturity where we are ready for the next step. A number of things have influenced our thinking on what that step should be:

• 16 years of lessons from incidents and emergencies since the CDEM Act came into effect;
• work to develop a national risk register, which aims to support better identification, understanding and comparison of national risks;
• global agreements such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 that outlines how nations should approach their wider societal risk from disasters;
• a Ministerial Review (2017) on Better Responses to Natural Hazards and Other Emergencies, and the Government’s response to it, and
• a two-year long strategy development process with a wide range of stakeholders to analyse our current state and determine vision, goals, and objectives.

We have identified areas where we can do more – to be more effective, more capable, fit-for-purpose, to have all the information we need to make the smartest choices, to keep pace with changing risks, and changes in society. This Strategy details the conclusions, and the areas we need to focus on for a more resilient New Zealand.
1.3 Ring-fencing the scope of this Strategy

While acknowledging broad societal resilience is desirable for achieving higher living standards and optimal prosperity and wellbeing, this Strategy is confined to the disaster aspects of resilience.

Furthermore, while acknowledging the vital importance of wider social and economic attributes of disaster resilience (such as high levels of health and education, reduced inequalities and social deprivation, the building of fiscal and macro-economic strength, etc.), these issues are well-catered for by other policies and programmes across government and through society, and will not be duplicated here.

This Strategy is focussed on building a culture of resilience, and the actions we can all take - at all levels, from individuals and families/whānau, businesses and organisations, communities and hapū, cities, districts and regions, and Government and national organisations - to contribute to a more resilient New Zealand.

1.4 Intended audience and use of the Strategy

This Strategy is for all New Zealanders, and all those who live, work or visit here.

It is intended to provide a common agenda for resilience that individual organisations, agencies, and groups can align with for collective impact.

Central government, local government, businesses, organisations, and iwi can use it to guide them in building resilience both for their own organisation, and for the people and communities they support or provide services for.

Hapū and community organisations can use it to support community wellbeing and resilience, and to understand the wider network of agencies and organisations working towards common goals.

Individuals, households and whānau can use it to prompt thinking on their own resilience, and what they can do to ensure they are prepared for disruption and crises in the long term. The Strategy hopefully gives assurance of the wider network of actors supporting them at a community, local, regional, and national level.

All readers are encouraged to consider what this Strategy means for them, their family/whānau, community/ hapū, business or organisation, and what they can do to contribute to their own resilience or the resilience of others.

1.5 Currency of the Strategy

This Strategy will be current for a period of 10 years from the date it comes into effect, unless it is replaced during that time.
2. Our vision: a safe and prosperous nation
Tā mātau matakītenga: he iwi haumaru, he iwi rangatira

National success is about more than just economic measures. It is about a healthy and happy life, a good education for our children, a healthy environment that protects our natural resources and taonga, family/whānau and communities we can rely on, a safe place to live and work, opportunities to start a business or get ahead, and the freedom to be who we want to be. This is prosperity.

New Zealand has seen much success over the past decade in global indices designed to measure wellbeing and prosperity. We hold up well in most categories of measurement, including in economic quality, business environment, and governance; for our health and education systems, our natural environment, and – in particular – for our personal freedoms and social capital.

However, while we do well, we certainly can’t afford to be complacent. New Zealand must continually adapt and evolve if it is to see prosperity grow.

For us to secure wellbeing and prosperity for all our people – in this generation and for future generations – we must think about prosperity in more than in economic terms. The New Zealand Treasury, in developing the Living Standards Framework, has initiated a shift of focus. The Living Standards Framework is based on an economic model, but puts intergenerational wellbeing as its core goal.

Wealth matters, but as a means, not an end; wealth is only useful if it translates into higher living standards for everyone. Protecting and growing those living standards is paramount for securing a prosperous future. This Strategy is centred on how it can contribute to that vision.

2.1 The Living Standards Framework

The Living Standards Framework is a New Zealand-specific framework that draws on a range of national and international approaches to wellbeing. In particular, it builds on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) approach to wellbeing, the How’s Life?/Better Life model.

The framework conceives of wellbeing as being comprised of a number of aspects of life experience, such as housing, income, employment, education, community engagement, enjoyment of environmental amenity and health and safety. Measures of these aspects provide a snapshot of current wellbeing. The wellbeing of future generations is represented by four ‘capital stocks’ – financial/physical, social, human, and natural capital.

---

The Four Capitals

Intergenerational wellbeing relies on the growth, distribution, and sustainability of the Four Capitals. The Capitals are interdependent and work together to support wellbeing. The Māori-Crown relationship is integral to all four capitals. The LSF is being continually developed and the next iteration of the framework will consider the role of culture, including Māori culture, as part of the capitals approach in more detail.

- **Natural Capital**
  - This refers to all aspects of the natural environment needed to support life and human activity. It includes land, soil, water, plants and animals, as well as minerals and energy resources.

- **Human Capital**
  - This encompasses people’s skills, knowledge and physical and mental health. These are the things which enable people to participate fully in work, study, recreation and in society more broadly.

- **Social Capital**
  - This describes the norms and values that underpin society. It includes things like trust, the rule of law, cultural identity and the connections between people and communities.

- **Financial Capital**
  - This includes things like houses, roads, buildings, hospitals, factories, equipment and vehicles. These are the things which make up the country’s physical and financial assets which have a direct role in supporting incomes and material living conditions.
The capitals are seen as ‘value stocks’, which jointly produce wellbeing outcomes over time. Each of the dimensions of wellbeing is the result of all of the different capital stocks. Investments in the capital stocks will result in the levels of the relevant stocks increasing, while depreciation, resource depletion, pollution or waste – or other shocks or stresses – may result in capital stock levels declining.

The four capitals in the Living Standards Framework help us to take into account the range of impacts that a policy option or practice may have on the material and non-material factors that affect New Zealanders’ wellbeing, now and in the future. The underlying principle of the capitals framework is that good public policy and practice enhances the capacity of natural, social, human and financial/physical capital to improve wellbeing for New Zealanders.

**2.2 Risk and resilience, and our future wellbeing**

Safety and security are integral to securing wellbeing and prosperity. People’s wellbeing is dependent on having secure living conditions, personal safety, and trust and confidence in authorities, and their ability to manage threats and dangers. A secure and stable environment is necessary for securing freedoms, and for attracting investment and sustaining economic growth. In short, a nation can prosper only in an environment of safety and security for its citizens.

To this end, it is imperative that we look to risk management and resilience for all four capitals stocks.

New Zealand is relatively well placed in this regard with a comprehensive legislative framework in place for risk management, including the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, the Resource Management Act 1991, the Building Act 2004, the Local Government Act 2002, and a range of other legislation and regulatory instruments. We have a system of managing, coordinating, and overseeing national security (the National Security System) and emergency management arrangements at the local, regional, and national level.

Today, however, risk management is increasingly challenged by complexity in which multiple systems simultaneously impact on the four living standards capitals. Risk management in this setting requires a greater acknowledgement of uncertainty and a shift from reactive to proactive risk management. Decision-makers in both the public and private sectors require more comprehensive strategies that combine the active management of specific risks with enhancement of generic resilience in society.

This Strategy combines these elements and considers ways to improve our resilience across the four capitals.
3. Risks to our wellbeing and prosperity
Ngā mōrea ki tō tātau oranga, tōnuitanga hoki

From the Hawkes Bay earthquake (1931) to the Tangiwai rail disaster (1953), the Wahine shipwreck (1968), the lower North Island floods (2004), Pike River mine disaster (2010), the Canterbury (2010-2011) and Kaikōura (2016) earthquakes, MV Rena grounding (2011), 1080 milk powder crisis (2015), Port Hills fires (2017), or M. Bovis disease outbreak (2018) – New Zealand has had its fair share of devastating events.

These events have caused loss of life, injury, damage and disruption. Some have caused impacts in the built and natural environments; they have cost millions of dollars in repair and reconstruction. Other events have caused lost productivity, lost livelihoods, and lost income. More than that, these events have caused untold trauma and social disruption to individuals, family/whānau, communities and hapū, the effects and costs of which we might never fully know. In short, disasters, or other highly stressful events, impact all four capitals in a profound and costly way.

Disasters may seem inevitable and intractable, but there is much we can do to reduce the chance that hazards will affect us, and much we can do to lessen the impacts if and when they do.

This section explores some key concepts so that we have a common understanding about our key risks and how we can manage them.

3.1 Our current risks
New Zealand is exposed to a range of significant hazards and threats. Natural hazards, such as earthquakes, volcanoes, or extreme weather, is only one type; our economy relies heavily on primary production and is thus vulnerable to adverse impacts from pests and diseases; the potential for an infectious disease pandemic has been highlighted in recent years through the SARS, bird flu and swine flu crises; heavy reliance on technology and just-in-time supply chains means we are vulnerable to disruption from a wide range of domestic and international sources; and the global geopolitical environment means threats to our security and economy are complex and often unpredictable.

In New Zealand, we classify these in five categories: natural hazard risks, biological hazard risks, technological risks, security risks, and economic risks.

3.2 How our risks might change in the future
In assessing our risks, we can learn from past events and crises, but we also need to consider broader and longer-term societal trends and think about how they could impact us in the future. These trends include:

- Climate change and environmental degradation, which could impact on, or accelerate, a wide range of our risks owing to their effects on sea level rise, the frequency and severity of natural hazards and extreme weather, biodiversity and the availability and quality of ecosystems and their services.
- Population trends, including that New Zealand society is becoming older and more ethnically diverse, with changing levels of income inequality, and changing geographic distribution of population. This has implications for how organisations engage inclusively, and what needs must be met.
- Global economic growth and productivity, which have implications for both the state and resilience of our economy, and how much we can afford to invest in risk management and resilience.
- Digital connectivity and technological change, which can, simultaneously, be a source of both risk (for example, cyber-crime) or opportunity (for example, by enhancing our ability to collect and analyse complex data about risks).
- Challenges to the rules-based international order, which have the greatest effect on some of our economic and security risks, but could have further-reaching implications.
3.3 Cost of disasters

Disasters over the decade or more, both in New Zealand and overseas, have shown the magnitude of costs that are involved in these events, both in terms of damage (the market value of losses), and in the response to and recovery from such events. It is important to note that the costs that are reported are often only direct costs. Less well defined is the flow-on, indirect costs, and – even less so – from other longer-term outcomes (also known as ‘intangible costs’). A recent Australian study found that the indirect and intangible costs, when calculated, more than doubled the total reported cost of each of the three events studied.¹

While we intuitively know that the impact of disasters is much larger than the direct economic cost, it is only when we start to consider the economic cost of these indirect and intangible impacts that we can see what these events really cost us as communities, and as a nation, and how critical it is to try to minimise these costs – financial and social – as far as we possibly can.

3.4 What is disaster risk?

Disaster risk is the chance that a hazard could impact us in a significant way.

Disaster risk is a function of three interlinked aspects: hazard, exposure, and vulnerability.

Hazard refers to the likelihood and intensity of a process or phenomenon that could cause us harm, such as ground shaking induced by an earthquake, extreme winds associated with a cyclone, or a pathogen caused by a food safety issue or biological agent.

Exposure refers to the location, attributes, and value of people and assets (such as buildings, agricultural land, and infrastructure) that are exposed to the hazard.

Vulnerability is the potential extent to which physical, social, economic, and environmental assets may become damaged or disrupted when exposed to a hazard.

Vulnerability includes physical vulnerability, which refers to the level of damage sustained by built structures due to the physical load imparted by a hazard event. It also includes social vulnerability, which refers to damage as it relates to livelihood, social connections, gender, and other factors that influence a community’s ability to respond to, cope with, and recover from a disaster.

These three components can be countered by a fourth component, capacity, which refers to the strengths, attributes and resources available to reduce or manage the risks associated with the combination of the other three factors.

When these potential impacts are determined probabilistically, that is, are multiplied by how likely the hazardous event is to occur, we can determine our risk – the chance of significant impacts.

3.5 Disaster risk reduction

Disaster risk reduction is the discipline concerned with reducing our risks of and from disasters.

Historically, dealing with disasters focused on emergency response, but towards the end of the 20th century it was increasingly recognised that disasters are not ‘inevitable’ and that it is by reducing and managing conditions of hazard, exposure and vulnerability we can prevent losses and alleviate the impacts of disasters. Since we cannot usually reduce the likelihood of hazards the main opportunity for reducing risk lies in reducing exposure and vulnerability. Reducing these two components of risk requires identifying and reducing the underlying drivers of risk, which are particularly related to economic, urban and rural development choices and practice, degradation of the environment, poverty and inequality² and climate change, which creates and exacerbates conditions of hazard, exposure and vulnerability. Addressing these underlying risk drivers will reduce disaster risk, lessen impacts if they do happen, and, consequently, maintain development and growth.

¹ The Economic Cost of the Social Impact of Natural Disasters (2016) Australian Business Roundtable

² The impact of hazards and threats is likely to exacerbate existing inequities that exist across New Zealand. This means that some populations are disproportionately affected by many of the social and economic impacts of risks, particularly Māori, as well as Pasifika, people with disabilities and those living with high levels of social and economic deprivation. Obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi as well as commitments to improving wellbeing mean we need to ensure that any action toward reducing risk does not increase existing inequities. Any plan should explicitly embrace equitable outcomes for all affected people.
Disaster risk reduction can be seen as a policy objective, a risk management process, or a social aspiration. Successful disaster risk reduction tends to result from a combination of ‘top-down’, institutional changes, strategies, and policies, and ‘bottom-up’, local and community-based approaches.

### 3.6 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030

In 2015 New Zealand signalled its commitment to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (the ‘Sendai Framework’). The Sendai Framework is one of three global agreements developed as part of the ‘post-2015 sustainable development agenda’. Together with the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the Sendai Framework aims to be a blueprint for how nations should approach risks to their development – in this case, from disasters.

The Sendai Framework has a desired outcome of:

> The substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries.

To attain this outcome, it has a goal to:

> Prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk through the implementation of integrated and inclusive economic, structural, legal, social, health, cultural, educational, environmental, technological, political and institutional measures that prevent and reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase preparedness for response and recovery, and thus strengthen resilience.

The Framework has four priorities, and a series of recommended actions at the global, regional, national, and local levels. It promotes three key ideas:

1. A greater effort to understand risk (in all its dimensions), so that we can prioritise investment, make better risk-informed decisions, and build resilience into everyday processes.

2. A shift of focus from managing disasters to managing risk, including to reduce the underlying drivers of risk (exposure and vulnerability)

3. A broader ‘whole-of-society’ approach to risk – everyone has a role in reducing and managing risk.

The Framework sets 7 global targets for improved disaster risk reduction, which nations are asked to report on annually. The targets are:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Target Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Substantially reduce disaster mortality by 2030, aiming to lower average per 100,000 mortality between 2020-2030 compared with 2005-2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Substantially reduce the number of affected people by 2030, aiming to lower the average figure per 100,000 between 2020-2030 compared with 2005-2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services, among them health and educational facilities, including through developing their resilience by 2030.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Substantially increase the number of countries with national/local disaster risk reduction strategies by 2020.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries through adequate and sustainable support to complement their national actions for implementation of [the] framework by 2030.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Substantially increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster risk information and assessments to the people by 2030.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Sendai Framework has been a key influence in the development of this Strategy. The principles and priorities of the Sendai Framework have been incorporated into it; many of the national and local recommended actions have been instrumental in developing the Strategy objectives.
In an effort to address our current known risks, manage uncertainty, and be ready for any events that may occur in the future, it is generally agreed that the overarching goal is resilience. But – what does resilience mean to us, as New Zealanders? How do we define it, what are the attributes of resilience, and how do we improve it?

### 4. Vision of a resilient nation

Resilience can mean a lot of different things to different people. In a series of workshops we asked participants to describe what a resilient nation meant to them and the aspirations they have for New Zealand in respect of its disaster resilience. The result is a description of our desired ‘future state’ – the end goal, ‘what success looks like’ for this Strategy. This is shown on pages 20-21.

#### 4.1.1 Guiding principles for this Strategy

Within this vision of a resilient nation, we specifically looked at what principles and values are important to us in pursuing a resilience goal. We agreed that it is important to act with the following in mind:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manaakitanga</th>
<th>We respect and care for others</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Wellbeing, health and safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Hospitality, kindness, goodwill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whanaungatanga, kotahitanga</th>
<th>We nurture positive relationships and partnerships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Engagement and communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Collaboration and collective action</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Respect of individuality</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kaitiakitanga, tūrangawaewae</th>
<th>We guard and protect the places that are special to us</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Protecting and enhancing our environment and ecosystems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Intergenerational equity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Stewarding our place in the world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Feeling enabled and connected</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Matauranga</th>
<th>We value knowledge and understanding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Using scientific, historic, local, and traditional knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Striving for a common understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Accountability and transparency</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tikanga</th>
<th>Our customs and cultural practices are central to who we are</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cultural identity and expression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ethical and values-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Accountability and transparency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rangatiratanga</th>
<th>We lead by example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Values-based leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Self-determination, principle of subsidiarity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2 Resilience: a working definition

In the wake of unprecedented disasters in recent years, “resilience” has become a popular buzzword across a wide range of disciplines, with each discipline attributing its own definition to the term. A definition that has long been used in engineering is that resilience is the capacity for “bouncing back faster after stress, enduring greater stresses, and being disturbed less by a given amount of stress”. This definition is commonly applied to objects, such as bridges or buildings. However, most risks are systemic in nature, and a system – unlike an object – may show resilience not by returning exactly to its previous state, but instead by finding different ways to carry out essential functions; that is, by adapting and transforming to meet challenges.

In terms of disaster resilience, an important quality is also to anticipate and minimise risks as far as possible, such that any impacts are manageable and recoverable.

The working definition of resilience for this strategy is therefore “the ability to absorb the effects of a disruptive event, minimise adverse impacts, respond effectively, maintain or recover functionality, and adapt in a way that allows for learning and thriving.”

Below we offer two additional explanations:

one, a more technical explanation, and one, a simplified approach.

4.2.1 Getting more technical...

While risks tend to focus on the negative consequences from uncertainty, the concept of resilience encourages us to build capacity to help protect us from vulnerability, and to be able to better deal with the impact from shocks and stresses as they occur. The degree of vulnerability we have then depends on the nature, magnitude and duration of the shocks or stresses that are experienced as well as the level of resilience to these shocks.

Under this interpretation, resilience has two dimensions:

- an absorption dimension, which comprises resistance and buffers that can reduce the depth of impact, and
- an adaptability dimension, which focuses on elements of adaptability and innovation that maximise the speed of recovery.

Figure 1 below illustrates this idea. When a system is subject to a shock or stress, the level of functioning declines, and can fall rapidly. The depth of the fall in functioning can be thought of as the absorption capacity of the system. A system with a high absorption capacity experiences only a small loss in functioning (e.g., because it has sufficient buffers to absorb the stress or shock to ensure it continues to achieve desired outcomes). The speed of recovery dimension is captured by the time lag between the stress or shock and when functioning returns to a steady-state level. Systems that have high adaptability are able to recover faster than is otherwise the case. The two dimensions together acknowledge that the total impact of a shock is a function of both the depth of the impact and the time it takes to recover.

![Figure 1: Two dimensions of resilience: absorption and adaptability](image-url)
4.2.2 Simplifying resilience...

A simpler way of thinking about resilience is our ‘tolerance for disruption’ – how much disruption, in the form of hazards, that we, or the system, can cope with before it becomes a significant impact on our wellbeing.

The implicit suggestion here is that as we are able to remove, avoid, or minimise more risk factors, and build our people, assets, and systems to be responsive and adaptable, so our tolerance for disruption grows – we can deal with a wider range and size of shocks and stresses, without them becoming a major crisis or disaster, and recover fast – and well – without significantly affecting our quality of life. The greater our range of tolerance for disruption, the better off we are.

4.2.3 Types of resilience

Resilience as a concept has wide applicability to a range of disciplines, and has become a popular area of academic study and organisational pursuit over recent years. As a result, it is routine to hear about many different types of resilience, for example ecological, environmental, institutional, infrastructural, organisational, economic, social, community, familial, and individual resilience – to name just a few.

Within this context, it is particularly important to be clear about our goals and objectives; in particular:

**Resilience of what, to what, why, and how?**

In terms of this Strategy, we have talked about **of what, to what, and why** – to protect and grow our capitals in the face of shocks, stresses, and uncertainty, in order to advance the wellbeing and prosperity of New Zealand. The remainder of this Strategy is about how we do that.

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4.2.4 Model of a resilient nation: protecting our capitals from shocks and stresses

The literature review and engagement process to develop this Strategy has identified the following types of resilience are important for protecting our capitals – our future wellbeing – from shocks and stresses:

- **Social resilience**: this includes promoting social connectedness and cohesion, and the effective operation of key social support functions, such as health, education, welfare, and justice, for the protection and strengthening of our social and human capital.

- **Cultural resilience**: including aspects such as cultural values, places, institutions, and practices; our identity as New Zealanders, and our history and heritage.

- **Economic resilience**: this includes the protection and continuity of the macroeconomic environment, businesses, financial markets, financial management practices (including through insurance), thereby protecting our financial capital.

- **Resilience of the built environment**: this includes the resilience of critical infrastructure (namely communications, energy, transport, and water), buildings and housing, effective urban design and planning, and the engineering and construction disciplines, for the protection of our physical capital.

- **Resilience of the natural environment**: including the sustainable use of natural resources, land-use, and the ecological system, managing long-term climate resilience, and improved understanding of both how hazards impact the environment and how the environment can protect society from hazards.

- **Governance of risk and resilience**: including leadership, policy, strategy, security, and the rule of law, for effective oversight, coordination, collaboration, and coherence of resilience activity.

- **Underpinning knowledge**: including up-to-date information on risks, and effective resilience practices. These are shown in the diagram on the next page.
These types of resilience can operate – in some form – at a range of levels, from individuals and families/whānau, to businesses and organisations, communities and hapū, cities and districts, and at a national level.

For example, at a community level, the attributes of a safe and resilient community are that it:

... is connected: It has relationships within its network, and with external actors who provide a wider supportive environment, and supply goods and services when needed.

... is healthy: it has a good level of individual and population health, access to medical treatment, education, and a range of other social welfare support, when needed.

... has cultural norms: it has a strong identity, attachment to place, and sense of civic responsibility. It is inclusive, and looks to cultural norms and values to sustain it in times of upheaval.

... has economic opportunities: It has a diverse range of employment opportunities, income, and financial services. It is flexible, resourceful, and has the capacity to accept uncertainty and respond to change.

... has infrastructure, services, and safe buildings: it has strong housing, transport, power, water, and sanitation systems. It also has the ability to maintain, repair, and renovate them.

... can manage its natural assets: it recognises the value of natural resources and indigenous ecosystems, and has the ability to protect, enhance, and maintain them.

... is organised: it has the capacity to identify problems, establish priorities, coordinate, collaborate, and act.

... is knowledgeable: it has the ability to assess, manage, and monitor its risks. It can learn new skills, build on past experiences, and plan for its future.

Adapted from: Characteristics of a Safe and Resilient Community, IFRC (2011)

This Strategy asserts that broad attention to resilient practices within and across each of these environments is critical to the overall resilience of the nation, and protection of our capitals and future wellbeing. The model is not a strategy itself, but a checklist, of kinds, to ensure we pay attention to the range of things that are important. It can also operate as a basis for assessment, or as a decision-making tool, for example, to evaluate whether options or investment are meeting, or are sensitive to, multiple needs.
4.3 Resilience and Te Ao Māori

Any comprehensive framework for resilience in New Zealand needs to consider both the resilience of Māori and Māori concepts of resilience. This reflects the status of Māori as the indigenous population of New Zealand and the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.

4.3.1 Tangata whenua and resilience

Māori share a holistic and community perspective on resilience, which can be characterised as the social, physical, familial, spiritual and environmental wellbeing of whānau, the unit of cultural capital in Te Ao Māori. Sustainable wellbeing is achieved through having a secure Māori identity, that is intergenerationally linked through whānau, local communities, and different iwi, to the earth mother Papatūānuku (the land), from whom all Māori descend. This genealogy imposes moral obligations on Māori to enact guardianship roles and responsibilities to ensure the oranga – ongoing wellbeing, or more broadly the resilience – of all residents, flora, fauna and the wider environment (lands, rivers and seas) of New Zealand.

4.3.2 Tangata whenua and disaster risk reduction

When a disaster occurs, the responsibility of caring for others and Te Ao Tūroa (the natural world), falls to whānau, hapū and iwi with historical ties to the areas impacted by the disaster. Whakapapa creates a kinship-based form of capital understood by Māori as whanaungatanga (close relationships), that may be drawn on to aid communities during times of adversity. Whānau, hapū and iwi respond quickly and collectively to provide support and address the immediate needs of communities as well as to institute practices that will aid the recovery, and the development of disaster resilience in affected regions.

This process is considered whakaoranga⁴ – the rescue, recovery and restoration of sustainable wellbeing and may be applied to whānau, hapū, and iwi, tribal homelands as well as all communities and parts of New Zealand impacted by disasters. The whakaoranga process is underpinned by kaupapa Māori (cultural values), informed by mātauranga Māori (cultural knowledge and science) and carried out as tikanga Māori (cultural practices). These cultural attributes interact to co-create community and environmental resilience in the context of disasters.

Key values that shape Māori inter-generational practices for facilitating whakaoranga (restoration and resilience) include kotahitanga (unity), whānau (family), whakapapa (genealogy), marae (community centres), whakawhanaungatanga (building/maintaining relationships), manaakitanga (respect/support/hospitality), and kaitiakitanga (guardianship). From a Māori perspective, such values link with a set of practices that must be learnt and enacted through giving time and support for the good of all rather than the wellbeing of oneself, and such actions are a positive indicator of a person's mana.

4.3.3 Tangata whenua and a resilient nation

The effective response and significant community support facilitated by Māori in the aftermath of the Canterbury and Kaikōura earthquakes, the floods in Edgecumbe as well as in other emergencies, has generated considerable interest in Māori disaster resilience. Māori moral and relational attributes applied to creating community resilience promote a collaborative response to disaster recovery, commitment to environmental restoration, and the extension of hospitality to others experiencing adversity. Māori also have a significant asset base, which has, and will again be mobilised to secure community wellbeing in the aftermath of disasters⁵.

These strengths are highly relevant to developing a resilient New Zealand, and partnering with Māori to build disaster resilience is essential to ensuring that outcome.

This Strategy recognises the importance of whakaoranga, the Māori-Crown relationship, and Māori worldviews generally: it is committed to an inclusive, community approach to resilience; it is focussed on putting people at the centre of resilience, including an emphasis on manaakitanga and wellbeing; it aims to build a partnership approach between iwi and agencies with roles in the emergency management system, and it seeks to build recognition of the role culture – including kaupapa Māori and tikanga Māori – plays in our wider resilience.

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⁴ Acknowledgement: The concept and application of the term whakaoranga to disaster resilience were developed in the National Science Challenge Resilience to Nature’s Challenges’ research project: Whakaoranga marae, led by Dr Christine Kenney.

⁵ It is important to note that while many Māori may share a similar worldview, there is still a need to recognise different dynamics both within and between iwi/ hapū, and to engage with each on an individual basis. There is also a need to recognise that different iwi, hapū and marae have different resource constraints and asset bases and their ability to respond is dependent on this; not all iwi will have the same resilience or capacity to respond.
4.4 A resilient nation: how are we doing?

The process to develop this Strategy included a collective evaluation of New Zealand’s current state of resilience, including our strengths, barriers to, and opportunities for building resilience. Appendix 3 details the main conclusions, and can be seen as the ‘baseline’ for the Strategy, as well as the main evidence base on which many of the priorities and objectives are based.

4.5 Conclusion: co-creating a resilient society

Today’s world is turbulent and is likely to be so in the future. However, it is also dynamic, and characterised by huge opportunities for leadership and innovation. A critical question for the next 10 years will be how to enable and use those opportunities to effectively build resilience and address the many challenges that will continue to confront us.

One of the key messages is that we need to look to a range of sources for inspiration and relevance as we adapt to a shifting, and increasingly challenging environment. These include exploring new opportunities for engagement and action through technology, new sources of inspiration and activity driven by younger generations, and new methods for measuring and demonstrating impact.

We need to embody agility and flexibility. We need to monitor risks and trends, maintain a learning, growth mindset, and adapt and transform our organisations and ourselves as necessary. Within this, it is important to focus on adaptive capabilities – the skills, abilities, and knowledge that allow us to react constructively to any given situation.

We need to work out how we build our resilience in a smart, cost-effective way, so that it’s realistic and affordable, and so it isn’t a ‘sunk’ cost, like stockpiles for a bad day – but rather enables better living standards today.

Above all, we need to work together. Building resilience as siloed sectors is not enough – government, the private sector, and civil society need to be more joined up. More effective ways of tackling challenges are required, which, by necessity, will transcend traditional sector barriers. This includes employing new business models that combine the resources and expertise of multiple sectors of society to address common challenges, as well as creating opportunities that enable leaders across all sectors to participate effectively in decision-making.

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It is in this cross-sectoral space that we have the opportunity and ability to underpin the resilience dynamism that we need, by engaging in ways that inspire, support and shape a change agenda that is needed for improved resilience at both the national and local levels. By developing these cross-sectoral opportunities, we can build powerful networks built on trust, commitment, and a focus on the collective good, which can be translated into positive outcomes for society.

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* Including representatives from over 300 organisations from local and central government, iwi, social, community, and voluntary sector groups, emergency services, and the private sector including the business, lifelines and infrastructure sectors.
Vision of a resilient New Zealand
He matakitenga o te Aotearoa manawaroa

A future resilient New Zealand is a nation where resilience thinking is integrated into all aspects of life as a matter of course. There is a deep, shared understanding of a wide range of risks and the nature of the action that each of them requires. From an individual level, to families and whānau, communities and settlements, towns and cities, and at a national level, everyone understands their own share of responsibility for reducing risk and strengthening resilience. A strong understanding of risk and resilience is also an integral part of business culture. The sum of these parts builds a risk-savvy, resilient nation.

Strong leadership has created a coherent, joined-up approach to resilience that connects with a range of government departments and organisational mandates. Communities are empowered to problem solve and adapt. At a national level, a long-term resilience strategy and the associated capacities and governance structures are in place. There is a constant flow of up-to-date, evidence-based information on best practice. This supports the capacity for local, site-specific, and innovative response. Rich information flows make it possible for communities and the nation to identify and connect-up resources and use them where they are most needed.

New Zealand communities and neighbourhoods are well connected both by face-to-face interaction and digital networks. There are shared values and social norms in relation to resilience that support a whole of society approach. At the same time, resilience thinking connects with, draws on and permeates all cultures within New Zealand. People make the connection between resilience and their own culture, values traditions, sense of identity and sense of place.
New Zealand takes a proactive, anticipatory, smart approach to limit impacts before they happen, understanding that action up-front limits costs later. This includes taking steps to both to mitigate the risks from climate change, and to adapt to the change that is already taking place. Tough issues are tackled through collective conversation and action.

Resilience is integrated into urban and rural design principles as a matter of course and supported by quality information on safe building materials and design. Rich data and modelling of hazard and risk are enabling the transition to smart land-use, where permanent dwellings and key infrastructure are not built on the highest risk ground.

Response to emergencies is characterized by an end-to-end system that supports cooperative and coordinated emergency management, and timely, accurate, and relevant information that enables the public to understand the situation and take action to protect themselves and others, and limit damaging and costly flow-on effects.

New Zealand as a whole is able to have informed debate about the optimal level of resource to invest in order to ensure that ALL aspects of recovery, including economic recovery, are smooth and swift. Recovery from emergencies is comprehensive, participatory, and inclusive of all peoples and organisations, having had discussions about priorities, processes, and desired outcomes before emergencies happen.

In all, as a nation, we understand that we live in a country exposed to hazards, but we also understand the range of action to take to limit impacts and ensure the hazards, crises, and emergencies we will inevitably face do not become disasters that threaten our prosperity and wellbeing.
Our priorities for improved resilience:
Ā mātau kaupapa matua mō te whakapakari i te manawaroa

Managing risks
Effective response to and recovery from emergencies
Strengthening societal resilience
5. Managing risks
Te whakahaere mōrea

What we want to see: New Zealand is a risk savvy nation that takes all practicable steps to identify, prioritise, and manage risks that could impact the wellbeing and prosperity of New Zealanders, and all who live, work, or visit here.

This priority is concerned with identifying and monitoring risks to our wellbeing, taking action to reduce our existing levels of risk (‘corrective risk management’), minimise the amount of new risk we create (‘prospective risk management’), and ensuring that everyone has the data, information, knowledge, and tools they need to be able to make informed decisions about resilience.

We have seen how we already have a considerable amount of risk in our society through the hazards we face, the assets we have exposed to those hazards, and the vulnerability of people, assets, and services to impacts. It is important for us to try and reduce that level of existing risk so that the chances of disaster are reduced, and/or the impacts are reduced if or when hazardous events occur.

At the same time, it is critical to recognise how we inadvertently add to that risk through poor development choices, including land-use and building choices. Planning for resilience at the outset of new projects is by far the cheapest and easiest time to minimise risk and has the potential to significantly reduce disaster costs in the future.

Risk information provides a critical foundation for managing disaster risk across all sectors. At the community level, an understanding of hazard events—whether from living memory or oral and written histories—can inform and influence decisions on preparedness, including life-saving evacuation procedures and the location of important facilities.

In the construction sector, quantifying the potential risk expected in the lifetime of a building, bridge, or other critical infrastructure drives the creation and modification of building codes. In the land-use and urban planning sectors, robust analysis of flood (and other) risk likewise drives investment in flood protection and possibly effects changes in insurance as well. In the insurance sector, the quantification of disaster risk is essential, given that the solvency capital of most insurance companies is strongly influenced by their exposure to risk.

A critical part of understanding and managing risk is understanding the full range of costs involved in disasters, both the direct costs from damage and the more indirect and intangible costs resulting from flow-on effects and social impact. We also need to identify the range of financial instruments that may be available to support the activities designed to reduce our risk and build our resilience, including those promoted in this Strategy.
The six objectives designed to progress the priority of managing risks are at all levels to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>What success looks like</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Identify and understand risk scenarios (including the components of hazard, exposure, vulnerability, and capacity), and use this knowledge to inform decision-making</td>
<td>By 2030, there is an agreed, standardised, and widely-used methodology for assessing disaster risks at a local government, large organisation, and central government level. Risks can be aggregated and viewed at a national or sub-national level, and the results inform the risk assessment efforts of others. Businesses and small organisations can make use of a simplified version to assess their own risks, and make decisions about courses of action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Put in place organisational structures and identify necessary processes to understand and act on reducing risks</td>
<td>By 2030, the governance of risk and resistance in NZ is informed by multi-sectoral views and participation including the private sector, civil society, and other community representatives. Progress on risk management and towards increased resilience is publicly tracked, and interventions evaluated for effectiveness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Build risk awareness, risk literacy, and risk management capability, including the ability to assess risk</td>
<td>By 2030 we have an agreed ‘plain English’ lexicon for risk, including better visual products for describing the risk of any situation, hazard, product, or process; government agencies and science organisations regularly communicate with the public about risks in a timely and transparent manner, and in a way that is understandable and judged effective by the public.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Address gaps in risk reduction policy (particularly in the light of climate change adaptation)</td>
<td>By 2030 we have had a national conversation – including with affected and potentially-affected communities – about how to approach high hazard areas, and we have a system level-response (including central and local government) with aligned regulatory and funding/financing policies in place.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Ensure development and investment practices, particularly in the built environment, are risk-sensitive, taking care not create any unnecessary or unacceptable new risk</td>
<td>By 2030, communities value and accept having resilience as a core goal for all development, recognising that this may involve higher upfront costs though greater net benefits in the long term; plans, policies and regulations are fit for purpose, flexible enough to enable resilient development under a variety of circumstances, and can be easily adapted as risks become better understood; developers aim to exceed required standards for new development, and may receive appropriate recognition for doing so; earthquake prone building remediation meets required timeframes and standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Understand the economic impact of disaster and disruption, and the need for investment in resilience. Identify and develop financial mechanisms that support resilience activities.</td>
<td>By 2030, there is an improved understanding of the cost of disasters and disruption, including the economic cost of social impact; we are routinely collecting data on disruption, and using it to inform decision-making and investment in resilience; there is a clear mix of funding and incentives in place to advance New Zealand’s disaster risk management priorities and build resilience to disasters.</td>
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6. Effective response to and recovery from emergencies
Te urupare tōkita me te whakaora mai i ngā ohotata

What we want to see: New Zealand has a seamless end-to-end emergency management system that supports effective response to and recovery from emergencies, reducing impacts, caring for individuals, and protecting the long-term wellbeing of New Zealanders.

Responding to and recovering from disasters remains – and may always remain – our toughest challenge. This is when we have most at risk, when human suffering is potentially at its greatest, and when there is most threat to our property, assets, and economic wellbeing. It is the phase of the fastest pace, of most confusion, of the most pressure, and the highest requirement for good decision-making and effective communications and action. It is also a phase when we have the chance to reduce impacts before they get out of control, to limit the suffering of individuals, families/whānau, communities and hapū, to manage risk and build in resilience for an improved future. In short it is the phase in which we all need to rise to the challenge, be the best that we can be, and work collectively to address the issues in front of us.

There are many strengths in New Zealand’s emergency management system. Our system is set up to deal with ‘all hazards and risks’, we work across the ‘4Rs’, and engage communities in emergency management. There is passion and commitment from all those who respond to emergencies, paid staff and volunteers alike.

In recent years, significant global and local events have changed how we think about emergency management. The Christchurch earthquakes are still fresh in our minds as a nation. A changing climate means we could get more frequent storms and floods. Globally, we see the impact of tsunami, pandemics, industrial accidents, terrorism incidents and other hazards that cause serious harm to people, environments, and economies. Our risks are changing. Our response system must change too to ensure it works when we need it.

This priority aims to take the progress we have made in responding to and supporting recovery from emergencies over the last 16 years since the CDEM Act came into force. It incorporates the Government’s response to the Ministerial Review into Better Responses to Natural Hazards and Other Emergencies (2017), and it looks at the next generation of capability and capacity we require. It aims to modernise the discipline of emergency management and ensure we are ‘fit-for-purpose’, including to address some of the emerging issues of maintaining pace with media and social media, responding to new and complex emergencies, managing whole-of-society response, and the type of command, control, and leadership required to ensure rapid, effective, inclusive, and compassionate response and recovery.
The six objectives designed to progress the priority of effective response to and recovery from emergencies are to:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>What success looks like</th>
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<tr>
<td>7  Implement measures to ensure that the safety and wellbeing of people is at the heart of the emergency management system</td>
<td>By 2025, there is renewed levels of trust and confidence in the emergency management system. A partnership approach with iwi means a collaborative approach and full engagement in relation to emergency management. In emergencies, the safety, needs, and wellbeing of affected people are the highest priority. The public know what is going on, what to expect, and what to do: hazard warnings are timely and effective, and incorporate new technology and social science; strategic information is shared with stakeholders, spokespeople, and the media, so they get the right advice at the right time; and public information management is resourced to communicate effectively with the public, through a variety of channels, in formats that are sensitive to the particular needs of people and groups, such as people with disabilities or non-English speakers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8  Strengthen the national leadership of the emergency management system</td>
<td>By 2025, more directive leadership of the emergency management system, including setting national standards for emergency management, so there is a consistent standard of care across the country. The Hazard Risk Board provides strengthened stewardship of the system, and there is clear understanding of, and arrangements for, lead and support roles for the full range of national risks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9  Improve policy and planning to ensure it is clear who is responsible for what, nationally, regionally, and locally, in response and recovery</td>
<td>By 2025, legislative and policy settings support plans at all levels that are clearer about how agencies will work together and who will do what. An updated incident management doctrine provides clarity about roles and functions, and is used by all agencies to manage all events. At a regional level, shared service arrangements are clear about local and regional roles, and mean better use of resources and better holistic service delivery to communities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Build the capability and capacity of the emergency management workforce for response and recovery</td>
<td>By 2030, all Controllers are trained and accredited; people fulfilling incident management roles have the appropriate training, skills, experience and aptitude and volunteers are appropriately trained, recognised, and kept safe in the system. Fly-in Teams supplement local capability and capacity.</td>
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<td>11 Improve the information and intelligence system that supports decision-making in emergencies</td>
<td>By 2025, all stakeholders in the emergency management system have access to the same operational and technical information, which provides greater awareness of the situation at hand, and allows timely and effective decision-making.</td>
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<td>12 Embed a strategic approach to recovery planning that takes account of risks identified, recognises long-term priorities, and ensures the needs of the affected are at the centre of recovery processes</td>
<td>By 2030, there is significantly increased understanding of recovery principles and practice by decision-makers; readiness for recovery is based on a strong understanding of communities and the consequences local hazards might have on these communities; in particular, it focuses on long-term resilience by linking recovery to risk reduction, readiness, and response through actions designed to reduce consequences on communities.</td>
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7. Strengthening societal resilience
Te whakapakari i te manawaroa o te iwi

What we want to see: New Zealand has a culture of resilience that means individuals, organisations, businesses and communities take action to reduce their risks, connect with others, and build resilience to shocks and stresses.

This Strategy promotes the strengthening of resilience in the social, cultural, economic, built, natural, and governance environments, at all levels from individuals and families/whānau, to business and organisations, communities and hapū, cities and districts, and at the national level. It promotes integrated, collective, and holistic approaches and the goal of linking bottom-up, grassroots endeavours, with top-down policy and programmes that empower, enable and support individuals and communities.

It is particularly important to ensure an inclusive approach, including engaging with, and considering the needs of, any people or groups who have specific needs, or who are likely to be disproportionately affected by disasters. Not all New Zealanders, or those who work, live, or visit here, will have the same capacity to engage, prepare, or build resilience. It is critical that the needs of all people are accounted for, including how we can best enable, empower, and support people to achieve good outcomes.

A key goal is to strengthen the culture of resilience in New Zealand, whereby New Zealanders see the value of resilience, and understand the range of actions they can take to limit their impacts, or the impacts on others, and ensure the hazards, crises, and emergencies we will inevitably face do not become disasters that threaten our prosperity and wellbeing.

Two key features are especially important to this goal: a learning culture, and developing our future foresight. Developing a strong learning culture is critical for expanding our knowledge and skills, for changing behaviours, for innovating, and for adapting to change. Alongside this, an ability to ‘see’ and anticipate the future – in terms of both our risk landscape, and the opportunities for improving our resilience – are key factors for success.

Inclusive and participatory governance of disaster resilience at the national, regional and local levels is an important objective, including the development of clear vision, plans, capability, capacity, guidance and coordination within and across sectors. Champions, partnerships, networks, and coalition approaches are crucial, as well as the development of increased recognition of the role culture plays in resilience. Infrastructure, including physical infrastructure for example roads, bridges, airports, rail, water supply, telecommunications and energy services, and social infrastructure for example health care, education, culture and heritage facilities, banking and finance services, emergency services and the justice system, is recognised as a critical element for healthy economies and stable communities. It enables commerce, movement of people, goods and information, and facilitates society’s daily economic and social wellbeing.

The ability of infrastructure systems to function during adverse conditions and quickly recover to acceptable levels of service after an event is fundamental to the wellbeing of communities. This Strategy supports other key policy and programmes in emphasising the importance of infrastructure resilience, in particular for its role in supporting wider community resilience. This includes assessing the adequacy and capacity of current infrastructure assets and networks, identifying key interdependencies and cascading effects, progressively upgrading assets as practicable, and identifying opportunities to ‘build back better’ in recovery and reconstruction.
The six objectives designed to progress the priority of strengthening societal resilience are at all levels to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>What success looks like</th>
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<tr>
<td>13 Build a culture of resilience, including a ‘future-ready’ ethos, through promotion, advocacy, and education</td>
<td>By 2030, the concept of, and requirements for, resilience are observably built in to more facets of New Zealand society, culture, and economy than in 2019. Resilience is an accepted part of who we are and what we need to do to maintain our wellbeing and prosperity, including in policy, plans, job descriptions, and other statutory or contractual obligations.</td>
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<td>14 Promote and support prepared individuals, households, organisations, and businesses</td>
<td>By 2030, emergency preparedness is part of everyday life. More people are able to thrive through periods of crisis and change because they have a plan to get through an emergency that they regularly practise, and have emergency supplies that are regularly checked and updated. Public, private, and civil society organisations are able to thrive through periods of crisis and change because they understand what they can do to improve their resilience, and are investing in improving their resilience. People and groups who have particular needs, or who are likely to be disproportionately affected by disasters, are engaged in planning and preparedness, and supported to build their resilience.</td>
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<td>15 Cultivate an environment for social connectedness which promotes a culture of mutual help; embed a collective impact approach to building community resilience</td>
<td>By 2030, new methodologies and approaches mean that communities are more knowledgeable about risks, are empowered to problem-solve, and participate in decision-making about their future.</td>
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<td>16 Take a whole of city/district/region approach to resilience, including to embed strategic objectives for resilience in key plans and strategies</td>
<td>By 2030, local authorities have adopted strategic objectives aimed at building resilience in their city/district, and work collaboratively with a broad range of partners to steward the wellbeing and prosperity of the city/district.</td>
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<td>17 Recognise the importance of culture to resilience, including to support the continuity of cultural places, institutions and activities, and to enable to the participation of different cultures in resilience</td>
<td>By 2030, there is an increased understanding and recognition of the role culture plays in resilience; there are improved multi-cultural partnership approaches to disaster planning and preparedness; and there is substantially increased resilience to disasters including cultural heritage.</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Address the capacity and adequacy of critical infrastructure systems, and upgrade them as practicable, according to risks identified</td>
<td>By 2030, we more fully understand infrastructure vulnerabilities, including interdependencies, cascading effects and impacts on society; we have clarified and agreed expectations about levels of service during and after emergencies, and see infrastructure providers that are working to meet those levels (including through planning and investment), and; we have improved planning for response to and recovery from infrastructure failure.</td>
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Our commitment to action
E paiherea ana mātau ki te mahi

Transparency and social accountability
Governance
Measuring and monitoring progress
Two key features of this Strategy are, firstly, a determined effort to improve our national resilience to disasters, and secondly, taking a whole-of-society, inclusive, and collective approach to doing so.

