**From:** N du Fresne s9(2)(a)
**Sent:** Saturday, April 19, 2025 10:32 AM
**To:** Emergency Management Bill [NEMA] <EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz>
**Subject:** Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

**11. Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services, including by recognising a wider range of infrastructure, strengthening planning, and reducing barriers to cooperation and information sharing**

1. In Northland we have regular power outages: "Top Energy" say they don't know the cause despite the obvious answer of wet trees and tall bamboo hedges touching the power lines. In very dry weather this can also cause fires. They should be fined for not maintaining at least 2 metres clearance all round power lines.
I know that could raise power prices but we recently had yet another 12 hour power cut "for no known reason"

2. We also have trees falling across roads in strong winds because Far North District Council are not proactive in maintaining road side trees despite being made aware of hazards. This obviously blocks emergency vehicles access.

regards
Nick du Fresne

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Nicolina Newcombe |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | IHC |

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I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

### Use of information

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The National Emergency Management Agency describes the problem as follows: "our emergency management system relies on most people being able to look after themselves in an emergency. In practice, this is not always possible." We find this description overly general, as it does not specifically identify people with intellectual disabilities, who may be among the most at risk in emergency situations. Without being

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explicitly named, people with intellectual disabilities risk being overlooked in planning efforts.

Furthermore, the discussion document uses deficit language by stating that some people "may not have the capability or capacity to share their needs." This phrasing places the responsibility on individuals rather than on the system. In light of Article 11 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which mandates that States Parties take all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, a rights-based framing would instead assert that our emergency management system proactively and inclusively understand the needs of people who communicate or engage in different ways.

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

We urge the National Emergency Management Agency to review the findings of Donald Beasley Institute. (2023). *Disaster resilience and disability: Nothing without us*. Auckland City Council. The report outlines barriers to disaster preparedness for disabled people, including financial access, community connectedness, communication and education, and disability specific barriers, such as the provider-bound nature of preparedness planning, and the needs of people who depend on a service animal.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The government has committed to ensuring that our emergency management system "does more" to meet diverse needs. We would like to see that additional effort co-designed with people with intellectual disabilities. Therefore, we prefer Option 3: Require CDEM Group plans to include strategies for planning for people and communities that may be disproportionately affected. This option embodies the disability rights dictum "Nothing About Us Without Us."

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

The National Emergency Management Agency has acknowledged that "communities (or their representatives) may have limited capacity to engage," we assure you that IHC has the capacity to engage and can connect the National Emergency Management Agency with people with intellectual disability who want to participate in this process.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Adrienne Staples |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Wairarapa Engineering Lifelines Association |

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I am in support of Option 3, a principles-based definition of 'essential infrastructure' on the basis that over time better alignment could be achieved through other legislation adopting the same principles-based definition. I note, of particular relevance to Wairarapa, that flood protection is not included in your list (paragraph 174 or in Appendix C) of options that could additionally be considered 'essential and believe it should be included. I am not, however, in favour of the new essential infrastructure providers suggested in Appendix C, as most of those listed (e.g. domain name system (DNS) services, internet service providers and payment systems) are wholly reliant on physical infrastructure (telecommunications systems) and are, as such, next-users of services rather than infrastructure entities in themselves.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Emergency management in New Zealand is, at its heart, a collaborative process. The emergency management sector has virtually no resources of its own to respond and relies on the resources of its Group members. In the case of the Wairarapa Engineering Lifelines Association (WELA), this means the resources of the energy, telecommunications, transport and water sectors in Wairarapa, who are the experts in their fields and who must comply with the regulatory frameworks imposed upon them. We cannot facilitate any discussion or planning without the collaborative input of our members. As such, we have had no issues with their sharing information within our Association. All are professional organisations that are working collaboratively with us on risk-reduction activities. Indeed, all have been happy to publicly share information about infrastructure vulnerabilities in Wairarapa (see https://www.wremo.nz/assets/Library/Reports/Wairarapa-Engineering-Lifelines-Association-Risk-Framework-Report ). I note that Options 2, 3 and 4 are either loose (option 2) or resort to *requiring* the lifeline utilities to be involved in, or contribute to, planning. This would not encourage a collaborative environment.

Further, I believe there is a distinction between a 'strong pre-event plan' and a plan that delivers a meaningful output. For example, as noted in our risk framework output (link provided above), one plan that will impact us is has a realistic goal of regaining road access to the Wairarapa three months after a major earthquake. The response plan is thought-through and cohesive, using existing infrastructure, however it delivers a response that many in Wairarapa would consider a poor level of service. This is not delivering a 'fit for purpose' outcome. This means that any regulator will have difficulty in defining what is a 'strong' response plan and a plan delivering an outcome that is effective for the community.

I therefore support Option 1 'status quo', not because it is a good option, but because the other alternatives presented here will not be effective. (For an alternative, see my comments below.)

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Regarding the contents of paragraphs 178 to 181 regarding 'business continuity planning' (I suspect you mean emergency response planning), I have the following feedback.
By recently publishing the WELA risk framework (details above), we have achieved something that is key while the infrastructure is not resilient – informing our communities of the risk they face from infrastructure that is not resilient, and therefore we are helping manage their expectations of outages. This will help them understand what it is that they should be preparing for.
I am aware of the work of the Wellington Lifelines Group (WeLG) in creating a framework of 'planning emergency levels of service' (PELOS) which addressed the above items by requiring the lifeline utilities (the experts in their respective fields) to publish their PELOS. Such a requirement would:

- Let the experts in their own sectors say what it is they are planning to deliver in an emergency.

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- Provide the communities (and next-users) an understanding of what will be delivered, managing their expectations and allowing them to plan for events.
- Allow the regulators and funders of their sectors, and the communities, to assess whether the stated PELOS is adequate, or if further investment is required to strengthen infrastructure, and at what cost.
- Come at minimal compliance cost, noting that most lifeline utilities:
    - will already know their likely PELOS, and
    - during- and post-event emergency event will not be checked back, as the PELOS is a planning tool only.

I am therefore disappointed that Clause 58 of the previous Bill was removed from this current Bill, as it would have had a positive impact on the ability of the remainder of the CDEM Group, and communities to manage their own risks.
Finally, this Bill appears to focus its attention on emergency response. Greater attention should be given to risk reduction, for which PELOS will provide an understanding of what aspects of infrastructure require greater resilience. If PELOS is not adopted, another means of providing evidence of where resilience investment is required to reduce risk should be developed, either through the emergency management system or through some other Central Government function.

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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# Response to Emergency Legislation Consultation by NEMA

April 2025

## Background

Disability Connect Incorporated is a pan disability organisation serving disabled people their families, whanau and carers based in Auckland with an increasingly national reach. We provide:

- DIAS (Disability Information Advisory Service)
- Cultural Disability Information Service
- Pastoral Care
- Housing Disability Navigation

This response was prepared by Disability Connect staff in consultation with our 5,500+ members.

## Feedback on Template

The use of tables in the template provided made it unwieldy for preparing and sharing our submission within our community. We would have preferred a standardised Word document similar to that used in IRD's recent consultation. Making it easier for organisations like ourselves, which are not well resourced for consultation, will lead to better legislation and policy outcomes. We want to help you be great at what you do.

https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/cdem-sector/legislation/emergency-management-bill

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# Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes

☒ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Given disabled people constitute 17% of the population according to Statistics New Zealand (2023) and they and their family and whanau are particularly vulnerable in a disaster they should be specifically identified in the objectives from the start. International research and our own experiences in Christchurch earthquakes and the floods in Auckland confirm that disasters disproportionately impact disabled individuals and their families. Highlighting the importance of disability-inclusive policies in all phases of disaster management directs that the voices of our most vulnerable people are included in emergency planning and is quite simply international best practise.

https://rm.coe.int/16800c6908 ; https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2023-06/politiki_za_vklucuvanje_na_poprecenost_book_-_eng_-_web.pdf ;

https://www.malteser-international.org/fileadmin/

Files_sites/malteser-international/A-About_us/E-Service/C-Publications/Specialized_Publications/DiDRR_Study_in_English.pdf;

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# Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

## Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes

☒ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Omits disabled people and their families. They are disproportionately vulnerable. Imagine being blind in an earthquake. Our Civil Defence failed to support blind people and their families in both Christchurch earthquakes because they weren't included in plans. People

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with physical disabilities and mobility challenges and/or long term health conditions were not considered in plans for Auckland floods.

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

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**Please explain your views.**

1. Limited Accessibility

Evacuation - Emergency shelters, transportation, and evacuation procedures are largely not accessible to people with mobility, sensory, or cognitive disabilities. People with physical disabilities or mobility issues rely on specialist equipment, carers, family members, specialist vehicles or vehicles with adaptations to mobilise. None of these supports may be available in a disaster.

Inaccessible communication: Emergency alerts and updates are often not in accessible formats (e.g., sign language, braille, easy read, or audio formats). This consultation is not in accessible format either!

2. Disruption of Support Systems

Loss of caregivers or services: Emergencies can interrupt access to essential support, such as personal care attendants, therapists, routine medical care. How do I know an emergency centre has a refrigerator for my meds?

Separation from assistive devices: In the chaos of evacuation, people may be separated from wheelchairs, hearing aids, medications, communication devices and other equipment necessary to sustain life, as well as their specialist adaptors to recharge with.

3. Socioeconomic Factors

Higher poverty rates: Disabled individuals and their families are more likely to experience economic poverty, which limits their resilience through reduced ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters.

Housing vulnerability: They may live in less safe or more disaster-prone housing due to financial constraints. Sadly affordable housing is being built on flood plains in Auckland that disabled people are more likely to live in.

4. Social Isolation

Lack of inclusion in planning: Disabled individuals are often excluded from emergency planning and decision-making processes. We are also excluded in the design and planning of social housing which has an impact on resilience from a disaster for older people and others with temporary disabilities.

Dependence on informal networks: Many rely on friends or family for help, who may also be affected or unable to assist during a crisis.

5. Health-Related Vulnerabilities

Chronic health conditions: Many disabled people have medical needs that can worsen without consistent access to healthcare or medication during an emergency.

Increased stress and trauma risk: Emergencies can have a more severe psychological impact, especially when autonomy or dignity is compromised.

6. Discrimination and Stigma

Systemic bias: Emergency responses often prioritise the general population, with disabled people seen as “less urgent.” Christchurch earthquakes’ immediate response ignored the needs of people who were blind or had low vision. Mainly because they weren’t in the plans so no one knew where they lived or how to contact them.

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Lack of training: Emergency personnel have limited training in how to assist individuals with disabilities respectfully and effectively. There is a general lack of investment in this area for Civil Defence, noting turnover of staff is an issue too.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   **Please explain your views.**

   Preparing for a disaster is an investment by central and local government to mitigate risks for both infrastructure and people. It is not a cost.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   **Please explain your views.**

   Emergency planning would be completely informed by disabled people's needs, with co-designed plans, accessible communication (NZSL, Easy Read, etc.), and inclusive shelters with mobility and sensory accommodations. Emergency staff would receive disability awareness training, and accessible transport would be available for evacuations. Plans would ensure continuity of care, access to assistive devices, and inclusion of carers. Data on disabled communities would inform local responses, and all efforts would align with Te Tiriti o Waitangi and the UNCRPD, ensuring equitable, culturally responsive support during emergencies.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

   **Please explain your views.**

   Some disabilities and long term health conditions require specialist equipment that emergency centres and planners will be unaware of. It is simply unworkable to think that they could no know where to go or who to contact no matter how well trained they are. For example people with spinal injuries have 2 national centres of acute treatment in Auckland and Christchurch. Getting the right catheters, batteries, pain treatments, mattresses and cushions as soon as possible is life saving for some. The two acute centres have peer support organisations that mobilised in the last floods to work alongside hospitals. They should ideally be connected to regional emergency centres so any person with a spinal injury who has been evacuated can quickly be supported. Making sure communication infrastructure is resilient is one priority. The other is reducing the number of calls required to get the right equipment to the right place as fast as possible from the right distribution centre. Working with people with long term health conditions, disabled people and their representative organisations to identify and maintain preparedness is critical, as disability and medical equipment and supplies are changing every 2 years at a minimum.

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## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ **Yes** ☐ **No** ☐ **Not sure / no preference**

**Please explain your views.**

Maori are proportionately disadvantaged by disasters as are disabled people and their families. They should both be specifically identified from the outset in all emergency planning.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ **Yes** ☐ **No** ☐ **Not sure / no preference**

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**Please explain your views.**

Maori play a significant role in disaster preparedness, planning and recovery for local communities that central and local government simply haven't capacity or capability to provide..

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

**Please explain your views.**

The initial options do not adequately address the needs of disabled people. Disabled communities face significant barriers during emergencies, including communication gaps, inaccessible evacuation plans, and delays in assistance. Without explicit inclusion of disabled people in disaster planning, the risks (loss of life, injury, isolation) are severe, and resilience will remain low.

**Preferred option:** Stronger mandates to include disability-specific planning in emergency systems, with consultation and co-design with disabled communities and providers.

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

**Please explain your views.**

Iwi Māori should be recognised as equal partners in emergency management, grounded in Te Tiriti o Waitangi, just as disabled people and their families should be included in recognition of Braille, NZSL and East Read to meet communities disproportionately impacted by disasters. Their role must reflect not just engagement but actual decision-making power at all levels — local, regional, and national.

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

**Please explain your views.**

CDEM Groups should form formal partnerships with iwi Māori, with Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) that ensure Māori perspectives are incorporated into all emergency phases: preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. A good way to do this would be through Neighbourhood Support networks and collaborations alongside Red Cross for example.

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

**Please explain your views.**

Coordinating Executive Groups are best to have designated Māori representatives with equal authority and clear responsibilities. Representatives are best selected by iwi themselves, not appointed by agencies.

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

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**Please explain your views.**

Iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga should be formally embedded into CDEM planning through advisory panels, mandated reports, and funded positions within NEMA and other bodies. Regular hui should feed into national planning processes.

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

**Please explain your views.**

A dedicated "Equity and Inclusion Division" within emergency management focused on vulnerable populations (disabled, Māori, ethnic minorities, rural communities) should be established.

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## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ **Yes** ☐ **No** ☐ **Not sure / no preference**

**Please explain your views.**

This is long overdue. Government simply doesn't have the capacity or capability to respond to all emergencies. Particularly emergencies that occur on weekends, holidays and those that have a long tail. Disabled people and their families are disproportionately impacted for during and after a disaster. Organisations, businesses and iwi are relied on by disabled people to mitigate their limited resilience.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

**Please explain your views.**

Most vulnerable populations must be identified and given a voice if disaster response is to improve their resilience in a disaster. Sadly this is not the case in this consultation document. The result is reduced resilience of disabled people and their families and greater dependence on government post disasters.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

**Please explain your views.**

Establish regional disability liaison officers embedded within CDEM Groups along with key disability advocates from Council and Community Disability Advisory Groups and Organisations who are connected to specialist disability networks e.g. Cerebral Palsy Assn of New Zealand.

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## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ **Yes** ☐ **No** ☐ **Not sure / no preference**

**Please explain your views.**

Disasters happen suddenly and often in remote places. Community organisations are often the only immediate support, particularly for isolated or high-needs individuals. Disability Information Centres are often best placed to support communities with the right contacts.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

**Please explain your views.**

If disabled people, their families and whanau and other support networks are not empowered and included in readiness programs, they will continue to suffer disproportionate impacts.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

**Please explain your views.**

Establish a register of disability support organisations including DIAS and spinal support organisations at the regional CDEM level.

Create formal pathways for rapid funding during emergencies to NGOs already supporting disabled people.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

**Please explain your views.**

Disability-specific planning is absent in most local emergency strategies. This must change by making disability inclusion a core performance indicator.

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# Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

## Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22-39. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

**☒ Yes** **☐ No** **☐ Not sure / no preference**

**Please explain your views.**

For questions 22–39 .

☒ Yes — problem described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly.

Clear operational control is crucial during emergencies, but so is clarity on who is responsible for vulnerable groups' welfare (e.g., disabled, long term health conditions, elderly, rural). Disability Connect urges the Ministry to mandate clear disability accountability at every level.

Other options:

- Specialist disability advisors and community representatives included on Coordinating Executive Groups and Controllers' teams.
- CDEM plans to include "vulnerable persons' emergency plans" with explicit reference to disabled people and their families, so we know no one is left out, with annual or bi-annual updates.

# Objective 3: Higher Emergency Management Standards

**40–46. Stronger National Direction and Performance**

**☒ Yes — problem identified well.**
National minimum standards must include disability-inclusive emergency planning,

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accessibility standards for shelters, and communication accessibility (e.g., NZSL interpreters, easy-read alerts).

**Other options:**

- Certification or audit requirement for CDEM plans to meet minimum accessibility standards. Would be good to have one government standards bureau. Expand the scope of Te Kāhui Kāhu?

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## Issue 9: Local Hazard Risk Management

**47–52**

The need for more consistent and disability-inclusive risk management is urgent. Plans must be accessible and consider the unique vulnerabilities and adaptive strategies needed for disabled people and their families and whanau.

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## 22. Issue 10: Cultural Heritage and Animals

**53–59**

☒ Yes

We strongly support the recognition of taonga Māori and cultural heritage. For disabled people, their families and whanau assistance animals are critical for survival and well-

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being. In emergencies, support animals must be accommodated alongside their disabled owners in shelters

**Other options:**

- Mandatory inclusion of disability support animals in emergency planning.
- Emergency shelters must allow service animals without question.

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## Objective 4: Minimising Disruption to Essential Services

**61–76**

Essential infrastructure must include services that disabled people and their families rely on, such as specialist medical suppliers, wheelchair repair services, pharmacies, community health and home care support.

Infrastructure providers must plan for disabled populations' needs, not just the general public.

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## Objective 5: Right Powers in Emergencies

**78–90**

☒ **Yes — agree**
Clear, prompt decision-making is vital. However, people with disabilities and their families

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must have equitable access to information about cordons, emergency powers, and changes during emergencies.

**Other options:**

- Emergency communication protocols must meet universal design standards.
- Representation of vulnerable populations in local Emergency Operations Centres (EOCs) during disasters.

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## Other Comments

**91**

Disability Connect strongly recommends:

- Embedding disability leadership in CDEM Groups.
- Making accessibility and disability-inclusion a core requirement in national and regional plans.
- Funding disability organisations as critical partners in resilience building and emergency response.

Without proactive inclusion, disabled people and their families will continue to face unnecessary hardship and death in emergencies.

---

Thank you

Mike Potter
C.E.O.
s9(2)(a)
www.disabilityconnect.org.nz

On behalf of Disability Connect members, disabled people and their families.

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National Emergency Management Agency
Te Rākau Whakamarumaru

# Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

## Submitter information

| | |
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| Organisation: (if applicable) | Parents of Vision Impaired NZ. See www.pvi.org.nz for more information on who we are. |

| | |
|---|---|
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Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website. You do not need to answer all questions.

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

### 1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?

| ☐ Yes | ☒ No | ☐ Not sure / no preference |
|---|---|---|

Disabled people constitute 17% of the population (Stats NZ, 2023) and are particularly vulnerable in a disaster. It would be useful if disabled persons were specifically identified in the objectives at the start.

International research (Alexander & Sagramola, 2014; Popovski, 2023), alongside experiences in Aotearoa New Zealand (e.g., Christchurch earthquakes, Auckland floods, and East Coast floods) confirm that disasters disproportionately impact disabled individuals and their families. Highlighting the importance of disability-inclusive policies in all phases of disaster management directs that the voices of our most vulnerable people are included in emergency planning.

Persons with disabilities are among those most impacted by natural hazards and climate induced disasters, yet more likely to be excluded from disaster risk reduction (DRR) related decision-making and practice (Twigg, Kiett & Lovell, 2018).

Inclusive efforts require making disaster responsiveness a shared agenda. This means increased multi-stakeholder collaborations and partnerships among governments, I/NGOs, UN agencies, OPDs, and civil society actors, as well as encouraging resource and capacity sharing (Gvetadze & Pertiwi, 2021).

Citations:

Alexander, D., & Sagramola, S. (2014). *Including People with Disabilities in Disaster Preparedness and Response*. www.coe.int/europarisks

Gvetadze, N., & Pertiwi, P. (October 2021). *Including Persons with Disabilities in Disaster Risk Reduction: A Research Study from Eight Countries of Africa, Asia and South/Central America*. Disability Inclusive Disaster Risk Reduction Network, Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Deutschland.

Popovski, V. (2023). *Policies for Disability-inclusive Disaster Risk Reduction in the Context of the Republic of North Macedonia*.

Twigg, J. Kett, M. Lovell, E. (2018). *Disability inclusion and disaster risk reduction: Overcoming barriers to progress.*

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# Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

## Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency. *Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| ☐ Yes | ☒ No | ☐ Not sure / no preference |

It is unclear if this specifically includes tāngata whaikaha and their whānau. Disabled Māori have specific needs in disaster responses.

The NZ Civil Defence failed to adequately support blind people and their families in both Christchurch earthquakes because they weren't included in Civil Defence plans.

The mitigation and support plans for managing the Auckland floods did not include persons with physical disabilities, people with mobility challenges, or those with long term health conditions.

There is a need to specifically mention and work with both Māori disabled in culturally appropriate ways, and with non-Māori disabled. Different disabilities have different requirements for access and support. The documentation does not specifically mention disability or disability communities.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

**Accessibility features** may be limited. For example:

- **Evacuation:** Emergency shelters, transportation, and evacuation procedures are traditionally not accessible. This includes mobility, sensory, and cognitive disabilities. People with physical disabilities or mobility issues typically rely on specialist equipment, carers, family members, specialist vehicles or vehicles with adaptations to mobilise. None of these supports may be available in a disaster.
- **Communications:** Emergency alerts and updates are often in inaccessible formats. This consultation document is a classic example of an inaccessible format – tables are not generally very accessible, neither are they necessary in a template (you will note that I have taken out the tables as they were quite difficult to navigate).

**Support systems** are often disrupted. For example:

- **Loss of caregivers or services**: Emergencies can interrupt access to essential support, such as personal care attendants, therapists, or routine medical care. How would a family know if the emergency centre has a refrigerator for medicine storage? What if the care workers live in a different city/suburb, will they still be able to manage providing care? If not, who will provide personal cares?

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- **Informal networks**: Many disabled persons rely on friends or family for help. These networks may not be formally recognised, but often meet access and support needs. These family may also be affected or unable to assist during a crisis.
- **Separation from assistive devices**: In the chaos of evacuation, people may be separated from wheelchairs, hearing aids, medications, communication devices, and other equipment. Some of this equipment is necessary to sustain life, and comes with specialist adaptors for charging. How will these factors be accounted for and mitigated?

**Socioeconomic factors** compound and exacerbate challenges:

- **Higher poverty rates:** Disabled individuals and their families are more likely to experience economic poverty. This limits their resilience to disaster, and results in a reduced ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters.
- **Housing vulnerability**: Many disabled individuals and their families live in less safe or more disaster-prone housing. Affordable housing is currently being built on flood plains in Auckland – it is likely that disabled people will live here.

**Health-related vulnerabilities** impact in the following ways:

- **Chronic health conditions**: It is not uncommon for disabled people to have additional an/or multiple medical needs. These needs can worsen without consistent access to healthcare or medication during an emergency.
- **Increased stress and trauma risk**: Emergencies can have a more severe psychological impact, especially when autonomy or dignity is compromised.

**Discrimination and stigma** towards disabled people makes things more difficult:

- **Systemic bias:** Emergency responses tend to prioritise the general population, with disabled people seen as "less urgent." The immediate response to the Christchurch earthquake completely ignored the needs of people who were blind or had low vision. This was largely in part due to this population group not being included in disaster management planning, so no one in the Civil Defence team knew where they lived or how to contact them.
- **Inadequate training**: Emergency personnel often have limited and/or inadequate training in how to assist individuals with disabilities respectfully and effectively. There is a general lack of investment in this area for Civil Defence. Staff turnover impacts on this also, with staff leaving resulting in a knowledge gap for remaining staff.

  **Exclusion from planning**: Disabled individuals are often excluded from planning and decision-making processes. This has flow in impacts. For example, not including disabled persons in the design and planning of social housing has impacted on resilience for older people.

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Framing preparation activities for disaster as a cost is rather problematic. We view it as an investment into communities to mitigate risks for both infrastructure and people.

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**5. What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Emergency planning would be fully informed by the needs and insights of disabled people through co-designed strategies that prioritise accessibility and inclusion. Communication during emergencies would be provided in accessible formats, including New Zealand Sign Language (NZSL), Easy Read, and other formats tailored to a range of access needs. Emergency shelters would be designed to accommodate mobility, sensory, and other disability-related requirements.

All emergency personnel would receive comprehensive disability awareness training, and accessible transport options would be available for safe and efficient evacuations. Plans would include provisions to ensure continuity of care, timely access to assistive devices, and the inclusion of carers as essential to support.

Local response efforts would be informed by accurate data on disabled populations, enabling targeted and effective action. All initiatives would be grounded in Te Tiriti o Waitangi and aligned with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), ensuring responses are equitable, culturally responsive, and uphold the rights and dignity of all disabled people during emergencies.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Some disabilities and long-term health conditions require highly specialised equipment that emergency planners and response centres may not be aware of. It is unrealistic to expect that even well-trained personnel will automatically know where to go or who to contact in every situation. For example, individuals with spinal cord injuries rely on two national centres for acute care, located in Auckland and Christchurch. Access to the correct catheters, batteries, pain relief, mattresses, and cushions can be lifesaving and must be secured as quickly as possible.

Peer support organisations affiliated with these acute centres played a crucial role during recent floods, working alongside hospitals to support affected individuals. Ideally, these organisations should be directly connected to regional emergency centres to ensure people with spinal injuries who are evacuated can be promptly identified and assisted.

Two key priorities are: ensuring the resilience of communication infrastructure, and minimising the number of steps required to get the correct equipment to the right location from the appropriate distribution centre. Ongoing collaboration with disabled people, individuals with long-term health conditions, and their representative organisations is essential to maintaining emergency preparedness—especially given that medical and disability equipment and supply needs often change at least every two years.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand. *Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Tāngata whaikaha Māori and whānau are disproportionately disadvantaged by disasters. As such it is important that tāngata whaikaha are specifically identified from the outset in all emergency planning.

The same for disabled persons in general.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Māori communities play a significant role in disaster preparedness, and are often involved in planning and recovery in ways that central and/or local governments are not.

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

The initial options do not adequately address the basic needs of disabled people. Disabled communities routinely face unacceptable barriers during emergencies. These barriers include inaccessible communications, evacuation plans that overlook mobility and sensory needs, and critical delays in receiving assistance. These are systemic failures that place disabled lives at risk. There is a need for the explicit and enforceable inclusion of disabled people across all stages of disaster planning. Without this, resilience efforts will continue to exclude those most at risk.

**Preferred option:** Introduce mandates that necessitate disability-specific planning across all emergency systems. This must include direct consultation and genuine co-design with disabled people, tāngata whaikaha Māori, and disability service providers. Anything less will continue to marginalise and endanger a significant portion of our population.

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Iwi Māori should be recognised as equal partners in emergency management, grounded in Te Tiriti o Waitangi, just as disabled people and their families should be included in recognition of Braille, NZSL and East Read to meet communities disproportionately impacted by disasters. Their role must reflect not just engagement but actual decision-making power at all levels — local, regional, and national.

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

CDEM Groups should formalise their partnerships with iwi Māori through Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) as a way to ensure that iwi Māori perspectives are incorporated into all emergency phases: preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation.

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**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Coordinating Executive Groups are best to have designated Māori representatives with equal authority and clear responsibilities. These representatives are best selected by iwi, not appointed by agencies

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management should be formally embedded into CDEM planning through advisory panels, mandated reports, and funded positions within NEMA and other bodies. Regular hui should feed into national planning processes.

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

A dedicated team within emergency management focused on vulnerable populations (disabled, Māori, ethnic minorities, rural communities) should be established and funded.

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response. *Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

It is heartening to read such a comprehensive response, and it is well time for a co-ordinated approach to emergency management.

Central and/or local government typically do not have the capacity or capability to respond to all emergencies, and even less when disasters occur on weekends or holidays.

Disabled people and their families are disproportionately impacted on both during and after a disaster. Organisations, businesses and iwi are relied on by disabled people to mitigate their limited resilience.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

It is important to identify vulnerable populations, and to ensure their voices are included and heard. This will improve their resilience in a disaster.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Establish regional disability liaison officers embedded within CDEM Groups.

Establish key disability advocates from Council and Community Disability Advisory Groups and Organisations who are connected to existing specialist disability networks. For example, Blind Low Vision NZ, Deaf Aotearoa, People First NZ, etc.

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### Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency. *Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Q18-Q20: Disasters often occur suddenly and in locations where formal emergency services may be delayed in arriving. In such situations, community organisations frequently serve as the first and only immediate support—especially for isolated individuals or those with high and complex needs. Disability Information Centres, in particular, are well-positioned to assist, given their established networks and local knowledge.

If disabled people, their families, whānau, and support networks are not actively included and empowered through emergency preparedness programmes, they will continue to experience disproportionate harm and disruption during emergencies. To address this, a regional register of disability support organisations—including Disability Information and Advisory Services (DIAS) and spinal support organisations—should be established and integrated into Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) systems.

Additionally, formal mechanisms should be created to enable rapid funding for non-governmental organisations already providing critical support to disabled communities during emergencies, ensuring continuity of care and timely response.

#### Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

As noted earlier, disability-specific planning is absent in most local emergency strategies. This is an international challenge. Changing this requires making disability inclusion a core performance indicator.

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency. *Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

Q22 – Q25: yes, the problem is described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities.

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for. *Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

Q26 – Q29: yes, the problem is described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

### Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability. *Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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31. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

32. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Q30 – Q32: yes, the problem is described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

### Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups. *Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

33. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

34. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

35. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Q33 – Q35: yes, the problem is described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

### Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities. *Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

36. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

37. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

38. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

### Other problems relating to this objective

39. **Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Q36 – Q39: yes, the problem is described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

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## Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system. *Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Q40-Q43: yes, the problem is described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

National minimum standards must include disability-inclusive emergency planning, and minimum standards for accessibility. This includes accessibility standards for shelters, as well as accessibility standards for communication (e.g., NZSL interpreters, easy-read alerts).

### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently. *Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Q44-Q46: yes, the problem is described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

National minimum standards must include disability-inclusive emergency planning, and minimum standards for accessibility. This includes accessibility standards for shelters, as well as accessibility standards for communication (e.g., NZSL interpreters, easy-read alerts).

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## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively. *Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Q47 – Q52: As noted earlier in this consultation document, there is an urgent need for more consistent and disability-inclusive risk management. Planning for local hazard risk management must be accessible in the first instance, and secondly, it must consider the specific vulnerabilities of disabled persons and the adaptive strategies needed.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately. *Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Q53 – Q55: Yes, we agree with how you have described the problem and we strongly support the recognition of taonga Māori and other cultural heritage.

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### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately. *Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

### Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Q56 – Q60: Yes, we agree with how you have described the problem. For disabled people, assistance animals are critical for survival and well- being. In emergencies, support animals such as guide dogs must be accommodated alongside their disabled owners in shelters.

We also recommend that there is mandatory inclusion of disability support animals in emergency planning, and that it is made very clear that emergency shelters *must* allow service animals without question.

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

Q61 - Q76: as mentioned across this consultation document, essential services and infrastructure must include services that disabled people and their families rely on, such as specialist medical suppliers, wheelchair repair services, pharmacies, and personal care support.

Infrastructure and essential service providers must plan for the needs of their local disabled population, not just the general public. This will required working with disabled people and local/national disability groups.

Disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

Q78 – Q90: as mentioned across this consultation document, disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

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Clear, prompt decision-making is vital. However, disabled individuals and their families must have equitable access to information about cordons, emergency powers, and changes during emergencies. This must be provided in the necessary accessible formats.

We strongly recommend that emergency communication protocols meet universal design standards, and that there is representation of vulnerable populations in local Emergency Operations Centres (EOCs) during disasters and subsequent responses.

## Other comments

There is a need for specific, proactive inclusion of disabled people and their families. Without this intentionality, disabled persons and their families will continue to face unnecessary hardship and risk during emergencies.

Parents of Vision Impaired notes that the following will go a long way to addressing the issues outlined in our consultation response:

- Embed disability leadership across all CDEM Groups.
- Mandate accessibility as a key feature (make it a KPI).
- Mandate disability inclusion as a core requirement in national and regional plans (make it a KPI).
- Adequately fund a range of national and local level disability organisations as key partners in resilience building and emergency response management.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Mark Mitchell |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Anglican Missions |

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I agree with the principle that the emergency management system must better meet the diverse needs of communities. However, it is important to recognise that engagement with diverse members of the community is not only necessary to address differing needs, but also to benefit from alternative perspectives that can improve the overall response. In my experience, diverse groups often observe the impacts of emergencies differently and offer insights and alternative approaches that are more practical,

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appropriate, and effective. Their inclusion strengthens both the fairness and the quality of emergency management, ensuring that responses are more closely aligned with the realities experienced by affected communities.

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. In addition to facing higher risks during emergencies, diverse community groups are often disproportionately affected because their perspectives and capacities are not adequately recognised or integrated into emergency planning and response. Excluding these perspectives limits the system's ability to understand the full impact of an emergency and can result in less effective responses. International best practice, including the Core Humanitarian Standard (Commitment 4) and the Sphere Handbook, emphasises the right of affected communities to participate in decisions that impact them. Failure to engage meaningfully with diverse communities results not only in inequity but also in poorer emergency outcomes for all. For example, during Cyclone Gabrielle, several rural and migrant communities reported that they received little or no information through official channels and had to rely on informal networks to coordinate their response. In addition, organisations such as NGOs and international humanitarian agencies operating in New Zealand often have strong relationships with diverse communities and could support more inclusive engagement if systematically involved in planning and response.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Strengthening the system's ability to identify and respond to the diverse needs of communities would bring clear benefits. Inclusive engagement improves the quality, relevance, and effectiveness of emergency responses, as communities often identify needs and propose solutions that are otherwise missed. It would also align New Zealand's emergency management practices with international standards, such as the Core Humanitarian Standard and Sphere guidelines. The main risk is that engagement could become tokenistic if not properly embedded into systems and practice, which would limit its effectiveness. Strong national guidance on meaningful participation, based on humanitarian best practice, would help mitigate this risk and ensure better outcomes for affected communities.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Planning would involve early, ongoing, and meaningful engagement with a wide range of community groups, particularly those likely to be disproportionately affected. Diverse communities would not simply be consulted after plans are written but would actively participate in shaping priorities, identifying risks, and proposing solutions. Emergency management bodies would ensure that planning reflects different lived experiences and perspectives, strengthening the relevance and effectiveness of preparedness and response strategies. Planning would focus not only on addressing vulnerabilities but

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also on enabling the strengths and capacities of diverse groups to be part of the solution. Principles from the Core Humanitarian Standard and the Sphere Handbook, particularly regarding participation, dignity, and accessibility, would be embedded at all levels. Structures such as community advisory groups, representation in CDEM planning processes, involvement of humanitarian organisations familiar with international standards, and inclusive public information strategies would help ensure that plans are grounded in the realities of all communities, not just the majority view. Following the Christchurch earthquake, churches in suburban areas mobilised food, water, and shelter independently, but were not integrated into the official response, leading to duplication of efforts and missed opportunities for stronger, more efficient service delivery. Better planning could have harnessed these strengths far more effectively.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Agree with the principle but no detailed comments to add at this time

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I strongly agree with how the problem has been described. In my experience, when local groups such as churches, marae, and community organisations are supported and engaged early, emergency responses are faster, better targeted, and more trusted by affected communities. However, without clear mechanisms for engagement established before emergencies occur, community mobilisation often happens independently and without coordination.

During Cyclone Gabrielle, for example, the national response effectively operated from major centres such as Napier outward to rural areas, but churches and marae already embedded in remote communities could have provided valuable intelligence and support. Because no preparedness structures, relationships, or communication protocols were in place, this capacity was not effectively utilised, leading to gaps in assessment and coordination.

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Strengthening community participation, including providing points of contact, clear communication pathways, and guidance for how groups, including NGOs and international humanitarian organisations, can connect into official structures, is vital. In the absence of clear engagement during Cyclone Gabrielle, some community hubs self-organised evacuation centres but struggled to access official support quickly, creating gaps in service provision.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Strengthening community participation in emergency management would have significant positive impacts. In my experience, when local groups such as churches, marae, and community organisations are supported and engaged early, responses are faster, better targeted, and more trusted by affected communities.

Investing in preparedness by establishing mechanisms for community engagement would bring relatively low costs compared to the benefits achieved. Building relationships, clarifying points of contact, and supporting basic orientation or training for community groups would significantly enhance their ability to respond effectively from day one of an emergency.

There are risks if engagement is not meaningful or is left too late. Without clear coordination structures, there is a danger of duplication of effort, confusion, or critical needs being missed.

This approach also aligns with international best practice, such as the Core Humanitarian Standard (Commitments 1 and 4) and the Humanitarian Charter, which emphasise the right of communities to participate in decisions that affect them and to receive information and assistance appropriate to their needs.

I would strongly support the development of clearer national guidance that enables consistent, proactive engagement with community organisations before emergencies occur.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

In addition to the options proposed, I recommend the establishment of formal community liaison roles within each CDEM Group. These roles would be responsible for maintaining active relationships with churches, marae, and other key community organisations during the preparedness phase, ensuring that lines of communication and coordination are established before an emergency occurs.

I also recommend the development of pre-agreed response protocols and communication pathways to help community groups mobilise effectively and integrate smoothly into the wider response structure. Supporting community-led preparedness exercises would further strengthen trust and operational readiness between community responders and official agencies.

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In addition, there would be significant benefit in supporting stronger coordination between community hubs, such as churches and marae, through localised collaboration networks. Facilitating structured communication and coordination between these groups, along with NGO networks such as the Council for International Development Humanitarian Network (CHN), would promote the sharing of best practice, enhance situational awareness, and enable a more cohesive and effective response. Establishing these networks during the preparedness phase would ensure that community-led efforts are better aligned and supported, both among themselves and with the wider official response system. International humanitarian practice demonstrates the value of structured, decentralised community clusters for strengthening response capacity and ensuring consistency across different community-led efforts.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I strongly agree with the need to strengthen the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance. In my experience responding to domestic emergencies such as Cyclone Gabrielle and the Christchurch earthquake, I have observed that minimum standards for emergency management are not always clearly understood or consistently applied. Internationally recognised standards, such as those outlined in the Sphere Handbook and the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS), offer a strong foundation for improving the quality, accountability, and effectiveness of emergency responses.

Many NGOs and international humanitarian organisations already operate using these frameworks and could provide valuable support in building national capacity. A clear example is the provision of water in emergencies. In several recent responses, the technical standards for water supply were not met, not only in terms of the quantity of water available but also factors such as the distance to collection points, availability of containers, and accessibility for vulnerable groups. Without a clear understanding of both the technical standards and the humanitarian principles behind them, planners and responders are unable to fully meet the needs of affected communities.

Greater emphasis must be placed on building understanding of the rationale behind standards, not simply compliance with technical requirements, but ensuring that dignity, access, participation, and protection are considered at all stages of response.

Awareness of the Core Humanitarian Standard (particularly Commitments 1, 2, and 4) would also empower communities by helping them understand their rights and entitlements in emergency situations.

At the same time, there must be careful management of expectations. In New Zealand, it is likely that affected populations will have higher expectations of service levels, which may be difficult to meet immediately after a major event. Standards must therefore be implemented in a way that is realistic about early response constraints while ensuring that minimum levels of dignity, safety, and access are maintained.

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41. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

42. **Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Greater national consistency is particularly needed in setting minimum standards for basic services such as water, sanitation, shelter, and protection of vulnerable groups. Aligning these standards with internationally recognised frameworks, such as the Sphere Handbook, would ensure that all affected communities can expect a consistent minimum level of dignity, safety, and support, regardless of where an emergency occurs.

Consistency is also needed in how community organisations, such as churches and marae, are engaged and coordinated as part of emergency responses. Clear national guidance on community engagement, coordination mechanisms, including NGOs, and public information management would help avoid the confusion and fragmentation often seen in recent responses.

Finally, national consistency in training and capacity building is essential. Emergency managers at all levels need a better understanding of humanitarian principles and the practical standards that underpin effective, accountable, and community-centred responses. Without this, there will continue to be significant variation in the quality of emergency management across regions.

43. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

44. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

I strongly support the general direction of the proposed reforms. Strengthening the inclusiveness, consistency, and quality of emergency management in New Zealand is critical. However, achieving these goals requires more than legislative change; it demands a significant cultural shift. A community-centred approach, grounded in humanitarian principles such as those outlined in the Core Humanitarian Standard and the Sphere Handbook, must be embedded across the system.

Churches, marae, community organisations, and humanitarian NGOs already provide substantial capacity, particularly in rural and remote areas, yet they remain underutilised due to a lack of preparedness structures and engagement mechanisms. Establishing relationships, communication pathways, and clear coordination protocols with these groups before emergencies occur will significantly enhance the effectiveness and reach of the national response.

Stronger minimum standards, better informed by international humanitarian practice, and meaningful community participation are essential to building a system that truly serves the needs and strengths of all New Zealanders. I encourage the Government to ensure that the spirit of partnership and local leadership is fully realised as part of these reforms.

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ANIMAL EVAC.NZ
KARAREHE WHAKAWATEA

5 May 2025 **FROM:** Chair, Animal Evac New Zealand

**SENT BY EMAIL TO:** EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

Dear Policy Unit,

**SUBMSISION ON DISCUSSION DOCUMENT: STRENGTHENING NEW ZEALAND'S EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION**

New Zealand's efforts to reform its emergency management law have highlighted a persistent gap between public sentiment and legislative action-particularly regarding the protection of animals during disasters. Despite robust public engagement and clear calls for animal-inclusive disaster arrangements, previous consultative processes have repeatedly failed to heed citizen expectations and translate these priorities into law. As the government releases its new discussion document for consultation on emergency management legislative reform, there is renewed hope that this deficit will be addressed.

**Strong Public Support for Animal Protection**

The Emergency Management Bill demonstrates overwhelming support for embedding animal welfare in disaster law, most importantly in primary legislation. Submitters called for:

- Clear **statutory** powers for animal rescue and evacuation;
- Mandated animal-inclusive emergency planning;
- Improved coordination and funding for animal disaster response; and
- Protection and identification of disability assistance dogs during disaster.

These priorities reflect both ethical concerns and practical realities: research from past disasters shows that people often risk their own safety to save animals, and that failing to plan for animals can undermine both human and animal welfare.

Despite the clarity and volume of public input, animal welfare provisions have often been sidelined or treated as peripheral in legislative drafts and policy documents.

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For example, after the 2017 Edgecumbe flood— published in International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction where nearly 33% of evacuees breached safety cordons to rescue pets—animal welfare concerns raised in subsequent reviews were relegated to annexes for "future consideration," rather than being integrated into core recommendations.

NZ's democratic system of government – which, includes opportunity to participate and consultation – meets the international standard and we want to ensure that this is taken into consideration during this EM Bill.

**The Government's Latest Discussion Document**

The government's new discussion document acknowledges the high volume of submissions advocating for animal-inclusive disaster law, a positive sign that public voices are being recognised. Past experience does, however suggest caution: previous documents have referenced academic work in passing but have not always engaged with the substance of the evidence or the most comprehensive research in the field despite such research being provided.

The discussion document does not prioritise the protection of animals in emergency management law as sought by the public through submissions made to the withdrawn 2024 Emergency Management Bill. There appears to be little evidence provided how objectives were determined and or how issues were prioritised.

While the discussion document includes a reference to some research, it does not fully reflect the breadth of analysis or the scale of public advocacy documented in recent peer-reviewed studies or the substantive report presented at Parliament in 2019. Nonetheless, the fact that the volume of animal-focused submissions is explicitly noted in the consultation process is an exciting step forward.

The case for animal-inclusive disaster law is both moral and practical. International experience—from Hurricane Katrina in the US to the Edgecumbe flood in New Zealand—shows that people's attachment to animals is a critical factor in disaster response. Laws that fail to account for this bond, risk not only animal suffering but also human non-compliance with evacuation orders, increased danger, and reduced trust in authorities.

There are international best practice examples to draw from like the US Pets Emergency and Transportation Standards (PETS) Act 2006 and Italy's Civil Protection Code 2018. These demonstrate that animal-inclusive disaster law is both achievable and able to be integrated into primary disaster management law as a matter of good practice.

**A Roadmap for Reform**

The public has provided a clear roadmap for reform, calling for:

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- Mandatory inclusion of animals in emergency management plans;
- Clear statutory powers for animal rescue and care;
- Proper funding and coordination for animal welfare response; and
- Recognition of the human-animal bond in disaster policy.

These recommendations are grounded in both lived experience and a growing body of academic research in NZ and overseas, including recent thematic analyses of public submissions. It is important to note that this peer-reviewed study was further validated by an independent research report undertaken by Parliamentary Library researchers in November 2024, commissioned by Rachel Boyack MP.

Non-legislative levers are demonstrably ineffective. This was discussed in the peer-reviewed article "It was one of the worst days of my life: Companion animal owners' experiences of the Edgecumbe 2017 flood in Aotearoa New Zealand" with regard to the "Principles of Evacuation".

The options provided in the discussion document can be seen to obfuscate the issues and disregard the options sought by the public and others in the multiple previous consultation exercises on emergency management reform and system improvement. We fear that this issue - that is clearly important to many submitters - will, again, not be dealt with in primary legislation causing emergency practices regarding animals to remain unclear and sidelined, increasing the risks to both people and animals in emergencies.

We submit that when the emergency management bill is drafted, that a new Part is added, that provides for improved and specific powers, responsibilities, rights and duties with respect to animal emergency management. NZ could build on international best practice, legislate and implement a model framework for animal disaster management repositioning NZ as a leader in animal welfare and emergency management. This would meet the public's clear expectations and enhance human and animal wellbeing in emergencies.

As New Zealand prepares a new draft bill, there is hope that emergency management legislation will be animal inclusive. Meaningful reform requires not just consultation, but genuine responsiveness to the clear priority people in NZ give their pets and other animals. By embedding animal welfare into disaster law, New Zealand can set a global standard for compassionate, effective emergency management.

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Animal Evac New Zealand welcomes direct conversation with NEMA's emergency management bill project team to support the development of world leading animal-inclusive disaster law.

**Mark Anderson, MNZM** BHSc, PG/Dip EM

**Chair**

**Animal Evac New Zealand**

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# Waimarama Submission for the new Emergency Management legislation.

In any civil emergency or natural disaster, communities are hit first; sometimes losing lives and destroying infrastructure and housing.

Any new legislation needs to consider **Communities** first and at the outset, whether they be urban or rural because it is at a local level that an event begins and ends at a community level.

## Background.

I live at Waimarama (Hawke's Bay) and I have been the Civil Defense leader for the last 14 years. In that time, we have had two significant natural disaster events:

1.. April 2011, we were hit by a catastrophic rain event; 700mls in 36 hours. This devastated our Waimarama region when we were totally unprepared for any civil defense (CD) emergency and were completely cut off from the outside world and left in isolation for almost a week, along with no power and no communication.
This event prompted us to fund raise within our own community to prepare us for the next big natural disaster. We erected a purpose built CD shed and filled it with emergency equipment such as a 4WD ute, a covered trailer to transport emergency equipment, a big generator, bar-b-q's, communication devices and other emergency equipment.

2.. Cyclone Gabrielle in February 2023.
Although not as badly damaged as other areas on the east coast, Waimarama still was affected in many ways.
We lost road access to the outside world through slipping and flooding.
We lost all communication, just as all other areas affected by the cyclone.
We lost our water supply to all the Waimarama property owners.
We lost power, also to all our people.
As the CD leader, keeping everybody safe, coping with medical issues was a challenge with no communication and managing stress levels within the community, wasn't an easy task.
However we got off lightly. It could have been worse.

## Result of Cyclone Gabrielle.

This latest cyclone event prompted us, as well as the rest of the Hastings District Council (HDC) region, to get motivated and create our own resilient Community Hubs.
This has been achieved by:

1. A motivated council (HDC) who has got in behind and alongside communities and assisted them in their endeavours to build their own community hub for their own particular community with what suits each individual community best.
2. A multitude of funders (MPI, Red Cross, TPK, Lottery Fund and many others) who were kind enough to help fund communities to create their own resilience capabilities. No two communities were the same as far as their own requirements

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were concerned. They varied enormously. Some communities have created wonderful structures and have amazing equipment to keep their people safe (and alive!) for what could be 10 days in isolation. However, sadly some of the funding was disproportionate; some got more than others and sadly also some are still short of funding to complete their resilience plans. Waimarama being one of those communities short of funding.

3. As a result of all this effort by the HDC and community leaders, we now have about 40 communities that are in varied stages of completeness and preparedness. This is a wonderful effort by everyone.

**Two reports done on Cyclone Gabrielle and other severe weather events in the North Island .**

1. One was commissioned by the Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Joint Committee which comprises of the Central Hawke's Bay District Council (CHBDC), Hastings District Council (HDC), Napier City Council (NCC), Wairoa District Council (WDC) and the Hawke's bay Regional Council (HBRC). This was compiled and completed by Mike Bush, the former commissioner of the NZ Police.
2. The other was commissioned by the NZ Government and was called Government inquiry into the Response to the North Island Severe Weather Events and released April 2024. This report was really well done by a group of four individuals John Ombler, Julie Greene, Sir Jerry Mateparae and Rangimarie Hunia.
3. Both reports were extensive **(and expensive)** and both told us what we already knew..!! And that was that Communities were the top priority for assistance to help them in their own individual preparedness planning.

**Let me elaborate to explain "what we already knew":**

After the April 2011 disastrous flood event that severely impacted our area so badly, (see above), we discovered we as a community were totally unprepared for such an event.
So we as a community got active and raised our own funds so that we could be more resilient for the next big event. See described above.

Our biggest fear at Waimarama, as with all coastal communities on the East Coast of the North Island is a near sourced tsunami from the Hikurangi Subduction Zone.
Our static population is about 450 people which can rise up to about 5,000 in the summer months.
As a result, over the last 14 years, I have done a lot of work at Waimarama with lots of signage to four safe location zones above the probable tsunami danger zone, a lot of education around this initiative, pamphlet drops, group meetings and enlarging our equipment base for any disastrous natural event.
We, as a community, met every month to discuss ideas and initiatives to keep our people safe.

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In 2012, two or three of us in the Hastings District then decided that we needed to push hard for other communities in our region to be more prepared for any future disastrous natural event that "will" hit us again.
So we created between 12 and 15 community hubs, each with their own individual community leaders and each with their own community individual hubs for their own individual areas.
This proved a great success and we as a committed volunteer leaders group would meet together every month or 6 weeks to do some training, discuss ideas and assist each other with issues we as individuals were facing.
All this initiative was all done by our own volunteer group all with a growing knowledge of what we needed and what our communities needed.
At that time, Civil Defence Emergency Management was part of the Hastings District Council.

In 2014, that changed. This existing CDEM suddenly became under the umbrella of the CDEM Group Joint Committee, which included Central Hawke's Bay District Council, Hastings District Council, Napier City Council, Wairoa District Council and the Hawke's Bay Regional Council.
Along with this change came a new directive; all existing community hubs that we worked so hard to establish, were disestablished and dismantled; all except my Waimarama CDEM. I held firm and refused to be taken down by this CDEM Group Joint Committee.
This new CDEM Group Joint Committee, then decided in their wisdom, that they would come and take away all our assets that we at Waimarama fundraised for…!!
As much as they tried and as one can imagine, I gave them the short sharp shift from our Waimarama area and told them never to return.

From conception in 2014, this CDEM Group Joint Committee, was so ineffectual and useless until Cyclone Gabrielle devastated our region. They did nothing to bolster our collective regions preparedness for another disastrous natural event until this Cyclone hit us.
As a result of our regions CDEM Group Joint Committee planning for a major event between 2014 and February 2023, we had a small centralized CDEM group that was supposed to be operational to cover the whole area from Wairoa to the north down to Porangahau in the south.
Sadly, as proven, it was set up to fail, and fail it did… BIG TIME.

At the aftermath, as I was one of the longest serving CD volunteer leaders in HB, I was invited to give a presentation at the Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Joint Committee meeting 26th June 2023.
In that presentation I told this group of some history which they didn't know about and were visibly shocked.
I then advised the "Group" strongly that we as a region, needed to resurrect our community hubs as we had before and make them stronger and more resilient so that they could cope in any civil emergency and or natural disaster on their own for what could be up to two weeks in isolation.
Thankfully the HDC mayor, Sandra Hazlehurst, picked this up and ran with it immediately.
This became the region's top priority.

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Then, at great expense, we had the two reports done to tell us what we already knew! Both reports made it very clear that the number one priority was to think of **Communities** first. And there is a desperate need for them to be resilient and to be able to look after themselves during and after an event.

**So what do I want to see as a result of this submission process?**

1. What we don't want is more wasteful spending and wasteful time spent on more bureaucratic legislation, more reports that will become a hefty document full of platitudes, guidelines and rules around Emergency Management (EM) that will just become some big document to fill a bottom drawer in a desk somewhere and forgotten about over time.
2. What we do want is immediate funding to equip and train people in communities to cope in any horrendous event.
    - Nobody knows rural and or urban areas better than the communities that live within them. They know their people and they know their strengths and weaknesses when hit with an event.
    - As a consequence, they know what is required to keep their people safe for what could be days in isolation.
    - Within every community, there are leaders who are willing to put their hand up and take the responsibility of the people. The government needs to take advantage of these courageous volunteers and assist them in their endeavours to create safe locations, safe and secure shelters and equip these shelters with what is required to keep communities safe and alive until help arrives.
    - When the event is over and help has arrived, communities need financial assistance and practical help to try and get their lives back again to some sort of normality.

Another report and more legislation costing taxpayers money through government agencies, consultants and bureaucratic people who think they know best, is not what we want, nor what is required.
We have had enough of these Government initiatives.
We don't want or need anymore.
Nobody knows best their own particular location areas than communities themselves and it is they that need to be consulted upon at the outset to see what their own individual requirements are, whether it be financial, physical help or training to help them through any natural disaster event.
What communities don't need is government agencies, government bureaucrats and those that think they know what communities need, telling them what to do and what is required. That is the best way to kill CDEM volunteerism and the best way to bring us back to being totally unprepared for what nature throws at us.

We need to learn from our past mistakes and not repeat the mistakes we've already made by being bound by misguided central and local government agencies who create unworkable rules and regulations and who won't listen to the people they represent.

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The answers to these and other CDEM problems are simple and just need a common sense approach to the issues of resilience.

Richard Gaddum.
Waimarama Civil Defence leader.
Email: s9(2)(a)
Phone: s9(2)(a)
Date: 7th May 2025.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | s9(2)(a) |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | GasNet Limited |

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I do not want my submission published on NEMA's website because...

### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

   ☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

   ☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

Proactively Released

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

There appears to be inconsistency between risk management outcomes across organisations that have responsibilities under the Act.

The Natural Hazard Risk Tolerance Literature Review published in July 2023 Natural Hazard Risk Tolerance Literature Review concluded that; "The most significant theme from this review is the current inconsistency in assessing risk tolerance and risk thresholds."

The Review summary goes on to say, Robust and transparent risk tolerance assessments and processes are important to manage risks effectively and implement risk reduction initiatives. Understanding risk tolerance is a critical part of the risk management process, but Aotearoa New Zealand does not have an agreed local, regional, or national regulatory approach to determining risk tolerance and risk acceptability. A key part of effective risk management is identifying the boundaries between different levels of risk, such as acceptable, tolerable, and intolerable risks.

The option (b) includes providing clearer guidance about what it means to achieve an 'acceptable' level of risk. Such guidance may include the provision of standard risk assessment tools and a recommendation on the use of risk management Standards.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

To ensure service providers that are critical to the operation of essential infrastructure have suitable emergency management planning in place to support continued service during emergency events, it is appropriate they are recognised as lifeline utilities under the Act. In doing so they will be made aware of their critical role and obliged to develop contingency plans to manage service disruptions.

Option 2 involving secondary legislation is preferable alternative i.e. to add additional sectors to the CDEM Act's schedule of lifeline utilities.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Increasing interdependency of essential services requires all providers to have strong contingency planning in place. A lack of contingency planning in one sector will impact on another's ability to restore service. We support Option 2, a non-legislative approach that provides for clearer expectations to lifeline utilities.

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

We observe that the attendance of essential service providers/lifeline utilities at CDEMG meetings is irregular.

Active participation in CDEMG activities provides opportunities for information sharing that can be useful in contingency planning. Agendas often include member reports on recent incidents, emergency management system updates, exercises held and improvement plans. Emergency Managers reports and advisories on emerging threats and new emergency management tools assist members to improve their systems. Regular attendance at meetings supports sharing local knowledge and provides general networking that fosters relationship building that is crucial to the smooth operation of an event. It is noted that after a significant emergency event the attendance at following CDEMG meetings is high.

We support the introduction of tools to encourage active participation of lifeline utilities and essential service providers in CDEMG meetings and activities.

Proactively Released

## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Rana Solomon |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Chatham Island Council Emergency Management |

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Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

Proactively Released

# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, these objectives provide a strong foundation for reform and reflect many of the key challenges faced in emergency management, including in remote communities like the Chatham Islands.

In particular:

- **Strengthening community and iwi/imi (Māori/Moriori) participation** is vital in places like the Chatham's, where community members are often the first responders and iwi/imi engagement is central to effective local planning.
- **Clear responsibilities and accountabilities** are essential, especially given Chatham's distinct governance arrangements and the need for strong coordination across a small but multi-functional leadership group.
- **A higher minimum standard of emergency management** is important, but this must be implemented in a way that is flexible enough for small, isolated communities to meet standards without being overburdened.
- **Minimising disruption to essential services** is critically important in a place where transport, power, water, and communication links are limited and highly vulnerable.
- **Having the right powers available** is also key, especially considering the logistical constraints of responding to emergencies without immediate external support.

Proactively Released

The key will be ensuring that these objectives are implemented in a way that recognises the Chatham Islands' unique scale, geography, and capabilities.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The limited number of local service providers and the small-scale government presence on the Chatham Islands make it difficult to deliver tailored support to all vulnerable groups in the same way as larger mainland regions.
To address this:

- Smaller CDEM Groups like the Chathams should be allowed to develop flexible, community-led arrangements that reflect local capacity, rather than being held to rigid service standards designed for larger regions.
- Dedicated resources should be allocated to the Chatham Islands to support outreach, engagement, and preparedness for vulnerable groups.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Geographic isolation, unreliable transport links, communication barriers (including digital exclusion), and limited emergency infrastructure can all cause greater impacts for some groups, especially remote island communities.