This means holding ourselves to account is paramount.

We will do this in three main ways: a principle of transparency and social accountability, formal governance mechanisms, and measuring and monitoring progress.

8.1 Transparency and social accountability

It is critical that we are transparent about both our risks and our capacity to manage them. It is only by exposing the issues and having open conversations that we will make progress on overcoming barriers, and build on strengths and opportunities.

Efforts to tackle the challenge of accountability have traditionally tended to concentrate on improving the ‘supply side’ of governance, including methods such as political checks and balances, administrative rules and procedures, auditing, and formal enforcement processes.

These are still important, and will be built into the process to monitor this Strategy. However, we also want to pay attention to the ‘demand side’ of good governance: strengthening the voice and capacity of all stakeholders (including the public, and any groups disproportionately affected by disasters), to directly demand greater accountability and responsiveness from authorities and service providers.

Enhancing the ability of the public to engage in policy, planning, and practice is key.

We must find ever-more effective and practical ways to do this. This could include activities such as: representation on governance or planning groups, deliberate efforts to engage different stakeholder groups on specific challenges, citizen or civil society-led action, or utilising the whole new generation of engagement offered by social media.

8.2 Governance of this strategy

The Strategy will be owned and managed by existing governance mechanisms, including those through the National Security System, and at a regional level by CDEM Groups.
8.3 Measuring and monitoring progress

The monitoring and evaluation of resilience building initiatives in New Zealand must capture progress at several points along the pathway to lasting change. A Theory of Change (Figure 3) helps us think about how to assess the process of social change, beginning by defining the desired impacts on society and working backward to programme design and required inputs. The desired impact of government policy in New Zealand is to enhance the intergenerational wellbeing of New Zealanders. Through a resilience lens that must include the continuity and enhancement of wellbeing in the face of acute and chronic shocks.

The decisive measure of the disaster risk reduction and resilience programmes that we implement in New Zealand will be the extent to which it can be associated with reductions in the negative effects of shocks and stresses (outcomes). In most cases, however, we will need to evaluate changes to resilience in the absence of shocks and we will need to assess the actions that have been shown through research and practice to contribute to disaster risk reduction and resilience (outputs). Finally, to assess our capacity to achieve outputs, we must consider the required resources or inputs across the systems supporting resilience building initiatives.

Each step will require a different monitoring and evaluation focus, will fall within the remit of different actors, and be guided by separate, but overlapping policy frameworks. The logframe in Figure 4 highlights the logical linkages between each step in the theory of change model to the guidance and indicators needed for monitoring.

Figure 3 Theory of change for resilience

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Acknowledgement: the measuring and monitoring regime for this strategy was developed in association with the National Science Challenge Resilience to Nature’s Challenges Trajectories workstream, led by Dr Joanne Stevenson.
8.3.1 Measuring inputs and outputs: progress on our goals and objectives

Inputs and outputs will be guided by the roadmap of actions that will accompany the National Disaster Resilience Strategy, at a regional level by CDEM Group Plans, and at a local level by those designing and implementing resilience outreach and enhancement programmes in communities across New Zealand.

8.3.2 Measuring outcomes: progress on resilience

Interim outcomes refer to proxies that have been identified through research and practice to reflect systems' capacity to absorb the negative effects of shocks and adapt and transform in dynamic environments. Outcomes are items that can directly confirm that targeted systems (e.g., individuals, communities, infrastructure) are able to absorb, respond, recover, adapt, or transform in the face of hazards and disasters.

A resilience index developed as part of the National Science Challenge: Resilience to Nature's Challenges will capture progress on a series of indicators designed to measure resilience attributes.

8.3.3 Measuring impact: progress on reduced losses from disasters

Our progress towards the desired impact we want to have will be measured by tracking losses from emergencies on an annualised basis, compared against baseline data collected for 2005-2015. This reflects our Sendai Framework reporting requirements.

Definitions, scope, and baseline data for these monitoring mechanisms will be produced in a separate, supporting document.

8.3.4 Formal reporting

Progress on this Strategy will be reported biennially by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, for the duration of its term, and will include:

- Progress on goals and objectives
- Progress on resilience, and
- Progress on impacts

These reports will be publicly available.
Appendices
Ngā āpitihanga

Overview of this Strategy
What can I do?
Analysis of our current state as a baseline for this Strategy
Two key opportunities
Appendix 1: Overview of this Strategy

National Disaster Resilience Strategy
Working together to manage risk and build resilience

Our Vision
New Zealand is a disaster resilient nation that acts proactively to manage risks and build resilience in a way that contributes to the wellbeing and prosperity of all New Zealanders

Our Goal
To strengthen the resilience of the nation by managing risks, being ready to respond to and recover from emergencies, and by empowering and supporting individuals, organisations, and communities to act for themselves and others, for the safety and wellbeing of all.

We will do this through:

1. Managing Risks
2. Effective Response to and Recovery from Emergencies
3. Strengthening Societal Resilience

OUR OBJECTIVES

1. Identify and understand risk scenarios (including the components of hazard, exposure, vulnerability, and capacity), and use this knowledge to inform decisionmaking
2. Put in place organisational structures and identify necessary processes to understand and act on reducing risks
3. Build risk awareness, risk literacy, and risk management capability, including the ability to assess risk
4. Address gaps in risk reduction policy (particularly in the light of climate change adaptation)
5. Ensure development and investment practices, particularly in the built environment, are risk-sensitive, taking care not create any unnecessary or unacceptable new risk
6. Understand the economic impact of disaster and disruption, and the need for investment in resilience. Identify and develop financial mechanisms that support resilience activities.
7. Implement measures to ensure that the safety and wellbeing of people is at the heart of the emergency management system
8. Strengthen the national leadership of the emergency management system to provide clearer direction and more consistent response to and recovery from emergencies
9. Improve legislation policy and planning to ensure it is clear who is responsible for what, nationally, regionally, and locally, in response and recovery
10. Build the capability and capacity of the emergency management workforce for response and recovery
11. Improve the information and intelligence system that supports decision-making in emergencies to enable informed, timely, and consistent decisions by stakeholders and the public
12. Embed a strategic approach to recovery planning that takes account of risks identified, recognises longterm priorities, and ensures the needs of the affected are at the centre of recovery processes
13. Build a culture of resilience, including a ‘future-ready’ ethos, through promotion, advocacy, and education
14. Promote and support prepared individuals, households, organisations, and businesses
15. Cultivate an environment for social connectedness which promotes a culture of mutual help and embed a collective impact approach to building community resilience
16. Take a whole of city/district/region approach to resilience, including to embed strategic objectives for resilience in key plans and strategies
17. Recognise the importance of culture to resilience, including to support the continuity of cultural places, institutions and activities, and to enable the participation of different cultures in resilience
18. Address the capacity and adequacy of critical infrastructure systems, and upgrade them as practicable, according to risks identified
Appendix 2: What can I do?
Ngā āpitihanga 2: He aha he mahi māku?

- **Individuals and families/whānau**  
  Te tangata me ngā whānau

- **Businesses and organisations**  
  Ngā pakihi me ngā whakahaere

- **Communities and hapū**  
  Ngā hapori me ngā hapū

- **Cities and districts**  
  Ngā tāonenui me ngā takiwā

- **Government and national organisations**  
  Kāwanatanga me ngā whakahaere ā-motu
Understand your risk
... the hazards or disruptions you could experience, your exposure – the things you have that are at risk to those disruptions, and your vulnerability – how you and your things might be adversely affected.

Reduce your risk factors
Think about the range of ways you could reduce your exposure or vulnerability, and invest in doing so where possible.

Future proof where possible
When making new purchases, think about how to future-proof yourself and build in resilience.

Prepare yourself and your household
Think about the range of impacts that could occur from crises or emergencies (for example, power, water, or communications outages, access or transport issues, the need to stay in or out of your home for an extended period), and think about the things you would want or need to have available to you during that time.

Plan for disruption
... including to consider how you would meet up with family/whānau and friends if there was a communications outage or access issues.

Stay informed
Find out more: talk to others about risk and resilience; sign up for alerts and warnings.

Know your neighbours
... and participate in your community – you are each other’s front line.
Businesses and organisations
Ngā pakihi me ngā whakahaere

Understand your risk

In all its dimensions (in terms of the hazards or disruptions you could experience, your exposure – the assets you have that are at risk to those disruptions, your vulnerability – how your assets and business might be adversely affected, and your capacity – the strengths and resources you have available to manage it) so you can make good decisions about how to manage it.

Make resilience a strategic objective and embed it in appropriate plans and strategies

The continuity of your business (and the wellbeing of the people that rely on your products/services) depends on it.

Invest in organisational resilience

By a) reducing and managing the factors that are causing your risk, b) ensuring comprehensive business continuity planning, and c) considering and building your adaptive capacity.

Benefit today, benefit tomorrow

Try to find solutions that have an everyday benefit and any crisis/disaster benefit is by-product.

Consider your social impact

Consider how you can contribute to the resilience of your community, city or district – for social good, or because there are benefits for you.

Keep the long term in mind

Consider the longer-term changes in your environment, for example, the impact of climate change, and what you could do about them.

Collaborate with others and build your network

Find others with similar objectives in respect of risk and resilience, and collaborate with them – we are stronger together, and you have much to contribute and gain.

Learn about response and recovery

Understand how response and recovery will work in your district or area of interest, and build your own capacity to respond to and recover from disruption.
Communities and hapū  
Ngā hapori me ngā hapū

Understand your risk
Seek to build a collective understanding of your risks: the hazards or disruptions you could face, your collective exposure in terms of people, property, and assets, and your vulnerabilities – how your people/property/assets could be adversely affected.

Reduce your risk factors
Consider whether there are ways to reduce your community’s exposure or vulnerabilities – it needn’t cost money, but there may be avenues if it does.

Keep the long-term in mind
Consider the longer term changes in your environment, for example, the impact of climate change, and what you could do about them.

Learn about response and recovery
Understand how response to and recovery from emergencies will work in your district.

Understand your collective resources
Think about what resources you have, now or in an emergency, and how you could put them to work.

Make a plan
Community response and recovery planning helps communities understand how they can help each other after a disaster. Ask your local emergency management office for help if you need it.

Benefit today, benefit tomorrow
Try to find solutions that have an everyday benefit and any crisis/disaster benefit is by-product.

Organise community events
Communities who know each other are stronger communities – in good times and in bad.
Understand your risk
Identify and understand risk scenarios, including what is driving high risk ratings, and use this knowledge to inform decision-making.

Organise for resilience
Consider whether your governance of risk and resilience is fit for purpose; engage all interested parties and take a whole-of-city/district approach.

Make resilience a strategic objective
Make resilience a cross-cutting strategic objective: the economic prosperity of your city/district, and the wellbeing of your communities depend on it.

Lead, promote, and champion
... city/district-wide investment in resilience; ensure resilience is a vital partner to economic development.

Tackle gaps in hazard risk management policy
... including matters of retreat or relocation from high risk areas, and adaptation to climate change.

Pursue resilient urban development
... including risk-aware land-use decisions, and urban design and growth that incorporates resilience.

Increase infrastructure resilience
Assess risk, and ensure the resilience of critical assets and continuity of essential services.

Safeguard natural buffers
... to enhance the protective functions offered by natural ecosystems.

Strengthen financial capacity
Understand the economic impact of disasters in your area, and the need for investment in resilience. Identify and develop financial mechanisms that can support resilience activities.

Strengthen societal capacity
Cultivate an environment for social connectedness which promotes a culture of mutual help. Support and enable grassroots efforts and organisations. Support diversity and promote inclusion.

Invest in organisational resilience
... by ensuring you have comprehensive business continuity planning in place, and by considering and building your adaptive capacity.

Build your capability and capacity for response and recovery
... including next-level, designed-for-the-future capability.
Government and national organisations
Kāwanatanga me ngā whakahaere ā-motu

Organise for resilience
Participate in mechanisms for the coordination of risk and resilience activity, and the implementation of this Strategy.

Monitor, assess and publicly report
... on a) national risks, b) economic loss from disasters, c) resilience, and d) progress on this strategy.

Champion resilience approaches
... and whole-of-society participation; promote stewardship | kaitiakitanga, wellbeing | manaakitanga, and working together | whanaungatanga.

Make resilience easy
... affordable, and common sense for clients, stakeholders, partners, decision-makers, and the public.

Invest in organisational resilience
... by a) understanding risk scenarios, including what is driving high risk ratings for your organisation and/or clients, b) reducing and managing the factors that are causing your risk, b) ensuring comprehensive business continuity planning, and c) considering and building your adaptive capacity.

Invest in societal resilience
... by understanding societal needs and values, before, during, and after emergencies. Ensure investments are multi-purpose, for stronger communities today and in case of emergency.

Work together
... and align risk/resilience-related policy and practice.

Tackle our complex risks
Tackle and progress some of the most complex risks facing society, including approaches for addressing risk in the highest hazard communities, and adapting to climate change.

Build capability and capacity
... including next-level, designed-for-the-future response and recovery capability.
Appendix 3: Analysis of our current state as a baseline for this Strategy

In order to form an effective strategy for the future and move towards a state of enhanced resilience, it is useful to look at our current state - our strengths, barriers, and opportunities – and how we capitalise on areas of strength and opportunity, overcome obstacles to progress, and make the smartest possible choices about actions and investment. Furthermore, in the quest to be ‘future ready’, it is useful to consider what other environmental and societal trends are occurring around us, even now, and how we can use them to build our resilience.

Strengths

New Zealand already has a number of strengths in respect of disaster resilience.

1. We have good social capital in our communities. New Zealand communities are aware, knowledgeable, passionate, and well-connected. In general, they have a strong sense of local identity and belonging to their environment, a belief in manaakitanga and concern for their fellow citizens, and a sense of civic duty.

2. We are a first world nation that has comprehensive education, health, and social welfare systems, which build our people and look after the most vulnerable in society.

3. We have a strong cultural identity, including the special relationship between Māori and the Crown provided through the Treaty of Waitangi. New Zealand is also one of a handful of culturally and linguistically ‘super-diverse’ countries, which brings a number of economic and social benefits (the ‘diversity dividend’). We value our culture, our kaupapa and tikanga. We celebrate and foster a rich and diverse cultural life.

4. We have a high-performing and relatively stable economy. The New Zealand economy made a solid recovery after the 2008-09 recession, which was shallow compared to other advanced economies. Annual growth has averaged 2.1% since March 2010, emphasising the economy’s resilience.

5. We have very high insurance penetration. Most countries struggle to get their ratio of insured to non-insured up to an acceptable level. Because of the Earthquake Commission, New Zealand’s insurance penetration is 98 per cent. This means that a good proportion of the economic costs of most natural hazard events are covered by re-insurance.

6. We have a stable political system, low levels of corruption, and freedom of speech.

7. We have a good range of policy in place for disaster risk management, including the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, the Resource Management Act 1991, the Building Act 2004, the Local Government Act 2002, and a range of other legislation and regulatory instruments. This includes regulation for land-use and building standards – critical factors in building more resilient futures.

8. We have an effective national security coordination system that takes an all-hazards approach and has governance at the political, executive, and operational levels.

9. At the regional level consortia of local authorities, emergency services, lifeline utilities, and social welfare agencies (government and non-government) form Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups that coordinate across agencies and steward emergency management in their regions.

10. We have an engaged and well-connected science community, including a number of platforms specifically targeting the advancement of knowledge and understanding about natural hazards and resilience. In general, there are good links between scientists, policy makers and practitioners. Scientists practice an increasing level of community outreach, engage in a co-creation approach, and are focussed on outcomes.

11. Organisations and agencies work well together. While there’s always room for improvement, a multi-agency approach is the ‘norm’, which means better coordination of activities, more efficient use of resources, and better outcomes.

12. We are a small country, which makes us well-connected, uncomplicated, and agile. We can ‘get things done’ in relatively short order.

13. We are experienced. We have seemingly had more than our fair share of crises, emergencies, and disasters over the last ten years. This has brought some bad times, but the silver lining is the awareness that it has built in everyone, the knowledge about ‘what works’ and what is needed, and the willingness to act.
Barriers to resilience

While we have a lot going for us, we also have some things that limit our resilience. The process to develop this strategy identified a number of barriers to resilience, and barriers to our pursuit of resilience.

What is limiting our resilience?

1. Some of our people still suffer considerable poverty, social deprivation, and/or health issues that limit wellbeing, quality of life, and resilience.
2. Our level of individual and household preparedness for emergencies is not as high as it should be, given our risks.
3. Our businesses and organisations are not as prepared as they could be, leading to loss of service and losses in the economy when severe disruption strikes.
4. Some of our critical assets and services are ageing and vulnerable. These are in most places being addressed by asset management plans and asset renewal programmes, (including strengthening, conservation and restoration), but these will take time (and resources) to implement.
5. We live in some high-risk areas, and are continuing to build in high-risk areas – particularly around the coast, on steep slopes, fault lines, reclaimed land, and flood plains. We live and build there because they are nice places to live, and because sometimes there is no other choice. However, at some point we need to consider – how much risk is too much?
6. We are only just starting to tackle some of the ‘truly hard’ issues around existing levels of risk, such as how to adapt to or retreat from the highest risk areas, including to adapt to the impacts of climate change. There is likely high cost around many of these options.
7. We have gaps in our response capability and capacity, as outlined in a recent Ministerial Review into better responses to emergencies in New Zealand (Technical Advisory Group report, 2017). These are predominantly around capability of individuals, capacity of response organisations, and powers and authorities of those individuals and organisations to act. The review also identified issues with communication and technology, in particular, the challenges of response intelligence and communications staying apace with social media.

What is limiting our pursuit of resilience?

1. Not enough people and organisations are taking action to prepare or build their resilience for disasters. This is generally either because it is seen as too expensive or difficult, because of other priorities, because it ‘might never happen’, or because of an expectation of a rapid and comprehensive institutional response.
2. Building community resilience – even where playing a facilitative role – is resource intensive. It also requires a high level of skill and understanding to navigate diverse communities and complex issues.
3. Emergency management issues tend to be ‘headline’ issues that require immediate corrective action. This is understandable, and needed, but means we often focus more on fixing the problems of the day, and addressing issues from the last event, than forecasting the future and taking action for the long-term.
4. Risk reduction and resilience are often perceived as ‘expensive’, and limiting of economic development and business growth.
5. At the same time, the full cost of disasters often isn’t visible (particularly the cost of indirect and intangible impacts, including social and cultural impacts), meaning it isn’t factored into investment decision-making.
6. Perverse incentives don’t encourage resilience – too often, as a society, we are aiming for the ‘minimum’ standard or ‘lowest cost’. This can deter people from aiming higher or for the ‘most resilient’ solution.
7. Recovery is often underestimated. The Christchurch earthquake recovery and many other smaller events have shown us just how complex, multi-faceted, difficult, expensive, and long-term recovery is. Other parts of the country need to consider how they would manage recovery in their city or district, and give priority to resourcing capability and capacity improvements.
8. We have had difficulty translating resilience theory into action. There is an abundance of academic theory on resilience, but turning that theory into practical action has, until recently anyway, been difficult to come by.
Opportunities

As well as strengths and barriers, it is important to consider what opportunities we have or may have on the horizon. The opportunities the strategy development process has identified are:

1. Awareness and understanding of disasters, disaster impacts and disaster risk, is at an all-time high following a series of domestic events over the last 5-10 years, including the Canterbury and Kaikōura earthquakes. This includes a willingness to act on lessons and to do so in a smart, coordinated, and collaborative way.

2. Our hazards are obvious and manifest. This is both a curse and an opportunity: we have high risk, but we also have an awareness, understanding, and willingness to do something about them, in a way that countries with less tangible risks might not. If we address risk and build resilience to our ‘expected’ hazards, we will hopefully be better prepared for when the ‘less expected’ hazards occur.

3. We have an incredible wealth of resilience-related research currently underway, including several multi-sectoral research platforms that aim to bring increased knowledge to and improved resilience outcomes for New Zealanders. Over the next few years there will be a steady stream of information about ‘what works’, and tried and tested methodologies we can employ in all parts of society.

4. We also have a lot of other work – in terms of resilience-related policy and practice – underway in organisations at all levels and across the country. Connecting the pieces of the jigsaw, sharing knowledge, and working together should enable even more improved outcomes.

5. There is a particular opportunity for building processes that support collective impact. Collective impact is a way of organising a range of stakeholders around a common agenda, goals, measurement, activity, and communications to make progress on complex societal challenges. [see page 46]

6. The introduction of the three post-2015 development agendas (Sendai Framework, Sustainable Development Goals, and Paris Agreement for Climate Change) brings an additional impetus and drive for action, as well as practical recommendations that we can implement. They also bring a strong message about integration, collaboration, and a whole-of-society approach.

7. The Government has a strong focus on wellbeing, particularly intergenerational wellbeing, and improved living standards for all. Simultaneously, local government has a renewed interest in the ‘four wellbeings’ with those concepts being re-introduced to the Local Government Act as a key role of local government. These priorities are entirely harmonious, and lead swiftly into a conversation with both levels of government on how to protect and enhance living standards through a risk management and resilience approach.

8. We have only just begun to scratch the surface of best resilience practice, including how to make the most of investment in resilience. There is much to learn from the Triple Dividend of Resilience [see page 47] – ensuring our investments provide multiple benefits or meet multiple needs, and are the smartest possible use of limited resources. The Triple Dividend also supports better business cases, allowing us to better position our case for resilience and convince decision-makers of the benefits of investment.

9. We are a small agile nation. We are ambitious, innovative, motivated, and informed: we can lead the world in our approach to resilience.
‘Wild cards’

The world is changing at an unprecedented rate driven by technical innovation and new ways of thinking that will fundamentally transform the way we live. As we move away from the old structures and processes that shaped our past, a new world of challenges and opportunities awaits us. While there might be uncertainty about how some of these factors might shape our risk and our capacity to manage that risk, there are some common implications that are critical to take account of as we work to build resilience.

1. The revolution in technology and communication is a key feature of today’s world. Regardless of the issue, technology is reshaping how individuals relate to one another. It shifts power to individuals and common interest groups, and enables new roles to be played with greater impact. Organisations and groups that can anticipate and harness changing social uses of technology for meaningful engagement with societal challenges will be more resilient in the future.

2. Local organisations and grassroots engagement is an important component. This is driven in part by the aforementioned technology and communication shifts that give local groups more influence and lower their costs for organising and accessing funding, but also the rising power of populations in driving actions and outcomes.

3. Following on from these, populations currently under the age of 30 will be a dominant force in the coming two decades – both virtually, in terms of their levels of online engagement, and physically, by being a critical source of activity. Younger generations possess significant energy and global perspectives that need to be harnessed for positive change.

4. The role of culture as a major driver in society, and one that desperately needs to be better understood by leaders across governments, the private sector, and civil society. Culture is a powerful force that can play a significant role (both positive and negative, if it is not handled sensitively), and is therefore a force with which stakeholders should prepare to constructively engage.

5. High levels of trust across organisations, sectors and generations will become increasingly important as a precondition for influence and engagement. This trust will need to be based on more than just the existence of regulations and incentives that encourage compliance. Organisations can build trust among stakeholders via a combination of “radical transparency” and by demonstrating a set of social values that drive behaviour that demonstrates an acknowledgement of the common good.

6. The importance of cross-sector engagement, particularly between government, the private sector, and civil society. The challenge of disaster risk can no longer be the domain of government alone. A collective approach is needed, including to utilise all resources, public and private, available to us, and to consider innovative approaches to managing and reducing risk. This includes the private sector and civil society participating in policy and planning, and oversight and decision-making. This requires active participation on the part of the private sector, and transparency, openness, and responsiveness on the part of politicians and public officials.

7. The need for higher levels of accountability, transparency, measurement. More work is required to ensure that those tackling societal challenges have the appropriate means of measuring impact. These mechanisms will need to be technology-enabled, customised to the challenge at hand, and transparent.
Appendix 4: Two key opportunities

Working together: making collective impact

Collective Impact is a framework to tackle complex social problems. It is a structured approach to making collaboration work across government, business, non-profit organisations and communities to achieve significant and lasting social change.

The Collective Impact approach is premised on the belief that no single policy, government department, organisation or program can tackle or solve the increasingly complex social problems we face as a society. The approach calls for multiple organisations or entities from different sectors to set aside their own, specific agendas in favour of a common agenda, shared measurement and alignment of effort. Unlike collaboration or partnership, Collective Impact initiatives have centralised infrastructure – known as a backbone organisation – with dedicated resources to help participating organisations shift from acting alone to acting in concert.

Collective Impact was first written about in the Stanford Social Innovation Review in 2011. Five key elements were identified:

1. A common agenda
   This means coming together to collectively define the problem and create a shared vision to solve it.

2. Shared measurement
   This means agreeing to track progress in the same way, which allows for continuous improvement.

3. Mutually reinforcing activities
   This means coordinating collective efforts to maximize the end result.

4. Continuous communication
   This means building trust and relationships among all participants.

5. A backbone organisation
   This means having a team dedicated to orchestrating the work of the group.

This Strategy aims to emulate the intent and conditions of collective impact. The process to develop this Strategy was based on a series of workshops around the country over two years; a measurement and monitoring regime will track achievement of objectives and ensure we are making progress towards outcomes; the objectives of the Strategy detail focus areas in which we can undertake a series of mutually-reinforcing activities at all levels; the Strategy advocates strongly for relationship and partnership building, and the emergency management sector, through the National CDEM Plan, and regional CDEM Group Plans act as backbone organisations, driving the agenda and coordinating activity.
Changing the narrative: the triple dividend of resilience

In New Zealand we have first-hand, recent examples of how much disasters can cost. The direct costs alone can be significant; as we start to consider methodologies for counting the economic cost of social impact, the total cost of disasters and disruptive events will be significantly more – maybe even double the reported ‘direct’ costs.

Even so, it is often difficult to make a case for investment in disaster risk management and resilience, even as we cite research on benefit-cost ratios – how upfront investment in risk management can save millions in future costs. We know these ratios to be true, we have seen examples of it, even here in New Zealand, so why is it such a hard case to make?

Other than short-term political and management cycles, it is generally due to how we calculate ‘value’. Traditional methods of appraising investments in disaster risk management undervalue the benefits associated with resilience. This is linked to the perception that investing in disaster resilience will only yield benefits once disaster strikes, leading decision-makers to view disaster risk management investments as a gamble that only pays off in the event of a disaster – a ‘sunk’ cost, that gives them no short-term benefit.

However, there is increasing evidence that building resilience yields significant and tangible benefits, even if a disaster does not happen for many years – or ever.

A 2015 report outlines the ‘Triple Dividend of Resilience’, or the three types of benefits that investments in disaster risk management can yield. They are:

1. Avoiding losses when disasters strike
2. Stimulating economic activity thanks to reduced disaster risk, and

While the first dividend is the most common motivation for investing in resilience, the second and third dividends are typically overlooked. The report presents evidence that by actively addressing risk, there can be immediate and significant economic benefits to households, the private sector, and, more broadly, at the macro-economic level. Moreover, integrating multi-purpose designs into resilience investments can both save costs, and provide community and other social benefits (for example, strengthened flood protections works that act as pedestrian walkways, parks or roads).

New Zealand needs to learn from this concept and ensure that our investments in resilience are providing multiple benefits to both make smart use of our limited resources, and to assure decision-makers that their investment is worthwhile, and will pay dividends – in the short and long term.

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**Figure 6 The Triple Dividend of Resilience Investment**

Adapted from: The Triple Dividend of Resilience – Realising development goals through the multiple benefits of disaster risk management (Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, the World Bank, Overseas Development Institute, 2015)
To: National Disaster Resilience Strategy submissions
Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6145

Submission on: Draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy

From: Federated Farmers of New Zealand

Date: 4 December 2018

Contact

JULIE GEANAGE
POLICY ADVISOR (ADVERSE EVENTS)

Federated Farmers of New Zealand
Box 715, Wellington, New Zealand

www.fedfarm.org.nz
1. Federated Farmers of New Zealand welcomes the opportunity to provide feedback on the consultation for the new Natural Disaster Resilience Strategy. We support the principle of a holistic approach to strengthening resilience and the three pronged approach of improving resilience to natural disasters.

2. Federated Farmers believes that more is achieved collectively than individually in times of severe and extreme hardship. We agree that people make the connection between resilience and their own culture, value traditions, sense of identity and sense of place (page 20). We believe there is little that evidences this more than the rural communities that run the length of New Zealand.

3. We would like the key terms (page 4) to also include a definition of community that acknowledges rural communities often cover a wide geographic area and those living on rurally located ‘lifestyle blocks’ are also included.

4. We are concerned that at times Civil Defence focuses on the urban definition of community and looks at cities, towns, suburbs and settlements without recognising the unique challenges and resilience issues of our wider yet connected rural communities.

5. Recognising that New Zealand’s economy relies heavily on primary production (page 11), we would like the risk of a biosecurity outbreak to be clearly considered as a potential future risk to our wellbeing and prosperity.

6. When we look to our resilient future, Federated Farmers recognises the role farmers and the farming economy play in creating and maintaining a sustainable and effective environment. Federated Farmers share the concern with intergenerational equity and protecting our habitat.

7. We are unclear as to the impact or meaning (page 14) of “guard and protect the places that are special to us “without reference to how these places are defined and decided on. As stewards of the land, farmers have a natural interest in protecting the shared environment.
8. We would like to ensure that any process for considering areas for protection also takes into consideration the economic, social, employment, educational and life experience wellbeing’s that the farming sector creates and sustains.

9. We would also like consideration to be given (page 16) to identifying the resilience provided by our primary production sector as a way of ensuring that regional and rural communities future wellbeing is protected from shocks and stresses.

10. Safe and resilient communities are important to us all, we would like the attributes (page 17) to include that safe and resilient communities are accessible in a rural context where infrastructure can already be compromised.

11. When looking at effective responses and recovery from emergencies, we welcome the objective “to ensure that the safety and wellbeing of people is at the heart of the emergency management system” (page 26). We would like success in this measure to include the ability and success of our rural communities and particularly our isolated rural communities to regain connectedness and to be fully engaged through any disaster.

12. The rural sector is often disadvantaged through natural disasters (page 30) and Federated Farmers would like to ensure that the good governance of this strategy includes a recognition and understanding that this sector needs to recover quickly from natural disaster not only for its own wellbeing but to ensure the country remains a vibrant and effective primary producer.

13. Federated Farmers is a member based organisation that represents farmers and other rural businesses. Federated Farmers has a long and proud history of representing the needs and interests of New Zealand’s farmers.

14. The Federation aims to add value to its members’ business. Our key strategic outcomes include the need for New Zealand to provide an economic and social environment within which:
• Our members may operate their business in a fair and flexible commercial environment;
• Our members’ families and their staff have access to services essential to the needs of the rural community; and
• Our members adopt responsible management and environmental practices.
07 December 2018

Dear Sir/Madam

Bay of Plenty Regional Council’s submission to National Disaster Resilience Strategy

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the above submission.

Our Organisation

The Bay of Plenty Regional Council is responsible for the sustainable management of resources within the Bay of Plenty region. Our role is determined by Central Government through statutes such as the Local Government Act and the Resource Management Act, and is different from that of territorial authorities (district and city councils). Some of our key roles are:

- Regional planning for land, water quality and air quality;
- Setting environmental management policies for the region;
- Allocation of natural resources;
- Flood control;
- Natural hazard response;
- Soil conservation;
- Pest control / biosecurity;
- Public transport;
- Strategic transport planning;
- Regional economic development; and
- Strategic integration of land use and infrastructure.

Summary

Please find our detailed comments attached. We trust you find them constructive.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

pp Stephen Lamb
Natural Resources Policy Manager

On behalf of:

Namouta Poutasi
General Manager Strategy & Science
## Comments from Bay Of Plenty Regional Council to National Disaster Resilience Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page No.</th>
<th>Section Heading and Reference</th>
<th>Clarify the issues you are concerned about</th>
<th>Support/Oppose or Seek Amendments and Provide Reason</th>
<th>3 Bay of Plenty Regional Council seeks the following decisions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Appendix 1. Strategy Overview</td>
<td>BOPRC supports the NDRS vision and goals. The Objectives are well aligned to one of our four Long Term Plan outcomes – Safe and Resilient Communities. The NDRS focus on improving NZ’s resilience to disasters is also well aligned to BOPRC’s Regional Policy Statement (natural hazard provisions), which provides a risk management framework for regional risk reduction. BOPRC will continue to work in partnership with EMBOP to action our responsibilities outlined in this Strategy.</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Clarity</td>
<td>Seek Amendment – Second to last sentence is too long. A maximum sentence word count of 20 is best practice for complicated content.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Clarity</td>
<td>Seek Amendment - Consider linking the potential extent of damage under vulnerability to the four capitals rather than the stated assets. This would provide a stronger link to Section 2. And “assets” is an uncommon descriptor for social, economic and environmental. These are normally referred to as values.</td>
<td>Consider linking the potential extent of damage under vulnerability to the four capitals rather than the stated assets. Or replace the word assets with values.</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>Clarity</td>
<td>Seek Amendment – Figure 4, top row uses M &amp; E Phase. It is unclear what M &amp; E stands for.</td>
<td>Consider inserting Monitoring &amp; Evaluation in full at the start of the first row of Figure 4. There appears to be space to have this in full. Alternatively, make a note in the Figure caption to clarify this.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Inland Revenue is pleased to have had the opportunity to review, and provide feedback on, the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

As part of the consultation process the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management posed the following questions:

1. Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

2. Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

3. Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

4. Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim? We would also appreciate your views if you disagree with this proposition.

5. Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?

6. Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?

We are in full agreement with the aspects covered in the first five questions; and below we offer several suggestions that we believe would assist in further strengthening the proposed Strategy.

**Key Feedback**

**Definitions**

**Definition of Resilience**

It’s disappointing that a definition of resilience has been created, rather than adopting or aligning to and existing definition of resilience such as the definition of organisational resilience from ISO 22316:2017 (“ability of an organisation to absorb and adapt to a changing environment”) or that used by Resilient Organisations (“the ability to survive a crisis and thrive in a world of uncertainty”). The definition created lacks any form of reference to longer-term / slowly developing changes that could have a disastrous consequence for New Zealand such as global warming and sea level rises.

**Consistency of Definitions**

While the proposed Strategy tries to define the Key terms (page 4) that are used throughout the document there appear to be inconsistent use of the definitions in different parts of the document.

- The definition of “Disaster risk” doesn’t consider the impact of the disruption of activities such as schools and businesses not operating;
- The defined terms “Disaster risk management” and “Disaster risk reduction” appear to be very similar;
- The definition of “Exposure” is somewhat circular as it used the word exposed in the definition. Additionally, the use of the word “exposed” in the definition of “Disaster” seems inconsistent with the way it defines the word in the later on page 4; and the term “Exposure” is then defined differently on page 12;
- The definition of “Hazard” (page 4) and “Vulnerability” (page 5) are defined differently on page 12;
- The definition of “Residual risk” could be clarified by simplifying it to read “The disaster risk that remains after effective disaster risk reduction measures are in place, and for which emergency response and recovery capacities must be maintained.”.

**Business Continuity**
In relation to Objectives 7 to 12, as stated on page 26, there is a failure explicitly include any reference to the need for business continuity as an underlying component of ensuring that effective responses can be delivered.

All organisations with any form of response, or recovery, responsibility or obligation need to have developed and rehearsed business continuity arrangements in place. This will provide others within the system the assurance that they can deliver their obligations. For too long organisations with emergency management obligations have planned to respond on the assumption that they will have full access to their staff, locations, equipment and systems (i.e. they are in no way impacted by the event that they are responding to). This is unlikely to be the case in reality and effective business continuity arrangements will help to manage, and therefore respond, in these situations.

Other Feedback

- We would suggest that the wording on the top of the second column of page 21 is amended to read “Response to emergencies and disruptions is characterised by a pre-identified and rehearsed end-to-end system that supports cooperative and coordinated emergency management, …”.

- There appears to be an correct word used in the definition of “What success looks like” for Objective 2. We believe that it should state “By 2030, the governance of risk and resilience in NZ …”

Thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback on the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy. We hope you find this feedback useful, and we are happy to provide any clarification required.

Cheers

Glen Redstall MBCI | Manager, Business Continuity and Emergency Management | Inland Revenue
Asteron Centre | 55 Featherston Street | PO Box 6140 | Wellington 6140
T. | DDI. | M. | E.

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Dear NationalStrategy@dpmc.govt.nz

Tonkin + Taylor Submission on the National Disaster Resilience Strategy (NDRS)

Background on Tonkin + Taylor (T+T)

Tonkin + Taylor is respected internationally as a leader in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), natural hazards planning and management, post-disaster assessments and recovery processes and having a comprehensive understanding of the importance of critical infrastructure resilience to extreme events such as heavy rainfall, earthquake, tsunami, cyclone, flood, drought and coastal erosion. The potential impacts can never be under-estimated; we view resilience as one of the most demanding challenges facing the world’s governments and society at large.

T+T’s work in the DRR, resilience and post-disaster space has provided a range of important insights, and helped develop a leading-practice understanding of risk and building the business case for resilience. Our approach seeks to holistically understand risk, opportunity and the value at stake, and uses a defendable and inclusive process to standardise and streamline characterising these factors.

Question 1: Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the (NDRS) strategy?

The stated purpose of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy is described in Section 1 of the NDRS and is to “outline the vision and long term goals for civil defence and emergency management (CDEM) in New Zealand”.

Its overarching aim is to provide “the vision and strategic direction, including to outline priorities and objectives for increasing New Zealand’s resilience to disasters”. The detail of how those objectives are to be achieved is not covered in the proposed Strategy, but is to sit “in a roadmap of actions alongside other related key documents, including the National CDEM Plan and Guide, the National Security Handbook, CDEM Group Plans, and a range of other supporting policies and plans”.

The Strategy “sets out what we as New Zealanders expect in respect of a resilient New Zealand, and what we want to achieve over the next 10 years. It explicitly links resilience to the protection and growth of living standards for all New Zealanders, and promotes a wide, whole-of-society, participatory and inclusive approach”.

The Vision is stated in the title of Section 2 - “a safe and prosperous nation” and the goal in the title of Section 4 - “a resilient future”. 

Exceptional thinking together www.tonkintaylor.co.nz
T+T Response: Agree in part

Link to Wider Context of Resilience and the Living Standards Framework

T+T applauds the excellent work done in presenting the vision and strategic direction of the Strategy in a wider context of resilience, and which embraces the Living Standards Framework (LSF) and the Four Capitals. Much of the NDRS Draft for Consultation focuses on this wider context. The strength of this connection could be even more strongly be made by including the full wording of Section 3(a) of the CEDM Act, rather than the abridged text included in Section 1.1,

Reproduced in its entirety, Section 3(a) (see below) provides a much broader platform that aligns to the LSF and four wellbeings/capitals.

“The purpose of this Act, which repeals and replaces the Civil Defence Act 1983, is to—

(a) improve and promote the sustainable management of hazards (as that term is defined in this Act) in a way that contributes to the social, economic, cultural, and environmental well-being and safety of the public and also to the protection of property;”

This wider framing for the Strategy could also better be supported by presenting key terms that more consistently reflect the breadth of the matters in Section 3(a). For example:

- the key term Disaster refers to “human, material, social, cultural, economic and environmental losses and impacts”; while
- Disaster Risk is far more narrowly expressed as “potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets”; and
- Exposure is focussed only on “people, infrastructure, buildings, the economy and other assets” with no reference to the environment.

Aligning key terms with CDEM Act Section 3(a) would also better align the strategy with the Resource Management Act (RMA) and its sustainable management purpose; and its wide definitions of Natural Hazards, Environment and Effects on the Environment. This alignment is important, given the significant role RMA plans and processes can play in disaster risk reduction.

Clarity of Focus and Scope

We submit that the purpose and focus of the Strategy is not clearly and consistently communicated within the draft document. Section 1.3 “Ring-fencing the scope of the strategy” states that the “strategy is confined to the disaster aspects of resilience”. This ring fencing is not clear and consistent through the majority of the document. As noted above a large part of the text presents wider contextual information on resilience and the LSF.

We note that the Strategy should, clearly, contribute to wider resilience, but needs to maintain its focus on the very significant contribution that disaster aspects (especially disaster risk reduction) can make to wider resilience.
We make the following suggestions that could help with clarity of the strategy's scope and focus.

1. Clearly separating out the contextual information about resilience and LSF in a stand-alone context section.
2. Enhance current Section 1 with more CDEM Act and disaster resilience contextual information. In particular, we recommend that a figure similar to the one below (which is presented in the 2007 National Civil Defence and Emergency Management Strategy) be included. This would illustrate the extensive range of agencies, documents, processes and plans involved in disaster resilience and emphasise the significant contribution these can make to wider resilience and wellbeing. Importantly, it would provide contextual information that can support more specific referencing to the individual plans/documents and agencies that can contribute to the objectives and outcomes described later in the strategy.

Question 2: Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy?

The stated priorities are:

- Managing Risks (Section 5)
- Effective response to and recovery from emergencies (section 6), and
- Strengthening societal resilience (Section 7).

T+T Response: Yes, we broadly agree

Redefining risk and its management

Modern thinking on risk provides a particularly helpful approach to dealing with the actual and potential threats that disasters present to our wellbeing. One of the key paradigm shifts is a change in how risk is conceptualised. Today’s universally accepted\(^1\) and promoted definition of "risk" is no longer "chance or probability of loss", but "the effect of uncertainty on objectives". Disaster risk management

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\(^1\) Definition in the international standard ISO 31000:2018,
must of necessity also include adaptation, and focus on realising objectives versus treating all the
impacts of the disaster. It would be helpful if this definition and conception of risk could be reflected
in the strategy and, be included in the key terms.

We would recommend emphasising understanding risk in priority 1 and submit that the title for
Section 5 should be: “to understand and manage the disaster risks that threaten our wellbeing and
prosperity”.

We note that the text in Section 5 on managing risk includes a very generic and rather “rose tinted
lens” comment about building codes and land use planning. These are both areas where delivery on
risk management has a huge need and potential to improve. This includes getting connections right
between different control regimes as well as improving their effectiveness in risk management (and
reduction). It is particularly relevant to note that the Treasury LSF document introducing the
Dashboard, issued this week identifies “natural hazard regulation” as a natural capital indicator on
which New Zealand’s performance has deteriorated. A focus on this could be added in the wording
of objective and outcomes.

**Question 3: Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy?**

The three priority areas set out in Question 2 each have six objectives and associated success factors
(what success looks like). Accordingly, there are 18 objectives with timeframes to be met by
(variously) 2025 or 2030.

**T+T Response: Broadly Agree**

We recommend that a number of the objectives and outcomes statements that are considerably wider
than the disaster resilience focus, be reworked to reflect that ring fencing (e.g. Objectives 3, 5, 13, 15
and 17). This could include much more specific references to outcomes associated with specific
agencies, plans, documents and processes.

**Question 4: Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance
of the proposed strategy?**

**T+T Response: Yes**

With local councils taking a lead role in the promotion of wellbeing (economic, social, cultural and
environmental), councils and community groups not only have a role in the governance of the
strategy, but in the governance of the response and recovery of disasters and emergencies. The range
of stakeholders should include representatives of mana whenua, Lifelines organisations (NZTA, three
waters, communications companies, energy providers etc.), key supply chain businesses and health
organisations. This list could also include representatives of privately owned key infrastructure. It is
now well established that connections made in advance result in faster, more effective recovery
outcomes.

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2 Our people, Our country, Our future: Living Standards Framework: Introducing the Dashboard. 4 December 2018.
Question 5: Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?

T+T Response: Yes

The links to the Living Standards Framework and Four Capitals, and the recognition that the capitals are “value stocks” which jointly produce wellbeing outcomes over time. The very fulsome text on these is helpful, but does need to be separated from the actual strategy to maintain the ring fence focus on disaster resilience.

Question 6: Are there gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?

T+T Response: Yes

Disaster risk reduction through RMA processes and plans and the transition from civil defence emergency to recovery are still poorly addressed. The Building Amendment Bill is currently going through its select committee hearings, and hopefully some clarity will come from that process. T+T has made a submission on this aspect. Similarly, the real challenges that exist in land use planning, lack of national policy/guidance/standards and action to address these is not addressed.

What this strategy does not articulate is how to get a joined up approach around actions, nor does it provide any substantive information about what those actions might need to be and who is responsible for implementation. In Section 8, the commitment to action is very theoretical, generic and descriptive rather than actually expressing any specific commitments to any particular action. Reference to a road map could be strengthened by providing details of its expected content, who will be responsible to develop it, when it will be produced and how it will link to the framework of documents/plans and agencies identified in the figure (or similar) we recommend be added to Section 1.

There are some references to agencies and roles etc. that need some explanation for those not familiar with them e.g., Hazard Risk Board (objective 8), controllers (objective 10) National Security System and CDEM Groups on p 30.

Yours faithfully

Marje Russ
Director + Principal Planner
Submission to draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy

6 December 2018

Introduction
The Social Equity & Wellbeing Network (SEWN, formerly the Council of Social Services in Christchurch) was established in 1978 to promote social and community wellbeing by fostering communication and collaboration between non-profit service providers and community agencies and central and local government. Our functions include disseminating information on social policy issues, social legislation and policy changes to our members and to other social and community service providers.

After the earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, SEWN was instrumental in supporting the non-profit sector as the sector worked in the community, especially with those groups disproportionately affected by disaster. Our experiences and those of our colleagues have given us a good understanding of the unique and critical role that the sector plays in building and maintaining community resilience.

Purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy
SEWN agrees with and supports the purpose, vision, and goal of the strategy. We particularly endorse the promotion of a whole-of-society, participatory and inclusive approach (para 1.1).

While we appreciate the need to ring-fence the scope of the strategy (para 1.3), we would like to see other government departments and ministries required to include in their outcome measures evidence of how well their policies and programmes support this strategy.

Priorities of the proposed strategy
SEWN agrees with and supports the priorities of the strategy.

Objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy
SEWN agrees with the objectives and success factors outlined. We are pleased that they contain explicit recognition of people and groups with particular needs or who are likely to be disproportionately affected by disasters.

Stakeholder involvement in governance
SEWN strongly agrees with the need for engagement of a broader range of stakeholders in governance of the strategy. In particular, the unique and invaluable contribution of the non-profit sector in disaster resilience makes it essential that the sector is part of any governance arrangement. We do not have a
strong view of how this might be achieved and recommend that representatives of stakeholder groups be invited to participate in a process of co-design of an appropriate structure.

**Definition of community**

We noted that the term ‘community’ is used over 60 times in the strategy, with no definition of what this means. Sometimes the context seems to suggest a geographical/location based community, while at other times it can be read generically.

We recommend that mention is made of the different types of community:

- place-based/geographical
- community of interest (e.g. p.41 mentions the ‘science community’)
- community of identity (e.g. ethnic communities, rainbow community, disability community).

and that mentions of ‘community’ are checked to see whether they do apply to all forms or whether it needs to be clarified that it is talking about a particular form of community.

**Role of non-profit sector**

SEWN considers that the unique and critical role that the non-profit sector makes to disaster resilience is not sufficiently signposted and recognised in the strategy. We must guess whether the sector is assumed to fit in ‘organisations’ (para 1.4) ‘community organisations’ (para 1.4), ‘civil society’ (obj 2, p.24), ‘community representatives’ (obj 2, p.24), or ‘civil society organisations’ (obj 14, p.28). (We do recognise what a challenge it is to find the correct terminology for the sector!)

Australia’s National Strategy for Disaster Resilience¹ is a good example of explicit and appropriate recognition, right from the first page:

“To succeed, it will be important that business and community leaders, as well as the not-for-profit sector, embrace this approach.” (p.ii)

and elsewhere in the document:

“Non-government and community organisations are at the forefront of strengthening disaster resilience in Australia. It is to them that Australians often turn for support or advice and the dedicated work of these agencies and organisations is critical to helping communities to cope with, and recover from, a disaster.” (p.iii)

“There is a need for a new focus on shared responsibility; one where political leaders, governments, business and community leaders, and the not-for-profit sector all adopt increased or improved emergency management and advisory roles, and contribute to achieving integrated and coordinated disaster resilience”. (p.3)

**Strengths of the proposed strategy**

We would like to congratulate the team on what it has achieved in this document, as we believe it represents an enormous step forward in building disaster resilience in Aotearoa. While there may be some fine-tuning required, generally it captures the values of social equity and wellbeing that we uphold.

Sharon Torstonson

¹ [https://www.preventionweb.net/files/18017_nationalstrategydisasterresilience.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/18017_nationalstrategydisasterresilience.pdf)
7 December 2018

Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6145

Email: NationalStrategy@dpmc.govt.nz

Christchurch City Council submission on the National Disaster Resilience Strategy

Introduction

Christchurch City Council (the Council) thanks the Ministry for the opportunity to provide comment on the National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

Overall, the Council is supportive of the proposed direction of the Strategy but recommend the strategy consider making ongoing strategy governance and implementation arrangements more explicit including the role of the community, as well as civil defence emergency management groups.

Please find attached the Council’s submission in response to the Ministry’s proposed questions. The Council has also provided specific comments on each objective of the strategy in the attachment.

As agreed, I will provide an addendum by next Tuesday.

For any clarification on points within this submission please contact Rob Orchard, Head of Civil Defence and Emergency Management at [contact information redacted].

Yours faithfully

Lianne Dalziel
Mayor of Christchurch
## Consultation Question

1. Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

## Council comment

Whilst CCC welcomes and celebrates the aspirational targets of the strategy, it does need to be reinforced with a detailed implementation plan that compliments the outcomes of the minister’s response to the TAG review, the National Plan and also the Group CDEM plan.

It cannot be a 10 year plan either – it needs to be reviewed in 2021, with a view to having another plan in place in 2025.

We have the following specific comments on the purpose, vision and goals of the proposed strategy:

**Purpose**
The purpose of the strategy isn’t clear enough and could be more explicit. For example:

- The draft strategy document states that the purpose is to “outline the vision and long term goals for CDEM in New Zealand” however the purpose also refers strongly to the CDEM Act e.g. the six bullet points in s1.1 are a truncated version of the Act’s purpose.
- The purpose might be better expressed as “To enable (or give effect” to the purpose of the Act.”

**Vision**
The vision could be more closely aligned to giving effect to the CDEM Act if that is the intent of the draft strategy.

## Council recommendations

Ensure that this strategy is capable of translating into action by cascading items of critical importance through the National CDEM Plan and also the Group CDEM plans.
It would be possible to read this Strategy and not realise that it replaces the National Emergency Management Strategy as required by the CDEM Act 2002. It is usual to look at what it is replacing, because it could be given more context.

The tagline on page 9 “Our Vision” is very broad so does not help to clarify the focus of the strategy. For example:
- ‘Safe’ is a very broad term, i.e. safe from what: crime, vehicle accidents, disease, natural hazards?.
- Delivering ‘prosperity’ is not a component of the draft strategy and may be better addressed with in other national strategies.
- We agree with the alignment of this draft strategy with the Living Standards Framework including risk and resilience across all 4 Capitals (section 2.2). However, the strategy should address the linkages and interconnectedness of all the capitals to avoid cultural matters such as heritage can be treated as a non-essential.

**Goals**
- The goal as currently worded is too “abstract”. It puts resilience as the destination however the strategy and the creation of a resilient New Zealand is more about the journey. We suggest rewording and using language from within the strategy. e.g. “Create a nation that understands risk and is better prepared for future challenges” is a bit more intuitive.
- Cultural heritage should also be recognised as being vital to our local community identity. Heritage comes into the natural and built environment aspects of resilience. Additionally, moveable heritage (objects and documentation) should be linked to the cultural heritage of the community. Moveable heritage was not recognised or provided for in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquakes. A broad definition of heritage would assist in this respect.
- We suggest including a role for ‘narrative and story-telling’ alongside Mataurangi (knowledge and understanding) as ‘meaning and feeling’ are equally important for encouraging action.
2. **Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.**

   The Council agrees with the proposed priorities of the strategy. The priorities of managing risk, having effective responses to and recovery from emergencies and strengthening societal resilience, all align with the current 4 Rs approach to emergency management.

   However, the position adopted on disaster risk reduction seems to be deficit based rather than strengths based. The focus on reducing exposure and vulnerability is fine, but would be enhanced with an equal focus on building the fourth component, as it is described, capacity – defined as the strengths, attributes and resources. This would give meaning to what is essentially a collaborative approach across local and central government, DRR scientists, planners and experts and the community. There must be a much better focus on the community.

   The Council notes that the Minister’s response to the TAG review, and the report itself, focuses largely on the ‘response’ component of emergencies. The ‘recovery’ component should also be given effect through this strategy.

   We anticipate that a detailed implementation plan would provide greater clarity on how and who will implement these.

   That the ‘recovery’ component of emergencies is also given effect to through this strategy.

3. **Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.**

   The Council agrees with the objectives and success factors of the strategy, with appropriate stretch targets to New Zealand.

   The Council notes that the Minister’s response to the TAG review, and the report itself, focuses largely on the ‘response’ component of emergencies. The ‘recovery’ component should also be given effect through this strategy.

   We anticipate that a detailed implementation plan would provide greater clarity on how and who will implement these.

   That the ‘recovery’ component of emergencies is also given effect to through this strategy.

4. **Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in the governance of the strategy? It is excellent to see the role for Maori emphasised in the way the draft suggests.**

   The Council agrees that a broad range of stakeholders should be involved in the governance of the strategy. It is excellent to see the role for Maori emphasised in the way the draft suggests.

   Continue to enable territorial authorities to manage community development.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>5. Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?</th>
<th>We would like to acknowledge the holistic view of resilience and the need for greater stakeholder engagement and input. This is particularly so in regards to the broader whole-of-society risks and the inclusion of Maori principles. The layout is friendly and inviting. The content and imagery is broad enough for other groups (not just CDEM) to see their place in the strategy.</th>
<th>None.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 6. Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy? | This new strategy is best viewed as a forward focusing strategy that deals with the environment in which we find ourselves now, and also what future resilience looks like in our communities. This requires a much stronger focus on climate change, and the need to achieve a net carbon neutral future. We know we face more severe and more frequent major incidents because of climate change and the reference to these in the future or preparing for the future portrays a lack of urgency. These will happen every year and in many areas. We need a state of preparedness we have not seen before, especially as help from New Zealand will also constantly be required in our Pacific neighbours. The Council suggests the Ministry considers:  
• the use of a National Risk Agency as an implementation vehicle. | Consider the use of a National Risk Agency as an implementation vehicle. Ensure that the National Disaster and Resilience Strategy be considered in conjunction with any potential changes in the 3 Waters management. The Council does not think 3 waters should be |
• If there is a timeframe for which CDEM plans must align with the strategy once it is adopted this could be included as an objective.
• Both Christchurch & Wellington have joined the 100 Resilient Cities Network pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation and could assist in the resilience planning component.

| separated from the functions of strong local government. |
Christchurch City Council’s feedback specific to the objectives of the proposed strategy

In each of these we have removed the reference to the target dates, which are based on the Sendai Framework. We are far more advanced than most countries in the world, so have placed a stretch target of 2021, which is the 10th anniversary of the February 2011 earthquake.

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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Identify and understand risk scenarios (including the components of hazard, exposure, vulnerability, and capacity), and use this knowledge to inform decision-making</td>
<td>By 2030, there is an agreed, standardised, and widely-used methodology for assessing disaster risks at a local government, large organisation, and central government level. Risks can be aggregated and viewed at a national or sub-national level, and the results inform the risk assessment efforts of others. Businesses and small organisations can make use of a simplified version to assess their own risks, and make decisions about courses of action.</td>
<td>Agree in principle, however consider that New Zealand is in a position to be much more aspirational with the timeframes. Risks relating to the built environment could and should continue to be managed through appropriate consenting processes and resource management as required. Specific Disaster risks should be identified and managed through the CDEM function. Ultimately, these risks should be identified and managed at the Regional CDEM level in conjunction with individual territorial authority representation along with appropriate industry experts.</td>
<td>Bring forward the timeframe to 2021 with a report back to the international conference scheduled for that year. Enable the Regional CDEM function to establish ‘Disaster’ risks within each regional boundary and work collaboratively with all sectors public, private and societal.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Put in place organisational structures and identify necessary processes to understand and act on reducing risks</td>
<td>By 2030, the governance of risk and resilience in NZ is informed by multi-sectoral views and participation including the private sector, civil society, and other community representatives. Progress on risk</td>
<td>Agree in principle, however consider that New Zealand is in a position to be much more aspirational with the timeframes. At local level this could include governance at Community Boards</td>
<td>Bring forward the timeframe to 2021 with a report back to the international conference scheduled for that year.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Build risk awareness, risk literacy, and risk management capability, including the ability to assess risk</td>
<td>By 2030 we have an agreed ‘plain English’ lexicon for risk, including better visual products for describing the risk of any situation, hazard, product, or process; government agencies and science organisations regularly communicate with the public about risks in a timely and transparent manner, and in a way that is understandable and judged effective by the public.</td>
<td>Agree in principle, however consider that New Zealand is in a position to be much more aspirational with the timeframes. This is a highly aspirational target in regards to the proposed scope and will need further clarification for implementation.</td>
<td>Bring forward the timeframe to 2021 with a report back to the international conference scheduled for that year. Provide further clarity regarding ‘products’ and whether there is already a recommended system that can communicate risks in an appropriate format, and one that can receive feedback from the public regarding its effectiveness.</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Address gaps in risk reduction policy (particularly in the light of climate change adaptation)</td>
<td>By 2030 we have had a national conversation – including with affected and potentially-affected communities – about how to approach high hazard areas, and we have a system level-response (including central and local government) with aligned regulatory and funding/financing policies in place.</td>
<td>Agree in principle, however consider that New Zealand is in a position to be much more aspirational with the timeframes. Natural Hazard Coordination Groups at regional level could provide the forum from which regional alignment regarding regulation and financing could be addressed.</td>
<td>Bring forward the timeframe to 2021 with a report back to the international conference scheduled for that year. Enable CDEM Groups to facilitate the conversation between regional and local. This strategy needs to be supported by an in-depth implementation plan that complements the minister's response to the TAG review, the National and also the Group CDEM plans.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Ensure development and investment practices, particularly in the built environment, are risk-sensitive, taking care not to create any unnecessary or unacceptable new risk.</td>
<td>By 2030, communities value and accept having resilience as a core goal for all development, recognising that this may involve higher upfront costs through greater net benefits in the long term; plans, policies and regulations are fit for purpose, flexible enough to enable resilient development under a variety of circumstances, and can be easily adapted as risks become better understood; developers aim to exceed required standards for new development, and may receive appropriate recognition for doing so; earthquake prone building remediation meets required timeframes and standards.</td>
<td>Agree in principle, however consider that New Zealand is in a position to be much more aspirational with the timeframes. Earthquake Prone Buildings should be assessed and managed within agreed timeframes and standards, but also pragmatically to ensure economical impact is appropriately limited.</td>
<td>Bring forward the timeframe to 2021 with a report back to the international conference scheduled for that year. National legislation needs to reflect any increased requirements to building standards, and where practical, supported by development contributions that turn this target from aspirational for developers, into tangible safety and resilience outcomes for communities.</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Understand the economic impact of disaster and disruption, and the need for investment in resilience. Identify and develop financial mechanisms that support resilience activities.</td>
<td>By 2030, there is an improved understanding of the cost of disasters and disruption, including the economic cost of social impact; we are routinely collecting data on disruption, and using it to inform decision-making and investment in resilience; there is a clear mix of funding and incentives in place to advance New Zealand’s disaster risk management priorities and build resilience to disasters.</td>
<td>Agree in principle, however consider that New Zealand is in a position to be much more aspirational with the timeframes. The cost of disasters are becoming easier to track. However, it should be kept in mind that direct cost comparisons between different disasters may not be possible as each disaster is unique.</td>
<td>Bring forward the timeframe to 2021 with a report back to the international conference scheduled for that year. Involve the private sector in any cost/benefit analysis for building in resilience. This should be lead at the national level and include conversations with insurers.</td>
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The six objectives designed to progress the priority of effective response to and recovery from emergencies are to:

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<td>7</td>
<td>Implement measures to ensure that the safety and wellbeing of people is at</td>
<td>By 2025, there is renewed levels of trust and confidence in the emergency management system. A partnership approach with iwi means a collaborative approach and full engagement in relation to emergency management. In emergencies, the safety, needs, and wellbeing of affected people are the highest priority. The public know what is going on, what to expect, and what to do: hazard warnings are timely and effective, and incorporate new technology and social science; strategic information is shared with stakeholders, spokespeople, and the media, so they get the right advice at the right time; and public information management is resourced to communicate effectively with the public, through a variety of channels, in formats that are sensitive to the particular needs of people and groups, such as people with disabilities or non-English speakers.</td>
<td>Agree in principle. Acknowledge the holistic view of resilience and the need for greater stakeholder engagement and input. This is particularly so in regards to the broader whole-of-society risks and the inclusion of Maori principles. The timelines for achieving some of this target are more stringent than that of providing training to Controllers.</td>
<td>Review target date in-line with other targets linked to technology, suggest this is 2021. Resourcing for foreign language messaging needs to be considered at regional level to ensure the capacity exists to undertake this work.</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Strengthen the national leadership of the emergency management system</td>
<td>By 2025, more directive leadership of the emergency management system, including setting national standards for emergency management, so there is a consistent standard of care across the country. The Hazard Risk Board provides strengthened stewardship of the system, and there is</td>
<td>Agree, but consider that New Zealand could achieve this by 2021. The national standards will need to be in place sooner to allow for further development of response capability in Controller and other functional areas.</td>
<td>The strategy needs to be supported by an in-depth implementation plan that complements the minister's response to the TAG review, the National Plan and also the Group CDEM plan.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Improve policy and planning to ensure it is clear who is responsible for what, nationally, regionally, and locally, in response and recovery</td>
<td>By 2025, legislative and policy settings support plans at all levels that are clearer about how agencies will work together and who will do what. An updated incident management doctrine provides clarity about roles and functions, and is used by all agencies to manage all events. At a regional level, shared service arrangements are clear about local and regional roles, and mean better use of resources and better holistic service delivery to communities.</td>
<td>Suggest reviewing the Strategy in line with the Council’s recommended date for achieving the objectives (i.e. 2021), rather than a 10 year review, would ensure the emergency management system is effective. The strategy needs to be supported by an in-depth implementation plan that complements the minister’s response to the TAG review, the National Plan and also the Group CDEM plan.</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Build the capability and capacity of the emergency management workforce for response and recovery</td>
<td>By 2030, all Controllers are trained and accredited; people fulfilling incident management roles have the appropriate training, skills, experience and aptitude and volunteers are appropriately trained, recognised, and kept safe in the system. Fly-in Teams supplement local capability and capacity.</td>
<td>Agree that all controllers are trained and accredited. However, the target of 2030 is too distant given the timeline used for other and more difficult targets in this strategy. Reduce the deadline for Controller accreditation to no later than 2021. This needs to be supported by an in-depth implementation plan that complements the minister’s response to the TAG review, the National and also the Group CDEM plans.</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Improve the information and intelligence system that</td>
<td>By 2025, all stakeholders in the emergency management system have access to the same operational and</td>
<td>Agreed, however the target of 2025 should be brought forward. The Common Operating Picture It is recommended to move away from a prescriptive nationally standardised system</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Embed a strategic approach to recovery planning that takes account of risks identified, recognises long-term priorities, and ensures the needs of the affected are at the centre of recovery</td>
<td>By 2030, there is significantly increased understanding of recovery principles and practice by decision-makers; readiness for recovery is based on a strong understanding of communities and the consequences local hazards might have on these communities; in particular, it focuses on long-term resilience by linking recovery to risk reduction, readiness, and response through actions designed to reduce consequences on communities.</td>
<td>Agree in principle. However, Recovery needs to be at the forefront of the conversation regarding resilience. The timeline of 2030 needs to be brought forward to ensure that Recovery is brought into the same space as 'Response' when dealing with emergencies.</td>
<td>The Minister’s response to the TAG review, and the report itself, focuses largely on the 'Response' component of emergencies. It is recommended that 'Recovery' is given effect through this strategy. Recovery is not just the built environment. The impacts at the societal level can be buffered with good Recovery practices being an early part of the Response.</td>
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The six objectives designed to progress the priority of strengthening societal resilience are at all levels to:

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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Build a culture of resilience, including a ‘future-ready’ ethos, through promotion, advocacy, and education</td>
<td>By 2030, the concept of, and requirements for, resilience are observably built in to more facets of New Zealand society, culture, and economy than in 2019. Resilience is an accepted part of who we are and what we need to do to maintain our wellbeing and prosperity, including in policy, plans, job descriptions, and other statutory or contractual obligations</td>
<td>Agree. However, New Zealand is already building a culture of resilience, with both Christchurch and Wellington included in the 100 Resilient Cities. The timeline of this objective should be brought forward.</td>
<td>Consider diversity and communities with particular vulnerabilities, and building innovation into our culture of resilience</td>
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| 14 | Promote and support prepared individuals, households, organisations, and businesses | By 2030, emergency preparedness is part of everyday life. More people are able to thrive through periods of crisis and change because they have a plan to get through an emergency that they regularly practise, and have emergency supplies that are regularly checked and updated. Public, private, and civil society organisations are able to thrive through periods of crisis and change because they understand what they can do to improve their resilience, and are investing in improving their resilience. People and groups who have particular needs, or who are likely to be disproportionately affected by disasters, are engaged in planning and preparedness, and supported to build their resilience. | It would be appropriate to acknowledge our resilient communities and the work that has happened in the resilience space already. We are gaining traction, and learning more and more. For example, Point 8 in Barriers to Resilience (p42) describes a lack of translating resilience theory to action. This is already happening in Christchurch and across the country. | Bring forward the target date for this objective to 2021.  
Promote and support a community-led and understood approach to resilience. |
<p>| 15 | Cultivate an environment for social connectedness which promotes a culture of mutual | By 2030, new methodologies and approaches mean that communities are more knowledgeable about risks, are                                                                                                                     | Agree. Community resilience is best discussed/developed at the local level with close cooperation                                                                                                               | Bring forward the target date for this objective to 2021. |</p>
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<th>help; embed a collective impact approach to building community resilience</th>
<th>empowered to problem-solve, and participate in decision-making about their future.</th>
<th>and involvement of all relevant stakeholders. At local level this should include the support of existing governance structures at Community Board level to ensure communities are empowered to make decisions about their future.</th>
<th>Promote and support a community-led and understood approach to resilience.</th>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Take a whole of city/district/region approach to resilience, including to embed strategic objectives for resilience in key plans and strategies</td>
<td>By 2030, local authorities have adopted strategic objectives aimed at building resilience in their city/district, and work collaboratively with a broad range of partners to steward the wellbeing and prosperity of the city/district.</td>
<td>Agree, however the timeframes could be brought forward. There needs to be clarity provided in regards to who holds the portfolio for developing resilience goals within their communities. Group CDEM plans may try to address regional resilience, but this should be delivered by local authorities.</td>
<td>The strategy needs to be supported by an in-depth implementation plan that complements the minister’s response to the TAG review, the National Plan and also the Group CDEM plan.</td>
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<td>Bring forward the target date for this objective to 2021.</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Recognise the importance of culture to resilience, including to support the continuity of cultural places, institutions and activities, and to enable to the participation of different cultures</td>
<td>By 2030, there is an increased understanding and recognition of the role culture plays in resilience; there are improved multi-cultural partnership approaches to disaster planning and preparedness; and there is substantially increased resilience to disasters including cultural heritage.</td>
<td>Agreed. This needs to factor in the wider ranging cultural diversity of New Zealand and not just mainstream cultures.</td>
<td>Ensure this links into any foreign language messaging programme along with the potential for partnering with cultural entities to ensure understanding of cultures is embedded into emergency response as well as recovery.</td>
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<td>Bring forward the target date for this objective to 2021.</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Address the capacity and adequacy of critical infrastructure systems, and</td>
<td>By 2030, we more fully understand infrastructure vulnerabilities, including interdependencies, cascading effects and impacts on society; we have clarified and</td>
<td>Agree. Lifeline utility providers are best placed to provide an holistic understanding of critical infrastructure and its capabilities.</td>
<td>A national review of critical infrastructure could provide the basis for development of future work plans that increase</td>
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<td>upgrade them as practicable, according to risks identified</td>
<td>agreed expectations about levels of service during and after emergencies, and see infrastructure providers that are working to meet those levels (including through planning and investment), and; we have improved planning for response to and recovery from infrastructure failure.</td>
<td>and capacities before, during and after an emergency.</td>
<td>resilience and ensure levels of service before, during and after an emergency. Bring forward the target date for this objective to 2021.</td>
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7 December 2018

National Disaster Resilience Strategy submissions
Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6145

Emailed to: NationalStrategy@dpmc.govt.nz

ICNZ submission on proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy

Thank you for the opportunity to submit on the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy ("Strategy"), which was released for comment in October 2018. ICNZ represents general insurers that insure about 95 percent of the New Zealand general insurance market, including over half a trillion dollars’ worth of New Zealand property and liabilities.

Please contact Andrew Saunders if you have any questions on our submission or require further information.

Submission

Overarching comments

ICNZ and insurers actively engage with central and local government and other stakeholders to raise awareness of natural hazards and promote New Zealand’s resilience and so we support the approach outlined in the proposed Strategy. The focus on managing risks, effective response to and recovery from emergencies, and strengthening societal resilience is appropriate.

In 2014 we released a position paper “Protecting New Zealand from Natural Hazards - An Insurance Council of New Zealand perspective on ensuring New Zealand is better protected from natural hazards” in which we proposed fifteen actions to reduce risks and improve resilience. While a number of these have been implemented, and the Strategy represents part of this, there is an ongoing need to work on improving risk management and resilience. Subsequent to this has been the global agreement to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, which amongst many sensible recommendations includes promotion of mechanisms for disaster risk transfer and insurance and we recognise the Strategy also addresses a number of these. Government has traditionally been strong at responding to disasters but has been less successful on reducing risks in advance or on swiftly
and effectively progressing recovery and so we welcome the proactive and all-encompassing approach outlined in the Strategy.

While we cannot control the forces of nature, we can reduce their impact significantly by building our capacity to withstand and recover from natural disasters. This is achieved by identifying and planning ahead on how to adapt or mitigate in order to reduce the risks we face. Numerous studies show that investment in those measures before disaster strikes saves much more than trying to pick up the cost afterwards. Reducing risks also helps to keep insurance available and affordable and high levels of insurance cover in turn benefits society by sharing the risk and reducing the cost individuals, businesses, local and central government would otherwise have to meet and improve an economy’s ability to recover after a disaster.

Given New Zealand’s exposure to natural disasters it is critical that New Zealand maintains access to international risk-capital to support both private insurers and the Earthquake Commission (EQC). Constructive and proactive efforts to reduce risks and increase the swiftness of response and recovery, such as outlined in the Strategy, are a welcomed step in this regard.

**Role of insurance in responding to disasters**

New Zealand is one of the most vulnerable countries in the world to the impact of natural disasters for an economy of our size, with a recent Lloyd’s report rating our exposure as having the second highest level of annual expected losses as a percentage of GDP. The insurance industry (insurers and re-insurers) has provided more than $30 billion to New Zealand people and organisations to help recover from the Canterbury and Kaikōura earthquakes. This has represented a significant proportion of the overall financial costs of these events.

We remain at risk from further earthquakes, volcanoes and tsunami and from weather events, with 2017 and 2018 New Zealand’s most expensive years for weather-related events. Climate change will increase the risk of flooding in parts of the country and drought in other areas. Coastal areas will be more vulnerable as sea levels rise and we can also expect more severe windstorms in the west. Seismic risks will however remain New Zealand’s biggest exposure, given the ability for individual events to cause national level impacts and involve multi-year recoveries.

When natural catastrophe strikes it takes a heavy social toll. Lives can be lost, homes destroyed, sanitation and communications systems wrecked, businesses bankrupted and jobs lost as well as the trauma and stress families suffer as they try to put their lives back together. Insurance plays a key role in helping families and businesses recover from natural disasters, this includes insurance for:

- residential property (homes and apartments)
- personal contents in residential property
- motor vehicles
- commercial property (buildings and equipment)
- business interruption insurance

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2 This includes funds that have been provided by private insurers to their personal and business customers and by re-insurers to EQC.
We note that these types of insurance can respond to almost any type of disaster. The cover provided by the EQC also responds to a range of events also, noting that in relation to flood events, which are the most common type of disaster, EQC does not respond to property damage, only to land damage.

ICNZ and the insurance industry aim to make New Zealand more resilient to natural hazards and disasters by educating the public about the risks they pose and by providing insurance to help manage those risks. We have for some time been raising awareness on the need for a coordinated, adaptation approach from the top of local government down to individuals for better management of natural hazards so as to keep the transfer of risk to insurance affordable and available for all New Zealanders long into the future.

**Recommendations**

As noted above we strongly support the proposed Strategy. We do have some recommendations as to additional matters to reflect in the Strategy that relate to the role of insurance and insurers and on the importance of implementation.

The Strategy is rightly focussed on human and societal impacts, however, it is important to remember that for people and communities to recover post an event it is critical they have homes to live in and businesses/workplaces to work from. The Strategy references the role of insurance in relation to risk-transfer and the high-level of insurance penetration in New Zealand. Given that high level, in the event of any disaster most of the financial costs will be met by insurance and in a large event this will be billions of dollars. The sooner insurance can respond, the sooner the inflow of insurance settlements that are critical to restoring properties and supporting the economy can occur.

It is critical that post-disaster the responsible authorities engage early and constructively with the insurance industry. This should occur at a general level so that government agencies leading response and recovery understand how insurance will respond and what they can do to facilitate, and avoid hindering, a swift insurance response so as to benefit their communities. There are also specific issues that require engagement and collaboration, such as facilitating access to properties to assess damage or sharing information at a regional or community level on disaster impacts, needs and vulnerabilities.

Given this we consider this critical role of insurance and the need for authorities to engage and collaborate with the insurance industry should be explicitly reflected in the Strategy. The involvement of EQC should not be seen as a proxy for insurance involvement given the many differences that exist between the specific coverage provided by EQC and the more diverse and extensive coverage provided by private insurers (e.g. coverage for businesses and commercial property and in future personal contents). We also note that, as occurred in response to the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake, insurers may continue in future to manage their customers’ EQC claims on behalf of EQC in the interests of more efficient claims responses and better customer outcomes.

In the section on Managing Risks on page 24, Objective 5 sensibly provides that it should be ensured that development and investment practices, particularly in the built environment, are risk-sensitive, taking care not to create any unnecessary or unacceptable new risk. We support this as increasing the resilience of buildings to disasters through improved building standards and planning plays a key role in managing risks.

We note the commentary to this Objective refers specifically to earthquake prone building remediation meeting required timeframes and standards. Completing this work is important but greater aspiration is required in this area and the focus needs to move from addressing the tail, strengthening the most vulnerable buildings considered “earthquake prone”, to over time ensuring
that all buildings are highly-resilient to earthquakes. To really improve the resilience of our built environment it is necessary to achieve a step-change in the resilience of buildings and fundamentally changing the New Building Standard (NBS) so that as well as protecting life safety, buildings are serviceable following a major seismic event, will be a critical step to achieving this. Given its risk profile this is perhaps the most important single action New Zealand can undertake to improve future resilience to disasters. The need to demolish buildings following a major earthquake has massive financial costs and means it takes years for communities to rebuild and recover.

As a final point, central and local authorities also need to be mindful of taking actions, particularly after a disaster, that increase moral hazard and potentially dis-incentivise the uptake of insurance in future.

Effective implementation of the Strategy will be critical to achieving its objectives. There are many activities outlined in it that will require significant effort to be undertaken and implemented by a range of agencies within central government, local government and beyond. It is therefore essential that Government provides the funding and focus necessary to implement the Strategy.

**Conclusion**

Thank you again for the opportunity to submit on the proposed Strategy. Insurers have long experience in this area and ICNZ and our members welcome opportunities to work with government agencies on these matters.

If you have any questions, please contact our Regulatory Affairs Manager on [redacted] or by emailing [redacted].

Yours sincerely,

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Tim Grafton  
Chief Executive

Andrew Saunders  
Regulatory Affairs Manager
7 December 2018

Submission on consultation document: National Disaster Resilience Strategy Rautaki Manawaroa Aituā ā-Motu

Museums Aotearoa welcomes the opportunity to comment on this consultation document.

1 Purpose, vision and goal
   We agree with the vision and goal of this strategy.

2 Priorities, objectives and success factors
   We agree with the priorities in general.

3 Risk reduction
   Public museums and art galleries have considerable expertise in risk reduction. They actively manage the physical protection of the taonga in their care, to ensure that our national cultural heritage is maintained and continues to nurture wellbeing even after a disaster. Museums also have an active role in educating the public, for instance in the effects of disasters and how to prepare for them.

4 Response
   The expertise in museums and galleries has been shown to be invaluable in the wake of disasters such as the Canterbury earthquakes. There is more that could be done to coordinate this expertise nationally in response to a region-wide disaster such as this, where each institution (and all their staff) has its own immediate issues to deal with. In Canterbury some larger institutions were able to provide considerable assistance to other organisations and individuals such as artists, but the response could have been more timely and effective if a coordination plan were in place in advance. The Canterbury Disaster Salvage Team was in place, but their ability to respond quickly was limited by the personal circumstances of the individual team members, some of whom were badly affected. The Canterbury Cultural Collections Recovery Centre that operated 2013-2017 at Wigram’s Air Force Museum is an exemplar of a successful response – but was only possible because of a happy coincidence of factors. If such facilities and expertise could be identified in advance their timeliness and effectiveness would be greatly enhanced.

5 Resilience
   The Strategy recognises the importance of strengthening societal resilience. It has been shown that cultural organisations such as museums and art galleries play a critical role in connected, culturally aware communities. Recognition of this role needs to be explicit to ensure that the resources are there to support them.
6 Stakeholders
We believe that disaster resilience needs to be broadly based, and is not the sole responsibility of any one agency. While the Civil Defence network and councils have a vital role, we would like to see nationally coordinated preparedness and response mechanisms which include more engagement with Ministry for Culture & Heritage and agencies such as Heritage NZ.

7 Strengths of the Strategy
The holistic and community-based approach to this Strategy are good, in particular recognition of the importance of social capital in times of disaster.

8 Challenges
In the next stage of developing this Strategy, we would like to see more detailed articulation of processes by which different agencies take responsibility in the event of a disaster, as noted in 4 and 6 above. We believe that the lack of such coordination mechanisms has lead to unnecessary and avoidable distress to individuals, destruction of heritage buildings, and damage to collections and taonga in the wake of some disasters. For example, there were individuals and institutions in other parts of the country ready and willing to assist in response and recovery of cultural heritage at the time of the Canterbury earthquakes, but no way to coordinate that assistance except one-to-one.

Phillipa Tocker
Executive Director
Museums Aotearoa

*Museums Aotearoa* is New Zealand's professional association for public museums and art galleries, and those who work in or are associated with them.

*Museums Aotearoa* institutional members include around 95% of staffed public museums and art galleries, and a smaller proportion of the 330+ volunteer institutions.

[www.museumsaotearoa.org.nz](http://www.museumsaotearoa.org.nz)
12 November 2018

Sarah Stuart-Black
Director, CDEM
Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
Sarah.Stuart-Black@dpcmc.govt.nz

Director Stuart-Black,

Consultation on the National Disaster Resilience Strategy

I am writing to you on behalf of the Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group to provide our collective input as part of the public consultation on the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy (the Strategy).

The Bay of Plenty CDEM Group supports in general the proposed strategy. We have particular interest in how the strategy will be operationalised to meet the challenges ahead in reducing our community’s exposure and vulnerability to risks, not just hazards. The proposed strategy does not go into detail on how this will be achieved or supported, nor the implications of doing so (direct and indirect). This is our biggest concern, with the key elephant in the room being funding.

Building sustainable resilience will cost New Zealand in the short to medium term and it is important that these costs are distributed evenly and not all passed onto local authorities and the ratepayers. It also requires leadership to not only have the essential courageous conversations, but to also make the necessary courageous decisions that cater for the needs of future generations (as reasonably foreseeable) beyond simplistic, short-term, economic impact calculations.

There is an opportunity through this strategy to look at the current funding models for local government to help reduce the often inequitable burden placed upon smaller local authorities and to achieve more even distribution of prosperity and wellbeing for our communities. New Zealanders do not differentiate geographically how they lead the kinds of lives they value and have reason to value.

Given the significant shift in the strategy’s approach and its interdependencies with other legislation, we strongly encourage the development of a Regulatory Impact Statement so that we can all understand the probable impositions that this strategy brings and how we will collectively address them through a true shared approach.

Further specific feedback on the strategy is provided below against the key questions asked via the consultation process.
Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy?
We support the purpose, vision and goal of the strategy as proposed. They are largely consistent with the approach already underway in the Bay of Plenty through the implementation of the Bay of Plenty Regional Policy Statement and the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Plan 2018-2022. We think it would be beneficial to expand upon the scope delineation of ‘disaster resilience’ (pg. 8) to create greater clarity up front in the document, rather than having to wait until Section 3.

Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? We support the priorities of the proposed strategy. They are complimentary to the legislated roles of local government required under both the Local Government Act 2002 and the Resource Management Act 1991.

Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? We support the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy. We understand that it is challenging at the commencement of a strategy design to state a definitive road map with progressive milestones. We encourage that the next steps in implementing the strategy includes the development of such a road map that shows how it will be progressively implemented, both holistically and programmatically within the three proposed priority action areas.

Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? The enablement of resilience has interdependencies across multiple policy areas and responsibilities that requires a broad governance approach. We see the strategy as a specific disaster resilience lens that is complimentary to the more holistic wellbeing resilience focus that is being returned to the purpose of local government. We support in part a broader range of stakeholders being involved in governing the proposed strategy to ensure and enhance the collective impact approach required to resolve the complex societal challenges that we face in achieving equitable resilience and wellbeing for our communities. The management of policy interdependencies, especially their side-effects, should be the core aim of a broader governance model.

Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?
- We support the specific consideration of Māori concepts of resilience, and resilience of Māori, and how that links to national resilience. This is in alignment with submissions from Bay of Plenty tangata whenua received in 2017 during consultation on the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Plan 2018-2028.
- We support the use of clear and simple language in the document, ensuring that it is easier to read and understand. We understand why there is a need for the extensive background at the front of the strategy to expand upon the strategic setting that this particular strategy is positioned within given it is the first specific resilience strategy released by central government. Expansion on the scope delineation earlier in the strategy is essential to ensure that the reader is well positioned at the start of the strategy.
- We encourage the use of Appendix 1 as a concise and simple way of presenting the ‘strategy on a page’.
- We support the use of Appendix 2 as a good way to identify opportunities to implement the strategy at all levels but it might be worth highlighting that this is the start of the approach and there are likely to be many more that haven’t yet been identified.

Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy? The key gap of the previous strategy is the limited guidance provided to local government on how to translate legislative goals into action on the ground. This is projected to be addressed by the proposed strategy through the three priorities, especially ‘managing risk’. Whilst they have not been produced yet, it is encouraging to see specification of proposed work on increasing risk literacy, specific risk reduction policies, and enhanced clarity on who is responsible for what. Similar to the previous strategy, the key challenge will be in operationalising the legislative goals through an equitable funding model that is
not solely reliant on a local property-based rating system that does not take into consideration the hazardscape, geographic extent or socio-economic capability of a local authority's rating base.

We encourage you to continue the consultative approach to the development and implementation of this key-stone strategy that will assist in enhancing the resilience of New Zealanders, both as individuals and as a whole, to disasters.

The Bay of Plenty CDEM Group welcomes the opportunity for any ongoing involvement in the evolution and implementation of this strategy.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]
Russell George
Chair: Coordinating Executive Group
Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management Group

cc: Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Joint Committee
30 October 2018

National Disaster Resilience Strategy submissions
Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6145

Dear Sir/Madam

Environment Southland Submission on the Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy

Environment Southland commends Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management for a well thought out strategy that promotes a holistic approach to strengthening resilience across New Zealand. Environment Southland supports the strategy’s vision – “to build a safe and prosperous nation” and how it considers that national success in respect to this vision covers aspects beyond economic measures and includes providing the following:

“healthy and happy life, a good education for our children, a healthy environment that protects our natural resources and taonga, family/whanau and communities we can rely on, a safe place to live and work, opportunities to start a business or get ahead, and the freedom to be who we want to be”.

Environment Southlands vision – to create a “thriving Southland” is considered to be consistent with the strategy’s vision on a regional scale. Also, the strategy’s goal of achieving “a resilient future” is reflected in Environment Southland’s Long-Term Plan targets to achieve empowered and resilient communities by 2028.

There are a few specific points we think need further explanation or clarification:

- What is meant by “sustainable management of hazards” (page 7)? We are not sure if this refers to the management of natural and built resources;
- A number of key terms have been defined but disruption and emergency are omitted, these might be useful to include as well;
- What are considered “basic services” (page 13)?

The strategy covers various types of resilience on Page 16, of which resilience of the natural environment and governance of risk and resilience are the most relevant to Environment Southland’s statutory obligation. Environment Southland is legally responsible for having communities well informed of hazards and preparing for emergencies through services such as operating flood warning systems, managing flood protection schemes and providing hazard mitigation advice to the community in the Southland region.
There are a couple of hazards which haven’t been included in the Strategy or have not been given a huge amount of ‘weight’. Two of note are drought, which we are acutely of in Southland and more broad is how climate change will affect our exposure to hazards. We are party to the difficult conversations that are underway across the country about managed retreat, rebuilding of infrastructure which is damaged or destroyed in ‘risky’ areas, increase risk of wildfires, contaminated water supplies and mental health implications. These sorts of hazards are outside of those which might be “obvious and manifest” (page 43).

While the strategy established a broad national resilience measuring and monitoring regime, Environment Southland believes that clearer direction on monitoring and measuring resilience at regional scale is necessary. Real world case studies in New Zealand supporting the log frame for resilience and monitoring and evaluation on Page 32 could help in adding more direction to Section 8.3 of the strategy.

Lastly Environment Southland supports the idea of involving a broader range of stakeholders in the governance of the strategy. Some additional parties to think about would be a defined role for banks and insurance companies in managing future risks.

Environment Southland does not wish to speak to its submission, but does look forward to collaborating with Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management in future in regards to achieving the improved resilience in Southland region.

Yours sincerely

Lucy Hicks
Policy and Planning Manager
To whom it may concern

**Submission on the Draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy**

Thank you for the opportunity to submit on the Draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy (the strategy). Overall we support the draft strategy and look forward to supporting MCDEM as it finalises and then implements the strategy.

**Consultation Questions**

1. **Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest?** We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

   GNS Science does agree with and support the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy. We believe it will assist in meeting the legislative requirements under the CDEM Act, and clearly provides the strategic direction to achieve these requirements. The scope and audience are clearly defined. The vision links strongly to the Living Standards Framework and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, which allows a consistent approach to resilience.

2. **Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest?** We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

   In general we agree with the priorities.

   We would like to emphasise the importance of scientific research in understanding the long-term risk posed by geological hazards. We see real value in accessing the geological record to inform the assessment of risk, and therefore priorities, and that this should be explicitly recognised in the strategy.

3. **Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest?** We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

   In general we do agree with the objectives and success factors.

   As an enhancement of the strategy we would support the uptake of probabilistic risk assessment methodologies over time.
4. Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim? We would also appreciate your views if you disagree with this proposition.

We agree that governance of the strategy requires engagement with a broad range of stakeholders to ensure that resilience becomes part of every New Zealander’s business. We would be happy to be involved in discussions with MCDEM about how the governance of resilience develops.

5. Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?

We support the use of the Theory of Change (Figure 3), and the Figure 4 logic map. These provide clear linkages and processes required, and a good basis for evaluating the strategy in the future.

6. Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?

We would encourage MCDEM to further consider how and when to engage with communities about risk as an integral part of the strategy. GNS Science has experience and expertise in this area and would welcome the opportunity to share this with MCDEM.

If you have any questions regarding our submission, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely,

Bruce Girdwood
Acting Divisional Director – Natural Hazards
Friday, 7 December 2018

National Disaster Resilience Strategy submissions
Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6145

To whom it may concern:

Feedback on the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy

The Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group (the Group) is pleased to provide this submission on the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy 2019-2029. The Group has encouraged members, partner agencies and individuals to submit feedback in addition to this Group response.

The leading points to our submission are:

- To support the expansion of the vision and goal from a focus on New Zealanders wellbeing and safety, to include the natural and financial/physical capitals.
- To separate effective response and recovery into two equally important areas of focus.
- To encourage further work to develop the Resilience and Te Ao Māori section of the strategy so that it acknowledges more clearly that Māori moral and relational attributes should be respected and not exploited, and that partnership should begin with co-creation of future strategies.
- To more clearly reflect how the strategy will work to improve resilience in a multi-cultural society.

Purpose, Vision and Goal

Overall, the vision and goal are good, and we strongly support them. There are aspects that we feel could do with additional clarity. How do we define safe? How do we encourage prosperity, at the same time assisting vulnerable people in society and ensuring they don’t fall further behind? Are we building resilience for a single nation with one cultural identity, or many cultural identities?

Individual wellbeing and prosperity are very important, but it takes a narrowly-focused approach to resilience – we need more than resilient individuals and households. More thinking is needed to expand and understand resilience and wellbeing as it applies to New Zealand as a single complex system. This should be followed by a more robust framework for managing risk and making risk and resilience-based decisions.

Many facets of New Zealand life - particularly individuals, families, hapū, and community organisations - have been identified as users of the strategy, but many are not likely to have the appropriate resources to either contribute or improve their own resilience. At the same time, the focus on different aspects of New Zealand society seems to ignore taking a more holistic view of New Zealand in the strategy.