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Greater flexibility for smaller communities would allow a more targeted and realistic approach. However, without guaranteed resourcing, even flexible models may fail to meet community needs.

Proactively Released

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Planning would incorporate tailored outreach strategies, culturally appropriate support mechanisms, and pre-identified community leaders as liaisons, particularly for isolated populations and vulnerable groups.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Provide targeted funding to support resilience initiatives that are developed *with* the community, rather than led by them, recognising that communities like the Chatham Islands are already stretched. Support should focus on building long-term capacity through trusted partnerships, while enabling shared service arrangements with other remote or small CDEM Groups to reduce duplication and pressure on local people.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The principles should explicitly recognise the distinct needs of remote island communities such as the Chatham Islands, where limited infrastructure and geographic isolation require different approaches from mainland responses.

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

It would allow for greater local decision-making, funding appropriate to the unique risks faced by remote areas, and recognition that standard mainland models cannot always apply to isolated communities like the Chatham Islands.

Proactively Released

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The initial options identified show a strong intention to strengthen the emergency management system. However, from a Chatham Islands perspective, there are specific concerns about costs, risks, and benefits:

- **Costs and Risks**: Any centralised approach risks being unsuitable for the isolated and small population of the Chatham Islands. Emergency support cannot be easily deployed from the mainland. Increased compliance costs, new training requirements, or system changes without local tailoring could create a heavy burden on the small council, iwi/imi Māori/Moriori organisations, and volunteer workforce here.
- **Benefits**: More formal recognition of iwi/imi leadership, clearer coordination structures, and targeted investment into isolated communities like ours could bring major improvements, especially for resilience and recovery phases.
- **Preferred Options**:
  We prefer options that:
  - Prioritise **local decision-making** and **mana whenua-led responses**.
  - Ensure **flexible funding** that reflects our isolation and unique needs.
  - Recognise the **need for different training models** adapted for remote areas.
  - Maintain **strong local autonomy** instead of centralised, one-size-fits-all solutions.

There is a risk that national reforms could unintentionally marginalise small, isolated communities like Chatham's if flexibility is not built into the system.

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

The Chatham Islands Council agrees that more needs to be done, Iwi and Imi must be recognised as equal and independent partners in all aspects of emergency management — including planning, response, recovery, and governance. On the Chatham Islands, this means both Ngāti Mutunga o Wharekauri and Imi Moriori should be engaged directly and meaningfully, not merely as stakeholders but as Treaty partners and rights holders. Their knowledge, priorities, and decision-making roles must be embedded throughout local emergency management structures, rather than treated as optional or advisory. Recognition of this partnership must be formally reflected in governance arrangements and supported with resources that enable active participation:

- **Moriori and Ngāti Mutunga o Wharekauri** must be recognised as key partners with distinct identities and rights.
- Their **mātauranga (knowledge), tikanga (customs), and decision-making** processes must be built into emergency planning and recovery frameworks.

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- They must have **formal roles** — not just consultation — in emergency committees, governance groups, and strategy development.
- Resourcing must be provided to support **iwi/imi-led resilience initiatives** and ensure capacity to participate effectively, recognising the limited local workforce and the impact of isolation.
- Recognition must be **place-based and whakapapa/Hokopapa-based**, not just based on generalised national models.

Emergency management for the Chatham Islands must therefore respect the unique Treaty relationships and histories of the peoples here.

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

On the Chatham Islands, the relationship between the CDEM Group (which is effectively the Chatham Islands Council) and Hokotehi Moriori and Ngāti Mutunga o Wharekauri should be built on formal partnership, mutual respect, and shared decision-making. Given the isolated and unique circumstances of the Islands, Māori/Moriori groups should have a recognised seat in emergency planning, response, and recovery processes, not just consultation.
The CDEM Group should establish formal Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) or similar agreements with iwi and imi, ensuring cultural values, traditional knowledge, and local leadership are embedded into emergency management.

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

On the Chatham Islands, both Ngāti Mutunga o Wharekauri and Hokotehi Moriori are already recognised and have seats on the Chatham Islands Coordinating Executive Group (CEG).
However, given the very small population size and the limited capacity of the community, it can be difficult for iwi and imi representatives to fully participate across all governance structures, including the Council, Enterprise Trust, and other groups.
In the emergency management system, iwi and imi should be formally acknowledged as key partners, but flexibility and additional resourcing may be needed to avoid overburdening a small group of people.
Recognition should also reflect the practical realities of a small, isolated community, supporting iwi/imi roles in a way that is sustainable, culturally appropriate, and realistic given limited human resources.

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, but it's important to acknowledge that, for the Chatham Islands, community participation presents unique challenges. With our small, close-knit population, there is often a high level of volunteerism, but this also stretches our local capacity. Many community members are already engaged in multiple governance and support roles, which can lead to burnout or limitations in resource availability during emergencies.

We believe that strengthening community participation requires additional support for these individuals and groups, perhaps through more targeted resources, training, and recognition of their contributions. This could help reduce the strain on those already involved and encourage broader community participation. Additionally, ensuring that participation opportunities are accessible and sustainable for Chatham Islands residents is crucial, especially given the isolation and limited infrastructure.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The likely impacts of the initial options for improving emergency management participation will differ for the Chatham Islands due to their unique geographical isolation and small population.

**Benefits:**

1. Improved coordination and integration of local resources will provide greater resilience to emergencies, as the Chatham Islands community already has strong, close-knit networks.
2. Increased community participation in emergency management can strengthen preparedness and response plans tailored to the specific needs of the islands, such as better communication strategies between local iwi/imi the council, and other stakeholders.

**Costs:**

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1. Given the limited number of people available to support governance roles and emergency management efforts, there is a risk that individuals and groups will become overburdened, leading to volunteer burnout. This issue has already been highlighted by the overlapping roles of iw/imi and local governance bodies.
2. Resources for training, equipment, and supplies may require a higher upfront investment to ensure that the Chatham Islands are adequately prepared for emergencies. Additionally, the cost of maintaining regular communication and engagement between island-based groups and larger national systems can be higher, given the geographical isolation.

**Risks:**

1. There is a risk of communication breakdowns in emergencies, particularly if island-specific issues are not considered in the broader, national emergency response planning. The isolated nature of the islands means that external assistance may take longer to arrive, and this could delay response efforts.
2. Local iwi/imi and smaller community organisations may be stretched thin by the increased demand for participation in multiple emergency management bodies, further impacting the ability of the community to effectively respond.

**Preferred Options:**

1. Strengthening the capacity of local iwi/imi and community leaders to engage in emergency management through dedicated, locally relevant training programs could enhance both individual and collective preparedness without overburdening the community.
2. Streamlining the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and local iwi by clarifying roles and responsibilities will help prevent duplicative efforts and ensure that the community is not stretched too thin. Local consultation and co-design of emergency management strategies will help ensure they are tailored to the unique needs of the Chatham Islands.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

The Chatham Islands face unique challenges due to its geographic isolation and limited resources. While the description of the problem likely fits for larger or more connected regions, for Chatham, the people, businesses, and local communities are often the first line of defence during an emergency. However, barriers such as limited communication infrastructure, transport difficulties, and a small population can hinder the ability to effectively respond in times of crisis. Additionally, the existing local networks are critical, but they may lack formal recognition or resources compared to mainland New Zealand communities.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The Chatham's may benefit from options that specifically address the logistical challenges of emergency response in an isolated location. Proposals that focus on enhancing local capacity through better training, equipment, and community engagement are vital. However, there are risks associated with expecting the local population to respond without sufficient support or resources. The costs of ensuring that the Chatham's are adequately prepared could be higher due to the challenges of importing materials, transporting responders, and maintaining infrastructure. It's important to consider both the resilience of the islands and the limitations that come with being a small, remote community.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

For the Chatham Islands, additional options could include:

- **Dedicated emergency response teams** with a clear mandate to serve the Chatham's, equipped with the necessary resources to quickly respond to local emergencies.
- **Stronger communication systems** that can function independently of mainland New Zealand during an emergency, ensuring that the Chatham's are not left isolated if traditional networks fail.
- **Local resilience-building initiatives** that focus on self-sufficiency, such as stockpiling essential supplies locally and training more people in emergency response.
- **Collaboration with NZ for** external support networks to ensure that the Chatham's are not left behind in a regional or national crisis response.

These options would ensure that the islands are prepared for emergencies while acknowledging the resource constraints and isolation they face.

Proactively Released

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

In smaller jurisdictions with fewer personnel and limited resources, confusion around operational command can significantly impact the speed and effectiveness of emergency response. It is especially important for places like the Chatham's that direction and control arrangements are not only clearly defined but also practically workable, given the small scale and unique governance arrangements. Strengthening clarity around who leads during an emergency would support better coordination with national agencies and faster mobilisation of assistance, which is often critical when help must come from outside the islands.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Clearer direction would be a benefit for the Chatham's. However, it is important that any model adopted recognises that the Islands may not have the same ability to quickly access national support compared to mainland NZ.
A preferred option would be one that **delegates more authority to local leadership** during the initial phases of an emergency, backed up with strong remote support if needed. Cost implications for training and maintaining a qualified local Controller need to be factored in.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

An additional option for the Chatham's could be:

- **pre-agreed backup Controllers** from Canterbury or Wellington, familiar with Chatham's unique conditions, who can be remotely accessed if needed.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

For the Chatham Islands, more fundamental changes are needed because the current direction and control model assumes access to a range of personnel and infrastructure that simply does not exist in such a remote and small community. In many cases, local responders must operate autonomously for extended periods before external support can arrive, due to transport delays or weather. A more flexible model that formally recognises and empowers local leadership to make timely operational decisions—while still integrating with national frameworks—would improve outcomes. This might include pre-authorised delegated powers, tailored training, or clear contingency protocols for when regional or national leadership is unreachable.

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that overlapping roles between CDEM Groups and local authorities can create confusion. However, the Chatham Islands context is different. The Chatham Islands Council serves as both the local authority and the CDEM Group — it is a single entity, not a joint committee, despite sometimes being referred to as such. This structure differs significantly from multi-member regional CDEM Groups on the mainland and must be recognised as such.

Clarification at the national level remains important to avoid confusion about the respective roles and responsibilities of national and local entities during an emergency. The discussion document proposes expanded and new responsibilities for CDEM Groups and administering authorities, but it is unclear how these will be funded.

Any changes to roles and responsibilities must be accompanied by dedicated resourcing and funding from central government. Without this, there is a risk of inequitable implementation, where the ability of a region or community to meet new standards depends on its rating base or local revenue. This would undermine the goal of achieving a consistent national standard in emergency management.

Proactively Released

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

For the Chatham's, clearer definitions of CDEM roles could reduce pressure on the small number of available staff and decision-makers.
Preferred options would include **recognising that smaller, isolated authorities like the Chatham Islands may not fit a "one size fits all" regional model** and may require more flexible or streamlined arrangements, with simplified expectations on compliance and reporting.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

An option could be formalising a **"Small Authority CDEM Model"** for places like the Chatham's, where the Council automatically holds all CDEM powers unless an external Controller is appointed. This would reduce red tape and enable faster decision-making during an emergency.

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

For isolated areas like the Chatham's, a more fundamental change may be needed. The current CDEM Group model assumes multiple councils collaborating, which doesn't apply on the Chatham's.
A better model would explicitly **recognise single-council CDEM Groups** with **direct national support channels**, given the Chatham's unique geographic isolation and small population base.

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

In general, the description of the problem is accurate for larger regions where multiple councils make up a CDEM Group. However, for the Chatham Islands, this issue is less significant because there is only **one local authority (the Council)** and **one CDEM Group made up of the councillors**
That said, clearer national standards and accountability would still benefit the Chatham's to ensure there is strong external support when needed.

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

A clear and consistent framework could help small councils like the Chatham Islands by reducing administrative burden and ensuring that national agencies understand and respect the island's specific governance structure.
Preferred options would focus on **light-touch accountability models** for remote councils, allowing local flexibility but with strong national support when emergencies escalate beyond local capacity.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

A specific option could be to develop a **"Remote Community Emergency Management Framework"** under the national plan, to acknowledge that places like the Chatham's operate differently from large, multi-council regions and need more flexible and proportionate arrangements.

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The problem is well described for most regions. On the Chatham Islands, the small size of the CEG and the multiple roles held by individuals (across Council, Trust, iwi,imi, and emergency services) mean that performance can be stretched.
Strengthening support for small or remote CEGs is important, but the approach needs to be **flexible** and **proportionate** to avoid overwhelming the small team with extra layers of compliance.

Proactively Released

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Strengthening the CEG structure could have benefits if it also includes **tailored support** (for example, through remote training, deployment-ready support staff, and easy access to national expertise).
The risk is that requiring the same level of formality and structure as much larger groups could overwhelm the Chatham Islands' limited resources.
Preferred options would include **scalable requirements** based on the size and capacity of the community.

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

One option could be to develop a **"Small CEG Model"** with modified expectations for performance reporting, meeting frequency, and capability development, ensuring that key relationships and responsibilities are strong without burdening a small team.

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

On the Chatham Islands, it can be particularly challenging to keep all emergency management plans up to date because there are very few staff.
However, it is important that the update process is **simple, flexible, and not too administratively burdensome** for small or isolated communities.

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Making it easier to update the Plans would benefit the Chatham Islands, but the method needs to be appropriate to the scale of the community.
Heavy consultation and review processes that are suitable for large regions do create a disproportionate burden here.
Preferred options would involve **streamlined update processes** with **regional or national-level assistance** to support isolated councils like Chatham Islands Council.

Proactively Released

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Another option is to allow CDEM Group Plans for small or remote councils (like Chatham's) to be reviewed on a longer cycle, or to permit **rolling updates** without a full plan rewrite every time small changes occur.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

The very small size and remote nature of the Chatham Islands mean that **national-level agencies need to take a more active support role**.
There is also a risk that placing "standard" expectations on isolated communities can create unrealistic burdens.
Accountabilities and responsibilities should be **scaled to reflect isolation, size, and available capacity**.

Proactively Released

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

For the Chatham Islands, clear national direction is important for consistency and ensuring the islands' needs are not overlooked.
However, flexibility must be built into recognise the unique challenges of remote island communities (small population, limited resources, isolation).

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:** include stronger oversight and better coordination nationally.
**Risks**: for the Chatham's include national standards that are too rigid and do not consider the islands' isolation, staffing challenges, and resource limitations.
**Preferred option:**
National standards must allow for a tailored application for remote island communities like the Chatham's.

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Greater national consistency would benefit areas such as training standards, public communication protocols, and data sharing systems. For the Chatham Islands, national templates and guidance that are clear, adaptable, and easy to implement would reduce administrative burden and increase local preparedness. However, it's important that such national direction still allows flexibility for remote contexts—such as limited internet access or different supply chain timelines. Standardised approaches to hazard risk assessment and planning tools would also support consistency without replacing the need for local judgment.

Proactively Released

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Introduce a mandatory requirement for the Director to consult directly with isolated communities like the Chatham's before finalising mandatory standards — to make sure they are practical and achievable. There needs to be explicit recognition that smaller, isolated communities will have different baselines of capability, and minimum standards should include scaled expectations based on size, location, and resourcing realities.

## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

For the Chatham Islands, when lessons are identified after an event, action must be taken promptly, especially given the high reliance on limited local personnel.
There can be serious consequences if identified issues are not corrected quickly in such a remote environment.

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:** include a more responsive and accountable system overall.
**Risks**: include the imposition of corrective actions that are not practical for very small and isolated communities like the Chatham's without additional support.
**Preferred option:**
Corrective actions must be realistic and matched with support to help implement them in small, remote areas.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

There should be an option for communities like the Chatham Islands to request phased or adapted corrective action plans that take into account geographic isolation, resource availability, and community capacity. The system must recognise that without extra external support (people, funding, technical expertise), it may not be reasonable to expect small, isolated communities like the Chatham's to meet the same corrective timelines as larger mainland regions.

Proactively Released

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The Chatham Islands have very specific and isolated hazard risks, including extreme weather, earthquakes, and tsunamis. Strengthening local hazard risk management is essential because national approaches often don't fit local realities. Better local planning would greatly improve resilience here.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:**

- Would support small, remote communities like the Chatham's to have better tailored hazard planning.
- Would help ensure local risks (that may not be well understood nationally) are properly managed.

**Risks:**

- If requirements are too complex, the Chatham's limited staffing and resources could struggle to keep up.
- Risk of "one-size-fits-all" national rules not being practical for the Islands.
- *'Acceptable risk'* and how it is managed is ambiguous in the emergency management context. CDEM Groups can reduce risk through readiness and response but have limited levers for reducing physical exposure to risk. Risk reduction requires integration across regulatory planning documents at the regional and local council levels (particularly Regional Policy Statements and District Plans) and CDEM Group Plans.

**Preferred option:**
Clear national expectations **with flexibility** so that the Chatham's can adapt plans to suit their specific geographic isolation, hazard profile, and small community structure.

Proactively Released

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

National consistency is important to set minimum standards, but regional flexibility is **critical** for places like the Chatham Islands.
The Islands face very different challenges compared to mainland New Zealand.
Plans must be allowed to reflect local realities, otherwise, they won't be effective during an emergency.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

- **Resource limitations:** The Chatham's have very few staff to work across different plans and systems.
- **Distance from support:** It's hard for a small, isolated council to align fully with wider national frameworks without a lot of external support.
- **Complexity of requirements:** Current planning frameworks are often too complex for small councils with generalist staff.

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

- Provide specific templates and guidance documents tailored for remote and rural councils like the Chatham Islands.
- Increase central government support (technical and financial) to help isolated areas integrate emergency management and hazard planning properly.

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Small, isolated councils like the Chatham Islands Council cannot deliver effective hazard risk management without stronger support from national agencies.
They need simple, flexible rules and extra staffing/funding help to meet modern emergency management standards.

Proactively Released

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

On the Chatham Islands, taonga Māori, Mehekĭ Moriori, and cultural heritage, including Moriori and Māori sacred sites and significant landscapes, are critical parts of the community's identity.
Emergencies can seriously damage these taonga, Mehekĭ if they are not properly considered during response and recovery activities.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:**

- Greater awareness and respect for taonga/Mehekĭ and cultural heritage in emergency decision-making.
- Avoids unnecessary harm to irreplaceable cultural sites during response operations.
- Strengthens trust and cooperation between, Moriori, Māori, and emergency managers.

**Risks:**

- Extra planning requirements may strain the limited capacity of a small council like Chatham's unless support is provided.

**Preferred option:**
Include early consultation with Moriori, and Māori organisations when developing emergency management plans, and create simple guidelines for responders to protect cultural heritage during emergencies.

Proactively Released

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

- Develop a quick-response cultural advisory system for emergencies (even remotely accessible) to help guide local decision-making when cultural sites may be affected.
- Offer training and simple checklists for Chatham Islands emergency workers about protecting taonga/Mehekĭ Māori and Moriori during emergencies.
- Ensure national-level support is available for the Chatham's to help assess and protect cultural heritage after a major event.

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

- Animals, especially livestock, working animals, and pets, are central to the way of life on the Chatham Islands.
- In an isolated setting, animals are essential for livelihoods (farming, fishing support) and community wellbeing. Emergency responses must plan appropriately for animal welfare to avoid severe economic and emotional impacts.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:**

- A coordinated animal welfare plan would help reduce loss of valuable livestock during emergencies (critical for the island economy).
- Protects companion animals, which are important for isolated families' well-being.
- Reduces biosecurity risks if evacuation or movement of animals is better managed.

**Risks:**

- Managing animal welfare in an isolated community could overstretch limited emergency services if not properly resourced.

Proactively Released

- Evacuating animals is more challenging on the Chatham's due to a lack of infrastructure (e.g., limited transport options).

**Preferred option:**
Develop a simple, locally adapted animal welfare emergency plan that can be implemented with existing island resources and supported remotely if needed.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

- After human life and safety, animal welfare should be prioritised *ahead* of general property protection on the Chatham's.
- Loss of livestock can have devastating long-term effects on family farms and the island's food security and economy, more so than damage to infrastructure or goods.
- A balanced approach is essential but saving animals where possible should be planned as a secondary priority.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

- Pre-identify safe animal evacuation or shelter areas around the island.
- Provide community education sessions for animal owners on emergency planning specific to their animals.
- Establish emergency stockpiles of animal feed and veterinary supplies.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

- Small, isolated communities like the Chatham's may not meet higher national standards unless they are accompanied by realistic, scale-appropriate resourcing and flexibility.
- There needs to be a strong support link between the Chatham Islands and national agencies to help meet new standards without overburdening the local council or volunteers.

Proactively Released

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The Chatham Islands are heavily reliant on a small number of essential infrastructure services, including shipping, telecommunications, aviation, and fuel supplies. These services are lifelines in the most literal sense, given the Islands' extreme isolation, small population, and dependence on external supply chains for goods, services, and emergency response capabilities.

The current narrow definition of "lifeline utilities" risks overlooking several of these critical services, particularly those that don't fall neatly into conventional utility categories. If any one of these were disrupted, the impact could isolate the Chatham community entirely, jeopardising not only basic needs like food and fuel but also the ability to communicate, evacuate, or receive aid in an emergency. This level of vulnerability means the current model used on the mainland is not fit-for-purpose here.

We therefore support **Option 3**, which introduces a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure". This option allows for easier recognition of a wider range of infrastructure as essential, including services that might not typically be prioritised in larger or more connected regions but are absolutely critical in a remote setting like Chatham's.

Option 3 also acknowledges the interplay between infrastructure types, where the importance of infrastructure cannot be judged solely on volume or population served. It ensures that our most vital services are considered in planning and risk reduction, even if they differ from those prioritised on the mainland.

Proactively Released

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:**

- Including a wider range of essential services would ensure that critical Chatham Islands infrastructure (like the shipping service and the airport) is properly prioritised during emergencies.
- Would create better planning links with private sector providers operating essential lifeline services.

**Risks:**

- Small providers might struggle with additional compliance and reporting obligations unless there is appropriate support or scaled requirements.

**Preferred option:**
Adopt a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure," but provide specific guidance to recognise the needs and capacities of small, isolated communities.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

For the Chatham Islands, it would be important to ensure the following are explicitly recognised as "essential services":

- Coastal shipping (essential for supply chains)
- Aviation (limited flights are a lifeline for passengers, freight, and medical emergencies, and stores)
- Fuel supply chain (critical for transport, generators, heating)
- Telecommunications links (satellite)

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

- **Shipping Infrastructure:** Ports and vessels supplying freight and essential goods.
- **Airport and Aviation Infrastructure:** Maintenance of the airstrip and flight services.
- **Fuel Storage and Distribution Facilities:** Including diesel and aviation fuel, given dependence on generators.

Proactively Released

- **Telecommunications Infrastructure:** Satellite connectivity and core communications hubs, since loss of communication severely impacts emergency coordination.

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

- Develop isolated community-specific guidelines for identifying and protecting lifeline utilities.
- Create national backup or contingency support plans for the Chatham Islands in case multiple essential services are simultaneously disrupted (e.g., backup shipping or aviation services).

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The Chatham Islands are highly dependent on a small number of utility providers, often with no redundancy. If services like shipping, electricity generation, or telecommunications go down, recovery is slow and complex. Without robust and tailored business continuity plans from lifeline utilities, the community is left vulnerable.

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:**

- Requiring stronger business continuity plans would help ensure lifeline utilities are better prepared to support isolated communities during disruptions.
- It could improve coordination with the Chatham Islands Council and CDEM Group, especially for joint planning and resupply contingencies.

**Risks:**

- There may be increased compliance costs for smaller providers, who already struggle to maintain consistent service levels due to remoteness.

Proactively Released

- Centralised planning models may overlook the distinct vulnerabilities of remote islands.

**Preferred option:**
Strengthen requirements for lifeline utility continuity planning but ensure guidance and compliance support are adapted for small, remote communities like the Chathams.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

- Develop a national support programme to help isolated areas build tailored business continuity and resilience plans with their utility providers.
- Introduce minimum continuity planning standards specifically for remote infrastructure providers, covering logistics like fuel storage, backup communications, and air/sea transport.

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

On the Chatham Islands, coordination is even more critical due to geographic isolation and limited resources. Currently, there are few formal structures or mechanisms in place for consistent communication between local lifeline utilities, external service providers (e.g. transport or fuel suppliers), and emergency management agencies. This can delay response efforts and reduce preparedness.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:**

- Improved cooperation and shared information could speed up emergency response and reduce duplication of effort.
- A formalised framework would help small communities like the Chatham's get earlier warnings or updates about potential disruptions (e.g. shipping or aviation).
- Local trust and informal relationships could be strengthened with national systems backing them up.

Proactively Released

**Risks:**

- National systems or coordination platforms may assume internet or telecommunications reliability that doesn't exist on the Chatham's.
- Increased reporting obligations could strain small-scale utilities and council staff.

**Preferred option:**
Adapt existing coordination frameworks to suit remote contexts, such as offline-capable systems, and fund local liaison roles to act as coordination bridges between agencies and service providers.

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

For the Chatham's, multi-level coordination works best when there is a dedicated local liaison or representative who maintains regular contact with both regional and national agencies. This person should understand local systems and infrastructure while also having access to national response networks.
Regular scenario-based exercises involving local and national stakeholders (including remote engagement tools) would further improve readiness and coordination.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

- Establish a shared digital emergency dashboard accessible to national agencies and Chatham's Council, with offline backup protocols.
- Create a pre-agreed emergency logistics support arrangement between the Chatham's and national supply chain partners (e.g. NZDF or transport contractors).
- Consider information-sharing legislation exemptions during declared emergencies to allow rapid exchange of critical data without bureaucratic delay.

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

The Chatham Islands often experience limited or delayed central government support during emergencies due to its geographic isolation and reliance on a small number of personnel and supply chains. Gaps in continuity planning from central agencies become more pronounced on the islands, where back-up resources and staff are not readily available.

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:**

- Including a wider range of central government agencies in the CDEM framework would help ensure more consistent support and resource availability for the Chatham's.
- Improved business continuity across central government services could reduce recovery times and uncertainty for island residents.

**Risks:**

- National continuity planning may assume mainland infrastructure and transport networks, which don't apply to the Chatham's.
- If plans are not regionally adaptable, they may be ineffective in a remote and self-reliant context like the Chatham's.

**Preferred option:**
Expand central government agency responsibilities but require each to tailor its business continuity plans specifically for remote locations like the Chatham Islands. This should be monitored and reviewed regularly in consultation with the local council.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

- Assign a lead agency responsible for inter-agency coordination for remote and island communities.
- Include Chatham Islands–specific continuity scenarios in national planning and resourcing exercises.
- Establish a minimum service level agreement with central government agencies for emergency responsiveness to isolated areas.

Proactively Released

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

- Essential service continuity on the Chatham Islands often depends on a small number of individuals or providers (e.g., one health care for medication etc, one airport operator). Plans must account for single points of failure and include practical backup arrangements (e.g., seconded roles, cross-trained locals).
- Freight and communication links should be prioritised for resilience investment, as these underpin all essential services.
- The islands' reliance on renewable energy and imported fuel also presents unique continuity challenges that should be reflected in national risk assessments.

Proactively Released

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Managing access to restricted areas can be particularly difficult in the Chatham's due to limited personnel and geographic isolation. The problem has been accurately described, particularly in relation to the challenges of communicating restrictions and enforcing them locally.

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:**

- Clearer legal authority will help local responders enforce cordons confidently.
- Simplified procedures will reduce confusion and improve compliance.

**Risks:**

- Any requirement for physical resources or additional personnel may be challenging to meet on the Chatham's.

**Preferred Option:**
Support options that clarify responsibilities and authorise local responders (such as police or designated wardens) to act quickly without requiring delays for legal interpretation.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Consider allowing the Emergency Management Office in the Chatham's to pre-approve access plans for likely scenarios (e.g. tsunami, fuel disruption), reducing the need for real-time decisions in high-stress situations.

Proactively Released

## Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

It is vital to clarify who holds emergency powers, particularly in a small community like the Chatham's where overlapping roles (e.g. Mayor, Controller, Emergency Manager) are often held by the same or a small group of individuals.

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:**

- Local clarity on authority roles ensures swifter, more coordinated responses.
- Reduces reliance on external legal interpretations or delays waiting for confirmation from the mainland.

**Preferred option:**
Formalise the delegation of powers to the most locally appropriate person (e.g. Emergency Manager or Controller) with clearly documented backup roles to ensure continuity.

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Introduce a Chatham-specific protocol acknowledging the limited availability of staff and allowing for more flexible delegation of emergency powers during overlapping events (e.g. storms followed by fuel shortages).

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

For isolated locations like the Chatham Islands, requiring a physical signature to declare a state of emergency is outdated and can delay critical action. The description of the issue recognises the need for more agile and modern systems.

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:**

- Enables faster declarations using digital tools such as email, text, or secure apps.
- Reduces risks caused by weather or communication disruptions delaying paperwork.

**Risks:**

- Cybersecurity risks must be managed if using digital approvals.

**Preferred option:**
Allow emergency declarations via multiple secure formats (e.g. email, verbal with confirmation log), and allow flexibility for remote locations like the Chathams where technology may fail intermittently.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Consider a standing delegated authority for local leaders on the Chathams that allows immediate declaration in specific scenarios (e.g. tsunami, severe storm), to avoid delays even when communications are down.

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The role of mayors is particularly significant in small communities like the Chatham's, where the mayor is often the most visible and trusted leader. Clarifying their emergency role improves transparency and accountability.

Proactively Released

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:**

- Ensures everyone in the community knows who is responsible for declaring emergencies.
- Reduces confusion during crisis communication.

**Risks:**

- In small communities where the mayor may be unavailable or directly affected by the emergency, rigid rules could delay response.

**Preferred option:**
Clarify the mayor's role but allow for clear, pre-authorised delegations to local Controllers or Emergency Managers in their absence.

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

On the Chatham's, Controllers may need powers typically reserved for central government, such as authority over limited inter-island transport, fuel allocation, or essential supply rationing, due to the logistical isolation. Without swift access to these powers, life-sustaining services (e.g. water, medical evacuations) could be compromised.

### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

On the Chatham's, Controllers may need extended powers to manage freight, fuel, and shipping logistics immediately after an emergency, especially when waiting on mainland decisions or resources. Legislative changes should account for extreme isolation and allow for broader short-term logistical powers.

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

The Chatham Islands have a unique combination of geographic isolation, limited infrastructure, and a small population, which means that national emergency management legislation often doesn't fit well by default. Any reform must explicitly allow for flexible, place-based approaches for outer island communities.

Key points to emphasise:

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- **Tailored governance:** The Chatham Islands should not be assumed to fit within a standard regional structure. The legislation must enable bespoke emergency arrangements with direct national support when needed.
- **Transport and logistics:** Emergency powers and planning must include specific provisions for shipping and aviation continuity, as these are essential for evacuation, supplies, and recovery.
- **Workforce capacity:** Emergency roles on the Chatham's are often carried out by individuals holding multiple responsibilities. Legislative and policy settings must allow for more flexible delegation, training, and decision-making that reflect these realities.
- **Resilience funding:** Long-term resilience on the Chatham's may require a separate funding model that accounts for the high cost of infrastructure and service delivery due to isolation.

Reforms must acknowledge the principles of equity and community-led resilience while recognising that remoteness and scale demand tailored solutions.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Naomi Freeman |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Disabilities Resource Centre Trust |

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### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We support the objectives, particularly strengthening community participation and ensuring a higher minimum standard of emergency management. We recommend recognising the needs of disabled people and older adults across all objectives. These groups are often among the most disproportionately affected in emergencies due to mobility limitations, reliance on health equipment, and communication barriers.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

The language should be stronger around accessibility as a legal requirement, not just a goal. Emergency planning must be inclusive by design.

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Many people with disabilities live alone, rely on support workers or assistive devices, and have limited access to transport. Emergency responses that do not consider these realities can place lives at risk.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

This could include:

- Emergency alerts available in multiple accessible formats (NZSL, Easy Read, audio)
- Pre-identified accessible shelters and evacuation transport
- Disability-inclusive community preparedness training
- Clear plans for continuity of care and supply of essential medications and medical devices
- Link in with care agencies to support welfare posts.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Establish an Accessibility Advisory Panel for CDEM at both local and national levels.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We support recognising iwi Māori as key leaders in emergency management. Māori communities have strong skills in whānau-focused response, tikanga-based recovery, and local knowledge. It is important to more clearly include the diverse needs within Māori communities, especially tāngata whaikaha Māori and kaumātua (elders).

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We acknowledge the vital role of marae and Māori health providers as community hubs, as well as the strength of Māori in mobilising collective resources.

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

- Resourcing iwi-led emergency management capability, including disability-inclusive training and infrastructure (e.g. accessible marae-based shelters).
- Partnerships between iwi and disability organisations to ensure disabled Māori are not left behind.

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

As co-leaders and Treaty partners. Iwi Māori should have representation in strategic and operational decision-making, with specific emphasis on culturally grounded, inclusive emergency response systems that reflect Māori worldviews and uphold mana motuhake.

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

The relationship should be formalised through partnership agreements. These should include plans for responding to the specific needs of tāngata whaikaha Māori and kaumātua during emergencies.

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Coordinating Executive Groups should include iwi representatives and consult hapū and Māori providers who are already trusted support systems for disabled and older Māori.

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**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Establish an Iwi-Māori Advisory Board within NEMA that includes disability advocates from iwi and Māori health providers. This ensures that tāngata whaikaha Māori and kaumātua perspectives are embedded into national strategies.

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

- Dedicated funding for iwi-led emergency preparedness projects that include accessibility audits and inclusive community response planning.
- Integration of whānau-centred, culturally safe practices into national training frameworks for emergency personnel.

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Enabling community-led initiatives and offering better coordination support will strengthen outcomes for marginalised groups, including disabled and older people.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

It is essential to acknowledge that individuals and communities often act faster than formal emergency services, but they must be supported to do so safely and inclusively.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support training for informal responders, including guidance on how to support people with disabilities and older people in emergencies.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Develop tailored resources and response kits for disabled and older people to increase community readiness.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Clarity is essential, particularly when coordinating support for high-needs populations.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Controllers must be trained in inclusive response practices, and disability liaison roles should be built into response teams.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The system must be easier to navigate for vulnerable populations and support agencies.

Proactively Released

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Support consistent roles and clearer accountability, with a requirement for community engagement (including disability organisations).

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Formal inclusion of disability and ageing reps on Coordinating Executive Groups.

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Plans must evolve to reflect population needs, including ageing and disability trends.

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Simplifying update processes is essential

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Disability-inclusive standards must be mandated at the national level.

Proactively Released

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Performance monitoring will help ensure access and equity.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

- Shelter accessibility
- Communication formats
- Inclusion of disability support organisations in planning

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Local risk planning often overlooks disabled and older residents.

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**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Support regular engagement with community health and disability networks.

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Set national minimum standards with flexibility for local innovation.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Cultural heritage must include the lived experiences and needs of elders and tāngata whaikaha Māori.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Animal companions are critical to mental wellbeing and continuity of care, especially for isolated disabled people.

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**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Lifeline definitions should include home-based disability and elder care services.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

- Accessible transport
- Assistive tech suppliers
- Community health support networks

#### Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

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*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Essential services must include disability supports and social services.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Improved clarity will help ensure better protection for vulnerable groups.

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Ensure any delegated powers prioritise the safety and wellbeing of disabled and older people, and decision-makers are trained accordingly.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

They should have powers to rapidly secure disability resources (e.g. mobility aids, generators for medical equipment).

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Accessibility must be embedded throughout the legislation. We support requiring all emergency planning to include consultation with disability organisations and affected communities.

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**From:** Tony Norris s9(2)(a)
**Sent:** Thursday, May 8, 2025 10:50 AM
**To:** Emergency Management Bill [NEMA] <EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz>
**Subject:** Emergency Management Bill

Hello

From the 1990s I began research into how information technologies can improve the quality of healthcare, its cost-effectiveness, and ease and equity of access. The research carried out in the UK and New Zealand lead to a focus on healthcare in disaster management. Interestingly, as the research progressed, it became clear that the potential benefits of the technologies could only be realised if there was a comprehensive understanding of the information needed by the various agencies involved in disaster response AND that there was a system that ensured that Information exchange between the agencies flowed freely an rapidly between them.

The system would automatically push defined information to an agency from a central resource and agencies could pull additional information from the system as needs became clear. The system would be designed and directed to minimise, if not overcome, the territorial, authority, cultural, and trust challenges that time-and-time-again appear in reports charting the causes of response failures. The system would establish a framework where information was a common, shared resource rather than a territorial asset.

Clearly, there are many other factors that must combine to ensure rapid and effective disaster response and these will be identified in the **Emergency Management Bill.** However, agency communication and cooperation are fundamental to the success of emergency management and the aftermath rebuilding.

Work on the design of the information exchange system noted above progressed until I retired but I have attached a paper published by our research group in 2018. System design would now use recent developments in artificial intelligence increasing effectiveness and ease of use.

I hope you find the paper of interest.

Kind regards

(Prof) Tony Norris

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# PINPOINTING WHAT IS WRONG WITH CROSS-AGENCY DISASTER COLLABORATION IN HEALTHCARE

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## Abstract

**Disaster is an event in which a hazard has a destructive environmental or ecological impact on such a scale that the effects cannot be managed within local community resources. In disaster healthcare, the main responders to provide emergency relief are usually emergency management and health personnel. Although these two sectors share the same vision of providing public health services to disaster victims, post-disaster analysis reflects poor communication between them leading to delayed, substandard and even unavailable healthcare. This paper investigates the barriers to smooth and effective communication between health and emergency management personnel in a disaster, with the aim of pinpointing possible points of improvement. The paper presents a comprehensive review of the available literature on the subject and suggests suitable interventions to enhance healthcare delivery through cross-agency collaboration and information exchange based on a projected telehealth system.**

**Keywords:** disasters; cross-agency communication; healthcare; emergency management; disaster medicine; eHealth

## 1. Introduction

Over the period from 1994-2013, EM_DAT recorded 6,873 natural disasters, which claimed 1.35 million lives and affected an annual average of 218 million people.[1] Moreover, whilst the frequency of geophysical disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions, has changed little over this period, the incidence of climate-related events, such as floods and storms,[2] has increased dramatically, up to 44% over the 1994-2000 average and more than double the level in 1980-1989.[3]

These challenging figures have stimulated international calls to action emphasising the need for taking measures to reduce their impacts. In 2015, the United Nations adopted the Sendai framework for disaster risk reduction with the goal of reducing the risk of man-made and natural hazards and the consequent losses in lives, livelihood, and health.[4]

While disaster management is concerned with the organisation and management of resources and responsibilities for dealing with disasters,[5] disaster medicine defines protocols for dealing with clinical events in a disaster, and the training and competencies required by clinical personnel.[6] Despite many common values and foci, as well as having many similar operational characteristics, health and emergency managers have mostly failed to share their tools and personnel.[7] Moreover, there is limited, effective use of eHealth technologies such as electronic health records, cloud computing, big data analytics, and Internet of Things that are currently revolutionising normal healthcare.[8]

Investigating communication failures in disaster scenarios has the potential to make a dramatic improvement in the appropriateness and quality of disaster healthcare by identifying ways in which information and communication technologies (ICTs) and eHealth technologies can be used to establish meaningful communication channels between emergency managers and disaster healthcare professionals.[9] Integrated information flows and optimal workflows facilitated by ICTs before, during, and after a catastrophic event are crucial to the formation of these channels. The collaboration of emergency management personnel and emergency medicine practitioners, and their use of eHealth technologies for the delivery of disaster-related healthcare has led to the establishment of a

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new discipline of Disaster eHealth (DEH) defined as "The application of information and eHealth technologies in a disaster situation to restore and maintain the health of individuals to their pre-disaster levels".[10]

The present paper identifies some key issues that hinder effective communication between the agencies responding to the health demands of disaster victims. Although the paper concerns primarily the response phase of the disaster lifecycle, it highlights points of possible application throughout the disaster lifecycle.

The paper aims at reducing the devastating impacts of disaster by showing how ICTs and eHealth can enhance the quality, access, safety, and cost-effectiveness of healthcare delivered to disaster victims and improve situational information that is crucial in such circumstances.

## 2. Methods

A literature review was undertaken to understand the obstacles that hinder collaboration and smooth information exchange between agencies responding to the health demands of disasters victims. The review attempted to answer three main research questions; What are the barriers to effective communication between clinical and emergency personnel during disasters? What essential information do these practitioners need to communicate in emergency situations? How can communication between emergency management and emergency medicine practitioners be improved?

The databases used included TRACIE: Healthcare Emergency Preparedness (Information Gateway), Disaster Lit: The Resource Guide for Disaster Medicine and Public Health (National Library), EM_DAT: The International Disaster Database (EM-DAT), Google Scholar, SocIndex, and Scopus. Journals consulted include but are not limited to; The American Journal of Public Health, Information Systems Frontiers, International Journal of Emergency Management, American Journal of Disaster Medicine, Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Policy Studies Review, Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, and Public Management Review. Grey literature used included government reports, policy statements, and issues papers. The search also covered websites of international humanitarian organisations including IFRC, UNOCHA, WHO.

Articles from different disciplines including information and communication technologies, healthcare, humanitarian relief and public policy were searched using keywords such as cross-agency collaboration, information exchange, disaster medicine, and disaster management. The search revealed 56 relevant articles from more than 100 publications, analysis of which extracted re-occurring themes reported as having a significant influence on inter-agency communication and representing potential barriers to consent.

## 3. Results

### *3.1 Inter-Communication Challenges That Occur Between Different Response Groups in a Rapidly Disaster Situation*

When a disaster event occurs, it is crucial that information is exchanged as early as possible to determine the extent of damage, the number of affected individuals, the dimension of required response, and the expected complications ahead. However, cross-agency collaboration is a complex task that requires considerable effort by the collaborating stakeholders especially when the response process requires several interrelated services provided by multiple agencies. The need to collaborate and coordinate efforts becomes vital as no one agency has sufficient information or resources to address the issues alone,[11,12] leading to poor information/technical/human resource management.[13] This paper categorises and discusses these issues under the key category headings mentioned above.

#### *3.1.1 Authority Challenges*

A potential cause of the sub-optimal collaboration between emergency management and health professionals is the different authority structures that ultimately reflect on organisational cultures, operational modalities, and capabilities, and the way each agency responds to disasters.[14] Emergency managers have traditionally been trained according to a military command-and-control model but there is a growing awareness that this model has limitations in emergency situations that require collaborative situation awareness, and rapid, adaptive decision making between the responding groups, e.g. civil defence, fire fighters, and increasingly ordinary citizens. Although local government agencies usually have the most extensive experience

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and expertise in disaster management among responding agencies, they cannot manage risk and respond to catastrophes without the aid of other sectors that are usually excluded from planning efforts.[15] Establishing cross-sectorial horizontal information exchange between intervening agencies gives a holistic picture of the situation in hand and reduces response cost as agencies share knowledge and expertise. Nevertheless, management in fluid, transitory, cross-agency arrangements is different from the vertical and horizontal management that goes on within stable organisations, and requires different skills and knowledge.[16-18] In a collaborative cross-sectorial context, the substitute for a command-and-control modus operandi would be a facilitative leadership. The management focus then would be on selecting appropriate agencies and resources, shaping the operating context and developing ways to cope with the strategic and operational complexity.[19]

In contrast with emergency management, disaster medicine, often seen as a poor relation of mainstream and emergency medicine,[7,20] whilst based on multi- disciplinary team work, is extremely hierarchical, very conscious of its academic credentials, focused on strict, set protocols, and is less familiar with the need to collaborate in real time with agencies external to its domain.[21] These distinctions can lead to different priorities and territorial misunderstandings making it difficult for disaster victims in need of treatment to receive seamless 'coordinated' care.[22] Moreover, authority (and cultural) differences can impose a leadership conflict when responding collectively to critical situations. For example, who is responsible for declaring a state of emergency?

Frameworks such as The New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management Systems (CIMS)[22] have been developed to coordinate emergency response but their success depends on the extent to which each agency applies the framework's concepts making the need for cross-agency collaboration indispensable. Cross-sector collaboration often includes elements of multi- functionality where people switch between roles and assignments in the organisations involved.[23] Clear roles, responsibilities and information needs for disaster respondents need to be well-defined but flexible in the context of emergencies in order to achieve the aims of the emergency response as a whole. This requires identifying the skills, resources and information that build the processes and culture needed. Collaboration has the potential to bring huge benefits to intervening agencies as they can exchange research findings and sector-specific tools and expertise to facilitate information exchange essential for decision-making whilst recognising each agencies origins and priorities. An important means to unravelling the complexities of disaster management is to recognise the interdependencies between healthcare and broader social systems and how they intersect to promote health and resilience before, during and after a crisis.[24]

### *3.2 Cultural and Trust Challenges*

The way an organisation is structured, how its members communicate with one another, and perform day-to-day activities shape its organisational culture.[25] According to Schein, organisational culture is divided into three different levels; artefacts and symbols, espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions.[26] Artefacts such as logos, architecture, structure, processes and corporate clothing are the visible elements in the organisation. Espoused values refer to the standards, values and rules of conduct. Basic underlying assumptions are the deeply embedded assumptions manifested in unconscious behaviour.[27] Although emergency management and clinicians share the same vision of providing public health services to disaster victims, it is probably naive to expect the two sectors to communicate smoothly without efforts to resolve issues that may stem from their different cultural origins. The way each agency perceives information (situational awareness – see next), for example, is completely dependent on the type of tasks that this information will be used for. These tasks are carried out to achieve the end goals of the responding agency. Medical respondents have their own evidence-based criteria for ranking emergencies. On the other hand, emergency managers cannot dispense with principles from multiple disciplines such as geography, geology, and meteorology in classifying and responding to a certain type of disaster. The two sectors may look at an emergency from different perspectives, as each is unfamiliar with the other's decision-making factors.

This situation poses the ritical question of what in-

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formation needs to be communicated between responding agencies to ensure a mutual understanding and collective decision-making. To answer this question, the two sectors need first to have an understanding of their basic concepts, structures, and processes. The complexity of interaction increases with the increase in the number of collaborating agencies. Standardising definitions and sector-specific terminologies is essential for synthesising the complete picture of the collaborative disaster response. Combined educational courses for emergency management and health practitioners could achieve this objective. In addition, the mix of roles and responsibilities in a collaborative context raises risks of dependence, distrust, managerial complexity, and power imbalances.[28] For instance, health specialists usually conduct a needs assessment and then evaluate the extent of damage, whereas emergency managers usually evaluate the damage and then respond to the needs of affected populations. Agencies need to 'understand' each other's operational modes and cultures in order to communicate smoothly.

A critical factor for successful cross-agency collaboration is trust.[29] Trust has dual and interrelated aspects: trust in integrity and trust in competence of the other party. Trust in integrity means confidence that the other party will not withhold information, will willingly share necessary information, will commit to shared contracts and laws, and will maintain confidence and work together with due diligence. On the other hand, trust in competence refers to a mutual confidence that the other party has the abilities, resources, skills, and willingness to contribute to the collaborative relationship in a complementary way.[30] Agencies that trust each other engage in joint problem-solving, joint action, and increased information sharing.[31] Moreover, trust eases the need for control, which in turn reduces transaction costs and the need for formal contracting.[32] Factors that influence the quality of trust in a cross- agency collaboration include team flexibility and adaptability, and the ability of actors to work together and with project outcomes.[33]

Information sharing, a major component of collaboration, is related to the trust that a person giving the information, has in the person receiving the information, to treat it professionally and use it judiciously.[31] Zaheer, et al.[33] refer to this type of trust as interpersonal trust and distinguish it from inter- organisational trust. Interpersonal trust affects inter- organisational trust, which in turn has a significant influence on information exchanges. Although face-to- face interactions may have the most significant impact on the establishment of trust between collaborators, other forms including email exchanges, blogs, web conferencing, and other shared information and communication spaces and channels are also influential on trust gaining. The emphasis here is on interpersonal skills regardless of the communication medium.

Another important concept that has the ability to foster cross-agency trust is the relatively new approach of colocation.[34] In emergencies and disasters, co-locating main actors, that is locating them in the same physical place, facilitates effective communication and increases efficiency due to better information interpretation, coordination and task allocation resulting in less response time and a shared sense of ownership that ultimately builds trust. The sources of trust and trustworthiness include accountability, reputation, reciprocity, third-party assurances and common norms. On the other hand, the sources of mistrust include lack or asymmetry of information, uncertainty, anonymity, a limited time window for decision making and lack of persistency.[35] A study conducted in the United Arab Emirates about government cross-agency collaboration found out that key barriers to collaboration among UAE public servants include losing ownership of ideas, losing control over information, undermining managerial hierarchy, and lack of ideas recognition.[30] The study suggests "incentivising" collaboration and sharing of information and knowledge through appraisal systems, as well as legislations enforcing information openness both within and between collaborative stakeholders.

### *3.3 Situational Awareness Challenges and Their Resolution*

Reliable information is crucial in dangerous times – to calm public anxiety, to mobilise resources from within the community, to tell people to move when they need to, and to warn people to stay away at times.[36] The common exchange of information in such scenarios is usually vertical, where information is exchanged with a top-level central agency that acts as a clearinghouse for subsidiary groups.[14] Although this centralised ap-

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proach simplifies the process of information verification, establishing real-time horizontal information exchange networks between agencies can be more efficient and timely and lead to improved decisions and action.[7] Therefore, there is a need for a coordinated approach to information exchange, which is essential for situation awareness. The shock and scale of a disaster count against collaboration and level-headed decision making and the importance of coordinated decisions points to the key role of situation awareness.

Situation awareness is about knowing and recognising what is going on around us.[37] Situation awareness (SA), defined as "The perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension and the projection of their status in near future" is required for moment-to-moment decision- making and improved performance in complex systems.[38] This definition points to the three levels of Endsley's situation awareness; perception, comprehension, and projection. Perception refers to understanding the importance of information about a certain situation. Comprehension refers to how the perceived information is combined, interpreted, stored, and retained. Projection refers to the ability to forecast future situations from current and previous ones.[39] In a collaborative context, two concepts are eminent; shared situation awareness (SSA) and team situation awareness (TSA).

On an individual level, each person within a team needs to have some level of situation awareness in order to perform their tasks as they contribute to the overall team objective. Endsley defines TSA as the degree to which every team member possesses the situation awareness required for his or her responsibilities.[40] SSA on the other hand refers to the overlap between the SA requirements of the individual team members.[28] Both individual and cross-agency situational awareness are of immense significance in emergency response since an individual's SA contributes to the information that needs to be interpreted and built upon in the process of decision-making. Information that is not relevant to the situation awareness of team members, other than the sender, results in wasted time and is best filtered to avoid unwanted 'noise'. The challenge here is to determine what are the minimum data sets that need to be communicated during emergencies? Defining these data sets cannot be done without unravelling the interactions that take place within and between responding agencies to have a clear picture of the information flow in order to be able to "see" where "blockage" exist. A suggested approach to do so is by carrying out workflow analysis for certain collaborative systems. Another pre-requisite is standardising definitions and terminologies of different responding agencies. The end goal of situation awareness is to have the right information sent to the right person at the right time.

Situational awareness is directly impacted by the structure of information flow. Thus, a study of several disasters where information flowed according to a command and control structure revealed a lack of shared protocols and a limited ability to cope with the resulting information surge, leading to poor shared situational awareness and fragmented views of the incidents.[40] On the other hand, situation awareness is positively impacted when responding organisations share timely information across a single platform designed to build a dynamic, holistic picture of a disaster situation. Platforms of this type, known as Common Operating Picture (COP) systems,[41] collect and integrate data from automated sensors, satellite feeds, and geospatial and mobile systems. Even so, COP systems requirements must involve all disaster stakeholders if they are to represent the range of perspectives that often challenge responders.

Situation awareness is not only critical for disaster response, it is also crucial to identify threats that may be on the way. Sharing different information views exposes otherwise unforeseen scenarios for which plans can be devised to minimise impact and determine appropriate responses that avoid under- or over- reactions (e.g. unnecessary mass evacuation) that can exacerbate already critical circumstances.[42]

Whilst the coordinated exchange of information in disasters is essential, informal exchange via, for example, social media has been used to find people in need, map damaged areas, organise relief efforts, disseminate news and guidance, attract donations, and help prepare for future disasters.[36] These, largely uncoordinated, exchanges can provide instant, up-to- date news faster than traditional news outlets or sources. There is, however, a need to verify the accuracy of this information.[43]

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### 3.4 Technical Challenges

The previous sections rightly offer a spotlight on human and organisational issues that hinder or expedite communication in disasters. Much of this communication, however, is facilitated by technology. The importance of ICTs in disaster response was especially obvious after the disaster of the Haiti earthquake in 2010. Underutilisation of ICTs in disaster response by both emergency management and medicine sectors almost certainly reflects understandable concerns about the costs and complexities associated with their adoption, application, and likely impact on practitioners and victims.[45] Technical interoperability refers to the ability of two or more ICT applications to accept data from each other and perform a given task in an appropriate and satisfactory manner without the need for extra operator intervention.[46] Technical interoperability is a significant concern. For instance, each responding agency usually has its own information storing processes and access controls that are pertinent to its mandate. Access restrictions can be based on considerations around information security, but also on the perceived need to own and control the data.

These factors were pointed out by an empirical study of information sharing in the management of shared social outcomes in New Zealand.[31] The study found out that the barriers to technical interoperability are incompatibility of hardware or software, mismatched data structures, incompatible database designs, incongruous data and information distribution channels, conflicting data definitions and different terminology. It also revealed that technical solutions to data management across agencies are available but unused because agencies lack the technical capability to explore and use technical solutions available to them, some officials would want to control data sets to ensure validity and accuracy, and due to cost-related restrictions for some non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Overcoming these technical communication barriers through a collaborative approach provides several benefits including enhanced health information management, timely access to health records regardless of time and geography, better communication between both healthcare providers and consumers, and better use of scarce commodities such as healthcare providers.[47] Post-Haiti earthquake, experts agreed on the need for more collaboration around an integrated framework for the use of multiple channels of information during disasters, better ICT preparedness, and public education on the use of alternative communications channels during an emergency.[48] ICTs can significantly impact information exchange, particularly in the first few hours after a disaster event happens; a critical time for making decisions.

### 3.5 Legislative Challenges

As mentioned earlier, information sharing is closely related to trust. However, in the healthcare context, there is a legal dimension to information sharing that stems from the need to protect patients' privacy and confidentiality. Using a Privacy Act as a restricting tool, many health practitioners are unwilling or unable to cooperate with other professional organisations as medical records including private patients' information are not shared even between members of the same agency.[31] Moreover, different agencies have different interpretations of privacy legislation and how it should be applied. In addition, it is not clear how government agencies should deal with other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community-based service providers who are not covered in the formal information exchange protocols of government agencies. This is sometimes solved through using consent forms but clearly there is a need to have a policy that governs this type of interactions. Cross-agency, information-sharing protocols provide clarity to officials of different agencies with varying mandates about how to interpret or apply legal provisions and helps build trust between them.

Thus there is a need to emphasise legal interoperability in a collaborative disaster response. Legal interoperability covers laws, policies, procedures and cooperation agreements needed to allow the seamless exchange of information between different organisations, regions and countries.[46] A trade-off between protecting patients' confidentiality and achieving a flexible level of information sharing that enables cooperation is crucial to the success of cross- agency collaboration. An important factor that complicates the process of legislating cross-agency collaboration is accountability. Accountability flows directly from the vertical structure of bureaucracy.[49] In a horizontal

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collective response to disaster events, where the leadership is only facilitative, individuals switch between roles and assignments and accountability may become unclear and needs to be legislated.[23] Accountability does not only stand out when addressing legislation; it also impacts cross- agency collaboration funding.[50]

## 4. Discussion

This paper pinpoints a number of obstacles that hinder meaningful communication and efficient information exchange between emergency management and health personnel and agencies in disasters. Further research involving health and emergency management personnel is needed to determine the extent of these and other factors. Much of this research will focus on the authority, cultural and trust, situational awareness, and legislative challenges noted in this paper but the ICT aspects of information exchange are critically important for the effective collaboration of responders during a disaster. The goal is a single, usable, knowledgebase system, which is dynamically updatable, and accessible to every disaster agency providing them with customised and interactive data. The system should have the ability to analyse inbound data items, perhaps generated by sensors, from responders and automatically route the items to identified recipients for decision making and action. The system will also be able to answer requests from agencies and source the required information from wherever it resides (including social media). To ensure that all data transactions are appropriate and efficient, the analytical engine should strip out irrelevant and superfluous items that could be time-consuming, confusing, or distracting in the stressful circumstances of a disaster situation. Minimum dataset specifications[51,52] would be especially apposite for this purpose.

In a disaster healthcare context, the above requirements specify an intelligent telehealth system (ITS) that can utilise the speed, accessibility, and cost- effectiveness benefits of eHealth technologies, for example, the electronic health record and decision support systems such as electronic triage. Disaster response plans aim primarily at avoiding loss of life so that their procedures tend to prioritise the evacuation of people rather than addressing the health status of victims and the interventions they require. Although a medium to long-term prospect, an ITS would greatly facilitate inter-agency interaction and have the potential to effect a radical improvement in the quality of disaster healthcare.

It is important to appreciate that the emergency management and disaster medicine domains targeted in this paper are not the only contributors to disaster healthcare. Several other agencies provide humanitarian relief in crisis and their existence cannot be ignored when addressing cross-agency collaboration. Underlying the current communication failings is a critical problem – independent disaster response – providing relief without appreciating the full benefits of collaboration or the means to achieve it. This fragmentation of response efforts results in lost resources, increased relief expenses, poor communication, and, most importantly, often poor healthcare quality. There is an urgent need for revising current emergency response strategies that develop collaborative approach to disaster response. The ITS and associated eHealth technologies will have a central role to play in this development.

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***Conflict of Interest.*** The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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# Submission on the Emergency Management Bill 2025

From: Kororia Webster

Date: 8th May 2025

To: National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)

Email: EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

## 1. Introduction

As an uri nō ngā Iwi me ngā Hapū whānui o Tauranga Moana, please find a submission on the proposed Emergency Management Bill 2025. As tangata whenua of this rohe there are responsibilities for the wellbeing of our people and whenua, particularly in times of crisis.