We noted a strong urban flavour and suggest that more thought needs to be given to rural New Zealand in this strategy. Following our rural community’s experiences in Canterbury with the Hurunui-Kaikōura earthquake and mycoplasma bovis, we believe the strategy would be strengthened with greater disaster resilience focus for rural New Zealand.

The vision, rightly, has a strong focus on people, but this appears to have come at the cost of other fundamental disaster resilience facets such as the natural and financial/physical capitals. We would
encourage expansion of the vision and goal to include resilience of the ‘four capitals’ and updating the CDEM Act to remove the four environments from recovery and instil the four capitals across the four Rs.

We lack a pro-active national agency that is effectively responsible for risk management and dealing with the issues of our times – such as sea level rise and funding approaches and community buy-in for managed retreat, and complex risks that span the New Zealand system. This would be the agency responsible for the proposed national risk register and coordinating system-wide risk treatments across agencies and communities, and it must go beyond just identification, understanding and comparison of national risks, or managing policy. There needs to be active leadership and management to reduce national disaster risk.

Priorities and Objectives

We broadly support the three priorities outlined in the strategy, but we were interested in what additional priorities may have been identified in the development process and didn’t make it to the proposed strategy. We found it challenging to assess the priorities and objectives without having a clearer indication of the next level of detail – for example, a draft roadmap and work programme.

The focus on people through the priorities and objectives is recognised and appreciated, however we felt the other two capitals (natural and financial/physical) need more focus in the priorities and objectives.

Managing Risks

Overall, we found the managing risk priority to be well set out and strongly support it and the associated objectives.

Objective 1: We would prefer to see regional and local identified in place of sub-national.

Objective 2: While robust legislation and responsibilities are in place for most risk, there is an increasingly apparent gap in national-level risk management leadership and responsibility. We would link this back to our previous comment identifying the need for a national risk management agency to act as overall coordinator for nationally significant risks.

Objective 4: We appreciate that it will take some time to have a conversation about high hazard areas, particularly those subject to sea level rise, but we believe that some parts of the country need to see actions, not just discussion, by 2030.

Effective Response and Recovery

Recovery needs stronger priority than currently suggested, so we would encourage the separation of the three priorities into four, having response and recovery as two differing and equally important areas of focus. As we have learnt through Canterbury’s response and recovery to significant events, the organisations, agencies, and approaches needed for response and recovery, and their focus, differ significantly between response and recovery. Significant detail around how we implement more effective recovery will need to be identified in the roadmap and work programme. It is much more than just ‘Strategic Planning for Recovery’.

Objective 7: We like the inclusion of social science but feel that the measure of “renewed levels of trust and confidence” is subjective and may be hard to quantify.

Objective 10: This objective is significant yet seems to ‘cherry-pick’ some specific emergency management system reform actions, when true success is beyond the scope of the current objective. We are concerned of the lumping together of response and recovery and feel that the challenges of
building capacity for response and recovery have different requirements and challenges. We note the timing to deliver Controller training is targeted at 2030, while many of the other related objectives are 2025. Recognition of the importance of volunteers is appreciated.

**Strengthening Resilience**

The societal, or New Zealand-wide, approach to many aspects of the strategy, including risks, challenges, trends and resilience is appreciated, but we would highlight that it needs to be balanced with regional, and most importantly local approaches to strengthening community resilience.

**Objective 14**: We would like to highlight the challenge of identifying vulnerable individuals and communities, and its importance to achieving success with this objective. We are concerned that emergency supplies are still being focused on as a measure of resilience.

**Strengths**

The approach taken to risk in the strategy is much improved from the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy 2008-2019. This is evident with the discussion of the strategic context and highlighting long term trends that impact our disaster risk and resilience. The strategy goes further than the previous one, with a clear emphasis on influencing decisions to produce better disaster risk and resilience outcomes.

We appreciate the transition away from a focus on Civil Defence and Emergency Management thinking towards adoption of a resilience-based approach. This will ensure that disaster resilience is the responsibility of NZ Inc. rather than Civil Defence. This will empower all levels of society to be involved and responsible for disaster resilience.

The logical structure, layout, and presentation of the strategy is to be commended. Figure 1 (p15) provides a clear and visual definition of the absorption and adaptability dimensions of disaster resilience.

**Gaps and Challenges**

We suspect there will be challenges associated with collecting global target reporting requirements for the Sendai Framework. Further, the proposed strategy seems to advance beyond the main reporting focus of the Sendai framework, which may require the development of benchmarks suited to monitor and evaluate our pathway to disaster resilience. Qualitative targets may prove challenging to benchmark against the proposed strategy.

We note the currency of the strategy is ten years, unless replaced earlier. We would like to see it clarified that the strategy will be modified if monitoring and evaluation indicate that targets are not being met. We would like to understand better what the triggers are that may result in a strategy update before required in 2029.

The timing of the proposed emergency management system reforms does not fit well with a significant strategy shift, and the resourcing required to accommodate both emergency management system reforms and implementing a 10-year resilience strategy. This is compounded by inertia within the CDEM sector waiting for more direction and leadership for the reforms. Closely related to this is securing additional funding to implement new work as a result of the proposed strategy in addition to existing work programmes, and expected costs of emergency management system reforms implementation.

The proposed strategy appears to lack suitable strength and focus on recovery, when compared to response. Greater thought needs to be given to the expansion of the significance of recovery in the
strategy, how recovery creates "stronger post-event communit[ies]", and how recovery strategies create increased resilience and disaster risk reduction.

**Governance and Engagement**

We commend MCDEM on the use of a much more collaborative and engaging approach to the development of the draft strategy.

The strategy seems relatively quiet on how this strategy fits within the broader range of government policy and strategy, and how other government agencies will incorporate resilience and disaster risk into their activities, and how those agencies will collectively contribute towards increasing New Zealand’s resilience and reducing our disaster risk.

We suspect there may be gaps in existing governance arrangements suggested in section 8.2. The focus of this strategy is far wider than CDEM, so existing National Security System and CDEM Groups arrangements may prove to be inadequate for such a wide-ranging strategy. Specifically, we are concerned about governance and engagement with community, local government and Māori/iwi.

**Māori, Iwi and the Treaty**

Our workshop identified various challenges with integration of Te Ao Māori into the strategy. It wasn’t apparent that it was co-created with Māori, and we didn’t see clear evidence of the Treaty partnership in the strategy.

We would encourage further work to develop the Resilience and Te Aō Māori section of the strategy so that it acknowledges more clearly that Māori moral and relational attributes should not be exploited during an emergency response, and that partnership should begin with co-creation of future strategies.

We have concerns about the relationship and involvement of Māori and Iwi in development and success of this strategy. It is not clear what role the Treaty partnership plays as part of the proposed strategy. The strategy does not appear to have been co-created with Māori. Have Māori agreed to the moral obligation presumed and accepted the guardian role, or is this lip service? Is it appropriate to be highlighting the asset base of Māori, whilst not raising other cultural/social groups in New Zealand that may have significant assets to bring to bear on disaster resilience?

**Structure and Language**

We recommend clarity around the use of ‘we’ in the strategy. Is it referring to the writer and reader? Is it referring to emergency managers? Is it referring to the New Zealand collective?

The Overview of this Strategy (p. 34) should not be buried in an appendix. It provides the best summary of the strategy and should be moved as far forward as practical.

We would like to see more key terms (pp. 4-5) added - including community, prosperity and wellbeing. Community is widely used through the strategy, but no definition, in the context of this strategy, is provided.

The goal is articulated in different ways comparing Section 4 - Our Goal (p. 14) to the Overview of the Strategy (p. 35). This should be consistent.
Conclusion

In closing, we again commend the significant and positive work that has gone into developing the proposed strategy. From the initial well-attended workshop in 2016 held at Christchurch City Council, the process has produced a solid strategy that turns resilience into a way of thinking for New Zealand through to 2029. We await more detail with the roadmap and work programme, to see how the strategy is implemented by action.

Reinforcing our key points, we support the strong focus taken on human and social capitals but would like to see the strategy and related documents (legislation, regulations, guidelines etc.) updated to embed the Living Standards Framework Four Capitals. We would like to see Maori involvement in the strategy treated more as a partnership and for them to be involved in co-creation. Finally, we believe that recovery needs to be separated from response into its own priority – the approaches and challenges facing recovery differ significantly from response.

Congratulations to all those involved on producing the strategy.

Signed on behalf of the Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group

Bill Bayfield
Chair
Co-ordinating Executive Group

John Sunkell
Deputy Chair
Joint Committee
Annex: Consultation workshop

This response was developed from a workshop that the Group held on 27 November 2018. The workshop followed the consultation questions provided by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management and included general discussion at the end. Email feedback from Timaru and Waimakariri District Councils has been incorporated.

Questions

1. Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

2. Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

3. Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

4. Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim? We would also appreciate your views if you disagree with this proposition.

5. Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?

6. Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy current strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?

Representation

The workshop included representation from the following organisations:

- Ashburton District Council,
- Canterbury District Health Board,
- Christchurch City Council,
- Environment Canterbury,
- Fire and Emergency New Zealand,
- Hurunui District Council,
- New Zealand Police,
- Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment,
- Oranga Tamariki,
- Selwyn District Council,
- Te Puni Kōkiri,
- Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, and the
- Canterbury CDEM Group Office.

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To whom it may concern

Dear Sir/Madam

Introduction

This message is a very brief response to the National Disaster Resilience Strategy. It is deliberately kept short, presenting only fundamentals and not giving exhaustive explanation, which can follow if Government is interested.

It is made by the writer as an experienced engineer and project manager, who has been involved in asset rebuild throughout the Christchurch earthquakes, but it also generally reflects the views of the other authors of the ENGAGE concept, who are identified in the attached document.

The Draft Strategy

The structure and scope of your draft strategy is applauded. It sets out very clearly the needs for preparedness for disaster, the impacts, the needs in response and describes longer term recovery, all leading to a framing for community resilience. Included are thorough cross references to other (international) lessons framing resilience.

There is a very significant element of the 'picture' where we feel that substance could be added. It is in the post-disaster rebuild of vertical and horizontal infrastructure – the built environment – and reinstatement of natural environment. Rebuild (reconstruction in your terms) is a major undertaking and a vital and significant contributor to early and best recovery.

The draft strategy, as with the international descriptions of disaster recovery and resilience, assumes that disaster damage is repaired promptly, whereas our experience is that it takes many years. Electricity can be restored, water become available, roads passable and people accommodated at home or for work, quite quickly after disaster. These activities can give people and communities a lift.

However, the proper, permanent and lasting rebuild of services and all the other infrastructure can take a very long time and must be carefully prioritised within the wide range of rebuild demands for funds and resources.

It is recommended that your strategy include more on rebuild so that resilience is based on complete foundations.

• The broad scope of your four capitals – Natural, Social, Human and Financial/Physical all depend on rebuild
• Risk outcomes must include rebuild, before or after disaster
• All the components of resilience which you identify need to reflect the importance of rebuild.

Rebuild

As described in the accompanying document, there are significant problems with delivery of rebuild following a disaster – in New Zealand and in other countries of the world. These are outlined in the attachment, but not described in detail.

Arising from these problems, governance, management and delivery of rebuild in the shortest possible time frames need a special approach.

ENGAGE

ENGAGE is a concept for fully addressing readiness and post-disaster rebuild and it is recommended to be brought into your strategy as a potential contributor – a service to be integrated and used. ENGAGE meets key problems of rebuild and although comprehensive in its
scope and details, is straightforward in creation and application. ENGAGE is based on a structured approach to getting things done, described as a framework for action. The framework includes a comprehensive management of information, a system for action. These elements are intended to be used by the small not-for-profit entity ENGAGE, which is planned to exist as an enduring service for New Zealand.

When a disaster happens, large or small, ENGAGE will serve the impacted community, asset owners and funders to create a rebuild capability that will be appropriate to the nature of the disaster and rebuild need, governed by funders, delivery organisations and communities. The rebuild entity will be open, transparent and communicating, working to a tailored framework for action and supported by a ‘spun-off’ replica of the system for action. As rebuild progresses the rebuilt features or assets are returned to communities or owners with all as-built data needed for on-going asset management.

ENGAGE and the Strategy
ENGAGE is seen by the authors as a prime example of Working together in Appendix 4 of the strategy, the principles of which are what we have experienced and can recreate. If ENGAGE is integrated into the strategy as a practical readiness and rebuild capability, then the whole sequence of preparedness, disaster, response and recovery will work fully and effectively, with best possible outcomes and New Zealand will become an exemplar to other nations.

Yours faithfully
Rod Cameron

Promoting the ENGAGE concept for New Zealand

www.engagenow.org.nz
Executive summary

This document describing the ENGAGE concept is a summary of the needs for preparedness for disaster and a fresh approach to infrastructure rebuild following an event, that will enable quicker and more effective community recovery. The concept is based on the career and SCIRT and NCTIR experiences of the writers and on local and international observation and research.

It is asserted that New Zealand is ill prepared for disaster rebuild, from the absence of strategies and plans, the siloed state of government, industry and societal structures, together with a lack of industry systems and capability to manage and carry out rebuild.

The ENGAGE model is proposed to address the challenges of disasters and to create collaborative, informed and thoroughly prepared framework for rebuild action and a related information and business management system to support it.

ENGAGE is conceived as a not-for-profit, enduring entity which will provide advice and support to local and central government and asset owners, to help set up an appropriate rebuild capability following a disaster. The concept for the existence, structure and functions of ENGAGE is explained and the current state of development is described.

Disaster rebuild capability problems

New Zealand, like most countries in the world, is not well prepared for the demands and complexities of infrastructure rebuild that is necessary for recovery following a disaster.

Probably the most fundamental problem involved is lack of awareness that there is a problem at all. The authors strongly assert that there is. Rebuild will not happen effectively by conventional process, as explained following.

Within society, at the highest levels, organisations, government sectors and industry are siloed from each other and fragmented in their operations. They are not experienced in working together for the needs of society, as required when whole communities are impacted.

Additionally, both the design and construction industries are fragmented. They need to be brought together for a single project in normal times and don’t have proven methods for approaching large scale projects, or for programmes of projects. Processes and contractual arrangements don’t exist that can deliver intended outcomes reliably, and this results in a common situation of poor track records of achievements of built outcomes against initial plans.

Neither does any sector have proven, large scale information systems to integrate planning, design and construction activities to manage and report on programmes. In addition, there is no cross-sector information system.

All these facts mean that the special needs of governance, management and delivery of post-disaster rebuild are unlikely to be met consistently or well.

Furthermore, current recovery legislation does not recognise the demands and complexity of central government involvement with local government and asset owners, which is always needed when disasters require a collaborative approach and shared funding arrangements that match the scale and complexity of the damage from the event.
Fresh start
The result of all these elements is that rebuild following a disaster of any size in New Zealand must start from scratch, bringing parties together as seems appropriate at the time, creating working arrangements, then focusing on the work needed, how to fund it and how to get it done, with a purpose-built system for managing and reporting on the activities.

With this ‘build from nothing’ approach, with a fresh set of uncertainties involved in each case, creates a slim chance of knowledgeable and organized thought processes being present and a very slim chance of efficient and effective outcomes.

More commonly there is erratic and disconnected activity, with project funding not aligning with needs and priorities, skills and resources not matching demands, and planning and sequences not focused to shorten and enhance recovery of the communities in need.

Not only does the fresh start process have a poor chance of good outcomes, but the significant costs involved in the set up and creation of entities and systems to do the work involve very significant sunk costs – every time.

Experience
The experience of all these factors playing out in Christchurch and Kaikoura earthquakes has reinforced for the authors, who are very experienced project and programme delivery professionals, that there is much to learn for New Zealand when rebuilding following disasters. They have taken their experiences of the purpose-built enterprises of recent rebuilds, captured their lessons and developed a concept of how to do things better.

There is no motive of personal gain in this initiative. The concept is open to all to share. It is envisaged as a not-for-profit entity, serving New Zealand.

Proposal
The proposal is for deliberate cross-sector and community collaboration before and after events, the active sharing of knowledge, the discipline of a shared framework for action that shapes the overall process, all supported by a comprehensive information and business management system which can reach across society, accessible to all who need it.

It is a complete packaged solution that will frame and support readiness and rebuild, it is ENGAGE.

ENGAGE
Engage is a concept for an enduring, nation-wide disaster readiness and rebuild capability to support and enable recovery, from large or small events. It is proposed as a working collaboration of central, regional and local governments, agencies and non-government organisations, asset owners, operators and industry concerned with built infrastructure, all working together with community organisations.

ENGAGE is envisaged as a small, not-for-profit enterprise which will facilitate collaboration, support education and preparedness for disasters, then bring its knowledge and networks to help shape the optimum rebuild recovery structure and functions, for any event.
The features of ENGAGE apply to all infrastructure from public facilities such as three-waters and roads, river stop-banks, harbours and ports, to public buildings and housing.

ENGAGE is intended to work collaboratively with other disaster response and recovery enterprises, to share comprehensive information about the damaged or impacted assets, to ensure that the rebuild startup is as early as possible, with communities linked together, with decision-making, planning and progress visible to all.

Participants

All the major stakeholders in disaster, and specialists in asset creation, are intended to be involved in ENGAGE. This collective commitment is a vital element throughout the sequences of rebuild and recovery.

Collaboration enables joint identification of work scope, criticalities, priorities, shared funding arrangements, resource management, delivery of throughput, and communication of intentions and progress, to all parties.

Action Framework

Chief among the lessons leading to ENGAGE are benefits of a framework for action, defining the enterprise structure and functions — ‘how everyone can work together to get stuff done’.

A framework includes statutory and legal arrangements to bring parties together and set governance structures, appropriations and funding processes, procurement, project management and a value framework against which enterprise performance can be measured. Tools and processes will be embedded within the framework to ensure preparedness of is a high standard and rebuild delivers best value for the affected communities and the nation.

Examples are available for these, but new ones will be created with the formation of ENGAGE, that are more generic and adaptable for programme needs irrespective of the origin of the disaster and nature of rebuild.
The same framework structure would be created for each rebuild, whatever its needs or leadership, tailored from the generic to suit the particulars of the disaster. This is illustrated in the following diagram, which includes the essential capture of lessons from each event, to better prepare for the future.

Information System

An information system is envisaged that will serve preparedness for disaster, from which will be 'spun off' a replica for an event. The system is needed for the framework implementation and the framework is needed to define and structure the system. They are symbiotic resources.

The system enables a visibility of the whole enterprise and its work, in preparedness, for setting scope and priorities and for carrying out and monitoring the rebuild, all of which are vital to achieve confidence within the affected communities, funders and New Zealand as a whole.

This visibility is illustrated in the following diagram, which the authors consider shows a very powerful tool in the generation of a confident, trusting interaction of rebuild and the funders and especially the affected communities, breaking down silos.

The views are subject to appropriate controls on commercial disclosure, to maintain market competitiveness:

Imagine sharing information........

Where you could see:
- Who's who and doing what
- What's where
- What's needing, being done
- What's first, next, later
- Who's paying
- Helicopter and detail views

And you were:
- Taxpayer
- Government
- Governor
- Operations
- Owner
- User
- Community
When the duplicate system is created and tailored for a rebuild, it provides support to activities such as HR, safety and environment, culture and communications, together with commercial and financial process and business systems.

A special and vital feature of the model is the creation of a positive culture of enterprise teamwork, mutual support, shared trust, enthusiasm, and the promotion of self-worth and value, which is vital for those working in a post-disaster environment.

**Shared information system - overview**

The foundation unit of the system is a project. All rebuild activities are then defined by a project, a programme of projects or portfolios of programmes, as needed. A project can range from a very small quantity of work such as clearing road debris, through to creating a conventional facility like a building, bridge or bypass road.

The system defines and channels operational matters throughout the evolution of projects, from initial asset assessment and work definition, through prioritisation, design sequences, construction, to final hand over to asset owners.

The system captures information and costs for each project from start to finish. It retains all data for the work and the built outcomes, for records and on-going use in asset life management. It aggregates all projects into whatever programme groupings are required and can report common information across projects.

The system functions as a 'single source of truth'. It is the only system. There are no separate records or processes that risk duplication, gaps or lack of transparency. It tells all, as shown in the above diagram of views. It is also a tool for monitoring a wide range of performance measures of the rebuild.

The system will be formed with the latest technologies and processes and will be kept up to date with evolution of the world of information management.

ENGAGE has defined the critical framework and system features identified during the recent Christchurch and Kaikoura events and translated them to higher level principles that will serve all manner of disasters, from relatively small scale to the largest envisaged – and beyond.

**The ENGAGE model – how it will work**

ENGAGE is envisaged as a capability that exists in ‘peace time’ as an enduring national presence. It will have the skills, knowledge, networks and information necessary to react
quickly following a disaster, to facilitate early commencement of the rebuild activity, by whomever carries it out.

It is intended to be governed by representatives of a wide range of stakeholders with disaster and resilience understanding, managed by a small team of people with relevant expertise, using shared information systems, with a raft of advisory groups and a wide network resource of similarly experienced people who can be called on to help after a disaster. It will be connected to all other relevant disaster preparedness and response initiatives.

Rebuild entity
When an event occurs and as the intelligence of the disaster impact comes to hand, ENGAGE will work with funders and key stakeholders to support creation of a specific rebuild entity involving all interested parties, to use a tailored framework and a replica of the information system. The system will be linked to existing data and fed with new information as the scale and impact of the disaster unfolds.

The team will be structured, governed, lead, managed and resourced to match the nature and demands of the disaster, to suit the community. As much as possible, it should be populated and run by locals, to the ENGAGE principles.
As the rebuild is carried out, lessons will be actively captured and fed back to ENGAGE.
Outcomes
The decision support system implicit in the framework brings rebuild expertise and experience to the recovery decision makers, such as a national recovery manager, local government mayors, CEOs, recovery managers at local or group level, and to key infrastructure providers such as NZTA, councils (three waters and roads), ports, rail etc.

This enables the creation of a rebuild entity that is entirely appropriate for the job, with people with the right skills and experience, drawn from the networks, to run it.

The shaped rebuild model then supports those decision makers with information on progress, tradeoffs, and value for money.

It provides this at whatever level and scale is needed, it’s adaptable. In smaller recoveries ENGAGE may only have a role in advising local councils at start up, to enable them to manage it. In larger disasters it can provide the framework and systems for setting-up and mobilising an effective recovery.

Preparedness that follows ENGAGE principles will deliver rapid deployment of capability and resources, focus on strategic issues and priorities, community buy-in, faster recovery, and ultimately provide assurance and value for money.

When the preceding elements are done well, the most important result will be earlier recovery, adding to community resilience.

Acceptance
ENGAGE has been discussed and reviewed with a variety of audiences in New Zealand and internationally over recent months. There has been widespread feedback that the concept is much needed for the benefit of disaster-prone New Zealand. The authors are therefore confident in the usefulness and appropriateness of the concept.
In More Detail

The preceding summary explanation describes over-arching principles of disaster rebuild, a framework for action and an information system. It also touches on the scope of activities of the ENGAGE entity.

It should be noted that ENGAGE also anticipates setting common, industry-wide methods, processes and standards for the framework. This includes:

- a suite of enterprise management plans
- prioritisation tools for timely delivery of rebuild projects
- design standards
- construction standards
- procurement processes and contracts
- internationally recognised supply arrangements, based on performance reputation
- business intelligence reporting
- value frameworks.

ENGAGE will also use, or create for itself and others, standard documentation and process for the support activities of the information system. It will facilitate:

- consistent taxonomy of asset descriptions
- assessment methods for data gathering
- methods of measurement
- asset management plans
- financial processes.

All of these can be adopted and used by industry generally, reducing duplication of effort and cost.

The system can curate and manage asset condition information and other data, collect and combine long-term plans and investment programmes and overlay this against the baseline so that planning outcomes could be compared to the planned investment.

With this baseline data and view of the future, investment planners, economists and use modelers could determine gaps and issues compared to a national long-term strategy and desired outcomes.

The system would provide much of the information required from a single source to assist with the future planning and procurement of New Zealand infrastructure management and projects, locally or nationally.

Industry Practices

ENGAGE has the strong prospect of being a catalyst for the development of uniformity of processes and protocols across creation and management of the built environment.

When this is achieved it will generate behavior changes for industry, giving clarity of purpose and process, reducing uncertainty, allowing greater efficiencies.

Engage can be a game-changer for design, building and construction and asset management.

All these features and outcomes could be adopted by the recently proposed Infrastructure Body, for the benefit of New Zealand. ENGAGE is enthusiastic to support this adoption.
What is needed to create ENGAGE

Business Case

A business case is under development, conforming with government Better Business Case guidelines and templates and is planned to continue over coming weeks.

Pilot studies

Work is intended to start as soon as funding is available to fully develop the structure and function of the information system to utilise latest software applications. This involves a study of ‘people and project information systems’, using specialist Microsoft consultants, the outcomes of which will be shared with Christchurch City Council (CCC) and Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Canterbury, who are taking a direct interest.

An initial submission has been made to CCC and a follow up meeting has been held with CCC and CDEM. This has a natural follow-on from current CCC system updates. Discussions are continuing.

An idea of mirroring of existing projects has been contemplated but discarded due to existing data structures not being suitable for a generic model.

Shaping concepts

The current ENGAGE team who have shaped the core concepts need to bring together a variety of experienced professionals and operators in a development plan, to create and document the entity. These include the following, which are not sequential activities, but have multiple overlaps.

- Government policy mapping – to identify coverage, overlaps and gaps of current and planned policy against ENGAGE
- Legislation - to formulate principles of enabling legislation, before and after an event
- Framework scoping – including interaction with government asset owners
- Procurement - to shape broad contractual strategies to bind parties
- Design and construction management – creating process templates and specifications to support workflow
- Enterprise and business information architecture - to shape information system fundamentals
- A comprehensive data model, covering each of the elements identified above, allowing interoperability, currently absent
- Documentation and people management software – to incorporate latest developments
- Financial system – for integration with funding entity / asset owner systems
- Geospatial expertise to create data storage, analysis, processing and views
- Reporting specialists - to shape report templates
- Strategic alignment focus – to work with any similar activities to the ENGAGE concept.
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National Disaster Resilience Strategy: Consultation questions

1. Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy?
2. Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy?
3. Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy?
4. Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim?
5. Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?

RNC Rural Co-creation Laboratory:
Submission on the National Disaster Resilience Strategy

Authors: Sarah Beaven, Nick Cradock-Henry, Thomas Wilson and Caroline Orchiston; the submission has also benefitted hugely from rapid review by the wider Rural Co-creation Laboratory team.*

The Resilience to Nature’s Challenges Rural Co-creation Laboratory (http://resiliencechallenge.nz/rural/) was established in 2015 to develop co-created research to improve rural resilience by working together with (local, regional and national) government sector co-creation partners. The following submission is informed by this experience to date. It draws from up-to-date scientific findings concerning rural and disaster resilience and science/policy collaborations (note that the submission is also informed by discussion at a Rural Laboratory-National Disaster Resilience Strategy meeting on 21 November 2018).

The aim of the submission is to identify where the draft Resilience Strategy aligns with current scientific and international policy thinking in these areas, and point to changes that could maximise the potential for greater alignment with current findings. This aim has informed a structure that addresses Consultation questions 1-3 throughout, and in Section 2 focuses in on questions 4 (‘Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be included in the Strategy’) and 5 (‘Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?’), providing specific recommendations.

1 Alignment with current scientific & global developments

The Rural Co-creation Laboratory program welcomes the draft Resilience Strategy, which constitutes a really exciting step forward in the development of ‘a resilient New Zealand’. The strategy is well-written, clear and accessible, and commendably aligned with cutting edge resilience practice and science in the following key areas.
1.1 Integrating disaster resilience, climate change adaptation, and development

It is exciting to see that the draft Resilience Strategy is explicitly framed with reference to the United Nations’ Agenda 2030 and its three key elements: the (UNISDR) Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, the (UNDP) Sustainable Development Goals laid out in 2015 in Transforming Our World: The 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development (UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1) and the commitments made under the (UNFCCC) Paris Climate Agreement in December of the same year. By explicitly referring to the need to be resilient to the risks posed by climate change, poverty and biodiversity loss as well as those posed by natural hazards, the Resilience Strategy is able to lay the groundwork for a highly integrated approach to building a resilient New Zealand. (We noted for example that the Strategy contains 7 references to climate change, which is in line with the 8 references to climate change in the Sendai Framework.)

1.2 Alignment with Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2040

Most importantly, the Resilience Strategy is well aligned with the broad ‘whole of society’ thrust that underpins the Sendai Framework, and which is described in the preamble as follows:

There has to be a broader and a more people-centred preventive approach to disaster risk. Disaster risk reduction practices need to be multi-hazard and multisectoral, inclusive and accessible in order to be efficient and effective. (Sendai: Preamble: paragraph 7 [p10])

This ‘whole of society’ focus is evident throughout the Resilience Strategy, and is particularly prominent in the scope and outcomes sections, which reiterate and refer back to the following passage in the foreword:

The Strategy promotes a holistic approach to strengthening resilience that connects with a range of agencies and sectors to deliver improved outcomes for New Zealanders. Disaster risk and disaster impacts reach all parts of society; so, to the greatest degree possible, disaster resilience should be integrated in to all parts of society. Disaster resilience therefore requires a shared approach between governments (central and local), relevant stakeholders, and the wider public – a collective approach to a collective problem. (p.5, Foreword, Sendai Framework)

1.3 Emphasis on social resilience

We highly commend the emphasis throughout the strategy on the need for building social resilience. As drafted the strategy uses a progressive interpretation of resilience which goes some way towards addressing the main critiques of this concept. We note that this allows the strategy to be guided in part by the need to answer the key questions: resilience of what, to what, why and how? Recognising that resilience is socially contingent also requires addressing the question of ‘resilience for whom?’ and to what end, connecting the socially, culturally and economically determined features of society that enable or constrain resilience. While the emphasis in the strategy is on the external hazards that impact society,
the strategy is in line with current scientific and international policy developments in that it highlights the need for understanding the internal social dynamics of communities, regions, activities and institutions which may affect the degree to which disturbances result in adverse societal effects.

1.4 Risk-based approach

The risk-based approach that informs the Resilience Strategy is also commendably aligned with the Sendai Framework, in which ‘a strong emphasis on disaster risk management as opposed to disaster management’ is identified as one of ‘the most significant shifts’ marked by this agreement (p. 5, Foreword, Sendai Framework). We would also like to take the opportunity to welcome the alignment between the Resilience Strategy and the national risk register. The practical development and use of such a register is commendable, particularly the use of national threat scenarios aid practical application, assessment and evaluation. However, we note that probabilistic risk assessment approaches, which attempt to consider the full range of potential impacts, do need to compliment scenario (deterministic) approaches. Additionally continued horizon scanning of future emerging and unknown risks should remain a priority. Inclusive and robust utilisation of appropriate risk expertise is essential, particularly through national capability such as collaborative national-good entities such as National Sciences Challenges.

2 Potential for greater alignment

2.1 The use of coordination mechanisms to build resilience

(Consultation Question 4: the need for greater stakeholder involvement)

As it stands, the draft Resilience Strategy is strongly focused on ‘what’ resilience is, and on how that currently applies and should apply in future in the New Zealand context. As stated above, this focus aligns extremely well with both Sendai and current research developments.

The current draft of the Resilience Strategy is much less well aligned, however, when it comes to ‘how’ to build resilience in New Zealand going forward. Where this is referenced, it indicates a ‘summative’ understanding of societal and national resilience – in other words, the Resilience Strategy consistently refers (in the preface, goals, outcomes) to resilience as something that results from adding together efforts that occur at different levels (individual, community, organisational, local, regional, national), in discrete sectors of society, and discrete government agencies.

The ‘Purpose’ section, for example, explains that the strategy is focused on

the actions we can all take – at all levels, from individuals and families/whānau, businesses and organisations, communities and hapū, cities, districts and regions, and Government and national organisations – to contribute to a more resilient New Zealand. (Section 1.3, p.8)
This list is reiterated in more detail under a series of headings in the following Section 1.4 ('Intended Audience and use of the Strategy'), which clarifies that the Resilience Strategy

is intended to provide a common agenda for resilience that individual organisations, agencies, and groups can align with for collective impact (Section 1.4, p.8).

This kind of ‘summative’ approach, in which national resilience equates to the collective impact resulting from the sum of myriad actions across levels and sectors is reiterated most explicitly in the Vision of a Resilient New Zealand:

A future resilient New Zealand is a nation where resilience thinking is integrated into all aspects of life as a matter of course. There is a deep, shared understanding of a wide range of risks and the nature of the action that each of them requires. From an individual level, to families and whānau, communities and settlements, towns and cities, and at a national level, everyone understands their own share of responsibility for reducing risk and strengthening resilience. A strong understanding of risk and resilience is also an integral part of business culture. The sum of these parts builds a risk-savvy, resilient nation. (Section 4, p. 20, emphasis added).

To be clear, we recognise that this ‘summative’ understanding of resilience is consistent with current national and international practice (and as demonstrated by the acknowledged alignment between the Model of a Resilient Nation presented in Section 4.2.4 and the list of resilient ‘environments’ proposed in 2011 by the International Red Cross [cited in Resilience Strategy, 4.2.4, p.15-16]).

As the primary mechanism to achieve integrated approaches to resilience, however, this focus on encouraging alignment across diverse social sectors and levels diverges significantly from both Sendai and current research findings, where the emphasis has shifted to the use of mechanisms and structures to actively facilitate more coordinated approaches to building resilience.

The Sendai Framework Guiding Principle (19: e), for example, states that

Disaster risk reduction and management depends on coordination mechanisms within and across sectors and with relevant stakeholders at all levels, and it requires the full engagement of all State institutions of an executive and legislative nature at national and local levels and a clear articulation of responsibilities across public and private stakeholders, including business and academia, to ensure mutual outreach, partnership, complementarity in roles and accountability and follow-up (19:e p.13)

The type of coordination mechanisms required are spelled out in Sendai Priority for Action 2 (Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk), which specifies that in order to integrate cross-sector disaster risk reduction efforts it is important:

To establish and strengthen government coordination forums composed of relevant stakeholders at the national and local levels, such as national and local platforms for
disaster risk reduction, and a designated national focal point for implementing the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. (Sendai 27:g, p. 17)

We appreciate that it can be difficult to justify the establishment of a national or local platform to coordinate activity across ‘all State institutions of an executive and legislative nature’ from within a particular government agency, such as MCDEM. In New Zealand, as elsewhere, government agencies are required to act according to the mandates and parameters established by legislation. However it is useful to recognise that cross-agency coordinating platforms of the kind proposed in the Sendai Framework are not proposed as alternatives to current government decision-making arrangements. Instead they are put forward as supplementary structures spanning government and other sectors. The aim is to facilitate the coordination of the decision-making that will occur in any case (as per relevant mandates and operating conditions) to more effectively align efforts to engage with a many-faceted social issue like disaster resilience.

We also note that an adjustment to the Resilience Strategy providing for the establishment of cross-sector, whole of government platforms would align it much more closely with Sendai, and recent research findings. An adjustment of this kind would be entirely in keeping with the spirit of the CDEM Act (2002), which as outlined in Section 1.1 encourages participation across society in disaster risk management, provides for coordination of the 4 Rs at local, regional and national levels, and encourages coordination across a wide range of agencies. Such an adjustment would still require a resilience ‘champion’, such as CDEM, but would require a significant broadening of the reach of the current CDEM structure, which is primarily focused on and funded for response, and which does not currently provide for the ‘full engagement of all State institutions of an executive and legislative nature at national and local levels’ specified in the above Sendai Guiding Principle.

2.1 Summary: The current draft of the resilience strategy recognises the need for cross-sector all of government coordination and oversight of resilience (see p. 7, p. 16, p. 17, p. 27, p. 40, p. 41 ), but focuses only on desirable outcomes. In other words, the Resilience Strategy describes cross-sector and all of government coordination as part of ‘what’ resilience consists of, but does not give equal weight to the ‘how’ – i.e. the mechanisms through which this coordination and oversight might be achieved.

RECOMMENDATION:
We recommend that this gap is addressed in the next draft of the Resilience Strategy though the inclusion of more concrete references (throughout) to the need to establish integrated cross-sector, all-of government (Disaster) Risk Management platforms in New Zealand, at national, regional and local levels. This would be most effective if it applied also to

- Resilience Strategy scope, allowing for CDEM to lead such platforms, and so bring together the other agencies referenced there as having responsibility for social and other types of resilience
- Resilience Strategy governance arrangements, to pave the way for more collaborative governance in line with the widened scope (in which each agency would retain decision-making authority as per their own mandates).
2.2 Rural resilience is not the same as urban resilience

We note that there are only passing references to the resilience of rural communities and regions. Rural environments differ significantly from their urban counterparts in ways that directly impact disaster management. Populations are usually dispersed across more or less accessible landscapes, which can leave them more exposed to the impacts of compounding natural hazards (such as earthquakes and landslides, or volcanic ash-fall and subsequent lahars, etc.), and / or post-disaster isolation for prolonged periods of time as a result of infrastructure damage.

At the same time, they are often presumed to be more resilient – as individuals, families and communities – than ‘city people’, despite current statistics that indicate higher levels of mental illness and suicide in rural areas. Acknowledgement of these differences in the strategy would help to ensure that current CDEM messaging is rural-appropriate. Rural populations, for example, are likely to require food and water for much longer than the 3 days recommended in current messaging.

We note that MPI has instituted a ‘Rural proofing’ process, which provides guidance to help policy makers address the challenges that are unique to rural communities by ‘rural proofing’ their policy during development and implementation (https://www.mpi.govt.nz/about-us/our-work/rural-proofing/).

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Strategy acknowledge the need for ‘rural proofing’ as per the MPI guidelines, and explicitly demonstrates that this has occurred with respect to the strategy. This should include, for example, addressing the gap between the public expectation of response within 3 days, in line with current MCDEM messaging, and the reality of prolonged isolation experienced by rural populations after major disasters, e.g. after the Kaikōura/Hurunui earthquake.

We also recommend that MCDEM institutes a similar ‘Disaster resilience proofing’ set of guidelines, to assist government policy makers during policy development and implementation.

2.3 Rural-specific disaster management coordination mechanisms

Recent research findings from the Rural Co-creation Laboratory focused on response and recovery to the Kaikōura/Hurunui Earthquake have confirmed that much greater coordination of response and recovery efforts is required between government agencies and across government, private and community sectors, and runanga (discussed above).

This acute need for disaster management coordination is driven by another difference between rural and urban disaster management: the much greater number of agencies and strong sector based private industry groups with significant rural disaster response and recovery capability and responsibility.
For example, CDEM, MCDEM, NZTA, MPI, MfE, and DoC all have significant disaster management roles, and carry these out largely in parallel, and alongside the discrete activities of strong sector-based private industry groups such as Dairy NZ, Beef and Lamb, Hort NZ, WGANZ, as well as tourism operators and rural insurers FMG. Researchers active in North Canterbury have noted that the lack of coordination in this complex mix of response and recovery efforts had adverse impacts on levels of trust and satisfaction in response and recovery operations among local communities, and risked compounding post-disaster stress.

Our Kaikoura research has highlighted the important role played by existing rural collaborative networks, such as the Water Zone Committee, in providing trusted networks that are able to facilitate recovery efforts. Such existing structures could usefully be drawn into resilience coordination processes through appropriate coordination platforms.

Currently there are no coordination platforms to bring even the main government players together to coordinate response and recovery efforts in disaster impacted rural areas. To be effective, such a platform would also need to incorporate private industry groups and community representatives (perhaps through existing community structures). Again, it is useful to reiterate that platforms of this kind would not diminish the decision-making authority or capacities of any of the participating entities – but would facilitate shared decision-making concerning the collaborations priorities and shared mission, reduce risk and greatly increase the coordination, transparency and accessibility of rural disaster management approaches and operations.

**RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that the Resilience Strategy is amended to include provision for disaster resilience coordination platforms that allow for the inclusion, where relevant, of all stakeholders active in rural disaster management.

**2.4 Provision for support of the science/policy interface for resilience decision-making**

(Consultation question 5: Gaps or challenges not addressed in the current draft)

We note that the current Resilience Strategy references the science input from the RNC-Trajectories toolbox project towards monitoring the impact of the strategy. However as it is currently, it does not include any direct references to the contribution of science in building resilience, or liaison mechanisms between scientific communities and policy makers focusing on resilience.

This is in marked contrast to the Sendai Framework, which contains seven references to the role of science. Two of these focus in particular on the importance of developing a ‘science/policy interface for decision-making.’

Sendai Priority 1: understanding disaster risk, for example, stipulated that to achieve policy making that is based on a rigorous, scientific evidence base it is necessary
To promote and improve dialogue and cooperation among scientific and technological communities, other relevant stakeholders and policymakers in order to facilitate a science/policy interface for effective decision-making in disaster risk management; (24 h p.15)

Similarly, Sendai Section V concerning the Role of Stakeholders requires that States determine ‘specific roles and responsibilities for stakeholders.’ The subsection relating to science communities requires that the State determines roles and responsibilities in order to encourage:

Academia, scientific and research entities and networks to focus on the disaster risk factors and scenarios, including emerging disaster risks, in the medium and long term; increase research for regional, national and local application; support action by local communities and authorities; and support the interface between policy and science for decision-making; (36 b [p.23])

We want to take this opportunity to acknowledge the enormous support that MCDEM and CDEM have provided to the New Zealand research community in this context, including in particular the AF8 project, and also MBIE funding for the Resilience to Nature’s Challenges programme, which has allowed us to develop the Rural Co-Creation Laboratory as a science/policy interface.

However these Sendai provisions require that, in addition to funding and otherwise supporting and engaging in relevant research programmes, government agencies ensure that high level strategies explicitly specify liaison and other mechanisms that will support the development of a science/policy interface for decision-making going forward. In requiring both that these mechanisms are transparent and that they are structured (the term ‘science/policy interface’ is frequently used in academic and policy contexts to refer to a structure that brings scientists and policy makers together) Sendai is consistent with more than two decades of research findings confirming that both transparency and explicit structures are required to ensure that decisions are both informed by sound science, and policy-relevant.

RECOMMENDATION:

We recommend that:

a) the current draft of the Resilience Strategy be amended to include explicit provisions for the role of the science community, and in particular including arrangements to support and structure the science/policy interface for resilience decision-making.

b) such a structure is linked into (or consists of a subset of) the wider coordination platforms discussed above, given that resilience decision-making occurs across government agencies, and in view of current disaster management research funding provided by agencies such as MBIE, EQC, MPI and MoH.

c) more fundamental and applied risk and resilience science (both fundamental and applied) be conducted to help mediate the making of choices and to highlight the options for policies that facilitate the inclusive social development that is essential to building resilience.
2.5 Provision for more support for rural resilience science
(Consultation question 5: Gaps or challenges not addressed in the current draft)

The rural sector is a huge contributor to this country’s GDP, in both tourism and primary industries. Despite this, there is very little provision for and visibility of the need for research into rural resilience, and disaster risk reduction in rural areas and communities. The Rural Co-creation Laboratory is the exception that proves the rule in this context, but it is small. However researchers in this programme have been struggling to adequately connect up the many research fields relevant to rural resilience, which includes water security & management, biosecurity & climate change adaptation, broader environmental management issues as well as disaster risk reduction. In line with recommendation 2.4 above, there is a need to effectively provision for more rural resilience science, integrated through a wider science/policy interface structure that brings researchers together with a platform or platforms that include for example DoC, MPI, MoH, Mfe, local & regional councils, and runanga as well as CDEM & MCDEM.

RECOMMENDATION:

We recommend that:

a) the current draft of the Resilience Strategy be amended to make explicit provisions for rural resilience science and mātauranga Maori to be included and specified as part of wider arrangements to support and structure the science/policy interface for resilience decision-making.

b) such a structure would most effectively be linked to (or a subset of) the wider coordination platforms discussed above, given that resilience decision-making occurs across government agencies (as noted above), and in view of research funding for disaster risk management research provided by agencies such as MBIE, EQC, MPI and MoH.

*Note that Jo Horrocks is a co-creation member of the Rural team, but has not been privy to or had input into this submission.
Dear Sir or Madam,

**Environment Canterbury submission: Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy**

Thank you for the opportunity to provide comment on the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy. Please find Environment Canterbury’s submission attached.

As a Regional Council with extensive experience in dealing with the consequences of disasters, we are particularly interested in ensuring our region is as prepared and resilient as possible.

We wish to express our support for the submission of the Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, which we developed with the other Group members and staff.

We would like to thank you for your work in developing this proposal, and for the opportunity to provide feedback. We would welcome the opportunity to work further with the Ministry for Civil Defence to in the development of the supporting roadmap of actions.

For all enquiries please contact:

Toshi Hodliffe  
Team Leader, Strategy & Planning  
Phone: [Redacted]  
Email: [Redacted]

Yours sincerely

Bill Bayfield  
Chief Executive

Encl: Environment Canterbury Submission to the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management  
Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy
1. Environment Canterbury thanks the Ministry for Civil Defence & Emergency management (‘the Ministry’) for the opportunity to comment on the Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

2. Environment Canterbury acknowledges that a whole-of-society participatory and inclusive approach to resilience will support the protection and increase of living standards for all New Zealanders. Environment Canterbury looks forward to ongoing involvement as the Ministry and the Government take this work forward.

3. Our submission focuses on those matters which are important to Environment Canterbury.
What are the key priorities for Environment Canterbury?