Recent responses to Cyclone Gabrielle, the Auckland floods, Whakaari Eruption and other events — confirms that (iwi) Māori are **essential partners** in emergency management, during response and recovery AND in risk reduction and community readiness.

This submission is in support the Government's intent to strengthen the emergency management system, and it is imperative to ensure the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi are embedded throughout this reform — in governance, planning, decision-making, and resourcing.

## 2. General Position

Support the direction of reform as this Bill presents a significant opportunity to:

- Strengthen partnerships between the Crown, local government, and Hapū/ Iwi Māori.
- Acknowledge and integrate mātauranga Māori and tikanga into planning and response.
- Build a more inclusive, effective, and culturally grounded emergency management system for all communities.

## 3. Specific Feedback on Key Issues

### 3.1 Iwi Representation in Governance

Support the legislative **requirement** for Māori representation on Civil Defense Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and Coordinating Executive Groups (CEG) and NEMA. Recommendations:

- That iwi representatives be nominated by iwi themselves, not appointed by external bodies (whakapapa).
- That representation comes with decision-making powers, not just advisory capacity.
- That resourcing be provided to support participation, including travel, staff time, and coordination roles.
- That there are secure dedicated FTE roles at management levels including in and at establishment of boards and working groups

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### 3.2 Mandatory Engagement in Planning

Strongly support requiring CDEM Groups to **partner** with iwi Māori during the development of Group Plans, but recommend:

- Engagement be defined as co-design, not post-drafting consultation.
- Planning processes acknowledge mana whenua status, regional iwi and hapū structures, and tikanga.
- That iwi priorities, such as marae-based evacuation planning and cultural welfare practices, are embedded.

### 3.3 Mātauranga Māori and Tikanga

Supportive of legislative recognition of mātauranga Māori and recommend:

- Mātauranga Māori be acknowledged as a **legitimate** and **protected** knowledge system.
- CDEM staff and responders be trained in tikanga-based engagement.
- Ensure secure Māori FTE avail to support CDEM staff
- Local and national plans include cultural protocols for manaaki, wāhi tapu and urupā protection, and whānau-led support.

### 3.4 National Māori Advisory Group

Supportive of establishment of a national Māori emergency management advisory group, provided that:

- Members are nominated by iwi/ Hapū not appointed centrally.
- The group has influence over national plans, funding frameworks, and policy direction.
- The group operates independently, with direct lines of communication to the Director of Emergency Management.

### 3.5 Resourcing and Capability

Seek guaranteed and sustainable resourcing for iwi to execute and participate effectively, including:

- Dedicated adequate equity based funding for iwi/ Hapū emergency management coordinators.
- Investment in marae-based response hubs and communications.
- Support for iwi/Hapū-led training, exercising, and response planning.

## 4. Summary of Recommendations

- Mandate iwi representation on CDEM Groups and CEGs with full participation rights.
- Require iwi/ Hapū co-design in Group Plans, not just consultation.
- Recognize regions which are Hapū-centric
- Recognize and embed mātauranga Māori and tikanga across the 4Rs.
- Establish a Māori advisory group with iwi/Hapū-nominated membership.
- Fund iwi participation, training, infrastructure and leadership roles.

## 5. Final Comments

This reform is welcome and forward looking to better working with NEMA, Bay of Plenty CDEM Group, and other partners to ensure the future emergency management system reflects true partnership, local leadership, and Māori worldviews.

***"Me arahi, me whai, me whakawātea rānei"*** – Eva Rickard

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## Contact for Further Discussion

Name: Kororia Webster

Position: He Uri o Tauranga Moana

(Kaitohutohu Hapori Māori Strategic Advisor– Tauranga City Council)

Email: s9(2)(a)

Phone: s9(2)(a)

*NB: Additional information and points toward submission as appendix attachment.*

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| EM Bill submission - Reform document | | |
|---|---|---|
| Section/ Table | Issue | *kōrero* |
| 16 | Decision making tools for significant natural hazard events | *Where is matauranga Māori and tikanga relfected in tools?* |
| 17 | Water done well reforms | *Ensure mana whenua included beyond just consultation* |
| | Local government | *Building consents to developers in Tsunami and flood prone areas - risk of legal action by Dev* |
| 4R's Māori 50 | | |
| Objective for re | Iwi Māori participation | *Does this refer to community or community Māori?* |
| 37 & 38 | When to take control, when to partner, when to get out of wa | *Me whai, me arahi, me whakawātea rānei' Eva Rickard* |
| Table 2 | From preferred options | *Option 3* |
| Table 3 51 | Partnering with Iwi Māori | *Partner with Māori not all in country are Iwi centric* |
| | | *Hybrid of options C+D+E; More Māori at top tables in secure seats inlcuding at NEMA and tho* |
| Table 8 103 | Clear consistent organization accountability for EM | *Option 2* |
| Table 9 107 | Assessment of options strengthen CEGs | *Option 2 with resource support to deliver rather than cost to TLA's* |
| Table 11 125 | Initial assessment to strengthen directors mandate for assura | *Option 3* |
| Table 12 131 | Options to strengthen mandate to intervene and diret | *Option 2* |
| Table 13 141 | Options to strengthen local hazard risk management | *Option 3 approving at central level increases misunderstanding due to disconnection for Regi* |
| Table 14 | Strengthen consideration of Taonga Māori; Issue 10; 10.1 | *Hapū and Iwi are authority on taonga Māori - Option 3* |
| Table 16 | Options to recognize wider range of essential infrastructure | *Option 3* |
| Table 17 | Strengthen lifelines utilitie and business continuity planning | *Option 3* |
| Table 18 | Strengthen cooperation and information sharing between util | *Option 5* |
| Table 20 | Options to better manage access to restricted areas | *Option 3* |
| Tabl 21 | Clarify who exercises what powers at the local level | *Option 2* |
| Table 22 | Modernize the process to declar SOE or transition period | *Hybrid options 2 and 3* |
| Table 23 | Clarify Mayors role in SOE declarations | *Option 2* |

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*ɔse in control agencies.  Increae the number of congtrollers and response team members, in CEGS and Regional Groups.*

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**From:** Hariata Baker s9(2)(a)
**Sent:** Thursday, May 8, 2025 1:35 PM
**To:** Emergency Management Bill [NEMA] <EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz>; s9(2)(a) s9(2)(a)
**Subject:** Waipuka Submission for New Emergency Management legislation

May 8, 2025

Tena koe

Please be advised that we from Waipuka hub (Ocean Beach, Hawkes Bay) support the Waimarama Submission submitted by Richard Gaddum May 7, 2025.

My name is Hariata Dawn Bennett I to have been involved with Civil Defence & was trained by our Waimarama team (Richard) since 2011.

Here is my submission:

I was also at Waipuka April 2011 event & Cyclone Gabrielle 2023.

I supported Richard Gaddum at the Hawkes Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Joint Committee 26 June, 2023 held at HBRC.

Here is a series of events leading up to the Cyclone:

Wednesday February 8, 2023 my Mother turned 92 years old so I had to plan & protect her as the warning came out by way of weather report not CDEM.

On Thursday 9th February, 2023 before Cyclone Gabrielle hit. I called a hui with our community members mostly whanau to be prepared for the coming event.

I called CDEM at HBRC 3x got cut off & had no call back.
My reason for the call was to give my contact details & to advise of our community group being prepared.

Unfortunately we were never contacted by any of your response team ever. WHY?

Waipuka community Feb 11, 2023
Power was cut which meant no phone no internet no wharepaku, lights, water for 8 days.
Fortunately we had planned ahead had water food & a fire to keep warm dry. We could not get to town as the road was flooded further down along Maraetotara river area.
Most of our whanau left for town before the road was impassable.

Richard Gaddum tried to get to us for days as the flooding prevented him to drive to our community. He did manage to get to us when the river subsided.

We had a radio & could listen to the news but no one from CDEM made contact to see if we were safe. No lifeline there?

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We have now with the help of HDC Sandra Hazelhurst & her team together with TPK, MPI, Red Cross & NZ Lotto managed to put a community hub on our whenua consisting of 6 containers a large generator showers & toilet block, coms unit with Starlink radio connected to HDC,
Triage area, sleeping & kitchen area.

We haven't seen or heard from CDEM which I find interesting an invitation will be sent to your team when the Hub is to be opened later this year.

In response to your discussion paper:

I have read your 81page discussion document written by NEMA lots of options risks.

The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act is over 20 years old. After April, 2011 event, one would have thought this discussion paper should have taken place back then, here we are 14 years later?

In your discussion paper the Hon Mark Mitchell quotes "my ambition is for the new legislation to make a difference on the ground"

Our position is that the govt has desktop warriors who write numerous expensive reports, who are not on the ground & do not listen, or dare I say it, are in their warm dry offices listening on a radio to the absolute devastation, where we on the ground are dealing with it at the cold face!

Page 5 of your discussion document shows table 1: example modelled natural hazard risk scenarios forecasts Cyclone Gabrielle equivalent event likelihood 50years which is estimated at 80% $9-14bn well that's a frightening piece of information so I do hope you with the powers that be get it right for future generations.

Page 10 Strengthening Community & Iwi Māori Participation:

All I can say to that is Iwi, Marae definitely need to be at the table to be heard with an input into this legislation.

Our Marae, Kahungunu Iwi, Te Taiwhenua
Provided beds, clothing, food, medication mental & physical support for over a year not to just Māori but to ALL that were directly affected by the Cyclone some who are still unable to go back to their homes.
500 meals a day to workers & those who had no where to go!!!

Iwi Hapu Marae need to be heard.

Page 28:
Govt inquiry noted that there needs to be clarity about roles & accountabilities between regional CDEM local authorities incl Group Controllers, CDEM groups & Chairs, CEO of regional council.

In closing :

Unfortunately the left hand didn't talk to the right hand who didn't talk to those on the ground so they failed badly…..

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Otherwise SOMEONE would've sent a chopper to see if Waimarama Waipuka Kairakau Mangakuri Porongahau & Pourerere communities needed provisions.

The past mistakes are to be considered don't make the same mistakes again,
let's move forward together not be bound as Richard has said "by misguided central & local government agencies who create unworkable rules & regulations & who don't listen to the people they represent"

In response to what I think we need to see as a result of this submission:

Immediate funding to equip & train our people now.

Our people working together in our community know what we need & will support as we always have to keep everyone safe.

We are volunteers that's what makes us strong within our community, we do it cos we care!

The leaders in these communities who are there to help support their community no one knows their area better than them, so support from the government to create safe locations shelters & provisions is needed now until help arrives.

After the event our communities need financial assistance & help get their communities back on track asap.

Tautoko Waimarama Submission.

Nga mihi
Hariata Dawn Bennett
Waipuka Civil Defence
s9(2)(a)

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# Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

8 May 2025

To
Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency
PO Box 5010, Wellington 6140
EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

Deadline
13 May 2025

Submission

Tena koe,

"New legislation to make a difference on the ground" requires consultation of Maori in our own right; thus, taking seriously the ongoing partnership established by the Treaty of Waitangi. Consulting Maori on emergency management legislation acknowledges the partnership established by the Treaty, not a racial privilege. Of course, it would be simpler and quicker not to do so; governments and business could just get on with what they believe is best.

Nonetheless, the government is one party to the Treaty; with the partnership quick decisions in emergencies by the right people is ensured. This collaboration fosters better cooperation between hapu, iwi Maori, businesses, and communities. Lifeline utilities and other agencies can plan together effectively, reducing disruptions to essential services and considering people's needs including animals, taonga, and cultural heritage. Special provisions for consultation should be based on necessity, encompassing all aspects of human well-being. Maori need assurance that the guarantee in Article.2 of the Treaty remains, while Pakeha need to act honourably.

Redressing disadvantages from historic injustices is a matter of justice. These injustices include land confiscations and the resulting social and economic hardships, such as poor living conditions, vulnerability to illness, and lack of financial resources for the cash economy. Additionally, Maori faced challenges in an education system tailored to the dominant culture until the 1940s. Due to the resulting inequalities, it would be inappropriate to treat all New Zealanders uniformly in "strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation". This approach would maintain the existing inequalities in New Zealand's emergency management legislation.

We need honest and constructive discussion of how the partnership is to be strengthened in the new legislation; how, in the pursuit of strengthening emergency management, rangatiratanga guaranteed in Article. 2 is respected in the legislation; and how the rangatiratanga can be exercised in ways that are credible, transparent, not exaggerated, accountable, and accepting of the governorship ceded in Article.1.

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Naku noa na Mere



Ngati Raka o Ngai Tuhoe & Te Parawhau Hapu

- Kaitiaki, Project Jonah volunteer 14815, 2025
- Kaitiaki, voluntary Pest Strategy: Takahiwai Hills and Forest. Est. 2017
- Chair, Kopuawaiwaha 2B2 Ahu Whenua Trust. Est. 1949
- Chair, Takahiwai Maori Committee. Est. 1977

8 May 2025

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | David Laurence Yeomans |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | |

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Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management.
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels.
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management.
- minimise disruption to essential services.
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Do you agree with how we have described the problem?**

***No**, Simply because NEMA have not identified interlacing roles of New Zealand Defence force, Fire Emergency New Zealand, Hato Hone St John, Heath New Zealand – Te Whatu Ora, and others as in the need of strengthening their roles in a community led management.*

*NEMA has focused on the inclusion of IWI and has not been overly inclusive of other emergency management contributors**. Reference:** The REPORT: Recommendation 1 'Legislate for and invest in an inclusive community -led emergency management model.*

**• Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified?**

The focus on **"community and iwi Māori"** is strong, but other **diverse or disproportionately affected groups** (e.g., disabled, elderly, ethnic minorities, migrant communities) are **not specifically mentioned**. Therefore, the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options NEMA has identified are unable to be established or realised as being impactive both in legislative changes and cost.

***Do you have any preferred options?***

***Yes,** Inclusivity in the use of language when identifying the 'strengthening of the community.'*

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• Are there any other options that should be considered? The document can be improved by:

- **Explicitly naming and addressing the needs of a wider range of communities** beyond iwi Māori
- Embedding **equity and accessibility** into each objective, particularly around participation and service delivery

With reference to using pages 8-9 there are no "options" to select

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation.

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities.

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The Reference to pages 10-13 the section touches on the diverse needs of communities but does not fully identify sections to ensure the system better meets those needs – particularly for groups disproportionately affected during emergencies.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

The document relies heavily on iwi Māori engagement (which is essential) but lacks equivalent detail or commitment for other at-risk groups. Such as: Disabled persons, Migrant and refugee communities, Pacific peoples, Children, and elderly and Rural or low-income populations

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**The Status Quo ~~CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION~~.**

**Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities.**

Preferred Options are:

**Option 2 (**non-legislative): Develop guidance on meeting diverse needs. **Preferred**

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**Option 3** (legislative): Require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for. **Preferred**

**Option 4** (legislative):

Require the Director to consult with representatives of disproportionately affected communities to inform national planning. **Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: **Preferred.**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: **Preferred**.

**5. What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it were better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Insert responseThe process of change must first identify the makeup of each community before asking what effective planning should look like?

An inventory of available services and equipment support is essential to determine which plans can be formulated and developed. Understanding the unique composition of each community is a key priority. Each community must first assess its existing resources before initiating any planning activities.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The document can be improved by:

• Explicitly naming and addressing the needs of a wider range of communities beyond iwi Māori

• Embedding equity and accessibility into each objective, particularly around participation and service delivery

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management.

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The document expresses a desire for a whole -of-society approach, including Iwi Māori to identify the roles and inputs before, during and after emergencies. The document does not identify what roles and inputs that are needed in any of the tiers of management during emergency conditions. The development of Key Performance Indicators (KPI's) and Legislative

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Delegated Authority companion documents would be helpful in strengthening and enabling Iwi Māori participation in emergency management.
There are no specific details on knowledge requirements, skills, resources, and historical experience Iwi Māori bring to all phases of emergency management. Key Performance Indicators (KPI's) would be needed.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert responseThe document identifies conceptual planning with no specific of "roles' for Iwi Māori which is legislative outcomes dependant.
This section needs to be reviewed to identify what potential roles are contemplated.

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management: Options.**

~~**Option 1: Status Quo – CANNOT REMAIN**~~

**Option 2** (non-legislative): Address the roles of iwi Māori in plans, guidance, and other policy settings **Preferred.**

**Option 3** (legislative): Require iwi Māori representation on CDEM Group decision-making structures. **Preferred**
**Option 4** (legislative): Require CDEM Groups to engage with iwi Māori during the development of CDEM Group plans. **Preferred**
**Option 5** (legislative): Require the Director to seek advice on Māori interests and knowledge to inform national level planning. **Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: **Preferred**.

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

The government report acknowledges the significant contributions of iwi Māori during the Gabrielle event. However, such recognition should not be construed as implying exclusivity within any organisation or government agency, as numerous other New Zealand nationals (Kiwi's) also demonstrated substantial expertise and played critical roles in emergency management efforts. Iwi Māori has a place at the emergency management table along with all Kiwi's.

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**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

The relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori should be based on mutual respect, partnership, and shared responsibility in emergency management. The government report acknowledges the significant contributions of iwi Māori during the Gabrielle event, which reflects the value of Indigenous knowledge and community leadership in crisis response. However, such recognition should not be interpreted as suggesting exclusivity within any organisation or government agency. It is essential that all relationships within the emergency management framework—whether with iwi Māori or other stakeholders—are inclusive, non-discriminatory, and recognise the contributions of all New Zealanders who possess the expertise and commitment to support emergency management efforts effectively.

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

The relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori should be based on mutual respect, partnership, and shared responsibility in emergency management. The government report acknowledges the significant contributions of iwi Māori during the Gabrielle event, which reflects the value of Indigenous knowledge and community leadership in crisis response. However, such recognition should not be interpreted as suggesting exclusivity within any organisation or government agency. It is essential that all relationships within the emergency management framework—whether with iwi Māori or other stakeholders—are inclusive, non-discriminatory, and recognise the contributions of all New Zealanders who possess the expertise and commitment to support emergency management efforts effectively.

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

It is important that iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga (knowledge, wisdom, understanding and skill) in emergency management are communicated to the Director through structured, transparent, and merit-based channels.

Establishing formal advisory mechanisms—such as an inclusive advisory panel or working group that incorporates iwi Māori representatives alongside other emergency management stakeholders—would ensure that these perspectives are considered fairly and effectively.

This approach enables the integration of valuable Indigenous knowledge without implying preferential access or influence, and supports balanced, evidence-informed decision-making in line with national emergency management objectives.

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No Comment

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## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management.

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The importance of communities developing self-sufficiency and resilience has long been understated and is largely absent from the public mindset, where reliance on "government" & "agency" assistance has become the norm. Re-educating the New Zealand population to understand that they may need to manage independently until external support becomes available is a significant undertaking—one that requires long-term investment in public education. NEMA and other government agencies must critically review and enhance their educational programmes to ensure the public is well-informed, empowered, and prepared to actively participate in emergency preparedness and response exercises.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management.**
**Options:**
~~**Option 1:** Status quo - CDEM Groups have flexibility in how the work with their communities – **CANNOT REMAIN**~~
~~**Option 2** (non-legislative): Develop guidance on meeting diverse needs – **CANNOT BE AN OPTION**~~
**Option 3** (legislative): Require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for. **Preferred**
**Option 4** (legislative): Require the Director to consult with representatives of disproportionately affected communities to inform national planning. **Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: preferred.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**Reference: The Report.**
Recommendation1: Put people and their communities at the heart of an integrated emergency management system.
**C.** Build networks of trained and accredited local community leaders and volunteers, which extends beyond the currently recognised volunteer groups.

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**D.** Develop and invest in a comprehensive and ongoing education and public awareness programme to ensure people have a common understanding of how to prepare for (readiness planning) and what to do in an emergency.
The NEMA survey document does not expand sufficiently on this particular recommendation or how it might be achieved.
If the goal is to have a community – led emergency management model there is a need to establish if the community is capable.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency.

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency.**
**Options:**
~~**Option 1: Status quo – CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~
**Option 2** (legislative): Provide for protection from civil liability. **Preferred**
**Option 3** (legislative): Enable compensation for labour costs. **Preferred**
**Option 4** (legislative): Enable compensation for injury and/ or death over that covered by ACC. **Preferred**
The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: preferred.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

An opportunity is provided to recognise a **"spontaneous emergency responder"** who initiates emergency actions based on local circumstances. Not under the direction control of any "Officer/Group or Unit." In "good faith" initiates a "safety response" as being "Johnny-on-the-Spot." Such a person would be enabled for:

- protection from civil liability,
- compensation of labour costs,
- compensation for machinery and or equipment loss.

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## Other problems relating to this objective.

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

No Comment

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels.

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels,**
Preferred Options:
~~**Option 1: Status quo - CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~

**Option 2** (legislative): Require the agency dealing with the specific hazard to be the "Control Agency. **Note:** only to be considered when an "event" has **NO** cascading/ "knock-on influences."

**Option 3** (legislative): Require Group Controllers (local emergency) or the Director (national emergency) to be the "Control Agency".

**Option 4** (legislative): A unified control model between the agency dealing with the hazard and the Group Controller or Direct. **Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: **Preferred**.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

All legislative options must identify empowerment from the local 'Mission Control" to the embody Community participation in emergency and recovery activities.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

**Just thoughts:** The importance of communities developing self-sufficiency and resilience has long been understated and is largely absent from the public mindset, where reliance on government assistance (in whatever form) has become the norm. Re-educating the New Zealand population to understand that they may need to manage independently until external support becomes available is a significant undertaking—one that requires long-term investment in public education. NEMA and other government agencies must critically review and enhance their educational programmes to ensure the public is well-informed, empowered, and prepared to actively participate in emergency preparedness and response (including practice exercises).

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management.

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities.

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management.**
**Options:**
~~**Option 1: Status quo – CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION.**~~
**Option 2** (legislative) Provide distinct responsibilities for CDEM Groups and their local authority members.
**Option 3** (legislative) Require CDEM Group plans to state how each member will fund and deliver on the functions and decisions of the CDEM Group. **Preferred Option**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: preferred.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

There may be additional options to consider, depending on the specific circumstances and any evolving legislative prescriptions.

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**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The Report on the North Island Serve Weather Events identified with the Recommended - Emergency management system design and structure.
**Recommendation 1: Put people and their communities at the heart of an integrated emergency management system.**
The current Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group model limits meaningful community engagement. Local councils often lack the mechanisms or capacity to assess and support effective civil protection measures at the community level.
The current CDEM model should be re-evaluated and aligned with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. NEMA's traditional "4Rs" approach—Reduction, Readiness, Response, and Recovery—does not fully reflect the more comprehensive priorities outlined in the Sendai Framework (**out of date**):
(a) Understanding disaster risk,
(b) Strengthening disaster risk governance,
(c) Investing in risk reduction for resilience, and
(d) Enhancing preparedness for effective response and recovery, including efforts to "Build Back Better."
A shift toward these priorities will ensure a more holistic and future-proof emergency management system

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management.

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management**
**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~

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**Option 2 (legislative): Provide distinct responsibilities for CDEM Groups and their local authority members. Provide for legislative inclusion of Option 3**

**Option 3 (legislative): Require CDEM Group plans to state how each member will fund and deliver on the functions and decisions of the CDEM Group. Provide for legislative inclusion of Option 2**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: preferred.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

There may be additional options to consider, depending on the specific circumstances and any evolving legislative prescriptions.

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups**

**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~

**Option 2 (legislative) Provide more specific expectations on members of the Coordinating Executive Group supported by good practice guidance. Preferred. In compilation with Options 3 & 4.**

**Option 3 (legislative) Require the Coordinating Executive Group to report to the Director on how and to what extent it has delivered on its functions under the CDEM Act. Preferred. Reporting lines to be established. Historic reporting on achievement of functions required. Future reporting lines to be re-established.**

**Option 4 (legislative) Remove the ability for Coordinating Executive Group members to delegate membership, or require these entities to have a single, specified delegate. Preferred. A "Delegated Authority Matrix" is needed. A parallel legislative authority of hierarchical "Delegated Authority" is required to identify the legal authority of each "named position" within the (A) Legislative Build & (B) NEMA – Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS).**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: preferred.

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**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

There may be additional options to consider, depending on the specific circumstances and any evolving legislative prescriptions.

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

It is still too early to fully determine the likely impacts, a balanced assessment of potential benefits, costs, and risks, guided by ongoing legislative developments, will be essential as the options continue to evolve.

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date.

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date:**

**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo – CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~

**Option 2: (legislative) Enable targeted, "more than minor" amendments to the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans. Preferred. Introduce the term "Minor & Mechanical Changes," which allows for legislative changes and document correction in layout, formatting, presentation (including digital access).**

**In legislative terms make provision for a "Disallowable Instrument" process to enable "quick change" to legislative anomalies and introduction temporary new legislative empowerment.**

**Option 3 (legislative): The National CDEM Plan isn't required to be made by Order in Council but retains its legislative status. Preferred. Clearly identify a more appropriate level for "sign-off" and assign enabling legislative Authority. The ability to add/subtract against a new threat is an administrative necessity. Waiting for "pedestrian" changes in legislation when lives are at risk is not acceptable.**

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The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: preferred.

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Develop a legislative suite that enables flexibility to combat threat & risks.

## Other problems relating to this objective.

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, it's important to assess whether roles and responsibilities across all levels are clearly defined and well-aligned to ensure effective coordination and avoid gaps or overlaps

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management.

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance.

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Provide legislative change to enable the Director to mandate expectations and to monitor performance and accountability.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management.**

**Options:**

**Option 1: Status quo – Preferred to remain. Strengthen the companion legislation requiring the Director to fulfil accountability through Key Performance Indicators (KPI's) for the Directors position.**

**Option 2: (non-legislative) Increased guidance and strengthened governance. Preferred. Currently there is a noticeable lack of guidance material.**

**Option 3: (legislative) Enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set through rules. Preferred. Incorporate the principles of empowerment & accountability.**

**Option 4: (legislative): Give the Director the function of monitoring the performance of the emergency management system. Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

(1) Require the development of Key Performance Indicators (KPI's) for each "named" position with the emergency management structure.

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(2) Ensure a common use language of Emergency Management Employment Positions is established.

(3) Ensure that "Delegated Authority" is provided to "named positions" and not to named individuals. The provision of "Delegated Authority" to named individuals is an administrative, burdensome, nightmare.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

There may be additional options to consider, depending on the specific circumstances and any evolving legislative prescriptions.

## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues.

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues.**

**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo – CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION.**~~ **Increase the powers of intervention via legislative means of the CDEM Act and any other legislative paths.**

**Option 2 (legislative) Provide the Director with the power to issue compliance orders. Preferred. Provide the Director with a fine & penalty schedule for failure to comply to issued compliance orders.**

**Option 3 (legislative) Expand the Minister's existing powers of intervention. Preferred. Additionally provide the Minister with retroactive legislation to empower enquiry into failure to comply and failure to act.**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

There may be additional options to consider, depending on the specific circumstances and any evolving legislative prescriptions.

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## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management.

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups, and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The 4r's Principles need to be replaced with the principles of:

(a) Understanding disaster risk,
(b) Strengthening disaster risk governance,
(c) Investing in risk reduction for resilience, and
(d) Enhancing preparedness for effective response and recovery, including efforts to "Build Back Better."

Local Risk Management is required to identify known weak points and recurring known risk areas. E.g. Known flooding areas, known road flooding. Local Risk Management must put in place safe mitigation strategies and a process to review and plan to overcome recurring risk areas. Every known "risk" in a particular area/location requires tabulation into an information bank of known risk for local Councils and CDEM Groups. Plans are required to mitigate the "local" risk when known reoccurrence of the risk is identified.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management.**

**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo, CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION.**~~ **CDEM Groups and local Authorities (Councils) are required to record known areas of risk. Provide safe mitigation strategies in problematic areas and develop plans to overcome known risk areas. Councils are required to identify a Risk Register within Council's administrative domain.**

**Option 2 (non-legislative) Provide clearer guidance about what it means to achieve an "acceptable" level of risk. Preferred.**

**Option 3 (non-legislative) Update guidance and strengthen assurance of CDEM Group plans. Preferred.**

**Option 4 (legislative) Enable the form and content of CDEM Group plans to be prescribed through secondary legislation. Preferred**

**Option 5 (legislative) Strengthen the Minister's role in the CDEM Group planning process. Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

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**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

This is as of "yet" an unknown. The build of the legislation will determine what is enforceable. All CDEM Group plans must identify a "minimum" standard of planning. All plans must identify what local Councils are able achieve within their own resources and what Councils may need to draw upon.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Each local Authority must produce a "Risk Register" which identifies know area(s)/location(s) and sites of repetitive risk. A "resources log" is required to identify what resources are required to mitigate known risks and repetitive risk(s). E.g. A roadway that repeatedly floods requires a mitigation strategy and identification of resources required to manage the risk. Long term strategies are to be investigated to eliminate the risk or live with the risk, with mitigation of the risk.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage, and animals during and after emergencies.

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies.

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The Issue title is incorrect and must be addressed under two separate subjects. Māori cultural heritage and animal welfare are separate issues because they involve different values, responsibilities, and responses. Māori heritage concerns the protection of taonga (treasures) like sacred sites and ancestral knowledge, which require culturally informed approaches and

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recognition of Indigenous rights. Animal welfare focuses on the care and humane treatment of animals, needing different legal and logistical measures. Treating them as distinct ensures both are properly respected and protected during emergencies.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga (treasures) Māori, cultural.**

**Heritage.**

**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo. CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION.**~~ **Commentary:** Taonga Māori (treasures) must be culturally recognised and protected with the same level of importance afforded to other national treasures of Aotearoa New Zealand. Many Māori pā sites, for instance, are located near coastal areas and lakeshores—regions that are increasingly vulnerable to flooding. These locations should be assessed for their risk exposure and, where necessary, measures should be taken to strengthen and preserve them. Emergency and risk management plans must also include alternative or backup strategies to safeguard taonga at sites known to be at considerable risk.

**Option 2 (non-legislative): Develop guidance on considering taonga (treasures) and other cultural heritage. Preferred. Commentary:** As noted in the commentary under Option 1 – Status Quo, any guidance material must be developed in accordance with contemporary interpretations of the Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga Act 2014.

**Option 3 (legislative): Strengthen planning expectations through secondary legislation. Preferred. Commentary:** Making the planning expectations of taonga Māori, through secondary legislation, by capturing cultural heritage, enforceable within emergency management planning is essential to safeguarding Aotearoa New Zealand's cultural identity, biodiversity, and ethical responsibilities. This approach strengthens emergency resilience and reflects national values.

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

There may be additional options to consider, depending on the specific circumstances and any evolving legislative prescriptions.

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## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies.

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Commentary:** While animal welfare is acknowledged in New Zealand's emergency management framework, it is often not sufficiently integrated as a core subject in Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) planning. The prevailing notion that animal care is solely the responsibility of owners is inadequate and does not reflect the cultural values of Aotearoa New Zealand, where the welfare of animals is closely tied to community wellbeing and resilience. Emergency planning must evolve to systematically identify farm-specific emergencies and designate known safe areas, such as high ground, to protect both animals and livelihoods.

Farm emergency plans are recommended to consider a range of scenarios, including fire, flood, and evacuation, and should include diagrams identifying safe areas and resources related to each emergency type.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo – CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~ **Commentary:** While animal welfare is acknowledged within New Zealand's emergency management framework, it is not yet sufficiently integrated as a core subject in Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) planning. The prevailing notion that animal care is solely the responsibility of owners is inadequate and does not reflect the cultural values of Aotearoa New Zealand. To better protect both animals and livelihoods, emergency planning must evolve to systematically identify farm-specific emergencies and designate known safe areas, such as high ground.

**Option 2 (non-legislative) Develop guidance on considering animal impacts. Preferred.**

**Option 3 (legislative) Strengthen planning expectations through secondary legislation. Preferred.**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

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**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Animals should always be prioritised above inanimate property, such as buildings, vehicles, and equipment.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective.

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

The higher minimum standard for emergency management cannot be properly validated as the appropriate standard unless there is an opportunity to test it in conjunction with the relevant legislation.

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services.

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

(1) A principle- based definition has not been provided. A principle-based definition with redefined wording of what constitutes "essential infrastructure" based on a 'National,' Regional, and local infrastructure would have been a great start, just a sample. It is critical to identify **Regional** and **Local Infrastructure** needs of what constitutes "essential infrastructure." Each Community needs to identify what is going to sustain them in an Emergency and create their own Schedule of "essential services and infrastructure" to fulfil the recommendations of **THE REPORT**.

(2) For future development/discussion a link to the CDEM Act and the Schedules identifying the current "essential infrastructure" Lifeline Utilities is required.

(3) Contributors to the discussion document need to know what the current Schedule Lifeline Utilities contains rather than having to refer to another document. i.e. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act. There is a need to replicate, for the purposes of discussion, what is currently in place. i.e. A copy

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services.**

**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~ **Commentary:** The fundamental purpose of reviewing the CDEM Act and the Bill is to strengthen legislation that has, to date, failed to adequately serve communities and the country. Repeating status quo recommendations in response to each new issue/disaster is redundant and ineffective. NEMA is not the sole agency that must continue encouragement of voluntary infrastructure providers.

**Option 2** (secondary legislation): Add additional sectors to the CDEM Act's Schedule of lifeline utilities. **Preferred.**

**Option 3** (legislative) Replace the lifeline utilities framework with an expanded, principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure". **Preferred with Caution. A principle- based definition has not been provided. A principle-based definition is required along with redefined**

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**wording of what constitutes "essential infrastructure" based on a 'National,' Regional, and Local infrastructure needs.**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure," are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

**ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO BE INCLUDED.**

**SUBJECT: AIRPORTS: Outdated Infrastructure Listings: Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 + Appendix C of the discussion document**

The current listing under the **Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 – Schedule 1 – Part A – Specific Entities** is outdated and requires urgent revision:

- The format and pagination of the schedule should be modernised for ease of reference and operational use.
- The list should reflect current infrastructure capabilities, including emerging transport and utility hubs that have expanded in scope and function since the Act was enacted.

**Reclassification of Airports for Emergency and International Relief Use**

The classification of international airports within the current legislation (Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch) should be re-evaluated and expanded. The definition of "international airport" must include not only current commercial passenger hubs but also:

- Airports capable of accommodating international relief flights, military deployments, and humanitarian operations.
- Regional airports with the infrastructure and runway capacity to handle international aircraft, including those that have been upgraded or re-certified since the original schedule.
- All military airports must be listed in the "New" Schedule 1.

**Proposed Additions**:

- **Hamilton Airport** and **Rotorua Airport** now meet criteria that could qualify them as suitable for international relief flight operations. These airports should be evaluated for inclusion based on technical capacity, geographical strategic value, and logistical flexibility. Consideration of additional airports is required.

| Category | Example Entities | Reason for Inclusion |
|---|---|---|
| Secondary Airports | Taupō, Chatham Islands, Great Barrier, | Emergency access, regional resilience, |
| | Te Anau/Manapouri, Oamaru, Masterton, | redundancy if primary airports are affected |
| | Ryan's Creek (Stewart Island), etc. | |

**Note: The premise of review as related to airports/aerodromes needs to apply to the current list of Specific Entities. The failure to able to refresh and restructure the Schedule is given as a good example of legislation that is inflexible.**

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**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

**ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO BE INCLUDED**

**Subject: Communications -**

**Outdated Infrastructure Listings: Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (page 89) + Appendix C of the discussion document.**

**Reference: Part B Entities carrying on certain businesses.**

- The schedule (Part B) does not explicitly include major **internet service providers (ISPs)**, **mobile network operators**, or **data centre operators**.
- In modern emergencies, **digital communications** (internet, mobile networks, cloud services) are as critical as traditional broadcast media for disseminating information, coordinating response, and maintaining public safety.
- Any developing communications systems should be considered as worthy of adding to the list of "essential services." There is **no explicit mention of digital or satellite communications providers**.

**Gaps Identified**

**1. Digital Communications**

- **The schedule does not explicitly include major internet service providers (ISPs), mobile network operators, or data centre operators.**
- **In modern emergencies, digital communications (internet, mobile networks, cloud services) are as critical as traditional broadcast media for disseminating information, coordinating response, and maintaining public safety.**

**2. Satellite Communications**

- **There is no mention of satellite communications providers (e.g., Starlink, Inmarsat, or local satellite ground stations).**
- **Satellite services are vital for:**
  - **Backup communications when terrestrial networks fail (e.g., after earthquakes, floods, or other disasters)**
  - **Remote and rural connectivity**
  - **Emergency services, government, and critical infrastructure resilience**

**Recommended Entities for Addition**

**A. Major Telecommunications Providers**

- **Chorus Limited (national fixed-line infrastructure)**
- **Spark New Zealand, Vodafone New Zealand (One NZ), 2degrees (mobile and broadband operators)**
- **Kordia (broadcast and critical communications networks)**

**B. Internet Service Providers and Data Centres**

- **Major ISPs (e.g., Orcon, Vocus, Voyager)**
- **Key data centre operators (e.g., Datacom, CDC Data Centres, Spark Digital)**

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**C. Satellite Communications Providers**

- **Starlink (SpaceX): Now widely available in NZ, increasingly used as backup for rural and emergency communications.**
- **Inmarsat, Iridium, or other international satellite operators: Where they have NZ presence or partnerships.**
- **Local ground station operators: E.g., Rocket Lab, or any NZ-based satellite uplink/downlink facilities**

**D. Cloud and Digital Infrastructure Providers**

- **Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud: If they have NZ-based infrastructure or are critical to government/utility operations.**

**Rationale for Inclusion**

- **Resilience: Digital and satellite communications are now essential for emergency response, public information, and coordination.**
- **Redundancy: Satellite services provide crucial backup if terrestrial networks are damaged.**
- **Comprehensive Coverage: Including these entities ensures that all critical communication channels remain operational during emergencies.**

**Suggested Schedule Addition (Sample Wording)**

***8. The principal provider(s) of telecommunications services, including but not limited to fixed-line, mobile, and internet services, as designated by the Minister.***
***9. The principal provider(s) of satellite communications services, including those operating ground stations or providing satellite-based connectivity for emergency and public communications.***
***10. The principal operator(s) of data centres and digital infrastructure essential to the continuity of government and lifeline utility operations.***

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> 10. The principal operator(s) of data centres and digital infrastructure essential to the continuity of government and lifeline utility operations."

Summary Table

| Category | Example Entities | Reason for Inclusion |
|---|---|---|
| Telecommunications | Spark, Vodafone (One NZ), 2degrees, Chorus | Critical for voice, SMS, and data comms |
| Internet Providers | Orcon, Vocus, Voyager | Essential for internet connectivity |
| Data Centres | Datacom, CDC, Spark Digital | Hosts critical digital infrastructure |
| Satellite Communications | Starlink, Inmarsat, Rocket Lab (ground ops) | Backup and rural/remote comms |
| Cloud Providers | AWS, Microsoft, Google (NZ infrastructure) | Hosts government and utility digital ops |

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning.

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

It is deeply ironic—and concerning—that legislative consideration is being given to the imposition of financial penalties on businesses and the public when no minimum standard for business continuity or public service resilience has yet been formally established. In practice, very little guidance—if any—has been offered to define what preparedness looks like for those entities deemed "essential."

**For example:**
A critical question remains unanswered: *Should all petrol stations be required to maintain the capability to function during emergencies, either via permanent backup power systems or through infrastructure enabling the rapid connection of external generators?* Ensuring the continuity of fuel

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supply is fundamental for both emergency response operations and public mobility during crisis events.

This example reflects a broader issue—there is currently no legislated or enforced **minimum standard of self-sustainment** required for businesses or facilities designated as Lifeline utilities. If an entity is to be identified as essential to national or regional resilience, it should be held to a clearly defined baseline of operational continuity under emergency conditions.

Such a standard must extend beyond the private sector to include:

- All central and local government buildings.
- All facilities designated for emergency use by regional and territorial authorities.
- All **FENZ** stations, **New Zealand Police** stations, **Hato Hone St John** stations, and any other premises identified as public refuge or recovery centres.

Until such a framework is developed, implemented, and properly resourced, any discussion of **financial penalties** under a community-led emergency management system is premature and counterproductive. Without equitable standards of preparedness, the burden of resilience is unfairly shifted to those with the least clarity, capacity, or mandate to deliver it.

**Question 66: This section needs a considerable re-work to encourage being listed as Lifeline Utility Business.**

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Refer to the response in Question 66**

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**Refer to the response in Question 66**

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

Options:

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70. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Option 1: Status quo – Remains - NEMA promotes voluntary cooperation and joint planning between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies. Preferred**

**Option 2: (non-legislative): Strengthen assurance and develop standards and guidance. Preferred**

**Option 3: (legislative): Explicitly require CDEM Groups to involve the lifeline utilities in their areas in the development of CDEM Group plans. Preferred**
**Option 4: (legislative): Require lifeline utilities to contribute to national response plans. Preferred**

**Option 5: (legislative) Strengthen information sharing protections. Preferred**

**Option 6 (legislative): Enable data standards to be prescribed through secondary legislation. Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

71. **Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

**No Comment**

72. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**No Comment**

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity.

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

73. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity.

**Options:**

**Option 1: Status quo - Public service agencies have business continuity requirements under the CDEM Act. All Agencies are to be listed. Preferred**

**Option 2 (non-legislative): Promote best practice business continuity practices. Documented Guidance Required. Preferred**

**Option 3 (legislative): Extend current business continuity requirements through a 'captured' "opt in" model. All Government Agencies are captured "opt in" agencies unless specifically exempt. Preferred**

**Option 4 (legislative): Extend current business continuity requirements to a broader group of central government organisations, with a mechanism to exempt specific Crown entities. Preferred**

**Option 5 (legislative): New requirement to take account of guidance issued by the Director. Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**No Comment**

## Other problems relating to this objective.

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

**No Comment**

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens.

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas.

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas.

Options:

**Option 1: Status quo. Preferred**

**Option 2 (non-legislative): National guidance and training on managing cordons. Preferred**
**Option 3 (secondary legislation): Prescribe the form of identification passes through regulations. Preferred**
**Option 4 (legislative): Clarify that access can be restricted to any class or group of persons. Preferred**
The explanation of options for (79) each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No Comment

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level.

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level.
Options:

~~**Option 1: Status quo – CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~

**Option 2: (legislative): Tidy up existing functions and powers related to CDEM Groups, Controllers, and Recovery Managers. Preferred**

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**No Comment**

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period.

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period.**

**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo CANNOT REMAIN AS A SOLE OPTION.**~~ **Modernisation is a MUST.**

**Option 2 (legislative): Enable authorised persons to use electronic signatures. Preferred**
**Option 3 (legislative): Enable authorised persons to declare a state of emergency verbally. Preferred**
The explanation of options for (85) each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

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**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The introduction of the Electronic "Flimsy."

Historical Information: Military in Origin

**Definition and Function:**

A "flimsy" referred to a thin, carbon-copied sheet of paper (often part of a multi-copy form) used to issue **orders, directions, or reports** quickly and efficiently. It was called a "flimsy" due to the lightweight, semi-transparent nature of the paper—typically duplicated using a typewriter and carbon paper.

**The Digital and Electronic World Equivalent:**

Today's digital and electronic environment, the **modern equivalent of a "flimsy"** would be any **rapid, semi-formal but authoritative digital communication** used to issue operational orders, instructions, or summaries.

**Samples to be considered:**

(1) Email with Operational Attachments
(2) Shared Documents – Microsoft Teams, Google Documents, SharePoint
(3) Command and Control (C2) Messages
(4) Situation Reports (SITREPS)/Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs), JChat, SIPRNet
(5) Mobile Messaging Apps – WhatsApp, Signal, GovComms, WHISPIR (notorious)

**Inter-Agency connectability, distribution and redundancy capacity would be a nice outcome for New Zealand.**

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

In the discussion between references 215 – 217. The issue of a Mayor not wanting to declare an emergency is an unstated issue that is required to be addressed. If a Mayor or an Elected Substitute cannot/ will not declare an emergency when there is evidence that a declaration of

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emergency must be bad. The One over One" Rule needs to be applied – In that a CDEM can override.

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices.**
**Options**
**Option 1: Maintain the Status Quo**
The current framework can remain; however, **the Council's Code of Conduct must include provisions enabling intervention when the Mayor is unwilling or unable to declare a state of emergency—despite clear evidence justifying such a declaration.**

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Consider a Council Group Decision on an Emergency Declaration.

### Other problems relating to this objective.

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

**No Comment**

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

**Upon reviewing the supplied documents, along with any supporting or companion materials, several observations have been identified.**

It is hoped that these observations, along with the accompanying suggestions and recommendations, will be carefully considered to enhance the quality of the current legislative documents, guidance materials, and inquisitorial content provided.

**(1) Removal of Lazy Legislative Terms**

A review of the legislative documents is required to eliminate the use of the term "*may*" where it creates ambiguity or weakens enforceability. Its discretionary tone can inadvertently support a "do-nothing" culture and done so for years. Clear and precise language—such as "*shall*" or "*must*"—should be used to ensure obligations are unambiguous and legally sound.

The following documents significant review to remove the word *"may."*

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**(a) National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015,**

**(b) Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002**

**(c) Emergency Management Bill**

**(d) NEMA Documents**

**(e) NEMA CSIM's Documents**

**Note:** All draft legislation must be reviewed and approved by the Ministry of Regulation prior to its public release. All Legislative material to be written plain English, with **no** "code-shifting" embodied. If an additional language document is required, it should be produced **without** "code-shifting."

**(2) Removal of the reference of CROWN from Legislation.**

Since the adoption of the Constitution Act 1986, which severed the remaining legislative ties to the United Kingdom, it is timely to review all legislative documents to ensure they clearly affirm that the authority to govern New Zealand resides with the Executive Branch of the New Zealand Government. Traditional references to the Crown should give way to neutral, institutional language that supports the development of a modern, future-focused legislative framework for Aotearoa New Zealand.

**New Zealand Defence Bases Review**

**Review and Recommendations: Defence Force Resilience in the Wake of Cyclone Gabrielle**

The Government Inquiry into the Response to the North Island Severe Weather Events (released 23rd April 2024) provided a comprehensive review of emergency management but did not specifically address the resilience or self-sufficiency of Defence Force assets such as bases, barracks, or supply autonomy. The report focused on improving the emergency management system, identifying systemic weaknesses, and recommending better use of the wider government ecosystem, including expanding the NZDF's role in logistics and coordination during civil emergencies.

**Gaps Identified:**

- The report did not assess the technical or operational autonomy of Defence Force establishments, nor their capacity for independent power, water, medical, fuel, or food supply during emergencies.
- There was no explicit requirement for Defence bases to be self-sustaining or to report on their ability to support civilian populations during crises.

**Recommendations**

- **Commission a Secondary Inquiry:** Conduct a dedicated review to assess the operational autonomy and resilience of all NZDF bases, ensuring no base is solely dependent on civilian infrastructure for critical supplies during emergencies. Including external power, water supplies and Fire Emergency Services.
- **Mandate Civil Support Capacity Reporting:** Require each Defence establishment to regularly report its capacity to assist civilian authorities with personnel and resources, in alignment with the Inquiry's recommendation to leverage the wider government ecosystem.
- **Enhance Certification and Preparedness:** Ensure NZDF assets (e.g., water/power supply and sewage disposal) meet civilian standards and that personnel are fully equipped and trained for rapid, safe deployment in disaster scenarios.

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This approach would close the current gap in national resilience planning and ensure Defence Force assets are fully integrated into New Zealand's emergency preparedness and response framework.

**Questions to be asked and reported on:**

**NZDF Response to Cyclone Gabrielle:**

- How many assets /resources did NZDF deploy, including personnel, ships, aircraft, and logistics, to aid affected communities during the Gabrielle emergency.
- Did any Internal reviews reveal challenges: such as water, PPE, Communication, and training Gaps. Did any of the challenges impact on deployment.
- Where any areas of improvement identified and can they be reported on?
- Does NZDF have sufficient resources to overcome any tactical or systemic issues, including self-sustainability and resilience with its bases?

**Utilise the value of the wider government ecosystem.**

**Recommendation: 2** Utilise the value of the wider government ecosystem

The report recognises that there is value in the utilisation of the Governments Ecosystem, specifically identifying New Zealand Defences Forces and New Zealand Weather Support Services.

The report falls short of recognising Fire Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) and Hato Hone St John Ambulance Emergency Services, New Zealand Police. As recommended in the: **New Zealand Defence Bases Review**

The aforementioned agencies are required to file a report on their self-sufficiency and resilience on the bases and premises they utilise. With the view that all bases and premises are self-sustainable. e.g. Establish how FENZ/Police Station/and Ambulances bases can take in external generator power?

**Definition: Spontaneous emergency responder**

An opportunity is provided to recognise a **"spontaneous emergency responder"** who initiates emergency actions based on local circumstances. Not under the direction control of any "Officer/Group or Unit." In "good faith" initiates a "safety response" as being "Johnny-on-the-Spot." Such a person would be enabled for:

- protection from civil liability,
- compensation of labour costs,
- compensation for machinery and or equipment loss.
- Re-imbursement in accordance with the emergency circumstances.

Final Note: When requesting information please make provision for attaching media, PDF, Video, Photo, etc. You know the ability to upload something that is contributory to the discussion.

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# Submission on the Emergency Management Bill Discussion Document

Submitted by: Clint David Adamson

Submitted as: Private Individual

Date: 07 May 2025

## 1. Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Emergency Management Bill discussion document. As someone who worked through the Cyclone Gabrielle event and its aftermath as a local controller, I have a personal interest in how New Zealand manages its emergency response capabilities going forward and I strongly support the effort to modernise and strengthen our emergency management legislation.

This submission is focused on one of the most critical areas for reform: the urgent need to transition from the current model—which relies heavily on part-time, business-as-usual (BAU) council officers filling emergency leadership roles—to a model underpinned by professional emergency controllers at the local level. This shift is essential to improving consistency, coordination, and confidence in emergency responses.

## 2. Objective 1: Strengthening Community and Iwi Māori Participation

I support all efforts to build a 'whole-of-society' approach to emergency management, and I specifically support:

• Requiring local emergency plans to be inclusive of disproportionately affected communities.

• Mandating engagement with iwi Māori during the development of emergency management plans.

• Providing greater legal protection for individuals and community members who act in good faith during emergencies.

The establishment of professional emergency controllers at the local level would enable deeper, sustained relationships with iwi and community groups. Unlike BAU staff who may be pulled into emergency roles occasionally and without consistency, professional controllers would have both the time and the mandate to prioritise relationship-building. This includes regular hui with iwi, collaborative scenario planning, and ensuring that Māori knowledge systems and values are integrated into response frameworks.

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## 3. Objective 2: Providing for Clear Responsibilities and Accountabilities

One of the clearest risks with the current emergency management system is the ambiguity around who leads during a crisis—especially in the crucial initial stages. Local controllers, often council executives or managers are expected to make potentially life-and-death decisions with limited training and infrequent exposure to real-world events.

This status quo is problematic for several reasons:

• It leads to inconsistency and hesitation in emergency declarations and response actions.

• It places unfair pressure on individuals who are not professional responders.

• It risks legal and reputational damage to individuals and councils in the aftermath of disasters.

Transitioning to professional controllers—deployed at the local level but coordinated regionally with the Group Controller—would ensure that decision-makers are qualified, experienced, and prepared while still having the required local knowledge. These professionals would bring clarity to the leadership structure, act decisively during emergencies, and enhance the overall credibility of the CDEM system.

## 4. Objective 3: Enabling a Higher Minimum Standard of Emergency Management

I support the intent to improve consistency while retaining flexibility for local context. Recommendations include:

• National standards should be supported by a professional development pathway for emergency managers and controllers.

• A pool of professional local controllers should be established to support Group Controllers and lift standards regionally. Local Controllers would also then be able to be called on to contribute to the pool of staff available to respond nationally to aide in consistency of response across the country.

• BAU council staff should not be expected to carry primary leadership responsibilities without significant investment and ongoing development.

## 5. Objective 4: Minimising Disruption to Essential Services

I support stronger expectations for both infrastructure operators and government agencies to plan for continuity.

• Emergency management legislation should enable data sharing between lifeline utilities and emergency controllers under appropriate privacy safeguards.

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• Recovery plans should be embedded into initial response planning to ensure rapid service restoration.

• Professional local controllers would be well-placed to maintain continuity relationships with critical service providers before, during, and after events.

## 6. Objective 5: Having the Right Powers Available When an Emergency Happens

I support modernising emergency powers and declarations. Specifically:

• Digital or remote declarations should be enabled, particularly during weather or communication disruptions.

• Legislation must clearly enable professionally designated local controllers to declare states of emergency where appropriate.

## 7. The Case for Professional Emergency Controllers

The creation of professional emergency controllers at the local level offers multiple advantages:

• Dedicated focus – Full-time roles allow for year-round training, engagement, and readiness.

• Enhanced leadership – Controllers can lead small to moderate events directly, while supporting Group Controllers during larger regional or national incidents.

• Continuity and trust – Embedded relationships with iwi, emergency services, NGOs, and infrastructure providers.

• Consistency across the country – Reduces the variability currently seen between local authorities with differing levels of capability.

• Reduced pressure on council staff – Allows other leaders to focus on maintaining core services during disruption.

## 8. Conclusion and Recommendations

The Emergency Management Bill represents a critical opportunity to reform New Zealand's approach to disaster leadership and coordination. I recommend the establishment of a nationally consistent model that includes full-time, professional local controllers who report through to Group Controllers within the CDEM structure. This shift would greatly enhance readiness, decision-making, equity, and community trust in our emergency response systems.

## 9. Thank You

Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this important discussion. I would welcome the chance to elaborate on any part of this submission.

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ANIMAL EVAC.NZ
KARAREHE WHAKAWATEA

10 May 2025 **FROM:** Animal Evac New Zealand Trust

Policy Unit

National Emergency Management Agency

Wellington

**SENT BY EMAIL TO:** EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

Dear Policy Unit,

**SUBMSISION ON DISCUSSION DOCUMENT: STRENGTHENING NEW ZEALAND'S EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION**

New Zealand's efforts to reform its emergency management law have highlighted a persistent gap between public sentiment and legislative action-particularly regarding the protection of animals during disasters. Despite robust public engagement and clear calls for animal-inclusive disaster arrangements, previous consultative processes have repeatedly failed to heed citizen expectations and translate these priorities into law. As the government releases its new discussion document for consultation on emergency management legislative reform there is renewed hope that this democratic deficit will finally be addressed.

**Strong Public Support for Animal Protection**

Analysis of public submissions on the Emergency Management Bill (2024) demonstrates overwhelming support for embedding animal welfare in disaster law, most importantly in primary legislation. A recent thematic study found that 61% of all submissions raised the importance of including animals in emergency legislation, with nearly half of all

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submissions directly influenced by our "No Animal Left Behind" campaign. Submitters called for:

- Clear **statutory** powers for animal rescue and evacuation;
- Mandated animal-inclusive emergency planning[1];
- Improved coordination and funding for animal disaster response; and
- Protection and identification of disability assistance dogs during disaster.

These priorities reflect both ethical concerns and practical realities: research from past disasters shows that people often risk their own safety to save animals, and that failing to plan for animals can undermine both human and animal welfare.

Despite the clarity and volume of public input, animal welfare provisions have repeatedly been sidelined or treated as peripheral in legislative drafts and policy documents.

For example, after the 2017 Edgecumbe flood—where nearly 29% of evacuees breached safety cordons to check on or rescue their pets[2]—animal welfare concerns raised in subsequent reviews were relegated to annexes for "future consideration," rather than being integrated into core recommendations.

**The Government's Latest Discussion Document**

The government's new discussion document acknowledges the high volume of submissions advocating for animal-inclusive disaster law, a positive sign that public voices are at least being recognised. However, past experience suggests caution: previous documents have referenced academic work in passing but have not always engaged with the substance of the evidence or the most comprehensive research in the field despite such research being provided.

The discussion document fails to prioritise the protection of animals in emergency management law as sought by the public through submissions made to the withdrawn 2024 Emergency Management Bill. There appears to be no evidence provided how

[1] The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction also promotes "Pets must be included in disaster plans"
[2] Refer Table 13

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objectives were determined and or how issues were prioritised using an empirical method.

While the discussion document includes a reference to Glassey's research, it does not fully reflect the breadth of analysis or the scale of public advocacy documented in recent peer-reviewed studies or the substantive report presented at Parliament in 2019[3]. Nonetheless, the fact that the volume of animal-focused submissions is explicitly noted in the consultation process is a step forward.

As a point of correction, the reference cited in the discussion document is erroneous, as the figure quoted (33% of households had attempted to illegally re-enter the evacuated township of Edgecumbe in 2017) is not from the article referenced, but from the article published in International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction. This was authored by Glassey, Libergreen, Rodriguez and King as part of a blind peer-reviewed University of Otago study. Though the articled cited does examine the current flaws across the suite of legislation that affects animal disaster rescue in New Zealand, noting none of the legal complexities raised in this 2020 article were addressed in the Emergency Management Bill (2024).

The case for animal-inclusive disaster law is both moral and practical. International experience—from Hurricane Katrina in the US to the Edgecumbe flood in New Zealand—shows that people's attachment to animals is a critical factor in disaster response. Laws that fail to account for this bond risk not only animal suffering but also human non-compliance with evacuation orders, increased danger, and reduced trust in authorities.

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[3] This report was championed by Gareth Hughes MP and former FEMA Director Craig Fugate, the later, notably one of the world's most renown thought leaders on emergency management.

Moreover, there are international best practice examples to draw from like the US Pets Emergency and Transportation Standards (PETS) Act 2006, Planning for Animal Wellbeing Act 2022 and Italy's Civil Protection Code 2018 These demonstrate that animal-inclusive disaster law is both achievable and able to be integrated into primary disaster management law as a matter of good practice. Other international examples of policy advancement is *Animals in Disasters: The need for protection and coordination across Europe,* a report submitted to the European Union in 2023 by Eurogroup for Animals.

**A Roadmap for Reform**

The public has provided a clear roadmap for reform, calling for:

- Mandatory inclusion of animals in emergency management plans;
- Clear statutory powers for animal rescue and care;
- Recognition of the human-animal bond in disaster policy; and
- Proper funding, coordination and accountability for animal welfare response.

These recommendations are grounded in both lived experience and a growing body of academic research in New Zealand and overseas, including recent thematic analyses of public submissions. It is important to note that this peer-reviewed study was further validated by an independent research report undertaken by Parliamentary Library researchers in November 2024, commissioned by Rachel Boyack MP. It is unclear why the discussion paper does not accurately reflect the depth and breadth of issues raised during the 2024 Emergency Management Bill Select Committee submission process.

Non-legislative levers are demonstrably ineffective. This was discussed in the peer-reviewed article "It was one of the worst days of my life: Companion animal owners' experiences of the Edgecumbe 2017 flood in Aotearoa New Zealand" (Glassey, Libergreen, Ferrere and King, 2023) with regard to the "Principles of Evacuation".

Animal Evac New Zealand does not support any of the options as they obfuscate the actual issues and even with Option 4, such powers already exist under the Animal Welfare Act 1999[4]. However, powers pertaining to power to enter property and dwellings, perform rescue of animals, disposal of rescued or presented animals (i.e. rehoming),

[4] Refer Table 1.

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power to microchip, sharing of microchip records, protection of disability assistance dogs, access to public transportation for the evacuation of companion animals, requisitioning to protect life, funding and accountability of volunteer response organisations[5], along with numerous other legal issues do require attention as previously submitted to the Select Committee on the Emergency Management Bill 2024.

The options provided in the discussion document obfuscates the issues and disregards the options sought by the public and others in the multiple previous consultation exercises on emergency management reform and system improvement.

We submit that when the emergency management bill is redrafted, that a new Part is added, that provides for improved and specific powers, responsibilities, rights and duties with respect to animal emergency management. New Zealand could build on international best practice and legislate and implement a model framework[6] for animal disaster management repositioning New Zealand as a leader in animal welfare and emergency management. This would meet the public's clear expectations and enhance human and animal wellbeing in emergencies.

As New Zealand prepares a new draft bill, there is hope that this time, the voices of citizens will be reflected in law. The lessons of past failures are clear: meaningful reform requires not just consultation, but genuine responsiveness to public priorities. By embedding animal welfare into disaster law, New Zealand can set a global standard for compassionate, effective emergency management—and restore faith in the democratic process.

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[5] Refer submission made by the Office of the Ombudsman to the Emergency Management Bill 2024.
[6] Refer Page 50.

Animal Evac New Zealand welcomes direct conversation with NEMA's emergency management bill project unit to support the development of world leading animal-inclusive disaster law.

**Animal Evac New Zealand Trust Board**

Email info@animalevac.nz

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**Acknowledgement**

This submission is adapted from the articles published by Glassey including the forthcoming *Routledge Handbook on Disaster Mitigation and Preparedness*.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Lachlan Keating |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Deaf Aotearoa |

☐ The Privacy Act 2020 applies to submissions. Please tick the box if you **do not** want your name or other personal information to be included in any information about submissions that NEMA may publish.

☐ NEMA may publish submissions or a summary of submissions to its website, civildefence.govt.nz. If you **do not** want your submission or a summary of your submission to be published, please tick the box and type an explanation below:

I do not want my submission published on NEMA's website because...

### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

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### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Our preferred options are the two legislative options, ie, options C and D

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Planning would include access to information in accessible / alternate formats, such as New Zealand Sign Language (NZSL), audio files, Easy Read etc.

   Planning would be highly visual and descriptive (not just text / word based)

   Planning would be described in simple, plain language

   Planning would be case-study driven with real world examples so people can see themselves in the scenarios / situations

   Planning would be embody a 'nobody is left behind' mantra and would prioritise at-risk groups.

   If it was better informed, plans would be fully accessible with everyone knowing what to do and when.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

   ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

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8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred options are 4 and 5.

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

14. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred option is number 2.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred options are 2 and 3.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred option is number 4.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred option is number 3.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred option is option d / number 4

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

No preference.

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred options are 2 and 3.

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Full access to information is necessary so that everyone knows what is going on. All levels (national, regional and local levels) must be held accountable to provide information to the public in accessible ways. All updates to the public must be in New

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Zealand Sign Language, so that Deaf people can access information at the same time as everyone else.

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Options 2 and 3. Whatever the option, we seek assurances that emergency information / broadcasts are available in New Zealand Sign Language, in real time (or as close to real time as possible).

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Provision of accurate and accessible information (ie information in accessible formats such as NZSL). Without reliable, accessible information, the emergency management system is only as good as the last communication, which can very quickly breakdown when people are left out / don't know what is going on.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Standards / Rules for emergency warning systems must include a requirement for both visual and auditory cues.

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Options 3 and 4.

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

The discussion is missing / not explicit about the importance of support animals, such as highly trained guide dogs, which are crucial for disabled people's welfare during and after emergencies. These animals are in demand / rare and expensive to train. Can be included as 'working animals', but it would be good to make this explicit.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred options are 2 or 3.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

As above, specialised support animals need to be prioritised – as these are an extension to a disabled person's ability to cope and adapt in an emergency.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3. We agree that a 'class of organisations', such as NZSL interpreter providers (NZ has three main providers), are essential as suppliers of information to the Deaf community.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

As above, essential services are Language Assistance Services (LAS), such as NZSL interpreters.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Penalties for not providing information in NZSL for key broadcasts.

Proactively Released

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred option is number 3.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred options are 4 and 5.

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred option is number 2. Access to restricted areas should be available to disabled people as well, on the same basis as a non-disabled people (for example, deaf or blind people should not denied access solely on the basis that they are deaf or blind).

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2.

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 and 3, ie be able to do either.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3.

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

In addition to the comments already made above, Deaf Aotearoa recommends you refer to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability (UNCRPD), especially referencing Article 11 – Situations of Risk and Humanitarian Emergencies. All legislative settings, policy decisions and options must take "all necessary measures to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies and the occurrence of natural disasters."

Deaf Aotearoa specifically recommends that there are policies and options to ensure that Deaf people have:

- the right to receive accessible and timely emergency-related information in sign language on an equal basis with others (including an expectation that speakers and press teams must ensure the interpreter is clearly visible at all times and not cut out of the frame)
- the right to access healthcare and medical services on an equal basis with others (and not, for example, be placed at the bottom of waiting lists as result of any communication barrier/s)
- the right to access emergency egress systems and services on an equal basis with others, including the right to be included in evacuation procedures (and not, for example, be left behind as a result of any communication barrier/s).

Thank you.

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# Te Runanga o Ngati Whare Submission on the Emergency Management Bill 2025

From: Te Runanga o Ngati Whare

Date: 12 May 2025

To: National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)

Email: EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

## 1. Introduction

Te Runanga o Ngati Whare welcomes the opportunity to submit on the proposed Emergency Management Bill 2025. As tangata whenua and kaitiaki of our rohe, we have long held responsibilities for the wellbeing of our people and whenua, particularly in times of crisis.

In our experience, including recent local response to Cyclone Gabrielle, confirms that we as iwi Māori are essential partners in emergency management re: response and recovery, and in risk reduction and community readiness.

We support the Government's intent to strengthen the emergency management system, and we seek to ensure the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi are embedded throughout this reform, in governance, planning and intel, decision-making, and logistics/resourcing.

## 2. General Position

We support the direction of reform and believe this Bill presents a significant opportunity to:

- Strengthen partnerships between the Crown, local government, and iwi Māori.
- Acknowledge and integrate mātauranga Māori and tikanga into planning and response.
- Build a more inclusive, effective, and culturally grounded emergency management system for all communities.
- Streamline and establish fit for purpose process and systems at locations.

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## 3. Specific Feedback on Key Issues

### 3.1 Iwi Representation in Governance

We strongly support the legislative requirement for iwi Māori representation on Civil Defense Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and Coordinating Executive Groups (CEG). However, we recommend:

- That iwi representatives are nominated by iwi themselves, not appointed by external bodies.
- That representation comes with decision-making powers, not just advisory capacity.
- That resourcing is provided to support participation, including travel, staff time, and coordination roles.
- Recognise already established existing iwi boundaries and affiliations in the establishment of CDEM and CEG groups.
- Implement operational and governance arrangements for the integrated management of natural hazards, flood management and climate change adaptation across iwi networks for long-term risk reduction in priority locations.

### 3.2 Mandatory Engagement in Planning

We strongly support requiring CDEM Groups to engage with iwi Māori during the development of Group Plans, but recommend:

- Engagement be defined as co-design, not post-drafting consultation.
- Planning processes acknowledge mana whenua status, regional iwi structures, and tikanga.
- That iwi priorities, such as marae-based evacuation planning and cultural welfare practices, are embedded.
- Support local emergency preparedness and evacuation planning to enhance the safety and preparedness of urban and rural communities.

### 3.3 Mātauranga Māori and Tikanga

We strongly support legislative recognition of mātauranga Māori and recommend:

- Mātauranga Māori be acknowledged as a legitimate and protected knowledge system.
- CDEM staff and responders are trained in tikanga-based engagement.
- Local and national plans include cultural protocols for manaaki, urupā protection, and whānau-led support.

### 3.4 National Māori Advisory Group

We strongly support the establishment of a national Māori emergency management advisory group, provided that:

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- Members are nominated by iwi, not appointed centrally.
- The group has input into national plans, funding frameworks, and policy direction.
- The group operates independently, with direct lines of communication to the Director of Emergency Management.

### 3.5 Resourcing and Capability

We seek guaranteed and sustainable resourcing for iwi to participate effectively, including:

- Dedicated funding for iwi emergency management coordinators.
- Investment in marae-based response hubs and communications.
- Support for iwi-led training, exercising, and response planning.

## 4. Summary of Recommendations

- Mandate iwi representation on CDEM Groups and CEGs with full participation rights.
- Require iwi co-design in Group Plans, not just consultation.
- Recognise and embed mātauranga Māori and tikanga across the 4Rs.
- Establish a Māori advisory group with iwi-nominated membership.
- Fund iwi participation, training, infrastructure, and leadership roles.

## 5. Final Comments

Te Runanga o Ngati Whare is committed to continuing our longstanding role as first responders and leaders in the resilience of our communities. We welcome this reform and look forward to working with NEMA, Bay of Plenty CDEM Group, and other partners to ensure the future emergency management system reflects true partnership, local leadership, and Māori worldviews.

We would be pleased to present this submission in person or via hui should the opportunity arise.

## Contact for Further Discussion

Name: Earl Rewi

Position: Deputy CEO Group

Email: s9(2)(a)

Phone: s9(2)(a)

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| | |
|---|---|
| TITLE: | Strengthening NZ Emergency Management Legislation |
| SUBMISSION TO: | National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) |
| SUBMISSION FROM: | The Body Corporate Chairs Group (BCCG) Incorporated. |
| CLOSING DATE: | 20 May 2025. |
| CONTACT PERSON: | Tim Jones, National Chairperson, BCCG. |
| CONTACT DETAILS: | Mobile + s9(2)(a) |

……..

The BCCG is an organisation that represents owners of Unit Title developments. It is a national organisation representing about 450 members. The membership comprises mainly Bodies Corporate within Unit title development. However, it also has members who are allied to the Body Corporate sector, such as lawyers, accountants, Body Corporate managers, and Building Managers. Of those members that are Bodies corporate, the members are predominantly apartment buildings or mixed-use buildings containing commercial and residential uses.
The BCCG appreciates the opportunity to comment on the legislative changes the government is proposing for managing civil defence emergencies. Our feedback will focus on how these proposed changes may affect the safety and well-being of those who work and live in multi-unit buildings, and specifically those used for residential purposes, i.e. apartment buildings.

It needs to be noted that New Zealand has a relatively short history of large multi-unit buildings and particularly in Auckland, where 35-40 floors are now not uncommon. These include both commercial and residential properties, and many that are a mix of both.

For ease of reference, our responses are focused on the sixteen key issues and options identified in the consultation overview.

**OBJECTIVE 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation.**

- **Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities:**

General Comment.
The proposed legislative changes need to include a much stronger focus on multi-unit buildings, as this is how our towns and cities will need to expand. The costs associated with urban spread are no longer practical and, in the interests of both economic and environmental benefits, we need to intensify within existing boundaries.

On that basis, BCCG would support option 1, as it reflects that our various villages, towns, and cities face quite different environmental challenges and risks and therefore require a tailored approach to emergency management. This would need to include a wide range of possible threats that differ widely across Aotearoa and even within towns and cities.

- **Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management**

General Comment.
Maori were the first settlers in Aotearoa and have centuries of experience with a very wide range of different physical environments. Their knowledge is an invaluable resource that needs to be a major part of emergency management planning.

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To ensure this occurs, BCCG would recommend Option 2, as this provides certainty around the sharing of historical information related to environmental management and the ability to identify risks pertinent to specific areas and geological factors.

- **Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management**

General Comment

Communities will have an interest in emergency management -the question becomes what, and how, as this can be either successful or a total failure.
Local authorities will need to ensure that their various communities contribute to the Emergency Management plans that Councils must prepare.

Within cities like Auckland, every apartment complex could be referred to as a community, even though the nature of that community could not be more different from a similar-sized town. It is not uncommon for one apartment complex to house 500+ people, and that number will increase as larger apartment complexes are built. Can this be defined as a community, and if so, do they have the ability to look after each other as they might do in a similarly sized town?

In addition, many of these large apartment complexes are multi-use buildings that include hotels and commercial activities. Managing these buildings as though each apartment where an independent village home is an unworkable notion. In the later, various community groups are the right entities to be involved in emergency management responses, but that situation does not exist for apartments and commercial buildings.
BCCG would recommend that Option 2 is the more workable solution in cities that have a high proportion of multi-unit buildings, either as residential or commercial entities.

- **Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency.**

General Comment

This statement might best be described as common knowledge because it is what has always been, and we expect will always be. What is not, and has never been, common knowledge, is the role that each of these groups undertakes in emergencies. That role is largely dependent on where the emergency occurs – remote forests, at sea, the foreshore, rural farms, small villages, larger towns, and big cities. How and who responds is entirely dependent on where the event occurs, and we often have little control over that. What we do have are local government entities that cover all of these areas, so realistically, they are the "guardians" that need to have appropriate documents and resources to manage the right responses, to the right people at the right time.

In this Issue, we would recommend that both options 2 and 3 be included within the relevant legislation, as those who respond need legal protection AND compensation for labour costs, etc. This is particularly critical in rural areas where local people, businesses and communities are often the ONLY people who can respond to a particular civil defence emergency.

**OBJECTIVE 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels.**

- **Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency:**
- **Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management**
- **Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date.**

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General Comment

The need for clarity, in terms of who does what, is critical in this legislation and a civil defence emergency. BCCG are of the view that regional government needs to pick up this role, as many of the emergencies in Aotearoa are weather-related. Regional government boundaries are based on water catchments, so inherently, that is where decisions need to be made in terms of managing emergencies related to weather. Regional Councils need to have responsibility for ensuring that the local councils all have the relevant Emergency Management plans, documents, and resources up to date for all emergency events.

In terms of apartment complexes, BCCG would recommend that section 84 of the UTA specifically require Body Corporate Committees (BCC's) to be responsible for preparing/updating Emergency Management Plans for their building, and to ensure that relevant contact information is available to all residents.

Another critical aspect of apartment complexes is the sheer number of residents and how/where they may need to be temporarily housed during an emergency evacuation. In our larger cities, and Auckland in particular, the evacuation of 4-5 apartment complexes could involve $2,500 - $3,000 people. The Auckland Convention Centre fire in 2019 was a classic example where residents living in proximity to the toxic smoke were told to stay in their apartments, close their windows and turn off the air conditioner.

While that is possible for a few short hours, it is not possible for several days, as occurred with the above fire event. Of particular concern is that many apartment complexes in Auckland city centre house families with children, and it is expected that this will become more common across all New Zealand cities.

The additional aspect of this issue is that, when people may need to evacuate in a fire event, they will need to do so away from the direction of any toxic smoke/fumes, etc., so there needs to be clearly understood alternatives, depending on what type of emergency is occurring.

**OBJECTIVE 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management.**

- **Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance**
- **Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management**
- **Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage, and animals during and after emergencies**

BCCG are supportive of the need to set national expectations and monitor performance. We would see this as a two-tiered situation where the Regional Government would take responsibility for ensuring that their associated local government units met their legal obligations. That reduces the number of councils that the government needs to work directly with to sixteen, which BCCG would consider a manageable number. For this to work, hazard risk management needs to be at a regional level, but the relevant local government units must prepare their own emergency management plans within a regional framework that the regional council then approves.

We are not certain what is meant by reference to '*strengthening consideration of taonga Maori and other cultural heritage,'* so this probably needs further clarification. New Zealanders all have personal cultural heritage, and they come from hundreds of different countries and cultures. It is BCCG's view that this is a personal matter and is not something that governments should be engaged in.

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However, if it relates to Maori descent, then we do have a national responsibility to ensure that Maori are well supported in terms of protecting that heritage. Aotearoa is the only country in the world where the Maori language and history resides and, in the interests of our national identity, we all need to work together to protect it.
Similarly, much can be done to educate, and support, those working with animals, livestock, and wildlife from the effects of natural disasters. Again, we would see local government as having that role and including this in their Emergency Readiness and Response Plans for approval by the relevant Regional Council.

NOTE: We consider that the inclusion of the word animals in the sentence..... *consideration of taonga Maori, cultural heritage, and animals during and after emergencies ……* is inappropriate and needs to be incorporated within another section of the proposed legislation.

**OBJECTIVE 4: Minimising disruption to essential services.**

- **Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services**
- **Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity.**

BCCG are incredibly supportive of these two statements, as it is essential in terms of the impact on residents and businesses, within multi-unit buildings. While most of these buildings have reasonable systems for people to evacuate quickly in an emergency, the inspections, enforcement, and reliability of conditions that ensure this can be done safely is not always clear.

A substantial proportion of these buildings are Unit Title developments that are governed under the Unit Titles Act 2010. It is BCCG's informed recommendation that this legislation, despite being updated in 2023, is still not adequate in terms of long-term maintenance and the management of body corporate funds. While section 116 provides that a Body Corporate must establish and regularly maintain a Long-Term Maintenance Plan, section 127 then says that a body corporate, by special resolution, can decide not to establish a Long-Term Maintenance Fund. Similarly, the need for both contingency and capital improvement funds is optional, which is not the ideal legislative arrangement to ensure that MUDs are as well prepared as they need to be in an emergency.

In terms of CDEM issues, we must all learn from the UK Grenfell disaster in 2017, which took the lives of 72 people.

> *The fire was started by an electrical fault in a refrigerator on the fourth floor. As Grenfell was an existing building originally built in concrete to varying tolerances, gaps around window openings following window installation were irregular and these were filled with combustible foam insulation to maintain airtightness by contractors. This foam insulation around window jambs acted as a conduit into the rainscreen cavity, which was faced with 150 mm-thick (5.9-inch) combustible polyisocyanurate rigid board insulation and clad in aluminium composite cladding panels, which included a 2 mm (0.079-inch) highly combustible polyethylene filler to bond each panel face together. As is typical in rainscreen cladding systems, a ventilated cavity between the insulation board and rear of the cladding panel existed; however, cavity barriers to the line of each flat were found to be inadequately installed, or not suitable for the intended configuration, and this exacerbated the rapid and uncontrolled spread of fire, both vertically and horizontally, to the tower.*

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While New Zealand has good legislation for buildings that require compliance schedules for specified systems, BCCG consider that adequate funding to support compliance needs to be a compulsory aspect of this process and that requires specific legislative support.

Similarly, the existing legislation does not appear to cover how essential services such as electricity and water are made available to MUD's during an emergency. While most high rise apartment/commercial buildings have short term availability, it is residential apartment complexes that need longer term solutions as people may need to stay at home for considerable periods i.e. the Convention Centre fire in Auckland.

It is our recommendation that the UTA should also require that all MUD buildings, both residential and commercial, must have emergency back-up power kits to ensure that electricity, water, heating/air conditioning are available to residents, in a manner that allows them, and their families, to stay at home for as long as is required by the relevant authorities. There are a wide range of options for both diesel and petrol generators available in New Zealand that would ensure all apartment complexes remain liveable until such time as the normal supplies of essential services become operational.

**OBJECTIVE 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens**.

- **Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas**
- **Issue 14: Clarifying who exercises emergency powers at the local level**
- **Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period**
- **Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices**

BCCG are generally supportive of the above proposals, and the need to ensure the process to access these powers, and who can use them, is fit for purpose.

We note reference in Issue 16 to the role of the mayor, but we have recommended that Regional Councils in New Zealand take responsibility for CDEM in their region. That would require Regional Council Chairs picking up responsibility for CDEM across their entire region. Mayors will clearly have a key role, but these two roles would need to be specified separately. A simple approach would be that Regional Council Chairs determine whether the emergency is a regional or local one and, if the later, responsibility for declaring a state of emergency moves to the relevant Mayor/s.

BCCG thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback on the proposed changes to the Emergency Management Bill and we look forward to collaborating with you on the final document.

Nga mihi Nui
Tim Jones
National President
Body Corporate Chairs Group Inc.
12th May 2025.

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# Grey Lynn 2030 Submission

**Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation**

From 15 April to 13 May 2025 the government is inviting submissions on options to strengthen New Zealand's overarching emergency management legislation and inform the design of a new Emergency Management Bill.

Our community group, Grey Lynn 2030, appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback on the discussion document Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation .

We recognise the importance of updating the current framework to better address the increasing risks and complexities of more frequent emergencies.

After our experience with the Auckland Anniversary flood event we are particularly concerned with the emergency readiness for residents in the inner city suburbs - people who are not part of community groups, people with poor social supports, people who are new to Auckland. Also many people now live in apartment buildings which have different issues in an emergency especially if this involves a long power failure.

The advice to "Go Home" is different for our many apartment residents means the whole building fails.

- Access is not possible to apartments or the lobby doors with electric password systems
- Vehicle access from shared garaging with electric doors stops working
- Electric Water pumps for sewage and drinking water will stop
- Internet communications stop without electricity
- Lighting stops. Public stairwells and lobby only have lighting for a short period of time.
- Cooking is not possible without electricity
-

Overall, we support the proposed objectives of the new Bill, particularly the emphasis on strengthening community and Iwi Māori participation. Our experience on the ground has consistently shown that local knowledge, networks, and initiatives are crucial in the immediate aftermath of an event and throughout the recovery process.

However, we believe the Bill needs to go further in several key areas, namely apartment residents to empower communities and ensure more resilience for the population dense communities that live in apartments. .

**Strengthening Community Participation:**

- **Formal Recognition and Resourcing:** While the document acknowledges the role of communities as first responders (Issue 4), it lacks concrete proposals for their formal recognition within the emergency management structure.

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- We urge the Bill to include provisions for the accreditation, training, resourcing of community-led emergency response teams and initiatives. This could involve dedicated funding streams, access to equipment, identifying, training and engaging of possible community emergency hubs before an emergency. We need clear pathways for integration with regional and national responses.

  There is a need to identify and resource emergency hubs within apartment buildings or clusters of apartment buildings. Residents in these vertical communities may have limited access to traditional members and places,In the city centre where there are no community halls or marae. The Bill should consider how to equip and train designated individuals within apartment complexes to act as floor or building wardens and establish temporary support systems within the building itself. This could include funding for emergency supplies within buildings (first aid kits, communication devices, etc.) and training for residents in basic emergency response and evacuation procedures specific to high-rise environments. Also solar/battery/Starlink enables basic services to run in power outage.

- **Meaningful Engagement in Planning:** Strengthening community participation (Issue 3) requires more than consultation. The Bill should mandate genuine co-design of emergency management plans at the local level, ensuring community voices, including those of vulnerable groups, are integral in identifying needs, resources, and effective response strategies.

  Living in Waitemata, one of the most densely and complexly populated parts of New Zealand we have much to input on what we need in our area.. The January 2023 Auckland floods impacted many members of our community. The worst affected have been helped by Auckland Council. Nothing has changed though at the community level for most residents if there was another emergency.

  We see the need to include the perspectives of apartment dwellers in local emergency management plans. Their evacuation routes, communication needs (which may differ from those in detached houses), and potential reliance on building management should be considered. Workshops should specifically target apartment residents to understand their vulnerabilities and capacities. For example, accessibility for residents with mobility issues in multi-story buildings during power outages needs specific planning. Communication plans in case of internet/mobile failure.

- **Support for Spontaneous Volunteers:** The Bill should consider how to better integrate and support spontaneous volunteers who often emerge during emergencies. Clear guidelines and mechanisms for coordination, safety briefings, and task allocation would enhance their effectiveness and safety.

  In the context of apartment buildings, spontaneous volunteers might include residents with specific skills (e.g., first aid, language translation) who can assist their neighbors. The Bill should consider how building management or designated floor wardens could help identify and coordinate these internal volunteers safely and effectively.

- **Awareness Raising and Training for Community Leaders -** we are well aware of the places and people who have the resources that would in an emergency. We need a

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community action plan to develop this. In Waitemata there is no overarching community group with the ability and funding to develop this.

We need  awareness campaigns and training opportunities specifically to city centre apartment residents and building managers. This could involve workshops on building-specific emergency plan for example for a ,power black out in an apartment building and communication protocols during an event. Identifying and training "community leaders" within apartment buildings is crucial, as they can act as vital links during an emergency.

**Clarity in Roles and Responsibilities:**

- **Local Empowerment:** While we understand the need for clear national and regional responsibilities (Issue 5 & 6), the Bill must ensure that local authorities and community groups have sufficient autonomy and resources to lead initial response and recovery efforts within their areas. Over-centralisation could stifle local initiative and delay crucial assistance.

  Auckland Council Emergency Management needs clear guidelines and resources to support the unique needs of high-density residential areas and apartment building. This includes pre-planning for mass evacuation from apartment buildings if necessary, establishing temporary shelters in accessible locations for apartment residents, and ensuring communication channels that can reach individuals within these buildings (e.g., building-wide alert systems).

- **Defining "Essential Services":** Issue 11 discusses minimising disruption to essential services. We believe the Bill needs a clearer and more inclusive definition of what constitutes an "essential service" at the community level. This should extend beyond utilities to include critical community support networks, such as local food banks, community centers, and volunteer organisations. In Auckland's city centre while there are food banks there are very few community centres and active volunteer organisations.

  Include building management and maintenance services in apartment complexes. During and after an emergency, residents rely on these services for essential functions like water supply, sanitation, and potentially even security. The Bill should address the continuity of these apartment services or contingency plans if they are disrupted.

**Meeting Diverse Needs:**

- **Accessibility and Inclusion:** While Issue 1 touches on diverse needs, the Bill should explicitly mandate accessible communication channels, culturally appropriate support, and tailored assistance for vulnerable populations, including people with disabilities, ethnic minorities, new New Zealanders, and the vulnerable  elderly.

  Accessibility in apartment buildings during emergencies, particularly for those with mobility issues, during power outages when lifts may not function. The Bill should

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mandate that emergency plans for high-density residential areas include specific provisions for evacuating and supporting these vulnerable residents. Consider also language barriers, which may be more prevalent in diverse city centre apartment populations, and the need for multilingual emergency information.

- **Psychological and Social Recovery:** The Bill should give greater emphasis to the long-term psychological and social recovery of communities affected by emergencies. This includes provisions for mental health support, community-led healing initiatives, and resources to rebuild social infrastructure.

  Residents of apartment buildings who may have experienced the emergency in close proximity to many others, or who may lack strong social connections within their building, might experience unique psychological challenges. The Bill should encourage community-led initiatives within apartment complexes to foster social support after recovery.

  **Other**

- **Evacuation Challenges:** Mass evacuation from multi-story buildings, especially for the elderly, people with disabilities, and families with young children. Elevators may be unusable, and stairwells can become congested and dangerous when lighting is out
- **Communication Barriers:**Traditional communication methods (e.g. public broadcasts in English) might not effectively reach all apartment residents, especially those who are not fluent in English or who may not have access to traditional media.due to power outages
- **Resource Sharing:** there may be opportunities for resource sharing among residents (e.g., generators, food supplies). Emergency plans could facilitate the identification and coordination of these resources.
- **Building Management Role:** Building management is essential in emergency preparedness, response, and recovery within apartment complexes. The Bill could outline responsibilities and requirements for building owners and managers in developing and implementing emergency plans for their residents

**Iwi Māori Participation:**

- We strongly support the objective of strengthening Iwi Māori participation (Issue 2). The Bill must go beyond consultation and ensure genuine partnership and recognition of tino rangatiratanga in emergency management planning and response. This includes respecting mātauranga Māori and empowering iwi and hapū to lead responses within their rohe.

In conclusion, Grey Lynn 2030 believes that the new Emergency Management Bill has the potential to significantly improve New Zealand's resilience. However, to truly achieve a "whole-of-society" approach, the legislation must place greater emphasis on empowering local communities through formal recognition, resourcing, genuine engagement, and respect for their unique knowledge and capabilities.

We look forward to further engagement in the development of this crucial legislation.

Sincerely,

The Grey Lynn 2030 Committee

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From 15 April to 13 May 2025 the government is inviting submissions on options to strengthen New Zealand's overarching emergency management legislation and inform the design of a new Emergency Management Bill.

Our community group, Grey Lynn 2030, appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback on the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. We recognise the importance of updating the current framework to better address the increasing risks and complexities of more frequent emergencies.

After our direct experience with the Auckland Anniversary flood event, which significantly impacted our densely populated Waitemata community, we are particularly concerned with the emergency readiness for residents in the cities and particularly apartment buildings.

The increasing number of Aucklanders living in apartments means a catastrophic power failure can render entire buildings uninhabitable, creating unique and significant challenges. For our many apartment residents, this includes:

- Inability to access apartments or lobby doors with electric password systems.
- Closure of vehicle access from shared garaging with electric doors.
- Cessation of electric water pumps for sewage and drinking water.
- Loss of internet communications.
- Complete loss of lighting.
- Impossibility of cooking without electricity.

Overall, we strongly support the proposed objectives of the new Bill, particularly the emphasis on strengthening community and Iwi Māori participation (Issue 2 & 3). Our on-the-ground experience consistently shows that local knowledge, networks, and initiatives are crucial in the immediate aftermath of an event and throughout the recovery process.

However, we believe the Bill needs to go further in several key areas, with a primary focus on empowering apartment residents to enhance community resilience in our population-dense urban environments.

**Key Priorities:** We urge the Bill to prioritise:

1. **Formal Recognition and Resourcing of Community-Led Initiatives (Relates to Issue 4):** This is critical for leveraging local capacity.
2. **Mandating Consideration of Apartment Residents in Local Emergency Management Plans (Relates to Issue 3):** Their unique vulnerabilities require specific attention.
3. **Clear Definition and Inclusion of Building Management as an Essential Service (Relates to Issue 11):** Their role in maintaining essential functions in apartment buildings is paramount.

**Strengthening Community Participation:**

- **Formal Recognition and Resourcing (Relates to Issue 4):** While the document acknowledges the role of communities as first responders, it lacks concrete proposals for

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their formal recognition within the emergency management structure. We urge the Bill to include provisions for the accreditation, training, and resourcing of community-led emergency response teams and initiatives. This could involve dedicated funding streams, access to equipment, and proactive identification, training, and engagement of potential community emergency hubs *before* an emergency. We need clear pathways for integration with regional and national responses.

    - There is a significant need to identify and resource emergency hubs within apartment buildings or clusters of apartment buildings. Residents in these vertical communities, particularly in areas like Waitemata with limited traditional community spaces, may have limited access to support networks. The Bill should consider how to equip and train designated individuals within apartment complexes to act as floor or building wardens and establish temporary support systems within the building itself. This could include funding for emergency supplies within buildings (first aid kits, communication devices, etc.) and training for residents in basic emergency response and evacuation procedures specific to high-rise environments. The inclusion of solar/battery/Starlink technologies should be considered to enable basic communication services during power outages

- **Meaningful Engagement in Planning (Relates to Issue 3):** Strengthening community participation requires more than consultation. The Bill should mandate genuine co-design of emergency management plans at the local level, ensuring community voices, including those of vulnerable groups and apartment residents, are integral in identifying needs, resources, and effective response strategies.

    - Living in Waitemata, one of the most densely and complexly populated parts of New Zealand, with a significant proportion of residents in apartments, we have much to contribute. The January 2023 Auckland floods highlighted the vulnerability of our community. While Auckland Council has assisted the worst affected, the fundamental preparedness at the community level for Waitemata and residents remains unchanged  at the on the ground level. We see a critical need to explicitly include the perspectives of dense city areas that include apartment dwellers in local emergency management plans.
    - Evacuation routes (potentially limited to stairs during power outages), communication needs (which may differ significantly from those in detached houses, especially during internet/mobile failures). Reliance on building management should be specifically addressed. Workshops should specifically target apartment residents to understand their unique vulnerabilities and capacities, such as accessibility for residents with mobility issues in multi-story buildings during power outages.

- **Support for Spontaneous Volunteers:** The Bill should consider how to better integrate and support spontaneous volunteers who often emerge during emergencies. Clear guidelines and mechanisms for coordination, safety briefings, and task allocation would enhance their effectiveness and safety. In the context of apartment buildings, this might include residents with specific skills (e.g first aid, language translation) who can assist their neighbours. Building management or designated floor wardens could help identify and coordinate these internal volunteers safely and effectively.

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- **Awareness Raising and Training for Community Leaders:** We are well aware of the places and people who have potential resources in an emergency. We need a community action plan to develop this.
- In Waitemata, there is no overarching community group with the dedicated ability and funding to develop this comprehensively for our diverse population, including a significant number of apartment residents.
- Waitmate while it does have some community groups - in the city centre with a more transient population, high number of renters these are not well established. Apartment buildings are the logical “community”- this needs to be considered rather than the church, marae or residents groups that operate in the suburbs.
- We need awareness campaigns and training opportunities specifically for city suburban residents and building managers. This could involve workshops on building-specific emergency plans (e.g for power blackouts) and communication protocols during an event. Identifying and training "community leaders" within apartment buildings is crucial, as they can act as vital links during an emergency.

**Clarity in Roles and Responsibilities:**

- **Local Empowerment (Relates to Issue 5 & 6):** While we understand the need for clear national and regional responsibilities, the Bill must ensure that local authorities and community groups have sufficient autonomy and resources to lead initial response and recovery efforts within their areas. Over-centralisation could stifle local initiative and delay crucial assistance, particularly in rapidly evolving urban emergency situations. Auckland Council Emergency Management needs clear guidelines and resources to support the unique needs of high-density residential areas and apartment buildings. This includes pre-planning for mass evacuation from apartment buildings if necessary, establishing temporary shelters in accessible locations for apartment residents (considering those with mobility issues), and ensuring communication channels that can reach individuals within these buildings (e.g., building-wide alert systems, potentially independent of mains power).

- **Defining "Essential Services" (Relates to Issue 11):** We believe the Bill needs a clearer and more inclusive definition of what constitutes an "essential service" at the community level. This should extend beyond utilities to include critical community support networks, such as local food banks, community centres, and volunteer organisations. In Auckland’s city centre, while there are food banks, there are very few readily accessible community centres and formally active volunteer organisations. Crucially, the definition must include building management and maintenance services in apartment complexes. During and after an emergency, residents rely on these services for essential functions like water supply, sanitation, and potentially security. The Bill should address the continuity of these apartment services or mandate contingency plans if they are disrupted.

**Meeting Diverse Needs:**

- **Accessibility and Inclusion (Relates to Issue 1):** While the document touches on diverse needs, the Bill should explicitly mandate accessible communication channels, culturally appropriate support, and tailored assistance for vulnerable populations, including people with disabilities, ethnic minorities (particularly new New Zealanders),

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and the vulnerable elderly. This is particularly pertinent in apartment buildings where a diverse range of residents may live in close proximity. Accessibility in apartment buildings during emergencies, particularly for those with mobility issues during power outages when lifts may not function, requires specific attention. The Bill should mandate that emergency plans for high-density residential areas include specific provisions for evacuating and supporting these vulnerable residents. Consideration must also be given to language barriers, which are prevalent in diverse city centre apartment populations, and the need for multilingual emergency information.

- **Psychological and Social Recovery:** The Bill should give greater emphasis to the long-term psychological and social recovery of communities affected by emergencies. This includes provisions for mental health support, community-led healing initiatives, and resources to rebuild social infrastructure. Residents of apartment buildings, who may have experienced the emergency in close proximity to many others or who may lack strong social connections within their building, might experience unique psychological challenges. The Bill should encourage community-led initiatives *within apartment complexes* to foster social support during and after recovery.

**Other Considerations Specific to Apartment Buildings:**

- **Evacuation Challenges:** Mass evacuation from multi-story buildings, especially for the elderly, people with disabilities, and families with young children, presents significant challenges when elevators are unusable and stairwells become congested and dangerous due to lack of lighting. Emergency plans must address these specific logistical hurdles.
- **Communication Barriers:** Traditional communication methods (e.g., public broadcasts primarily in English) might not effectively reach all apartment residents, especially those who are not fluent in English or who may not have access to traditional media due to power outages or language preferences. Multi-lingual and building-specific communication strategies are essential.
- **Resource Sharing:** There may be significant opportunities for resource sharing among residents within apartment buildings (e.g., generators, food supplies, skills). Emergency plans could facilitate the identification and coordination of these internal resources.
- **Building Management Role:** Building management is essential in emergency preparedness, response, and recovery within apartment complexes. The Bill could outline clear responsibilities and requirements for building owners and managers in developing and implementing emergency plans tailored to their residents and building infrastructure.

**Iwi Māori Participation (Relates to Issue 2):**

We strongly support the objective of strengthening Iwi Māori participation. The Bill must go beyond consultation and ensure genuine partnership and recognition of tino rangatiratanga in emergency management planning and response. This includes respecting mātauranga Māori and empowering iwi and hapū to lead responses within their rohe. In the context of urban environments with significant Māori populations residing in apartments, culturally appropriate communication and support mechanisms within building-level emergency plans should be considered in partnership with local iwi.

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In conclusion, Grey Lynn 2030 believes that the new Emergency Management Bill has the potential to significantly improve New Zealand's resilience. However, to truly achieve a "whole-of-society" approach, the legislation must place a significantly greater emphasis on empowering local communities, with specific and tailored considerations for the growing number of New Zealanders living in apartment buildings.

This includes formal recognition, resourcing, genuine engagement, and respect for their unique knowledge and capabilities.

We look forward to further engagement in the development of this crucial legislation.

Sincerely,

Suzanne Kendrick

The Grey Lynn 2030 Trust Committee

www.greylynn2030.co.nz

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Natalie Robb |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Radio Hawke's Bay |

☐ The Privacy Act 2020 applies to submissions. Please tick the box if you **do not** want your name or other personal information to be included in any information about submissions that NEMA may publish.

☐ NEMA may publish submissions or a summary of submissions to its website, civildefence.govt.nz. If you **do not** want your submission or a summary of your submission to be published, please tick the box and type an explanation below:

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### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

1.

**Radio Hawke's Bay** is a member of the **Community Access Media Alliance (CAMA)** which represents a national network of 12 independently operated, publicly funded stations across Aotearoa. While rooted in their local communities, CAMA stations share everyday infrastructure needs, a strong public interest mandate to facilitate media services **by, for, and about** underrepresented groups, and a proven capacity to support emergency communications.

Established over 40 years ago with the backing of UNESCO, Community Access Media as a sector was created to fill a critical democratic gap, serving diverse, minority, and underserved populations that are often excluded from mainstream media. These are the very communities most at risk of being left behind in an emergency, making CAMA's role in the emergency management system both unique and essential.

Radio Hawke's Bay strongly supports the proposed objectives of the legislation, especially the focus on strengthening community participation and minimising disruption to essential services. However, to be effective, these objectives must **explicitly recognise Radio Hawke's Bay a member of Community Access Media as a critical partner in emergency communication**, given our sector's trusted role and public service function.

The Government's 2025 strategy, *Strengthening Disaster Resilience and Emergency Management*, highlights the importance of community engagement, transparent and

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inclusive communication, and integrating Māori perspectives. CAMA stations are uniquely equipped to deliver on all these priorities—broadcasting in over 50 languages, centring te reo Māori and Pasifika voices, and providing culturally attuned, localised information.

To truly realise the Government's emergency management goals, **CAMA stations must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and integrated into statutory emergency planning frameworks**.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The description captures essential barriers. However, it could go further in highlighting how mainstream communication channels often fail to reach **multilingual, disabled, migrant, and Māori communities**, especially those who rely on **Community Access Media** for culturally relevant and accessible information.

CAMA stations produce over **4,000 hours of local content each month in more than 50 languages**, serving audiences who are traditionally hard to reach and who may be disproportionately affected during a crisis. For more information about our core services, see here: https://cama.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/2024-Reach-your-audience-1.pdf

Globally, agencies such as UNESCO, ITU, and UNDP emphasise the value of community radio (what we refer to as Community Access Media) in disaster risk reduction. Specifically:

- UNESCO recognises community radio as a key factor in achieving the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction's goal of "understanding disaster risk" by providing locally relevant and culturally specific information.
- The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) highlights the reliability of analogue radio in crises, noting it remains accessible when digital or mobile infrastructure fails.
- The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) advocates for the inclusion of community radio in recovery and preparedness efforts, acknowledging their role in amplifying the voices of marginalised people and disseminating life-saving information.

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3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Further factors include language and literacy barriers, disability, digital exclusion, and cultural mistrust of mainstream institutions. Radio Hawke's Bay as part of Community Access Media plays a critical role in overcoming these barriers by offering **trusted, localised communication in the languages and formats that communities rely on.**

For more information about our core services, see here: https://cama.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/2024-Reach-your-audience-1.pdf

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

1.

We support the combined delivery of all four proposed options (a–d), particularly **options (c) and (d)**, which require both local and national emergency planning to be informed by the needs of communities that are disproportionately affected.

However, to ensure these needs are effectively met, we recommend the following:

- **Radio Hawke's Bay and other CAMA stations must be formally recognised** as communication partners in both legislation and planning guidance.
- **Non-legislative guidance** (Option b) should include the role of Community Access Media and encourage their engagement by CDEM Groups.
- **Local planning requirements** (Option C) should mandate engagement with broadcasters who serve minority and vulnerable groups.
- **National planning** (Option d) should involve direct consultation with CAMA as a representative of media providers serving these communities.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

1.

- **Formal partnerships** with CAMA stations to co-design emergency messaging.
- **Dedicated funding** for station infrastructure resilience and broadcast continuity.
- **Emergency broadcast testing** and drills in multiple languages and formats.

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- **Multilingual outreach campaigns** that reflect cultural nuances and local knowledge.
- **Representation of CAMA stations** in emergency advisory groups at the local and national levels.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks. To align with the goals of the Emergency Management Bill, we recommend:

1. **Statutory recognition of Community Access Media** as part of New Zealand's essential communication infrastructure.
2. **Inclusion of CAMA stations in emergency planning and advisory groups** at local and regional levels.
3. **Translation and distribution of all public alerts and warnings** through Community Access Media channels.

**Dedicated funding for multilingual emergency preparedness campaigns**, using Community Access Media networks to amplify life-saving information.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The description appropriately highlights gaps in recognising and resourcing iwi Māori contributions to emergency management. Māori communities are often early responders and offer essential cultural, environmental, and community knowledge. Marae is geared to cater for large groups of people offering shelter, community and kai.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Māori are deeply embedded in the social fabric of their regions, often providing shelter, food, spiritual support, and communications during emergencies. The role of marae, iwi

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radio, Māori networks, and, by extension, Community Access Media, in disaster response is significant and under recognised in national frameworks.

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Recognising iwi Māori as equal partners in emergency governance and planning would improve trust and resilience. The benefits of acknowledging mātauranga Māori and existing networks outweigh any additional coordination costs. This was proven with the support that the Hawke's Bay region received from iwi during Cyclone Gabrielle.

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Formally acknowledge iwi as partners at governance levels, with co-design obligations embedded in legislation and supported through resourcing.

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

CDEM Groups should establish partnership agreements with local iwi and hapū, ensuring Māori representation in decision-making and communications planning.

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Formally embedding iwi into emergency governance is essential for upholding the Crown's obligations under Te Tiriti o Waitangi, particularly around equitable access to information and resources.

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Create a national Māori advisory board or panel with direct reporting lines to the Director. This panel should include representatives from iwi broadcasters and local marae who already lead community communication and care.

14. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

1.

The role of CAMA stations in broadcasting Māori perspectives and te reo Māori contributes directly to the Crown's obligations under Te Tiriti o Waitangi to ensure equitable access to public services and culturally appropriate communication during emergencies.

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Any changes should prioritise Māori media, including iwi and Community Access Media, in official emergency plans to ensure culturally appropriate communication before, during, and after emergencies.

**Additional Māori-related facts: ***

- An estimated 19% of all content across CAMA stations is produced in te reo Māori.
- CAMA member stations broadcast Māori-focused programmes across 12 different stations, supporting rangatahi, kaumātua, iwi leaders, and community groups.
- CAMA stations regularly collaborate with Māori health, education, and civil defence agencies to deliver culturally safe and accessible information.
- Māori-led content ensures that critical emergency messaging reflects tikanga Māori and acknowledges Māori responses and leadership.

See more information about our core services here: https://cama.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/2024-Reach-your-audience-1.pdf

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that participation is uneven. Many community organisations already play key roles during emergencies but **lack formal pathways, protocols, or resourcing** to be effectively included. This is particularly true for the Community Access Media sector.

CAMA stations are regularly relied upon by local councils and national bodies during civil defence events. **Radio Hawke's Bay** continued broadcasting during Cyclone Gabrielle to meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks. Specifically, CAMA recommends

- **Incentivising formal partnerships** between CDEM Groups and local CAMA stations to build shared protocols and ensure resilience.
- **Training emergency responders** to work effectively with Community Access Media as trusted communication partners.

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- Establishing a framework that **designates CAMA stations as "approved providers of warnings and notifications"**, building on earlier iterations of the Emergency Management Bill and the current Memorandum of Understanding.

**Providing readiness grants and capacity-building support** to CAMA stations for emergency infrastructure, backup systems, and multilingual broadcasting capability without backup power.

Yet, despite their clear value, CAMA stations are **not formally recognised outside of the current Memorandum of Understanding**, and **no dedicated funding exists** to support their emergency role. See CAMA's critical infrastructure case study and presentations for further information:

- https://cama.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Case-study-critical-infrastructure-3-1.pdf

https://drive.google.com/file/d/11bXvoW8ZEMFhXFZ4NNcNR1fCmoPnltj_/viewr

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

CAMA strongly supports the proposals to:

- Develop formal arrangements with CAMA stations **before emergencies happen** (Option b).
- Require CDEM Groups to state how they will manage offers of help (Option C).

These would create opportunities for CAMA stations to be **included in emergency planning, with clear roles and expectations, and funding to address any additional capacity needs.**

Our preferred approach combines both non-legislative guidance and legislative requirements, so that stations are not only acknowledged in principle but also woven into planning frameworks.

CAMA also recommends:

- Formal recognition of CAMA stations as **emergency response stakeholders**, like existing lifeline utilities.
- Mandated consultation with **Community Access Media** in preparedness and recovery strategies.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

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To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks. Specifically, CAMA recommends

- **Incentivising formal partnerships** between CDEM Groups and local CAMA stations to build shared protocols and ensure resilience.
- **Training emergency responders** to work effectively with Community Access Media as trusted communication partners.
- Establishing a framework that **designates CAMA stations as "approved providers of warnings and notifications"**, building on earlier iterations of the Emergency Management Bill and the current Memorandum of Understanding.
- **Providing readiness grants and capacity-building support** to CAMA stations for emergency infrastructure, backup systems, and multilingual broadcasting capability.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The description correctly identifies that individuals and communities are frequently first responders during emergencies. However, the current legal, operational, and resourcing frameworks do not reflect this reality for all community actors.

Radio Hawke's Bay and other Community Access Media (CAMA) stations often continue broadcasting vital information throughout emergencies, sometimes without backup power or formal emergency direction, placing them in a **grey area in terms of legal liability and eligibility for compensation**.

Simplifying legal frameworks and recognising media resilience as critical infrastructure would ensure stations can act swiftly without risk. This includes ensuring sites, studios, transmission infrastructure, and generators are fit for purpose and subsidised. Operational guidance and funding tailored to media infrastructure resilience should be prioritised.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

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Improving support for community responders, such as CAMA stations, would ensure the faster and more trusted dissemination of life-saving information.

**Benefits:**

- Enhanced community resilience and faster recovery.
- Increased public trust and engagement.
- More equitable access to emergency messaging.

**Risks of inaction:**

- Communication breakdowns for culturally and linguistically diverse communities.
- Continued reliance on overloaded centralised systems.
- Legal uncertainty deterring community-led response efforts.

**Preferred options:**

- Extend **civil liability protection** to media organisations acting in good faith.
- Ensure CAMA stations are eligible for **compensation or reimbursement** for emergency-related broadcasting, especially when acting without direct instruction.
- Introduce **funding mechanisms and asset planning tools** to reflect the infrastructure needs of community media.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes.

- Establish **formal recognition** for emergency responders at Community Access Media stations. This would enable access to critical services, resources, and legal protections during emergency response and recovery phases.
- Develop **templates and technical guidance** for emergency broadcast continuity planning.
- Allocate **dedicated funding** for readiness, including translation and targeted outreach campaigns.

A framework for designating CAMA stations as "**approved providers of warnings and notifications**" to support the national alerting system (in addition to and above the current Memorandum of Understanding).

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. There are still barriers to ensuring that Māori-led and community-led responders—like iwi media and CAMA stations—are integrated as strategic partners. This includes:

- **Formal inclusion in emergency planning frameworks**
- **Resourcing models** that enable the delivery of culturally grounded and locally responsive information
- **Trust-based engagement**, rather than ad hoc consultation.

Failing to recognise these entities as **core partners** risks excluding some of the most trusted and responsive actors in our emergency ecosystem.

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Radio Hawke's Bay and other CAMA stations regularly engage with Civil Defence during emergencies, but inconsistent clarity around who oversees communications, along with staff changes, creates challenges. Better direction, control, oversight and increased engagement at the operational level would support consistent messaging, coordination, and quicker responses.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support clearer delegation and communication protocols. The benefit would be improved timeliness and effectiveness of public messaging, especially via local broadcast networks.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Continue to include communication partners, such as CAMA stations, in decision trees and pre-scripted alert processes. Increase dedicated liaison and community engagement roles within CDEM Groups to ensure information flows effectively to local media, such as CAMA stations.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

More centralised coordination and community engagement, combined with clear local implementation pathways, would improve consistency and effectiveness. This includes recognising CAMA stations as trusted partners that must be integrated into emergency communication chains and emergency preparedness awareness campaigns.

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## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Confusion around responsibilities and staff changes among officials contributes to delays in community messaging and engagement. Clarifying these roles and increasing community engagement efforts will help ensure that information is disseminated quickly and reliably.

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred options include more unified protocols for engagement with community partners. The benefit would be stronger accountability and less duplication.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Create explicit obligations for CDEM Groups and Local Authorities to consult, engage, and campaign with locally relevant communications partners such as Radio Hawke's Bay and other CAMA, Iwi radio stations.

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The model should be adjusted to prioritise community engagement and communication readiness, including stronger partnerships and emergency preparedness awareness campaigns with local public interest broadcasters, such as Radio Hawke's Bay, other CAMA stations and Iwi Radio.

### Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

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*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We have observed inconsistent performance across regions, in part due to limited community engagement and resources, as well as staff changes. Consistent and streamlined structures, along with increased capacity and resources, would improve service delivery and awareness.

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred options should strengthen local leadership and clarify responsibilities, particularly in communications planning and outreach, which should include increased public investment in emergency preparedness campaigns.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Ensure that accountability frameworks include engagement with diverse communities and partners, especially communication providers (such as CAMA stations) that have local access. Roll out of App that Radio Hawke's Bay have piloted to add enhanced layer of connectivity and reduced repetition of interviews by CDEM/Mayoral personnel in emergency situations.

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

There is a need for more operational clarity and accountability. Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) are key connectors between policy and implementation—yet they are often disconnected from community-level delivery.

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support options that improve the functioning of Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) and enable them to work more directly with local stakeholders, such as CAMA stations. This would benefit public confidence and service responsiveness. Emergency

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Hubs that have been set up in the Hawke's Bay Region need ongoing financial support and integrated training with all communication systems/partners.

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, Radio Hawke's Bay and other Community Access Media must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks. Specifically, CAMA advocates for:

- Requiring Coordinating Executive Groups to establish formal communication frameworks that include designated CAMA partners.
- Allocating further public investment into emergency preparedness awareness campaigns and other strategies.

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Plans must keep pace with evolving roles, technology, and community needs. Updating plans and increasing community engagement are essential to effective and inclusive emergency management.

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Faster and more iterative planning updates, along with increased community engagement and outreach campaigns, would allow for the timely integration of new risks and partners, such as social service agencies (including CAMA stations).

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Provide dedicated funding (for emergency preparedness campaigns, infrastructure upgrades, and community engagement) and staffing to maintain plans and engage stakeholders in the update process, especially those involved in communications.

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Communication responsibilities are often assumed but not formalised. There is no national or regional clarity on how diverse communities will be reached, nor who is accountable for ensuring emergency communications are inclusive. Formalising partnerships with Community Access Media stations, in addition to the current Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), would address this gap and improve the equity of access to information.

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The need for stronger national direction is clear. CAMA stations frequently face inconsistencies in engagement, access, and awareness of civil defence information across regions. A more standardised framework (including further investment in awareness campaigns, community outreach, and critical infrastructure) would improve coordination and information dissemination, and ensure equitable treatment.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support options that increase accountability and set national expectations. However, any additional compliance or reporting requirements placed on CAMA stations, or their service providers must come with corresponding support or funding.

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

- Definitions of essential communications infrastructure.
- Additional standards and investment in public alerting and messaging.
- Involvement of Community Access Media (and other media providers) in response planning.
- Criteria for designating lifeline utilities, which should broaden to include CAMA stations.

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**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. National direction should include guidance on the role of Community Access Media, with expectations for how Civil Defence Groups will engage with them.

### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

There must be mechanisms in place to address performance gaps, mainly when failure to act affects vulnerable communities. Too often, local variations result in inconsistent communication during emergencies.

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Strengthening the Director's mandate is appropriate. However, this mandate should include community feedback loops and transparency around interventions.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Enable public-interest media outlets (such as CAMA stations) to raise performance issues directly with NEMA when local coordination fails, with assurance of follow-up and necessary resources.

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Current local hazard planning often lacks meaningful community input and overlooks communication infrastructure gaps, particularly those experienced by Community Access Media stations. These limitations directly impact the ability to reach vulnerable communities with critical risk and preparedness information effectively. CAMA stations are an underutilised but essential part of local risk communication networks. This was

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witnessed first-hand by Radio Hawke's Bay as we were one of two fully local stations to be heard across the whole region following the cyclone.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support improvements to planning tools, enhanced public education, and stronger coordination between hazard planners and communicators. A key benefit would be improved public understanding of local risks, more effective messaging, and increased readiness, especially for underserved communities.

However, recognising CAMA as a key communication partner will require **increased capacity, infrastructure, and coordination at the local level. These new expectations must be backed by dedicated funding**. Otherwise, the burden will fall on already under-resourced CAMA stations. This could undermine the effectiveness of any proposed changes.

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

We support national consistency in the core aspects of hazard identification, risk assessment, and communication protocols. However, regional flexibility is essential for tailoring engagement strategies and using trusted local communication providers, such as CAMA stations.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

- Limited staffing and resourcing.
- Fragmentation between council departments.
- Gaps in training around community-led communication strategies.
- Underuse of locally embedded media platforms.
- CAMA stations are underutilised in the current local and national awareness campaign budget allocations.
- Low awareness of the role Community Access Media can play in risk communication.

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. CDEM Group plans should be required to:

- Formally integrate local communications partners such as CAMA stations.
- Include these partners in risk mapping, planning exercises, and scenario testing.

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- Allocate specific funding to support their participation and infrastructure development.
- Develop and increase funded public education campaigns in collaboration with trusted local broadcasters, such as CAMA stations, to improve awareness among vulnerable or hard-to-reach communities.

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Current structures rely heavily on discretionary engagement. There needs to be clearer statutory obligations to involve community organisations, improve data sharing, and integrate communications in risk planning.

There should be clear statutory obligations for CDEM Groups to engage with Community Access Media as critical communication providers. This would ensure consistent, two-way risk communication, particularly with groups who are often left out of mainstream channels. However, **this will not be effective without adequate resourcing.** CAMA stations cannot take on greater responsibilities in emergency planning without support.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The protection of taonga Māori and cultural heritage is vital during and after emergencies, not only for iwi and hapū but for the nation. These assets hold deep spiritual, historical, and identity-based value and must be safeguarded through intentional and culturally informed planning. The recognition of such heritage in emergency planning frameworks is overdue and well supported.

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**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support approaches that embed iwi leadership in identifying and prioritising taonga and cultural assets before emergencies occur. The benefit is a system that reflects local values and enhances intergenerational resilience. The risk of inaction is irreversible cultural loss. The preferred option is the development of mandatory protocols for taonga protection in CDEM Group plans.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Require emergency communication partners, including iwi and Community Access Media, to collaborate on cultural asset alert systems and post-event reporting. Ensure CAMA stations are trained (and funded to meet the additional capacity required) to communicate the cultural significance of protected sites and practices during a response.

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Animal welfare is intrinsically linked to human well-being during emergencies. Clear protocols and resources for protecting pets, working animals, and livestock are essential for reducing trauma and supporting recovery.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support options that expand planning requirements to include animal evacuation, sheltering, and public communication. The benefit consists of greater public cooperation and reduced harm.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Animal welfare should be considered second only to human safety, prioritised above property protection. Public communication should reflect this hierarchy, especially in communities that rely on animals for their livelihood and companionship.

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**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Leverage local Community Access Media stations to deliver real-time updates on animal evacuation centres and safety advice. Establish partnerships between animal welfare organisations and CAMA stations to develop emergency content and resource awareness campaigns in advance. Radio Hawke's Bay played a role communicating information and seeking veterinary support for found animals during Cyclone Gabrielle.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. The communications infrastructure required to deliver culturally inclusive, accurate, and accessible emergency information is not formally recognised, and in some cases, the critical infrastructure required to disseminate information is lacking or inadequate (e.g. obsolete or inadequate generator support, high transmission costs, over-reliance on the internet, AM/FM limited frequency availability). Without this critical infrastructure, community and iwi-led media organisations remain underutilised and under-supported despite being essential to maintaining community cohesion and trust during crises. Radio Hawke's Bay has mitigated some of these issues post Cyclone Gabrielle but face the ongoing costs of maintaining transmission and plant capable of providing full coverage for the region.