We seek that in further developing Government’s approach to increasing New Zealand’s resilience to disaster as set out in the Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy there be an ongoing focus on:

- **working collaboratively with communities and local government.** Our experience with freshwater management in Canterbury highlights the importance of working together with mana whenua and our communities – we are the strongest and most effective when working together and hope that central government also follows this approach. We would like to continue to engage with the central government as the roadmap of actions is developed.

- **honouring the Treaty of Waitangi** and reflecting meaningful partnerships between iwi and Government. We strongly value our Tuia approach to working with Ngāi Tahu¹ and suggest a similar approach could be taken by the government on resilience.

- **cost efficiency.** Any approach to disaster risk management should be cost-effective. Investing in risk reduction, disaster prevention is always more cost-effective than response and supports ongoing resilience building. Robust and ongoing assessment of risks will be critical to informing prioritised and aligned action at a national, regional and local level to reduce risk.

- **clarifying funding arrangements for disaster risk reduction.** Building resilience and facing the consequences of disasters is often beyond the resources of many communities, so the government must put funding in place to address this.

Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

4. We think the vision and goal should be expanded to cover all of the Four Capitals, currently Natural and Physical Capital are not strongly addressed. The current ones only strongly reflect Human and Social Capital, with only a touch on Financial / Physical Capital.

5. The vision could be expanded to cover all capitals by removing the words ‘nation’, ‘New Zealanders’ and ‘individuals, organisations, and communities’. Using words like ‘Aotearoa/New Zealand’ would be preferable as this encompasses all aspects of our country and is more holistic.

6. The importance of the natural and built environment to support intergenerational wellbeing should not be underestimated. The resilience of the natural and built environment also needs to be strengthened “for the safety and wellbeing of all”. “Toitū te marae o Tāne, Toitū te marae o Tangaroa, Toitū te iwi. – When the domains of Tāne and Tangaroa are nurtured and sustained, so too will people prosper and flourish.”

¹ See the New Zealand Productivity Commission’s Low-emissions economy: Final report, p. 238-239
7. We learnt through the recovery from the Canterbury earthquake series that the recovery of the natural environment of greater Christchurch was a central part of the recovery of the area, along with the built environment which was a major programme of works.

8. More thought could be given regarding the effect on agriculture and the rural economy. Following our experience with the Hurunui – Kaikōura earthquake, we believe that the strategy could be strengthened with more consideration given to rural communities.

Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

9. The three priorities set out in the strategy are good:
   - managing risks
   - effective response to and recovery from emergencies
   - strengthening societal resilience.

10. We would like to see four priorities; response and recovery are two different aspects with different goals and capacity requirements and should be separate.

Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

11. The objectives clearly reflect the *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030* and the Ministerial Review (2017) on *Better Responses to Natural Hazards and Other Emergencies*.

12. The integration of the Living Standards Framework should be improved, with more focus on the Natural and Financial / Physical Capitals into the objectives. For example, the Recovery Strategy for Greater Christchurch focuses on six components of recovery: leadership and integration; economic recovery; social recovery; cultural recovery; built environment; and natural environment.

13. On page 23 “reduce disaster costs in the future” seems to prioritise financial rather than human/social/natural impacts, especially when paired with “by far the cheapest”. We suggest rewording this to emphasise that resilience planning supports all the capitals.

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2 The recovery of the natural environment was driven through the National Environment Recovery Programme: (http://www.eqrecoverylearning.org/assets/downloads/rec2052-natural-environment-recovery-programme.pdf) which sits under the Recovery Strategy for Greater Christchurch: Te Mahere Haumanutanga o Waitaha
Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?

14. The expanded focus of the Strategy is a great improvement from the previous strategy.

15. The visual format and strategy map structure are great, page 34 is particularly excellent as a stand-alone piece and could be further up in the page ordering or perhaps as a fold out A3.

Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim? We would also appreciate your views if you disagree with this proposition.

16. At a Canterbury Group CDEM level, the mana whenua of Waitaha/Canterbury are represented by the Office of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu's Director – Earthquake Response & Recovery as a Joint Committee Member. At a Council level we have two Ngāi Tahu councillors under the Environment Canterbury (Transitional Governance Arrangements) Act 2016.

17. We have found this representation at a governance level upholds the Te Ao Māori worldview in a position of authority and as an essential part of decision-making.

18. We suggest that a similar approach to governance would support the delivery of the strategy. We would be happy to share our experience with our governance model with the Ministry.

Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy current strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?

19. We have no specific comments on this question.

Further points

Scope

20. The proposed strategy is broad in scope and while ‘ring-fenced’ there is a lack of clarity about what the edges of the strategy are and what will be done to address the issues regarding ‘wider social and economic attributes of resilience’.
Structures

21. We strongly agree with the recommendations in the Technical Advisory Group’s report for establishing a National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), and therefore separating the operational and policy arms. We would like to see this new agency be resourced and funded to take a proactive, assertive and directive stance.

Rangatiratanga

22. We contend that to honour the principles of Treaty of Waitangi, co-creation of the strategy should have been the first step in developing a partnership approach, rather than handing this off to iwi and agencies.

Section 4.3

23. We would like the Ministry to work further on the section 4.3 Resilience and Te Ao Māori. This section implies that Te Ao Māori and Māori ways of being are a strength to use/exploit/acknowledge during disaster response and that partnership is something to be aimed for in the future without being clear on how this will be done.

24. The asset bases of other cultural / social / economic groups are not mentioned as a strength in the ‘Analysis of our current state’. This highlighting of Māori asset base seems inappropriate given:
   - the vulnerability of many Māori, their lands, assets to disasters, especially climate change
   - the alienation of Māori lands and resources throughout the history of Aotearoa / New Zealand and therefore the loss in wellbeing and way of being.

Natural Hazards

25. Natural hazards: To date there has been an increasing focus from central government on understanding and managing the increase in natural hazard risk. To further support this maturity we suggest that the Ministry encourage the Ministry for the Environment to prioritise national direction on natural hazard risk management.

Climate change adaptation

26. Environment Canterbury notes that natural hazards exacerbated by climate change are being experienced by many (not just coastal) communities; this needs to be acknowledged as a national problem. Climate change is affecting the whole country and the scale of response will require the resources of the whole country. Environment Canterbury urges the Government to acknowledge and respond to the full scale of the climate change adaptation challenge.
Insurance

27. Point 5 (page 41) highlights high insurance penetration as a strength of our current state. There is nothing in the proposed Strategy about managing the risk of insurance withdrawal from New Zealand. If there was another significant disaster like the Canterbury earthquake series, there may be the withdrawal of insurance or insurance underwriting, such as in Japan and California for earthquake damage.
07 December 2018

National Disaster Resilience Strategy submissions
Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6145
nationalstrategy@dpmc.govt.nz

Dear Sir/Madam,

Please find attached Auckland Council's submission in response to the draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy. Please note that due to time constraints this submission has not been approved by the governing body of Auckland Council. While retrospective political approval will be sought in due course, the contents of this submission should be regarded as an officer-only submission.

If you require any clarification on any aspect of the submission please contact Stephen Town, Chief Executive on [Redacted] or by email at nationalstrategy@dpmc.govt.nz.

Yours sincerely

[Signature]

Stephen Town
Chief Executive, Auckland Council
Chair, Coordinating Executive Group

Encl.
Submission to the

Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management

DRAFT NATIONAL DISASTER RESILIENCE STRATEGY

07 December 2018
Auckland Council submission to the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management

1. This is Auckland Council's submission on the draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

2. The address for service is: Auckland Council, Private Bag 92300, Victoria Street West, Auckland 1142.

3. Please direct any queries to Stephen Town, Chief Executive. Phone [REDACTED] or email [REDACTED]

4. This submission has not been approved by the governing body of Auckland Council. Please consider this submission as an officer-only submission.

5. The submission is set out as follows:

   Section 1: Introduction
   Section 2: Executive summary
   Section 3: Auckland Council's submission on the draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy
   Section 4: Concluding comments

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

6. The vision of 'Resilient Auckland', the Auckland 2016-2021 CDEM Group Plan, is: 'working together to build a resilient Auckland'. The plan recognises that everyone from individuals and families; business and government, both central and local, must work together to build a resilient Auckland.

7. While, arguably, ahead of its time in reflecting the broad nature of resilience and of significant global developments and frameworks such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Auckland CDEM Group Plan will be reviewed and updated in 2019. The plan will be brought up-to-date to reflect, among other things, the general direction of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy and the 2018 Auckland Plan (see below).

8. Auckland Council recognises that building 'resilience' is an all-of-council activity requiring more than just the emergency management sector. For this reason, the draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy has been reviewed within the context of the broader legislative and governance framework that Auckland Council operates under. This broad framework is particularly important for current and future development activity which operates under enabling legislation. Auckland Council's Natural Hazard Risk Management Action Plan (currently under development) considers all of the activities
undertaken by Auckland Council and how those activities are influencing risk management and, in turn, resilience.

9. A recent survey\(^1\) representative of the Auckland region showed that 83% of Aucklanders have a good understanding of the type of disasters that could occur in Auckland and the chances of them occurring; 66% of Aucklanders (measured using three weighted composite attributes) are prepared for an emergency; and 84% (measured using four weighted 'resilience' attributes) feel connected to their local communities. While these figures are high, Auckland Council acknowledges that building community resilience in Auckland requires more than just traditional approaches and that an all-of-council approach is required to achieve significant resilience gains in Auckland.

10. The Auckland Plan is Auckland's 30-year guiding strategy. Required by legislation\(^2\) it sets the high-level direction for Auckland and considers how to address key challenges of high population growth and environmental degradation. Importantly, the plan has recognised 'resilience' as an important concept. 'Resilience' has been embedded as a 'cross-cutting' theme influencing the outcomes sought, the goals to be achieved, and the action to be undertaken by the entire Auckland Council family in delivering the intent of the Auckland Plan. It is an all-of-council and, indeed, an all-of-society plan in much the same way as the National Disaster Resilience Strategy has been designed.

11. Understanding the challenges of meeting demand for development at pace also gives Auckland Council insight into some of the challenges of recovery at pace, following a disaster.

12. This submission, which is structured primarily around the six consultation questions posed in the draft strategy document, seeks to add some commentary and insight from Auckland Council's perspective. Auckland Council wishes to thank the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management for the inclusive and comprehensive strategy development process undertaken over the past two years which has seen a range of stakeholders, including Auckland Council, contribute towards the development of the draft strategy.

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\(^1\) Auckland Council, Preparedness and Resilience Monitor, May 2018
\(^2\) Local Government (Auckland Council) Act 2009
SECTION 2: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

13. Auckland Council submits that the participatory, inclusive and whole-of-society approach to building resilience promoted in the draft strategy is to be applauded and is similar to the approach imbed in both the Auckland Plan and in Auckland's CDEM Group Plan.

14. Auckland Council questions how 'directive' the strategy is and recommends that consideration is given to how the objectives can be achieved consistently across government and council directed outcomes in order to ensure that targets are met and actions delivered.

15. The vision of the draft strategy ('a safe and prosperous nation') is one that aligns well with the Auckland Plan which seeks 'opportunity and prosperity for all' and a safe city.

16. Auckland Council submits that New Zealand's legislative framework needs to be reviewed and integrated as much as possible to ensure that risk mitigation and resilience building is able to be properly considered and supported. The current legislative framework, for example, still allows for housing and other developments to be built in risk-prone areas with appropriate mitigations.

17. The draft strategy provides useful commentary on 'how our risks might change in the future' and identifies a number of factors such as climate change. Auckland Council's approach to natural hazard risk management is explained and may provide a useful approach to be adopted across the country.

18. Auckland Council broadly agrees with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy and notes that many of these were suggested from the various rounds of consultation undertaken with stakeholders, including Auckland Council. The strategy is, however, ambitious and is light on detail as to how it will be delivered. Many of the success factors, for example, were they to be delivered upon would require significant legislative and other changes in order to be implemented.

19. Auckland Council submits that joint ownership of the strategy through, for example, joint central and local government governance arrangements would be helpful and notes that it is unlikely that current governance mechanisms would be fit-for-purpose to deliver such an ambitious strategy.

20. The draft strategy is a clear improvement on the current national strategy. The inclusive nature of the consultation and engagement that the Ministry carried out through the strategy development process is to be applauded.
SECTION 3: AUCKLAND COUNCIL’S SUBMISSION ON THE DRAFT NATIONAL DISASTER RESILIENT STRATEGY

Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest?

21. The purpose of the draft strategy, as stated in the document, is to outline the vision and long-term goals for civil defence emergency management (CDEM) in New Zealand. Although governed and required by the CDEM Act 2002, Auckland Council is pleased that the scope and intent of the strategy recognises the intent of the legislation which is, ultimately, to build the resilience of New Zealand.

22. Linking resilience to the protection and growth of living standards for all New Zealanders is similar to the approach taken by Auckland Council in the development of the Auckland Plan which seeks to deliver a world-class city while at the same time ensuring shared prosperity for all Aucklanders. The participatory, inclusive and whole-of-society approach promoted in the proposed strategy is to be applauded and, again, is similar to the approach imbued in both the Auckland Plan and in Auckland’s CDEM Group Plan.

23. The need to confine the strategy to the disaster aspects of resilience is understood but not entirely agreed with. The purpose states that ‘while acknowledging the vital importance of wider social and economic attributes of disaster resilience... these issues are well-catered for by other policies and programmes across government and through society’ (p8). While this may be the case, the vision of the document is far broader. Auckland Council suggests that the final strategy outlines how wider aspects of resilience may be monitored, evaluated and reported on, whether through the National Disaster Resilience Strategy or elsewhere, to ensure that progress in building resilience is properly understood across central government, local government and other stakeholders.

24. Related to the above point is the question of how directive the strategy is. The proposed strategy states that central and local government, businesses, organisations and iwi will be able to use the strategy to guide resilience building both for their own organisation, and for the people and communities they support or provide services for. Noting that Auckland Council works on investment cycles of annual, 3-year, 10-year and 30-year financial planning, particularly around infrastructure investment it is acknowledged that a directive approach will make some aspects of resilience easier to implement, but will require extensive planning and engagement. Auckland Council is able to work with the Ministry on developing achievable targets.

25. The vision of 'a safe and prosperous nation' is one that aligns well with the Auckland Plan which seeks 'opportunity and prosperity' and a safe city in its...
broadest sense. Given recent proposals\(^3\) to restate the promotion of social, economic, environmental and cultural well-being of communities to the statutory purpose of local government it would seem sensible that the proposed strategy considers these factors including, for example, the Four Capitals in the Living Standards Framework.

26. The proposed strategy states that New Zealand is well-placed in having a ‘comprehensive legislative framework in place for risk management’ including a number of pieces of legislation and regulatory instruments. While probably outside of the scope of this submission, Auckland Council would like to stress the importance of legislation in its ability to reduce risk and enable decision-making that is able to properly take account of risk and improve resilience planning. New Zealand’s current legislative framework, for example, still allows for housing and other developments to take place in risk-prone areas with appropriate mitigations, and is enabling both in its intent and in its openness to challenge. Thought needs to be given to allowing risk and resilience factors to be prioritised over other factors in determining such issues. Auckland Council recommends that the Ministry assesses how central government agencies can develop an integrated approach to legislation in order to enable risk reduction and investment in resilience as much as possible. This may include environmental, building and commercially focused legislation. Auckland Council believes that it is important that legislation, and indeed central government strategies and priorities, where appropriate and where possible, leverage off and support New Zealand’s national disaster resilience strategy.

27. Auckland Council agrees with the goals of the draft strategy in general, however, it is recommended that consideration be given to the inclusion of ‘wairuatanga’ (spirituality) as an additional aspect of ‘resilience’ in the Māori worldview (p14). Māori have always recognised the significance of wairuatanga (spirituality) for wellbeing. Wairuatanga is also reflected in relationships with the natural environment, for example, whenua (land), awa (rivers, lakes) and maunga (mountains) have spiritual significance, and access to the natural environment is important for identity and sense of wellbeing.

28. From a broad perspective, Auckland Council would like to see more of a specific focus on critical infrastructure necessary to sustain quality of life. In particular, readiness to recover, or capacity to recover, is missing from the discussion at present.

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\(^3\) Local Government (Community Well-being) Amendment Bill
29. The draft strategy provides useful commentary on ‘how our risks might change in the future’. Climate change, population trends, digital connectivity and other factors are identified. Auckland Council’s Natural Hazards Risk Management Action Plan (currently being drafted) is a whole-of-council plan which identifies a range of actions with regards to natural hazard risk management and mitigation. The plan, a first-of-its-kind for New Zealand, may be a useful approach to be adopted by the Ministry and others in the CDEM sector, including CDEM Groups. The final document can be shared with the Ministry once complete.

30. The articulation of risks and hazards to communities and to all the entities who are engaged in building resilience, may be better framed in terms of impacts to communities, rather than the hazards and risks themselves.

31. Auckland Council’s recent experiences responding to the significant storm event that passed through Auckland and the upper North Island in April 2018 confirmed, anecdotally at least, that some communities, and in particular some rural and remote communities, have changed and evolved as the city has changed over time. Population growth has been a major factor in Auckland’s development over recent years but so too has other changes in demographics and also in other societal factors. Auckland Council recommends, therefore, that the final strategy acknowledges the importance of community engagement (of both geographic and non-geographic communities of interest) and of establishing opportunities for meaningful community engagement in resilience-building activities.

32. The acknowledgment of, and focus on, climate change and its effects on New Zealand’s risk profile and of the need to consider climate risk reduction, mitigation and adaptation is to be applauded. Auckland’s Climate Action Plan (to be released mid 2019) will set a path to rapidly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help prepare Auckland for the impacts of climate change.

33. At priority 1, ‘Managing risks’, it is noted that ‘it is critical to recognise how we inadvertently add to (risk) through development choices, including land-use and building choices’ (p23). As above, Auckland Council recommends that thought be given to the legislative framework guiding these decisions and choices as the framework, as it is currently, is enabling of development, with mitigations, in most cases. In addition, managing risks across the 5Rs (with the 5th ‘R’ being ‘Resilience’) requires risks to be envisaged and articulated around recovery, including construction industry capacity, financial implications of recovery and so forth.

34. Priority 2, ‘Effective response to and recovery from emergencies’, is well aligned with the Government’s response to the Technical Advisory Group’s recommendations on the effective response to natural disaster and other
emergencies and to recent legislative changes\textsuperscript{4} which have helped to embed a more strategic approach to disaster recovery. Auckland Council would like to stress the importance of recovery, and of reinforcing the need to prioritise recovery planning considerations as part of resilience.

35. The final priority; ‘Strengthening societal resilience’ aligns closely with the approach to resilience building in Auckland through both the Auckland Plan and Auckland’s CDEM Group Plan. It is, however, ambitious and it is unclear how the measures of success identified on p28 of the document will be delivered. The priority is appropriate. However, applying a methodology such as a ‘theory of change logic framework’, which requires objectives to be linked with expected outputs and measurable indicators, may help to ensure a common understanding and delivery by the wide range of partners and stakeholders who would have to deliver upon the outcomes sought through this strategy. Auckland Council recommends that the insurance industry is engaged in how this priority may be taken forward across central and local government and other stakeholders, particularly since there were barriers to ‘build back better’ in previous rebuilds.

| Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? |

36. Auckland Council broadly agrees with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy in principle and notes that many of these were suggested from the various rounds of consultation undertaken with stakeholders, including Auckland Council. That said, the comments above related to delivery and implementation and of maximising levels of buy-in across stakeholders apply here. Auckland Council believes that the strategy needs to ensure that steps are in place to enable the strategy to succeed. In particular, for objectives 1-6, having national data platforms will enable a number of these objectives to be more easily met, which will require a more directive and central approach than is currently the case. This is also likely the case for consolidation of financial impact data, and the impetus to respond to such financial pressures at a national level.

37. Objective 12 ‘Embed a strategic approach to recovery planning that takes account of risks identified, recognises long-term priorities, and ensures the needs of the affected are at the centre of recovery processes’ aligns well to the current strategic approach to disaster recovery. However, Auckland Council would prefer to see the suite of objectives at 7-12 to have a higher focus on recovery and preparing for recovery. Auckland Council acknowledges that ‘response’ was a strong focus on the recent reviews of the sector and believes the strategy to be an opportunity to set the equivalent direction in resilience.

\textsuperscript{4} Civil Defence Emergency Management Amendment Act 2016
38. Implementation of objective 5, similarly, will require changes to legislation, and in particular to the Resource Management Act 1991, to be enabled. Auckland Council recommends that thought be given as to how best to balance the intent of this objective with other priorities including, for example, those related to infrastructure provision and housing affordability and delivery.

39. In addition, it is recommended that thought be given as to the interdependencies of each of the success factors with other developments across the sector. Objective 10, for example, which relates to the capability and capacity of the emergency management workforce identifies the training of controllers and incident management roles as a success factor but states that these factors will be in place by 2030. Given recent developments and the importance placed on the professionalism of the emergency management workforce, Auckland Council recommends that the Ministry prioritises this success factor and brings the timing of these factors in line with the priority placed on these issues through the current reforms taking place in the sector.

40. Objective 16 is related to embedding strategic objectives for resilience in key plans and strategies at the city/district/regional level. While to be applauded, again, thought needs to be given as to the practicality of this objective. Auckland Council, for example, is the only local authority in New Zealand required by legislation to develop a ‘spatial plan’ (the Auckland Plan) of a type where these kinds of objectives would sit comfortably. In addition, it has to be acknowledged that the priorities of local government do tend to differ across the country in relation to a number of factors including, for example, population growth, infrastructure provision or water quality. Balancing the need to consider resilience factors, for example, with other requirements such as affordability has to be considered.

41. Most of the success factors identified for each objective provide for success to be measured ‘by 2030’. This timeline may be appropriate given the largely systemic nature of the objectives identified, however, without having sight of the ‘action plan’ that will deliver upon this strategy, it is difficult to comment. Commentary on the need to identify a ‘roadmap of actions’ or similar is provided below for the Ministry’s consideration.

42. Auckland Council recommends that as well as identifying a ‘roadmap of actions’ or similar related to each objective, that the Ministry considers the practicalities of each success factor in detail. The success factors are, by-and-large, ambitious and many, if fully implemented, would require significant changes, including legislative changes, to how risks are managed currently in New Zealand. Objective 4, for example, would require an all-of-government approach and strategy related to hazard risk mitigation with a view to informing what could be difficult, complex conversations with communities about risk and about some of the decisions that may have to be made about how risks may be dealt with or not in the future. A pathway for this to occur will have to be provided.
Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim?

43. The proposed strategy is light on detail as to the governance arrangements of this strategy only than to note that “the strategy will be owned and managed by existing governance mechanisms, including those through the National Security System, and at a regional level by CDEM Groups” (p30). Auckland Council recommends that more detail is required in this section including to outline what those mechanisms are, how they report and how stakeholders and the public will be informed of progress. Given the ‘devolved’ nature of CDEM in this country it is recommended that thought be given as to ensuring as much joint ownership of the strategy through, for example, joint central and local government governance. There are various models of joint governance and, perhaps even, joint funding that could be explored for this strategy. It is likely that current governance mechanisms will not be fit-for-purpose to deliver such an ambitious strategy. Auckland Council reiterates the value in taking a cross-agency approach to resilience-building.

Are there any particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?

44. The inclusive nature of the consultation and engagement that the Ministry carried out through the strategy development process needs to be acknowledged. It is clear that the views of the sector have been taken into account in this draft strategy.

45. The strategy is clearly ambitious, and this is to be applauded. New Zealand’s emergency management sector, given the country’s risk to natural hazards and other events, needs to be world-leading. It is pleasing to see that the draft strategy has taken account of recent developments including reforms to the CDEM sector, international frameworks and best-practice.

Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?

46. The proposed strategy is, as stated above, a clear improvement on the current national strategy. That said, one thing that the current strategy does which the proposed strategy does not, is explain in detail the linkages between the national strategy, CDEM Group Plans, legislation and other mechanisms. While not perfect, thought needs to be given as to whether the proposed strategy should include this level of detail. Auckland Council recommends that
central and local government collectively conducts a mapping exercise to understand current and future programmes of work that contribute to the objectives, as well as identifying any interdependencies, gaps and challenges. While this may be included elsewhere (the ‘roadmap of actions’, for example) Auckland Council’s comments above with regards to delivery of the strategy also apply here.

47. As an urban centre, Auckland is acutely aware of the importance of societal resilience, and the complex factors which interplay. Auckland Council believes there needs to be further exploration of ‘preparedness’, and how government (local and national), NGOs and commercial enterprises can be encouraged to manage the provision of more resilient societal ‘infrastructure’, for events larger than those for which individual preparedness would suffice. The strategy document notes this is expensive and difficult. Auckland Council agrees and confirms that expense and difficulty do not detract from the need to do this, if New Zealand is to be a truly resilient country.

48. As noted in the introduction, every local authority has different organisational priorities, and financial imperatives, which are developed with public engagement on a regular basis. Auckland Council requests that consideration is given to the likely additional cost to councils of implementing the strategy by 2030, and in particular consideration as to how the timing and roll out of the strategy and road map will work alongside budgetary and political cycles.

SECTION 4: CONCLUDING COMMENTS

49. Auckland Council wishes to thank the Ministry for providing the opportunity to submit on the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

50. Auckland Council is broadly supportive in principle of the aims, intent, goals and objectives of the proposed strategy. The document is a clear improvement on the current national strategy.

51. Comment has been made throughout Auckland Council’s submission on the need to strengthen the strategy’s ability to be implemented fully. This includes alignment with the work of other agencies and industry partners.

52. Auckland Council welcomes the broad approach to resilience displayed in the national strategy. This approach aligns well with efforts being undertaken in Auckland as demonstrated through the Auckland Plan and Auckland’s CDEM Group Plan.
03 December 2018

National Disaster Resilience Strategy Submissions
Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6145

Dear Sir,

Submission – National Disaster Resilience Strategy

The NZ Transport Agency would like to thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback on the National Disaster Resilience Strategy Draft for Consultation. Our comments on the proposed Strategy are as follows:

General

The Agency considers that this is a strong and fit for purpose document, addressing the topic of National Disaster Resilience management and response well and comprehensively.

Therefore the Agency supports the document as a whole.

The Agency particularly supports the premise in the Strategy of taking an "holistic approach to strengthening resilience that connects with a range of agencies and sectors to deliver improved outcomes for New Zealanders." (page 2)

Specific

The Key Terms provide useful definitions for use throughout the Strategy. We would however, suggest that two areas bear further consideration and amendment.

Firstly, the definition of Resilience appears focused on asset or network condition, and is well expressed from that perspective. We would suggest that there is value in also presenting Resilience in the definitions section as “societal systems enabling communities to continue undertaking activities which matter to them (or minimising the impacts on those activities), during and following disruptive events.” This helps focus on the customer (or community) impacts, and is consistent with the later content that discusses linking “resilience to the protection and growth of living standards for all New Zealanders.” (page 7)

It is also consistent with section 4.3.3 which acknowledges that Māori world view of resilience is focused on putting people at its centre. This could also be explored in section 4.2 as part of that sections more exploratory discussion of the meaning of Resilience. Recognition of the interaction with a range of other policies and programmes across Government as contributing to the wider social and economic attributes of society’s resilience is well made.

Secondly, the Reconstruction and Recovery definitions which include an expectation of build-back-better and enhancement should add a condition of “where affordable and appropriate” or similar to manage a universal expectation of betterment that could occur with the current wording.

We found the “Vision” provided in pages 20–21 very useful but being after section 4, found it too separated from Section 2 “Our Vision” which did not appear to contain a vision statement. We acknowledge that the “Vision” on pages 20–21 could be considered to be a
consolidation of sections 2-4, and if so, then we would recommend reference to it in sections 2-4 so that one knows that it is coming up.

The Agency supports the 18 Objectives proposed. However, we question #18 (Addressing the capacity and adequacy of critical infrastructure systems, and upgrade them as practicable, according to risk identified”) being allocated to the “Strengthening Societal Resilience” priority rather than “Managing Risks”

We found the “What success looks like” sections supporting each of the 18 objectives as very useful. However, it was not clear to us why most were based on a 2030-based future and a few were based on a 2025-based future.

In addition, it is vital that the first priority following the Strategy adoption is the development of a work programme showing the staging and trajectory for achieving the desired future state (What success looks like) of each objective. The work programme would assist us, as a partner organisation, to know who would lead the development of the (national cross-agency) projects and when that work may commence (compared with the other national work streams) so we can align our own programme accordingly.

It would also be helpful to see the opportunities highlighted in Appendix 4 referenced more directly in the strategy objectives under section 7. “Strengthening societal resilience”.

Appendix 4 holds promise for moving forward and we would suggest there are potentially more opportunities which would benefit from a brief expose here.

Conclusion

Once again, we express our support for the draft Strategy overall and consider that it should achieve its purpose.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit on this key strategy during its development.

If you have any clarifications, queries or further contact needs regarding this strategy’s development, please contact Stuart Woods, Lead Advisor Resilience,

[your contact details here].

Yours sincerely,

Brett Gliddon
General Manager, System Delivery and Design
Submission on Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy

Introduction

1. This is Vector’s submission on the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy for New Zealand.

2. Vector believes the proposition of a new National Disaster Strategy is very timely given that electricity resilience will be increasingly important as climate change is materialising and the economy’s dependence on electricity is growing.

3. We set out below our responses to the questions in the consultation.

4. No part of this submission is confidential. Should you have any queries regarding this submission please contact Steve Heinen, Policy Advisor, Strategic Planning and Technology Integration.

Responses to consultation questions

Q1: Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors?

5. We agree that resilience includes the 3 following abilities (page 3):
   i. The ability to prepare for disruptive events;
   ii. Absorb disruptive events; and
   iii. Recover from disruptive events.

   We note that Civil Defence and Emergency Management’s focus is naturally on preparation and recovery, however the strategy vision in Section 1 could emphasise the consideration of all three approaches, and the trade-offs between them.

   Section 4 reduces resilience to 2 dimensions only, absorption and adaptability, and seems therefore incomplete as ‘preparation’ is not included in the goal of the strategy. This ‘preparation’ dimension seems essential as it is closely linked to the resilience priority ‘managing risks’ in Section 5 (and Appendix 1).

6. Under the resilience definition of Section 1 (see our previous comment), hardening and strengthening physical assets is a response to reduce the impact of a disruptive event through absorption. We believe the referral to ‘strengthening of capacity’ in Section 3.4 as a forth component of disaster risk (along with hazard, exposure and vulnerability) is inconsistent with the resilience definition and the Sendai Framework. To summarise, we believe disaster risk depends on hazard, exposure and vulnerability, while disaster impacts depend on the 3 pillars of resilience (i.e. preparation, absorption/strengthening/hardening and recovery).
7. A stronger alignment of the resilience definition (page 3) and the strategy in Section 1 would improve clarity. The definition refers to the effects of ‘disruptive events’, while the strategy mostly refers to ‘disasters’ (or even ‘devastating events’). While a disruptive event and disaster may both represent an external risk, an efficient resilience strategy minimises the impacts of a disruptive event to ideally avoid a disaster.

We support the use of the term ‘disruptive event’, which emphasizes the importance of an efficient resilience strategy to rely on the 3 pillars of the resilience strategy in order to avoid or minimise a disaster (i.e. preparation, absorption/strengthening/hardening and recovery).

8. We strongly agree with the future goal of intergenerational equity. We need to ensure today’s resilience solutions build a resilient future while also avoiding unnecessary financial burdens on future generations. Infrastructure investments, such as electricity infrastructure assets, often have long lifetimes that need to be paid by future generations and risk being redundant in the face of rapid technology change. Wherever economically possible, flexible solutions should be favored, this will ensure intergenerational equity and strengthen societal resilience.

Q2: **Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors**

Q3: **Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.**

9. The priorities on ‘strengthening societal resilience’, currently Section 7, should be listed before the priorities on response, currently Section 6. This will reflect the order of the three resilience solutions identified in the definition (see our paragraph 5). We also believe a more appropriate title would be ‘Strengthening Societal and Infrastructure Resilience’ or ‘Strengthening Resilience’. This would then reflect the range of the objectives listed under this title.

10. Priorities that fall within the ‘strengthening resilience’ Section 7 include both infrastructure as well as societal strengthening. In our perspective, Priority 18 on infrastructure needs to highlight that in order to ensure societal strengthening, customer-side resilience is increasingly part of developing resilience capacity (we refer to this as ‘shared resilience’).

11. Sound decision-making stems on good information. With the increasing digitalisation of physical assets and appearance of the Internet of Things (IoT), we believe it is critical to harness and guarantee access to data for planning and management of critical infrastructure. The importance of information is raised as part of an emergency response (Priority 11), however needs to also be included in the sections on ‘managing risks’ and ‘strengthening societal resilience’. Policy needs to recognise and publicly support the use of data for increasing infrastructure resilience given it is in the long-term interest of the public.

12. Objective 6 in Section 2 raises the importance on not exclusively valuing only economic impacts when assessing resilience solutions. However, Objective 6 seems to exclusively focus on understanding economic impacts, which we think misses important social and environmental impacts of disruptive events.

13. Objective 6 includes ‘financing to implement resilience solutions, we believe the importance of financing cannot be understated. For most infrastructure planners, the possibility to improve resilience depends on the regulatory framework. The regulatory framework needs to support enhancing resilience capability through better prevention, strengthening and emergency response, while balancing this intergenerational equity.
concerns. Under the current regulatory framework spending is based on historical benchmarking. However, past experience is not sufficient to assess resilience needs in the future as climate change materialises. In our case, regulators, such as the Electricity Authority and Commerce Commission, do not explicitly recognise resilience due to climate change, which discourages appropriate investment.

14. Understanding interdependencies between critical infrastructures are essential to ensuring resilience and support effective response to an emergency. A recent study from NZ Lifeline Council highlights such interdependencies and notes that electricity is today required to operate most other critical infrastructures. This is partially related to Priority 9 and 16, which focusses on organisational coordination as opposed to physical interdependency.

15. As previously mentioned, the increasing digitalising of infrastructures provides huge societal opportunity but also requires new capacities to manage risks of cybersecurity. We believe this objective should be highlighted and a strategy should be proposed.

Q4: Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim? We would also appreciate your views if you disagree with this proposition.

16. As mentioned in paragraph 13, the regulatory framework and thus the regulator has a role to play in supporting the development of a resilient infrastructure. Our capital and operation expenditure allowance are strongly defined by the Commerce Commission and its regulations, so we rely on them recognising the importance of resilience and the long-term interest of customers in 'shared resilience'.

17. As previously mentioned in paragraph 11, policymakers, including data management and privacy groups, should support the use of data to increase resilience, which is in the interest of the public.

Q5: Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?  
Q6: Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy current strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?

18. No additional comments.

Concluding comment

19. The effective emergency response after the April 2018 storms in Auckland demonstrated the value and necessity of a well-coordinated response between many important parties including Civil Defence, Auckland Council and Vector.

20. We are looking forward to continuing to work alongside Civil Defence on ensuring resilient energy services are provided to Aucklanders.

Kind regards
For and on behalf of Vector Limited

Mark Toner
Head of Public Policy

1 New Zealand Lifelines Council (2017), New Zealand Lifelines Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Comment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hazard</td>
<td>The definition of hazard does not align to the definition detailed in part 1 s 4 of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Heading</td>
<td>The vision of 'a safe and prosperous nation' that also features in the contents page, differs from the vision on page 14 section 4.1 and to that in the heading of page 20 'Vision of a resilient nation'. Both of these visions differ to the one on page 34 'Our Vision: New Zealand is a disaster resilient nation that acts proactively to manage risks and build resilience in a way that contributes to the wellbeing and prosperity of all New Zealanders.'</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>There is potential for confusion with this figure. The depth of impact is clearly depicted. However there does not appear to be too much differentiation between the two lines when looking at the speed of recovery. Both lines appear to increase at roughly the same time and rate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Paragraph 1, Line 3, word 2</td>
<td>Suggest the word ‘have’ is replaced with ‘are’. The resultant sentence would then read ‘This is when we are most at risk….’</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Paragraph 4</td>
<td>Suggest a restructure of the first sentence to: ‘This priority aims to further progress the advancements that we have made in responding to and supporting recovery from ….’</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Paragraph 4, Line 5</td>
<td>Amend document title from 'Ministerial Review into Better Responses to Natural Hazards and Other Emergencies' to 'Ministerial review into better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies'</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Our Goal</td>
<td>The goal differs to the goal featured in contents page and on page 14 of 'a resilient future'</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Managing Risks, item 1</td>
<td>A space is required in 'decisionmaking'</td>
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Submission by the Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Inc. on the National Disaster Resilience Strategy

December 2018
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Introduction

The following submission is made on behalf of The Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (referred to as SPCA).

SPCA is the preeminent animal welfare and advocacy organisation in New Zealand. The Society have been in existence for over 140 years with a supporter base representing many tens of thousands of New Zealanders across the nation.

The organisation includes 39 Animal Welfare Centres across New Zealand and over 70 inspectors appointed under the Animal Welfare Act 1999.

SPCA welcomes the opportunity to make a submission on the National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

SPCA and its role within Civil Defence Emergency Management

The Director’s Guidelines to ‘Welfare Services in an Emergency’ outlines the roles and responsibilities of various organisations in an emergency. Under these arrangements, during an emergency, the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) is the lead agency responsible for the Animal Welfare Services Sub-Function which operates under the Welfare Function of the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Framework. SPCA is a support agency that operates as part of that sub-function. SPCA, along with several other organisations, works with and supports MPI with its responsibilities under the sub-function during an emergency.

As described in the Director’s Guidelines to ‘Welfare Services in an Emergency’, the role of the Animal Welfare Services Sub-Function group is to help provide for the needs of animals when their owners (or persons in charge) are not able to do so themselves due to the consequences of an emergency.
However, it continues to be essential that all owners of animals, or persons in charge of them, must be encouraged to prepare in advance for their animals in case of an emergency situation as their duty of care remains. It is important that emergency preparedness for animals is encouraged and takes place alongside standard emergency planning in households, businesses and in government.

Inclusion of animals in the National Disaster Resilience Strategy

The inclusion of animal welfare as a sub-function within the CDEM Framework is an important step forward. However, the current version of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy shows that there is still a vastly insufficient acknowledgement of the importance of animals within disaster management and response planning. SPCA supports the work of the New Zealand Government to properly prepare for future emergencies and the formulation of a National Disaster Resilience Strategy but submits that significant improvement must be made to the Strategy to incorporate animal welfare preparedness and response in the event of emergencies.

In general, SPCA supports the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy. However, the Society submits that the purpose of the Strategy described on page 7 to “explicitly link resilience to the protection and growth of living standards for all New Zealanders, and promote a wide, whole-of-society, participatory and inclusive approach” has not been met. Animals play a huge part in New Zealand culture, and society places a great importance on the welfare of companion animals, farmed animals and those confined in other institutions, such as zoos, aquaria and laboratories. In order to build a resilient New Zealand, it is essential that domesticated and confined animals are included as an essential feature of emergency management planning.

A 2016 report from the New Zealand Animal Companion Animal Council (NZCAC) stated that there are well over 4.6 million companion animals in New Zealand, with 64% of New Zealand
households being home to at least one companion animal, which is more than almost any other country in the world (NZCAC, 2016). Only the United States has a marginally higher percentage of companion animals in households at 65%.

Cats are the most popular companion animal in New Zealand, with 44% of households found to be sharing their homes with at least one cat. This was followed by dogs at 28% of households. New Zealanders overwhelming consider their companion animals to be members of the family. This is said to be true for 83% of people who own cats and 77% who own dogs. These figures have remained this high since 2011 (NZCAC, 2016).

Farmed animals are equally important in New Zealand life. Farming is a huge part of the economy in this country and animals are relied upon to provide an income for hundreds of thousands of New Zealanders. In June 2017, there were stated to be 3,616,091 beef cattle, 6,529,811 dairy cattle, 27,526,537 sheep, 836,337 deer, 273,860 pigs and 43,684 horses in New Zealand (Stats NZ, 2017). Other farmed animals such as chicken, duck, rabbits, alpaca, llama and goats also exist in large numbers across the country.

In addition, countless companion, farmed and wild animals are housed in other establishments, such as laboratories, zoos and aquaria.

Each of the different species have different physical, health and behavioural needs, such as environment and feed requirements. It became apparent to everyone involved in the rescue and recovery operations during the Edgecumbe flooding that a huge range of species are kept within New Zealand’s households alone, such as cats, dogs, birds, turtles, guinea pigs, cows, pigs, etc. The potential for disaster when large number of diverse animals need immediate care or rescuing during or following an emergency is easy to imagine. If these factors are not properly considered and catered for during the planning process, resources and agencies will be stretched beyond capacity and the demand for help will outstretch the nation’s ability to cope.
The Strategy details three priorities to be focused on to improve the nation’s resilience to disasters: risk reduction; building capability and capacity to manage emergencies; and strengthening a wider societal resilience. SPCA, again, agrees with the priorities in principle, but is concerned that no consideration has been given to: reducing the risks posed to animals; ensuring that animals are properly catered for in emergency management planning (both capacity and capability); and recognising that the inclusion of animals in these measures is part of strengthening societal resilience.

**Priority 1 – Managing Risks**

None of the risk reduction strategies considered for New Zealand can claim to be comprehensive if they do not include planning and preparing for animals in emergencies. The human-animal bond is proven; failure to recognise the emotional bond between many people and their companion animals has been found to have a significant impact during many disasters (Darroch & Adamson, 2016). Humans have been known to risk their lives to protect their animals or refuse to evacuate from danger without their animals (Hesterberg et al., 2012). It is impossible to properly plan for risks to New Zealand as a nation without including consideration of its animals across all spheres. For example, people living with animals are likely to be more inclined to commit to disaster risk reduction if the needs of their animals are included in the planning (Darroch & Adamson, 2016). As detailed in the Strategy, environmental disasters affect all of society, of which animals are a part. Therefore, emergency resilience must be integrated into all parts of society, including animals in homes, industries and institutions.

There is a large body of evidence demonstrating that providing for animals within the planning, rescue and recovery of disasters is an integral component to ensure the safety of humans during an evacuation. In an emergency, saving animals also saves human lives. During previous disasters, both in New Zealand and abroad, it has been found that people are more
likely to evacuate if they are able to take their companion animals (Hunt et al., 2012). Indeed, human lives have been lost when animal owners have returned home prematurely to rescue their animals (WSPA, 2014; Barlow & Shadwell, 2016). Refusal to allow companion animals to be evacuated with their owners can lead to non-compliance with evacuation orders and failure to evacuate, leading to greater risk of losing the lives of rescue workers (Irving, 2009; Heath, 2001; Glassey, 2010; Fritz Institute, 2006). In August 2005, during Hurricane Katrina, 44% of people who did not evacuate decided not to do so in part due to not wanting to leave a companion animal (Fritz Institute, 2006).

Priority 2 – Effective Response to and Recovery from Emergencies

There is no doubt that both humans and animals are affected by disasters. Therefore, it is essential to construct an effective response to and recovery from emergencies which includes animals across species and locations, such as on farms and within the home, industry and institutions. Research shows that requiring people to evacuate without their animals can be a traumatic experience for those people affected (Awadi et al., 2008). This is exacerbated when adequate pre-planning has not been in place. For response and recovery efforts to be comprehensive, animals must be included in the detailed planning of these tasks.

SPCA is disappointed that, at present, the provision of animal welfare in emergencies does not appear to be considered within much of CDEM planning. This was highlighted during the Ministry for Civil Defence Emergency Management Conference that took place in Wellington in May 2018, where there were unfortunately few references to animal welfare, nor the inclusion of animal welfare in planning and preparedness. Although SPCA acknowledges that there is a lot of effort currently being focused towards general emergency preparedness of the public, there is disappointingly limited information included alongside that work to encourage preparedness regarding animals. SPCA submits that CDEM’s messaging around preparedness in relation to animals must be strong, clear and consistent. There are simple actions that members of the public can take in relation to their animals that will ensure a
better preparedness for disasters. Examples include having sufficient and suitable animal cages and stored food, as well as having animals microchipped (and the microchip registered) or otherwise properly identified. Such actions will help to ensure a more efficient emergency response and enable quicker and easier reunification of displaced animals with their owners post-emergency. Other response and recovery actions include ensuring that all types of animals can be housed and fed when they have been displaced and ensuring that institutions and establishments that contain large numbers of animals have sufficient planning for disasters that require relocation or recovery.

**Priority 3 – Strengthening societal resilience**

Animals play an important role across all sections of society. Part of the emergency management plan of New York reads: "It is clear through analysis of these local and national disasters that planning for animal welfare is planning for human welfare." (State of New York, 2010). Many instances have been recorded where people have died while attempting to save their animals during disasters (Thompson, 2013). All sorts of species of animals are considered important members of the family which people are often very hesitant to leave during a crisis (Irvine, 2009; Glassey, 2010). It is no surprise, therefore, that there are significant negative psychological effects on the owner if an animal is left behind and/or killed during an emergency (Edmonds & Cutter, 2008; Gerwolls & Labott, 1994; Hunt et al., 2008; Leonard & Scammon, 2007). Animals can also play a positive psychosocial role in helping people cope during an emergency (Hunt et al., 2008; Heath, 1999; Glassey, 2010). When an animal dies as a result of a negative occurrence, it has been shown that the owner often feels as though they have lost a significant source of emotional support, which further complicates their recovery from the event (Evans & Gray, 2012). Ensuring that animals are properly catered for in disaster preparedness and response will help to strengthen societal resilience to emergencies. Therefore, it is essential that animals are included in planning and coordination in order to ensure effective emergency management.
Due to the strength of feeling that the public overwhelmingly has for animals, there is a significant risk of generating negative domestic and international media if animals are not included in emergency management provisions. A recent example of this is the negative attention that was produced over the three cows who were stranded during the 2016 earthquakes in the Kaikoura region. The images of these cows quickly garnered concern on social and traditional media, with many people focussed on their welfare and survival. During a time of emergency, such as this, emotions are heightened and societal interest increased. The three cows in this case were rescued and the story ended happily but consider the impact on society and the resilience of the nation, as well as the negative international publicity, had these cows died or been euthanased. The story of the cows has since been made into a children’s book called “Moo and Moo and the Little Calf too”, which demonstrates the nation’s interest and empathy with animals even during times of crisis.