For more information about the status of the sector's critical infrastructure, see here: https://cama.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Case-study-critical-infrastructure-3-1.pdf

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This section is critical to CAMA's submission. The definition of lifeline utilities must reflect 21st-century communication realities, including publicly funded, culturally embedded media services relied on during past disasters.

The current definition of lifeline utilities **excludes key communication services,** such as Community Access Media. While RNZ and TVNZ are recognised, CAMA stations—despite providing trusted, multilingual, and localised content to communities underserved by mainstream media, including Māori, Pasifika, people with disabilities, rural populations, and migrant communities—are not. Although our structures may differ, CAMA stations share the same public service and emergency communication objectives. Our role as signatories to the national Memorandum of Understanding on emergency broadcasting underscores this.

This narrow designation fails to reflect how communities **receive and rely on information** during emergencies. During recent engagements with officials, this omission was raised as a serious concern.

Although the earlier Emergency Management Bill proposed more prescriptive definitions and support for transmission services, the current direction instead **imposes obligations on infrastructure entities without additional funding**. This risks **costs being passed onto CAMA stations** by providers such as Kordia and Chorus, threatening their operational capacity.

A recent Cabinet paper acknowledged the lack of structural or funding reform to address systemic gaps in risk reduction and community resilience. Without formal inclusion of CAMA stations as essential infrastructure, these challenges will persist, **leaving frontline community broadcasters unsupported** in future emergencies.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. CAMA strongly supports **Option C**: a **principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure"** that recognises the importance of community-based public media.

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This would:

- Enable inclusion of publicly funded CAMA stations in planning and funding systems.
- Acknowledge their role in business continuity and emergency broadcasting.
- Reduce reliance on centralised systems by empowering trusted local providers.

Without such inclusion, the system risks **communication failures and inequitable outcomes**, particularly for vulnerable groups.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Broadcast services from Community Access Media** should be added as critical communications infrastructure. These services:

- Provide life-saving information in over 50 languages.
- Are trusted by local communities across Aotearoa.
- Support Māori, iwi, and Treaty-aligned outcomes in emergency response.
- Have already demonstrated their importance during major events (e.g., Cyclone Gabrielle, Auckland floods).

For more information about our core services, see here: https://cama.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/2024-Reach-your-audience-1.pdf

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

**Community Access Media infrastructure**, including broadcast sites, transmission networks, studio equipment, and backup power, should be covered.

This infrastructure:

- Delivers 24/7 localised information across FM, AM, and digital platforms.
- Serves over 1 million people annually via 12 regional stations.
- Produces over 4,000 hours of content per month, with a focus on equity and local connection.

Serves as a **trustworthy bridge** between emergency services and the community.

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**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. To meet the Emergency Management Bill's objectives, CAMA recommends the following additional steps:

**1. Formal recognition of Community Access Media as essential infrastructure**, with a role in statutory emergency frameworks.

**2. A tiered framework** that recognises CAMA services as essential at local and regional levels, allowing flexible inclusion in emergency contexts.

**3. Infrastructure and readiness support**, including:

- Transmission and generator upgrades
- Resilience training and emergency planning resources
- Emergency communication templates and multilingual campaign funding

**4. Representation on emergency advisory groups** to ensure equitable planning and delivery.
**5. Dedicated investment** to future-proof the sector, including technical, staffing, and resilience planning support.

Community Access Media aligns with international best practice, including UNESCO and UNDP guidance, and delivers on Aotearoa's own Treaty, equity, and resilience commitments. Without formal inclusion in emergency management systems, the government risks overlooking one of the most effective, local, and trusted sources of communication during disaster. **We urge recognition, investment, and inclusion of CAMA as a cornerstone of Aotearoa's emergency response infrastructure.**

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Community Access Media (CAMA) stations play a vital role in providing localised, culturally relevant information during emergencies. However, CAMA stations are currently excluded from the lifeline utility framework, despite being relied upon during crises. While CAMA stations are committed to service continuity, most lack the necessary infrastructure and funding to meet the high business continuity standards expected of lifeline utilities.

CAMA stations are already operating under significant financial constraints and resource limitations, and we urge that any new business continuity obligations come with **adequate funding** to enable compliance.

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**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

CAMA supports **Option (b): increasing assurance through non-legislative guidance and monitoring**. However, this option must be coupled with **dedicated funding** to enable CAMA stations to meet the infrastructure and resilience standards required for emergency continuity. Without this, there is a risk that smaller broadcasters will bear the costs, which could lead to financial strain and increased service costs for our stations.

We strongly caution against Options (c) and (d), as financial penalties or legislative mandates without corresponding funding will disproportionately burden smaller, underfunded organisations like CAMA stations. The increased transmission costs and compliance requirements could be passed on by infrastructure providers, placing further financial pressure on stations that are already operating on tight budgets.

Without funding support, such measures would effectively penalise essential emergency broadcasters for circumstances beyond their control.

We recommend introducing **safeguards to protect public interest broadcasters** from cost escalation due to new obligations placed on infrastructure providers, such as Chorus and Kordia.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. In addition to the current options, we recommend:

- **Access to central government infrastructure funding** for the installation of backup transmission systems, off-grid studios, and other emergency readiness tools.
- A **tiered approach** to lifeline utility obligations, recognising the varying capacities of regional and community-based broadcasters and ensuring funding levels reflect these differences.
- The development of **a dedicated funding mechanism** specifically to support the emergency preparedness needs of CAMA stations. This could be managed through the current NZ On Air allocation or a separate funding stream aimed at emergency broadcasting needs.

Recognising the **value of existing MOU partnerships** and integrating CAMA into the national business continuity planning framework.

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

The problem is accurately described. Community Access Media stations are often left out of formal emergency coordination forums and education communication campaigns despite playing an essential role in disseminating localised, multilingual, and culturally attuned information.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the development of more formalised coordination structures and information-sharing channels at both regional and national levels. This would ensure CAMA stations can be part of coordinated messaging strategies and awareness campaigns and quickly access critical information in emergencies. However, to effectively engage in these partnerships, CAMA stations will require **dedicated funding for training, simulation exercises, awareness campaigns, and infrastructure upgrades** to ensure they meet the demands of emergency response roles.

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

We advocate for the expansion of the **national emergency broadcasting MOU,** with clearly defined and resourced **local implementation protocols** between CEMA Groups and CAMA stations. This ensures that CAMA stations can quickly respond to local needs while remaining integrated into the broader national emergency response framework.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks. Specifically, CAMA recommends:

- **Embedding information-sharing expectations within service-level agreements** between CEMA agencies and Community Access Media, backed by clear, resourced commitments.
- **Funded joint training, simulation exercises, and awareness campaigns** to strengthen partnerships and ensure readiness for emergency communications.
- **Formal recognition of CAMA stations as essential communications infrastructure**, with corresponding funding to support business continuity planning and emergency preparedness.

Ultimately, essential services must include the communications ecosystem—not just telecommunications providers, but also publicly funded community broadcasters, such as CAMA stations, which act as conduits for critical information. These services are essential to public safety and cohesion during emergencies, particularly for Māori, Pasifika, people with disabilities, migrants, and rural communities.

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Business continuity planning must formally acknowledge public messaging as an essential function and provide the resources and infrastructure protections needed to deliver on that obligation. To fully realise the goals of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks, not just as a partner, but as an operationally necessary asset.

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree with the problem definition. The COVID-19 pandemic and recent severe weather events have highlighted the critical need for all central government organisations to be prepared to maintain essential services during emergencies. These services include not only operational and infrastructural continuity but also the ability to effectively communicate with the public, primarily through trusted and accessible channels, such as Radio Hawke's Bay and other Community Access Media stations.

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the proposal to expand the scope of organisations recognised in the Act. We endorse extending business continuity obligations to Crown agents, Autonomous Crown Entities, and Independent Crown Entities, as well as requiring all recognised agencies to take account of Director-issued guidance. These changes will increase clarity, improve coordination, and enhance operational resilience across government.

However, **the inclusion of communication-related agencies must be explicit**, especially those that fund or rely on community broadcasters. Community Access Media (represented by CAMA) plays a frontline role in public messaging during emergencies, providing multilingual, localised, and culturally relevant information to vulnerable communities.

While CAMA is currently acknowledged through a discretionary Memorandum of Understanding, this is not sufficient. It lacks enforceability and integration into emergency frameworks. **Formal recognition and obligations are needed to ensure that CAMA can fulfil its essential communications role during a crisis**.

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**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. We recommend the following additional actions:

- **Extend business continuity requirements** to include government agencies that fund, oversee, or depend on public-interest media, such as NZ On Air and the Ministry for Culture and Heritage.
- **Require central government departments** to identify their communications partners (e.g. CAMA stations) as part of their business continuity planning.
- **Include Community Access Media** in inter-agency contingency frameworks for emergency communications.
- **Allocate dedicated funding** to support business continuity planning, readiness, and restoration for the community media sector.
- **Prioritise communications infrastructure** (e.g. studio and transmitter sites used by CAMA stations) for protection and restoration in emergencies.

**Funding and resource needs:**
To effectively integrate CAMA into emergency communications frameworks, additional funding and resources will be necessary. Currently, CAMA stations face significant challenges in terms of staffing, equipment, and infrastructure resilience. The following should be considered:

- **Targeted funding streams** to support CAMA stations in maintaining emergency-ready operations, including staffing, training, equipment, and infrastructure upgrades.
- **Resourcing for community-based outreach and preparedness**—CAMA stations often provide localised information that bridges gaps in national communication strategies. Funding should support these initiatives (and awareness campaigns) in high-risk areas and vulnerable communities.
- **Investment in secure and resilient broadcasting infrastructure**, including backup power systems and transmission equipment that can operate in the event of natural disasters or other emergencies.

**Training and capacity building** for CAMA staff in emergency management, media protocols, and crisis communication.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. The current framing of "essential services" must be expanded to include **the broader communications ecosystem**, beyond just telecommunications infrastructure. Publicly funded community broadcasters like CAMA stations act as vital conduits of critical information to diverse and underserved populations.

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Yet, without formal statutory recognition, these broadcasters remain excluded from the planning and protection frameworks they need to function in emergencies. Their omission puts public safety, community cohesion, and equitable access to emergency information at risk.

To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, **Community Access Media must be recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in emergency legislation, not just as partners, but as operationally necessary assets.**

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The process for managing access to restricted areas must be clear, consistent, and adaptable. This ensures safety while allowing essential personnel, including CAMA station staff and content creators, to continue operating. During past emergencies, such as Cyclone Gabrielle and COVID-19, confusion around access restrictions has led to unnecessary disruption of critical communication services. This has hampered the ability of CAMA stations to disseminate vital information to vulnerable communities that rely on them for local, multilingual, and culturally relevant updates.

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support options that provide a more transparent and coordinated process for designating access rights, particularly for media personnel working in public-interest Community Access Media. Preferred options should include clear protocols for issuing passes or access rights to media staff, ensuring that **CAMA stations are explicitly recognised as essential communication services**. The key benefits include:

- **Reduced downtime in the dissemination of critical information**.
- **Improved public trust** through consistent access for CAMA station personnel to serve their audiences during emergencies.

Without a formal accreditation process, CAMA stations may continue to face delays or restrictions in accessing their infrastructure and facilities, which can delay their ability to perform their essential communication role.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. A key recommendation is to **develop a national template for rapidly accrediting essential communication personnel during emergencies**. This framework should explicitly **include CAMA stations** as part of the vital communications infrastructure. Accreditation should guarantee access to broadcast towers, transmission sites, and studio facilities, enabling stations to continue operations uninterrupted during emergencies. Additionally, this framework should ensure that CAMA stations are

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recognised and protected as critical assets, prioritised for access and repair when necessary.

## Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The responsibilities for using emergency powers must be unambiguous. Confusion can delay decision-making and negatively impact response time, including the timely dissemination of emergency information through **CAMA station channels**. Without clarity in who holds the authority, **CAMA stations** may face delays in receiving necessary permissions to broadcast vital updates to the public, particularly in areas requiring restricted access.

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the option that delineates authority and promotes consistency across local government boundaries. This reduces confusion and improves confidence in leadership. Clear roles for **CDEM Groups**, **Controllers**, and **Recovery Managers** should explicitly include media, especially **CAMA stations**, in the decision-making process. This ensures **CAMA stations** are integrated into the emergency management ecosystem, reducing the likelihood of disruption to essential communication services during crises.

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, we propose that all local emergency declarations include a **communications liaison officer** tasked with managing the dissemination of information through approved media channels, including **CAMA stations**. This would ensure a consistent flow of critical information and further integrate Community Access Media into the emergency response framework.

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

In a digital era, requiring physical signatures for declarations creates unnecessary delays. Transitioning to electronic methods is practical and increases the agility of emergency response processes. For **CAMA stations**, the lack of timely access to emergency powers or declarations can cause delays in broadcasting critical information. Moving to electronic signatures would expedite decision-making, ensuring that **CAMA stations** can continue providing essential updates to the public without unnecessary delays.

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred options should support digital authorisation mechanisms with appropriate checks and balances. This ensures speed without compromising legitimacy. This digital shift would also enable **CAMA stations** to receive timely notifications regarding the activation of emergency powers, allowing them to adjust and broadcast accurate information to the public quickly.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, include an **automated communication protocol** tied to the declaration system that immediately alerts designated media partners, including CAMA stations, when emergency powers are activated. This would ensure that **CAMA stations are promptly informed and can start their crucial role in disseminating emergency information immediately.**

**Funding Consideration:**
Increased reliance on CAMA stations for timely and accurate emergency information dissemination will require enhanced **funding to ensure their capacity can meet the demand**. This includes expanding their ability to cover additional personnel, technological tools (e.g., emergency broadcasting equipment and redundancy systems), and training staff in emergency communication protocols. Therefore, **funding support for CAMA stations should be included in any legislation or policy that enhances their role in emergency management.**

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Mayors hold a visible leadership role and are often perceived by the public as the face of local government. Making their roles more explicit in the legislation would support transparency and help streamline response coordination. This more precise definition can also strengthen the integration of CAMA stations in the local communication framework, as it clarifies who is responsible for directing public information during emergencies.

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support codifying mayors' responsibilities and communication duties, especially regarding public information and local coordination. This would increase public understanding and accountability. Additionally, requiring mayors and **local authorities to include CAMA stations in their communication plans** would **significantly enhance the dissemination of information, particularly in areas where traditional media are less effective.**

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, provide mayors with **briefing materials** and **communication templates** tailored for multilingual outreach, specifically for CAMA stations and iwi media. This would ensure that **emergency messaging reaches all segments of the population, including underrepresented communities.**

**Funding Consideration:**

To support the expanded role of **CAMA stations** in emergency communications, dedicated funding for equipment, staffing, and operational costs is necessary. Without this, there could be gaps in coverage or the ability to deliver timely messages, particularly in communities with limited access to traditional media.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Controllers and Recovery Managers may require the power to requisition or prioritise access to local media infrastructure to ensure the continuity of critical broadcasts. They should also be empowered to directly engage with CAMA stations in planning and message dissemination during the response and recovery phases, particularly when mainstream channels are compromised or less effective for targeted communities.

**Funding Consideration:**

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To enhance CAMA stations' ability to contribute effectively in emergencies, funding should be made available for establishing e**mergency response capacity**. This would include ensuring that **CAMA stations have the necessary resources to maintain their infrastructure, personnel, and technology, allowing them to operate effectively during emergencies**.

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

**CAMA's role in emergency management**

Community Access Media (CAMA) is a signatory to the national Memorandum of Understanding on emergency broadcasting and has longstanding relationships with emergency management agencies. Despite this, the nature of our public funding and our UNESCO-backed origins, we lack formal recognition as lifeline utilities in emergency management frameworks.

CAMA serves over 1 million New Zealanders annually through 12 member stations. Collectively, we produce over 4,000 hours of locally made content monthly in more than 50 languages. We reach more than 200 community groups through a mix of AM, FM, and digital platforms, with a strong emphasis on **te reo Māori**, Pasifika languages, and languages from ethnic communities.

**Critical role in emergency response**

CAMA stations are integral to the emergency management system, providing:

- **24/7 broadcast capacity** to ensure the timely dissemination of emergency information.
- **Localised, culturally attuned communication**, including support for communities traditionally underserved by mainstream media, such as Māori, Pasifika, ethnic minorities, youth, disabled, and rural groups.
- An **established trust network** developed through decades of consistent local programming.

In times of crisis, CAMA stations often serve as the **sole source of emergency information**. For example, during the 2023 flooding in Hawke's Bay, radio was the only available platform for crucial emergency information for some residents.

**Funding and infrastructure needs**

Our sector makes a significant contribution to emergency communications. Stations collectively pay **$366,000 annually** in transmission costs, with some stations spending over **$50,000 per year** on transmission alone. Infrastructure and generator costs vary widely, and these disparities represent significant barriers to maintaining consistent emergency readiness across the sector.

While **wages account for over 70% of sector overheads**, many stations operate with minimal staff and rely heavily on volunteers. Despite receiving a **$3.6 million NZ On Air allocation for 2023/24**, the current funding model, which is based on population reach, fails to reflect the **emergency communication value** that CAMA provides. **Additional**

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**funding** is essential to support infrastructure upgrades, such as backup generators and transmission systems, and to **enhance preparedness** in meeting the unique needs of the communities we serve.

**Recommendations for strengthening CAMA's role**

To ensure that CAMA can continue its vital role in New Zealand's emergency management framework, we strongly recommend the following:

1. **Formal recognition as a lifeline utility** in the revised framework to ensure CAMA is integrated into emergency planning and receives appropriate support during emergencies.
2. **Dedicated funding** for infrastructure upgrades, including the provision of backup power systems and improved transmission resilience.
3. **Representation on emergency advisory and planning bodies**, ensuring equitable inclusion of CAMA in national and local civil defence strategies.
4. **Funding for training, equipment, and readiness**, as well as **awareness campaigns** to enhance emergency preparedness within communities.
5. **Support for capacity-building initiatives** that promote national coordination and infrastructure investment in resilience planning and training for emergencies.

**Supporting Māori engagement and global best practices**

CAMA stations directly support the government's objectives for iwi engagement in emergency planning, primarily through our **broadcasting in te reo Māori** and our amplification of Māori voices, environmental knowledge, and traditions. Our sector's ability to deliver information in **culturally relevant ways** ensures that Māori communities are prepared and informed during emergencies.

Internationally, community radio (CAMA) is **recognised as a key element of disaster resilience** by **UNESCO, UNDP**, and the **International Telecommunication Union (ITU)**, all of which highlight the unique reliability of radio in reaching underserved and high-risk populations. Formal recognition and support for CAMA stations align with **global best practices** for emergency communication and resilience building.

**Conclusion: Ensuring equitable and inclusive emergency management**

CAMA stations are a cornerstone of Aotearoa's **democratic infrastructure** and **emergency resilience**. Formal recognition of our role in emergency management legislation, supported by **infrastructure investment, planning integration, and dedicated funding**, will ensure that our diverse and vulnerable communities are not left behind during times of crisis.

We look forward to working with NEMA to strengthen the system and ensure a more **inclusive, responsive, and resilient** emergency communication framework.

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Disabled Older People's Group

C/- Valerie Smith

s9(2)(a)

11 May 2025

## Submission on proposals in the Discussion Document: Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation

This submission is on behalf of Disabled Older People. We are group of older people who have been disabled most or all our lives and live is different cities. We have all been involved in ensuring that disabled people live in a world that does not create barriers to fully contributing to and living safely in New Zealand society.

We have also had significant roles in the development of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (UNCRPD) and New Zealand's Disability Strategy and Action Plan. We have fought hard to have the same rights as everyone else and that includes ensuring our specific needs as disabled people are considered by Emergency Management at every level. We want to see our needs and voice reflected in any Emergency Management planning and legislation, and to know we can access emergency management information that is accessible and in alternate formats and available wherever we live. Some of us have also been involved in emergency planning for disabled people in the past either locally, nationally or internationally.

**Our Disabled Older People's Group (DOPG) supports the proposed objectives for the new bill especially:**

**Objective One Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management**:

We fully endorse the following statement:

> "Everyone has a role to play in emergency management – before, during and after disaster strikes. The Government wants to achieve a 'whole of society' approach to emergency management, where communities can act alongside the 'official' emergency system. This means having an emergency management system which has a good understanding of the diverse needs of communities, particularly those who may face worse outcomes. It also means having a system that can draw on the expertise and resources offered by iwi Māori, community groups, businesses, volunteers, and other organisations before, during and after emergencies."

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Note that the disability community is **diverse in every way,** including type and level of impairment; age; we may live alone or with our families, or some us live in group homes or larger dedicated facilities, while some people with life-long disabilities live in aged residential care for lack of other options. Our impairments range from physical, sensory to learning disabilities and autism, and we may have a wide range of chronic health conditions or injuries. We may have several impairments, be Maori or Pasifika, live alone and have a low income and hence be considered multiply disadvantaged.

**Given the right circumstances our disability communities and their support organisations (often NGOs), dedicated disability responsiveness staff within key government organisations and 'able' disabled people (including older disabled people who may have weathered several emergencies in their life time) are fully able to 'act alongside the 'official emergency system', if they understand emergency management roles and have access to resources and systems to supplement their own resources and systems.**

Cyclone Gabriel and the Christchurch earthquake have taught us how to work 'alongside the official system':

- In the February 2011 earthquake, the then Ministry of Health's Disability Support Services staff in Wellington quickly set up an Emergency Room. They contacted every group home of people with learning disabilities living in the Christchurch area (NGO providers) and got every person in affected homes out of Christchurch, working with St Johns and the Air Force, within 48 hours. Other group homes throughout New Zealand accepted these Christchurch 'refugees'.
- At the same time the local Christchurch (Disability) Needs Assessment and Service Coordination (NASC) facilitators for mainly younger disabled people operated effectively from their new lap tops and own homes, checking in on clients.
- The Principle Advisor Disability for the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) contacted every Christchurch disability organisation including DHB Mental Health Services, and organised a plane to fly interpreters for the Deaf to Christchurch. We all recall interpreters standing alongside the Mayor and Emergency personnel whenever they spoke on TV.

**The issues and options we are looking at under this objective are:**

**Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities**

Options that we fully support include:

1) 'provide more tailored information on emergency management to different groups based on their specific needs or interests.' One such group is definitely people with different impairments and disabilities.

- **We need all information in accessible and alternate formats** e.g. Easy Read, Braille, Enlarged print, and Word documents that blind people can access electronically, available at the same time as everyone else accesses



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information. The Deaf need interpreters to know what is going on in real time too.

- Some local Emergency Management Offices e.g. WREMO are separately developing emergency information booklets for their disability communities, working with disabled people to do this. It may be useful to have a template developed nationally that different local communities/ regions can adapt for their needs, rather than all communities develop their own booklet from the ground up.
- NEMA's website is a good example of information using plain language. It was a lesson learnt by some of the recent events including the Christchurch earthquake and Cyclone Gabriel. Having information available in plain language and interpreters are both crucial in keeping disabled people safe.

2) 'require local government emergency plans to consider the needs of people that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies.'

- This is very important for at risk-disabled people living in emergency-affected local communities.
- Local government needs to identify knowledgeable local disabled people and if they exist pan disability support organisations to help them in their planning, and to consider how they will locate and if necessary relocate disabled people in an emergency
- There needs to be a list of people who may require electricity to be available for dialysis machines, ventilators, concentrators etc. Many electricity suppliers have taken on this responsibility. Lists need updating at least annually.
- A major issue identified during the Christchurch earthquake was the lack of accessible porta loos. Any place that is to be used as an emergency centre should have ramps with hand rails, accessible toilets and showers and a quiet room.
- There needs to be consideration of important things like toilet chairs and raised seats for accessible toilets in community facilities (including maraes) and having some beds rather than mattresses on the floor. As older disabled people none of us could manage to get down to the floor! This equipment would also help people injured in any emergency situation
- The planning for emergency centres should start now.

3) 'require NEMA's Director to consult with representatives of disproportionately affected communities to inform national planning.

- This is essential. We would support representatives from Disabled Persons Assembly Inc., a pan disability organisation, and other disability specific national organisations e.g. Blind Low Vision NZ, Deaf Aotearoa, Balance; Pacific DPO; People First; Muscular Dystrophy Association.
- Other countries' experiences should also inform our planning. Japan has done a lot of work in emergency management through the Nippon Foundation. It became involved in this work because disabled people were disproportionally killed in their various earthquakes. It would be useful to make contact with the Foundation and find out what they are currently doing. https://en.nippon-foundation.or.jp/who/mission The Daisy Foundation developed a training programme for people with autism. This has had the



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effect of reducing the effect of an emergency on people with autism and and at the same time it has helped them to become leaders. https://www.daisyfoundation.org/ Anne Hawker, Chair of our DOPG, cellphone s9(2)(a) , and former World Chair of Rehabilitation International could speak to international responses to emergency situations.

**Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management**

Options we endorse include:

1) address the roles of iwi Māori in plans, guidance, and other policy settings

2) require iwi Māori representation including Tangata Whaikaha (disabled Maori) on local government emergency management decision-making bodies.

3) require local government to engage with iwi Māori and Tangata Whaikaha during the development of emergency management plans.

4) require NEMA's Director to seek advice on Māori interests and knowledge including Tangata Whaikaha to inform national planning,.

We also support Pasifika disabled people participating in emergency management.

**Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management**

Options we endorse include:

1) provide better information and guidance for community groups.

2) require local government emergency plans to state how they will manage offers of assistance from the public.

- This is really important as we know that local efforts can be overwhelmed with inappropriate stuff, e.g. perishable food.
- There needs to be consideration of important things like toilet chairs and raised seats for accessible toilets in community facilities (including maraes) and having some beds rather than mattresses on the floor. As older disabled people none of us could manage to get down to the floor. This equipment would also help people injured in any emergency situation.
- As stated above, some disabled people may need to be evacuated quickly. Thought needs to be given in advance as to who might receive such people, especially as due to lack of physical access, disabled people may not be able to go to family members homes where most other people go. Some disabled people may have to go to hospitals, e.g. if we require oxygen.
- In Christchurch, some disabled people living in the community were forced to stay in condemned homes for a considerable period due to lack of other options, as their home was at least still accessible even if hardly habitable.
- Each disabled community should have one point of contact to avoid well-meaning people undermining advice.

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**Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency. We have no comment on the 2 options under this.**

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9 May 2025

Tēnā koutou

**Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland CDEM Group submission – Strengthening NZ's emergency management legislation**

Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission. Please find attached the submission of the Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland CDEM Group to the discussion document 'Strengthening NZ's emergency management legislation'. The submission is in two parts, with the submission template complemented with an Appendix.

The submission has been pulled together in short order and includes input from across Auckland Council as much as possible to assist with questions relating to hazard management and the different legislative frameworks local authorities work under.

We note that the time frame for responding did not enable engagement with mana whenua and mataawaka of Tāmaki Makaurau and would like to see sufficient time for submissions to the Emergency Management Bill to enable engagement.

Ngā mihi,

Councillor Sharon Stewart
Chair, Auckland CDEM Committee

Councillor Alf Filipaina
Deputy Chair, Auckland CDEM Committee

Glenn Wilcox
Houkura member, Auckland CDEM Committee

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National Emergency Management Agency
Te Rākau Whakamarumaru

# Submission of Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland CDEM Group: Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | C/ Adam Maggs, General Manager<br>Auckland Emergency Management |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: | Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland CDEM Group |

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## Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

✓ Yes ☐ No ☒Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

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3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Culture and language can also contribute to people's isolation in a 'one-size-fits-all' where the main languages and modes of communication used in response to, and recovery from emergencies are not shared by all members of the community who have been impacted. Limited numbers of interpreters, programs in different languages, and a shortage of translated materials further exacerbate this.

Public preparedness, readiness and response messaging also does not consider extended family units which often have large numbers and are inter-generational. Being unaware of what support is available, a fear of authorities, or previous experiences can also result in people not reaching out for help.

Cultural heritage for many Culturally and Linguistically diverse (CALD) communities is intangible, particularly for communities who rely on spoken narratives, songs and dance in preserving their cultures. Isolation and sudden loss of older generations can be devastating, with permanent loss of history, and an absence of daily participatory observations on how key decisions are made, food is cooked and conflicts are resolved.

Rental tenancies can leave people more vulnerable to the impacts of an emergency, depending on the landlord's decision-making. We are aware of situations where tenants have had difficulty securing alternative affordable accommodation in the same area after rental arrangements have been terminated, damage repaired and the premises made available at a higher rental cost. Tenants may also have less information available to them compared to homeowners, putting them at higher risk.

The Auckland CDEM Committee noted that the discussion document makes no mention of the wellbeing of volunteers and members of the impacted community and responders who may be first on the scene and exposed to traumatic circumstances before the arrival of more emergency responders. The Committee expressed concern about the level of support received by people in these circumstances, the need to take into account the lived experience of volunteers, to acknowledge their assistance and use their experience to inform their actions.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Appendix 1, Issue 1 for comments.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

At the local level, planning informed by the needs of disproportionately affected groups would involve developing strategies and plans with communities, ensuring inclusive response arrangements (like accessible evacuation centres and multilingual alerts), and partnering with trusted local organisations. It would also mean training a more diverse, culturally competent workforce and monitoring equity outcomes to ensure all communities are supported before, during and after emergencies.

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Best practice and tools to support these activities include universal design, the Disability Support Toolkit, lenses commonly used in working with culturally and linguistically diverse communities, the International Association of Public Participation (IAP2) framework of consultation and for engagement, co-design, community development practices and ways of better understanding the needs of communities, and the resources available both within a community and for a community.

The goal would be for communities of diverse backgrounds to be ready to help themselves, and others within the systems and with the support available to them.

As always, the level and success of activities will be determined by the level of resources available and the supporting level of commitment. These issues are significantly exacerbated by Auckland's superdiverse population of 1.6m people.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Consideration should be given to including flood risk in the Healthy Homes standard. Tenanted properties should not have intolerable risk to life flood risk

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The contribution of iwi Māori and their inclusion throughout EM needs greater acknowledgement, including Mātauranga Māori as a formal knowledge stream, alongside science and engineering — especially for pre-event indicators and traditional water behaviours.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The discussion document raises and refers to many aspects of the contribution of iwi and Māori and the range of arrangements that may be involved.

A practical example of local knowledge being applied was identifying the right time/conditions to supply a marae across the Kaipara Harbour when road access was lost during an emergency.

Ensuring kaitiaki are engaged on needed emergency works to enable the protection of or minimisation of impacts on wāhi tapu and taonga.

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**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Appendix 1, Issue 2 for comments.

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

See Appendix 1, Issue 2 for comments.

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

The Auckland CDEM Group acknowledges the need to build and maintain strong relationships as a basis for working together. On behalf of the Group, Auckland Emergency Management (AEM) has been working through Te Kotahi a Tāmaki marae collective and directly with an increasing number of Tāmaki Makaurau's marae. AEM recognises there also needs to a focus on iwi and mataawaka and is working with Ngā Mātārae (holders of Auckland Council's relationships with mana whenua, mataawaka and marae.)

Key aspects of the relationship include mutual understanding and communication to support need. Arrangements will need to be flexible enough to accommodate autonomy and different preferences, support training, capability and capacity building, and other matters of significance. Resources to mitigate threats and enable retreat may also be involved.

Challenges include finding common ground together for resolving differences between local government's representative processes and respecting the voice of each iwi.

The short timeframe for submission has constrained opportunities to engage with iwi Māori though the importance of EM to iwi Māori has been raised through Auckland Council's engagement in other activity areas.

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

The Auckland CDEM Group Plan 2024-2029 includes an objective to enhance representation of mana whenua and mataawaka across the emergency management system, with an action to secure representation of mana whenua and mataawaka in the Auckland Coordinating Executive Group. AEM is currently working with Nga Mātārae (Auckland Council's Māori Outcomes Directorate) to establish an appropriate process to achieve this.

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**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Given the nature of relationships involved, this would likely require resolution as between the director and iwi, supported by engagement with Groups to avoid potential adverse impacts on or undermining of local relationships.

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The Auckland CDEM Group supports the increased participation of the community though has genuine concern about liabilities under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 that supporting communities to stand up in response may attract. What would be the situation, for example, where a community stood up its own community-run, independent community emergency hub with some material support from the Group, and a person attending the hub for accommodation support was assaulted or suffers harm?

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Appendix 1, Issue 3 for comment.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 4 for comment.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ✓ Not sure ~~/ no preference~~

Please explain your views.

The current framework of the CDEM Act 2002 for all hazards has lead and support roles provided for in the National Emergency Management Plan. It is noted that the current National Plan has not been reviewed since its introduction in 2015.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 5 for comment.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The age of the current National Emergency Management Plan is noted and it is not clear that opportunities to address and resolve the identified problems have been exhausted within the existing framework of lead and support agencies CIMS 3rd edition.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Options 2, 3 and 4 represent significant change and stretch current arrangements. Greater or more fundamental system change could pose increasing questions regarding governance, resourcing, funding between central and local government

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ✓ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Auckland Council (Governing body) is the Auckland CDEM Group as sole local authority member (unitary authority for the Auckland region) pursuant to s12(1A) of the CDEM Act 2002 with a statutory CDEM Committee to fulfil its roles and responsibilities under that act. Auckland Council wishes to retain these arrangements in the forthcoming EM Bill as they have been shown to work well in Auckland.

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 6.1 for comment.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Advocating, or mandating, a consistent approach across the country to how Lifelines Advisory Groups are structured within (or outside) Coordinating Executive Groups.

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 6.2 for comment.

Proactively Released

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 6.3 for comment.

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

✓ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 7 for comment.

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**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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# Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

## Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 8.1 for comment.

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Not quite sure this is the right place to make reference to the following, which reflects comments made in parts of this submission and its appendix, where the Auckland CDEM Group is of the view that national consistency is merited:

- Declaration of state of emergency (see comment on this topic in Appendix document).
- Warning systems - and particularly guidance on the use of EMAs.
- Consideration of the interplay between emergency powers under the CDEM Act and Subpart 6B of the Building Act, and whether there is scope for better alignment
- Expectations around "transition periods" and transition to recovery. Consideration around whether the statutory timeframes currently included for extension of local transition period is appropriate. Interplay between / expectations of formal transition period and period of recovery activities.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 8.2 for comment.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ✓ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

It is not clear that the problem has been clearly articulated. The purpose of the Act refers to the sustainable management of hazards and "to encourage and enable communities to achieve acceptable levels of risk." More specifically the Groups function in relation to hazards and risks is set out in s17(1)(a) and the Group {Plan under s49(1A) with a focus on te CDEM to manage the risks.

The import of the discussion seems to draw heavily from disaster risk management and risk reduction with implications for the legislative frameworks CDEM groups and local authorities discharge their responsibilities and undertake activities. The discussion of the problem appears an oversimplification of complex legislative matters as well as the determination of an 'acceptable level of risk'.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 9 for comment.

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**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Regional flexibility will reduce potential for tension between CDEM and Growth and Development priorities within Councils but risks inequitable and unequal treatment of risk and uneven protection and preparation for communities.

Not all Councils will be able to invest as much into the identification and treatment of risk as others. CDEM Groups are also not traditionally involved in the full DRM cycle so there would be a need to clarify the different mandate and responsibility for DRM and EM at a regional level.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Legislative frameworks that do not explicitly talk to each other are a fundamental barrier. There are different acts with different purposes seeking to achieve different outcomes.

There is tension between government policy, growth and development policy, homeowner rights, public agency and self-efficacy, iwi/Māori ownership and rights, and Disaster Risk Management.

CDEM Groups' location within local authorities means there are competing priorities within and between respective legislative frameworks and risk ownership. Funding and resourcing constraints across the diversity of local authorities exacerbate their issues.

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Standardisation of information and information sharing in relation to natural hazards is required:

- Methodologies to predict natural hazards can vary across the country. e.g., each council has its own methodology for predicting exposure risk and impact from flooding and landslips. Enabling a consistent, fit for purpose approach will provide a more robust picture of the risks and potential impacts of natural hazards across the country.
- Any such methodologies must be able to be updated with new information and learnings. However, information on properties impacted by an event is currently significantly under reported as it is being captured by a variety of different organisations, including councils, emergency services and individual insurance companies, that are not collecting the information consistently, nor sharing it due to commercial / privacy matters. This leads to severely underestimating the impact of past events, thereby limiting the ability to plan for future ones.
- Inconsistent information is limiting the ability to raise awareness and issue warnings to the wider community, in particularly those who are at higher risk.

These matters also apply to Issue 11.3 below.

A key issue is the lack of clarity on what legislative vehicle would mandate the derivation of these standards. Options in the discussion document include they sit within the Group Plan, however given such standards, such as what constitutes acceptable risk, must also be derived for land use management purposes, they also fit under the RMA. Such standards

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have also been derived under the DPMC as part of response and recovery and may also form part of the Local Water Done Well requirements. This issue reflects the need for readiness, reduction, response and recovery actions to be aligned and mandated across legislative vehicles, for instance through overarching legislation.

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Clarifying CDEM Group's role in DRM as opposed to EM would help. Currently, there are some agents within the sector who still see CDEM Group's role as 'sandbags and soup kitchens but this discussion document is strongly suggesting a much stronger role in the reduction space. Similarly, there are agents within local government who believe they have a responsibility to operate within the CDEM space without engaging with CDEM Groups. This speaks again to clarity of the role of local government mandate in CDEM/DRM/EM at different levels of government; is there a place for DRM in the Local Government Act? How would this Bill interact with the legislation laid out in the RMA and Building Act? More consistent resourcing for Groups would ensure a minimum level of service.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

✓ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 10.1 for comment.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 10.2 for comment.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

An updated definition, and/or specific mention of additional lifeline utilities, could have multiple benefits. In addition, changes to the process by which Schedule 1 (or the equivalent) is modified, making the process more straightforward than an Order in Council, could help to future-proof this part of the system.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 11 for comment.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

It is not clear why Radio NZ and TVNZ should be the only broadcasters included. It may be better to use a principles-based definition so that additional broadcasters may be included, either now or in the future.

It would be better to allow for broader definitions of fuel types that did not preclude energy cells fuelled by the production of helium, or other either currently used or emerging fuel types. The proposed definitions consider only petroleum-based products, gas and electricity. The definition of electricity does not seem to allow for an organisation that may provide charging stations for electric vehicles but is not also a generator of, or distributor of, electricity.

The proposed definition of water supplies is limited to only drinking water. That excludes water supply for rural, agricultural or other purposes vital to economic activity. Broadening the definition of water supplies, and not limiting it to "drinking water", would achieve better outcomes.

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**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Ensure definition of stormwater includes flood protection and drainage. The inclusion of flood protection and drainage under stormwater varies across legislation, and is essential given that the construction, maintenance, operation and replacement of these types of assets is similar to other types of engineering infrastructure.

The inclusion of streams and overland flowpaths similarly should form part of the stormwater definition, as set out in the Water Services Act.

The inclusion of solid waste infrastructure is supported.

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

It is suggested there are good reasons for retaining reference to 'lifelines' to denote the importance of the included infrastructure, existing relationships and the arrangements for and within Lifeline Groups.

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 11.2 for comment.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

✓ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 11.3 for comment.

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code 2020 could be extended to apply to local emergency to remove barriers and support sharing of relevant information at a granular level.

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 12 for comment.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

More arduous consenting status of essential infrastructure maintenance and upgrades before or in the absence of a State of Emergency.

Emergency declarations under EM legislation significantly enables RMA authorisation of essential infrastructure maintenance and upgrades required for response efforts. However, similar essential infrastructure works outside of declarations, but nonetheless required for increased readiness, reduction, reduction as well as response, are subject to more onerous consenting requirements, resulting in the delay and even abandonment of such works. While also an RMA matter, ensuring essential infrastructure works are enabled under RMA authorisations as part of readiness, recovery, reduction and all forms of response will minimise the disruption to essential services.

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

✓ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 13 for comment.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 14 for comment.

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 15 for comment.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ✓ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

See Attachment 1, Issue 16 for comment.

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

**Notice of Transition Period**

Auckland Council/Auckland CDEM Group suggests that the default period for the initial or first Notice of Transition period should be for a longer period, synchronising with the period for a designation under the Building Act 2014. This would ensure sufficient time to get a full sense of the nature of the recovery and enable focus on recovery activities. If powers are still required at the end of this time, the opportunity to renew the notice should be available.

We view this amendment as a sensible change that strikes a balance between the protection against arbitrary use of powers and ensuring sufficient time for the nature, scale and complexity of an emergency event's potential consequences being fully understood.

**Thresholds and status of response before or in the absence of a State of Emergency**

Auckland Council/Auckland CDEM Group suggests there is a need to consider thresholds of activation, below a declared state of emergency, for which protection from civil liability is extended to Controllers and constables and those who may be tasked to undertake activities on their behalf.

**Work across government contribution to disaster resilience**

Absence of reference to the Building Act 2004 is noted in this context. Building consents are a key mechanism for improved resilience, and while the Act offers some controls on managing flood risk, the following areas of improvement have been identified:

- There are no building code requirements with respect for flood management for commercial businesses. This applies to sensitive commercial uses such as retirement homes / villages as well as supermarkets.
- Building code calculations on flooding do not include recent updates or are silent on climate change allowances
- Increase the Building Code requirement for the floor level of a residential building to be above a flood level, which is currently equivalent to a storm event with a 2% AEP (1 in 50 year). This is too low, does not align with that implemented under the RMA (1% AEP), and is compounded by the Building Act stating building authorities cannot impose a standard higher than that stated in the Building Code.
- Alignment is needed between the RMA, which places restrictions on buildings within a 1% AEP (1 in 100 yr flood events), and the Building Act, which only requires the

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floor level of a residential building to be above a flood level, equivalent to a storm event with a 2% AEP (1 in 50 year).

- The effectiveness of s72 is unclear.
- There is confusion between the terms 'flood resistance' measures (keeping the water out) and 'flood resilience' (it floods but is not damaged or can recover more easily)
- Clarification on the term 'freeboard' is also needed.
- Inclusion provisions to enable TLAs to request inspection and maintenance records for onsite stormwater devices included as part of s73 controls.
- Setting minimum construction standards for housing in floodplains, for instance, footing design, materials used, placement of electrical switches and gas storage cylinders. Design standards must take into account anticipated water velocities, wave action (freeboard), erosion and buoyancy.
- Identifying works near or on stormwater assets as restricted works
- Controls on rain tanks is also an area worth reviewing given their role in resilience.

**Essential infrastructure recovery funding**

The current thresholds for local authority reimbursement, set out below, are a barrier to this source of funding being accessed for recovery in Auckland. It is suggested their application in an Auckland context needs to be reconsidered as they make it impossible to seek reimbursement for any emergencies that have occurred in the region to date, including the Anniversary Weekend flooding and Cyclone Gabrielle combined.

**Local Authority Threshold for Reimbursement**

Section 33.4.2 the Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015 states that:

*Government policy is to reimburse 60 percent of other eligible response costs, combined with essential infrastructure recovery repair costs, above a threshold of:*

- *0.0075 percent of the net capital value of the city council, district council or unitary authority involved.*
- *0.002 percent of the net capital value of unitary authorities where the assets in question are of a type that ordinarily are managed by regional councils, or*
- *0.002 percent of net capital value in the case of regional councils.*

**Deployment**

The NISWE illustrated the value of deployment in response to emergencies both in EM and in the wider context. Water New Zealand, with its access and reach to skills and expertise across its membership was able to assist in the deployment of staff to ensure continued operation of water services, where the local staff were impacted themselves and/or becoming exhausted. It is suggested NEMA could provide a valuable role in supporting such support in a similar way it does in administering EM deployment.

**Land Information Memorandum**

Explore opportunities to strengthen the use of Land Information Memoranda (LIM's) to give notice of the occurrence of emergency and known hazards affecting the subject land, such as floods and land instability.

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## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi participation

| Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities | | |
|---|---|---|
| Options: 1: Status quo, 2: Guidance on meeting diverse needs, 3: Group Plans include how plan for, 4: Director consult representatives | | |
| **Option** | **Benefits** | **Costs / Risks** |
| 1 | • Aligns with progress being made in this direction<br>• Enables scope of task to be self-managed (super diverse population of 1.6 million)<br>• Enables innovation | • Challenges of engagement with Auckland large, superdiverse population<br>• May become subject to financial constraints when / if Auckland Council comes under financial pressure |
| 2 | • May enable scope of task to be self-managed (super diverse population of 1.6 million)<br>• May enable innovation | • Minor potential for alignment with direction being taken in Auckland to be lost<br>• May come under financial/resource pressures and constraints |
| 3 | • Secure opportunity to establish ongoing dialogue with community / build deeper understanding of needs, opportunities and constraints<br>• Visibility to communities of Auckland via Group Plan development and publication | • May not address / add to challenges of engagement with Auckland large, superdiverse population<br>• Potential to become prescriptive – loss of alignment and innovation<br>• Community expectations exceed practicable delivery /resourcing |
| 4 | • Benefits of leadership and national conversation/messaging to help manage inflated expectations of what might be achievable | • Need to remain informed of practicalities of delivery and operational/resourcing issues |
| Comment:<br>The Auckland CDEM Committee sought definitions and guidelines to assist in distinguishing who might be disproportionately impacted, in meeting statutory obligations in its submission to the EM 2023. Ensuring an appropriate balance as above and that scope of terms used will be very important.<br>This issue continues to be of significant interest and development in Auckland. Meeting the needs of impacted communities is at the forefront. The CIMS model operated in Auckland includes a CALD function that in the Anniversary Weekend Floods/Cyclone Gabrielle reached out to umbrella organisations through the Council's Ethnic Communities advisory panel. Concern about potential risk that community expectations become over inflated needs to be balanced with opportunity for ongoing dialogue and deeper mutual understandings. (Expectations of delivery at individual household level amplified by scale of population, particularly in large / regional events). Achieving this balance would be assisted by having clear principles and national messaging that emphasises individual responsibilities for own safety, the need for neighbours to look out for each other, alongside the sector's responsibilities to respond to emergencies and the needs of impacted communities. Suggest that reframing 'welfare' as 'emergency relief and support' would assist in striking this balance. | | |
| **Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management** | | |
| Options: 1: Status quo, 2: Role of iwi/Māori in plans & policy, 3: iwi / Māori representation, 4: Group Plan engagement, 5: Director seek advice to inform National Planning | | |
| **Option** | **Benefits** | **Costs / Risks** |
| 1 | • Continue progress being made<br>• Relationship based | • Subject to reimbursement and resources issues<br>• Consistent approaches and ongoing commitment over time needed to retain and strengthen relationships |
| 2 | • Spur to increase the contribution able to be made by iwi Māori to emergency management and its recognition | • Issues regarding reimbursement from the centre and resourcing still need to be resolved |

Proactively Released

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi participation

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3 | • Formal recognition of iwi Māori contribution reflected in decision-making | |
| 4 | • Formal recognition of iwi Māori contribution reflected in EM Group Plan and arrangements | |
| 5 | • Framework for EM system informed and consistent vertically/horizontally | • Need to preserve primacy of respective relationships |

Comment:

Auckland CDEM Group supports the provisions promoting the inclusion and participation of iwi / Māori in Emergency Management while seeking clarity about representation on the EM Committee vis a via current Houkura IMSB arrangements, Crown support and funding. It is noted that reimbursement of expenditure supporting communities through emergency response by iwi / Māori and resourcing of iwi / Māori EM is absent from the discussion document. While reimbursement has value, the Committee is of the view that ensuring minimum standards for marae and facilities providing community support in a response and upfront infrastructural investment to ensure standards can be met to raise preparedness for emergency events is more effective. Consideration of national funding for national programmes is required.

### Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management (New issue)

Options: 1: Status quo, 2: Guidance and public education, 3: Group Plan state how public offerings managed

| Option | Benefits | Costs / Risks |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | • Ability of Groups to self-manage<br>• Pre-established, procurement procedures before emergency events enabling efficient utilisation to be preserved<br>• Flexibility to address novel situations/needs unencumbered | • Some opportunities / benefits may be forgone in a response to an emergency |
| 2 | • Significant potential to unlock community benefits of national leadership and educational programmes<br>• Consistent with individual responsibilities and exercise of neighbourly and community care | • May not of itself secure improved community outcomes |
| 3 | | • Assumption that all offers may be known in advance<br>• Definition and scope of offerings required<br>• Become cumbersome / burdensome for little benefit<br>• Encourage commercial opportunism with little benefit |

Comment:

The problem refers to an acceptable level of risk, which is complex. Threats to life and property provides some guidance but can be challenged by the different tolerance to risk of individuals and inconsistencies across different legislation – i.e. RMA and development / natural hazards, which would benefit from greater alignment across national conversations.

Preferences for community offerings to be addressed through guidance or codes of practice with appropriate consultation.

### Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency (New issue)

Options: 1: Status quo, 2: protection from civil liability, 3: compensation

| Option | Benefits | Costs / Risks |
|---|---|---|

Proactively Released

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi participation

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1<br>2 | • Consistent with individual responsibility, risk assessment and decision-making | • Unclear what the scale and scope of the problems is? |
| 3 | | • Unclear what the scale and the scope of the problem is?<br>• Unclear who is responsible for compensation? |
| Comment:<br>Noted that protection from civil liability proposed for businesses / members of the community while it currently does not exist for Controllers outside of a declared state of emergency. This is a complex issue. The Committee is of the view that protection from civil liability for elected members making decision in support of their community at the local level also needs consideration. It is further noted that the discussion document does not address concerns raised by the sector about the status of emergency response at less than a state of emergency. It is suggested that activation levels ought to be considered as a basis / reference for determining thresholds for protection from civil liability for decision-makers who have been activated or tasked in response.<br>Believe the expressed problems require more robust examination. For example, what constitutes "emergency management actions"? Presumably any actions taken would need to be proportionate. Query also whether protection should be only for actions to protect life/safety (i.e. whether it should extend to steps taken to protect property). Need to clarify whether the proposal (does it apply only to declared state of emergency - or to actions taken in any emergency response)? | | |

Proactively Released

## Objective 2: providing clear responsibilities and accountabilities at national, regional and local levels

| Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency (New issue) | | |
|---|---|---|
| Options: 1: Status Quo, 2: Hazard agency as Control Agency, 3: CDEM s Control Agency, 4: Unified Control | | |
| **Option** | **Benefits** | **Costs / Risks** |
| 1 | • Familiar and functional in Auckland<br>• Opportunity to clarify expectations in regard to State of Emergency and the circumstances in which it is appropriate to declare (i.e. problem intensified "*where there is no declared state of emergency*") and whether this aligns with public / political expectations. | • Some ambiguities within existing relationships and frameworks<br>• Hazard agencies expertise not consistently involved in response<br>• Not clear that options to resolve defined problems within existing arrangements have been exhausted – identity of lead agency and support agency/cies |
| 2 | | • Uncertainty introduced through scale of change<br>• Require principles, criteria, areas of responsibility to be clarified/delineated and made explicit<br>• It is noted that the problem refers to there not always being a predetermined hazard agency.<br>• Uncertainty introduced through hazard agencies reduced knowledge and familiarity with situations beyond their specialist experience/knowledge<br>• Potential for hazard agency to task CDEM with tasks beyond what CDEM might be able to deliver<br>• Significant change requires amendments to the definition of 'emergency', to the process for declaring SOE, access and use of powers etc, and thresholds of activation etc<br>• Requires identification of thresholds for operational / response status<br>• Has implications regarding roles and responsibilities of CEG and Committee<br>• Ability of control agency to direct use of local authority resources funded by ratepayers without being accountable to ratepayers, which is a significant risk to communities. |
| 3 | | • Uncertainty introduced through scale of change<br>• Require principles, criteria, areas of responsibility to be clarified/delineated and made explicit<br>• CDEM Controllers who undertake BAU role in addition to Controller roles become accountable for performance of specialised hazard agencies without knowledge, experience, standing or relationships to do so<br>• Potential for CDEM Controller to be held accountable for failings in reduction or readiness that manifest in a response, without any ability to influence, mitigate or resolve situation. How can the Controller influence level of readiness, ensure adequacy of pre-event response plans if only become Controller during the response?<br>• Significant change. Require amendment to definition of 'emergency', to process for declaring SOE, access and use of powers etc, additional detail as to thresholds of activation etc<br>• Require identification of thresholds for operational / response status |

Proactively Released

## Objective 2: providing clear responsibilities and accountabilities at national, regional and local levels

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | | • Implications re roles and responsibilities of CEG and Committee and CDEM controllers<br>• Ability of CDEM control agency to direct use of hazard agency resources independently secured by hazard agency beyond CDEM Controllers influence<br>• Do not believe it would work in Auckland.<br>• Potential implications for availability of local authority staff to perform role of Controller |
| 4 | • Most similar to existing arrangements<br>• Sits well with existing definition of emergency<br>• Potential areas of uncertainty able be to be clarified with reference to clear principles in respect of knowledge, expertise, resources and risk<br>• Current framework able to accommodate Option 4 with less significant change than would be required for options 2 or 3 | • Change to current roles and responsibilities<br>• Uncertainty introduced through scale of change<br>• Require principles, criteria and areas of responsibility to be clarified/delineated and made explicit re duplication of resources, responsibilities, communications and messaging etc<br>• Require identification of thresholds for operational / response status |

Comment:

Option 4 has previously been preferred in feedback to request for comment from NEMA sought during development of EM Bill 2023. It is noted that this is an option under CIMS 3rd edition.

Suggest that would be more the way in which Option 3 would operate in reality as CDEM Controller likely defer to hazard agency within their area of expertise / without expertise from their own. The EM Bill is intended to be all hazards. It is not clear for example that a CDEM controller would have the expertise, knowledge or standing to assume control over NZ Police in a civil unrest or terrorist emergency. Similar concerns are raised in respect of pandemic, hazardous spill and biohazard incursion.

Options 2 and 3 are the least preferred. Implications for recovery need to be more fully considered, for all options. The current framework appears to put obligations and responsibilities in place without establishing a sufficient mandate to support the needs of multi-agency recovery. It is noted that Option 3 refers to "*including the ability to direct the agency dealing with the specific hazard"* … and … "*powers to coordinate resources made available during response to an undeclared emergency*." This would require statutory powers outside of a declaration. It is not clear how this would operate and what thresholds or criteria might be involved.

Changes from status quo require significant additional levels of support, training, pathways for capacity and capability buildings and time for implementation. Transition for status quo to changed status would require careful management. Extent of change should not be underestimated.

It is noted that the National EM Plan is somewhat dated, and it is not clear that all options to address the identified problem within the existing frameworks have been exhausted.

### Issue 6: Strengthening regional tier of EM

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group / local authority roles and responsibilities'

Options: 1: Status quo, 2: responsibilities of Groups / local authorities, 3: Groups Plan state groups arrangements

| Option | Benefits | Costs / Risks |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | • Obligations on the groups mirror those of Auckland Council<br>• Separate obligations re administering authority support main purpose<br>• More direct link to decision-making on financial and resource allocation through LTP<br>• Supports understanding of obligations across the Auckland Council organisation / Council Group including CCO's | • Unintended consequences of change |
| 2 | | |

Proactively Released

## Objective 2: providing clear responsibilities and accountabilities at national, regional and local levels

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3 | | |

Comment:
Auckland Council (Governing Body) is the Auckland CDEM Group as the sole local authority member (unitary authority for the Auckland region) pursuant to s12(1A) of the CDEM Act 2002 with a statutory CDEM Committee to fulfil its roles and responsibilities under that act. Auckland Council wishes to see this provision continued in the forthcoming EM Bill as it is working well.

### Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation accountability for EM

Options: 1: Status quo, 2: Guidance, 3: Groups responsible for EM, 4: CE of local authorities Controller and Recovery Manager

| Option | Benefits | Costs / Risks |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | • Current arrangement works well | |
| 2 | | • Potential for unintended consequences arising from legislative change |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | • Potential for inconsistency across NZ to increase through assignment to an individual<br>• Not clear that address the problem<br>• CE of Auckland Council already deeply involved when an emergency appears likely or occurs and has a far larger job ensuring business continuity of the Council organisation and restoration of Council services, heavy political liaison (including decision about SOE declarations etc), and ensuring CDEM and infrastructure providers under their control have what they need |

Comment:
Auckland Council (Governing body) is the Auckland CDEM Group as the sole local authority member (unitary authority for the Auckland region) pursuant to s12(1A) of the CDEM Act 2002 with a statutory CDEM Committee to fulfil its roles and responsibilities under that act. Auckland Council wishes to see this provision continued in the forthcoming EM Bill as it is working well.
If need for consideration of assigning Group Recovery Manager role and responsibilities to CE, not clear why assignment to local authorities not considered?

### Issue 6.3: Strengthening the role of CEG (New issues)

Options: 1: Status quo, 2: CEG report to Director, 3: Removal of ability to delegate

| Option | Benefits | Costs / Risks |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | • Current arrangement works well in Auckland | |
| 2 | | • Undermine role of CDEM Committee |
| 3 | • May have benefits | • Need to delegate needed, for illness for example (i.e. only one local authority CE in Auckland) |

Comment:
Sense that in addition to sharing experience of CEG with CDEM Committee via advice (consistent with unified control at group level), the proposal seems geared to requiring attendance by local authority CE's. If the ability to delegate were to be constrained there would be a need to provide for exceptions, enabling delegations in appropriate circumstances.