**Risks to our wellbeing and prosperity**

Section 3 of the Strategy explains that New Zealand is committed to the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. The Sendai Framework promotes three key ideas:

- 1. A greater effort to understand risk (in all its dimensions), so that we can prioritise investment, make better risk-informed decisions, and build resilience into everyday processes.
  
  To understand the extent of the risks that arise during an emergency, it is essential to appreciate the human-animal bond and understand the importance of animals within society. When this is not considered, the risk to human lives increase. For example, some people are prepared to risk their own lives for animals and many more will refuse to evacuate if adequate provision is not made for their animals. In addition, there is a significant economic risk to the country, particularly within the agricultural sector, if the lives of large numbers of farmed animals are lost.
• 2. A shift of focus from managing disasters to managing risk, including to reduce the underlying drivers of risk (exposure and vulnerability).
  
  o Due to the vast numbers of animals across all spheres of New Zealand life, the exposure and vulnerability to risk is huge when animals are not considered in emergency preparedness. It is essential that it is not just direct risks to humans that are focused upon – there are many aspects that factor into ensuring a prosperous and happy nation.

• 3. A broader ‘whole of society’ approach to risk – everyone has a role in reducing and managing risk.
  
  o SPCA advocates that everyone must be encouraged to consider what role they could have in reducing and managing the risks associated with the animals who are part of their lives. Although animals are not able to take on responsibilities in an emergency situation, they are part of society, and so must be protected and planned for accordingly. This is the same for other members of society who are unable to take care of themselves – those responsible for vulnerable humans play an important role in reducing and managing risk on behalf of those vulnerable persons. The situation for animals parallels this requirement to reduce and manage risks for vulnerable people. There is a culture in New Zealand to help one another. This attitude shows the nation’s ability and desire to step forward and embrace animals in emergencies as a ‘whole of society’ issue.

**SPCA proposed additions to the Strategy**

SPCA agrees in principle with the objectives and success factors detailed in the Strategy. However, once again, it is disappointing to see animals omitted from this important part of the document. There are myriad places where these sections should include mention of
animals and their place in the preparedness and response of disasters. Some examples for the Objectives are listed here:

- **Objective 2**: “Put in place organisational structures and identify necessary processes to understand and act on reducing risks.” The “multi-sectoral views” that the vision of success for this Objective describes must include the views and representation of those within the animal welfare and management sector.

- **Objective 6**: “Understand the economic impact of disaster and disruption, and the need for investment in resilience. Identify and develop financial mechanisms that support resilience activities.” It is important that issues involving animals are properly considered within the analysis of costs of disasters and disruption. This must include the economic impact on society when people lose or are parted from animals in their care. The most obvious cost is the financial loss when farmed animals are killed due to an emergency, but there is a broader scope which includes a wider range of species; for example, a person’s emotional wellbeing and resilience to a disaster may be affected by the loss of an animal (Thompson et al., 2014; Evans & Gray, 2012).

- **Objective 7**: “Implement measures to ensure that the safety and wellbeing of people is at the heart of the emergency management system.” It is stated that this Objective is successful when there are renewed levels of trust and confidence in the emergency management system. SPCA submits that levels and trust and confidence from the public will not be high if they cannot see that the emergency management system recognises and responds to the whole of society, which includes ensuring and encouraging the safety and wellbeing of animals.

- **Objective 14**: “Promote and support prepared individuals, households, organisations, and businesses.” As noted in the measure of success for this Objective, emergency preparedness needs to become part of everyday life. Because animals play such a
huge part of everyday life, it is impossible to achieve this goal without ensuring that animal preparedness is promoted and enacted.

SPCA agrees that a broad range of stakeholders need to be involved in the governance of this strategy and submits that this must include representatives of those working in the animal welfare sector.

SPCA advocates that reference to animals can be included throughout the Strategy document. Examples are given (highlighted in red) below:

- **Key Terms (page 4). Exposure** – “People, animals, infrastructure, buildings, the economy and other assets that are exposed to a hazard.”

- **Key Terms (page 4). Response** – “Actions taken immediately before, during or directly after a disaster to save humans and animal lives and property, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected, and to help communities recover.”

- **1.4 Intended audience and use of the Strategy (page 8).** Individuals, households and whanau – “can use it to prompt thinking on their own resilience, and what they can do to ensure they and their dependants, such as animals, are prepared for disruption and crises in the long term.”

- **1.4 Intended audience and use of the Strategy (page 8).** “All readers are encouraged to consider what this Strategy means for them, their family/whanau, community/hapu, business or organisation, animals in their care, and what they can do to contribute to their own resilience or the resilience of others.”
- Risks to our wellbeing and prosperity (page 11). Second paragraph “These events have caused loss of human and animal lives, injury, damage and disruption.”

- Strengthening societal resilience. Objective 14 (page 28). “Promote and support prepared individuals, households, organisations and businesses (preparedness must include any responsibility for animals).”

- Strengthening societal resilience. Objective 14 success measure (page 28). “By 2030, emergency preparedness for all members of society, including animals, is part of everyday life.”

- Appendix 1: Overview of this Strategy (page 34) 3 - Strengthening Societal Resilience. Objective 14 “Promote and support prepared individuals, households, organisations, and businesses (preparedness must be for all members of society which includes animals).”

- Appendix 3: Analysis of our current state as a baseline for this Strategy (page 42). Barriers to Resilience, What is limiting our resilience? 2. “Our level of individual and household preparedness (including preparedness for our animals) for emergencies is not as high as it should be, given our risks”.

- Appendix 3: Analysis of our current state as a baseline for this Strategy (page 42). Barriers to Resilience, What is limiting our resilience? 3. “Our businesses and organisations (including those involving animals) are not as prepared as they could be, leading to loss of service and loses in the economy when severe disruption strikes.”

In addition to the above, SPCA proposes that the following areas of the Strategy need further consideration to incorporate animals in disaster resilience:
• SPCA acknowledges that there are insufficient images of animals throughout the strategy. The Society advises that photos should be included across the sphere of animal use in the country.

• SPCA proposes that the Foreword, which discusses the nation’s risks, the impact of emergencies and the whole of society approach to resilience, should be reworded to reflect the need for animals to be included within these areas.

• The Four Capitals (page 9) discusses animals only within the Natural Capital area. SPCA feels that this is inaccurate as animals provide a variety of functions and roles in society. Animals are not solely considered to be a resource in New Zealand - many are also part of the family and/or provide an important role in society. Therefore, SPCA submits that animals should also be included under the Social Capital category.

• Similarly, SPCA believes that animals should be included in “Section 3 Risks to our wellbeing and prosperity” (page 11) as they play a large part in the wellbeing and prosperity of the nation.

• Appendix 2: What can I do? (page 36). SPCA recommends that information regarding preparedness for animals within industry, institutions and the home should be included in this part of the Strategy. SPCA would be very happy to provide detailed information that could be included on these pages.

Conclusion

SPCA strongly advocates that the National Disaster Resilience Strategy must be amended so that it includes relevant references to animals throughout. It is essential that companion and farmed animals, along with those confined in captivity across all establishments, are sufficiently included in disaster risk reduction strategies. In an emergency, the inclusion of
animals and animal welfare in planning, response and recovery is important to ensure human wellbeing and safety, along with economic benefits. Therefore, it is vital that preparations to ensure animal welfare during disasters is properly included in future versions of this Strategy or within other documents or plans relating to emergency management.

SPCA is concerned that, at present, the provision of animal welfare in emergencies is severely under-resourced and under-prepared. This means that any response which may take place is often limited in scope and inconsistently delivered. Significant lessons can be learnt from previous emergencies, both in New Zealand and abroad. Addressing these issues will help to achieve improved evacuation compliance and to enable a more efficient, effective and coordinated response which adequately addresses the safety and welfare of animals and, in turn, provides for the safety, wellbeing and financial security of people.

SPCA is supportive of the formulation of a National Disaster Resilience Strategy; however, we feel that much more can be done to include advice and information regarding the management of animals in emergencies to ensure a comprehensive and inclusive approach to disaster resilience and emergency management in New Zealand.

SPCA appreciates the opportunity to contribute to the National Disaster Resilience Strategy and would welcome further engagement on this issue. If any further information is required, the Society is happy to discuss this matter further.
References


We would welcome the opportunity to be part of the stakeholder group consulted on the governance of the strategy.

Belonging. Issues of building resilience costs (earthquake prone buildings) should also be mindful of the benefits of their survival post disaster in rebuilding community and culture. Approaches of TLAs within the cultural heritage sector in particular HNZP for buildings and sites, archaeological provisions. Ministry Culture and Heritage for Taonga tuturu and Museum and Archives institutions for post disaster recovery actions to protect and secure community cultural heritage. Communication and planning in this area should be a high priority.

Rebecca O Brien and Dean Whiting

Directors – Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga

Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga welcomes the introduction of this strategy and agrees with its purpose, vision and goal. Ensuring New Zealand’s Landmarks and historic heritage places are fully prepared for natural disaster and that plans are in place to restore those places in the event of a disaster must be incorporated into any national disaster resilience strategy. The importance of historic heritage to people’s sense of place and well-being was exemplified during the Canterbury Earthquakes. The substantial loss of approximately 200 heritage places as a result of the Canterbury Earthquakes contributed to sense of dislocation and depression experienced by people in the immediate aftermath and the years after the quakes. The restoration of some of the surviving heritage places has been hailed as a sign of hope and recovery. Legislation is being amended to recognise the damage caused by the loss of heritage to peoples’ sense of well-being. The Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga Act 2014 makes provisions for National Historic Landmarks. These identify New Zealand’s most significant sites and require that they are protected as far as possible from destruction, including through natural disasters. The introduction of National Historic Landmarks was prompted by the damage sustained to the Christchurch Cathedral in the Canterbury Earthquakes and the desire to ensure that places of great importance are repaired as soon as possible. The first National Historic Landmark is expected to be launched in 2019. Similarly the proposed changes to the Building Act through the Building Amendment Bill recognises the damage that was done to Canterbury by the loss of heritage and attempts to provide a process to ensure that decisions on demolishing heritage are carefully thought through and made at a ministerial level.

The importance of ensuring the resilience of cultural heritage within communities as a way to reinforce and strengthen identity. Post disaster to ensure that communities can rebuild with a sense of continuity and belonging. Issues of building resilience costs (earthquake prone buildings) should also be mindful of the benefits of their survival post disaster to in rebuilding community and culture. Approaches of TLAs within the cultural heritage sector in particular HNZP for buildings and sites, archaeological provisions. Ministry Culture and Heritage for Taonga tuturu and Museum and Archives institutions for post disaster recovery actions to protect and secure community cultural heritage. Communication and planning in this area should be a high priority.

Heritage assets and taonga fall under social capital in the Living Standards Framework. Heritage is particularly at risk in New Zealand from natural disaster as well as economic risk. Below are specific recommendations on the draft Strategy:

- Within the goals section (p.14) we would recommend including specific mention of cultural heritage under Kaitiakitanga ‘We guard and protect the places that are special to us.’
- On p. 15 we welcomed the cultural resilience and the reference to place, history and heritage as contributing to the identity of New Zealanders.
- We fully support the objectives set out on pp. 24-28 and the aspirations to set in place consistent and widely-used practices around risk assessment and planning. We would strongly support the reference to the protection of heritage that is specifically considered under objective 17. We would recommend that specific mention of cultural heritage places (including marae) and historic heritage is mentioned here.
- On p.32 we recommend consideration is given to including the protection of heritage assets and taonga as an indicator for resilience and recovery. This would reflect the important role of heritage places in creating a sense of continuity after a disaster. Consideration of this indicator has been weighted by Statistics New Zealand as a potential indicator for the well-being budget of 2019. They found this to be a strong indicator that has an existing data set and useful measures.
- On p.34 we welcome the reference to the importance of culture (item 17) and would recommend specific mention is made to the importance of cultural and historic heritage places assets and taonga.

We have look at the options put up in the proposed strategy and support option (c) that builds on the current strategy but expands and includes the importance of community and societal resilience and linking to the TCG with further emphasis on the importance of cultural heritage.

We would welcome the opportunity to be part of the stakeholder group consulted on the governance of the strategy.

Many thanks for the opportunity to make this submission.

Ngā mihi

Rebecca O’Brien and Dean Whiting
Dear DPMC,

Thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback on the draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

LINZ would like to reiterate its support for the Strategy in terms of its scope and connection to our own priorities and high-level outcomes. We stand by the comments we made previously on the pre-consultation draft circulated earlier in the year:

- “We agree that limiting / defining the scope as it is laid out in the draft is appropriate and sensible.”
- “We believe that the objective make sense and provide guidance to the right direction of travel. We welcome the proposed introduction of measures and monitoring to track progress on the success of the strategy.”
- “The strategy does support key elements of LINZ’s work programme in the Resilience and Climate Change adaptation space. At a high-level LINZ has aligned key aspects of its work with the goals and priorities of the Sendai Framework, and we recognise the merit in this national strategy being prepared with the view in mind. We welcome MCDEM’s openness and collaboration as we have developed these over the past two years and look forward to continuing to work together and with MCDEM and others in the same vein to implement the action plan that follows the finalisation of the strategy.”
- Specifically we reiterate LINZ’s willingness to be part of the national emergency management system. Objective 1 is an area that we see we can play a role in helping to establish improved data and information to create an improved evidence base. We recognise the need under objectives 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 relating to clarifying roles and responsibilities, and the need for a ‘Common Operating Picture’, all of which are areas the we are working toward supporting.”

As the Strategy is presented in its current draft:

- We feel that it would be strengthened if accompanied by the “Roadmap” which it refers to. Having greater clarity over the actions planned (e.g. their scheduling, dependencies and priority) to achieve the outcomes that will deliver on the goals of the Strategy would provide a greater degree of confidence in the Strategy itself, and also provide a platform for stronger engagement with collaborators.
- It would help to have more commentary of how the Strategy sits with other current strategies and systems e.g. the RMA and NPS’s
- Very specifically, in respect of Objective 3, and what success looks like, we believe that increasing the level of understanding of uncertainty in risk, and being able to communicate the effectively with the public is a critical part of that success, and worthy of specific mention.

We’d like to thank and congratulate you on the great work done to date in the development of this draft Strategy, and look forward to continuing to provide support in the delivery of its objectives.

Best regards

Rob Deakin
Manager Resilience

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Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy. Scion’s team of social and cultural researchers working on various aspects of wildfire risk and resilience, including in a multi-hazard rural environment, have contributed to this submission.

It is a welcome addition to see the Living Standards Framework reintroduced to policy framing, including the importance of qualities of life into resilience building. The Sendai Framework, as well as focus on wellbeing, the four capitals and adopting a risk management approach, are all leading progressive developments.

We appreciate the effort that has gone into bringing societal resilience into the picture of disaster response and recovery. However we feel the need for a more forward focused strategic document intended for the next ten years, and consider that there are some weaknesses in the text for strengthening the relationship with resilience planning and development between disasters.

Explicit recognition to the factors driving risk and need to address the interrelated aspects of access and opportunity, such as environmental degradation, poverty and inequality are key influencers of resilience. The risk of not acknowledging this connectivity between resilience and other societal inequalities may lead to a less welcome reception from communities exposed to vulnerabilities and those who have experienced the havoc of responding to significant disasters.

In short, resilience needs to better reflect the aspirations of the Sendai Framework to build back better and improve the capacity of those less privileged to reduce risk and prepare for disasters.

Yours sincerely,

Andrea Grant, Lisa Langer, Marie McCarthy and Simon Wegner

Preamble

A decade of some significant events has changed the dynamics of emergency response based on international experience and better understanding of interactions between events and externalities. Many opportunities for learning based on past directions and new challenges, such as climate change and global responses to disaster, exist to guide the development of the 2018-2028 strategy.
From this perspective, we have looked at the strategy in terms of the extent to which it responds to trends and can anticipate future changes and challenges of disaster response.

As noted in the Ministerial review (Nov 2017) “Better ... responses” the measure of success will be the extent to which the public has trust and confidence in the emergency management system. Understanding the boundaries of that system and how it interacts with other dynamics deemed to be external to that system is critical. It is clear from the responses to the “whole-of-government” inquiries (GCC, DMPC, 2017) leading to the lessons report following the Canterbury earthquake sequence that publics want to participate in problem solving and recovery from disasters, although improvements were needed in communicating decision making roles and responsibilities and managing public expectations.

One aspect which concerns us as community researchers is the lack of attention to the equity aspects of resilience, particularly around issues of access to resources, knowledge and its applications, as well as capacity and capability for recognizing and supporting or building resilience. The current definition of resilience used in the strategy places too much emphasis on response and recovery and needs to broaden its lens to the other two Rs in standard disaster management readiness and reduction. Many communities and their various characterizations have experienced natural hazards across New Zealand with enough awareness of the importance of increasing preparedness and reducing vulnerability. Our research indicates that if these community-based activities and initiatives are not supported and nurtured the existing community capability will diminish or at best remain the same.

A higher level of emphasis needs to be given to the intelligence and other resources within rural communities, such as networks and localized infrastructures. Some of these have been referred to as ‘soft infrastructure’ (Valance et al, 2017), such as community connectedness and initiatives for shielding against adverse events opening up policy discussions with central government (Vallance and Carlton, 2015; Wothersoon et al, 2018). International and local developments show that communities are making better use of social media and additional value of community connectedness can be enhanced through better local development of information systems. At the moment, much of the emphasis is on national level research and development with the key stakeholders who are seen as decision makers within policy and agency senior management. Stronger regionalization of knowledge networks and a much improved capacity to interact with local intelligence is needed.

One concern for making a real difference to the lives, livelihoods and communities exposed to natural hazards (especially those with less buffering of cities or infrastructure intensive areas) is the opportunity that events provide for ‘building back better’ and supporting improvements of dysfunctional connections and support for people. There are some instances where relationships are in good shape but others where isolation and limitations of access to resources to help people through create breaking points for a weak system. Understanding such conditions and how they are created can help put the right supports in place for people who need it most and to help communities strengthen their abilities to support the most vulnerable of their residents.

In regards to the challenges of over promising on disaster response and recovery following the Christchurch sequence of earthquakes, we believe the direction is now more clearly understood as building upon existing community capacity to become involved in resilience planning and risk reduction. The challenges remain in ensuring efforts are focused on social justice and address issues of access, knowledge, capacity and capability for increasing resilience and improving community resilience outcomes. Beyond the need to clearly communicate decision making and rationale that
incorporates public engagement and feedback, we feel the need to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of outcomes based on this feedback is critical to lasting improvement to resilience building.

Two further avenues in which the strategy could be improved are the strengthening of governance arrangements towards resilience building. These are identified in the whole-of-government lessons from Christchurch:

Lesson: Build in formal and regular review processes for the governance arrangements to ensure they continue to be fit-for-purpose, particularly as roles and responsibilities evolve.

Lesson: Dedicate and prioritise resources to manage partnership and interagency relationships at multiple organisational levels. (DPMC, 2017, p. 27).

Specific comments

Page 2

Definition of resilience offered up front needs to include the opportunity to change for the better in terms of social and environmental outcomes, otherwise run the risk of returning to normal which is inequitable and unsustainable.

Page 3

Some prioritizations need to go towards readiness and reduction. Whilst Civil Defence is a response and recovery Ministry, it is important to note that better responses and recovery come from the increased preparedness and risk reduction of communities. It is not clear how this aspects of disaster risk reduction will be realized as there is no other agency responsible for these other two elements of DRR. Thus, it is all the more important that the linking up with other areas of governing is recognized rather than ‘ring fencing’ CDEM disaster resilience activities.

Page 4

There is good use of the term capacity throughout the document, however reference to capability is missing. To be able to cope with an unfolding and uncertain future of disasters further consideration needs to be given to capability, adaptability and transformation – it may be useful to include these terms in the glossary.

Page 7

There is some inconsistency here with the document structure focusing on the first two Rs and giving limited attention to the latter two. This document needs to strengthen its articulation of delivery beyond a statement of purpose. It is difficult to find the means through which the ‘integration’ and ‘coordination’ activities are to be accomplished.

Encouraging ‘wide participation’ requires attention to details on how this might be achieved and how the inequities of access and types of knowledge utilized for understanding and responding to risk are realized.

The building of relationships and partnerships for increasing capability to coordinate and integrate a diversity of knowledge will need some structure. Capacity to learn from experience and take actions
to improve resilience outcomes requires the commitment of a range players will require good processes for decision making.

Page 8

The language of ring-fencing is not helpful for communities and individuals that experience disasters on top of existing inequities. A better approach here would be to describe coordination and cooperation with other resilience initiatives and activities in other policies and programmes.

Page 9

A greater focus on the strength and weaknesses of New Zealand’s current position on the OECD Better Life index could capture key elements of how the strategy can contribute to building back better.

This needs to play to NZ strengths in the OECD Better Life Index currently rated at 11/38 – highlighting where we rate well, e.g., health (1), community (3) and environment (6) – and building resilience through these to increase performance in other areas, e.g., work-life balance (29), safety (24) and housing (21) (http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/new-zealand/).

Page 10

Meeting the challenges of risk management and bringing together public and private sector contributions needs concerted effort. There is a need for structure and processes to enable such interactions at a level of commitment to community resilience that is led by the Better Life index and Living Standards Framework.

Page 12

Footnote 2 should be elevated to the main text and given more discussion.

Page 13

Some attention should also be given to those who disproportionately benefit from disasters and the responsibility to ensure that better social and environmental outcomes are derived from recovery efforts. This may not be something specifically directed by MCDEM, however the Ministry could become a conduit for raising awareness about the equitable distribution of recovery – as part of a leadership role – specifically with attention to those with fewer resources and access to knowledge or capacity to respond.

Page 18

Footnote 5 should be incorporated in the text much earlier in this section.

Page 20

The final paragraph on page 20 describes a vision where people have shared values and social norms. In an increasingly multicultural society, a single set of shared values and social norms may not be practical or wholly desirable. It would be better to have a vision for progress that accepts and allows for differences in values and social norms.

Objective 2
The text of Objective 2 does not appear to match the success description. Objective 2 should be revised to emphasise the need to enable community involvement and accountability as described in the success description.

Objective 3

It is unclear whether Objective 3 is talking about the awareness and capability among officials and managers or among the general public. If the former, Objective 3 should be revised to clarify whose capability is being referenced. If the latter, then Objective 3 should be better linked to Objectives 13-15 and place greater emphasis on enabling action over mere awareness.

Objective 4

Gaps are not the only way that policy can be a barrier to resilience. The objective should also include assessment and resolution of unintended consequences where existing policies, laws and institutional structures restrict or create disincentives for action.

Objective 5

Earthquake remediation is not the only way that existing infrastructure will require improvement. The description of success should include remediation of existing buildings and other infrastructure to address other hazards beyond those required for earthquake prone areas.

Objective 4

Gaps are not the only way that policy can be a barrier to resilience. The objective should also include assessment and resolution of unintended consequences where existing policies, laws and institutional structures restrict or create disincentives for action.

Objective 5

Earthquake remediation is not the only way that existing infrastructure will require improvement. The description of success should include remediation of existing buildings and other infrastructure to address other hazards beyond those required for earthquake prone areas.

Objective 6

While it is good to offer financial support for resilience building, it is wrong to assume that finances are the only barrier to action. Interventions to improve resilience must take into account the complex influences behind decisions and actions so as to provide appropriate and effective incentives and support. The success description refers to ‘funding and incentives’, implying that these terms are not interchangeable. The objective should make a similar distinction and mention non-financial incentives.

Objective 10

Either Objective 10 or a new separate objective should raise the importance of investing in local relationships and lines of communication before an event occurs and then, during a response, making use of local networks to facilitate responses.

Objective 14

The success description includes the sentence:

“More people are able to thrive through periods of crisis and change because they have a plan to get through an emergency that they regularly practise, and have emergency supplies that are regularly checked and updated.”

However, simplistic plans and emergency stockpiles are only the minimum standard for personal and household preparation. True success would be a much deeper level of preparation and resilience that includes planning for flexibility, adaptation, and resources for long-term recovery (beyond short-term stockpiles). Success would be better described as:

“More people are able to thrive through periods of crisis and change because they have adaptable plans to get through different emergency scenarios, access to regularly maintained resources to
draw upon in an emergency, and established networks of information and support in the short and long terms.”

Page 31

The ‘Theory of change’ is extremely vague and only minimally discussed. As such, it is not clear what benefit this adds. Greater articulation of the change desired, e.g., through the focus on the Living Standards Framework as a guideline for ensuring the development and accountability of resilience is needed. Perhaps this is something that needs to be better articulated as readiness and reduction – through the implementation of the strategy as a starting point. As it stands the emphasis is on response for CDEM and many of the suggested measures or indicators relate to other agencies, e.g., including land use planning, soil and water health and quality. This does seem a little cursory and would look vastly different for different stakeholders. It seems that the practice of this kind of tool needs to be something embedded in a range of activities.

Finally, the NDRS would be better to adopt the full UNISDR resilience definition that is inclusive of adapt to and transform for supporting necessary change or improvement to wellbeing, sustainability and social equity outcomes.

Resilience

The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management.

Further definitions for the glossary are given, based on the Sendai Framework (UNISDR).

UNISDR

Whilst there is acknowledged referral to the UNISDR, with a good development of many aspects, there are some areas of the strategy that could be strengthened. Specifically we suggest inclusion of the following definition would help position the strategy for a more forward thinking resilience for NZ. We believe NZ is well positioned to take a leadership role in regards to joining up top down and bottom up approaches to resilience.

We suggest the adoption of the UNISDR definitions including:

Building back better

The use of the recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phases after a disaster to increase the resilience of nations and communities through integrating disaster risk reduction measures into the restoration of physical infrastructure and societal systems, and into the revitalization of livelihoods, economies and the environment.

Capacity

The combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available within an organization, community or society to manage and reduce disaster risks and strengthen resilience.

Annotation: Capacity may include infrastructure, institutions, human knowledge and skills, and collective attributes such as social relationships, leadership and management.
Coping capacity is the ability of people, organizations and systems, using available skills and resources, to manage adverse conditions, risk or disasters. The capacity to cope requires continuing awareness, resources and good management, both in normal times as well as during disasters or adverse conditions. Coping capacities contribute to the reduction of disaster risks.

**Disaster risk governance**

The system of institutions, mechanisms, policy and legal frameworks and other arrangements to guide, coordinate and oversee disaster risk reduction and related areas of policy.

Annotation: Good governance needs to be transparent, inclusive, collective and efficient to reduce existing disaster risks and avoid creating new ones.

**Disaster risk reduction**

Disaster risk reduction is aimed at preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience and therefore to the achievement of sustainable development.

Annotation: Disaster risk reduction is the policy objective of disaster risk management, and its goals and objectives are defined in disaster risk reduction strategies and plans.

**Resilience**

The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management.

**Underlying disaster risk drivers**

Processes or conditions, often development-related, that influence the level of disaster risk by increasing levels of exposure and vulnerability or reducing capacity.

Annotation: Underlying disaster risk drivers — also referred to as underlying disaster risk factors — include poverty and inequality, climate change and variability, unplanned and rapid urbanization and the lack of disaster risk considerations in land management and environmental and natural resource management, as well as compounding factors such as demographic change, non disaster risk-informed policies, the lack of regulations and incentives for private disaster risk reduction investment, complex supply chains, the limited availability of technology, unsustainable uses of natural resources, declining ecosystems, pandemics and epidemics.

**Vulnerability**

The conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards.

Annotation: For positive factors which increase the ability of people to cope with hazards, see also the definitions of “Capacity” and “Coping capacity”.
References


Dear Sir/Madam

National Disaster Resilience Strategy – Draft for Consultation

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy 2018 (the draft strategy). These comments are made on behalf of the Canterbury Rural Advisory Group (RAG). This submission briefly outlines the role of the Canterbury RAG, followed by some general comments on the draft strategy and comments on specific objectives.

1. Canterbury Rural Advisory Group

The Canterbury RAG was initiated and is supported by the Ministry for Primary Industries, after a series of adverse events in Canterbury. The Canterbury RAG membership consists of representatives from key farming, primary sector and rural-based organisations, and is supported by representatives from local authorities and the Department of Conservation within Canterbury. The Canterbury RAG forms part of the Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) group: a representative from the Canterbury RAG has been invited to sit on several Canterbury CDEM Committees; and the RAG is formally recognised by Canterbury CDEM as a contributing organisation to CDEM.
The Canterbury RAG was formed after recent adverse events affecting rural Canterbury highlighted a gap in CDEM response in two ways:

i. The need to ensure any community-initiated response from rural organisations and the wider primary sector is co-ordinated across those groups and is consistent and targeted to needs; and

ii. To provide Canterbury CDEM with a single informed, reliable and recognised point of contact and source of information on issues and needs within the affected farming and rural community(ies).

Simply put; the Canterbury RAG’s establishment is an attempt to formally recognise and co-ordinate the exchange of information and resources between Canterbury CDEM and rural and primary sector organisations in relation to adverse events which affect farming and rural communities.

2. Defining Farming/Rural Communities

For the purpose of this document, we refer in our comments to farming communities being rural areas predominantly engaged in farming activities and the settlements which service them. We hesitate to use the term ‘rural communities’ because cities such as Christchurch and Auckland have a considerable peri-urban or rural-lifestyle population surrounding them. While these areas may be zoned Rural in the relevant district plans, people’s economic and social ties are often to the city and their lifestyle, skillsets, resources to hand, and need for and expectation of assistance in an adverse event, may be more akin to that in urban areas. We would not wish our comments in relation to farming communities to be construed as applicable to all Rural Zoned areas in Canterbury.

3. Comments on Draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy

3.1 Need to Identify Actions

Canterbury RAG agrees a review of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy is timely given the spate of recent adverse events and associated learning; and the review of CDEM in New Zealand. Given the role of the Canterbury RAG our comments are focused on the application of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy to farming communities.

Overall, the draft strategy is comprehensive and well-written. It focuses on describing resilience, and contains a vision, goal, objectives and outcomes. A strategy usually has a combination of objectives/outcomes and actions. We believe the strategy could be enhanced by providing more guidance on the work programmes and other actions which are envisaged to achieve the objectives. It is difficult to comment in any informed way on the priorities, objectives and outcomes of the strategy without knowing the actions and work programmes which are envisaged to achieve the objectives and outcomes; who will be responsible for those actions, how much they will cost, how they will be funded, and how they affect or interact with other central or local government policy and work programmes.
Identifying actions, even at a very general level, may also help clarify what is envisaged by some of the objectives and whether the objectives will be achieved through current actions or if new work programmes are required. It would also help clarify how objectives may be achieved that relate to matters which are beyond the powers and functions of CDEM under the CDEM Act 2002. For example, is Objective 5 - resilience to natural disasters is to be incorporated into development and investment practices especially in the built environment, to be achieved through further legislative changes or is it already being achieved through the recent amendments to section 6 of the Resource Management Act 1991 and the new Building Code requirements for Earthquake Strengthening?

**Suggestion:**
- Identify key actions or work programmes to implement the objectives in the draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy, including existing actions or work programmes that will be continued and any new actions or work programmes recommended.

### 3.2 Purpose of the Draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy

In our submission, the purpose of the draft strategy could be clearer; in particular the relationship between the general discussion about resilience in the draft strategy and CDEM in New Zealand. The draft strategy includes a comprehensive discussion about defining resilience and the foundation documents the Ministry has relied on in developing the concept of resilience. There is little introductory material on CDEM in New Zealand, and as such it is hard to see how the objectives for CDEM in the draft strategy relate back to the discussion on resilience or the ‘vision’ in section 2 and ‘goal’ in section 4.

Section 1 - Purpose of the Strategy (p.7) states ‘The purpose of the strategy is to outline the vision and long-term goals for CDEM in New Zealand’ (emphasis added). Section 1.2 (p.7) explains how the strategy is prepared under the CDEM Act 2002 and that this strategy will be the third such strategy. However the penultimate paragraph in the Foreword (p.2) describes the strategy as a ‘three-pronged approach to improve our nation’s resilience to disasters’ and the last paragraph states that the draft strategy ‘promotes a holistic approach to strengthening resilience’. The Foreword does not tie the strategy to the long-term goals and vision for CDEM in New Zealand. That goal and vision may be based on the principle of resilience but the purpose of the strategy is CDEM management.

**Suggestion:**
- Reword the Foreword to clearly identify that the draft strategy sets the long-term goals for CDEM in New Zealand, which is based on a principle of improving resilience to natural disasters.
3.2 Vision and Goal

The draft strategy contains both a ‘vision’ in section 2 and a ‘goal’ in section 4. ‘Our Vision’ in section 2 (p.9) relates to a vision of nationhood not a vision for CDEM. Similarly, the goal in section 4 (p.14) also relates to the state of resilience of the nation per se, not the long term management of CDEM in New Zealand. Given the purpose of the draft strategy as set out in Section 1.2, in our submission the vision and the goal should relate to the long-term management of CDEM and how that contributes towards the resilience of New Zealand to national disasters or adverse events. To that end we are not sure the draft strategy needs a vision and a goal, as well as objectives. However if the strategy is to have both a vision and a goal, we suggest:

- ‘Our Vision’ in Section 2 should relate to building New Zealand’s resilience to national disasters or adverse events; and
- ‘Our Goal’ in Section 4 should relate to how CDEM contributes to the vision of a disaster resilient New Zealand.

Suggestions:

- Combine ‘Our Vision’ (section 2) and ‘Our Goal’ (section 4) into one section so the relationship between the vision of resilience and the goal for managing CDEM are linked.
- Create one vision or goal for CDEM management in New Zealand along the lines of: CDEM in New Zealand enables and enhances the resilience of people and communities to adverse events.” Or
- Amend the ‘vision’ to read something along the lines of: “Our Vision: a nation which is resilient to adverse events (or national disasters);” and amend the ‘goal’ to read something along the lines of: “Our Goal: CDEM in New Zealand enables and enhances the resilience of people and communities to adverse events.”
- Put the material around the living frameworks in section 2 as an appendix.
- Delete section 4 and include the material on defining resilience in the new proposed section 2 and add a discussion as to how resilience relates to the long-term vision and goals for CDEM in New Zealand. For example, how the guiding principles in section 4.1.1 apply to CDEM in New Zealand.

3.3 Defining Risk

Key terms in the draft strategy include definitions of both disaster and hazard (p.4). Section 3.1 (p.11) of the draft strategy describes risks to our well-being and prosperity. Some of the examples cited in this section are not examples of events which have involved CDEM or would meet the definition of a disaster or even hazard as defined in the draft strategy, in that they are not incidents that have resulted in widespread damage or disruption. They have not involved a CDEM response. In saying this, we are not belittling these incidents in any way - they have been very traumatic for those involved, but it is confusing as to why they are cited in the draft strategy when they did not involve CDEM. For example, M. Bovis is being managed as a biosecurity issue; Pike River Mine Explosion is managed by the Police...
and Mines Rescue; and the ‘1080 Milk Powder scare’ was a criminal act. Juxtaposingly, no mention is made in the examples in section 3.1 of the 2014-17 Canterbury and Marlborough drought – which does meet the definition of a hazard in the strategy though again it did not involve a CDEM response.

Canterbury RAG agrees it is important to recognise a range of potential risks to our environmental, socio-cultural and economic systems especially when focusing on resilience; but we submit that section 3 in its current form is confusing given the draft strategy is a document prepared under the CDEM Act 2002 and relates to the long-term management of CDEM in New Zealand. We suggest it may be more helpful for section 3.3 to focus on adverse events which have involved CDEM at the forefront. The section could then include a paragraph on examples of other incidents which have the potential to create national disasters to make the point that a focus on resilience involves a wider net than just looking at CDEM response to floods and earthquakes; and explain that there is other legislation that deals with risk and response in New Zealand. To that end the draft strategy could include an objective on integration between agencies working under different legislation to build a co-ordinated approach to improving resilience to adverse events in New Zealand.

Suggestions:

- Focus section 3.1 on risks and adverse events that involve CDEM.
- Include a paragraph identifying other potential issues or hazards that may cause economic, social or environmental disruption and the other legislation and agencies that manage those risks.
- Include a new objective to develop a programme for co-ordination between CDEM and other agencies dealing with risk management in New Zealand.

3.4 Recognition of Rural/Farming Communities

While the draft strategy talks comprehensively about resilience in all communities and the CDEM objectives are potentially quite general in their application, the Canterbury RAG is concerned that CDEM in New Zealand is becoming urban-focused. While an urban and earthquake focus in CDEM is understandable given the spate of recent events, it is important to remember that adverse natural events affect farming and rural communities as well. New Zealand’s two most frequent adverse events are still flooding and drought; and the communities most frequently affected by those natural events are farming communities and the provincial townships that service and rely on them.

The Canterbury RAG wishes to take this opportunity to submit that CDEM needs to recognise that the risk awareness, resilience, and response and recovery needs in farming communities often differ from urban areas. Recognising and providing for these differences in CDEM means that the needs of farming communities are met and that CDEM can respond more efficiently and effectively with how and where it sources and targets resources.
From the Canterbury RAG’s experiences and observations of adverse events in Canterbury, some of those differences are described below:

(i) Farming communities tend to be more self-sufficient in providing water, food, energy alternatives to electricity, temporary accommodation, and access and infrastructure alternatives in an emergency. Doing it yourself is an essential part of farming life and the more remote the community the more self-reliant they tend to be.

(ii) Farming communities tend to have good community and communication networks. Those communities rely on local volunteers to make many things happen in day to day life so the volunteer networks already exist, and there is usually a strong ethos of helping one another.

(iii) Due to their local environmental knowledge, farming communities can often quickly identify where damage is likely to have occurred as a result of an adverse natural event in their area and who in their community is likely to be vulnerable, and make contact with them. As one farmer observed in the Hurunui-Kaikoura-South Marlborough Earthquake 2016, “we don’t need a whole lot of help; we just need Civil Defence to let us help ourselves.”

(iv) Farming communities tend not to have the same ready access to internet and cell phone communications as urban areas, and these tenuous communication links are often quickly lost in an adverse event. Electricity supplies can be down for days or weeks. Communicating essential information only through web-sites or text alerts is not helpful for many farming communities, yet increasingly it is being relied on as the main form of communication by central and local government, including in adverse events. However, farming communities are very good at passing information on once they get it, and they will gather for a local meeting.

(v) Many farming communities do not have a permanent GP, let alone access to mental health services. Like mana whenua, face to face communication and building trusting relationships is a core component for farming communities, with people they know and who understand their way of life. That is why the Rural Support Trust was established and works so well in supporting farming communities. These characteristics of farming communities need to be borne in mind when determining how to provide health services and resources to aid recovery in farming communities.

(vi) Because of the nature of farm work, some of the needs of farming communities in response to an adverse event will differ from urban communities. In particular, farming communities often identify as first priority needs things which an urban-based CDEM responder may identify as recovery rather than response. This is due simply to a lack of understanding of how farming works, and the implications for animal welfare if things cannot be done.
For example, in the Hurunui-Kaikoura-South Marlborough Earthquake in 2016, significant issues included: having no stockwater during hot weather; boundary fences down and livestock running away or lying injured; not being able to milk cows due to damaged sheds; being unable to get sheep dipped and treated to manage flystrike due to damaged yards and fences; not being to get lambs away for grazing or sale or heavy machinery in to cut baleage or sow crops due to how the Inland Kaikoura Road was being managed. To a non-farmer, such actions may seem to be motivated by greed - farmers wanting to just carry on and make money, and some farmers were labelled by CDEM responders as being ‘selfish and making trouble.’ However anyone with a farming background understands that one cannot just stop milking cows; it causes them considerable pain and distress and increases the risk of mastitis and other infections. Similarly sheep must be treated for flystrike immediately or they die a cruel death. In hot days livestock cannot be without water for more than a few hours so getting stockwater systems back up and running is a first priority for a farmer, and getting young livestock off-farm before summer is necessary or the farm will quickly run out of the green feed they need to grow.

Even close to urban centres, rural areas can create some unique challenges in adverse events. In the Port Hills fires in Christchurch in February 2017, it was through the assistance of North Canterbury Federated Farmers members and local farmers that the livestock on several lifestyle properties was able to be rounded up and moved. Emergency responders did not have the equipment (in this case sheep dogs) or skillsets to deal quickly with distressed livestock.

People who work in CDEM are not expected to know these things; but we need them to recognise and appreciate that they do not know about these things, and to be ready to accept information and expertise from those that do.

In our view, it is also important that in responding to natural adverse events the CDEM system recognises that rural areas have people too – rural areas are not just strips of unoccupied land that link urban areas. The single major criticism of the management of the Inland Kaikoura Rd in 2016 is that the road was managed by Canterbury CDEM and NZTA as an access route to Kaikoura and the needs of the local farmers and residents along that road were not met.

In our view, the National Disaster Resilience Strategy needs to recognise the different challenges of responding to and recovering from a natural adverse event in farming communities compared with urban centres. We submit that:

(i) the strategy should include objectives that ensue the needs of local communities in adverse events are determined by those communities; and

(ii) that in CDEM policies and procedures, consideration is given to the particular needs of rural and farming communities.
The strategy should acknowledge the specific needs of farming communities in response and recovery; and recognise the local knowledge and resources farming communities can provide to CDEM in an adverse event.

Suggestions:

- The draft strategy includes a section recognising the different culture and characteristics of urban, peri-urban and farming communities, and that CDEM is most effective when it respects and responds to those differences and empowers local communities to identify their needs.

- Additions and amendments to specific objectives and outcomes as identified in section 4 of this submission below.

3.5 Role of CDEM and 4Rs

The draft strategy commits to continuing the 4Rs model of CDEM but suggests looking at options for ensuring a more streamlined and consistent approach to CDEM nation-wide. The Canterbury RAG supports the use of the 4Rs model but we are unsure what is meant by ensuring more consistency in how the 4Rs are understood and delivered.

Within farming communities we believe it is essential that CDEM response and recovery remains flexible to the nature of each adverse event and the needs of the communities affected by it. Canterbury RAG would be concerned at any attempt to create a ‘one boot fits all’ definition of what constitutes response and what constitutes recovery in all times and all places. As already explained above, in farming communities what constitutes response has been identified by Canterbury CDEM as not being first response. In our view it is unhelpful to communities if the CDEM structure prevents them from getting on with things because those things are deemed by someone in CDEM to be recovery while CDEM is still in a response phase. In our submission that sort of approach undermines resilience by preventing people from helping themselves.

The Canterbury RAG supports a model whereby the needs of communities affected by an adverse event are identified by the leaders within those communities who have appropriate local knowledge, connections and respect; not by outside agencies who may have little or no knowledge of that community. In the 2016 Earthquake our farming community was overwhelmed by agencies offering provisions and help they did not need while “Team Ag” – the combined farming response, struggled to get to those farmers the resources and supplies they desperately wanted and repeatedly requested: pipes, troughs and pumps for stock-water, fencing gear, wood to shore up walls and buildings, veterinary supplies, diesel, access for stock trucks and workers etc; because it was not regarded by Canterbury CDEM as a response priority.
In our view, when it comes to response and recovery, the wider CDEM system should be primarily focused on delivering assistance to meet the needs of the community as identified by the community, not to define the community’s needs. We submit it is important that the people identifying the community needs and communicating them to CDEM are recognized and respected by CDEM in New Zealand as being competent to identify and appropriately prioritise those needs. Therefore we submit this approach needs to be formalised in the CDEM system.

Canterbury RAG has no view as to whether CDEM personnel should continue to be sourced primarily from territorial local authorities or whether there should be a ‘fly in’ squad of dedicated trained professionals; as long as community needs in an adverse event are identified by local community leaders. One observation we do have is that a major adverse event can be challenging for territorial local authority staff trying to juggle both repairing community infrastructure (water supplies, sewage, and roads) as well as managing a broader Civil Defence response. In the current system, staff from all areas of the council is involved in a civil defence emergency, not necessarily because they have the appropriate skillsets but because they work for the council. Bringing in staff from other local authorities to relieve local council workers can also be challenging if the replacements have no local knowledge and there is no handover of issues and information between shifts. To that end, a dedicated, trained ‘fly in’ squad to respond in a natural adverse event may strengthen the CDEM system; but in our view that ‘fly in’ squad needs to work in a system where local issues and needs are identified by the Mayor and other local community representatives. The ‘fly in’ squad focuses on working the CDEM system to respond to those needs; not over-riding local community leaders in deciding what the local needs are.

Suggestions:

- Any streamlining of 4Rs for national consistency must retain flexibility to respond to local situations and the needs of different communities.

- The identification of the needs of the affected communities should remain with local community representatives who have local knowledge and connections into and respect within local communities.