Proactively Released

## Objective 2: providing clear responsibilities and accountabilities at national, regional and local levels

| Issue 7: Keeping EM Plans up to date (New issues) | | |
|---|---|---|
| Options: 1: Status quo, 2: 'more than minor amendments', 3: National Plan by mechanisms other than OIC | | |
| Option | Benefits | Costs / Risks |
| 1 | | • Current provision can be a barrier to making more than minor changes |
| 2 | • Remove barriers and enable more timely change | • Unclear scope of more than minor – how substantial?<br>• Costs of maintaining consistency with frequent National Plan changes<br>• Practicability of outcome if changes to National Plan not consulted on with EM sector or insufficient period for Groups to align with changes |
| 3 | | |
| Comment:<br>Beneficial changes though would like changes accompanied by clear scope of 'more than minor,' with consideration of costs of compliance, periods within which to align or meet introduced National Plan requirements, notice to the sector and consultation requirements before National Plan changes are made. | | |

Proactively Released

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of EM

| Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance<br>Issue 8.1: Strengthening Directors mandate to set expectations and monitor performance (New issue) | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Options: 1: Status quo, 2: Guidance, 3: Wide range of mandatory standards via rules, 4: Director's function to monitor** | | |
| **Option** | **Benefits** | **Costs / Risks** |
| 1 | | |
| 2 | • Increased clarity of expectations<br>• Benefits of building support and understanding as a precursor to mandatory requirements | |
| 3 | • Clarity of requirements<br>• Increased effectiveness where support of the sector built into processes for standard design, development and implementation | • Finance, resource and process implications '<br>• Time before compliance may be practicability achieved – i.e. alignment with LTP and Annual Plan cycles, annual work programme and Group Plan etc<br>• Workability and extend to which pre-signalled and consulted upon in advance of becoming mandatory – in particular, where national consistency is prioritised over genuine local circumstance. |
| 4 | • Generate detailed understanding of operational circumstances across the country | • Need to avoid cumbersome, burdensome reporting requirements and their drain on scarce resources (it would be best if it can be built into existing cycles of CEG and CDEM Committee reporting and Group Plan implementation.) |
| Comment:<br>Ideally, the proposals are the basis of an extended leadership role in working with the sector to raise performance that meet anticipated challenges associated with climatic change. | | |
| Issue 8.2: Strengthening mandate to intervene and address performance issues (New issue) | | |
| **Options: 1: Status quo, 2: Compliance Orders, 3: Expanded Ministerial powers of intervention** | | |
| **Option** | **Benefits** | **Costs / Risks** |
| 1 | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | • Implications for public confidence arising from their use |
| Comment:<br>Coercive powers are generally held in reserve for use as a last resort as appropriate. In this instance, raising performance is the primary objective that requires clear expression, understanding and time to achieve. While it is appropriate that such powers are included in the discussion document (as they would need to be provided for in legislation), there is greater interest in the system context in which they may become available, the checks and balances and the circumstances that warrant their use. More information is sought. | | |
| Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management (New issue) | | |

Proactively Released

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of EM

| Options: 1: Status quo, 2: Guidance re acceptable level of risk, 3: Guidance and assurance of Group Plans, 4: Form and content of Group Plan by secondary legislation, 5: Ministerial powers re Group Plan | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Option** | **Benefits** | **Costs / Risks** |
| 1 | • Reflects the powers Group Managers have to influence Risk Reduction policies currently in place i.e. RMA, Building Act.<br>• No additional costs to commission research into understanding risk tolerance, acceptable levels of risk.<br>• Will not create tension between acceptable levels of risk within different parts or levels of Councils. | • Risk management of natural hazards remain separately addressed under different legislation<br>• There is currently insufficient guidance about what constitutes an acceptable level of risk so it is unclear how the national assurer will be able to assess performance of Groups. |
| 2 | • Benefits of greater clarity, especially when supported with robust science-based standards, thresholds, methodologies to elevate understanding of risk | • Complexity, geographic and climatic diversity (though mostly known)<br>• Does not address inconsistencies / difference priorities across different legislative frameworks<br>• Still does not provide mandate for Groups to influence risk reduction policies at a local level.<br>• May create disparity between acceptable levels of risk within different parts of Council leading to tension and confusion in growth and development of region. |
| 3 | • Maximise opportunities for 'soft' direction<br>• Would not require large legislation change of supporting acts (i.e. RMA/Building Act) and if done correctly could provide templates and standards without creating additional onus or resourcing requirements at a local level. | • Group Plans describe what is happening, but do not provide the mandate for change within a council.<br>• DGLs would need to align with delivery timelines of Group Plan revisions otherwise they risk being up to 10 years out of date.<br>• DGLs often do not provide enough standards/threshold or templates to support national consistency (see new tsunami evacuation DGL). |
| 4 | • Compliance made easier by amended Group Plan change processes | • Costs of compliance, particularly of frequent or reactive uses<br>• Group Plans describe what is happening, but do not provide the mandate for change within a council.<br>• Risks creating tension within councils in Development vs DRM. |
| 5 | | • Undermine CEGs and CDEM Committees<br>• Unclear need if options 3 and 4 in place<br>• A risk of ill-informed recommendations that are not supported by legislation or that don't have a strong evidence or science base.<br>• Could result in politically charged or 'knee-jerk' reactionary advice in some circumstance (i.e. directly following a national event). Would create a precedent for future Group Plans.<br>• Risks inconsistent advice and recommendations across Group Plans. |
| Comment: Acknowledge importance and complexity of risk management and determining acceptable levels risks, which may vary from person to person and through time. Attitudes to risk can change significantly before and after risk manifests. Further complexities where previous decision-making subsequently increases exposure, which are then added to over time. | | |

Proactively Released

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of EM

Increased obligations via Group Plan does not achieve desired outcomes of itself. Emphasis needed for more robust science-based methodologies (including mātauranga Māori, local knowledge and specialist expertise) and collaboration between national and local roles.

Suggests that the Group Plan somehow overrules existing other legislation such as the RMA and Building Act. Puts Groups at risk of non-compliance with standards created by outside parties they are unable to influence, and at odds with local government vision and growth. Does not address the resourcing needed to develop or research the hazard impacts and risk assessments to meet external standards and thresholds, therefore risks inequitable treatment based on locally determined risk thresholds and resourcing potential of local councils.

Is there some confusion in the discussion and recommendations between the level of CDEM that is being discussed? Heavily focused on Group Plans (i.e. regional level) but also suggesting direct influence on council operations and land use planning (Local/TA level). Not sure if a regional CDEM Group can have some influence over the operations of a territorial authority.

### Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Taonga and cultural heritage before and after emergencies (New issue)

**Options: 1: Status quo, 2: Guidance, 3: Strengthen expectations through secondary legislation**

| Option | Benefits | Costs / Risks |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | • Enables knowledge and planning through strengthening of relationship with iwi / Māori at Group and local level | • Potential resourcing issues depending on needs, particularly if relocation required |
| 2 | • Guidance promoting consideration and dialogue can support strengthening relationships | • Hard resource issues may still remain |
| 3 | | • Potential unintended consequences |

Comment:

Opportunities through guidance to leverage knowledge, understanding and relationships from across range of local authority activities to benefit of EM.

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals before and after emergencies (New issue)

**Options: 1: Status quo, 2: Guidance, 3: Strengthen expectations through secondary legislation, 4: Expand emergency powers**

| Option | Benefits | Costs / Risks |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | • Enables practices to emerge<br>• Retains current leadership and responsibilities of agencies – i.e. MPI | |
| 2 | • Acknowledges importance of animal welfare and relationship to people's welfare | |
| 3 | • Emphasis on pre-emergency consideration and planning | |
| 4 | • Avoid suffering where appropriate | • Pre-requisites supporting decision-making may be required, particularly where animals owners are not in agreement |

Comment:

Auckland CDEM Group acknowledged the importance of animal welfare through our submission to the EM Bill 2023

Proactively Released

## Objective 4: minimising disruption to essential services

| Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provide essential services<br>Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility" | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Options: 1: Status quo, 2: Add additional sectors to Schedule, 3: Principles based definition of "essential infrastructure"** | | |
| **Option** | **Benefits** | **Costs / Risks** |
| 1 | | • Not address dynamics of technological and other change<br>• Not address interdependencies |
| 2 | • Clear identification of additional organisations | • Potential for lags before additions made |
| 3 | • Most responsive to change | • Not clear that sufficient clarity to identity individual organisations |
| Comment:<br>Preference to flexibility of option 3 supported by mechanisms to identify individual organisations, such as gazette notice or similar | | |
| Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning | | |
| **Options: 1: Status quo, 2: Assurance of lifelines business continuity plans, 3: Penalties and requirements through regulation, 4: Penalties and requirements through legislation** | | |
| **Option** | **Benefits** | Costs / Risks |
| 1 | • Minimal compliance costs | • Effectiveness of planning may not be known<br>• Estimated time for restoration of services may not be available / clearly communicated to EM, emergency services |
| 2 | • Clearer expectations<br>• Could leverage industry standards / regulations which form the basis of planning | • Potentially no more effective than status quo depending on the level of monitoring |
| 3<br>4 | • More detailed business continuity requirements supported by monitoring | • Clear communication of status and restoration times remain unaddressed<br>• Business continuity is managed differently across industries and therefor would be difficult to regulate under same legislative vehicle<br>• May conflict with existing economic regulation and result in cumbersome reporting requirements with little benefit |
| Comment:<br>Strengthening business continuity is supported. It would be helpful if these were to include communication of current status and updated estimations of time before services can be restored.<br>Not clear that EM Bill is appropriate place for penalties and perhaps more appropriate under the responsibility of the infrastructures primary regulator. | | |
| Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing | | |
| **Options: 1: Status quo, 2: Assurance, standards and guidance, 3: Lifelines participation in Group Plan development, 4: Lifeline utilities to contribute to National Plans, 5: Strengthen information sharing protections, 6: Data Standards** | | |
| **Option** | **Benefits** | **Costs / Risks** |

Proactively Released

## Objective 4: minimising disruption to essential services

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | • Relationship based (when strong) | • Relationship based (when change)<br>• Access to and timeliness of information can be an issue<br>• Coordination in recovery can be an issue |
| 2 | • Clarify expectations | • May be of limited effect |
| 3 | | • Unclear how address fundamental issues |
| 4 | • Consistent with national size and scale of many infrastructures (but not all) | |
| 5 | • Benefit of mandatory requirements<br>• Support availability of information at speed in a response<br>• Better protect sensitivity of information | |
| 6 | • Benefits of greater above with flexibility | |

Comment:

Maintenance of operational awareness and the visibility of response and recovery phase plans are of central importance. In its submission to the EM Bill 2023 Auckland CDEM Group summitted in favour of provisions for the sharing of information and the recognition of sensitivities and purposes for which information was shared. It was also requested that information sharing should extend beyond state of emergency alone, as many responses do not result in a full State of Emergency. It is suggested this could align with levels of activation as discussed under Issue 4 above.

The statutory mandate for recovery is not as strong as it ought to be, with coordinated activity based on influence. Sharing plans for infrastructure recovery after an event as an input into EM sector recovery plans with communities.

### Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

Options: 1: Status quo, 2: promote best practice, 3: "Opt-in" mode 4: Extend business continuity obligations to central government / with exemptions 5: Requirements to take Director's guidance into account

| Option | Benefits | Costs / Risks |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | | |
| 2 | | |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | | |

Comment:

This appears to be national issue.

Proactively Released

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

| Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas | | |
|---|---|---|
| Options: 1: Status quo, 2: Guidance and training on cordon management, 3: Prescribed identification, 4: Clarification that access can be restricted to any class or group of persons | | |
| Option | Benefits | Costs / Risks |
| 1 | | • Risk to property presented by opportunists difficult to combat |
| 2 | • Partially addressing the need | • Training would need to be refreshed periodically<br>• Accurate identification of who has access rights can remain an issue |
| 3 | • Support training initiatives and operation of cordons | • Compliance costs vis a via ease of copying<br>• Consideration of specifications for letters / windscreen passes authorising access could enable flexibility and ensure prompt authorisation. Distribution in electronic form may also assist. |
| 4 | • Presents stronger mandate than closing a road to deny access.<br>• Support training and identification requirements | |
| Comments:<br>Issues have been experienced in Auckland where people have portrayed similar dress and postures to genuine workers as they scope opportunities to access people's properties. After police exit the area, security firms are contracted to operate cordons with variable results. Similarly, Watercare has reported issues where their contractors were denied access along public roads where other emergency vehicles could go. National training and certification of security also support more effective procurement and community outcomes. | | |

| Issue 14: Clarifying who users emergency powers at the local level | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Options: 1: Status quo, 2: tidy up existing functions and powers** | | |
| **Option** | **Benefits** | **Costs / Risks** |
| 1 | | |
| 2 | • Elimination of duplication and inconsistent provision would be beneficial | |
| Comment:<br>EM Bill presents an opportunity to clarify these provisions. Is this also an opportunity to consider alignment / interaction between a State of Emergency and other emergency powers such as sub-part 6B of the Building Act? | | |

| Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Options: 1: Status quo, 2: Electronic signatures, 3: Verbal declaration** | | |
| **Option** | **Benefits** | **Costs / Risks** |
| 1 | | • Issues can arise in emergencies |
| 2 | • Remove potential barrier to declaring a SOE and NoTP in appropriate circumstances | |



Proactively Released

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 3 | • Remove potential barrier to declaring a SOE in appropriate circumstances | |
| Comment:<br>Options 2 and 3 may remove barriers to the timely execution of decision-making in appropriate circumstances. | | |
| **Issue 16: Mayor's role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices** | | |
| **Options: 1 Status quo, 2: Mayors primary responsibility, 3: Groups primary responsibility** | | |
| **Option** | **Benefits** | **Costs / Risks** |
| 1 | | |
| 2 | • Consistent with and supports the role of the mayor under Auckland Council governance model as a unitary authority<br>• Consistent with community expectations<br>• Process and listed alternates in Group Plan well established | |
| 3 | | • No overlap in Auckland<br>• Change would need a lot of support to establish understanding in the community |
| Comment:<br>Primacy of mayor welcomed. Amendment is sought to make it that clear a state of emergency can be declared for the Auckland region, a ward, wards, a local board area or areas to better reflect the area impacted by an emergency. | | |

Proactively Released

**From:** Rudi du Plooy <s9(2)(a) >
**Sent:** Monday, May 12, 2025 4:20 PM
**To:** Emergency Management Bill [NEMA] <EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz>
**Subject:** Submission on Emergency Management Bill - Hamilton Grey Power – Price Gouging Prohibition

To: EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz
From: Rudi du Plooy, Chairman, Hamilton Grey Power Inc.
Date: 12th May 2025
Attachment: NEMA Submission

Dear NEMA Policy Unit,

I am pleased to submit Hamilton Grey Power's feedback on the Emergency Management Bill consultation, as attached in Microsoft Word format. Our submission responds to the discussion document Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation and reflects our commitment to ensuring equitable and inclusive emergency management for all New Zealanders, particularly vulnerable groups such as the elderly.

We strongly urge the inclusion of a price gouging prohibition as a core component of the Emergency Management Bill, detailed under Objective 4 (Minimizing Disruption to Essential Services) in our submission (Question 76). This provision is critical to protect communities from exploitative price increases for essential goods and services—such as food, fuel, and accommodation—during emergencies. Drawing on international best practices (e.g., California, Florida, and Jamaica) and our advocacy on issues like water meter affordability and community safety in Hamilton, the proposed clause ensures affordable access for seniors and other vulnerable groups, aligning with the bill's community-led model and the Sendai Framework's priorities.

Key features of the price gouging prohibition include:

A 10% price increase cap above pre-emergency averages, with exemptions for justified cost increases.

Civil and criminal penalties, enforced by NEMA and the Commerce Commission, with a consumer hotline for reporting.

Integration with CDEM Group plans to ensure local accountability.

This provision is a "must-have" to safeguard New Zealanders from exploitation during crises, reinforcing the bill's objectives of minimizing disruption and empowering communities. We encourage NEMA to consult with advocacy groups like Grey Power and Consumer NZ to refine this clause, ensuring it meets the needs of diverse populations.

Our submission also addresses other critical areas, including community participation, iwi Māori engagement, and infrastructure resilience, building on our prior advocacy with Hamilton City Council and submissions to the Royal Commission on Covid-19.

We appreciate the opportunity to contribute to this legislative reform and are available for further clarification or discussion.
Thank you for considering our feedback. Please confirm receipt of this submission.

Kind Greetings,

Rudi du Plooy - DipLaw

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Chairman, Hamilton Grey Power
s9(2)(a)

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Rudi du Plooy |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Hamilton Grey Power |

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### Use of information

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The proposed objectives are broadly appropriate but lack specificity in addressing the roles of key emergency response agencies (e.g., New Zealand Defence Force, Fire and Emergency New Zealand, St John, Health New Zealand) and their integration into a community-led model. While the focus on iwi Māori participation is vital, it overshadows the inclusion of other disproportionately affected groups, such as the elderly, disabled, migrant communities, and rural populations. The objectives should explicitly embed equity and accessibility to ensure all communities are represented.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

The discussion (pages 10–13) acknowledges diverse needs but fails to provide actionable strategies for addressing them, particularly for groups like the elderly, who face unique challenges (e.g., mobility issues, cognitive decline and frailty). The document lacks a framework for assessing community composition and resource availability to tailor planning effectively.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Groups such as the elderly, disabled, migrant and refugee communities, Pacific peoples, children, and rural or low-income populations face specific vulnerabilities, including:

5. **Elderly:** Limited mobility, reliance on medical equipment, and social isolation.
6. **Disabled:** Accessibility barriers and dependence on caregivers or specialized equipment.
7. **Migrant/Refugee Communities:** Language barriers and limited access to information.
8. **Rural Areas:** Geographic isolation and delayed response times.

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

9. **Impacts:** The status quo (Option 1) is inadequate, as it perpetuates gaps in addressing diverse needs. Options 2–4 offer practical steps but require clearer implementation plans.
10. **Preferred Options:**
11. **Option 2 (non-legislative):** Develop guidance on meeting diverse needs, including specific protocols for elderly and disabled communities.
12. **Option 3 (legislative):** Require CDEM Group plans to address disproportionately affected groups, with mandatory consultation processes.
13. **Option 4 (legislative):** Mandate the Director to consult representatives of vulnerable communities, including elderly advocacy groups like Grey Power, for national planning.
14. **Risks:** Without clear funding and accountability, these options may remain aspirational.

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5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Planning should begin with a community-specific inventory of demographics, vulnerabilities, and resources. For example:

15. **Local Level:** Councils conduct annual assessments of elderly populations, identifying those requiring mobility or medical support during emergencies.
16. **National Level:** NEMA develops a standardized framework for inclusive planning, incorporating feedback from groups like Grey Power on safety issues.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

17. Mandate community resilience hubs that serve as accessible, inclusive coordination points for diverse groups during emergencies.
18. Develop public education campaigns tailored to vulnerable groups, addressing specific risks (e.g., evacuation challenges for the elderly).

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The document's whole-of-society approach is commendable but lacks clarity on the specific roles, skills, and resources iwi Māori contribute across emergency phases. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and delegated authority frameworks are needed to formalize their participation without creating exclusivity.

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The document outlines conceptual roles but lacks detail on practical contributions, such as iwi Māori's logistical support during Cyclone Gabrielle. Specific roles (e.g., cultural liaison, resource coordination) should be defined through consultation.

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**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

19. **Impacts:** Options 2–5 provide a pathway for integration but require clear KPIs to ensure accountability.

20. **Preferred Options:**

21. **Option 2 (non-legislative):** Develop guidance on iwi Māori roles in plans and policies.

22. **Option 3 (legislative):** Require iwi Māori representation on CDEM Group decision-making structures.

23. **Option 4 (legislative):** Mandate engagement with iwi Māori during CDEM Group plan development.

24. **Option 5 (legislative):** Require the Director to seek Māori knowledge for national planning.

25. **Risks:** Over-reliance on iwi Māori without equivalent engagement of other groups may strain resources and create inequities.

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Iwi Māori should be recognized as key partners with unique cultural and community knowledge, integrated into planning and response frameworks alongside other stakeholders. Their contributions during Cyclone Gabrielle demonstrate their value, but recognition must be inclusive, acknowledging all New Zealanders' expertise.

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

The relationship should be based on mutual respect, partnership, and shared responsibility. Iwi Māori should have formal representation in decision-making, the same as other groups, supported by clear KPIs and delegated authority, but this must not exclude other community leaders or agencies like Fire and Emergency New Zealand or St John.

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

The relationship should be based on mutual respect, partnership, and shared responsibility. Iwi Māori should have formal representation in decision-making, supported by clear KPIs and delegated authority, but this must not exclude other community leaders or agencies like Fire and Emergency New Zealand or St John.

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**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Establish an inclusive advisory panel with iwi Māori representatives, community leaders, and agency stakeholders (e.g., Grey Power, disability advocates). This ensures mātauranga Māori is integrated transparently and equitably into national planning.

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

26. Develop a national training program on mātauranga Māori for emergency managers, ensuring cultural competence.
27. Create a digital platform for iwi Māori to share real-time insights during emergencies.

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The document understates the need for public re-education to foster self-sufficiency. Reliance on government assistance remains entrenched, particularly among vulnerable groups like the elderly. NEMA must invest in long-term public education to empower communities, as recommended in *The Report* (Recommendation 1).

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

28. **Impacts:** Options 3 and 4 align with a community-led model but require robust funding and training.
29. **Preferred Options:**
30. **Option 3 (legislative):** Require CDEM Group plans to address disproportionately affected communities.
31. **Option 4 (legislative):** Mandate consultation with representatives of vulnerable groups, including elderly advocates.

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32. **Risks:** Without sustained investment, community participation may remain superficial.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

33. Establish networks of trained community leaders, including elderly volunteers, to coordinate local responses.

34. Implement annual community resilience drills, tailored to diverse needs, as per *The Report* Recommendation 1D.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Explanation:**
The problem is well-articulated, recognizing barriers to spontaneous community response. This is critical for groups like the elderly, who may act informally to support neighbours but face legal or financial risks.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

35. **Preferred Options:**

36. **Option 2 (legislative):** Provide protection from civil liability for spontaneous responders.

37. **Option 3 (legislative):** Enable compensation for labour costs.

38. **Option 4 (legislative):** Provide compensation for injury/death beyond ACC coverage.

39. **Impacts:** These options incentivise community action, particularly for seniors who often lead informal responses.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Recognise "spontaneous emergency responders" (e.g., "Johnny-on-the-Spot") with:

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40. Protection from civil liability.
41. Compensation for labour, equipment, or machinery loss.
42. Reimbursement aligned with emergency circumstances.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

43. Lack of accessible communication channels for elderly and disabled communities during emergencies.
44. Insufficient training for community leaders to coordinate diverse groups effectively.

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Explanation:**
The problem of unclear control during emergencies is critical, as seen in Cyclone Gabrielle. Clarity ensures efficient coordination, particularly for community-led responses.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

45. **Preferred Option:**
46. **Option 4 (legislative):** A unified control model between hazard-specific agencies and Group Controllers/Director.
47. **Impacts:** This balances expertise with local knowledge, ensuring community input (e.g., from elderly advocates) is integrated.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Empower local "Mission Control" hubs to coordinate community participation, with clear delegated authority.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Explanation:**
Public reliance on government assistance must be reduced through education, as communities, including seniors, need to be empowered for self-sufficiency until external support arrives.

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## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Preferred Option:** Option 3 (legislative) – Require CDEM Group plans to specify funding and delivery responsibilities.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

48. Align CDEM Group models with the Sendai Framework's priorities: understanding risk, strengthening governance, investing in resilience, and enhancing preparedness.

49. Require annual performance audits of CDEM Groups, with community input.

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Explanation:**
The CDEM Group model limits community engagement, as seen in Hamilton's advocacy efforts. It should be realigned with the Sendai Framework to prioritize risk understanding and resilience investment.

### Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Preferred Options:** Combine Options 2 and 3 to define responsibilities and funding mechanisms.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

50. Align CDEM Group models with the Sendai Framework's priorities: understanding risk, strengthening governance, investing in resilience, and enhancing preparedness.

51. Require annual performance audits of CDEM Groups, with community input.

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Preferred Options:** Options 2, 3, 4 – Set expectations, require reporting, and limit delegation with a "Delegated Authority Matrix."

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

52. Align CDEM Group models with the Sendai Framework's priorities: understanding risk, strengthening governance, investing in resilience, and enhancing preparedness.

53. Require annual performance audits of CDEM Groups, with community input.

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## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

54. **Preferred Options:**
55. **Option 2 (legislative):** Enable targeted amendments, including "Minor & Mechanical Changes" for formatting and digital access.
56. **Option 3 (legislative):** Remove Order in Council requirement, with clear sign-off authority.
57. **Impacts:** Streamlined updates ensure plans remain relevant, benefiting communities like Hamilton advocating on issues like water meters.

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Introduce a "Disallowable Instrument" process for rapid legislative adjustments during emergencies.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Ensure roles are clearly defined to avoid overlaps, particularly for community advocates interfacing with CDEM Groups.

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

58. **Preferred Options:**
59. Option 2 (non-legislative) – Increase guidance.
60. Option 3 (legislative) – Enable mandatory standards.
61. Option 4 (legislative) – Monitor system performance.
62. **Additional:** Develop KPIs for all emergency management roles, ensuring accountability.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

63. Standardized KPIs for emergency roles.
64. Common terminology for positions.
65. Delegated authority tied to roles, not individuals.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Establish a national audit framework to assess compliance with minimum standards.

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## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Preferred Options:**

66. Option 2 (legislative) – Issue compliance orders with penalties.
67. Option 3 (legislative) – Expand Minister's intervention powers with retroactive inquiry authority.

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Establish a national audit framework to assess compliance with minimum standards.

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Explanation:**
The 4Rs framework is outdated. Adopting Sendai Framework principles (risk understanding, governance, resilience investment, preparedness) is essential. Local risk registers, as advocated by Hamilton Grey Power, are critical for identifying and mitigating known risks (e.g., flooding).

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

68. **Preferred Options:**

69. Option 2 (non-legislative) – Clarify "acceptable" risk levels.

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70. Option 3 (non-legislative) – Update guidance for CDEM Group plans.

71. Option 4 (legislative) – Prescribe plan content via secondary legislation.

72. Option 5 (legislative) – Strengthen Minister's role in planning.

73. **Impacts:** Risk registers enhance proactive mitigation, reducing impacts on vulnerable groups like seniors.

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

CDEM Group plans must meet a national minimum standard but allow regional customization based on local risks and resources.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

74. Lack of funding for risk assessments.

75. Limited community input in planning processes.

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Mandate local "Risk Registers" and "Resource Logs" for all councils.

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Explanation:**
Councils must maintain risk registers and resource logs to address recurring risks, as seen in Hamilton's water meter advocacy.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

**Explanation:**
Taonga Māori and animal welfare are distinct issues requiring separate treatment. Combining them risks diluting their importance.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

76. **Preferred Options:**
77. Option 2 (non-legislative) – Develop guidance aligned with the Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga Act 2014.
78. Option 3 (legislative) – Strengthen planning expectations via secondary legislation.
79. **Other Options:** Assess coastal pā sites for flood risks and develop preservation strategies.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

80. **Preferred Options:**
81. Option 2 (non-legislative) – Develop guidance aligned with the Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga Act 2014.
82. Option 3 (legislative) – Strengthen planning expectations via secondary legislation.
83. **Other Options:** Assess coastal pā sites for flood risks and develop preservation strategies.

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

84. **Preferred Options:**
85. Option 2 (non-legislative) – Develop guidance for animal welfare.
86. Option 3 (legislative) – Strengthen planning expectations.
87. **Explanation:** Animal welfare must be integrated into CDEM plans, with farm-specific emergency plans identifying safe areas.

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**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

88. **Preferred Options:**
89. Option 2 (non-legislative) – Develop guidance for animal welfare.
90. Option 3 (legislative) – Strengthen planning expectations.
91. **Explanation:** Animal welfare must be integrated into CDEM plans, with farm-specific emergency plans identifying safe areas.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Animals should be prioritized above inanimate property, reflecting New Zealand's cultural values.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Mandate farm emergency plans with diagrams for fire, flood, and evacuation scenarios.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Standards must be tested through simulations to validate effectiveness.

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Explanation:**
The definition of "lifeline utility" is too narrow and lacks a principles-based approach. Communities must define their own "essential infrastructure" schedules, including regional assets like Hamilton Airport.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

92. **Preferred Options:**
93. Option 2 (secondary legislation) – Add sectors to the CDEM Act's schedule.
94. Option 3 (legislative) – Adopt a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure."
95. **Caution:** A clear definition is needed, specifying national, regional, and local infrastructure.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

96. **Include:**
97. **Airports:** Add Hamilton and Rotorua Airports for international relief capabilities. Include military airports.
98. **Communications:** Add ISPs, mobile operators, data centres, and satellite providers (e.g., Starlink).

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99. **Sample Wording:** "Providers of telecommunications, satellite communications, and digital infrastructure essential for emergency response."

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

100. **Include:**

101. **Airports:** Add Hamilton and Rotorua Airports for international relief capabilities. Include military airports.

102. **Communications:** Add ISPs, mobile operators, data centres, and satellite providers (e.g., Starlink).

103. **Sample Wording:** "Providers of telecommunications, satellite communications, and digital infrastructure essential for emergency response."

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Publish the current lifeline utilities schedule in the discussion document for transparency.

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

104. **Disagreement:** No minimum standard for business continuity exists, making penalties premature.

105. **Preferred Option:** Develop a legislated baseline for self-sustainment (e.g., backup power for petrol stations).

106. **Other Options:** Extend standards to government buildings, FENZ, Police, and St John stations.

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

107. **Disagreement:** No minimum standard for business continuity exists, making penalties premature.

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108. **Preferred Option:** Develop a legislated baseline for self-sustainment (e.g., backup power for petrol stations).

109. **Other Options:** Extend standards to government buildings, FENZ, Police, and St John stations.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

110. **Disagreement:** No minimum standard for business continuity exists, making penalties premature.

111. **Preferred Option:** Develop a legislated baseline for self-sustainment (e.g., backup power for petrol stations).

112. **Other Options:** Extend standards to government buildings, FENZ, Police, and St John stations.

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Preferred Options:** All (Options 1–6) – Promote voluntary cooperation, develop standards, and strengthen information sharing.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Preferred Options:** All (Options 1–6) – Promote voluntary cooperation, develop standards, and strengthen information sharing.

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Establish regional coordination hubs with community representation to bridge local and national efforts.

Proactively Released

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Create a secure digital platform for real-time information sharing among utilities and CDEM Groups.

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Preferred Options:** All (Options 1–5) – List all agencies, promote best practices, and extend requirements with exemptions.

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Preferred Options:** All (Options 1–5) – List all agencies, promote best practices, and extend requirements with exemptions.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**Preferred Options:** All (Options 1–5) – List all agencies, promote best practices, and extend requirements with exemptions.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

**Explanation:**
Price gouging during emergencies, where unscrupulous traders exploit vulnerable communities by significantly increasing prices for essential goods and services such as food, water, fuel, accommodation, and repair services, poses a severe threat to equitable access and community resilience. This issue disproportionately affects vulnerable groups, including the elderly, disabled, and low-income populations, who rely heavily on affordable access to these essentials. Hamilton Grey Power's advocacy underscores the need to protect communities from exploitative practices during crises. Without specific legislative protections, price gouging exacerbates economic hardship, undermines trust in emergency management, and disrupts the continuity of essential services, countering the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill.
**Proposed New Sub-Issue: Preventing Exploitation Through Price Gouging**

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**Problem Description:**
During emergencies, such as Cyclone Gabrielle or earthquakes, some traders may exploit supply shortages or increased demand to inflate prices for critical goods and services, as seen globally in events like Hurricanes Helene and Milton in the United States. New Zealand's current legislative framework lacks targeted measures to prevent such exploitation, leaving communities, particularly seniors, vulnerable to unaffordable costs for necessities. This gap risks deepening inequalities and hindering recovery efforts, especially for those with limited financial resources.

**Proposed Legislative Provision:**
To address this critical issue, we propose the following clause be incorporated into the Emergency Management Bill under Objective 4:

**Clause: Prohibition of Price Gouging During Emergencies**

113. **Definition**: Price gouging is defined as charging an unconscionable or excessive price for essential goods or services during a declared state of emergency, where the price significantly exceeds the average price charged in the 30 days prior to the emergency declaration, without justifiable cost increases.
114. **Scope**: Applies to essential goods and services, including:
115. Food and potable water.
116. Fuel (e.g., gasoline, diesel, heating oil).
117. Accommodation (e.g., hotels, motels, short-term rentals).
118. Medical supplies and equipment.
119. Building materials, emergency supplies (e.g., generators, batteries), and repair or reconstruction services.
120. **Threshold for Violation**: A price increase exceeding 10% above the pre-emergency average is deemed unconscionable, unless the seller demonstrates increased procurement or operational costs (e.g., emergency transport, hazard pay).
121. **Duration**: The prohibition applies during the declared state of emergency and for 30 days thereafter, with an extension of up to 180 days for reconstruction or repair services, as determined by the Director of Emergency Management.
122. **Penalties**:
123. Civil penalties: Up to NZ$5,000 per violation, with a maximum of NZ$50,000 for multiple violations within a 24-hour period.
124. Criminal penalties: For egregious or repeated violations, fines up to NZ$100,000 or imprisonment for up to 6 months.
125. Restitution: Refunds for excessive charges to affected consumers.
126. **Enforcement**:
127. The Director of Emergency Management, in coordination with the Commerce Commission, shall investigate complaints and enforce compliance.
128. A dedicated hotline and online portal, managed by NEMA, shall be established for consumers to report suspected price gouging.

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129. Local authorities may issue compliance orders, with non-compliance escalating to the Commerce Commission.

130. **Exemptions**: Price increases due to documented supplier costs, operational expenses, or unrelated market trends are exempt, provided evidence is submitted to NEMA within 7 days of a complaint.

131. **Public Awareness**: NEMA shall develop and disseminate guidance on price gouging, including permissible and prohibited practices, through community networks such as Grey Power, to ensure vulnerable groups are informed.

**Likely Impacts (Benefits, Costs, Risks):**

132. **Benefits**:

133. Protects vulnerable communities, including the elderly, from financial exploitation, ensuring equitable access to essentials during emergencies.

134. Enhances community trust in the emergency management system, aligning with Hamilton Grey Power's advocacy for fair treatment of seniors.

135. Deters unscrupulous practices, as demonstrated by Florida's success in receiving over 200 price gouging complaints post-Hurricane Helene via a dedicated hotline.

136. Supports the Sendai Framework's priority of reducing economic losses during disasters.

137. **Costs**:

138. Initial costs for NEMA to establish a hotline and monitoring system, estimated at NZ$500,000 annually, offset by fines collected.

139. Administrative burden for businesses to document cost increases, mitigated by clear guidance and exemptions.

140. **Risks**:

141. Potential for overregulation if thresholds are too rigid; the 10% cap, modeled on California's Penal Code 396, balances flexibility and protection.

142. Enforcement challenges in rural areas; mitigated by leveraging local authorities and community networks like Grey Power for reporting.

**Preferred Option:**

Legislate the price gouging prohibition as a core component of Objective 4, integrated into Issue 11 (Reducing Disruption to Infrastructure) as a new sub-issue. This ensures it is seen as essential to maintaining access to critical services. Additionally:

143. Cross-reference the provision in Objective 5 (Having the Right Powers Available), empowering Controllers to issue immediate cease-and-desist orders for price gouging, with NEMA overseeing enforcement.

144. Require CDEM Group plans under Objective 3 (Enabling a Higher Minimum Standard) to include strategies for monitoring and preventing price gouging, ensuring local accountability.

**International Precedents:**

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145. **California, USA**: Penal Code 396 imposes a 10% price increase cap during emergencies, with local enforcement and exemptions for cost-based increases.

146. **Florida, USA**: Florida Statute 501.160 criminalizes price gouging, supported by a hotline that processed significant complaints during recent hurricanes.

147. **Jamaica**: A 2020 resolution made price gouging a criminal offense during disasters, emphasizing consumer protection.

148. **Australia**: Recent scrutiny of supermarket price gouging (e.g., Coles, Woolworths in 2023–2024) highlights the need for stronger competition laws, relevant to New Zealand's context.

**Additional Options to Consider:**

149. Establish a real-time price monitoring system during emergencies, using digital platforms to track complaints and market trends, similar to Florida's model.

150. Mandate that lifeline utilities (e.g., fuel suppliers, accommodation providers) include price stabilization commitments in their business continuity plans (Issue 11.2).

151. Engage community advocacy groups, such as Grey Power and Consumer NZ, to co-develop guidance and promote awareness, ensuring the elderly and other vulnerable groups are protected.

**Rationale for Inclusion:**

Price gouging undermines the bill's goal of minimizing disruption to essential services, particularly for seniors who face financial constraints, as highlighted in Hamilton Grey Power's advocacy on water meters and community safety. By embedding this provision in Objective 4, it aligns with the legislative focus on equitable access and community resilience, while drawing on global best practices to ensure enforceability. The provision is critical to protecting New Zealanders from exploitation, making it a "must-have" component of the Emergency Management Bill.

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

152. **Issue 13 (Managing Access to Restricted Areas):** Options 1–4 (all preferred).

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Issue 14 (Clarifying Emergency Powers):** Option 2 (legislative) – Tidy up functions and powers.

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Issue 15 (Modernising State of Emergency Process):** Options 2–3 (electronic and verbal declarations).

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Introduce an "Electronic Flimsy" system for rapid, authoritative digital orders, using platforms like Microsoft Teams or WHISPIR.

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Issue 16 (Mayors' Role):** Option 1 (status quo) with a provision for CDEM override if a mayor refuses to declare an emergency.

Allow council group decisions to declare emergencies if a mayor is unavailable or unwilling.

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**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Grant powers to requisition community resources (e.g., vehicles) with compensation.

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

153. **Remove Ambiguous Language:** Replace "may" with "shall" or "must" in all legislative documents (e.g., CDEM Act, Emergency Management Bill) to eliminate discretionary gaps.

154. **Modernize Terminology:** Remove references to "Crown," aligning with the Constitution Act 1986, to reflect New Zealand's sovereignty.

155. **Defence Force Resilience:** Conduct a secondary inquiry into NZDF base self-sufficiency, ensuring no reliance on civilian infrastructure for power, water, or fuel.

156. **Agency Reporting:** Require FENZ, Police, and St John to report on base resilience, including generator connectivity.

157. **Spontaneous Responders:** Formalize protections and compensation for spontaneous responders, as outlined in Issue 4.

158. **Media Uploads:** Allow submissions to include media (e.g., PDFs, photos) for richer evidence.

159. **Final Note:**
Hamilton Grey Power's advocacy, underscores the need for inclusive, community-led emergency management. This submission aligns with our commitment to ensuring the elderly and other vulnerable groups are prioritized in New Zealand's legislative reforms.

160. Include Price Gouging Prohibition as a cornerstone to this Bill.

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National Emergency Management Agency
Te Rākau Whakamarumaru

# Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

## Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Jill Wilson |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Inner-City Wellington Residents Association (ICW) |

☐ The Privacy Act 2020 applies to submissions. Please tick the box if you **do not** want your name or other personal information to be included in any information about submissions that NEMA may publish.

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Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We are the association for the inner-city of Wellington. In 'our patch" of Te Aro/Wellington we have somewhere between 15,000-17,000 residents who have made their homes here - many of whom are renting or owning an apartment in our over 100 apartment buildings.

We know from reading the review of the Cyclone Gabrielle response that it is vital that the community be included in emergency training and readiness. We absolutely agree with this.

We genuinely welcome this *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation* initiative.

With this in mind, our feedback has the following aspects:

1. Training
   there is an urgent need to include residents in emergency planning and training so that they can provide assistance to both the emergency services and to each other. A large number of people live in many inner-city Wellington buildings – they will have skills, tools, resources and a willingness to help – but currently have no mechanism to discuss or practice how these could be deployed.

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2. Space:
   there is an urgent need to address the barriers that exist for residents living in inner-city apartment buildings where space can be very limited. For cost reasons, many residents live in very small inner-city apartments. This means they physically cannot find space for the essential resources they may need. This means the building itself should find space to supplement this.

3. Inclusion:
   many residents in an apartment building are renting. There is an urgent need for a process of decision-making that includes both renters and owners, with a focus on the welfare and emergency readiness for the building's community of residents.

4. Master list
   there is an urgent need to have an agency responsible for maintaining a master contact list of all Body Corporate Chairs and Committees. With the forecast growth in apartment living, this would enable easier knowledge-sharing, resource sharing and collective buying power for those making decisions for their apartment buildings. Once established, this list could be a catalyst for creating apartment building residents groups – including renters – who are likely to be in-situ rather than absent from the building.

We live in a very intensified region of the city – perhaps the most intensified in New Zealand.

We also live in an area which, in a major emergency, could be cut off from evacuation routes – Wellington Regional Emergency Management Office (WREMO) describes us as one of the 'seven islands' that would be created in the Wellington region should we experience a major event.

We are also told that, if we need to shelter at home, we must cope for 7-10 days without water or power – and perhaps 30 days without toilets.

This is impossible advice to follow for most apartment buildings in the inner-city.

When we consider emergency readiness and management from the point of view of a resident in an apartment building in inner-city residents, we must take into account the following:

- We are likely to be renters – which means we are not part of the body corporate communications, AGM or directly part of the decision-making processes for our home;

- we may live in a very small apartment - 39 square metres or less – because of the cost of rent and/or rates, insurance and rising costs in areas such as power

- because of these costs, particularly for renters – our 39 square metre apartment may be home for two people or more – and we may also have a pet

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- we may not have a car park and an associated locker, because we are living in a converted building, or in a newer apartment building where these are not incorporated in the design – possibly to reduce body corporate fees.

Taking these into account:

- we may want to follow WREMO's advice about being prepared – but we simply don't have enough room to store what we are told we might need, for example, 12 litres of water per person per day, a 7-10 day supply of non-perishable food, a camp stove, a stock of medical and first aid supplies, sufficient number of batters and torches, a powerful power bank, and a range of tools, including a crowbar.

- and, when considering our lack of storage, we may find that the apartment building in which we live has not incorporated any community space where the building's community of residents could meet, or store shared emergency supplies per floor, or within the building

- and, we may find that space to store a large tank of water for the residents is not available

- and, even if there were to be space, we may find our body corporate does not have the funds to buy and maintain the water tank and a store of emergency supplies

- and, we may find that our Body Corporate Chair and Committee do not prioritise emergency preparedness for its residents because this is not a requirement under law – so their focus is solely on matters of building maintenance (roof, cladding etc) and not on the welfare of the building's residents

- and finally, as a renter, we may have no way of petitioning the Body Corporate Committee or Chair to hear our views as residents, even though we have made our home in the building - because we are not unit title holder.

We have been thinking about the above issues and we have created an initiative we call "Lifeboat Buildings" https://www.innercitywellington.nz/lifeboat-buildings. Its focus is thinking about how the building can be a lifeboat for its residents, and it includes considering the ultra-local area around the building where businesses and locations might also be able to provide solutions and support.

We believe Lifeboat Buildings is an initiative that would be of interest to other cities and towns where inner-city intensification is leading to the building of multi-level, multi-unit, multi-owners buildings - aka "apartment buildings".

It might also have a part to play in this CDEM review and we would be happy to provide further information

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# Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

## Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

From talking to other residents association similar to ours, we are aware that different parts of the system work differently regionally.

To ensure that priority is given to how regional parts of the system work together, we would recommend that 'c' be re-written as follows:

- c. enable the different parts of the system to work better together at the national level and the regional level.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. We believe that residents in inner-city apartment buildings are disproportionately affected by emergencies.

For example, someone living in a more traditional home, may have options such as a garden (where they can create a toilet long drop), space to install a large water tank (to collect rain water from their roof), a garage or shed (where they can store extra food, emergency supplies and perhaps also use for shelter if their home is damaged.)

As the inner-city local residents' association, we know that people living in inner-city apartment buildings will not have these options.

Nor is there any obligation for apartment building Body Corporates (the most common decision-making structure) to find solutions to fill the void.

This is an alarming gap because the building of more inner-city apartment buildings is being promoted at central and local government level as the solution for population growth and for the more effective use of land and infrastructure.

We believe emergency management planning must therefore urgently recognise the realities, and the lack of options, that individuals living in multi-level, multi-owner, multi-unit-title buildings – aka 'apartment buildings' – have available to them.

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We also believe that emergency management planning should recognise that a typical apartment building represents a 'community of residents' – perhaps 100-500 people – living in one place within a very small footprint.

Inner-city Wellington also includes a very diverse mix of residents. We have elderly residents, migrants, students, short term renters, and people with mobility challenges. We urge the Bill to ensure:

- Community engagement is **tailored to different living contexts** (e.g. high-rise apartments vs. suburban homes).
- Planning reflects the needs of **people with limited mobility or language access**.
- Emergency messaging and resources are **available in multiple languages and accessible formats**.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

'Our patch' of Te Aro and Wellington Central is currently Wellington's largest residential suburb. 15,000-17,000 live here – most in an apartment building. One of our large apartment buildings is estimated to be home for 400-500 people; and one of our inner-city streets where there is a block of apartment buildings, is estimated to be home for 1,000 residents.

We believe that communication and engagement with inner-city residents needs to adopt an 'ultra local' approach where the emergency services engage directly with individual apartment buildings, or a block of apartment buildings, as they might with a small township.

We believe this could provide cost benefits for emergency services in terms of local residents better understanding the messaging, being able to talk through their building's specific emergency needs and challenges, and developing realistic emergency readiness action plans that they will carry out.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

As the inner-city Wellington residents' association, we know from experience that the emergency advice on offer misses the mark.

The obvious irrelevance of advice such as 'digging a hole in your garden', 'adding a water tank to catch your roof's rainwater' and 'storing 12 litres of water per day per person in your home' creates shoulder shrug ambivalence.

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We believe there is an opportunity to address this. As well as tailoring the emergency advice, the large number of residents within a typical inner-city apartment building could be sufficient to warrant emergency services engaging directly with them.

With support from CDEM, this could lead to a bulk buying power approach for apartment building residents (renters and owners) to reduce the cost of items such as first aid training, emergency supplies – eg first aid kits, buckets, torches, batteries, power banks – and for the body corporate to afford high cost options such as installing water tanks for the residents, that will fit into the building's design.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

We believe there are a range of options to consider.

As mentioned, we believe emergency services should tailor their engagement to be an ultra-local approach where they engage specifically with an apartment's community of residents.

This could lead to emergency services having a greater understanding of the skills many of the residents could bring to an emergency event (medical, construction, emergency planning). It could also include evacuation planning that fits the specific location of the building.

We also believe that direct engagement between emergency services and apartment building residents – formally recognising them as a community of residents - could also be a catalyst for Body Corporate Chairs and Committees to consider the welfare needs of residents when planning for their building – currently not an obligation they are required to consider.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We have two suggestions:

1. Many people may assume that the term 'natural hazards' means events such as flooding, weather events. They may not associate it with earthquakes, particularly given the new name of EQC. We suggest that words such as 'for example earthquake events' be incorporated into the language.

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2. When reading the discussion document, terms used by councils and emergency management teams were used. Perhaps familiar words such as "rural, suburban and urban environments' be included in the language to help to personalise it.

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We ask that any regional funding related to this initiative be protected and only be available for the targeted activities and/or outcomes intended.

We make this request because we are aware that councils under financial stress may sometimes choose to re-direct funds.

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

14. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We support the intention to improve community participation, but we believe the proposals should go further. Specifically, we recommend the Bill, through legislation:

- **Mandate the inclusion of local resident representatives** (e.g. residents' associations, body corporate reps, tenant unions) in emergency planning processes.
- **Enable and fund community participation in emergency exercises** and scenario planning at the local and regional level.
- **Provide formal training opportunities** for residents who want to take part in readiness or response roles, especially in areas with high population density or vulnerable populations.
- **Provide free and/or discounted services and resources** for residents in apartment buildings who collectively wish to increase their emergency readiness and response
- **Recognise community groups** as part of the emergency management network (alongside councils, iwi, and emergency services).

*Why this matters:* Residents know their buildings, neighbours, and vulnerabilities. During an emergency, we are often first responders — checking on neighbours, clearing drains, guiding others to safety. But we are rarely included in preparedness activities.

Unlike formally structured community agencies such as DCM and City Mission, inner-city residents do not have a collective identity that could lead to more effective engagement with emergency services.

We suggest that established organisations like residents' associations – which we are for the inner-city of Wellington - could become the representative community organisations for their areas, supported by CDEM recognition as a stakeholder and associated funding..

This would enable ultra-local knowledge to be captured and organised by the residents' association – for example, for inner-city Wellington, documenting the buildings in the area and their access requirements, identifying those with specialist equipment such as a defib and a stair chair. It could also enable residents' expertise in areas such as medical

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training, construction skills and tools, people who are electricians, plumbers, childcare teachers, and even those who have emergency response training, to be available .

This could also be a very useful organisation, after an event, to help Police who are likely to be handling a high level of missing persons reports. It could also ensure meaningful reports to Community Emergency Hubs were being delivered.

Further, this organisation could also provide a co-ordination point of contact for initiatives such as group first aid training, ultra local workshops, bulk buying schemes and more.

16. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

17. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

18. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We support formal recognition of residents as first responders. The Bill should:

- **Identify and engage with large apartment buildings** to identify opportunities for their residents to offer an ultra-local volunteers group within an intensified area
- Provide a **mechanism to pre-register and train willing local volunteers**.
- Ensure communities are **resourced to sustain themselves for 72+ hours**, including advice on shared resource storage in apartment buildings and community hubs.

19. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

As mentioned earlier, we believe our ***'Lifeboat Buildings'*** initiative could be of interest.

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https://www.innercitywellington.nz/lifeboat-buildings - '*how can your building and neighbourhood be a lifeboat for you in an emergency*'

It encourages residents – owners and renters - to work together and learn more about their building. This includes knowing the location of power and gas controls, having up-to-date contacts lists, identifying spaces that could be used ahead of time for the storage of emergency supplies and tools for the floor, the creation and testing of communication channels, and the appointing of per floor 'buddies' to help each other.

Having these in place ahead of an emergency could save time and money.

*Lifeboat Buildings* also includes residents examining the immediate neighbourhood of their building to identify local businesses and places to include in the planning.

For example, this could include discussions with local businesses about ways local volunteers could be co-ordinated to be stationed at doors if the power is off, identifying if the business might have room for people needing immediate shelter, and if they have essential supplies that might be needed.

The neighbourhood businesses might be very diverse but still have a part to play in an emergency - for example, dairies, cafes and bars, hair salons, petrol stations, supermarkets, churches and community halls. Once identified, perhaps extra equipment and items could then be stored in them in readiness.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

We believe that the lack of space residents have in our inner-city apartment buildings is a major problem which has been ignored when setting building regulations and applying resource consents.

Because of this, residents will be reliant on the local council and emergency services to have filled the gap ahead of time.

This could take the form of, for example

- having small shipping containers located in side alleys within the inner-city ready to provide, or be distribution points for, emergency supplies

- ensuring 'street furniture' such as public seating is designed to hold supplies, and be capable of ambient lighting to provide emergency lighting if the power is out, and with plug in power points for cellphones

- that any work done to improve city streets – such as the Golden Mile in Wellington – incorporates emergency essentials such as solar or battery-based wayfinding lighting (for example in the pavement or street furniture) to help residents evacuate to higher ground

- that Councils have in place a process to immediately take over local digital billboards so they can provide ultra-local community messaging, for example

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"the water tanker will be here at 3pm", "the disposal of toilet buckets/bags will be available here at 9am" etc.

- that Councils and local emergency services have organised groups able to use scooters and cargo bikes to bring in supplies should roads be impassible.

### Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

When planning major cities, we ask that regional planning bodies be required to:

- Include **apartment resident representatives** from inner-city apartment buildings as part of community-based organisations
- Include reports on engagement with **community-based organisations** as part of regional tier performance requirements

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

As the Inner-City Wellington Residents Association, we have provided feedback and perspectives throughout this document about the role and the needs of residents in high rise inner-city apartment buildings.

We have talked about the fact that inner-city apartment buildings hold a large number of people, that they have very little if any shared internal community space, that there is no central list of key contacts for them, and that the buildings themselves can be difficult to enter given their secured access.

All this combines to create major challenges for emergency services.

A fundamental change could be to identify residents' associations such as ours as formally recognised stakeholders in the emergency planning process. Work could then

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commence on what services they could offer to help local knowledge gathering and local volunteer planning and training.

### Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We believe there is a major gap for emergency services – ie, 'who has the contact details for inner-city apartments?'.

As mentioned previously, there is no agency holding a master list of Body Corporate contacts. Furthermore, it is assumed by many that Body Corporate Chairs and Committees - or perhaps the Property Management company used by the building – have some responsibility for the welfare of its community of residents. This is not the case. Their duties involve maintaining the health of the building, not its population.

Additionally

- Body Corporate Chairs and Committee members may not live in their building - they may have rented out their property;
- renters are invisible in the Body Corporate system
- and property management companies may have many clients, are not in-situ, and only carry out maintenance duties, not emergency-related duties that consider the welfare needs of the residents.

This supports our earlier feedback that residents' associations, such as ours, could be the local organisations best placed to be a connector for emergency services and inner residents.

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Please see our comments throughout this document.

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# Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

## Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

As mentioned earlier, we believe that our 'Lifeboat Buildings' initiative https://www.innercitywellington.nz/lifeboat-buildings could be a useful model to discuss when considering the question of acceptable levels of risk for inner-city residents.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

As the residents' association for inner-city Wellington, we know our residents have a very different living experience from those living in our 'leafy suburbs'. One size will definitely not fit all.

Therefore we believe having regional flexibility is essential if the emergency services are to tailor their plans appropriately to meet local needs.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We believe fundamental changes are needed.

The current and future plans for intensifying inner-cities – primarily by building more and even higher rise apartment buildings - are introducing hazards and risks that are new.

If not urgently addressed, large numbers of people in a very small footprint of a city will be at risk.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

As the inner-city residents' association for Wellington, we know that there has been a growing number of companion animals in the inner-city. The increasing relaxation of Body Corporate rules, and central government initiatives regarding landlords permitting pets, is increasing this number.

These pets provide support and comfort for their owners, who will often view them as family members. We know from reports of the New Orleans flood that people broke red zone barriers to retrieve animals that the emergency services would not evacuate. This is likely to happen here too.

Advice and assistance needs to be part of any emergency planning discussions. We believe that the role of residents' associations such as ours could be a local knowledge holder and connector for such discussions.

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**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

We hope our feedback throughout this document help to inform this objective.

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# Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

## Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

We hope our feedback throughout this document help to inform this objective.

### Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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# Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

## Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

# Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

We hope our feedback throughout this document is helpful for this reform.

We also hope that we have helped to explain the different experiences of people living within inner-cities in high rise apartment buildings and that they have a reduced number of opportunities to respond to traditional emergency planning advice.

We hope that our Lifeboat Buildings initiative https://www.innercitywellington.nz/lifeboat-buildings is of interest.

And, finally, we hope we have conveyed that residents' associations such as ours (Inner-City Wellington Residents Association www.innercitywellington.nz) are already in place in many communities and that we could play an important part in emergency planning and resilience.

Currently we are not formally recognised and funded as having that role – unlike other community organisations (such as the City Mission and Downtown Community Mission in Wellington) who might be invited to the table because of their place in the local community.

So we invite this reform to find a place for us in emergency planning because we believe we can fill an important gap – the gap of connecting effectively with large numbers of people who live in inner-city apartment buildings.

With the goal of encouraging residents to actively engage in emergency readiness and response planning, we believe we can be an important connector and an ultra-local point of contact with residents if we were to be invited to the table.

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**CIVIL DEFENCE BILL SUBMISSION**

**Introduction**

I held the appointment of Director of Civil Defence and Emergency Management for the period 2006 -2014. I was the National Controller for the response to the 2011 Christchurch earthquake and since "retiring" to Hawke's Bay I was involved in the Cyclone Gabrielle response through the provision of airfield services at Napier airport for NZDF aircraft and charters. Following that response I was appointed as an adviser to the Hawke's Bay CDEM Group Joint Committee to assist in the implementation of the review of the response.

From my experience the critical issue faced by EM in an emergency is inadequate knowledge and understanding of who is expected to do what in the response and less about the legislation and regulations available to manage the response although I accept the Act can be improved to eliminate ambiguity. The rules mean nothing to participants that do not adhere to them, either because they lack the knowledge or they ignore the functions that are intended to control and coordinate EM.

As a starting point for my submission I firmly believe the approach to EM in New Zealand should always start with the strategy covered by the four Rs of Risk Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery. The four Rs approach can be applied to the many hazards New Zealand is exposed to and at the many levels involved in each level. The framework in which activities in each of the four Rs take place is best based on a hierarchy, pyramid or the layers in which the community (in every aspect) is at the base and is expected to do all they can in the four Rs. The second tier is the local government council for the management and coordination of activities in their district. The third level is the CDEM Group and its committees with the functions of coordinating and assisting communities with expertise and resources at the regional level. The top tier is the national level and NEMA which has the role of guiding and coordinating planning in the lower levels, and in the response and recovery phases when required by the scale of an emergency, coordinate and control the national response and recovery effort.

**Objective 1: System Participants**

Issue 1: For me, the foundation for an effective EM system has to be the community. Communities come in many configurations, compositions and sizes. Catering for that diversity in EM requires the guidance and those facilitating developments, to have the flexibility and adaptability to take into account the needs of the different groups that make up a community to avoid any one group being overlooked unwittingly. If community is the focus of EM plans and practices, then full participation by all members of that community is expected. Emphasis and guidance should be tailored to the needs and requirements of community groups and their role in planning and an initial response.

Issue 2: More engagement with Maori at the local level will assist the development of effective and inclusive community based plans. Local Government should have the responsibility for encouraging local Maori participation. Maori should also be represented at the CDEM Group Joint Committee level to ensure participation in the development of regional plans and procedures.

Issue 3: The CDEM Group and local government members should have NEMA developed guidelines to help communities develop their community-based response plan. Community based response plans empower communities to take the initial response in an emergency by gathering information on an impact and its scale, providing assistance wherever they can by using local resources available, and communicating with the council EOC through reports to

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enable the district impacts and response to be coordinated and managed upwards as necessary. The community plan relies on local understanding of vulnerabilities and resources, a process for gathering information and communicating situations, the ability to plan and respond to the situation involved and the authority to carry out the initial response. It should encourage communities to take control of their own circumstances and reduce, and eventually eliminate, the propensity for some communities to say that Civil Defence never came to our rescue – as a community we are all involved in our defence and should be encouraged to take part in planning and the community response.

Issue 4: To encourage community members to get involved in the response in their locality, there needs to be assurance that there is legal protection for those individuals who are willing help in an emergency and act with the best interests of the community. The legislation should make provision for some legal protection. In the case of groups and companies offering their support to a response, the Act should also provide for compensation to be paid to them, not just in labour costs, but also for the use of machinery and services.

**Objective 2 Responsibilities and Accountabilities**

Supporting resources

Local Government
Planning, education/awareness
Communications upwards and outwards

Issues 5 and 6: Response Control. Many EM participants do not understand the role of the Controller in a response. As a consequence they ignore the Controller's priorities and directions and do their own thing. The worst offenders are the uniformed services including Police and Defence, who retreat to hide beyond command lines while dismissing its partner Operational Control. Some of the spontaneous volunteers also behave in a similar manner and usually out of ignorance. It is no wonder that some responses appear to lack coordination and responsiveness. The use of CIMS aggravates the situation. CIMS is a tactical construct. Its arrangements confuse command (or operational control) with the staff functions (or advice) and ignores the EM organisation required at the operational level. In the larger scale responses, CIMS is inadequate. The Act or the CDEM National Plan could be more explicit in defining and describing the structure and roles to be used in coordinating and controlling a response and take into account the concept of lead agency and supporting agency.