- The focus on CDEM should be on appropriating and delivering the resources and assistance needed to meet the needs of the community as identified by local community leaders.

- Consistency and surety in that community needs are appropriately identified and prioritised can be obtained by having a formal structure in CDEM that identifies the people who can officially advise CDEM in relation to community needs: eg Mayors and Council CEs, representatives of emergency services, the police and medical professionals, Rural Advisory Group representatives.

4. Objectives

4.1 Objectives 1-6 Managing Risk

Objectives 1 to 6 are laudable principles, but we submit that more information is needed from the Ministry on what sort of work programmers are envisaged to implement these objectives compared with
work already done now, who will do it, how much it will cost and who will fund it; and given the limited information available on the probability, magnitude and nature of many adverse events, how useful will such work be in improving risk identification, assessment and reduction. Both the Canterbury 2010 and Christchurch 2011 earthquakes occurred on faultlines not previously known; and while the 2016 earthquake occurred along the Hope Fault, it is our understanding that the simultaneous fault movements that occurred in that episode was a phenomenon that scientists had not considered.

Due to our geology, topography and climate, the potential for natural adverse events in New Zealand creates a very tall order for comprehensive assessment of the risk of any hazard, in any situation. There is simply not the information. Rather we suggest a strategy for prioritizing hazard risk assessment is more practical and that the priorities may differ between regions or districts depending on the adverse events which communities are most vulnerable. We also submit that work on risk awareness, risk management and risk reduction needs to be tailored to local situations. It would be nonsensical to require the same level of risk assessment, management and reduction from the effects of flooding, landslips and rockfall along a local road through a mountainous area accessing one or two farms, as one may employ in deciding to rezone and develop a hillside for residential development in a major city.

**Suggestions:**

- A work programme needs to be developed and costed for implementing objectives 1 and 6.
- Add an objective along the lines of:

  *Ensure risk awareness, risk management and risk reduction policies are appropriate given the natural environment of an area, the land uses undertaken and number of people residing in the area, and the risk of injury to people or damage to property.*

**4.2 Objectives 7-12 Response and Recovery**

We support Objective 7 in principle but question how it differs from the current CDEM approach. Isn’t the safety and well-being at the heart of what CDEM does now? The issue, we submit, centres more on who determines what is necessary for the safety and well-being of people and communities, based on what knowledge; and who decides what is an acceptable level of risk? To that end, we suggest the partnership approach with local iwi referred to on Objective 7 - *What Success Looks Like*, should be expanded to a commitment to a partnership with all local communities.

We submit the intent and meaning of Objective 8 is unclear. In particular, Canterbury RAG would be concerned at any strengthening of national leadership that equates to decisions on CDEM response and recovery being made increasingly from desks in Wellington without local knowledge or input. We also question what ‘consistent standards of care across the country’ means. As discussed in this submission, the diversity of both adverse events and the circumstances of the individuals and communities affected by adverse events, mean that in our view a ‘one boot fits all’ response to CDEM is inappropriate. We are
also concerned that decision-making imposed on local communities from a strong national leadership may detract from rather than build resilience if it removes the ability of people and communities to help themselves. We believe that Objective 9 already addresses the issue of understanding roles and responsibilities within the various levels of CDEM.

An additional matter that we submit should be addressed in objectives for risk and recovery relates to methods of communication in an adverse event; in particular ensuring CDEM and other agencies involved in adverse event response and recovery do not expect affected people and communities to rely on websites or cell phone texts to access important information.

We also suggest a new objective is added to the draft strategy to work collaboratively with other organizations involved in hazard response and recovery. Such an objective may be useful in trying to achieve a co-ordinated approach to disaster management and in helping build societal resilience to adverse events. This objective and associated actions may include more clearly identifying whether, when and how CDEM may have a role in adverse events managed primarily under other legislation such as biosecurity outbreaks, health pandemics, an environmental incident, or acts of sabotage or terrorism; any of which result in widespread economic, social or environmental disruption or degradation.

Suggestions:

- Rewrite Objective 7 along the lines of

  Implement measures to ensure the needs of local people and communities in an adverse events are identified by local communities and responded to by CDEM; and
  
  Ensure the CDEM approach is flexible and accommodating to meet the diverse needs of individuals and communities in responding to and recovering from an adverse event.

- Delete or clarify Objective 8.

- Add a new objective along the lines of:

  Ensure the communication of relevant information on response and recovery is readily accessible and that information can be accessed by people who have limited or no access to internet or cell phone coverage.

- Add a new objective along the lines of:

  Strategies are developed to identify the role and responsibilities for CDEM in potential hazards that are managed primarily under other legislation.

4.3 Objectives 13-18 Strengthening Societal Resilience

The draft strategy puts much focus on resilience. While Canterbury RAG supports the principle of resilience, we submit that the draft strategy paints a picture that New Zealand is not currently very resilient to adverse events. We wonder if that is the case, especially in an international comparison, and
we suggest the objectives should be focusing more along the lines of ‘strengthening’ resilience. To that end we disagree with Objective 13 to ‘build a culture of resilience.’ If anything, in some cases we think too much professionalism and standardization of CDEM may have the potential of undermining community resilience by taking decision-making out of local hands and removing local initiatives by people and communities to help each other. We submit that Objective 13 should be replaced with an objective to ensure that CDEM encourages resilience by enabling and supporting individuals and local communities to help themselves and each other in preparing for and responding to adverse events.

We support objectives 14, 15 and 17 but suggest the draft strategy should recognize that a culture of preparedness and social connectedness already exists in many farming, rural and small town communities. Objective 14 may not be worded quite right? ‘Promote and support prepared individuals, households, organisations and businesses’ could be read as meaning CDEM will not help those individuals and households who are not prepared? Perhaps the intent is to ‘Promote and support preparedness for adverse events among individuals, households, organisations and business?’

We are not sure what Objective 16 and a ‘whole of city, region or district approach to resilience’ means. We are also not sure what the advantages of a ‘whole of city, region or district’ approach are, given many adverse events occur within a part of a region or district while others span regions or districts. Perhaps the intention in Objective 16 is for local authorities to provide a comprehensive approach to resilience?

Suggestions:

- Rewrite Objective 13 along the lines of:
  “CDEM encourages and enables a culture of resilience, through supporting individuals and local communities to understand the risk of adverse events, be prepared for adverse events and to help themselves and each other in responding to and recovering from adverse events.”

- Rewrite Objective 14 as
  “Promote and support a culture of preparedness for adverse events among individuals, households, organisations and businesses.”

- Reword Objective 15 to read;
  “Recognise and support communities which have environments of strong social connectedness and cultures of mutual help; and cultivate an environment for social connectedness which promotes a culture or mutual help in communities which have less social connectedness, to help build community resilience.”

- Reword Objective 16 to refer to a comprehensive approach to resilience rather than a ‘whole city/district/region approach.’
We would like to be informed of any opportunity to speak in support of our submission or to provide further information.

Yours faithfully

Lynda Murchison

Co-Chairperson

Canterbury Rural Advisory Group

Contact: [redacted] or [redacted]
7 December 2018

National Disaster Resilience Strategy Submissions
Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6145

By email to: NationalStrategy@dpmc.govt.nz

**National Disaster Resilience Strategy**

**Submission from the New Zealand Lifelines (Utilities) Council**

We would like to make this submission on the "National Disaster Resilience Strategy, Draft for Consultation", undated but seeking submissions by the 7th December 2018.

Please note that the New Zealand Lifelines (Utilities) Council consists of a range of organisations. Not all of these organisations may be fully supportive of this submission and it is understood that where this is the case they may engage directly with the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC).

**The New Zealand Lifelines (Utilities) Council**

The New Zealand Lifelines (Utilities) Council (the “Council”) brings together key national utilities (Transpower, Spark, New Zealand Transport Agency, KiwiRail, Vector, First Gas and Water NZ), along with other organisations with an active interest in promoting infrastructure resilience (Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, the Earthquake Commission, the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment and GNS Science). This Council is particularly conscious of the dependence of social infrastructure and the community on infrastructure, consistent with the broader objective of developing more resilient communities and The Treasury Living Standards framework. The Council works to support regional lifelines activities, assist national lifelines utilities in their resilience work and is a connector with relevant government agencies in their resilience activities.

Lifeline Utilities have status and obligations under section 60 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, including the ability to function to the fullest possible extent (this may be at a reduced level), during and following an emergency. They also have responsibilities in the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015 across the 4Rs (reduction, readiness, response, and recovery), including on building operational resilience, developing business continuity plans, response planning, and exercising.
The New Zealand Lifelines (Utilities) Council is one of the few entities that have active insight and engagement across all sectors of energy, transport, telecommunications and water. We annually hold a National Lifelines Utilities Forum, this year attended by around 200 delegates and presenters across a broad range of infrastructure service providers, end-users and researchers. We actively ensure this Forum does not present a financial barrier to participation.

Context
The New Zealand Lifelines Council’s comments contained in this submission are largely based on work with infrastructure service providers, researchers and government agencies, leveraging vulnerability work together with the ground breaking, first ever, “New Zealand Lifelines Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment: Stage 1 (New Zealand Lifelines Council, September 2017).

The vulnerability of New Zealand’s economy, environment and society to adverse events has been well-established through actual events, hazard studies and national simulation exercises. While this work has focused in the main on natural disasters, crises can also develop from equipment failures and malicious intent.

The interconnectivity of all infrastructures now means that the potential for cascading effects across other infrastructure sectors is high.

The New Zealand Lifelines (Utilities) Council recognises that many of the infrastructure sectors risks, vulnerabilities and opportunities can be addressed through enhanced "business as usual" capacities and capabilities. New Zealand is currently lacking in mechanisms to mobilise these.

This Submission
As documented above, the views expressed in this letter are not necessarily those of individual organisations.

This submission is structured to respond directly to the Consultation questions.

1. Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

The New Zealand Lifelines (Utilities) Council strongly supports the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy.

The fact it is purposefully constrained to “disasters” both in the Cabinet paper and the Draft for Consultation is disappointing but respected.

Although resilience is covered in other government documents, having an overarching, up to date, accessible and visible National Resilience Strategy that takes a systems view would help drive New Zealand more quickly to where it needs to go.

It is hoped that the Government will apply future effort to a broader “National Resilience Strategy”. This would provide even greater support to regional infrastructure resilience work and, for
example, the New Zealand Lifelines Vulnerability Assessment” September 2017, undertaken by the New Zealand Lifelines Council.

2. Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

These comments are made with reference to the sections in the document under “Our priorities for improved resilience”, pages 22 to 28, and more specifically:
- Section 5. Managing risks,
- Section 6 Effective response to and recovery from emergencies, and
- Section 7. Strengthening societal resilience

The overarching comment is that the value and opportunities associated with infrastructure services should be more explicitly recognised and included.

The good performance of lifelines utilities and infrastructure services in a disaster is key to an effective response to and recovery from disaster e.g. to prevent the “flight” of resident populations and the associated undesirable impacts. We believe this opportunity could be handled in a more meaningful way in the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

Our view is that there are numerous ways that utility and infrastructure governance and management can be improved and strengthened to add to disaster resilience to the benefit of all New Zealanders. This is especially the case when one considers the cost of infrastructure with, for example, councils spending approximately 60 to 70% of their cash flows on infrastructure alone.

To be more specific:

a) The intent of the CDEM Act 2002 in regard to utilities and infrastructure being as resilient as possible needs to be proactively implemented by Territorial Local Authorities (TLA’s), infrastructure owners and Infrastructure operators.

b) Proposals for the creation of the new Independent Infrastructure Body are currently being developed by Treasury. A natural and core role of the new Independent Infrastructure Body could be the setting of standards for the management and operation of utilities and infrastructure and the proactive development of asset management skills capability in the infrastructure sector generally. This could include data management and standards that would be critical to inform robust decision making.

c) The government also has a major role to play in coordinating the understanding of risk and to facilitate the investment in resiliency in utilities and critical infrastructure. The oversight of this activity could also sit within the new Independent Infrastructure Body, or be an emergent new organisation based on the Treasury Infrastructure Unit but separated from Treasury, or be an enhanced role of the National Risk Unit in DPMC.

The Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management (MCDEM) should be funded and, very importantly adequately resourced, to develop a community level National Disaster Resilience Strategy (NDRS) implementation plan with a particular focus on materials and programmes for regional CDEM groups to implement.
The draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy sets out 18 objectives under three headings - managing risks, effective response to and recovery from emergency, and strengthening societal resilience. We propose that these be repackaged into three separate programmes:

A. Risk and Resiliency
B. Utility and Infrastructure Governance and Management – potentially part of the new Infrastructure Body (In this form it could then be easily considered / adopted by this new body).
C. Improving Societal Resilience – MCDEM

3. Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

**Managing risks**
Highly support all objectives and success factors. Particularly important is inclusion of “Understand the economic impact of disaster and disruption, and the need for investment in resilience. Identify and develop financial mechanisms that support resilience activities”. Collectively the stated objectives should expose and reveal the importance of infrastructure not only in exposure but also mitigation and adaptation.

**Effective response and recovery from emergencies**
Highly support all objectives and success factors. Of particular note is that embedding a strategic approach to recovery planning would very clearly include being better prepared in advance to reinstate infrastructure services at the household through to national infrastructure level with tools and surge capability immediately available. In many ways, we could be in a low level state of recovery at all times, be deploying and learning at small scales and being better prepared to react for large scale.

**Strengthening societal resilience**
Highly support all objectives and success factors. Most appropriately infrastructure services are identified as a strong contributor to societal resilience and Objective 18 refers to “Address the capacity and adequacy of critical infrastructure systems, upgrade them as practicable, according to risks identified.” The New Zealand Lifelines have been endeavouring with limited resources to pursue these ambitions for many years but dispersed and unclear responsibilities across government including the Ministry of Civil Defence are frustrating and fail to appreciate the new challenges presented by infrastructure interdependencies, increasing exposure to hazards, cascading effects and societal impacts. Unfortunately, the current proposed scope for the new Independent Infrastructure Body does not include this.

4. Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in the governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim? We would also appreciate your views if you disagree with this proposition.

There is no need to involve a broader range of stakeholders in governance of the strategy.

The strategy advocates strongly for relationship and partnership building. The New Zealand Lifelines Council totally supports this and will continue to be one of the strong partnering entities.
However this is different to the “governance of the strategy”. Providing the relationship and partnership building is truly implemented this will provide confidence, demonstrate action and contribute to subsequent enhancement of the strategy through regular reviews.

Currently the proposed strategy is understandably light on analytics and measurement, both key to achieving demonstrable action. It is considered critical that the metrics and monitoring of progress (Section 8.) are established quickly and that transparent public reporting be strictly adhered to at no greater than 2 yearly intervals.

It is highly recommended there be a willingness to review the strategy at 5 years rather than 10 years as currently prescribed. This is suggested on account of the increasingly dynamic environment we are experiencing.

5. Are there particular strengths of the proposed strategy that you would like to comment on?

Two particular strengths of the proposed strategy are:

1) The application of the New Zealand Treasury Living Standards Framework and “The Four Capitals” of Natural Capital, Social Capital, Human Capital and Financial/Physical Capital, and

2) Figure 2, page 17, “Model of a Resilient Nation” as extremely well and succinctly representing the resilience components. Particularly notable are the concentric semi-circles spanning “Resilient Homes, Families & Whanau” through to “Enabling, Empowering & Supportive Government” as resilience does depend on one's perspective – the authors are to be very much commended for this foresight.

6. Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?

No specific gaps relative to the current strategy. New challenges are appropriate and are supported.

Specific Comments

Foreword, last sentence, delete surplus “... of ...”

Page 7, section 1.2 – great to see work underway “to develop a national risk register”. This is well overdue and will very much help inform future priorities and activities.

Page 11, section 3. Risks to our wellbeing and prosperity – this section is very well considered. In particular we note reference to “just-in-time supply chains” and “How our risks may change in the future”.
Page 15, section 4.2 Resilience: a working definition – the systemic nature of risks is totally appropriate and provides the foundation to many of the comments the New Zealand Lifelines Council is making in this submission.

Page 17, under “… has infrastructure, services …” – should include reference to telecommunications.

Page 37, Recommend subtitle to be edited to “Make resilience a strategic objective and embed it in appropriate actions, plans and strategies”

Page 37 under Businesses and organisations, recommend addition of a new subtitle along the following lines:

**Supply chain vulnerability**

Seek specific advice and assurances from suppliers as to their business continuity plans, stock carrying policies, exposure to non-supply and supply chain alert processes.

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**Summary**

The New Zealand Lifelines (Utilities) Council strongly supports the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy”. There are certain recommendations made to enhance translation of the strategy to measurable actions and to improve recognition of the substantial contribution of infrastructure to wellbeing metrics.

We would appreciate the opportunity to meet with you to brief you in more detail on matters we believe are important and should be addressed.

Yours sincerely,

Roger Fairclough
Chair
New Zealand Lifelines (Utilities) Council

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NZ Lifelines Council – National Disaster Resilience Strategy
Hi

See submission below. You may have a valid reason to ignore this.

Enjoy the end of another year - and the promise that a New Year always brings!

Best wishes
Woody

SUBMISSION on the proposed National Resilience Strategy, by Peter R Wood - as public citizen.

GENERAL SUBMISSION POINTS:

1. While I endorse, laud, and indeed promote the intent evident in the draft National Resilience Strategy, I find it reads more like a thesis than a strategy. In my view the strategy could be split into a "Backgrounder" and a "Strategy". The latter may then benefit from greater succinctness and clarity of purpose.

2. I commend the 2016 "Biosecurity 2025 Direction Statement for New Zealand's biosecurity system" as a similar but clearer 'strategy' that fits the 'strategy' requirements of the CDEM Act.

3. I was lost towards the end of the Introduction, and in the subsequent body of the draft, when I could not identify the Priorities (later found in the small lettering of page 22 to be:

1. Managing risks;
2. Effective response to and recovery from emergencies;
3. Strengthening societal resilience). These three priorities (rather than "prongs") could be made far clearer by rewording of the following Introduction paragraph, from -

This Strategy proposes a three-pronged approach to improve our nation's resilience to disasters - what we can do to minimise the risks we face and limit the impacts to be managed, building our capability and capacity to manage emergencies when they do happen, and a deliberate effort to strengthen our wider societal resilience.

to -

This Strategy proposes three Priorities (each with six objectives) to improve our nation’s resilience to disasters: 1. Managing risks - what we can do to minimise the risks we face and limit the impacts to be managed; 2. Effective response to and recovery from emergencies - building our capability and capacity to manage emergencies when they do happen, and 3. Strengthening societal resilience - a deliberate effort to strengthen our wider societal resilience.

1. 
2. 
3. 
4. The repetitive use of the collective "We" abdicates responsibility from any one or any agency, so how will strategic actions be promoted, encouraged, and supported (by who)?
5. The responsibility of the Minister is not acknowledged (s31 CDEM Act); it should be.
6. There is no (useful) acknowledgement of the increasing resilience actions by a number of agencies (e.g. the EQC Resilience Strategy, the Resilience Programme of LINZ, the growth of Community Hubs by CDEM Groups - at least by WREMO, the increasing resilience of lifeline utilities, etc).

7. Good that the science programmes addressing DRR and resilience are acknowledged.

8. One entity named in the draft Strategy may not be known by most readers outside of the core State Service entities is - “the Hazard Risk Board” - will that Board have responsibilities for the Strategy (has it already endorsed the draft?). Add an appropriate reference (URL?) to the Hazard Risk Board.

9. There are many statements that “praise the quality of life in New Zealand” - but some are provocative, e.g. “We are a first world nation that has comprehensive education, health, and social welfare systems, which build our people and look after the most vulnerable in society.” However, recent Government Reports and releases (of this week) suggest otherwise, e.g. Tomorrows Schools Independent Task Force; The Inquiry into Mental Health and Addiction; Housing New Zealand's Meth Assistance Programme for those in social housing evicted needlessly; Housing shortages, affordable housing, Social Welfare matters, etc. ...

10. The repetitive use of "...first world country .." is an unfortunate, provocative, and for some international commentators an outdated term from the era of the cold war.

11. I fear that the National Resilience Strategy with its holistic, all of society (socialist), approach may be unpalatable for some in the House of Representatives to accept (s35 of the CDEM Act), this may impede implementation.

12. The reference in 'Current States', 'Strengths 5 We have a very high insurance penetration' is not in context, EQC’s 98% only addresses residential property, that should be noted. Also, this current state is already changing as insurers are increasing premiums in perceived higher risk areas of New Zealand following the realities following the Canterbury and Kaikoura earthquakes. Property owners are already considering not carrying insurance. The strategy should note this.

13. The statement on Governance is remarkable for not spelling out all existing governance mechanisms; I recommend expanding, at least to the government agencies of the wider State Sector, in some way, to improve understanding of where/how responsibilities lie in the following -

"8.2 Governance of this strategy
The Strategy will be owned and managed by existing governance mechanisms, including those through the National Security System, and at a regional level by CDEM Groups."

Consultation questions

1. Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

1. YES, I agree with the purpose, vision, and goal. However, under the mandate of the CDEM Act, the Strategy is the Crown's Strategy. On reading the Draft National
Resilience Strategy I found it very difficult to find a clarity of purpose, vision and goal in the draft strategy because of being swamped in a sea of words of good social intent but with few actionable items or commitments to action - by the principle owner - the Crown. The use of the collective "we" reduces, even removes, responsibility from any one person or any one agency.

2. I have not been able to find the roadmap of actions nor a reference to it - yet it is referred to in - "The Strategy provides the vision and strategic direction, including to outline priorities and objectives for increasing New Zealand’s resilience to disasters. The detail of how those objectives are to be achieved sits in a roadmap of actions, alongside other related key documents including the National CDEM Plan and Guide, the National Security Handbook, CDEM Group Plans, and a range of other supporting policies and plans". Is this to be a future 'measurable target' (s31.2.c CDEM Act)?

3. I cannot find, in the public domain, any reference to a National Risk Register (other
than financial ...). I recommend deleting this reference OR make it a measurable target to be achieved.

2. Do you agree with the priorities of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

1. The priorities are okay, but the 2025 and 2030 goals are too far out (and, if climate change mitigation actions are not already in action before those dates then this National Resilience Strategy may be but a historical reference .... ).

2. The priorities should acknowledge the advances since 2002 (the CDEM Act enactment) and the work already being undertaken domestically and globally on all six priorities. New Zealand is not starting from a zero resilience baseline.

3. Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what
changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.

1. The objectives do not acknowledge the advances since 2002 (the CDEM Act enactment) and the work already being undertaken domestically and globally on all three priorities and their six objectives. New Zealand is not starting from a zero baseline.

4. Do you agree that a broader range of stakeholders needs to be involved in governance of the strategy? If so, what ideas do you have for achieving this aim? We would also appreciate your views if you disagree with this proposition.

   1. YES, a broad range of stakeholders need to be involved in governance, in a tiered approach, such as A. DES; B. ODESC; C. Hazard Risk Board; D. CE's of all other State Service agencies (to have an annual monitoring/reporting responsibility).

5. Are there particular strengths of the proposed
strategy that you would like to comment on?

1. No, rather I am concerned it’s high ideals may not be palatable by the House of Representatives at this time.

6. Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy current strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?

1. No, the proposed strategy is so broad that it encompasses most everything!

END of submission
Wellington Region Emergency Management Office (WREMO):
Submission on Draft National Disaster Resilience Strategy (NDRS)

Overview

Overall we think this is a well written document that sets a new direction for emergency management. The reference to the Sendai Framework is an important and positive step. The gaps we have identified mainly relate to the ‘line of sight’ between the other documents that support the NDRS and how CDEM directly influences the four capitals. The four capitals do not appear to be a good fit for measuring the success of the NDRS as it is heavily reliant on other sectors. Both risk and resilience are not mentioned in any of the four capitals.

We think it would be helpful to clarify if the intent of this document: is it to compliment or replace the 4R’s? (there appears to be some confusion).

Foreword

We note that the definition of resilience given in the Foreword is different to that outlined in the Key Terms. In the Foreword, the ‘ability to anticipate’ (ie intelligence) is included. However, this is not included in the Key Terms definition. Is this an oversight? Given the variety of definitions that already exist, we think a consistent definition should be used throughout the document to help reduce confusion. The definition should also align with the general direction of the Sendai Framework and the Emergency Management Sector Reforms.

Key Terms

We note that there is no definition for Reduction – even though this is one of the key areas of Sendai, Disaster Risk Management and the Emergency Management Sector Reforms. It also features prominently in section 3.5. We think there should be such a definition given the significance of the 4R’s and the stronger emphasis on reduction going forward.

We also note that some of the definitions listed in the Key Terms are different to the definitions that have been used previously (eg 4R’s definitions). Is this a conscious decision? If so, given the significance of the 4R’s, we think there should probably be conversations or material produced to understand the significance of the changes.

Our Vision and Goal

1. Purpose of this strategy

Overall we think this all reads well and makes sense. It would be good to add a definition of what the ‘disaster aspects of resilience’ (section 1.3) are, as this is the scope of the NDRS. Additionally, a statement emphasising why we are making this shift and that it will require the practices and emphasis that are currently in place to be reconsidered and reprioritised.

2. Our vision: a safe and prosperous nation

The four capitals, in our opinion, are not a good fit. The clear influence of emergency management is not clear and is hidden amongst these. This makes it difficult to see the true
value of the work and influence of the sector. The reference to wellbeing and prosperity is tenuous and does not add clear value (more work on this required if it is to be used). The *Model for a Resilient Nation* (section 4.2.4) is much more relevant and clearly articulates our sector’s influence. It would be able to measure progress within this. If there has to be a link to the four capitals, then another diagram aligning the *Model for a Resilient Nation* to the four capitals (as has been provided to WREMO staff previously) should be included.

3. **Risks to our wellbeing and prosperity**

Our current risks are referred to in section 3.1 but not listed in detail. Nor is there a clear correlation between the risks and the strategy. In Group Plans, the risk assessment is required to influence the strategy and this influence is to be shown. This may be in another document somewhere. If so, there should be a reference to it and an indication of where to find it. After all, section 5 talks about identifying, prioritising and managing risk, but there does not appear to be any evidence of this being done in this document.

4. **Our goal: a resilient future**

This section is well written and the *Model for a Resilient Nation* is an excellent inclusion. We are supportive of the addition of Cultural resilience, Governance and the emphasis on underpinning this with an evidence base. However, in section 4.2, the blue circle definition of resilience excludes anticipation, while the paragraph next to it includes it. Once again, we think there needs to be consistency here and it needs to be consistent with other parts of the document.

Section 4.5 is a good summary. We suggest strengthening the second paragraph to emphasise that current CDEM practices need to evolve to address these future challenges through a co-creation process with communities. This begins with what skills sets we want to attract to the sector and how we build the capability to achieve these future goals.

**Our priorities for improved resilience**

Overall we think the three priorities are well written. It would be good to see how these objectives link to and influence the *Model for a Resilient Nation* and the four capitals. We also think there is an opportunity to reference other documents that provide more detail on the ‘how’ and the responsibilities of key partners in delivery - as the ‘how’ is important for those who need to support these objectives and outcomes.

5. **Managing Risks**

While the general content of this section is fine, we think there should be much stronger emphasis on anticipation (ie intelligence) to help inform decision-making in this area. Not only is this international best practice but it is consistent with the direction of the Emergency Management Sector Reforms.

6. **Effective response to and recovery from emergencies**

While the “whole-of-society” approach is excellent, we think the title “effective response to a recovery from emergencies” is at odds with the following content of the “what we want to
see” part which talks about “a seamless end-to-end emergency management system”, “4R’s” and “having the chance to reduce the impacts before they get out of control”. Indeed, the content of the whole section appears to suggest that the section is about “response” in the broadest (reduction, readiness and response) sense, along with recovery. If this is the case, then we think the section should perhaps be re-titled: *a seamless end-to-end emergency management system* or something similar which more accurately reflects that it covers all 4R’s.

Given the “whole of society approach” that is outlined and the wide range of actors that are involved, we think this section could be strengthened by emphasising that the sector needs to evolve to be able to play more of a facilitation role across the 4R’s. We also note that there does not appear to be a direct reference for the CDEM sector to prepare for, link to and support (ie work with) the inevitable organic community response and recovery. We think this a key oversight.

7. **Strengthening societal resilience**

In Objective 13 we suggest adding *empowerment* after education, via a community partnership approach to emphasise that CDEM needs to find ways to proactively create a more empowered community approach across the 4R’s. Apart from that, we are very supportive of the collective impact approach.

**Our Commitment to action**

8. **Our commitment to action**

We think more can be done in this section to change the emphasis from producing a strategy to the effective implementation of one. The following quotes could perhaps be used as a basis:

- Without strategy, execution is aimless
- Without execution, strategy is useless
- It’s not just about what you do but about the way in which you go about it
- It’s all about relationships

If one accepts that strategy is the ways in which desirable ends are achieved with the available means (ie an ends, ways, means approach) then to effectively deliver a national strategy one not only needs to know what means are available, but also have the buy-in of those who are responsible for implementing it. Given the complexity of the environment and way in which knowledge and experience can now be gained through the internet, this requires a truly collaborative approach. While this may mean that some things take longer to achieve as a result, the benefit of doing so is that they are more likely to be fit-for-purpose once completed and are more likely to have the support of others when it comes to getting things done.

**Transparency and social accountability**

While transparency is key to this process - as it helps reduce suspicion and helps build trust and confidence – so too is the ability to have open and honest conversations. This includes
being willing and able to have difficult conversations as and when they are required, and being genuine and authentic in all interactions with others – regardless of where they are in the system as the system requires all to play their part in the strategy if it is to be truly successful.

**Governance**

We note that the document states that the strategy will be owned and managed by existing governance mechanisms, including those through the National Security System and at a regional level by CDEM Groups. If effective strategy implementation requires effective governance, how do we know that the existing mechanisms are fit-for-purpose?

We note that the *Model of a Resilient Nation* identifies Governance as a key component of the model, yet the document (section 8.2) only attributes one sentence to it. We think this a major deficiency and something that requires more work. If we accept that the strategy is, ultimately, a multi-year programme of work comprising of various projects with various stakeholders (or “partners” if we want to be truly collaborative), then we think the strategy should also include content on introducing or developing effective project and programme management skills at all levels as part of the gradual professionalisation of the sector. If the effective implementation of the strategy is dependent on these skills, then we think the introduction or development of these skills should be done as a matter of priority.

**Measuring and monitoring progress**

Recognising that this is a new area and that the measuring of progress is under development, good programme management requires a clear ‘line of sight’ to be identified between the current state and the future state. To do this, one needs to have a good understanding of what both states look like (noting that thinking can evolve over time) and the ability to measure progress over time. With the four capitals we think it is very easy for individual sectors (such as emergency management) to be lost amongst all other sectors and to lose sight of emergency management actually is and how it contributes to the whole. This being the case, we think this is an area that requires more work.

There is also reference to a *National Disaster Resilience road map*. What is this? Where is it?

**Appendices**

In closing, we think there is an opportunity to include more information on or from other relevant documents in the appendices such as the relevant risk assessment document, the MCDEM Business Plan (which does not appear to be mentioned in the strategy even though it is presumably the means through which the strategy will be implemented on an annual basis) and relevant DGLs.

This document does not stand alone. We think it is important to recognise this and it be captured in the overall narrative.
Tēnā koutou,

It is the opinion and concern of the New Zealand Archaeological Association that the National Disaster Resilience Strategy does not adequately consider the effect of disasters on New Zealand’s heritage.

The Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga Act 2014 and its predecessor, the Historic Places Act 1993, provide blanket protection to all archaeological sites, specified in the recent act as “any place in New Zealand, including any building or structure (or part of a building or structure), that –

(i) was associated with human activity that occurred before 1900 or is the site of the wreck of any vessel where the wreck occurred before 1900; and

(ii) provides or may provide, through investigation by archaeological methods, evidence relating to the history of New Zealand;”

Any works that may damage or modify an archaeological site require the grant of an archaeological authority by Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga under Section 44 of the act. Archaeological recording is a regular requirement of these authorities, as the archaeological record is a finite resource, and there is only ever one opportunity to excavate and record archaeological remains.

Both archaeological sites, as specified under the legislation, and other significant heritage places are vulnerable to the effects of natural disasters, both due to the destruction of built structures and to the need for subsequent earthworks for repair and reconstruction.

The 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes provide a case study for how heritage is affected in the face of a national disaster. An expedited system of granting archaeological authorities was developed under the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011, but Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga was unprepared both in terms of resources and previous experience to deal with the volume of authority requests and unauthorised works that would occur over the next several years.

In the aftermath of the earthquakes, several hundred historic buildings were demolished, often without the required authority or prior recording that is a regular condition of archaeological authorities. Christchurch City Council’s Draft Heritage Strategy 2019-2029 states that “almost half of the central city’s protected heritage buildings, and more than a third of all protected heritage buildings in Christchurch, were demolished”, amounting to 204 of 588 protected buildings lost. In addition to these hundreds of other unlisted and unprotected 19th century buildings have been lost, the exact
numbers of which are not known. Many of these buildings were demolished unnecessarily, and could have been repaired or saved.

Numerous subsurface archaeological deposits were also destroyed as part of the post-earthquake works. The true loss of heritage fabric and archaeological remains in the city is not known, but includes the complete destruction of hundreds of archaeological sites. The Christchurch Cathedral, still in a state of partial ruin as a result of the quakes, remains a powerful symbol of the heritage that the city has lost.

The draft resilience strategy considers tikanga and kaitiakitanga guiding principles (Section 4.1.1) and the need to “guard and protect the places that are special to us.” However, this neglects to include New Zealand’s unique heritage places in these principles. These places are physical manifestations of the memory of society, and can serve as markers of history, and the challenging events New Zealand has weathered. Greater consideration of how these places would be of significance in terms of social resilience, cultural resilience, and the resilience of the built environment should have been included in the production of this strategy.

Consequently, the strategy insufficiency considers the risk of disasters to heritage or the archaeological record, and does not appear to have taken into consideration lessons from recent disasters in Canterbury and on the Kaikoura coast regarding the effects of disasters on heritage.

The New Zealand Archaeological Association lauds the goals of the strategy, and the need for resilience in the face of a national disaster, but urges the New Zealand government to consider the importance of heritage and its role as kaitiaki of these places, which act as symbols of that resilience. It also urges the government to better plan for the ways in which this heritage can be protected and preserved in the face of disaster.

The New Zealand Archaeological Association therefore recommends that the National Disaster Resilience Strategy include greater provision and consideration of the value of heritage in resilience, in particular including heritage under the kaitiakitanga section of Section 4.1.1 “Guiding principles for this Strategy”.

Ngā mihi,
Tristan Wadsworth
Submissions Officer
New Zealand Archaeological Association
PO Box 6337
Dunedin 9059
National Disaster Resilience Strategy

submission

David Wither
PhD Candidate
University of Otago | Centre for Sustainability

Email: 
Mobile:

Scope of this submission

I am a PhD student and a member of the rural and cultural teams of the Resilience to Nature’s Challenges National Science Challenge. The rural team is submitting a collective submission and this submission should be considered supplementary to that. It should be noted that this submission was written and reviewed solely by myself and should not be considered an opinion of the wider challenge (I am currently in the middle of fieldwork, and this was written last minute). The aim of this submission is to support the language around societal resilience - building upon the rural team’s submission. At the end there is also a suggestion on one way to begin to rural proof the strategy.

Maintaining the language around societal resilience

The comment made by the rural team’s submission, as quoted below, sets the scene for the point to be made here.

We highly commend the emphasis throughout the strategy on the need for building social resilience. As drafted the strategy uses a progressive interpretation of resilience which goes some way towards addressing the main critiques of this concept. We note that this allows the strategy to be guided in part by the need to answer the key questions: resilience of what, to what, why and how? Recognising that resilience is socially contingent also requires addressing the question of ‘resilience for whom?’ and to what end, connecting the socially, culturally and economically determined features of society that enable or constrain resilience. While the emphasis in the strategy is on the external hazards that impact society, the strategy is in line with current scientific and international policy developments in that it highlights the need for understanding the internal social dynamics of communities, regions, activities and institutions which may affect the degree to which disturbances result in adverse societal effects.

(p.2-3 Rural team NDRS submission)

In addition to the excellent points made above, the emphasis on social resilience in the strategy is particularly exciting from a student/researcher point of view because it provides
legitimacy to a new and challenging area of research within a New Zealand context. While the academic concept of ‘social ecological resilience’ heavily emphasises the importance of social resilience, research in the area is sparse and extremely context dependent, and the New Zealand context is unique. The signposting of the importance of social resilience in the Sendai Framework (international), the NDRS (National), and academic literature provides strong incentive for continuing research in this area in New Zealand.

It should also be noted that the notion of social resilience is strongly aligned with the current governments focus on wellbeing, as well meshing nicely with the Treasuries Living Standards Framework. The Sendai Framework emphasises the importance of an “all-of-society and all-of-State institutions engagement” (p.5, Foreword, Sendai Framework). In this context, New Zealand occupies a somewhat unique position where both government policy priorities and scientific research are strongly aligned, allowing for a unique partnership between science and policy in this particular area. This could be internationally significant as New Zealand is a small country with a strong history of, and reputation for, rapid change and leading the world in certain areas (eg Women’s suffrage). Research into social resilience, combined with the governments focus on wellbeing and the living standards framework could provide a unique case study and demonstration of what an “all-of-society and all-of-state institutions engagement” might look like.

Some criticisms that may be received around the notion of ‘social resilience’ would be questions about ‘what it actually means’, or accusations of it being impractical, unrealistic or idealistic - ‘airy fairy’ so to speak. These arguments should not prompt the removal of references to the importance of social resilience from the strategy. While those questions may not be able to be answered with firm certainty at this current point in time, it’s inclusion will help ensure that research is conducted which will be able to provide those answers in time. It should also be noted that removal of the language around social resilience could have a significant negative impact, whereas there is no similar negative possibility by keeping the language in there. Thus, there is good reason to keep it, and no good reason to remove it.

Rural proofing the strategy

This point addresses question 5 of the consultation questions “Are there any gaps or challenges with the current national civil defence emergency management strategy that are not addressed by the proposed strategy?”

I would strongly recommend emphasising and strengthening the language around the importance of protecting people’s livelihoods within the strategy, especially in a rural context. This is already signposted in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction expected outcome and goals section, where specific mention is paid to reducing losses in livelihoods.

While some progress in building resilience and reducing losses and damages has been achieved, a substantial reduction of disaster risk requires perseverance and persistence, with a more explicit focus on people and their health and livelihoods, and regular follow-up. Building on the Hyogo
Framework for Action, the present Framework aims to achieve the following outcome over the next 15 years:

**The substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries.**

(p.13 Sendai Framework/Expected Outcomes and Goals)

To explain: from a rural point of view (and in context of the need to rural proof the strategy), a focus simply on people’s lives is not enough, you also need to look at their livelihoods.

One thing that has come out quite strongly in my fieldwork is that farmers will not leave their stock. They love their animals, and their livelihoods depend on them. Following the 2016 Hurunui-Kaikoura earthquake, most of the attention was focused on making sure the people were ok, but no provisions were made for stock. This was particularly problematic as the earthquake hit at the apex of a four-year drought, and significant damage was done to water storage tanks. While the results of my study are yet to be published, I can say with certainty that I have had a significant number of farmers and local representative discuss the importance of, and harm caused by, animal welfare issues during the disaster period.

I understand that from an urban point of view, a focus on people’s animals is not a priority. However, as this quote from the rural team’s submission to the NDRS explains, rural communities differ significantly from their urban counterparts.

> We note that there are only passing references to the resilience of rural communities and regions. Rural environments differ significantly from their urban counterparts in ways that directly impact disaster management. Populations are usually dispersed across more or less accessible landscapes, which can leave them more exposed to the impacts of compounding natural hazards (such as earthquakes and landslides, or volcanic ash-fall and subsequent lahars, etc.), and / or post-disaster isolation for prolonged periods of time as a result of infrastructure damage.

(p.6 Rural team submission to the NDRS)

As it currently stands, there are three mentions of livelihoods in the current proposed strategy, on Page 2, 4 and 11. None of these discuss the importance of helping protect people’s livelihoods, rather the focus is on rebuilding livelihoods during the reconstruction phase, post disaster, or it is descriptive in terms of how disasters impact people. It would be extremely useful to sign post the importance of helping protect livelihoods during a disaster, and in the direct aftermath, such as happened following the 2016 Hurunui/Kaikoura earthquake. This would have a significant positive impact on the resilience of our rural communities and help restore/build trust between rural communities and government responses to disasters.
[UNCLASSIFIED]

Kia Ora,

Great job on the National Disaster Resilience Strategy. I’ve just had a read through, and wanted to make a quick submission:

- I think the wording of objective 15 is unclear in terms of what action can be taken from this objective.

- I also think there is an opportunity to encourage the use of, and encourage participation in, participatory governance to increase resilience. For example, objective 16 writes for a whole of city/district/region approach to resilience, but disasters are inherently local and require a local perspective to increase resilience, particularly in rural communities where community members are likely to be the first line of response. Involving communities in resilience decision-making is an effective way of increasing this resilience. Another example is on page 38 of the draft, community members could be encouraged to participate in participatory governance, and pages 39 and 40 could more explicitly advocate for including community members in decision-making processes.

I hope these suggestions make sense! Very much looking forward to the final strategy.

Cheers,

Alistair

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1. **INTRODUCTION**

1.1. Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu (Te Rūnanga) thanks the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (the Ministry) for the opportunity to formally respond to the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy (the proposed Strategy).

2. **GENERAL STATEMENT**

2.1. Te Rūnanga endorses the general purpose of the proposed Strategy, to ensure that all New Zealand communities and households are as well prepared as possible to deal with natural disasters.

3. **TE RŪNANGA O NGĀI TAHU**

3.1. This response is made on behalf of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu (Te Rūnanga), statutorily recognised as the representative tribal body of Ngāi Tahu whānui and established as a body corporate on 24th April 1996 under section 6 of the Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu Act 1996 (the Act).

3.2. Te Rūnanga notes for the Ministry the following relevant provisions of our constitutional documents:

   - **Section 3** of the Act States:
     
     “This Act binds the Crown and every person (including any body politic or corporate) whose rights are affected by any provisions of this Act.”

   - **Section 15(1)** of the Act states:
     
     “Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu shall be recognised for all purposes as the representative of Ngāi Tahu Whānui.”

3.3. The Charter of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu constitutes Te Rūnanga as the kaitiaki of the tribal interests.

3.4. Te Rūnanga respectfully requests that the Ministry accord this response the status and weight due to the tribal collective, Ngāi Tahu whānui, currently comprising over 62,000 members, registered in accordance with section 8 of the Act.

3.5. Notwithstanding its statutory status as the representative voice of Ngāi Tahu whānui “for all purposes”, Te Rūnanga accepts and respects the right of individuals and Papatipu Rūnanga to make their own responses in relation to this matter.

4. **TE RŪNANGA INTERESTS IN DISASTER RESILIENCE**

4.1. Te Rūnanga notes the following particular interests in the Discussion Documents:

   - **Treaty Relationship**
     - Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu have an expectation that the Crown will honour Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty) and the principles upon which the Treaty is founded.
     - Te Rūnanga has a specific interest by virtue of the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 (NTCSA). The Act provides for Ngāi Tahu and the Crown to enter an age of co-operation, which is the basis of the post-Settlement relationship underpinning this response.
• The Crown apology to Ngāi Tahu, as shown in Appendix One, recognises the Treaty principles of rangatiratanga, partnership, active participation in decision-making, and active protection.

Rangatiratanga
• Te Rūnanga upholds the mana of Ngāi Tahu through leadership.

Kaitiakitanga
• Kaitiakitanga is about ensuring that future generations have the resources and ability to sustain them in the way that generations before have been sustained. We are guided always by the whakatauki: “Mō tātou, ā, mō kā uri ā muri ake nei” (For us, and those who come after us).

Whānaungatanga
• Te Rūnanga has a responsibility to enable the social, cultural and economic wellbeing of Ngāi Tahu whānui.

4.2. With regards to the Ngāi Tahu takiwā, Section 5 of the Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu Act 1996 statutorily defines the Ngāi Tahu takiwā as those areas “south of the northern most boundaries described in the decision of the Māori Appellate Court ...” which in effect is south of Te Parinui o Whiti on the East Coast and Kahurangi Point on the West Coast of the South Island.

4.3. Section 2 of the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 statutorily defines the Ngāi Tahu claim area as being:

“the area shown on allocation plan NT 504 (SO 19900), being—
(a) the takiwā of Ngāi Tahu Whānui; and
(b) the coastal marine area adjacent to the coastal boundary of the takiwā of Ngāi Tahu Whānui; and
(c) the New Zealand fisheries waters within the coastal marine area and exclusive economic zone adjacent to the seaward boundary of that coastal marine area;—
and, for the purposes of this definition, the northern sea boundaries of the coastal marine area have been determined using the equidistance principle, and the northern sea boundaries of the exclusive economic zone have been determined using the perpendicular to the meridian principle from the seaward boundary of the coastal marine area (with provision to exclude part of the New Zealand fisheries waters around the Chatham Islands).”

(See the map attached as Appendix Two)
5. **TE RŪNANGA RESPONSES TO THE MINISTRY’S QUESTIONS**

1. **How can we weave Te Ao Māori through the proposed strategy?**

   5.1. Whilst Te Rūnanga commends the Ministry’s recognition of the significance of Te Ao Māori to this Strategy and disaster management more broadly, we have concerns with the way this has been framed in the proposed draft.