Effective communication between the Controller and supporting agencies and with impacted communities is essential to an effective response. So to are the internal processes in an EOC and swift and accurate decision-making. Establishing a response strategy and response priorities are important. Gathering information from communities about the impact (Observe) will help staff and the Controller to Orient and, after planning, Decide what is to be done and then put into Action (The OODA Loop). At the operational level in a response planning is generally weak. There is a need for the development of the planning process and practical guides and standardised training.

The functions in an EOC should not act in isolation of the other streams but should act in a coordinated and directed manner. Better and standardised training will assist in improving the performance of EOC staff.

In a state of national emergency it is important to have close integration of the response down through each of the levels. Better definition of the roles and boundaries of the National

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Controller, Group Controllers and Local Controllers would help clarify the situation. This is not necessarily a legislative issue but more about an explanation of the doctrine. Vertical communication and direction downwards during a state of national emergency is critical and needs to be improved and practised.

**Objective 3 Higher Standard of Emergency Management**

Issue 8: EM would benefit from ensuring the Groups' organisations are standardised while allowing some flexibility to take into account local conditions. In addition, those involved in EM should receive nationally standardised training and assessment. It should be NEMA's responsibility to develop the model for a Group organisation and to develop the training programmes required to put it into action in all four phases of EM.

**Objective 4 Minimising Disruption to Essential Services**

Issue 11: It is important to include in Schedule 1 of the Act those functions that are essential services that are critical to the functioning of a community in an emergency. The definition of a lifeline utility should be changed for an Essential Infrastructure providers and be named in the Schedule. Of the services suggested in the discussion document for inclusion as new entities, those that provide and support hazard warnings should take priority for inclusion.

Issue 12: But in addition to stating the Essential Services to be included in the Act, there is benefit to the response by providing greater guidance for participants on a mechanism to gauge their readiness, and what is expected of them individually in readiness and in an emergency, and how they might collectively prioritise and coordinate their actions. Bring them into the EM fold and have them work with the Controller including in communicating restoration of services to the public!

**Objective: 5 Powers**

Issue 13 and 14: The EM emergency powers available to a Controller are extensive and provided communities and response participants understand the situation and are willing to comply with common-sense directions, most of them are not required to be implemented.

Issue 15: Declarations at the local level should remain the responsibility of the mayor or a delegated elected official. The basis for a declaration of a state of local emergency could be refined to include the making a declaration to give the community confidence in the response and to avoid panic and uncoordinated actions. Ensuring a declaration can be made without the office holder being present to sign the paperwork is important and enhances efficiency. The use of electronic signatures should be investigated and applied.

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Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6140
[by email: EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz ]

12 May 2025

**AWS Submission on the Emergency Management Bill Discussion Document**

Dear Policy Unit,

Thank you for the opportunity for Amazon Web Services New Zealand Ltd. (AWS) to comment on the *Emergency Management Bill Discussion Document*. As you may know, AWS is the cloud computing arm of Amazon.com, Inc. AWS has been operating in New Zealand for 11 years. We have offices in Auckland and Wellington and employ more than 200 New Zealand staff. In September 2021, AWS announced that it will establish an AWS Region in Auckland, which will be available later this year.

An AWS Region consists of at least three separate "Availability Zones", each of which comprises one or more discrete data centres supported by independent and redundant power infrastructure, networking, and connectivity. AWS data centres are carefully located, designed and maintained to mitigate environmental risks and avoid being simultaneously impacted by a shared fate scenario like a natural disaster or utility power outage. AWS infrastructure is the most secure and reliable cloud infrastructure globally, and we support the organisational resilience and business continuity of our customers.[1] The AWS Region brings world-class cloud computing infrastructure onshore to New Zealand and will enable existing and new customers to deploy and back up their workloads in New Zealand while also retaining the choice to use or back up to other AWS Regions of their choice overseas.

Please find attached AWS comments focused on Objective 4 of the *Discussion Document: Minimising disruption to essential services*. We would be pleased to meet to elaborate on the points made in our submission. Should you have any questions or if you would like any further information or clarifications, please feel free to contact me at s9(2)(a) or on s9(2)(a)

Sincerely,



Paul Keating
Amazon Web Services New Zealand Ltd.

[1] AWS Guide to Building Organizational Resilience: How to Navigate Emergencies and Disruptions to Maintain Business Continuity



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National Emergency Management Agency
Te Rākau Whakamarumaru

# Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

## Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | s9(2)(a) |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | AWS New Zealand |

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I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because…

## Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**1. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, the problem is defined appropriately in general terms. The challenge will be accurately defining the types of infrastructure assets that should be designated as essential infrastructure across diverse industries.

Consultation between government and industry leaders for any new essential infrastructure categories will be important to best define, for the purposes of the legislation, which infrastructure assets are essential. Industry can provide important insights into how to set appropriate materiality thresholds for inclusion so that an overly broad definition does not unintentionally capture 'non-essential' infrastructure.

**2. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

*Option 2 Add additional sectors to the CDEM Act's Schedule of lifeline utilities* is an appropriate approach for addressing the stated problem.

*Option 3: Replace the lifeline utilities framework with an expanded, principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure"* could be workable if the definition of "essential infrastructure" provides clarity as to which infrastructure assets are indeed essential, and includes appropriate materiality thresholds. It should also provide clarity as to which operator is responsible for complying with the relevant obligations. Page 51, paragraph c. states: *"An organisation or class of organisations could be recognised as an "essential infrastructure provider" if they were responsible for infrastructure components (including assets, information, networks, systems, suppliers, people, and processes) necessary to deliver an essential service."* The definition of an "infrastructure component" should in all cases refer to clearly identifiable and essential infrastructure *assets* that is necessary for the delivery of the essential service in New Zealand (e.g. a telecommunications network, a road network, an airport, or, notionally, a grocery stores network or a data centre or

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network of data centres). By providing this level of clarity about the type of essential asset/component, operators will then be able to readily identify the necessary inputs for operating that asset/component (including any equipment, information, networks, systems, suppliers, people, and processes) to deliver/maintain services, and to develop appropriate business continuity plans.

3. **If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Definition of essential infrastructure:** An important consideration for defining essential infrastructure should be whether the infrastructure is essential in its own right (without reference to its support for the delivery of an essential service). It may be appropriate to exclude infrastructure that forms part of a third party supply chain for a lifeline utility or essential service, but is not a critical dependency for the essential service, and is not otherwise essential by itself. For example, a power grid may be regarded as an essential third party infrastructure asset for a lifeline utility that relies on the power grid, whereas providers of optional or substitutable services (including for example many types of data services), which may be chosen from among a range of service providers, would not necessarily be. In such cases, we encourage the government to consider whether outsourcing to the third party infrastructure should simply be the responsibility of the lifeline utility/essential service provider under its business continuity arrangements, without any legislative obligations falling on the operator of the third party infrastructure. This would align with, for example, prudential regulatory frameworks for outsourcing and business continuity wherein the regulated service provider is responsible for managing risk across their supply chains.

In the case of technology/data services, lifeline utilities/essential service providers have many options in deciding how they will procure IT/data services. For example, they can and do store and process data within their own on-premises computing facilities, or they might split these services between on-premises solutions and outsourced data centres or cloud service providers. Some of these IT/data services might be a critical dependency for the lifeline utility/essential service (e.g., a computing service that is running the algorithms and automated decision-making in a power plant), while others would not be (e.g., a data storage service that is used to store photos of company recreational events). In addition, third party suppliers (e.g., data centre operators, cloud service providers, and providers of software services) often have little or no visibility of which workloads (essential or otherwise) are being run by their customers in their data centres or on their software. These factors highlight the definitional challenges in identifying which infrastructure should be classified as essential, and it reinforces the logic of ensuring that lifeline utilities/essential services providers remain responsible for their own digital supply chains.

**Industry engagement in defining infrastructure components for new essential services**: Prior to designation, we recommend that the government engage directly with relevant industry players to identify appropriate thresholds for defining relevant essential infrastructure assets. For example, should data processing and storage assets be included, the size and nature of a data centre facility might well be a material threshold particularly

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given that data centres come in different sizes, are used for different purposes, have different operating models and often very different customers. AWS would welcome the opportunity to provide input in defining appropriate thresholds for defining essential data processing and storage infrastructure.

**"Data processing and storage services"**: Should the government decide to proceed with inclusion of "data processing and storage" as an essential services category, it will be vital to clarify an appropriate materiality threshold for essential data processing and storage infrastructure (i.e., data centre facilities) that would be subject to specific legislative obligations. This is because there are countless types of data storage and processing assets, many of which are small, insignificant, or clearly inessential. Direct industry consultation will be important in defining what constitutes an appropriate materiality threshold for the purposes of this legislation.

**"Cloud computing services":** We recommend that cloud computing services not be included as a standalone essential services category because cloud computing services are simply one example of a data processing and storage service, and the "data processing and storage services" category is already proposed to be included. The essential infrastructure component for the "data processing and storage services" category (i.e. data centre facilities, as discussed above) would encompass any workable definition for "cloud computing services" infrastructure. By way of illustration, AWS cloud computing services are provided from data centre facilities that would be captured under the proposed "data processing and storage services" definition above.

**"Managed information technology services":** For similar reasons, "managed information technology services" are likely already encompassed within the "data processing and storage services" category.

**4. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

If outsourced supplier services such as data processing and storage service providers are considered essential services by virtue of the support they provide to lifeline utilities, we recommend that other outsourced service providers also be included, on the basis that they provide similarly important services for lifeline utilities (e.g. transportation/logistics service providers, providers of equipment, providers of technicians or maintenance services related to installing/operating/maintaining essential services equipment). As above, there should be appropriate materiality thresholds so that only certain types of infrastructure assets within these industries are characterised as essential.

**5. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

As described above, an option is to limit essential infrastructure to only infrastructure that is essential by itself, rather than simply because it might be part of the third party supply chain of another lifeline utilities/essential service provider.

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## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**6. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes. the problem is described adequately

**7. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

*Option 2: Increase assurance of lifeline utilities' business continuity plans* and *Option 3: Introduce financial penalties and enable detailed business continuity planning requirements to be set through regulations* appear appropriately scoped for the described problem. Any guidance or regulations should be developed only following industry consultation to ensure these are workable across the diverse range of industries and infrastructure types. AWS would welcome the opportunity to participate.

*Option 4 Introduce financial penalties and prescribe specific business continuity planning requirements in primary legislation* may be problematic as it presents the risk of providing legislative requirements that would be difficult to evolve or adapt with experience and best practices, or else would potentially need to be drafted too broadly to capture all situations across a wide range of essential services providers and infrastructure types.

**8. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

N/A

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**9. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, the problem is adequately described.

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10. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

*Options 3: Explicitly require CDEM Groups to involve the lifeline utilities in their areas in the development of CDEM Group plans* and *Option 4: Require lifeline utilities to contribute to national response plans* appear to be appropriate to the described problem. We recommend industry consultation be undertaken prior to defining these requirements for essential service providers. AWS would welcome the opportunity to participate.

*Option 5: Strengthen information sharing protections* and *Option 6: Enable data standards to be prescribed through secondary legislation* appear to be relevant options for further exploration with the objective of encouraging timely information sharing of necessary information for managing emergencies and for protecting sensitive information that may need to be shared in these contexts.

In considering information sharing requirements and appropriate data standards, we recommend that government consult thoroughly with industry to identify appropriate relevance and materiality thresholds for any reporting/information sharing requirements. We recommend that information sharing requirements be focused narrowly on achieving specific emergency management outcomes, and on facilitating timely reporting of necessary information while reducing information overload in an emergency. We recommend that secure protocols and mechanisms be established for receiving and storing information relating to essential infrastructure assets, and to ensure that shared information remains confidential and secure. Government should consider developing a secure platform for sharing and storing sensitive information about essential infrastructure assets.

11. **Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

In considering how information sharing and coordination is achieved in complicated emergencies, it is important to recognise that the more times information is duplicated and shared (e.g. to comply with multiple information collection and reporting obligations across multiple agencies and levels), the greater the risks of accidental or unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, that information. Government should consider strategies to minimise duplicative reporting requirements, and developing a secure platform for sharing and storing sensitive and time sensitive information about essential infrastructure during emergencies.

12. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

N/A

## Other comments

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**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

In addition to placing additional requirements on essential service providers, we recommend that the reform of the emergency management legislation take the opportunity to define how the legislation can support the providers of New Zealand's essential infrastructure to prepare for, respond to and recover from any impacts of an emergency event. For example, essential infrastructure could be prioritised for support in maintaining uninterrupted operations or for the rapid restoration of services during or after an emergency**.** This could include consideration for priority or expedited access to, for example, the restoration of utility power, water supplies, telecommunications and networking infrastructure, fuel for backup power generators, or for security or the clearance of blocked access routes etc. It could also include measures to provide priority access to or consideration for government permits, consents, services or other requirements in order to uplift the resilience of essential infrastructure assets in advance of or following an emergency.

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Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6140
emergencymanagementbill@nema.govt.nz

13 May 2025

Kia ora

**Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation**

## Executive Summary

This submission is prepared on behalf of New Zealand's Response Team (NZRT) network. NZRTs are an important, highly trained part of New Zealand's volunteer response network for Civil Defence emergencies.

NZRTs are integral to delivering the Government's objectives of giving effect to a whole-of-society approach to emergency management and supporting local government to deliver a consistent and higher standard of emergency management across New Zealand. Through numerous deployments, NZRTs have demonstrated the effectiveness of having volunteers trained to levels that enhances local response operations.

The Bill needs to enshrine in legislation the value of deploying trained, qualified volunteer groups in an emergency and give effect to the ability of these groups to work alongside local authorities and emergency services before, during and after disaster strikes. The Bill must also ensure that suitably trained and qualified volunteer groups are able to contribute to a disaster response without the risk of civil liability, and with assurance that expenses will be reimbursed.

With respect to spontaneous volunteers, the bill needs to identify spontaneous volunteers as a distinct group in the emergency management system (as different to 'trained volunteers') and provide for a Volunteer Coordination role in the emergency management system to account for and manage spontaneous volunteers. In this way, regions will be required to actively factor spontaneous volunteers into their readiness, response and recovery phases of emergency management.

## Recommendations:

NZRTs request that the Bill is drafted to:

1. legislate for community and iwi Māori representation and participation throughout New Zealand's CDEM structure;

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2. provide clear direction and guidance to CDEM Groups and local authorities on maximising the use of community and iwi Māori resources during a disaster response;
3. make a clear distinction between spontaneous volunteers and trained, organised volunteer groups that are accredited under an agreed, disaster-response focussed framework;
4. legislate for a Volunteer Coordination role in the emergency management system to account for and manage spontaneous volunteers across all aspects of readiness, response and recovery;
5. set clear expectations for CDEM groups and local authorities, potentially in the form of a regulatory framework or set of guiding principles, on how to make the best use trained volunteer groups such as NZRTs;
6. provide a suitable accreditation pathway for non-accredited volunteer groups such as Taskforce Kiwi and Land Search and Rescue to be formally recognised and utilised by local authorities and emergency services during a disaster responses;
7. extend protection from civil liability for loss or damage to include situations where a local authority has deployed an accredited volunteer group, such as an NZRT, to respond to an event that has not reached the threshold for a declared emergency;
8. require all local authorities to contribute to a dedicated, centrally held fund that supports accredited volunteer groups such as NZRTs to have the resource they need to deploy effectively; and
9. legislate the provision of explicit funding pathways for volunteer groups and iwi Māori to be compensated for expenses incurred during and after a disaster event.

## Background

NZRTs are teams of qualified volunteer first responders supporting CDEM Grous, local authorities and their communities before, during and after emergency events. There are NZRTs throughout New Zealand. They are owned and/or supported either by territorial authorities or non-government organisations. NZRTs are trained to high standards and accredited in accordance with NEMA's Capability and Competency Framework.

NZRT volunteers work alongside emergency services and other responding agencies to provide surge support in large scale emergencies. They also support their local authorities to provide response services during events that do not meet the threshold of a declared emergency.

NZRT capabilities are based on the local hazards and risks within their regions. They can also be deployed to support emergency response activities across the country. There are currently over 400 members of NZRTs who, in 2024, were deployed to support 24 emergencies.

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## Discussion

### *Objectives for reform of the CDEM Act*

As a minimum for strengthening New Zealand's disaster resilience and emergency management, NZRTs support the Government's proposed objectives for reform.

The NZRT experience of disaster response is that local authorities and emergency services have an inconsistent approach to utilising trained volunteers during an emergency. This has led to underutilisation of volunteer resources during times of crisis.

Strengthening the role of trained volunteers through legislation and providing for clear accountabilities will enable NZRTs and other trained volunteer groups to be used more effectively and consistently during responses.

In addition, the Bill needs to provide a suitable accreditation pathway for other trained and capable volunteer groups to be formally recognised and utilised by local authorities and emergency services during a disaster response. Volunteer groups like Taskforce Kiwi and Land Search and Rescue make themselves available to respond to disasters but are at risk because they are currently not recognised under the CDEM framework. The Bill needs to provide a pathway like that of NZRTs for these groups to apply for and be recognised as emergency responders.

Such a framework would give CDEM Groups and local authorities more assurance when deploying additional volunteer resources.

### *Objective 1: strengthening community and iwi Māori participation*

NZRTs support the objective of strengthening community and iwi Māori participation before, during and after disaster strikes, and agree that there are many previous examples of where community skills and resources have been underutilised.

A key issue is that many CDEM Groups and local authorities do not understand or appreciate the latent resource sitting within their communities, and do not have the mandate or clear direction to utilise volunteers and iwi Māori to support response activities. This needs to change.

The new legislation needs to provide clear direction and guidance to CDEM Groups and local authorities on how to maximise the use of community skills, trained volunteer groups and iwi Māori resources during a disaster response. This is not a 'nice to have'. Rather, it must be enshrined in Act and monitored to ensure that local authorities incorporate community volunteer resources across the four Rs.

### *Objective 1 issue 3: strengthening and enabling community participation*

With respect to strengthening and enabling community participation in disaster responses, we believe that the problem definition does not go far enough. The Bill needs to make a clear distinction between spontaneous volunteers with individual skills and those of organised groups that are trained and accredited under a framework that is focussed on disaster response.

Spontaneous volunteers play an important role in local authority response activities and can provide valuable assistance in welfare support and council-led clean-up activities.

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Trained and accredited disaster response volunteer groups, on the other hand, are trained to a higher level and should be mandated to support emergency service operations where the risks are higher.

Under the options in Issue 3, developing guidance and strengthening public education is a good start, as is requiring CDEM group plans to state how they will manage public offers of assistance. For this to be effective and consistent across the country, however, the legislation needs to set clear expectations for CDEM groups and local authorities about how to use trained volunteer groups such as NZRTs, potentially in the form of a regulatory framework or set of guiding principles.

We would also like to see the bill provide for a Volunteer Coordination role in emergency management structures to account for and manage spontaneous volunteers across all aspects of readiness, response and recovery.

***Objective 1 issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency***

NZRTs support the Government decision to make it explicit that people acting under official direction are protected from civil liability where the loss or damage relates to a state of emergency or transition period.

We would like to see this taken further by extending protection from civil liability for loss or damage to include situations where a local authority has deployed a volunteer group such as NZRTs to respond to an event that has not reached the threshold for a declared emergency.

***Funding to support readiness activities of volunteer groups***

The discussion document is silent on how volunteer groups can be adequately funded to prepare for an emergency response. Currently, a small number of Councils provide funds to support their local NZRT, but this is ad hoc and inconsistent. It also creates an imbalance whereby some local authorities who do not contribute to the operational costs of maintaining an NZRT still expect to gain the benefit of having teams deployed to their region to support an emergency response.

One mechanism to address this issue would be to require all local authorities to contribute to a dedicated, centrally held fund that supports accredited volunteer groups such as NZRTs to have the resource they need to deploy effectively. This would address the current imbalance of funding and improve the resourcing of volunteer groups.

***Funding community and iwi Māori participation during an emergency***

During a disaster, local authorities rely on NZRTs and iwi Māori to provide vital resources to support response and recovery operations.

The discussion document, however, is silent on how these groups should be compensated for expenses incurred during and after an event.


We encourage officials to extend the Bill to legislate for the provision of explicit funding pathways for accredited volunteer groups and iwi Māori to be compensated for expenses incurred during and after a disaster event.

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## Conclusion

NZRTs support the overall direction and intention of the Emergency Management reform programme. Strengthening the role of volunteer groups such as NZRTs, iwi Māori and the community across the four Rs will lead to stronger response and recovery outcomes.

Unless the Government mandates compulsory direction to CDEM Groups and local authorities through legislation and regulation, there is a risk that little will change, and we will be facing the same questions when the next review rolls around. Including a clear monitoring framework in this process will hold local and regional leaders accountable for lifting capability and performance and provide for more consistency across the country.



Richard Hardie
Team Leader NZRT8
On behalf of the NZRT steering group

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Anna Thomson |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Manaaki Tāngata \| Victim Support New Zealand |

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Under section 71of the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015 (which supports the Act) Victim Support are listed as an agency providing support. Clarifying our organisation's role – which is to "facilitate access to approved counsellors (who will provide direct support to affected persons during and after an emergency)" and "to provide access in an emergency to trained support workers who deliver direct emotional and practical support, information, and personal advocacy to affected persons during and after emergencies, crime, and trauma, and to facilitate access to approved counsellors as required" would be beneficial to ensure that people are receiving the right support and stakeholders are clear about what organisations can offer.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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2. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 (legislative): Require Group Controllers (local emergency) or the Director (national emergency) to be the "Control Agency" might work best because then there would be clearer and more consistent expectations from the top about the roles of organisations (such as Victim Support).

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We consider that the guidance in respect of how agencies work together could also be updated to ensure roles are clear. The Plan Order has guidance which suggests that Victim Support should be 'contracted' as follows:

**Victim Support**

| | |
|---|---|
| **Function** | Victim Support provides 24-hour emotional support, personal advocacy and information to all people affected by crime and trauma throughout New Zealand. Victim Support may be contracted during emergencies to provide necessary welfare services as per the National CDEM Plan 2015. |
| **See** | • Section 14, Welfare services |

However, this is not how this appears to operate in practice – some clarification needs to occur here.

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New Zealand Banking Association
Te Rangapū Pēke

# Submission

to the

# National Emergency Management Agency

on the

# Discussion document: *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*

13 May 2025

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**NEW ZEALAND BANKING ASSOCIATION – TE RANGAPŪ PĒKE**
PO Box 3043, Wellington 6140, New Zealand
www.nzba.org.nz

## About NZBA

1. The New Zealand Banking Association – Te Rangapū Pēke (**NZBA**) is the voice of the banking industry. We work with our member banks on non-competitive issues to tell the industry's story and develop and promote policy outcomes that deliver for New Zealanders.

2. The following seventeen registered banks in New Zealand are members of NZBA:
   - ANZ Bank New Zealand Limited
   - ASB Bank Limited
   - Bank of China (NZ) Limited
   - Bank of New Zealand
   - China Construction Bank
   - Citibank N.A.
   - The Co-operative Bank Limited
   - Heartland Bank Limited
   - The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited
   - Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (New Zealand) Limited
   - JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.
   - KB Kookmin Bank Auckland Branch
   - Kiwibank Limited
   - Rabobank New Zealand Limited
   - SBS Bank
   - TSB Bank Limited
   - Westpac New Zealand Limited

## Contact details

3. If you would like to discuss any aspect of this submission, please contact:

Antony Buick-Constable
Deputy Chief Executive & General Counsel
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Policy Director & Legal Counsel
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## Introduction

4. NZBA welcomes the opportunity to provide feedback to the National Emergency Management Agency (**NEMA**) on the discussion document: *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation* (**Discussion Document**). NZBA acknowledges the work that has gone into developing the Discussion Document and appreciates the opportunity to contribute at an early stage to the reform of the emergency management legislation.

5. NZBA supports the Government's objective to minimise the impact of emergencies on essential services, so that communities can continue to function normally during an emergency – or return to normal as soon as possible.

6. Cyclone Gabrielle and other recent emergencies provide timely reminders of the interconnectedness and interdependencies between essential infrastructures that provide or enable essential services. As outlined in the Discussion Document, during Cyclone Gabrielle outages quickly cascaded across electricity, telecommunications and roading infrastructures, which impacted access to some banking services.

7. NZBA agrees that it is important that New Zealanders have confidence that they will have access to basic banking services (in particular, cash and payment services) during and after an emergency, and acknowledges that banks (as well as other participants) have a role to play in ensuring these services are available.

8. This submission focusses on issue 11 in the Discussion Document, which is to reduce disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services. In particular:

    8.1. whether the current lifeline utilities framework in the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (**CDEM Act**) should be replaced with an expanded, principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure";

    8.2. whether there should be minimum business continuity planning (**BCP**) requirements for essential infrastructure providers; and

    8.3. options to address barriers to co-operation and information sharing between essential infrastructure providers, government agencies and emergency services.

9. This submission has three main themes:

    9.1. Banks are heavily reliant on essential infrastructures, such as electricity, telecommunications and roading infrastructure, to provide access to banking services during and after an emergency. As reflected in Figure 5 of the Discussion Document, the disruption to payment services often occurs at the end of the 'chain of disruption'. Therefore, any requirements introduced by the Emergency Management Bill (**Bill**) should reflect that many essential

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infrastructures are often dependent on other essential infrastructures not being disrupted.

9.2. Cash and payment services are provided by multiple participants across complex supply chains. Therefore, any requirements should be proportionate and take into account an essential infrastructure provider's role in the supply chain, the dependencies that exist between various participants in the supply chain, and the essential infrastructure provider's ability to manage and control risks. The role of an essential infrastructure provider in an emergency will also depend on the nature, scope and scale of the emergency.

9.3. Any requirements introduced by the Bill should:

9.3.1. not be inconsistent with, not duplicate, seek to leverage and work together with the existing and proposed sector-based regulatory regimes that essential infrastructure providers are subject to; and

9.3.2. promote and facilitate coordination between essential infrastructure providers, sectoral regulators and the government agencies that are responsible for emergency management.

For instance, banks are subject to prudential regulation and supervision by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (**RBNZ**) under the Banking (Prudential Supervision) Act 1989, which will be replaced by the Deposit Takers Act 2023. The RBNZ requires banks to, among other things, have systems in place to monitor and manage material risks (including operational risks) and report internal outages and service failures. In addition, as Financial Market Authority (**FMA**) licensed 'financial institutions', banks are also required to comply with licence standard conditions for business continuity management.

## Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

10. NZBA supports the option to replace the current lifeline utilities framework with an expanded, principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure". Appendix C proposes that the Bill would set out a list of additional essential services, with corresponding essential infrastructure providers designated once the legislation is in force.

11. Two potential essential services that are set out in Appendix C that are relevant to basic banking services are:

11.1. vaulting, processing, settling distribution, withdrawal and deposit of New Zealand legal tender; and

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11.2. operations of systems, services and products that are critical to the initiation, instruction, authorisation, clearing and settlement of payments in New Zealand.

12. If this option is adopted, the Bill should set out a clear process to follow and criteria that must be met before an essential infrastructure provider or class of essential infrastructure providers is designated as such. The process should include the requirement to consult with proposed essential infrastructure providers, sectoral regulators and other affected persons. This would ensure a more informed and effective designation process. For instance, consultation feedback could help determine the scope of the appropriate class for designation, roles and responsibilities of those designated and any appropriate exemptions from requirements, having regard to existing sectoral regulatory obligations on that designated essential infrastructure provider or class of essential infrastructure providers.

13. Essential services often involve multiple participants across complex supply chains. For example, the provision of cash services involves the central bank, bank and non-bank deposit taker branches and ATMs, independent ATM providers, cash-in-transit firms, mobile money providers and merchants. The ability of banks to provide cash services is reliant on the provision of services by other participants in the supply chain. Similarly, the provision of payment services involves the central bank, banks, payment service providers (including card schemes and point-of-sale providers) and merchants. Given the interdependencies between the many participants in the supply chain, designation as an essential infrastructure provider should reflect the particular functions and roles each participant performs in the provision of an essential service with clear requirements for specific functions and roles. On a related note, Issue 13 of the Discussion Document, which relates to managing access to restricted areas, should be considered in a way to support the ability of essential infrastructure providers to carry out their functions and roles.

14. Not all services that are provided by an essential infrastructure provider will be essential services. Designation as an essential infrastructure provider should identify the functions and roles each participant performs in the supply chain and clarify that an essential infrastructure provider is only treated as such (and that the requirements under the Bill only apply) to the extent that the essential infrastructure provider provides an essential service. The role of an essential infrastructure provider in an emergency may also depend on the nature, scope and scale of the emergency. For instance, an entity designated as an essential infrastructure provider should not be treated as such in a region where the provider has no or a limited physical presence.

15. Finally, changes to technology, consumer behaviour and sectors may over time change what is considered to be an essential service and who should be subject to the EM Bill. For example, recent changes to the cash system include a significant increase in the cash distributed by independent ATM providers.

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## Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

16. NZBA agrees that essential infrastructure providers should understand the risks they face, prepare for potential disruption, and manage disruptions effectively when they occur. Where essential infrastructure providers are not currently subject to minimum business continuity planning requirements, it makes sense that they should be.

17. Any minimum business continuity planning requirements that are imposed on essential infrastructures providers should have regard to existing and proposed regulatory regimes that essential infrastructure providers are subject to. For instance, banks are subject to sector-specific regulations that are imposed by the RBNZ as the prudential regulator and the FMA as the conduct regulator.

18. To avoid unnecessary duplication and implementation costs, any minimum business continuity planning requirements that are introduced should not be inconsistent with, not duplicate, seek to leverage and work together with sector-based regulatory regimes. In some cases, it may be appropriate for certain designated essential infrastructure providers or classes of essential infrastructure providers to be exempted from minimum business continuity planning requirements under the Bill where they are subject to equivalent requirements under existing regulatory regimes.

19. Even with business continuity plans that comply with minimum regulatory requirements, banks remain heavily reliant on other essential infrastructures, such as electricity, telecommunications and roading infrastructure, to provide access to banking services. To support the provision of essential services during and after an emergency, it will be important that the needs of essential infrastructure providers are considered in the development of emergency management plans (for example, via prioritised access to particular resources, such as fuel for electricity generators), which will require engagement with NEMA and CDEM Groups.

20. Finally, it should be recognised that during an emergency essential infrastructure providers will require a degree of flexibility in determining how to allocate finite resources to enable communities to continue to "function normally" following an emergency (such as electricity generators and secure transport vehicles), which might result in needs-based rationing of essential services.

## Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

*Information sharing*

21. Banks are subject to reporting and other information gathering powers under different legislative regimes and have established processes to securely share information with regulators.

22. It is important that any reporting or information gathering powers in the Bill are accompanied by information sharing protections to protect against improper use or

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disclosure by recipients. Information that relates to business continuity management, event management, internal outages, service failures or cash and payment services is likely to be sensitive.

23. Information sharing protections may include:

    23.1. statutory obligations to treat information gathered as confidential;

    23.2. offence and penalty provisions for unauthorised use and disclosure by recipients of information; and

    23.3. appropriate protections from the application of the Official Information Act 1992 and the Privacy Act 2020 for information that is supplied by essential infrastructure providers under the Bill.

24. Many essential infrastructure providers have a national presence and operate essential infrastructures that may span across multiple regions and CDEM Groups. Therefore, consideration should be given to ways to standardise information requests to avoid multiple and inconsistent requests.

25. Consideration should also be given to the extent to which essential infrastructure providers' information might be shared at a sector level with a regulator where the emergency response is coordinated by that regulator (as opposed to essential infrastructure providers contributing direct to emergency management plans). This approach might also better leverage existing information sharing regulatory protections.

*Barriers to cooperation*

26. As discussed earlier in this submission, the provision of essential services often involves multiple participants across a complex supply chain. Clearer statutory protections from the application of the Commerce Act 1986 for emergency planning and response could promote greater sector-wide coordination, which could prevent unnecessary duplication and implementation costs and improve emergency preparation and management.

27. Sector-wide coordination can help to ensure that business continuity readiness can be maintained in a cost effective manner. This could be led by sectoral regulators or government agencies that are responsible for emergency management. For example, as part of the RBNZ's stewardship mandate for money and cash the RBNZ has a work programme to strengthen the resilience of the cash system, with a particular focus on branches, ATMs and cash-in-transit.

28. Finally, it is important that NEMA remains aware of sector-wide and regulatory initiatives and engages with relevant stakeholders as it develops the EM Bill to avoid unnecessary duplication and implementation costs.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Carol Comber |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | n/a |

☐ The Privacy Act 2020 applies to submissions. Please tick the box if you **do not** want your name or other personal information to be included in any information about submissions that NEMA may publish.

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I do not want my submission published on NEMA's website because...

### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I agree that the problem has been partially well-described. I agree that the needs of older people and people with dementia need to be well considered.

My main concern is for water storage capacity for people living in social/public housing and people living in apartments with insufficient space to store enough water. This concern may be specific to preparedness for an earthquake in Wellington, as the situation with water pipes in Wellington is precarious. The NEMA water storage guidance is 3 litres of water per

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person for 3 days (9 litres per person for a week). In Wellington the Wellington Regional Emergency Office (WREMO) guidance is 20 litres of water per day per person for 7 days (140 litres per person per week). Underground water supply pipes won't stand up to the force of a major quake. We [Wellington Water] estimate around 75 per cent of the 2,000 kilometres of buried pipes will be damaged[1], and some suburbs could be without water for more than 100 days after a major earthquake[2]. (Refer to Wellington Water's publication Wellington's above ground emergency water network which details the alternative emergency water measures that are to be instigated during the first week after a major earthquake to provide water. [1]Page 6, [2]Page 3).

I would like to see legislation in place that will make it mandatory for developers to plan for and provide adequate space for bulk water storage, and for landlords/body corporates to be required to maintain the bulk water supply, including replacing the water annually and ensuring the water tank is cleaned. This would include social housing landlords. N.B. There are thin tanks on the market which would take up less space than a traditional large round tank, and which could be retrofitted.

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

I am sure that lots of people/groups may be 'under the radar', for example, some people are not connected with the communities around them, they prefer to keep their own company.

In terms of cultural understanding, please reach out to the leaders and faith leaders of groups who may not be planning for an emergency, and to school communities and local council staff who have a strong network reaching a wide variety of different communities. It may take patience and several approaches before people are ready to speak about what their cultural concerns are. Students whose world view spans several cultures could play a role in breaking down the reticience of their elders to seek information about emergency-related topics.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

Planning would have a strong local focus. Requiring CDEM leaders to identify and work with people who may be disproportionately affected by a natural emergency is a sensible approach. It is understandable that people who have a long history of living somewhere that has been identified as prone to natural disaster could be reluctant to accept mitigations for their situation.

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I support Option 2 (non-legislative) - develop guidance on meeting diverse needs. I see this as being the most flexible option that will allow emergency management options to be used to suit different situations, while still giving guidance on the spirit of the requirement.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I think that the key to communicating with communities is not to think that this is a one-off exercise. Building trust and increasing knowledge is a gradual and on-going process. People absorb information at their own pace, building on what they are already familiar with.

You are probably aware of the WREMO Community Emergency Hub model? This model utilises 'roles' as part of the Hub emergency response (e.g. the Needs/Offers role would follow-up with anyone making an offer); Page 31 of the Newtown Hub Guide shows all the 'roles'; further explanation of the 'roles' is in the preceding pages. Anyone who turns up to help during an emergency can take on a role and will wear a lanyard to indicate their role at the Hub.

The strength of the Hub model is that it gives *agency* to community members during an emergency response. Agency is a vital element for the response. A discussion on what is required to bring a community together for successful emergency preparedness can be found in this article in the International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, Vol 118, 15 February 2025, 105218– Das M, Becker, J, and Doyle, EEH, *One big team working together' - Shifting narratives to encourage civic participation and collective action in disaster preparedness.*

Section 5 – Your Community's Response in the Hub Guide is excellent (again, the Newtown Hub Guide is a good example). Section 5 is the collected local knowledge

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from the community of all the groups, medical facilities, schools, etc., operating in the area local to the Hub.

The extension of creating the Section 5 list would be to make contact with all of the listed groups and businesses to ensure that they are well-informed about emergency preparedness and aware of the Hub's existence and its role during an emergency.

I do not agree with all of the elements of the Hub model, e.g. it provides a place to go to during the day, but does not cater for anyone dislodged overnight, e.g. central city residents in Wellington who may have evacuated due to a tsunami warning and who have not secured temporary accommodation. The Hub does not store any food to offer people - some plain biscuits and teabags would surely be useful.

I feel that there is a disconnect between collating the list of community groups and actualising the benefit of using the list of community groups to make contacts and spread the word about preparedness and the existence of the Hub.

The Ministry of Education provides good guidance for emergency planning. I think these plans could be exploited to reinforce a stronger appreciation of emergency management planning by bringing similar groups together to talk about their plans and compare notes, e.g. preschools or schools that are located in the same area may face similar challenges.

I see an emergency plan as a starting point, not an end-point, i.e. the plan allows people to think about how an emergency would pan out. The plan should not be regarded as a tick in the box that is shelved for another year.

16. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I support Option 2 (non-legislative): Develop and update guidance and strengthen public education. There needs to be flexibility to localise the approach to fit different communities of place.

Ideally there would be a lot more contact with communities/groups to build up their knowledge than I am aware of happening at present; this requires time. Community volunteers could do some of this mahi, but placing the value of paid work on this important local mahi would be appropriate.

17. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I support both Option 2 (legislative): Provide for protection from civil liability and Option 3 (legislative): Enable compensation for labour costs. I believe that the majority of people will act in good faith in an emergency. Emergencies can escalate quickly, so we need to empower people who are on site before the emergency becomes official. Where a person is using their work skills in an emergency situation it is reasonable to compensate them.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I believe that pharmacies are an essential infrastructure that should be treated as a lifeline service. Many people take medications daily and rely on their pharmacy to supply repeat prescriptions. In some cases, e.g. methadone treatment, a person is required to be present at the pharmacy to consume their treatment. Pharmacies can also provide important health information.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

As in question 63 – Pharmacies.

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I support Option 2 (legislative): Enable authorised persons to use electronic signatures.

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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Feedback from

Raukawa

To

# National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)

On

# Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

13 May 2025

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13 May 2025

Policy Unit
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Email: EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

Tēnā tātou katoa,

**RAUKAWA SUBMISSION: STRENGTHENING NEW ZEALAND'S EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION DISCUSSION DOCUMENT**

## 1. INTRODUCTION

**1.1.** This submission on strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management legislation is made on behalf of the Raukawa Settlement Trust [RST] and the Raukawa Charitable Trust [RCT] on behalf of the Raukawa iwi.

**1.2.** The Raukawa Settlement Trust (RST) represents 16 marae and is the post-settlement governance entity for Raukawa. The RCT is mandated by RST, as the iwi authority, to represent Raukawa for resource management purposes.

**1.3.** Raukawa's 16 marae are located across four traditional pou whenua: Te Pae o Raukawa, Wharepūhunga, Maungatautari and Te Kaokaoroa O Pātetere. These four areas include Mōkai, Atiamuri, Whakamaru, Mangakino, Arapuni, Tokoroa, Putāruru, Tīrau, Tapapa, Matamata, Kēmureti (Cambridge), Kihikihi and Te Awamutu. This network provides Raukawa with deep, place-based relationships, trusted community connections, local knowledge, and a strong boots-on-the-ground presence across the takiwā.

**1.4.** Raukawa welcome the opportunity to respond to the discussion document on Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation. We commend the intent to improve system-wide coordination, equity, and resilience.

**1.5.** Our submission addresses all five legislative reform objectives and incorporates the lessons and leadership demonstrated by Raukawa during the COVID-19 pandemic The Raukawa-led response was informed, measured and met immediate needs, built long-term resilience, and strengthened community trust, emphasising the critical role of iwi as partners in emergency management.

**1.6.** Our submission also emphasises the importance of coherence and integration across wider government reforms and strategic frameworks, including resource management, climate adaptation, infrastructure, and cyber resilience.

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**1.7.** Building on this leadership, Raukawa is leading an iwi-centred initiative to strengthen the resilience of our marae in the face of climate-related emergencies. This includes a marae-centric climate change risk framework, enhanced emergency preparedness, and community cohesion, all of which align with the objectives of this reform.

**1.8.** Raukawa seek legislative and policy settings that enable iwi to participate directly and meaningfully in emergency management across planning, governance, and delivery functions. This requires formal recognition of our role as a Te Tiriti partner, as re-affirmed through our Treaty Settlement arrangements. Resourcing and authority to lead must be consistent with these legislative arrangements and reflect the status and responsibilities conferred through them.

**1.9.** This submission builds on the position outlined in our November 2023 submission on the Emergency Management Bill, which forms a foundational context for this submission and is **attached** by reference.

## 2. Raukawa Treaty Settlement Arrangements

**2.1.** Our Treaty settlement arrangements include:

a. A comprehensive settlement of our historical Treaty of Waitangi claims as set out in the Deed of Settlement dated 2 June 2012 and given effect to by the Raukawa Claims Settlement Act 2014 [the Raukawa settlement].
b. The co-management arrangements for the Waikato River as set out in the 17 December 2017 Deed and the Ngāti Tūwharetoa, Raukawa and Te Arawa River Iwi Waikato River Act 2010 [the Waikato River arrangements].
c. The Central North Island forests collective iwi settlement as set out in the 25 June 2008 Deed of Settlement and the North Island Forests Land Collective Settlement Act 2008 [the CNI settlement]; and
d. Interests in a number of other settlement arrangements, including fisheries settlements and co-management arrangements for Te Waihou River that are provided for in the Hauraki collective settlement.

**2.2.** Our river settlement arrangements include specific acknowledgement that 'the settlement is intended to enhance the ongoing relationship between Raukawa and the Crown (in terms of the Treaty of Waitangi, its principles, and otherwise).'

**2.3.** Included in our settlement arrangements are a number of instruments that were designed to enhance the Raukawa-Crown relationship in the context of the terms and principles of Te Tiriti. The aim of these is to grow a true partnership for all matters relating to social, cultural, environmental, and economic outcomes for our iwi, hapū and marae.

**2.4.** This includes mechanisms such as Joint Management Agreements [JMA's] within our takiwā, accords with several Crown agencies and Ministers, overlay classifications, statutory acknowledgements, and deeds of recognition, the establishment of the Waikato River Authority [WRA], and the creation of Te Ture Whaimana.



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**Specific Comments on the Consultation Discussion Document**

## Objective 1: Strengthening Community and Iwi Māori Participation in Emergency Management

**3.** Raukawa support the direction to ensure the system recognises and meets the diverse needs of communities. However, Raukawa are of the view that the unique status of iwi as Treaty partners requires explicit recognition distinct from general community needs.

**4.** Legislative mechanisms must go beyond consultation to enable co-design of emergency management services and plans with iwi. This must include recognition of tikanga Māori, whānau-centred response models, and resourcing for marae to function as primary community response hubs. Diversity must not be treated as a catch-all category that dilutes tangata whenua-specific responsibilities.

**5.** Marae in the Raukawa takiwā are critical community anchors but often excluded from mainstream emergency planning. Legislation must recognise cultural, geographic, and infrastructure differences and ensure Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) planning reflects these. This includes enabling marae-based evacuation, communication, and supply protocols.

**6.** The current emergency management system under the CDEM Act 2002 has failed to fully operationalise the Treaty partnership. Iwi are inconsistently involved, often at the discretion of local CDEM leadership, and without formal status in governance, planning, or real-time emergency response.

**7.** The role of iwi was clearly demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Raukawa, in collaboration with other Tainui Waka iwi including Waikato-Tainui, Maniapoto, and Hauraki, established a regionally coordinated and iwi-led pandemic response that included:

a. Establishing localised call centres and digital communications platforms;
b. Coordinating kai and hygiene supply chains across the rohe;
c. Delivering urgent welfare and health care support to kaumātua, isolated whānau, and marae-based communities;
d. Developing marae readiness plans and deploying contactless delivery infrastructure;
e. Providing data to and coordinating with DHBs, Police, Civil Defence, and MSD across multiple territorial boundaries.
f. Establishing Marae based testing facilities that serviced rural, isolated communities that otherwise may have been missed.

**8.** These efforts were critical in filling service gaps and delivering culturally appropriate support. They were also delivered at significant financial and logistical cost to iwi, without guaranteed resourcing or recognition. The *Tainui Waka Iwi Response to the Covid*



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*Pandemic* (2023) provides an extensive review of these efforts, with Raukawa identified as a proactive leader in communications, supply chain delivery, and whānau outreach.

**9.** Raukawa are of the view that the legislation must:

a. Statutorily require iwi participation in CDEM governance, planning, and implementation;
b. Establish a national Māori Emergency Management Advisory Committee with oversight and strategic input roles;
c. Mandate co-development of CDEM Group Plans with iwi, including shared resourcing agreements;
d. Provide for iwi-led or jointly led emergency responses through formalised powers.

**10.** Upholding the Crown's Treaty Settlement obligations, including those made to Raukawa, requires more than policy preference; it requires a commitment to the relational redress embedded in our treaty settlements. These obligations are enduring and must be meaningfully reflected in how the Crown partners with iwi in disaster management frameworks.

**11.** Our treaty settlement arrangements affirm the Crown's commitment to working with Raukawa as a Treaty partner, including through statutory acknowledgements and protocols that relate directly to natural hazard management and emergency response. As such, CDEM Group Plans must actively incorporate these commitments, ensuring Raukawa has a clear, co-developed role in planning, decision-making, and response mechanisms consistent with both the intent and the letter of the settlement.

**12.** Finally, it is important that the legislative framework does not compel or prescribe marae participation in emergency management in ways that override mana whenua decision-making. Participation must be determined at place, by iwi and hapū themselves, reflecting their unique circumstances, capacity, and aspirations.

**13.** However, it is equally critical that the legislative framework fully enables and supports iwi and marae to participate at their discretion, by providing the necessary authority, flexibility, and resourcing when they choose to lead or engage.

**Objective 2: Providing for Clear Responsibilities and Accountabilities at National, Regional, and Local Levels**

**14.** Clarity of responsibility is essential, especially when multiple agencies interact in high-stakes crisis situations. The current legislative framework often treats iwi as informal stakeholders, despite Treaty settlements and governance arrangements establishing clear legal roles.

**15.** Raukawa recommends that the legislation:

a. define PSGEs like RST as formal entities under the emergency management system, with specific statutory rights and responsibilities;



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b. require all CDEM Groups and Coordinating Executive Groups to enter into formal relationship agreements with iwi in their regions;
c. establish reporting obligations on agencies to demonstrate how iwi have been involved in planning, decision-making, and post-event evaluation.

**16.** The need for cross-agency coherence is paramount. A lack of alignment across reforms and sectoral strategies poses a significant risk to iwi, particularly in hazard-prone and climate-vulnerable areas. Specifically:

a. Resource Management Reform must not permit infrastructure development in high-risk locations without iwi input and hazard risk reconciliation;
b. The National Adaptation Plan must be linked to CDEM planning, with iwi co-leadership on climate risk assessment and adaptation investment;
c. Public Works Act emergency provisions must protect iwi land and Treaty settlement assets from compulsory acquisition without appropriate safeguards;
d. Cybersecurity Strategy for Critical Infrastructure must consider iwi data sovereignty and service continuity for iwi-led hubs;
e. Local Government Reform must avoid fragmentation of service delivery and enable regional partnerships with iwi;
f. The National Risk and Resilience Framework must explicitly include iwi as contributors and owners of community-based risk knowledge and scenario planning.

**17.** Without alignment, government risks undermining its own disaster resilience objectives.

**Objective 3: Enabling a Higher Minimum Standard of Emergency Management**

**18.** Raukawa supports national standards for emergency preparedness, but these must include minimum engagement and capacity-building requirements for iwi. Many iwi currently operate below capacity due to lack of dedicated funding, access to hazard information, and inclusion in training or intelligence briefings.

**19.** Raukawa recommend that the legislation:

a. require CDEM Groups to provide resources to support iwi-led emergency management plans, infrastructure, and capability development;
b. mandate the inclusion of iwi in emergency simulations, readiness drills, and recovery design processes;
c. establish standardised iwi engagement protocols and performance measures for implementation.

**20.** Raukawa are leading a five-year marae resilience initiative grounded in the Raukawa Climate Change Strategy – Te Tahatū o Te Rangi, Mōtai ki te Whenua. This includes marae-specific emergency management plans, GIS vulnerability mapping, climate risk assessments, and the development of locally relevant response networks that include cultural knowledge holders and trained personnel. This proactive, marae-centric approach demonstrates what locally led, Treaty-consistent emergency management looks like, and provides a model that can be supported and scaled nationally.



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**21.** In addition, emergency management must not operate in isolation. The science, innovation, and technology system must enable iwi-led data collection, scenario modelling, and digital infrastructure development. Iwi must be provided access to hazard mapping, predictive tools, and other intelligence platforms to support timely, place-based action.

**Objective 4: Minimising Disruption to Essential Services**

**22.** The concept of essential services must be expanded to include marae, whānau service providers, and iwi communication infrastructure. These played a critical role during COVID-19 and will remain vital in future emergency contexts.

**23.** Raukawa recommends:

a. marae and iwi facilities be classified as essential service infrastructure in legislation;
b. DHBs, utility providers, and emergency response agencies be required to integrate iwi facilities into their continuity and recovery plans;
c. cyber resilience and emergency communications protocols include protections for iwi data, platforms, and digital systems;
d. supply chain resilience strategies include mechanisms for iwi to lead and deliver direct support to communities during periods of disruption.

**24.** In the 2020-21 pandemic, Raukawa helped maintain medical, social, and wellbeing services across rural and urban communities within our takiwā. This included partnering with the Waikato DHB to deliver the COVID-19 vaccination programme, where Raukawa led outreach exceeded the agency's three-month Māori and Pasifika vaccination target within just two days. This demonstrated iwi capacity to operate as essential service providers under pressure. That capability must be recognised, formalised, and resourced in the design of the future emergency management system.

**Objective 5: Having the Right Powers Available When an Emergency Happens**

**25.** Legislation must enable the Crown to act quickly and lawfully, but it must also empower iwi who are often the first to respond due to their on-the-ground presence, deep local knowledge, and trusted networks across communities. Raukawa's 16 marae are distributed across remote and rural areas where nationally, regional, and local response capacity may be delayed or limited. In such cases, iwi-led activation is not only faster, it is essential.

**26.** Raukawa recommends:

a. Iwi be legally empowered to activate local emergency responses in their rohe, particularly where State or local presence is limited;
b. emergency powers under the proposed Act be subject to checks that ensure Treaty settlement protections and cultural sites are not unjustifiably impacted;

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c. clear protocols be developed for shared decision-making during emergencies involving marae or iwi populations;
d. the system recognises that in certain instances, iwi may lead or co-lead responses, with government agencies operating in support.

**27.** Embedding these provisions will enhance the legitimacy, responsiveness, and equity of New Zealand's emergency response system, and ensure compliance with the Crown's Te Tiriti o Waitangi obligations.

**Conclusion**

Raukawa supports the reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation and acknowledges the Crown's intent to modernise and strengthen the system. For this reform to be enduring and effective, new legislation must embed the role of iwi as Te Tiriti partners and ensure that our leadership, local knowledge, and networks are meaningfully reflected throughout the system. Specifically, we recommend that the legislation:

- Recognise iwi as Treaty partners and statutory actors in emergency management;
- Establish clear, enforceable mechanisms for iwi participation in governance, planning, and response functions;
- Align with and reinforce other broader government reforms, including RM reform, climate adaptation, cyber security, and local government reform;
- Commit to sustained investment in iwi capacity, infrastructure, and workforce development;
- Provide pathways for the devolution of emergency management powers and responsibilities to iwi where appropriate and agreed.

Raukawa welcomes ongoing engagement with the Minister and officials and is ready to partner in the co-design the next phase of legislation. Together, we can shape an emergency management system is equitable, durable, and resilient.


Ngā mihi

Anaru Begbie
**Group Manager – Pūtake Taiao**
**Raukawa Charitable Trust**

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**National Strategy Manager – Pūtake Taiao**
**Raukawa Charitable Trust**

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**Appendix One – Raukawa Takiwā and Area of Association**




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Submission from

Raukawa

To

# Governance and Administration Committee

On

# Emergency Management Bill

1 November 2023

**Contact person**

Anaru Begbie, Group Manager, Pūtake Taiao

**Email:** s9(2)(a) | **Phone:** s9(2)(a)

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1 November 2023

Governance and Administration Committee
Parliament Buildings
**WELLINGTON 6143**

By email: ga@parliament.govt.nz

Tēnā koe,

**SUBMISSION ON THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT BILL**

**INTRODUCTION**

1.1. Raukawa welcomes the opportunity from the Governance and Administration Committee ("**G&A Committee**") to make a submission on the Emergency Management Bill ("**Bill**").

1.2. This submission is made by the Raukawa Charitable Trust[1] ("**RCT**") on behalf of the Raukawa Settlement Trust ("**RST**")[2].

2. **RAUKAWA POSITION – SUMMARY OF OUR KEY POINTS**

2.1. Overall, Raukawa support the general intent of the Bill which aims to improve the emergency management system performance and capability, recognising and providing for Māori participation in emergency management and improving risk awareness.

2.2. Raukawa however, are of the view that there are parts of the Bill that are vague and ambiguous which could result in our inability to exercise mana whakahaere in our takiwā. This, in turn, has a direct impact on the ability to respond effectively to emergencies.

2.3. Raukawa endorse a Tiriti-based approach in the future design and implementation of the emergency management system and this approach must be reflected in this Bill. The Crown cannot depart from their Treaty obligations. They must ensure that Raukawa are equitably represented on decision-making bodies and that our views are reflected in the decisions of those bodies, that impact social, environmental, cultural and economic outcomes in our takiwā.

2.4. Raukawa also want to ensure that at an operational level, that when an emergency event occurs, our iwi and marae can care and protect for our people and communities. The Bill does not directly provide for this and relies on local authorities and Emergency Management Committees ("**EMCs**") to deliver this operational intent for us.

2.5. To improve the Bill, Raukawa seek changes to:

[1] RCT, is the social development arm of RST, and is responsible for ensuring the delivery of services and initiatives that aim to drive iwi and community wellbeing, environmental sustainability, and the revitalisation of Raukawatanga
[2] The RST was established in 2009/10 as the Post Settlement Governance Entity for Raukawa and represents 16 marae throughout our rohe including various hapu



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a. Strengthen the provision for Te Tiriti o Waitangi/Treaty of Waitangi;
b. Directly recognise marae in the Bill;
c. Provide greater certainly for iwi and marae to actively participate in the design and delivery of the Emergency Management System at place;
d. Improve the appointment and membership provisions of the Emergency Management Committees ("**EMCs**");
e. Seek a clearer position of the funding provision policies, specifically to ensure a high trust funding model and flexible policies are included;

2.6. To strengthen the Emergency Management System, Raukawa seek further consideration that iwi are prescribed opportunities within the Bill that direct local councils to include iwi and marae representatives into the operation of the CIMs structure.

2.7. This will require capability and capacity training currently delivered to local and central government staff and volunteers. The outcomes of this type of inclusion will instil confidence in the legislation, systems and processes utilised during a state of emergency by iwi and marae.

2.8. This will also enhance and foster relationships between iwi and persons responsible for ensuring the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi are given effect to and move towards a visual partnership when a state of emergency occurs. This is particularly relevant to rural communities, which our takiwā primarily consists of.

**RAUKAWA – WHO WE ARE**

2.9. Raukawa is a large iwi associated with a significant area of the central North Island that is rich in natural and cultural heritage, as well as being a key area for energy and primary production for the country.

2.10. The Raukawa takiwā is represented by four traditional rohe: Te Pae O Raukawa, Wharepūhunga, Maungatautari and Te Kaokaoroa O Pātetere. These four areas include Mōkai, Atiamuri, Whakamaru, Mangakino, Arapuni, Tokoroa, Putāruru, Tīrau, Tapapa, Matamata, Kēmureti (Cambridge), Kihikihi and Te Awamutu.

2.11. The Raukawa Claims Settlement Act[3] was passed in 2014. This Act, along with the Central North Island Forests Land Collective Settlement Act 2008[4], Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claim) Settlement Act 1992[5], and Ngati Tuwharetoa, Raukawa, and Te Arawa River Iwi Waikato River Act 2010[6] form part of the comprehensive redress package for our iwi.

2.12. Inclusive in the redress package, are key treaty instruments that were designed to reflect a trajectory of the Raukawa-Crown Treaty relationship of true partnership for all matters relating to social, cultural, environmental, and economic outcomes for our iwi, hapū and marae. For Raukawa, and in the context of this Bill, this includes all aspects of emergency management in our takiwā.

2.13. Raukawa continue to stress the importance of enabling and providing for an effective and collective Raukawa voice across our takiwā. We remind the Crown of the underlying intent of our settlement

[3] Raukawa Claims Settlement Act 2014
[4] Central North Island Forests Land Collective Settlement Act 2008
[5] Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settlement Act 1992
[6] Ngati Tuwharetoa, Raukawa, and Te Arawa River Iwi Waikato River Act 2010



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arrangements in working to establish a distinct Raukawa presence in decision making processes and that this voice is given space to influence decision making across the entirety of our takiwā.

**RAUKAWA – OUR VISION**

2.14. Our 2030 vision *Raukawa Kia Mau achieve and Thriving Raukawa Iwi*[7], encompasses who we are, describes the future we want to achieve, and brings us together in shared purpose. It is an ambitious and intergenerational goal to inspire, motivate and guide our strategic thinking, our decision-making, and our behaviours.

2.15. The outcome we seek for Raukawa iwi by 2030 as part of this vision is that 'the well-being of Ngā Uri o Te Poari Matua o Raukawa [RST] has been enhanced and our kaitiakitanga o Te Taiao and our resources has been strengthened'.

**MANAAKITANGA DURING TIMES OF CRISIS**

2.16. When disaster hits, whether it be a natural disaster, pandemic or otherwise, our uri turn to our iwi and marae for manaaki and support. Cyclone Gabrielle, Auckland Floods, Whakaari Island eruption and the Covid-19 Pandemic response highlights the key role iwi and marae have during an emergency event.