   5.2. Te Rūnanga consider this understandable, given the complexity of the Māori world, and the Strategy’s national-level focus, however, there are some statements in the proposed Strategy regarding te Ao Māori which we find somewhat problematic. Our concern is that these will be detrimental to the Strategy’s efficacy when it comes to implementation.

   5.3. Te Rūnanga advises that the Strategy’s interpretation of te Ao Māori requires revision moving forward. In order for this to be as effective and credible as possible, Te Rūnanga further notes that it is necessary for tangata whenua to be involved in the revision and drafting of those parts of the Strategy which do seek to speak to and for tangata whenua.

   5.4. Te Rūnanga strongly recommends that the Ministry forms a small Māori working group, to sit alongside the Strategy team in order to co-design these parts of the Strategy to ensure it is fit for purpose.

   5.5. It is our expectation that this group will include representation by those iwi which have been impacted by the disasters of recent years in their respective regions. Collaborating with those iwi which have first-hand experience of both the State processes and protocols that come into effect at these times, and of the profound physical and physiological impact these have on the ground will enhance the efficiency of the Strategy, and help to maximise its effectiveness.

   5.6. This is further necessary as the values and priorities of iwi Māori are not homogeneous – and will differ further according to region, nature of disaster and iwi capacity during states of emergency. What a working group will be able to facilitate is a way for the Strategy to provide for the diversity of Māori communities during disasters, in order to ensure that the overall integrity of the disaster response, recovery and resilience system is maintained.

   **Recommendation**

   5.7. Te Rūnanga recommends that:

   - The tangata whenua-specific sections of the Strategy be revised in order to appropriately weave te Ao Māori through the Strategy; and
   
   - The Ministry forms a small, targeted working group of iwi advisors who have experience of significant disasters in order to co-design the parts of the Strategy which pertain to tangata whenua alongside the Strategy team.

2. **Does the discussion about Māori concepts of resilience, and resilience of Māori, resonate with you?**

   5.8. Te Rūnanga acknowledges and highly regards the inclusion of Māori resilience within the Strategy, particularly situated as this is within the context of the Treaty partnership. However, as intimated above, the discussion requires further development.
5.9. Te Rūnanga is concerned that there are some generalisations within 4.3 of the Strategy which do not quite portray Māori concepts fundamentally, nor Māori society. More concerning still are the assumptions we identify within the discussion as a result of the former misconstructions.

5.10. The means of iwi vary across the country, and vary still more at the hapū, marae and kāinga levels, which, in our experience, is where disasters are most acutely borne. In respect of our own iwi, we do not consider it appropriate for an expectation to be placed on all 60,000 of our iwi members to shoulder the brunt of the responsibility for their wider communities by virtue of their whakapapa. Te Rūnanga also consider the current descriptions of manaakitanga, whanaungatanga and mana to be particularly inappropriate, as these read as though our fundamental principles are a resource of convenience to be tapped at whim.

5.11. Te Rūnanga also advises that the discussion would benefit from clarifying the focus of Māori and iwi involvement during disasters to better facilitate Māori resilience. Te Rūnanga advise that this is key to ensuring the operational success of the Strategy, in line with the lessons we have all learnt since the previous Strategy was produced.

5.12. Te Rūnanga reiterate our earlier recommendations that a working group involving relevant iwi be established to work with the Strategy team to revise the discussion. Te Rūnanga cannot speak for other iwi affected by disasters within their own respective rohe, but for our own part, Te Rūnanga would be very glad to work with the Ministry in order to progress this, the better to advance and meaningfully give effect to our partnership.

3. The proposed strategy envisages that emergency management agencies would partner with iwi to deliver strategy objectives. At a practical level, what does that mean to you?

5.13. Te Rūnanga strongly supports the Strategy regarding the proposed partnership between iwi and Emergency Management agencies. We seek a partnership where Ngāi Tahu can be involved in emergency planning, decision-making and working collaboratively with other agencies, maximising our ability to respond effectively to future natural disasters and to lessen the impact on whānau and communities.

Recommendation

5.14. Te Rūnanga recommends that:

- It is essential to a meaningful partnership that relationships are formed and strengthened prior to an emergency. A meaningful partnership between emergency services and iwi will require relationships being strengthened at the local, regional and national level with emergency services as described below:

  - Local – where not already in place, relationships need to be strengthened between Papatipu Rūnanga, marae and the local Civil Defence and territorial authorities. At a minimum this would require both parties knowing who to contact in an emergency to ask for support. Ideally, local Civil Defence and Papatipu Rūnanga would work together to prepare a marae emergency plan, develop an understanding on how they will work with each other in an emergency and to build the capability of the marae to respond in an emergency.

  - As seen in previous emergencies, marae often become the natural gathering places for affected whānau and their wider communities. For the most part, marae are able to provide a social-wellbeing response for whānau members
from their area and further afield as they are well-equipped to assist in a welfare capacity during an emergency response; have established tribal networks; and have an inherent ability to manaaki large groups of people.

- Te Rūnanga advises that strengthening communities at the local level is the key to fostering national resilience.

- **Regional** – Te Rūnanga is currently strengthening relationships with South Island Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups to be more involved in emergency response planning and to provide an iwi perspective into region-wide emergency management.

- The recent agreement in the Government’s response to the Targeted Advisory Group recommendations to include iwi in Co-ordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) allows iwi to input advice to the Groups, helps iwi to form relationships with the other members of the CEG, and recognises the role of iwi in an emergency.

- In an emergency response, if required, an iwi representative should be present at the Emergency Operations Centre/Emergency Coordination Centre to help communicate the needs of the marae/Māori community, and also to communicate iwi capability to assist in an emergency for a coordinated response.

- Te Rūnanga advises that both Papatipu Rūnanga and Te Rūnanga should have relationships at the regional, CDEM Group level.

- **National** – Iwi need to be recognised and acknowledged as a Treaty partner, having equivalent status to local authorities in response and recovery legislation, as the current Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act is silent on iwi involvement.

- Following the Christchurch earthquakes Ngāi Tahu was recognised as a statutory partner in the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act with the same status as local authorities – this was a watermark achievement of Treaty partnership recognition. It meant Ngāi Tahu were at the table, involved at both the governance and project levels, with Te Rūnanga able to be involved in all parts of the recovery, whether this was in terms of environmental, economic, cultural, social factors or leadership.

- In comparison, following the Kaikōura/Hurunui earthquakes, Te Rūnanga was not recognised as a Statutory Partner in legislation and therefore did not have the same legal recognition and expression of mana in the Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery Act 2016. This was detrimental to the recovery process overall, as rather than actually working together with other agencies, Te Rūnanga was preoccupied having to justify playing a part in the decision-making process.

5.15. For Te Rūnanga, it is this contrast of experiences which particularly necessitates the provision for mana whenua in both emergency legislation and disaster management policy. Many unnecessary challenges can be mitigated by setting relationships and communication channels in place at the strategic level.

5.16. The Ministry establish a working group of iwi familiar with disaster response and emergency management, in order to identify the challenges previously faced by tangata whenua during such events, in order to identify what challenges and issues
were faced, how these were overcome, and, most importantly when we plan for resilience, how these can be avoided in the future.

4. **Do you agree with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy? If not, which of these do you disagree with and what changes would you suggest? We would also appreciate your views if you do agree with these factors.**

5.17. Te Rūnanga agrees with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed Strategy. Particularly the recognition of the need to build resilience and manage risks across the four capitals with a focus on wellbeing as its core goal.

5.18. Te Rūnanga also agrees with the Strategy’s approach to promoting a wide, whole-of-society, participatory and inclusive approach where everyone has a role in reducing risk and strengthening resilience. However, the Strategy should allow for the special recognition of tangata whenua, based in the Treaty partnership.

**Recommendation**

5.19. Te Rūnanga recommends that:

- Specific allowance be made for the Treaty partnership as between iwi, local authorities and State agencies.

**Guiding Principles**

5.20. While thoroughly endorsing the Guiding Principles of the Strategy, Te Rūnanga suggests the following additions to the values presented alongside these:

1. **Kaitiakitanga, tūrangawaewae**

   **Recommendation**

5.21. Te Rūnanga recommends that:

- The protection of areas of cultural importance be added to the ‘Kaitiakitanga, tūrangawaewae’ principle. Given that, for example, in the Kaikōura/Hurunui earthquake recovery, there has been competing demand between rebuilding coastal infrastructure, and the protection of and damage to culturally significant areas.

2. **Whānaungatanga, kotahitanga**

   **Recommendation**

5.22. Te Rūnanga recommends that:

- The Treaty Partnership be incorporated into the ‘Whanaungatanga, Kotahitanga’ principle. This is a simple measure towards ensuring partnership with affected iwi is meaningful.

5. **Strategy Priorities**

5.23. Te Rūnanga agrees with the proposed priorities.

6. **Do you agree with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy?**

   **Objective 7**

5.24. “A partnership approach with iwi means a collaborative approach and full engagement in relation to emergency management.”
5.25. Te Rūnanga endorses the incorporation of this into the Objectives. However, Te Rūnanga also advise that we are concerned the significance of this message is somewhat misplaced within this particular objective.

**Recommendation**

5.26. Te Rūnanga recommends that:

- The statement regarding the partnership approach with iwi needs to be moved from Objective 7 to another objective, the better to fulfil its aims.

- The Strategy facilitate relationships and channels of communication to guarantee an effective partnership between iwi and relevant authorities and agencies during emergency situations.

**Objective 9**

**Recommendation**

5.27. Te Rūnanga recommends that:

- Iwi be recognised and acknowledged as a Treaty partner, having a level of status equivalent to local authorities in response and recovery systems (including emergency legislation and disaster management policy), as the current Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act is silent on iwi involvement. Te Rūnanga advise that it is necessary for iwi to have recognition at the same level as councils in order to ensure better holistic service delivery to communities more efficiently.
APPENDIX ONE: TEXT OF CROWN APOLOGY

The following is text of the Crown apology contained in the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998.

Part One – Apology by the Crown to Ngāi Tahu

Section 5: Text in Māori

The text of the apology in Māori is as follows:

1. Kei te mōhio te Karauna i te tino roa o ngā tūpuna o Ngāi Tahu e totohe ana kia utu mai rātou e te Karauna—tata atu ki 150 ngā tau i puta ai tēnei pēpeha a Ngāi Tahu arā: “He mahi kai tākata, he mahi kai hoaka”. Nā te whai mahara o ngā tūpuna o Ngāi Tahu ki ngā āhurutanga o ngā kawenga a te Karauna i kawea ai e Matiha Tiramōrehu tana petihana ki a Kuini Wikitoria i te tau 1857. I tuhia e Tiramōrehu tana petihana arā: ‘Koia nei te whakahau a tōu aroha i whiu e koe ki runga i ēnei kāwana... tērā kia whakakotahitia te ture, kia whakakotahitia ngā whakahau, kia ōrite ngā āhurutanga mō te kiri mā kia rite ki tō te kiri waitutu, me te whakakotakotakotakotako i te aroha o tōu ngākau pai ki runga i te iwi Māori kia noho ngākau pai tonu ai rātou me te mau mahara tonu ki te mana o tōu ingoa.’ Nā konei te Karauna i whakaee ai tērā, te taumaha o ngā mahi a ngā tūpuna o Ngāi Tahu, nā rēira i tō whakaiti atu ai i nāiani i mua i ā rātou mokopuna.

2. E whakaae ana te Karauna ki tōna tino hēanga, tērā i takakino tāruaruatia e ia ngā kaupapa o te Tiriti o Waitangi i roto i āna hokonga mai i ngā whenua o Ngāi Tahu. Tēnā, ka whakaae anō te Karauna tērā i roto i ngā āhurutanga i takoto ki roto i ngā pukapuka ā-herenga whakaatu i aua hokonga mai, kāore te Karauna i whai whakaaro ki tāna tōu rā i haina te Tiriti, kāore hoki ia I whai whakaaro ki te wehe ake i ētahi whenua hei whai oranga tinana, whai oranga ngākau rānei mō Ngāi Tahu. E whakaae ana te Karauna tērā, i roto i tāna takakino i te wāhanga tuarua o te Tiriti, kāore ia i whai whakaaro ki te manaaki, ki te tiaki rānei i ngā maua whanui whenua a Ngāi Tahu me ngā tino taonga i hiahia a Ngāi Tahu ki te pūpuri.

3. E mōhio ana te Karauna tērā, kāore ia i whai whakaaro ki a Ngāi Tahu i runga I te ngākau pono o roto i ngā tikanga i pūtane mai i te mana o te Karauna. Nā tāua whakaaro kore a te Karauna i puaki mai ai tēnei pēpeha a Ngāi Tahu: “Te Hapa o Niu Tiri”. E mōhio ana te Karauna i tāna hē ki te kaipono i ngā āhurutanga whai oranga mō Ngāi Tahu i noho pōhara noa ai te iwi ia whakatupuranga heke iho. Te whakatauāki i pūtane mai i aua āhurutanga: “Te mate o te iwi”. E mōhio ana te Karauna i tōna whakatauāki i aua āhurutanga: “Te mate o te iwi”. E whakaae ana te Karauna tērā, kāore i whai whakaaro ki a Ngāi Tahu i runga I te ngākau pono o roto i ngā tikanga i pūtane mai i te mana o te Karauna. Nā tāua whakaaro kore a te Karauna i puaki mai ai tēnei pēpeha a Ngāi Tahu: “Te Hapa o Niu Tiri”. E mōhio ana te Karauna i tāna hē ki te kaipono i ngā āhurutanga whai oranga mō Ngāi Tahu i noho pōhara noa ai te iwi ia whakatupuranga heke iho. Te whakatauāki i pūtane mai i aua āhurutanga: “Te mate o te iwi”. E whakaae ana te Karauna tērā, kāore i whai whakaaro ki a Ngāi Tahu i runga I te ngākau pono o roto i ngā tikanga i pūtane mai i te mana o te Karauna. Nā tāua whakaaro kore a te Karauna i puaki mai ai tēnei pēpeha a Ngāi Tahu: “Te Hapa o Niu Tiri”. E mōhio ana te Karauna i tāna hē ki te kaipono i ngā āhurutanga whai oranga mō Ngāi Tahu i noho pōhara noa ai te iwi ia whakatupuranga heke iho. Te whakatauāki i pūtane mai i aua āhurutanga: “Te mate o te iwi”.
tōna hokonga mai i ngā whenua o Ngāi Tahu, kāore hoki te Karauna i wehe ake kia rawaka he whenua mō te iwi, hei whakahaere mā rātou i ngā āhuatanga e whai oranga ai rātou, kāore hoki te Karauna i hanga i tētahi tikanga e maru motuhake ai te mana o Ngāi Tahu ki runga i ā rātou pounamu me ērā atu tāonga i hiahia te iwi ki te pupuri. Kore rawa te Karauna i aro ake ki ngā aurere a Ngāi Tahu.

7. E whakapāha ana te Karauna ki a Ngāi Tahu mō tōna hēanga, tērā, kāore ia l whai whakaaro mō te rangatiratanga o Ngāi Tahu, ki te mana rānei o Ngāi Tahu ki runga i ēnā whenua ā-rohe o Te Wai Pounamu, nā rēira, i runga i ngā whakaritenga me ngā herenga a Te Tiriti o Waitangi, ka whakaae te Karauna ko Ngāi Tahu Whānui anō te tāngata whenua hei pupuri i te rangatiratanga a roto i ēna takiwā.

8. E ai mō ngā iwi katoa o Aotearoa e hiahia ana te Karauna ki te whakamārie i ngā hara kua wāhina ake nei—otirā, ērā e taea i nāianei - i te mea kua āta tau ngā kōrero tūturu ki rito i te pukapuka ā-herenga whakaritenga i hainatia i te 21 o ngā rā o Whitu hei timatanga whai oranga i rito i te ao hōu o te mahinga tahi a te Karauna rāua ko Ngāi Tahu.

Section 6: Text in English

The text of the apology in English is as follows:

1. The Crown recognises the protracted labours of the Ngāi Tahu ancestors in pursuit of their claims for redress and compensation against the Crown for nearly 150 years, as alluded to in the Ngāi Tahu proverb 'He mahi kai takata, he mahi kai hoaka' ('It is work that consumes people, as greenstone consumes sandstone'). The Ngāi Tahu understanding of the Crown's responsibilities conveyed to Queen Victoria by Matiaha Tiramorehu in a petition in 1857, guided the Ngāi Tahu ancestors. Tiramorehu wrote:

"This was the command thy love laid upon these Governors ... that the law be made one, that the commandments be made one, that the nation be made one, that the white skin be made just equal with the dark skin, and to lay down the love of thy graciousness to the Māori that they dwell happily ... and remember the power of thy name."

2. The Crown hereby acknowledges the work of the Ngāi Tahu ancestors and makes this apology to them and to their descendants.

3. The Crown acknowledges that it acted unconscionably and in repeated breach of the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi in its dealings with Ngāi Tahu in the purchases of Ngāi Tahu land. The Crown further acknowledges that in relation to the deeds of purchase it has failed in most material respects to honour its obligations to Ngāi Tahu as its Treaty partner, while it also failed to set aside adequate lands for Ngāi Tahu’s use, and to provide adequate economic and social resources for Ngāi Tahu.

4. The Crown acknowledges that, in breach of Article Two of the Treaty, it failed to preserve and protect Ngāi Tahu’s use and ownership of such of their land and valued possessions as they wished to retain.

5. The Crown recognises that it has failed to act towards Ngāi Tahu reasonably and with the utmost good faith in a manner consistent with the honour of the Crown. That failure is referred to in the Ngāi Tahu saying 'Te Hapa o Niu Tireni!' ('The unfulfilled
promise of New Zealand’). The Crown further recognises that its failure always to act in good faith deprived Ngāi Tahu of the opportunity to develop and kept the tribe for several generations in a state of poverty, a state referred to in the proverb ‘Te mate o te iwi’ (‘The malaise of the tribe’).

6. The Crown recognises that Ngāi Tahu has been consistently loyal to the Crown, and that the tribe has honoured its obligations and responsibilities under the Treaty of Waitangi and duties as citizens of the nation, especially, but not exclusively, in their active service in all of the major conflicts up to the present time to which New Zealand has sent troops. The Crown pays tribute to Ngāi Tahu's loyalty and to the contribution made by the tribe to the nation.

7. The Crown expresses its profound regret and apologises unreservedly to all members of Ngāi Tahu Whānui for the suffering and hardship caused to Ngāi Tahu, and for the harmful effects which resulted to the welfare, economy and development of Ngāi Tahu as a tribe. The Crown acknowledges that such suffering, hardship and harmful effects resulted from its failures to honour its obligations to Ngāi Tahu under the deeds of purchase whereby it acquired Ngāi Tahu lands, to set aside adequate lands for the tribe's use, to allow reasonable access to traditional sources of food, to protect Ngāi Tahu's rights to pounamu and such other valued possessions as the tribe wished to retain, or to remedy effectually Ngāi Tahu's grievances.

8. The Crown apologises to Ngāi Tahu for its past failures to acknowledge Ngāi Tahu rangatiratanga and mana over the South Island lands within its boundaries, and, in fulfilment of its Treaty obligations, the Crown recognises Ngāi Tahu as the tangata whenua of, and as holding rangatiratanga within, the Takiwā of Ngāi Tahu Whānui.

9. Accordingly, the Crown seeks on behalf of all New Zealanders to atone for these acknowledged injustices, so far as that is now possible, and, with the historical grievances finally settled as to matters set out in the Deed of Settlement signed on 21 November 1997, to begin the process of healing and to enter a new age of co-operation with Ngāi Tahu.”
Indicative boundary only refer to Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998 for full description.
The New Zealand City-to-City Resilience Collaboration & Knowledge Sharing Network

Elrasheid Elkhidir, Prof Suzanne Wilkinson, Dr. Sandeeka Mannakkara
The University of Auckland
12/6/2018
In line with the purposes of the CDEM Emergency Management Act 2002 clauses 3 (d), (e) and (f), and the objectives of the proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy, clauses 1,2,3,6,10,13,16 & 18, we are proposing the introduction of a tool that should assist with the accomplishment of the above mentioned purposes and objectives. We are currently conducting a research at the University of Auckland, funded by the National Science Challenge, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment MBIE, to study the development of a National New Zealand City-to-City Resilience Collaborative and Knowledge Sharing Network.

International city-to-city (C2C) resilience networks such as the Rockefeller 100 Resilient Cities Network and the UNISDR Making Cities Resilient Campaign have been developed to enhance resilience building in cities. These global resilience networks have been established due to the projected advantages of shared knowledge and resources. However, there is currently no evidence of resilience networks being established locally within countries, and this project is pioneering research in this space. The following is a brief about the research project.

This New Zealand C2C Resilience Network project aims to introduce a collaborative approach to resilience-building by developing an intercity resilience network tailored to New Zealand cities. The network is aimed at connecting cities to assist and support each other to build resilience and to facilitate and encourage knowledge sharing between cities. Having a resilience network in place will benefit New Zealand cities through capacity building from lessons learnt, better awareness of common issues, learning and co-learning, collaboratively solving common problems and providing the chance for co-operation and access to expertise between cities, leading to the development of national solutions, figure 1. Adopting a unified approach to resilience-building leads to enhanced outcomes for New Zealand communities.

This study is conducted in two stages. The first stage of the research has been completed and it assessed the level of resilience of the seven largest urban cities in New Zealand to identify current resilience successes, challenges and future direction. The main stakeholders were Auckland, Hamilton, Napier, Tauranga, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin. Variations between the seven cities were discovered, figure 2, which suggested the need for a more collaborative approach to resilience-building within New Zealand. A copy of the project report can be accessed here. The second stage of the research is focused on developing a practical and efficient C2C collaborative knowledge-sharing resilience network in New Zealand.

Designing and establishing the network will be done through early stakeholders’ engagement, and a co-design approach will be utilized to capture the specific needs, requirements, preferences, and expectations of the stakeholders. A multi-disciplinary literature review of the urban resilience concepts, information management fundamentals, and city-to-city (C2C) collaboration theories was conducted. The modes and philosophies of operation of international networks such as the Resilient 100 Cities Network, as well as other national networks, are also be studied.
Currently, stakeholders are fully engaged, and the network design requirements, needs, preferences and structure are being collected. So far, data
is being collected through focus group discussions with the main stakeholder cities as well as through interviews. Focus group discussions were held and conducted, with diverse participants represented the Cities’ Councils (various sectors such as Infrastructure, Community Engagement, and Finance), Regional Council, CDEM Groups and researchers. A very high degree of acceptance and support for the network project was recorded. Interviews with leading resilience specialists and practitioners are also conducted to achieve a holistic and a participatory co-design approach towards developing the network and its operation philosophies.

- **Interviews**
  - An interview with the Chief Resilience Officer of Wellington.
  - An interview with Auckland Lifelines Utilities Director.
  - An interview with the Director of UNISDR Sub-Regional Office for the Pacific.
  - An interview with a Local Climate and Resilience Specialist and Consultant.
  - Discussions with the Chief Policy Advisor of Local Governments New Zealand (LGNZ).

- **Focus Group Discussions**
  - Tauranga City Council
  - Hamilton City Council
  - Christchurch City Council
  - Auckland City Council

Preliminary stakeholders’ insights highlighted that objectives and goals identification as well as agreements on tangible outcomes, with the possibility of introducing time boundaries, were indispensable. Extensive pre-engagement planning, formalised agreements, trust and leadership are indispensable to the success of a collaborative network. Considering the types of knowledge involved, using the relevant taxonomy, provision of Information Technology resources, training needs of stakeholders and regular communication were identified as crucial for the sustainability of the network. The introduction of incentives and motivational schemes can aid when resourcefulness hinders reciprocity. It is also of vital importance to have the support of all levels of Government, Local, Regional and Central for the success and sustainability of the network. The quest for more data, information, requirements, preferences and needs is still ongoing and more criteria and refinement will be conducted in due course. Conclusions and recommendations from the analysis of the final data sets will be consolidated to pave a pathway for the development of the network.
Hi Amanda,

I have not finished reading the strategy, and while only half way through, it does generally seem an excellent document, particularly in the systems approach taken in section 4.2. The one major flaw in the document is the focus in financial capital; which is now in itself a significant source of risk. I acknowledge the many very powerful things that our economic system does, particularly in the realm of network creation and maintenance (many levels), distributed trust, distributed governance, distributed risk management, and more. The problem is that all market value is predicated on scarcity, and exponential increases in technology are enabling the production of universal abundance in an ever expanding set of goods and services. Thus holding on to the concept of markets causes an exponential increase in the tendency to concentrate wealth into fewer and fewer hands – which breaks all the distributed functions that markets once sustained. So it is a very complex, and very subtle set of transitions required across many dimensions; as our long term security is very much dependent upon technology and abundance, yet our existing systems are founded in human labour and scarcity. This is the greatest potential for disaster facing us. Bigger even than Taupo exploding, and far more likely. Molecular level manufacturing and indefinite life extension are both near term technological developments that are required for our long term survival, yet pose the ability to place existing systems under severe stress. Developing dimensions that limit or mitigate that stress is an urgent priority, perhaps the single most urgent priority. Developing a sufficiently high level strategy to enable transition to a post scarcity world is (beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt in my understanding) the single greatest risk mitigation and resilience strategy possible. I would love to be part of that – at the highest levels, and I have been part of it at lower levels for several decades. Consider this an update to the submission lodged on Friday. (If you doubt my credibility, talk to Dave Brash or Kathey Perreau as I have worked with both in the RLG and elsewhere relating to Kaikoura post earthquake).

Arohanui

Ted
Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management’s Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy

7 December 2018

For more information please contact:
Jane Murray
NMDHB Public Health Service
Email: [REDACTED]
Phone: [REDACTED]
Submitter details

1. Nelson Marlborough Health (Nelson Marlborough District Health Board) (NMH) is a key organisation involved in the health and wellbeing of the people within Te Tau Ihu o Te Waka a Maui. NMH appreciates the opportunity to comment from a public health perspective on Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management’s Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy.

2. NMH makes this submission in recognition of its responsibilities to improve, promote and protect the health of people and communities under the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 and the Health Act 1956.

General Comments

3. NMH congratulates the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency on its approach for this strategy to improve resilience to disasters by reducing disaster risk and limiting the impacts to be managed, building capability and capacity to manage emergencies and a deliberate effort to strengthen out wider societal resilience. The incorporation of the Living Standards Framework into the Strategy puts overall wellbeing at its core. Wellbeing is influenced by a wide range of environmental, social and behavioural factors. The most effective way to maximise people’s wellbeing is to take these factors into account in decision making which this document has done well.

Specific Comments

4. **Question 1:** NMH agrees with the purpose, vision and goal of the proposed strategy. NMH supports the holistic approach the Strategy has taken and supports the focus on wellbeing. NMH agrees with the attributes of a safe and resilience community as listed on page 17. By focusing on social, cultural, economic, environmental and governmental resilience, communities in New Zealand will be more prepared to tackle future risks. It is pleasing to see that the Strategy also incorporates Maori concepts of resilience and whakaoranga which can build on the wider resilience across New Zealand. NMH supports the focus on

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1 Whakaoranga – the rescue, recovery and restoration of sustainable wellbeing and may be applied to whānau, hapū, and iwi, tribal homelands as well as all communities and parts of New Zealand impacted by disasters as developed in the National Science Challenge.
developing strong ties between the government agencies because this will also build resilience.

As part of recovery from an emergency it is important to work with people to have a focus on being prepared again.

Resilience is important to build and facilitate in all our communities which will be very helpful should an emergency occur, however it will assist generally with all events and incidents that affect our communities. We need to ensure that recovery and support is understood to be an ongoing process across many years, eg 5 years onwards.

5. Question 2: NMH agrees with the priorities of the proposed strategy.

6. Question 3: NMH agrees with the objectives and success factors of the proposed strategy.

7. Question 4: NMH agrees that there should be a broad range of stakeholders that need to be involved in the governance of the strategy, however the document does not include a stakeholders list. Further clarification on this would be useful. It is important that people are supported primarily through primary and community networks. The secondary services and government agencies should support from behind to facilitate and meet the needs identified, led by the community themselves.

8. Question 5 – Particular Strengths of the Strategy: NMH was pleased to see that the Strategy has shifted focus from managing disasters to managing risk, which enable organisations and individuals to cope more effectively when disasters strike. It is also pleasing to see that there has been a broader “whole of society” approach to risk, that everyone has a role in reducing and managing risk. It is good to emphasise that this will then support communities to be resilient and support each other for all incidents and events.

9. Question 6 – Gaps in the Strategy:

10. The Strategy has given particular mention to supporting vulnerable groups and raising resilience of the overall population, however it does not acknowledge the impact disasters, specifically extreme weather events as a result of climate change, may have on an ageing population. Older people may be physically, financially and emotionally less resilient to deal with the effects of a changing climate than the rest of the population. The insecurity and heightened exposure to certain threats caused by a changing climate are compounded in old age by
reduced capacity for coping independently.\textsuperscript{2} Vulnerability will be determined by exposure level, likelihood and magnitude of the threat and different coping capacities.

We support that all plans should have a targeted approach for all identified vulnerable population groups, including Pasifika, Maori, migrants and refugees, older people, people with disabilities, people with mental health concerns and children. Points of contact at community level must be identified and brought into response and recovery planning. We have found community navigator roles particularly useful to support vulnerable population groups.

11. Climate change may have an effect on the health of older people. The United States Environmental Protection Agency have outlined the key health concerns as follows\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{itemize}
  \item a. Increase in extreme heat events and higher temperatures can increase the risk of illness and death especially with people with congestive heart failure and diabetes. Higher temperatures have been linked to increased hospital admissions for people with heart and lung conditions. In Europe’s 2003 heatwave, 70\% of the 14,800 deaths were people aged over 75 years old.
  \item b. Extreme weather events such as flooding and storms are expected to increase. Older adults again are more likely to suffer storm and flood-related deaths. Over 50\% of deaths in Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy were those aged over 65. If an extreme event requires evacuation, older adults have a high risk of both physical and mental health impacts. Health impacts could be exacerbated with power outages and interruptions to essential services.
  \item c. Changing weather patterns and increased fire risk may increase the amount of pollution, dust and smoke in the air which will worsen respiratory conditions common in older adults such as asthma, heart conditions and chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD).
  \item d. Increased temperatures could increase the number of vector borne diseases which pose a health risk to those with already weakened immune systems.
\end{itemize}

12. Social isolation and loneliness can affect between 33\%-50\% of the older population\textsuperscript{4} and this can affect an individuals ability to respond to disasters. It is

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \url{https://www.sei.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/Climate/climate_change_growing_old.pdf}
  \item United States Environmental Protection Agency (2016) Climate Change and the Health of Older Adults EPA 430-F-16-058 \url{https://www.cmu.edu/steinbrenner/EPA%20Factsheets/older-adults-health-climate-change.pdf}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
vital that communities can build social connectedness in order to strengthen overall societal resilience to disasters.

Conclusion

13. NMH thanks the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management for the opportunity to comment on the *Proposed National Disaster Resilience Strategy*.

Yours sincerely

Peter Bramley  
**Chief Executive**

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4 Landeiro, F., Burrows, P., Nuttall Musson, E., (2017) *Reducing social isolation and loneliness in older people: a systematic review protocol*, BMJ Open Volume 7, Issue 5 Retrieved from [https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/7/5/e013778](https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/7/5/e013778)
Submission to National Disaster Resilience Strategy Consultation

Engineering New Zealand (formerly IPENZ) is New Zealand’s peak professional body for engineers. We are New Zealand’s strongest and most influential voice on engineering issues. Our membership is growing, with more than 22,000 members who want to help shape the public policy agenda.

AN ENGINEERING VIEW OF RESILIENCE

This year we released Engineering A Better New Zealand, which sets out an expert engineering vision for a healthier, more prosperous New Zealand – and the steps we must take together to get there. Community resilience sits at the heart of this vision – a more resilient and sustainable New Zealand that can thrive in the face of climate change, natural disasters and the effects of growing urbanisation. This means valuing resilience and creating buildings, infrastructure and processes that protect people and property. Much of what we discuss and recommend in our report is relevant to the National Disaster Resilience Strategy. For example, in our report, we discuss how communities expect safety, but safety is a difficult concept. Safety can never be guaranteed. We suggest let’s talk about risk, not safety. We ask that you consider our report as part of our submission.

VISION

He matakitenga o te Aotearoa manawaroa would appear to be the proposed strategy vision, but the document doesn’t make a single vision completely clear.

In our view, the initial vision of a “safe and prosperous nation” in section 2 (page 9) does not promote an informed risk conversation. ‘Safe’ is an absolute statement – the reality is that we can only ever be ‘safe enough’. We can however be a resilient and prosperous nation, as the strategy outlines. Indeed, the strategy says in section 4 (page 14) headed “our goal: a resilient future” that the vision is of “a resilient nation”. The vision is restated as “a resilient New Zealand” (page 20). Appendix 1 has yet another and presumably final version of the vision, “New Zealand is a disaster resilient nation that acts proactively to manage risks and build resilience in a way that contributes to the wellbeing and prosperity of all New Zealanders” and another statement of the goal.

We suggest the strategy adopt a single, strong vision that is referred to consistently throughout the document, and that this vision is focussed on resilience not safety.
OUTCOME INDICATORS
We support and agree with the intent and much of the content of the strategy, which is a high-level document with broad objectives and descriptions of success. But there are no resilience outcome indicators. We suggest that we need a resilience index to measure resilience attributes. At this stage we would expect to see some high-level indicators as part of the proposed strategy.

INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE
As we highlight in Engineering a Better New Zealand, progressively enhancing the resilience of our infrastructure is vital for the economy and wellbeing of the country. We consider this doesn’t receive sufficient emphasis in the strategy, being somewhat lost within section 7 on strengthening societal resilience. We would like to see infrastructure resilience given further attention, perhaps in a dedicated section.

THE ROLE OF ENGINEERS
Finally, we note that engineers are not identified as a strength in Appendix 3. We have led the world in many aspects of safety engineering and resilience. As is noted, we have seemingly had more than our fair share of crises, emergencies, and disasters over the last ten years. When a disaster occurs, it is our engineers who are on the ground working as a key part of the Civil Defence Emergency Management response from the outset. We are committed to doing all we can to engineer a more resilient New Zealand.

We would welcome the opportunity to meet and discuss our work together to increase resilience to disasters.

Helen Davidson

Acting Chief Executive

Contact:

Neil Miller, Senior Policy Advisor
P: [Redacted]
M: [Redacted]
Addendum to Christchurch City Council submission on the National Disaster Resilience Strategy

Thank you for the opportunity to submit some additional thoughts on the National Disaster Resilience Strategy, which replaces the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Strategy, which was last updated a decade ago. Before I comment on the proposed strategy, Council colleagues wanted me to specifically point out the challenges that a city council faces when proposals are made to strip them of one of their core functions. In everything we do, whether it's infrastructure or community development, there is a connection. When a major component of our responsibility is removed or centralised, then this can impact in more far-reaching ways than may be apparent. I use the example of the Government considering the future of Three Waters, which make up around 60% of Council spend. The centralisation of this function could impact on our city's resilience in ways that a strategy such as this couldn't even begin to address. Although it is not a focus of the proposed Strategy, it is important that the whole of government takes note of the significance of the impact that their decisions may have with respect to resilience.

When reading the proposed strategy I was concerned about two things. First was the loss of the principles that guided the last strategy and which I've attached. The proposed strategy doesn't capture or recognise the importance of self-reliance and empowerment as do the previous ones. Principle One is headed: Individual and community responsibility and self-reliance. This is as vital for building resilience as it is in all aspects of response and recovery.

The second was, despite the focus on resilience and a good understanding of the true definition of what resilience is, there is a lack of understanding of how much the community can and should be empowered to do for themselves. This is related to the first point about the lack of focus on community responsibility and self-reliance.
I was invited to become a member of the UNISDR Parliamentarians Advisory Group on Disaster Risk Reduction and Christchurch was one of the founding members of the 100 Resilient Cities Network pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation. This is an area I feel we can lead the world on, and which is why I don’t believe we should allow this strategy to exist for 10 years (1.5 Currency of Strategy) - make it 3 years or 5 years (max) so that we are forced to return to it and reconsider it in light of what we achieve.

In section 1.3 “Ring-fencing the scope of this Strategy”, it is stated that the proposed strategy is confined to the disaster aspects of resilience, and states that the other attributes of resilience are well-catered for by other policies and programmes across government and through society.

I believe that this underestimates the value of resilience and the grassroots up approach that is core critical to success. I would workshop this draft with the groups that emerged as community leaders in the post disaster environment in Christchurch – e.g. the Student Volunteer Army, Project Lyttelton, CanCERN.

In section 3.4 we are asked ‘What is disaster risk?’. The answer talks about the combination of hazard/exposure/vulnerability. It then says that these three components can be countered by a fourth component, capacity, which refers to the strengths, attributes and resources available to reduce or manage the risks associated with the combination of the other three factors. That’s a big YES. Absolutely spot on.

However Section 3.5 says since we cannot usually reduce the likelihood of hazards, the main opportunity for reducing risk lies in reducing exposure and vulnerability. What happened to building capacity? This undermines the excellent statement in 4.5 Co-creating a resilient society. Without building capacity, we won’t build resilience. Resilience is not a destination. It is a journey!

We actually know this stuff and yet we keep ignoring it.

“Resilient communities adapt through creating innovative approaches to collective governance, seizing unexpected opportunities to decide for themselves how to respond, organising to work with government agencies in new ways, and accepting both the promise and responsibility of joint decision-making.”
The thing that excites me most about what Robert L Bach, writing in the 2012 MCDEM Journal Tephra after the Canterbury Earthquakes, is saying is the seemingly boundless possibility that is presented by empowering communities to participate in ‘collective governance’.

If we in government – central and local – helped our communities to develop their own capacity to engage in local governance in a meaningful way, communities would not only be better prepared for disaster should one strike, but would also of themselves be better and safer places to live.

The potential is enormous.

Not only does it bring the promise of a better way of life, it also gives meaning to democracy in the true sense of the word.

Robert L Bach also says:
“The need to support new forms of local governance through collaborative efforts has become an essential dimension of resilient communities. Resilience involves transformation of the role of citizen and grassroots organisations from that of stakeholders, who are able at best to advise governments, to full equity partners. Equity partners are full shareholders, equally able to participate in the design and implementation of disaster-related efforts. The challenge for governments is to find ways to embrace these innovations and redesign their own structures and processes to incorporate the changes.”

At the time of the earthquakes, New Zealand was a signatory to the Hyogo Framework for Action: Building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters and was actively engaged in the Multinational Community Resilience working Group.

Despite New Zealand’s endorsement of the approach, we still have not seized the opportunity that the disastrous impact of the Canterbury earthquakes presents to build resilience in the true sense of the word.
We need to build a partnership between government and society which sees the people, not as consumers but as engaged citizens actively involved in decision-making and becoming more resilient individually and collectively. The role of government – both central and local – changes as well and we become:

Enablers within a framework of collective responsibility;
Partners who use their power and that of the State to support the contributions of others; partnership depending as it does on trust, goodwill and mutual respect;
Facilitators who convene citizens and organisations to build communities of purpose;
Collaborative actors who work with others to coordinate decisions and to achieve concerted actions;
Stewards of the collective interest with the power to intervene and to course-correct when the public interest demands it;
Leaders to achieve convergence and a common sense of purpose;

I have forgotten where I found those words, but they inspire me to think that a legacy of our experience will be such a partnership.

The UK government's guidance on resilience is unequivocal: "In times of need, individuals and communities often already help each other. Volunteering and spontaneously helping each other does not need to be organised by central or local government. Local people and communities who are prepared and who, working with the emergency services, are able to respond effectively and recover quickly from emergencies, show us how successful community resilience can work... By building on existing local relationships, using local knowledge and preparing for risks your community will be better able to cope during and after an emergency."

"Preparedness and resilience both depend on identifying and strengthening the people, processes, and institutions that work in a community under normal conditions, before an incident.

“The strategic foundation of all hazards resilience, therefore, involves engagement with neighbourhood associations, businesses, schools, faith-based community groups, trade groups, fraternal organizations, ethnic centres, and other civic-minded organizations that have routine, direct ties to local communities. In a real sense, they are the community. Local collective action, by, with and for the individuals who live in local areas, becomes the leading edge of efforts to protect and sustain the nation.”
These quotes comes from an unpublished FEMA memorandum, 2010. Cited in London paper. Please rewrite 4.5 Conclusion: co-creating a resilient society with this in mind.

“Today’s world is turbulent and is likely to be so in the future. However, it is also dynamic, and characterised by huge opportunities for leadership and innovation. A critical question for the next 10 years will be how to enable and use those opportunities to effectively build resilience and address the many challenges that will continue to confront us.

We know from our experience in Christchurch that we need to look to our communities for the leadership we know is there, and we don’t need to wait for a disaster to happen for that leadership to come to the fore. Building capacity is one of the strands of Disaster Risk Reduction, which makes the resilience journey absolutely embedded in the community. As Robert Bach said, in summing up the Canterbury experience:

“Resilient communities adapt through creating innovative approaches to collective governance, seizing unexpected opportunities to decide for themselves how to respond, organising to work with government agencies in new ways, and accepting both the promise and responsibility of joint decision-making.”

One of the key messages is that we need to look to a range of sources for inspiration and relevance as we adapt to a shifting, and increasingly challenging environment. These include exploring new opportunities for engagement and action through technology, new sources of inspiration and activity driven by younger generations, and new methods for measuring and demonstrating impact. We need to embody agility and flexibility. We need to monitor risks and trends, maintain a learning, growth mind-set, and adapt and transform our organisations and ourselves as necessary. Within this, it is important to focus on adaptive capabilities – the skills, abilities, and knowledge that allow us to react constructively to any given situation.

We need to work out how we build our resilience in a smart, cost-effective way, so that it’s realistic and affordable, and so it isn’t a ‘sunk’ cost, like stockpiles for a bad day – but rather enables better living standards today.

Above all, we need to work together. Building resilience as siloed sectors is not enough – government, the private sector, and civil society need to be more joined up. More effective ways of tackling challenges are required, which, by necessity, will transcend traditional sector barriers.
This includes employing new business models that combine the resources and expertise of multiple sectors of society to address common challenges, as well as creating opportunities that enable leaders across all sectors to participate effectively in decision-making.

It is in this cross-sectoral space that we have the opportunity and ability to underpin the resilience dynamism that we need, by engaging in ways that inspire, support and shape a change agenda that is needed for improved resilience at both the national and local levels. By developing these cross-sectoral opportunities, we can build powerful networks built on trust, commitment, and a focus on the collective good, which can be translated into positive outcomes for society.

“There is no ultimate or end state of resilience. But, by working together to build resilience to the greatest degree possible, we can reduce our reliance on crisis as a driver of change and, instead, deliberately take the future into our own hands – for the well-being of our families, our communities, our cities, and indeed, the planet we all share.” (Judith Rodin, the then chair of the Rockefeller Foundation ‘The Resilience Dividend’)
**Principle One: Individual and community responsibility and self-reliance**

Individuals and communities are ultimately responsible for their own safety and the security of their livelihoods. CDEM arrangements in New Zealand support and encourage local ownership of this responsibility. Individuals and communities must be able to care for themselves and each other, as much as possible, when the normal functions of daily life are disrupted. Arrangements to support this are best developed at the local level. Local and regional efforts contribute to the overall national capability. Central government intervenes when an event is beyond the capacity of local resources.

In the New Zealand context, it is particularly important to note the role of Māori as an important community stakeholder. The Māori worldview incorporates a special relationship with the environment, expressed inter-generationally through kaitiakitanga. The environment forms the base from which cultural, spiritual, emotional, and physical sustenance flows. Because of this perspective, Māori have a particular interest in the management of hazards and associated risks, including risks that may be posed to wāhi tapu sites and other sites of significance. It is important that whānau, hapū, iwi and the wider Māori community are involved in CDEM planning. In addition, Māori communities often have important resources for response and recovery, such as marae for use as emergency shelters, and Māori welfare and support services.

**Principle Two: A transparent and systematic approach to managing the risks from hazards**

Communities must be given a say in what levels of risk they consider acceptable and what measures are put in place to manage those risks. A systematic approach is necessary to ensure that a logical and consistent process is followed when identifying and assessing risks, consulting and communicating with communities and, where appropriate, implementing cost-effective measures to reduce risk.1

**Principle Three: Comprehensive and integrated hazard risk management**

Comprehensive risk management means dealing with the risks associated with all our hazards, through the 4Rs: reduction, readiness, response and recovery. Integrated activity promotes the coordinated involvement of all agencies that have a role in managing these risks.


**Principle Four: Addressing the consequences of hazards**

The consequences of hazards can be physical, social, technical, environmental, cultural, or economic, and may affect one or more communities. Focusing on consequences provides a basis for planning, informs decision-making, and enables more effective action through improved prioritisation and resource allocation. CDEM arrangements must also ensure that support is available to individuals and communities that are overwhelmed by civil defence emergencies despite having taken responsibility and action to manage their own risks.

**Principle Five: Making best use of information, expertise and structures**

Making the best use of information, as well as improving both information systems and the application of research, is crucial. In order to realise the vision, it is necessary to develop the appropriate range of skills, knowledge and decision support tools and systems within our society as well as share best practice approaches to hazard risk management and operational activity.

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![Diagram: Components of a Resilient New Zealand](image-url)