2.17. During an emergency event, iwi and marae respond in real time to the safety and wellbeing of all people within their communities. This is often done at pace and before the Coordinated Integrated Management System (CIMS) structure is in full operation. The value of manaakitanga[8] is a responsibility for Iwi and marae to care and protect for their communities and their environment.

2.18. Raukawa recognise the importance of working in partnership with statutory agencies and stakeholders to achieve positive and holistic outcomes that meet the social, environmental, cultural and economic needs of our people, communities and our environment during an emergency event. Collectivising iwi and uniting statutory bodies in emergency management responses will be key in achieving these outcomes.

2.19. The success of collectivising iwi was demonstrated during the Covid-19 pandemic response. Raukawa recommend that the G&A committee review and adopt key recommendations outlined in the publication "*Amohia Ake te orange o te iwi, kia puta ki te wheiao – Iwi Response to Covid Pandemic*"[9] commissioned by the Tainui Waka Confederation: Maniapoto, Waikato-Tainui, Raukawa and Hauraki.

2.20. Raukawa also recommend that the G&A committee seek direct consultation with the Tainui Waka Confederation to explore the recommendations of this report to enhance iwi and marae participation in Emergency Management.

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[7] 'About Our Organisation', *Raukawa Settlement Trust* https://raukawa.org.nz/about-our-orgaisation

[8] **Manaakitanga**: It is a powerful way of expressing how Māori communities care about each other's wellbeing, nurture relationships, and engage with one another. The value of Manaakitanga is often expressed through the responsibility to care and protect. Manaaki is to support, take care of, give hospitality and protect.

[9] *"Amohia Ake te orange o te iwi, kia puta ki te wheiao – Iwi Response to Covid Pandemic"* commissioned by the Tainui Waka Confederation: Maniapoto, Waikato-Tainui, Raukawa and Hauraki (2023)

**Balancing across other proposed legislation and National policy guidance**

2.21. Raukawa are conscious of the various reform[10] programmes that have concluded recently and those that are still live including the ongoing call for public submissions for matters relating to Climate Change management and response.

2.22. Raukawa are actively engaging and participating in all reform programmes. We would like to draw the attention of the G&A committee to our submission to the Parliament's Environment Committee on the Inquiry into Climate Change Adaptation.

2.23. That submission should be read alongside and form part of our submission to this Bill. We note that the inquiry has a specific interest (amongst others) in understanding potential institutional arrangements, including roles and responsibilities of central and local government agencies, iwi and hapū.

2.24. Raukawa note in our inquiry submission that any system for adaptation must provide for the Crown and Māori, and specifically the role of manawhenua as kaitiaki at place. This is across a system that includes both adaptation pre and post disaster. This includes being part of discussions to mitigate for the effects and putting in place response mechanisms that do not disproportionately effect iwi but recognise ongoing and enduring adaptation to respond accordingly to changing climatic conditions and hazard risk through a te Tiriti and mātauranga lens. Such a system needs a robust funding and financing model.

2.25. As noted in the Briefing on Māori climate adaptation[11] to the Māori Affairs committee, it is not possible to design an appropriate response without understanding the nature of the connection of Māori to place.

2.26. Understanding the role and responsibility of Raukawa as manawhenua is supported by early and meaningful system design and implementation including pre and post planning disaster management, response, and post recovery. The proposed amendments we are seeking in this submission will help to strengthen the role of Raukawa across a whole of system approach to climate change adaptation, which includes emergency management resulting from climate change.

2.27. In addition to the above, we anticipate further national guidance on natural hazards, and ongoing iterations of the National Planning Framework for example. We reiterate that Raukawa must be an integral part of the design and construction of the Emergency Management System.

2.28. Finally, Raukawa urge the Crown to stop agencies working in silos from each other. The myriad of overlapping and complex mechanisms that are coming to fruition because of all the Resource Management Reform, Water Services Reform and Local Government Reform places significant pressure on Iwi to engage at pace. As noted in "*Amohia Ake te orange o te iwi, kia puta ki te wheiao – Iwi Response to Covid Pandemic*" report:

> *'it is difficult to create systemic and transformational change without multi-agency buy in. Crown agencies further need to recognise the relationship and long-term nature of iwi relationships. There is one iwi and many crown agencies in each rohe.*

[10] Water Services, Resource Management, Critical Infrastructure and Community-led retreat.
[11] Briefing on Māori Climate Adaptation: Report of the Māori Affairs Committee (June 2023)



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*Iwi may have limited resources and staffing to work with all regional and national agencies separately. A joined-up approach in areas of similarity on behalf of crown agencies are preferable'.*

## RAUKAWA- THE CHANGES WE ARE SEEKING

3. **STRENGTHENING TE TIRITI O WAITANGI/TREAY OF WAITANGI PROVISIONS**

3.1. Raukawa supports the inclusion of a Te Tiriti Clause in this Bill. As we have already highlighted, the Crown has obligations under Te Tiriti, and Raukawa agree that a Te Tiriti clause is essential to support National Emergency Management Agency and other parties to exercise their obligations and powers and to ensure that the needs of Māori are met equitably and appropriately[12].

3.2. Raukawa however, disagree with the quasi- descriptive clause that has been adopted in this Bill. The clause does not go far enough in making it clear that persons exercising powers and performing functions and duties under this Bill must give effect to the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi/Treaty of Waitangi.

3.3. We understand that Te Arawhiti has provided some guidance on the types of Te Tiriti clauses that might be used in legislation and believe that the use of a 'descriptive' clause in this context is inconsistent with the guidance. As the Bill provides for several delegated functions or decisions, some of which have significant impact on iwi and marae, this type of Bill is better suited to the 'operative/general' form of reference.

3.4. In addition, the fact that some of these functions or decisions are very separate from the specific involvement of Māori that are noted in clause 4 also suggests that a 'operative/general' form of reference is more appropriate.

3.5. The planning functions prescribed in Part 2 subpart 4 – Emergency Management Planning and the decision-making functions in Part 3 -Emergency designations and powers, highlight this separation. It is our expectation that any person/s, committees, and/or roles who have powers to perform these functions and duties will give effect to the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi/Treaty of Waitangi.

3.6. Furthermore, regarding Part 3 – Emergency Powers, the definition of "Emergency" in clause 5 is very broad and goes beyond natural disaster events and extends to "actual or imminent attack or warlike acts". Given the Crown 's past approaches toward Māori in these types of contexts, it is important that a Tiriti lens is applied.

3.7. Without an 'operative/general' form of reference the result is an unclear obligation for those exercising powers and performing functions and duties, which may mean that Tiriti principles are not adhered to during an emergency, or the powers are applied inequitably. An 'operative/general' clause will show Parliament's intention that compliance with Te Tiriti in the emergency management context is as important as in less urgent settings.[13]

[12] Regulatory Impact Statement: Emergency Management System Reforms (22 July 2022) p.36.

[13] Regulatory Impact Statement: Emergency Management System Reforms (22 July 2022) p.37



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3.8. **Raukawa would like to see the introduction of a new sub-clause in clause 4 and for it to read:**

**Section 4 (1): All persons exercising powers and performing functions and duties under this Act must give effect to the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi/Treaty of Waitangi.**

3.9. **DIRECTLY RECOGNISING AND PROVIDING FOR IWI AND MARAE PARTICIPATION**

3.10. Raukawa support the changes in the Bill that look to enhance the role of iwi/Māori in emergency management. It is undeniable that iwi and marae play a significant role and bring a great deal of capability in relation to emergency management. Manaakitanga is in our DNA.

3.11. The important role of Iwi and marae are highlighted in the 2017 Technical Advisory Group[14] report (TAG) and throughout subsequent policy work and sector engagement undertaken by the National Emergency Manage Agency and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet[15].

3.12. TAG called upon the Government to legislate for the recognition and enhanced participation of both iwi and marae therefore, it is perplexing that marae have no recognition through the Bill, albeit there is reference to "Māori" and, in some limited cases, 'iwi'.

3.13. Raukawa have concerns with the broader reference to "Māori" which is noted throughout the Bill. This appears to be used as a generic term rather than consideration being given to whether the appropriate reference is to 'Māori', 'iwi', 'marae' or a combination of these, in the specific circumstances of the reference. When it comes to matters that directly impact our takiwā, Raukawa do not want out voice as iwi and manawhenua aggregated up to that of broader "Māori" interests, and similarly do not want the interests of others aggregated into our interests.

3.14. Incorrect references as to who to engage with have the potential to affect Raukawa mana whakahaere, weaken our engagement and elevate that of others, which in turn affects our ability, and ability of our marae, to respond effectively to emergencies.

3.15. Raukawa would like to remind the G&A Committee that the terminology being used to reference "Māori, iwi and marae" must be consistent. The G&A committee should revisit their usage in each clause so the intent and purpose is clear, whether it be the use of "Marae" in an operational sense or "Māori/iwi" in a strategic sense. Raukawa suggests that further clarity is needed to avoid unnecessary confusion.

3.16. Raukawa support a mana-a-iwi approach which is exampled in the "*Amohia Ake te orange o te iwi, kia puta ki te wheiao – Iwi Response to Covid Pandemic*" Report. The following amendments reflect the recommendations of this report which Raukawa endorse.

3.17. **Raukawa seek to amend Clause 3 (f) – Purpose and for it to read:**

**Clause 3(f):** "The purpose of this Act is to…'provide greater recognition **and support for Māori, iwi and marae** in emergency management and recognise and provide for enhanced **Māori, iwi and marae** participation throughout the emergency management system".

[14] Delivering better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies – Government response to the Technical Advisory Group's recommendations (August 2018) ISBN: 978-0-947520-07-6 (online)

[15] Regulatory Impact Statement: Emergency Management System Reforms (30 July 2018) (23 July 2020) (28 October 2021) (22 July 2022); Emergency Management System Reform Proposals (GOV-22-SUB-0031); Regulatory Impact Statement: Emergency Management System Reforms; Report of the Cabinet Government Administration and Expenditure Review Committee Minute (CAB-22-MIN-0339)



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3.18. **Raukawa seek to amend Clause 4 Tiriti o Waitangi/Treaty of Waitangi and for it to read:**

**Clause 4 (a):** "specifies in **Section 3** providing greater recognition of the role of Māori**, iwi and marae** and enhancing Māori, **iwi and marae** participation in emergency management".

**Clause 4 (c):** "provides in **section 25** for **iwi** members to be appointed to Emergency Management Committees…".

**Clause 4 (d) (i):** "**Partner with iwi, hapū and marae** to identify hazards and risks and develop plans to address the emergency management needs of iwi **and marae** within their area".

**Clause 4 (d) (ii):** "Recognise the role and contributions Māori, **iwi and marae** have in emergency management and communicate that information to local authorities, communities, and others".

**Clause 4 (d) (iv):** "Establish systems and processes to ensure that the **Emergency Management Committee and iwi** have the capability and capacity to engage **with each other** and to understand **each other's** perspectives.

**Clause 4 (e):** "provides in **section 33** for **iwi and Māori** members to be included on each…".

**Clause 4 (f) (i):** "must provide for the role of Māori, **iwi and marae** in emergency management".

**Clause 4 (f) (ii):** "may prescribe the process for co-development of national-level planning arrangements wit**h** Māori**, Iwi and Marae** and the principles for guiding the appointment of **iwi and Māori** members on Emergency Management Committees and Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executives".

## 4. IMPROVING THE APPOINTMENT AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES

4.1. In essence, Raukawa support the inclusion of tangata whenua membership onto EMCs but disagree with the reference to "Māori" as already noted above. It is our view that membership onto these committees must be recognised as "iwi" membership to protect and provide for mana whakahaere at place. Furthermore, we recommend including iwi organisations as the appropriate member body as these are the entities that have the resources and relationships to be able to respond, or co-ordinate a response, in practice.

4.2. As noted in the *"Amohia Ake te orange o te iwi, kia puta ki te wheiao – Iwi Response to Covid Pandemic*" report, our iwi organisations were best placed to deliver the support and care needed through such a critical time.

> "All iwi organisations pivoted, redeployed and even employed new staff to meet the need of the Covid pandemic environment and to ensure they could meet the needs of their communities. They were able to adapt quickly and showed flexibility in how they repurposed roles and staff as soon as the first lockdown began in 2020. From the smallest iwi organisation to the largest, they constantly re-strategised, reviewed and assessed the service they were providing to their people alongside awareness of staff fatigue and burnout. They were supported by their governance



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members who advocated at regional and national levels on behalf of their iwi communities. The models, communication channels and frameworks of operation they set up were always aimed at protecting their people and their rohe."[16]

4.3. This highlights the strength and capability iwi organisations will bring to the Emergency Management Committee and Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive.

4.4. Regarding the appointment provisions in the Bill, it is our view that they must be designed by iwi at place and not through regulations, as currently being offered in clause 144. This may look different in each takiwā but is in due recognition of the Tiriti partner role with iwi that civil defence are obligated to recognise and implement[17].

4.5. We support the provisions provided for in clause 23 (c) and Clause 67 (2) which provides guidance on engagement and appointment processes which EMCs must give effect to. However, this guidance needs to reflect a tiriti based approach that provides for true partnership arrangements at place.

4.6. **Raukawa seek amendment to clause 25 and for it to read:**

**Clause 25**: Membership of Emergency Management Committees

(1) The membership of each Emergency Management Committee **must** consist of –

a) The local authorities within the Committee's area; and

**b) Iwi representatives within the Committee's area.**

(2) Every local authority must be a member of an Emergency Management Committee.

4.7. Raukawa also welcome the membership of Māori members on to the Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive, given the important role it will provide during an emergency event as outlined in clause 34. It goes beyond to what some may view to be predominately a local government management forum. As part of our Treaty Settlement instruments, our Joint Management Agreements should automatically afford Raukawa a place within this executive committee.

4.8. **Raukawa seek to amendments to clause 33. They are as follows:**

**Clause 33 (1) (f) and (2)** and for it to read:

'An Emergency Management Committee must appoint and maintain an Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive consisting of:

(f) **the chief executive or senior member of an iwi organisation within the Executive's area;**

**Clause 33 (2)** to be deleted.

## 5. FUNCTIONS AND DUTIES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

5.1. As we have noted earlier in our submission, Raukawa seek a Tiriti-based approach to the design and implementation of the Emergency Management System that will operate within our takiwā.

[16] "Amohia Ake te orange o te iwi, kia puta ki te wheiao – Iwi Response to Covid Pandemic" commissioned by the Tainui Waka Confederation: Maniapoto, Waikato-Tainui, Raukawa and Hauraki (2023) p.98

[17] "Amohia Ake te orange o te iwi, kia puta ki te wheiao – Iwi Response to Covid Pandemic" commissioned by the Tainui Waka Confederation: Maniapoto, Waikato-Tainui, Raukawa and Hauraki (2023) p.14



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5.2. The functions and duties prescribed for local authorities' members of Emergency Management Committees in Clause 37 does not reflect a Tiriti-based approach. The Crown have an obligation as our Treaty Partner to actively protect and provide for our interests. The duty of the Crown is not merely passive but extends to active protection of Raukawa in the use of our lands and our taonga on those lands, to the fullest extent practicable. Any hazards or risks in our takiwā need to be identified and assessed in partnership[18].

5.3. We are concerned that the way that functions and duties of local authorities in an Emergency Management Committee is provided for, in combination with clause 4, means that the Committee and local authorities appear to have their Treaty duties discharged solely through the appointment of Māori/iwi representation to the Committee, not through their own approach to decision making. Again, we point to the comments made above regarding the need for a more 'operative/general' from of Treaty reference in clause 4 to ensure this is not the case.

5.4. We also note that this structure of clause 37 means that the local authority and Māori/iwi member of the Committee effectively have different functions and duties. This encourages a divisive rather than collaborative approach to engagement on the Committee. This is particularly if, as noted above, local authorities see their obligations to Māori being fully discharged simply by the appointment of a Māori member. We suggest that all members have the same duties and functions and as noted above, a more 'operative/general' Treaty reference is provided in clause 4.

5.5. Raukawa have an inherent connection to our whenua, we engage daily with or people, marae and wider communities, we know where the needs lie and where the risks are. It is paramount that from an early stage, Raukawa are seen as an integral part of the emergency management system design and that we are seen in the delivery of that system. However, it is also important that this engagement is structured in a way that encourages us to work together rather than at cross purposes.

5.6. As we noted earlier on in the submission, Raukawa seek to strengthen the Treaty provisions at clause 4 of this Bill. However, if those recommendations are not adopted, Raukawa would like to see amendments made to clause 37 to ensure that the local authority members of the committee understand their Treaty obligations to iwi.

5.7. **Raukawa therefore seek the following amendments to clause 37:**

**Clause 37:** Functions and duties of local authorities members of Emergency Management Committees in emergency management

The functions and duties of each local authority member of an Emergency Management Committee are to—

(a) do, in relation to hazards and risks within its region or district, the following:
  (i) **partner with iwi** to identify and assess those hazards and risks:
  (ii)report to the Committee on its identification and assessment of hazards and risks:
  (iii) **consult with iwi on how to** manage those hazards and risks:
  (iv) **partner with iwi** identify how to reduce risks and implement cost-effective risk reduction:

[18] Raukawa recommend that the G&A Committee review the position paper presented to the Prime Minister and Ministers of the Crown on enhancing Raukawa climate resilience "Our Marae-centric Approach – A Tiriti-based partnership between Raukawa and the Crown" (May 2023) which (amongst other matters) outlines a detailed plan on risk identification in our takiwā.



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(v) consult **with iwi** and communicate with the communities within that region or district about those hazards and risks:

(b) arrange for the provision of suitably trained and competent personnel, including volunteers, **iwi and marae representatives** and an appropriate organisation structure for those personnel for effective emergency management:

(c) take all steps necessary to maintain and provide, or to arrange the provision of, or otherwise to make available material, services, information, and any other resources for effective emergency management:

(d) **partner with iwi to** respond to and manage the adverse effects of emergencies in its region or district:

(e) **partner with iwi to** plan and carry out recovery activities in its region or district:

(f) assist, when requested, other local authorities in the implementation of emergency management in their regions or districts as appropriate:

(g) promote and raise public awareness of, and compliance with, this Act, and legislative provisions relevant to the purpose of this Act, within its region or district:

(h) monitor and report on compliance within its region or district with this Act and legislative provisions relevant to the purpose of this Act:

(i) do, in relation to an emergency management committee plan of the Committee, the following:

(i)provide input in the development or review of the plan:

(ii)implement the relevant aspects of the plan:

(iii)ensure alignment between the relevant aspects of the plan and the local authority's local government planning instruments relevant to the purpose of this Act:

(j) participate in the development of the national disaster resilience strategy and the national emergency management plan:

(k) promote emergency management in its region or district that is consistent with the purpose of this Act.

## 6. HIGH TRUST FUNDING MODELS

6.1. Raukawa welcome the inclusion of the Crown to reimburse iwi or Māori organisations for any expenses incurred in emergency management activities as well as providing funding support to participate in EMCs.

6.2. The Bill however, does not make clear how, or if, central government will provide capability and capacity funding for iwi/Māori organisations or marae to participate in engagement processes outlined in the Bill.

6.3. As per messaging in our submission to *He mata whāriki, he matawhānui*, the draft report released in October 2023, by the panel overseeing the review into the Future of Local Government, Raukawa consider that the introduction of a system to prepare and respond to the emergency management system requires equitable funding and financing to create a structure which allows for genuine partnering with iwi.

6.4. We reiterate, as we have stated throughout this submission, that Raukawa hold manawhenua across our takiwā, must be involved in policy decisions which impact our takiwā and are a natural partner for service delivery. Funding and financing must be enabled primarily at a local level to ensure that mana whenua and communities can adapt locally and are at the centre of funding decisions. Decision making



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should be non-politicised to enable funding to be used in a way that is tailored to the unique local situation.

6.5. Raukawa seek high trust funding models, broadened and flexible policies and less cumbersome reporting requirements. Raukawa recommend that any funding models developed emulate the funding and policy settings that were implemented during the Covid pandemic as an expression of an enduring and useful Tiriti partnership, and to provide the greatest opportunities for positive outcomes for iwi.[19]

6.6. The model further needs to include the ongoing capacity and capability needed to assist iwi and vulnerable communities to respond in the present with action, while being a model that also anticipates pre, post and recovery planning with community at the heart and flexibility to tailor approaches needed. This approach to capacity building is a more efficient and cost-effective model long term as it avoids the reactive spend of having to upskill resources during and after an emergency event. A truly *Tiriti* based and mātauranga informed model spans generations and a funding model must be designed in this way.

6.7. We reiterate that devolution of decision making should be community focused. Raukawa know our community and know where the needs lie, and a funding model should provide opportunities and flexibility for iwi to lead emergency response particularly in rural communities.

6.8. Raukawa again encourage this committee to engage with the Tainui Waka Confederation to further discussions regarding funding and financing.

## 7. CONCLUSION

In closing, Raukawa finish with the themes from "*Amohia Ake te orange o te iwi, kia puta ki te wheiao – Iwi Response to Covid Pandemic*" report. It is these themes that underpin our proposed recommendations to this Bill:

> "Mana Motuhake – the Tainui waka collective iwi determined and navigated their own pathway throughout the Covid pandemic. Manaakitanga was a guiding principle along with the love and care for the safety of their people and communities;
>
> The power and influence of iwi acting as a collective with a unified approach and common objectives at local, regional and national levels enabled iwi to hold the government to account with greater authority;
>
> The role of government agencies was both helpful and unhelpful at times and a myriad of recommendations have emerged from contributors and supporting material. They should not be unfamiliar recommendations, similar themes have been expressed by iwi for generations. However, how government agencies choose to address these recommendations will determine their willingness or not to accept and implement change with their Tiriti partner;
>
> The acknowledgement of iwi aspirations and how they fit alongside local, regional and national policy settings. Co-existence should be a goal; and,

[19] "*Amohia Ake te orange o te iwi, kia puta ki te wheiao – Iwi Response to Covid Pandemic*" commissioned by the Tainui Waka Confederation: Maniapoto, Waikato-Tainui, Raukawa and Hauraki (2023) p.16



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Iwi will continue to lead and support the resilience of their people in their continuous pursuit of positive wellbeing outcomes”

Raukawa thank the Government for the opportunity to provide feedback and potential improvements to the Emergency Management Bill.


Nāku noa, nā



**Kataraina Hodge**
Chair, Raukawa Settlement Trust/Raukawa Charitable Trust

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**Appendix One – Raukawa Takiwā and Area of Association**




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NZVA
New Zealand Veterinary Association
Te Pae Kīrehe

Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6140

12 May 2025

Tēnā koe,

**Submission on options to strengthen New Zealand's overarching emergency management legislation and inform the design of a new Emergency Management Bill**

The New Zealand Veterinary Association Te Pae Kīrehe (NZVA) is the largest membership organisation representing veterinarians in New Zealand. We support members through leadership, education, advocacy, recommended best practice, and wellbeing support.

We are making this submission on behalf of NZVA members. We have been actively engaged with members in areas affected by emergencies and extreme weather events in recent years and have kept members informed about our submission and the proposed Emergency Management Bill.

We previously made a submission on the Emergency Management Bill in 2023.

In essence we are advocating for:

1. acknowledgement in legislation that animals are sentient beings
2. including a requirement for animals to be prioritised above property in legislation
3. acknowledgement in legislation that animal welfare needs are included as part of the responsibilities of emergency response teams, at the level of the controller
4. inclusion in legislation of provisions ensuring that veterinary professionals deployed as part of an official emergency response are appropriately compensated for their time and contribution, consistent with the approach taken in responses to disease incursions such as foot and mouth disease (FMD).

Yours sincerely,



Kevin Bryant
Chief Executive Officer
New Zealand Veterinary Association Te Pae Kīrehe

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Kevin Bryant |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | New Zealand Veterinary Association Te Pae Kīrehe (NZVA) |

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☐ NEMA may publish submissions or a summary of submissions to its website, civildefence.govt.nz. If you **do not** want your submission or a summary of your submission to be published, please tick the box and type an explanation below:

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### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The NZVA recommends Option 3 be enshrined in legislation, and that Government officially recognises veterinary services as an essential service during emergencies, as it does with disease incursion plans for COVID-19 and the Foot and Mouth Disease Response and Recovery Plan.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The cost/risk of not having veterinary services available in an emergency response is significantly higher than the cost of paying for these services to be provided as part of the response. This opportunity cost can be measured in terms of biosecurity, loss of international market confidence, unnecessary injury to/loss of animal life, and increased insurance costs from claims. Ensuring essential veterinary services are provided means that communities and government can have confidence that animals (and the wellbeing of their owners) are looked after in the best way possible during a response. Having these services paid for also creates the option of surge capacity being available in a response.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The NZVA recommends that veterinary services are funded as part of the emergency response funding through Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM). The NZVA recommends an Animal Welfare Emergency Management (AWEM) Reimbursement Fund is established to enable AWEM support agencies to effectively deliver essential animal welfare services during emergencies and aid in the recovery process.

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**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The NZVA strongly supports the suggestions made in relation to considering animals during and after emergencies. This is reflected in our previous submission on the Emergency Management Bill (Bill No. 225-1), dated 3 October 2023.

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**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The NZVA supports Option 3, which recommends strengthening planning expectations through secondary legislation. We believe it is important for these expectations to be enforceable, to ensure they can be consistently considered and applied during and after an emergency response.

There is a sense among veterinary professionals that animals are not seen as a priority during emergency responses, and that animal welfare is treated as separate from human welfare – rather than intertwined.

In the early stages of the Cyclone Gabrielle response, for example, CDEM did not accept animal feed and supplies from veterinary clinics as critical supplies for isolated communities.

This included CDEM refusing requests from veterinarians to deliver dry cow therapy to dairy farmers.

**Resources and guidance**

We recognise there will be a cost to develop and implement secondary legislation and supporting guidance and training. The NZVA has done considerable work to create emergency management guidance and resources for the veterinary profession. In 2024, we released a handbook and template to help veterinary businesses develop a personalised emergency management plan for their workplace and team.

Following Cyclone Gabrielle, we knew we needed a robust framework to help us support veterinary professionals in the event of another emergency. We commissioned BML Consulting to conduct an independent review of our response to the cyclone, including debrief sessions with NZVA staff, industry representatives and veterinary professionals in Hawke's Bay and Tairāwhiti.

Based on feedback from these debrief sessions, we developed a handbook and planning template to help NZVA members prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters or emergencies that may impact their business, staff, clients, patients and community. We also developed a detailed emergency management plan and strategy for the NZVA.

We would be happy to share these resources to support the development of guidance and training on animal welfare during and after emergency responses.

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**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

We believe that animal welfare should be prioritised above protection of property. The Animal Welfare Act 1999 recognises animals as sentient beings, meaning they can experience emotions that are meaningful to them, not unlike humans.

New Zealand was the first country in the world to capture this in legislation, a fact that we as a country have proudly promoted internationally. Being seen as a country that upholds the highest standards of animal sentience has certainly aided our reputation and trade activities overseas.

It seems logical that our emergency management legislation should follow and support this leadership position.

**Animal sentience**

In August 2015, the Animal Welfare Act was revised "to reform the law relating to the welfare of animals and the prevention of their ill-treatment". In particular, the Act was revised:

(i) to recognise that animals are sentient:

(ia) to require owners of animals, and persons in charge of animals, to attend properly to the welfare of those animals: …

The National Animal Welfare Advisory Committee (NAWAV) explains sentience as:

*The National Animal Welfare Advisory Committee (NAWAC) understands animal sentience to mean that animals have emotions, feelings, perceptions, and experiences that matter to them. These can be negative (such as pain or boredom) as well as positive (such as pleasure or comfort). We don't know whether animals' emotions, feelings, and experiences are similar to those of humans. We also don't know if they are felt with the same intensity. But they matter to individual animals and have an impact on their welfare.*

The NZVA's definition of sentience, which encourages prioritisation of positive states and welfare enhancement, is consistent with scientific knowledge and current public expectations of 'good practice'.

It also aligns with the stated objectives of the NZVA 2030 strategy, which recognise that the wellbeing of animals, humans and the environment are inseparable. This acknowledgement establishes a responsibility for those in charge of animals to treat them in a way that prevents unnecessary pain or distress, and to provide opportunities for them to experience positive emotions.

**Relationship between humans and animals**

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The separation of human and animal welfare in the Emergency Management Bill is a major concern. Many veterinary professionals argue that a failure to understand interdependency between human and animal welfare creates unintended divisions and results in ineffective emergency responses.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, it became evident that there is a direct correlation between humans and animals, and that animals play an important role in human wellbeing. The human-animal bond is a mutually beneficial and dynamic relationship that is influenced by behaviours essential to health and wellbeing. This includes emotional, psychological and physical interactions between people, animals and the environment. A veterinarian's role in the human-animal bond is to maximise the potential of this relationship between people and animals.

There is a lot of literature supporting the importance and relevance of the human-animal bond, including an article by Robin Chadwin DVM, MPVM titled Evacuation of Pets During Disasters: A Public Health Intervention to Increase Resilience. In this article, Chadwin states:

Pet owners may be stranded at home, unwilling to leave their pets behind. Others refuse evacuation orders or attempt to re-enter evacuation sites illegally to rescue their animals. Psychopathologies such as grief, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder are associated with pet abandonment during an evacuation. Health care workers may refuse to work if their animals are in danger, leaving medical facilities understaffed during crises. Zoonotic disease risk increases when pets are abandoned or left to roam, where they are more likely to encounter infected wildlife or unowned animals than they would if they were safely sheltered with their owners.

The Human Animal Bond Research Institute (HABRI) is internationally recognised for its support of scientific research into the human-animal bond. They have found that:

*Positive human-animal interactions appear to be related to changes in physiological variables in both humans and animals, such as reduced heart rate and blood pressure. Research has demonstrated an association between pet ownership and enhanced social support, emotional well-being and general well-being. Pet ownership has also been found to play a role in helping people manage long-term mental health conditions.*

Similarly, a report on the animal welfare impact of the September 2010 earthquake in Christchurch states:

*It is clear from the Canterbury earthquake that the integration of animal welfare organisations and veterinary professionals with wider civil defence emergency management will be essential for managing future disasters…. As new guidelines are published by NAWEM, further uptake of animal emergency planning is likely to occur and this will see an increased demand for contributions by veterinary professionals to local civil defence emergency management. The uptake of companion animal emergency management by CDEM Groups would be strengthened if statutory mandate gave effect to the new NAWEM guidelines. Whatever the future New Zealand disaster; pet owners, farmers, veterinarians, animal welfare officers and emergency managers need to*

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*collaborate to create resilient communities, with the understanding that animals too, are part of these communities.*

During Cyclone Gabrielle and the North Island flooding events in 2023, we heard stories of people refusing to evacuate homes without their pets, farmers sneaking past cordons to tend to their animals, and horse owners putting themselves in danger to save their horses.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

**Cost to veterinary professionals and businesses**

Successful policy implementation and emergency response requires sufficient and appropriate resources, including financial, human, technology, supplies and equipment. Access to resources was a key issue for the veterinary profession during the response and recovery phases of Cyclone Gabrielle.

The NZVA recommends that veterinary services are funded as part of the emergency response funding through Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM). We recommend an Animal Welfare Emergency Management (AWEM) Reimbursement Fund is established to enable AWEM support agencies to effectively deliver essential animal welfare services during emergencies and aid in the recovery process.

The New Zealand CDEM funding framework does not currently include costs associated with AWEM response and recovery. Organisations with appointed AWEM roles and responsibilities are required to retain funding and resources to maintain their capacity and capability outlined in the legislation.

Human welfare arrangements are delivered by central and local government agencies in a business-as-usual capacity. However, organisations delivering animal welfare services during an emergency are generally working in non-routine operating parameters.

These organisations rely primarily on volunteer, private business and non-government organisations during an emergency, with the exception of local authorities. These arrangements, based on good-will, limit the availability of resources and create a significant risk to the organisations' ability to operate after the event.

Furthermore, the increased frequency and severity of emergencies in New Zealand has the potential to cause burnout in responders and communities, further depleting already limited resources.

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Veterinary businesses assume a financial burden when addressing animal health requirements and providing animal welfare services during an emergency. They have emphasised they cannot afford to bear the financial risk associated with delivering animal welfare services and addressing human wellbeing needs in isolated communities if they cannot seek reimbursement for costs incurred.

In the Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Response and Recovery Plan, there is provision for veterinary services to be funded to deliver services in the event of an FMD outbreak. As such, a precedent for veterinary services to be funded during an emergency exists. The NZVA contends that there is little difference in providing veterinary services during a natural disaster emergency, compared to a disease incursion emergency.

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# Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation

**Submission of Andrea Beard**
**Of Pahurehure Papakura**
**Auckland**

**12 May 2025**

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**Submission on the Discussion Document: Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation**

**Submitted by: Andrea Beard**
Pahurehure, Papakura
Auckland, New Zealand
**Date: 12 May 2025**

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## To: The Policy Development Team

**National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)**

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## Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to the important conversation around strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation. This topic is one that I hold close to my heart, and I am deeply invested in advocating for meaningful structural improvements in the way we manage civil emergency responses across the country.

Over the past 18 months, I have been actively engaged in grassroots emergency preparedness efforts within my local community. My work has focused on increasing neighbourhood awareness and readiness for natural disasters through community-led planning and coordination.

---

## Background

Since 2023, I have worked initially within my own street and, in collaboration with a small group of community-minded individuals, have rolled out a local initiative aimed at fostering stronger community ties and encouraging proactive civil emergency planning.

I feel particularly connected to the issues outlined in the April 2025 discussion document, especially those informed by findings from commissions of inquiry into recent national disasters. Through my experiences as a Street Activations Coordinator, I've seen first-hand the long-term value of building a neighbourhood-based model that embodies the "4 Rs" of emergency management: **reduction, readiness, response, and recovery**.

A foundational principle of my work is the belief that neighbours being "on the ready" is essential to achieving a *whole-of-society approach* to emergency management. When communities are connected, informed, and empowered, they form a vital first line of resilience.

To support this submission, I have included the following appendices:

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- **Appendix 1**: A brief precis of learnings from local events that I have led in the Papakura District over the past 18 months. These events demonstrate the tangible benefits of community engagement in emergency preparedness.
- **Appendix 2**: A conceptual model presented in diagram form, titled *Emergency Management Preparedness and Response Continuum*. This continuum illustrates how a neighbourhood-based response group could operate as part of a national, whole-of-society emergency management framework.
- **Appendix 3:** Accessing information and resources. A table listing and highlighting the challenges associated with accessing and sharing of information.

---

## Scope of Submission

In the body of this submission, I provide feedback on the following issues outlined in the discussion document:

- **Issues 1–6**
- **Issue 9**

My responses are shaped by the practical insights and lessons gained through my coordination work on the ground. Many of these insights align closely with the legislative options and themes presented in the discussion document.

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**<u>Issue 1 -</u> Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities**

Bridging the disconnect between AEM and their communities. A whole-of-society approach.

Option 3. (legislative):
Require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for.
Option 4. (legislative): Require the Director to consult with representatives of disproportionately affected communities to inform national planning.

Support for options 3 and 4 would appear to be the most amenable approach, giving specific accountability to a director. (ref; option 4) And using ground level Civil Defense Neighbourhood Response Teams as a source of real time information to create a less burdensome route for the timely flow of communications.

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**<u>Issue 2 -</u> Strengthening and enabling iwi Maori participation in emergency management**

Acknowledgement of Maori and iwi's skills, knowledge and resources.

Partnering with iwi seems most logical and sensible given the large and varied resources they can provide and the local knowledge that has been passed through generations.

Option 3. (legislative):
Require iwi Maori representation on CDEM Group decision-making structures.
Option 4. (legislative):
Require the Director to seek advice on Maori interests and knowledge to inform national level planning.

Option 3 and 5 seemly would be the most appropriate choice, with the creation of time and resources for Maori to have these options in their capacity.
It would definitively give Maori a voice in decision making and action.

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**<u>Issue 3 -</u> Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management**

A whole-of-society approach.

Opposed to options 1-2 and 3.  But propose a new option (option 4) as follows:

**Proposed option 4. (legislative)- (not yet defined or addressed)**

Require CDEM Group to actively involve community hubs and Civil Defense Neighbourhood Response Teams with consultation on local EMR plans, with mandated plans, including lines of authority, access to resources and training and support for appointed local leaders.

*Note: A new option 4 would be encapsulated under legislative provisions.

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**<u>Issue 4 -</u> Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency**

Although community members are expected to follow the 4 R's, they are not recognised/not always protected and not always reimbursed for costs both personal and financial.

Option . 2 (legislative):
Provide for protection from civil liability
Option . 3 (legislative):
Enable compensation for labour costs

**Propose a new option (option 4) as follows:**

**Proposed option . 4 (legislative)- (not yet defined or addressed)**
Enabling and promoting communities with more resources to act with more recognition/support/compensation and protection

Option 2 and 3 together are the optimal choices and with new option 4 would increase capabilities and actual drive for people to become more involved.

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**<u>Issue 5 -</u> Clearer direction and control during an emergency**

The question of who has command and control of the overall operational response to an emergency is sometimes ambiguous - it is not explicit in the CDEM act. Causing confusion, delayed decision making and resulting in an uncoordinated response.

Option 2. (legislative):
Require the agency dealing with the specific hazard to be the “Control Agency”
Option 3. (legislative):
Require Group Controllers (local emergency) or the Director (national emergency) to be the “Control Agency”
Option 4. (legislative):
A unified control model between the agency dealing with the hazard and the GroupContoller or Director

**Propose a new option 5 (legislative)- (not yet defined or addressed)**

**Option 5. (legislative)-(not yet defined or addressed)-Directing Team**
The Directing Team, under the authority of the Director should ultimately be in control. The Directing team remains in constant communications with all Agency Appliances and Crew to create unison in performance and actions.
The Directing Team could comprise representatives from each of the principal agencies.

Option 2 is on the premise that the agency dealing with the disaster is able to be confirmed as the single point of authority. There can be occasions, where multiple “Agencies” are present at a disaster and it is unclear as to which one will take lead. For example, in the case of an earthquake it would be likely that Civil Defense, FENZ and HHSJ will all be present. This creates an issue with who is now taking control and who is taking accountability. This appears to be very much the same model as the status quo, which is falling short.

Option 3 still provides choices over who will be in ultimate control and who will be accountable, the Group Controllers or the Director.

Option 4 still provides ambiguity as to who exactly is in control. The agency dealing with the hazard, the Group Controller or the Director?

Option 5, Which is a variation of Option 4, would create less confusion as to who was ultimately in charge and who would take accountability in a disaster response.

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**<u>Issue 6 -</u> Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management**

Overlapping CDEM  Group and local authority roles and responsibilities. Inconsistent organisation and lines of accountability. Variable Executive Group performance.

Option 2. (legislative):
Provide distinct responsibilities for CDEM Groups and their local authority members.

Support this option but defining of responsibilities should involve local communities wherever possible. Of note, in issue 6, there is reference at point 83, to local authorities being better placed than central government to understand and manage the risks that communities face and partner with them to build resilience.
In this reference there is mention of partnering with communities which in itself can be a significant exercise in consultation, which is quite often taken as a process of working with volunteers from the community. Policy makers should be mindful of relying on volunteers in the realms of emergency management practices. People with a proclivity towards volunteerism although often well meaning, can be unreliable and unable to commit to availability.  Of more important note, is the total lack of authority to act.

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**<u>Issue 9 -</u> Strengthening local hazard risk management**

Unidentified problem 1:
Councils and CDEM Groups are often unaware of disaster events at a grassroots level. It is not happening due to a disconnection to communication and knowledge of happenings at the local level.
Unidentified problem 2:
The chain of Authority is too long, which could lead to multiple handling of information resulting in slower response times.

Option 3.(non-legislative):
Update guidance and strengthen assurance of CDEM Group plans
Option 4.(legislative):
Enable the form and plan to be prescribed through secondary legislation
Option 5.(legislative):
Strengthen the Minister role in the CDEM Group planning process

**Propose a new option (option 6) as follows:**
**Proposed Option 6. (legislative)-(not yet defined or addressed)**
The redirection of investment into future proofing our environments and communities by including communities in the planning process.

Knowing levels of risk relies heavily on knowing what resources and training you already have on the ground floor, when it is currently not known.

Option 3, building relationships at the highest tier of authority although positive, still is disconnected to the grassroots level. This does not appear to do anything different functionally.

Option 4 is still disconnected to the ground level. A constant standard of an unconnected emergency management model seems redundant.

Option 5, strengthening the Minister's role is good if he is the “Director”. Albeit positive, it is still strengthening a review process that neglects grassroots awareness and seems like it could lead to ineffective processes.

**Newly proposed Option 6**, is a new innovative review of methods to obtain local ground knowledge, and connect to the Director in Option 5

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**Appendix 1: Information and feedback on neighbourhood street meetings in the Papakura District**

The following is a precis of observations and learnings from a series of street activation meetings held across the Papakura district in the last 18 months. The purpose of the meetings were to establish groups of residents who had a shared interest in being better prepared to look after themselves and others in the event of a natural disaster.

Street activation meetings were held across a diverse range of neighbourhoods . An assessment tool was devised to measure the many aspects of diversity observed.

Locations of street meetings:

Ashdown Place, Pahurehure

This activation was a follow on from a number of previous social get togethers of residents who then showed an interest in becoming more responsive in the event of a natural disaster. The street residency (Dwelling) numbers of 63 are made up of a number of different cultural groups and age diversity. Participation levels on a direct (physically involved in the initiative) and indirect (in support of the initiative) basis were running around 95 %

Four people volunteered to become street leaders who would be responsible for liaising with immediate neighbours when a disaster occurred.

A street register was compiled, with contact details of residents, including identification of vulnerable, aged and or unwell people. Included in this register is a range of available special skills that residents are able to utilise; e.g. Nurse Practitioner, Labour workers, coordinators etc. Additionally it was identified what residents had special equipment or tools and other shareable items; e.g. chainsaws, tools, water tanks/bulk water storage and gas cooking appliances etc.

Future activity is planned to include engagement with civil defence personnel for more active support and or training.

Hunua Road, Papakura

This activation was requested and generously supported by the Papakura Marae.

It is noted that the Marae is actively involved in supporting the community across a number of initiatives, including working on ways and means of having people ready and prepared for handling a natural disaster. The event was unique in the sense that Hunua Rd is a mix of residential and industrial businesses and a school, plus the Marae which is seen as a place of importance in the district. Most people in Papakura have an affinity with the Marae as it became the focal point of the fight against Covid. Residents have also grown to better understand the importance the Marae has when it comes to looking out for people in times of adversity.

Other significant features of the activation included extensive engagement with local businesses who were very supportive of the initiative, attendance of a class of students from

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the local school, representatives from NZ Police and Fire and Emergency NZ and Auckland Council representatives.

Mack Place, Red Hill

This activation was initiated through a member of the local network. It included a relatively small attendance but a good cross section of age and culture with all people actively engaging and showing interest in discussion on managing the 4 Rs.

Clark Road, Pahurehure

This area incorporates four new apartment builds and has experienced two activations to date. Of note, there was strong interest from younger family groups of differing cultures when meeting neighbours face to face. An enthusiasm for the initiative was evident along with a desire to learn more about emergency management preparedness.

Sutton Road, Drury

This area is a semi rural community with demographic diversity and showed a strong desire to connect with each other on issues relating to the 4 R's. Included within this community is a strong religious connection to the local Church. The second activation of the Drury Streetmeet was a resounding success, with an increase of approximately 20-25% from the first event. This growth indicates a positive trend in community engagement, with many new faces joining the event, reflecting a wider interest in the initiative.

Manuroa Road, Takanini aka Conifer Square

This area is a small gated community situated in a high flooding risk zone, with new residents who were reluctant to mingle. It is highly diverse in nature demographically. The second activation of the Conifer Square Streetmeet saw a notable increase in attendance of 40-50%, which is especially significant for such a small community. Several residents provided apologies for their inability to attend, further indicating the event's increasing popularity.

Cornwall Road, Lakeside Karaka aka Thornton Reserve

This is a more affluent area, with a perfect meeting place on the Reserve. The community were largely unknown to each other, but became widely engaged and eager to meet each other and increase their disaster readiness. With 42 dwellings, their 52 strong attendance was inspiring and confirmed again the success of such gatherings. This activation was ably supported by a very capable local resident who facilitated the solid attendance.

Sunline Estate, Takanini

This activation was an abject failure. Upon review, it was established that there were significant language barrier issues between the coordinator and the street lead. This resulted in a very poor attendance due to the lack of local level engagement with residents. Also of note is the choice of venue being isolated from the targeted area of households receiving an invitation.

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**Observations and learnings:**

The main learnings from the meetings held to date include:


- A genuine interest and enthusiasm from participants to learn more about emergency management preparedness.
- A genuine interest in becoming involved in neighbourhood based structures that are equipped to deal with emergency management issues.
- Strong interest from young families
- Strong interest from diverse ethnic backgrounds
- Strong interest from new citizens to the area
- Capable and committed street level leaders to establish local communities of interest.

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**Appendix 2:**

# EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Overview of hierarchy and structures of people involved in preparedness, response and capability in the event of a civil emergency




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**Appendix 3: Access to Information and Resources**

# Access to Information and Resources

- There are numerous resources available within our local community environment that our community is not aware of.

- There are multiple online locations to access disaster information, but there are also many barriers to accessing this information.

- We were recently shown during covid, the barriers many families experienced, being able to access both the hardware (devices) or an internet connection and data, to enable online learning.

| **Barriers Getting Necessary Information to the Public** |
| --- |
| Non-engaged communities<br><br>• Gated communities<br>• Low income communities<br>• Newly established sub-communities such as apartment blocks<br>• High crime rated communities<br>• Commercially integrated communities<br>• Transient communities<br>• Religion infused communities<br>• Ethnically diverse communities<br>• Rural communities<br>• High traffic zones<br>• Aged communities<br>• Non informed communities<br>• No existing community networks<br>• New builds and newly established communities |
| Access to internet resources<br><br>• Financially unable to afford required devices<br>• Financially unable to afford required data or internet connection<br>• Communities living in areas with little or not available online network<br>• An aged community unable to use required technology<br>• A population afraid of technology<br>• People who don't know how to use the internet<br>• People, who choose not to use the internet<br>• Time restricted people |

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Internet Information Overload

- Those who use the internet will be aware of an excess of information online. Multitudes of websites, links, hyperlinks, tags, emails, feeds, Texts, MS, SMS, Messenger, Whatsapp, URLs, HTML, CSS, streaming, JavaScript and navigation.
  It is a busy super highway of information.
  Being able to filter out or even remember the important or relevant information is impossible.
- The wide use of acronyms is confusing and difficult to follow.
- We are extremely aware of the massive amounts of ***Misinformation***- False or inaccurate information that is shared without the intent to deceive or cause harm, often due to a lack of knowledge or understanding.
  ***Disinformation-***False information that is deliberately created and shared with the intent to deceive, mislead, or cause harm.
  ***Malinformation***-Information that is based on reality but is used in a harmful or manipulative way, often to damage a person, organization, or country.
- The increase in 'trolling' (the practice of deliberately posting online content to provoke, annoy, or cause emotional distress to others) and trolls who frequently target public online forums. And being targeted negatively.

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13 May 2025

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Tēnā koutou,

**Canterbury Regional Council (Environment Canterbury) Submission:**
***Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation***

Thank you for the opportunity to provide comment on *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation.* Please find Canterbury Regional Council (Environment Canterbury)'s submission attached.

We welcome this consultation and look forward to more opportunities to engage on this topic further.

Our submission is reflective of our responsibilities as a regional council – including to provide flood protection infrastructure, and as the administrating authority for the Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group.

We also support the submission being made by the Canterbury CDEM Joint Committee on the document.

For all enquires please contact:

Name: Bridget Lange
Position: Principal Strategy Advisor – Climate Change and Community Resilience
Email: s9(2)(a)

Yours sincerely

**Craig Pauling**
Chair, Environment Canterbury
Encl: Canterbury Regional Council (Environment Canterbury) submission

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# Canterbury Regional Council (Environment Canterbury) submission on *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*

## Introduction

1. Canterbury Regional Council (Environment Canterbury) welcomes the opportunity to comment on the *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation* (the discussion document; the document).

2. We provide our submission in the context of our roles and responsibilities as a regional council, including those as the administering authority for the Canterbury CDEM Group (the Group) under the CDEM Act. Environment Canterbury also has planning and service delivery functions through the Resource Management Act 1991 and its replacement statutes, and the Local Government Act 2002, among a range of emergency management relevant legislative responsibilities.

3. We are the regional council for the largest geographical region and second most populous region in New Zealand. Our region encompasses substantial diversity, both in terms of our geography, hazard scape, and population, which contributes to a wide range of community needs and expectations. The Canterbury region faces numerous natural hazards, including earthquakes, landslips, floods, droughts, storms, tsunamis, erosion, and wildfires. Climate change is expected to worsen these challenges. An efficient and effective emergency management system helps us achieve a thriving and resilient Canterbury.

4. Environment Canterbury delivers three core services. Of key relevance is the Community Preparedness and Response to Hazards Core Service which incorporates Canterbury CDEM Group (the Group), Flood and River Resilience, Flood Warning and Advisory, Navigation Safety, Natural Hazards, Contaminated Land and Climate Change. We are well placed to support and enable emergency management change and improvements in Canterbury, predominantly through the established work in this core service.

5. In addition to our role as the administering authority for the Group, as a regional council we lead the identification, investigation, and management of hazards, as required, within the appropriate area of responsibility as mandated through the Regional Policy Statement, and in alignment with the hazard scape detailed in the Canterbury CDEM Group Plan.

6. Environment Canterbury also undertakes detailed assessment of the risks Canterbury faces from climate change and the likely impact on hazard risks. This work supports territorial authorities to prioritise the identified climate change risks, allowing local authorities to plan for action.

7. We are an active participant in response and recovery from regional and national scale adverse events through our close association with the Group. In preparing this submission we have noted the Group are submitting on the discussion document and support this approach. Our submission does not seek to replicate that submission, instead it focuses on aspects of the discussion document that are particularly relevant to the regional council.

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**General comments**

8. We support operational improvements and legislative reform but require greater understanding of the cost implications, and where they fall. The discussion document signals expanded and new responsibilities, and potential sanctions for not meeting them, but it is unclear from the document how these changes will be funded at a regional and local level.

9. Stronger consideration and greater clarity is needed regarding funding across the whole emergency management system. Environment Canterbury believes the funding implications of changes to roles and responsibilities should be assessed together with scoping of new regulations that may guide implementation, prior to their enactment.

10. Environment Canterbury encourages a whole of government approach to essential infrastructure, as well as inclusion in emergency management legislation. Situating critical or essential infrastructure obligations within the Emergency Management Bill could lead to expectations that the emergency management system will take care of it. We support strengthening of requirements on providers of essential services and a wider strategic consideration of critical infrastructure provision.

11. We strongly consider flood protection infrastructure to be essential infrastructure – however, we require greater understanding of the implications and imposition of being identified as such. Again, this is closely related to the issue of funding. Without central government co-investment, regional councils may face liability issues if they are unable to fund flood protection infrastructure from their rating base.

12. The discussion document is largely silent on undeclared emergencies. Environment Canterbury would like to see a legislative option that balances the need for action with the potential liability issues of those doing so. This could include new Controller functions and powers, with thresholds for their use.

13. We seek greater guidance, and legislative direction, around responding to concurrent emergencies.

14. Emergency management impacts and connects to society in multiple ways. We strongly encourage the Bill to be set-up in a way that balances increased national direction with subsidiarity, and is flexible to the ongoing reform processes and transformations occurring within central government legislation.

**Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation**

*Meeting the diverse needs of people*

15. Environment Canterbury agrees more needs to be done to meet the increasingly diverse emergency management needs in communities, and to enable broad community participation in emergency management. We encourage strong referencing of the *National Disaster Resilience Strategy* when considering community participation in legislation, and a focus on supporting, enabling, and empowering individuals, households, organisations, and businesses to build their resilience.

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16. Those who are affected by emergency planning decisions have a right to be involved in the decision-making process. Active, early engagement with different communities, with different strengths and vulnerabilities, will help address and plan for the unique needs of communities. However, engagement needs to include genuine involvement of communities in emergency planning broadly not just public engagement during the development of CDEM Group Plans. A strong focus on community capacity building and development, that moves beyond public education and is aligned with the *National Disaster Resilience Strategy* and *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030*, will support the achievement of this objective.

17. Environment Canterbury supports stronger and explicit reference to engagement with, and involvement of, representatives of communities that may be disproportionately impacted by emergency events (Options 3 and 4). However, developing appropriate regulations to guide the identifying of, and reaching out to, such communities in a meaningful way will be challenging, as will providing appropriate resourcing to enable engagement.

18. Some challenges will need to be addressed to ensure Options 3 and 4 are successful in their aims, including:
    - how communities will be reached and engaged with over the long-term, particularly as this will include parts of the population who may currently be marginalised, unengaged, or disenfranchised from the current system
    - what support will be provided to ensure communities have capacity to engage with emergency planning activities
    - who is engaged with, and who is considered to represent different people and populations.

*Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management*

19. Environment Canterbury's partnership with Ngāi Tahu is central to our work. Council recognises that Ngāi Tahu hold mana whenua, maintain rangatiratanga, and have intergenerational kaitiaki responsibilities within their takiwā.

20. We strongly support a strengthened role for iwi Māori in emergency management to ensure greater recognition and integration of mana whenua perspectives, needs and tikanga in a manner consistent with the Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Environment Canterbury acknowledges that Ngāi Tahu holds the rangatiratanga and mana moutuhake to determine how they wish to participate in the emergency management system at both the regional and national level.

21. Within Canterbury there is a strong working relationship between mana whenua, Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu and CDEM elected representatives with aspirations to embed genuine partnership across the four R's – Reduction, Readiness, Response, and Recovery.

22. Ngāi Tahu is represented on the Canterbury CDEM Group through an observer role on the Joint Committee, established via invitation in February 2019. This Kai Mataara role supports the Committee in providing strategic direction for the CDEM Group with full voting rights during meetings. However, existing legislation does not enable Ngāi Tahu to be a full voting member of the committee. In addition, a senior representative of Te Rūnanga o Ngāi



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Tahu sits on the Canterbury CDEM Group Coordinating Executive Group as an additional representative.

23. To strengthen and enable iwi Māori participation in emergency management, Environment Canterbury supports Option 3 which would establish, in legislation, mandated roles for iwi Māori on CDEM Group decision making structures. It is important that these roles be established specifically for mana whenua, to properly acknowledge and uphold their rangatiratanga and that the balance of representation effectively reflects the breadth of the takiwā.

24. We support legislative change that would enable the Joint Committee's aspiration for a representative of Ngāi Tahu to be appointed as a full member of the committee as well as transitioning Ngāi Tahu from an additional representative role to a statutory appointment on the Canterbury CDEM Group Coordinating Executive Group.

25. Environment Canterbury also broadly supports Option 4 which would require the CDEM Group to engage with iwi Māori during the development of their plans. In Canterbury, Ngāi Tahu was involved in the recent Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan update via their participation in the CDEM Group.

26. These options would reinforce existing arrangements established in Canterbury and support requirements under the Local Government Act 2002 to enable iwi Māori participation in local government decision-making processes, ultimately improving positive outcomes for emergency management.

27. It is essential that iwi Māori are appropriately resourced with adequate funding to build capacity and support participation in the emergency management system. Iwi Māori must not be put in the position of having to fund participation from financial redress received as part of negotiated Treaty Settlements.

28. In addition to their involvement in the CDEM Group, Ngāi Tahu are members of the Regional Welfare Coordination Group and are represented as Control function Iwi Liaison on both the Regional Emergency Coordination Centre and Local Emergency Operation Centres. This involvement enables Ngāi Tahu-specific impacts and issues to be raised during emergency response.

29. Importantly, Papatipu Rūnanga Marae are identified as potential civil defence centres in an emergency. They have the capability and experience to quickly stand up to support the welfare response by showing manaakitanga to displaced people in emergencies as well as enabling important communications, intelligence, logistics and iwi liaison.

30. We encourage central government to engage meaningfully and in good faith with respective mana whenua on a place-based level, including Ngāi Tahu within Waitaha, to determine the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director. National Māori Entities must not become substitute bodies for direct engagement with iwi and hapū, nor usurp the role of mana whenua as decision-makers within their takiwā.

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*Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management*

31. We support in principal measures that enable members of the public, acting in good faith as first responders, to be protected from civil liability for loss or damage. Legislative options need to be strongly linked to other initiatives aimed at increasing public awareness of their role in a whole- of-society, emergency management system.

**Objective 2: Providing clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels**

*Clearer direction and control during an emergency*

32. Environment Canterbury supports clarifying roles, responsibilities, and accountabilities across the emergency management system. We support options that will lead to greater standardisation and equitable provision of services across all regions.

33. We note and support the specific identification of ambulance services as an emergency service.

34. While noting that a unified control model balances the need for pre-event clarity with existing responsibility prescribed across legislation, and that the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) 3rd edition already supports unified control, currently there isn't the level of emergency management system maturity to support Option 4 – and legislation will not create this maturity.

35. Requiring Group Controllers or the Director to be the 'Control Agency' still allows for unified control but provides the necessary hierarchy to ensure final accountability. There is a risk that under Option 3, agencies with responsibilities for managing hazards within a range of legislation could absolve pre-planning obligations to CDEM Groups. Despite this, we support Option 3. Option 3 may push Controllers beyond their current capabilities or experience, so should be accompanied by a suitable development programme and the availability of more technical support.

*Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management*

36. While we agree that locally led delivery of emergency management is a strength of our system, we are concerned that the increased responsibilities proposed are highly likely to require additional resourcing to support regional councils to fully undertake their role. While the activities involved in discharging these responsibilities are not entirely new, we believe they will require additional skills and resources available to administering authorities to enable and support the CDEM Groups work. We cannot rely on spare capacity within local authorities so at present this can only be funded from additional rating.

37. The discussion document signals expanded and new responsibilities. However, it is not clear how this is to be funded. Environment Canterbury believes the funding implications of changes to the role and responsibilities for administering authorities requires resourcing and funding support from central government. Without this support, there is a risk of inequitable and uneven implementation across regions based on the ability to extract



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funding from an existing rating base. This in turn will impact the standardisation sought across the emergency management system.

38. Option B is the preferred option for avoiding the identified problem of overlapping functions of local authorities and the CDEM Group. Option B supports standardisation and integration of services without weakening the ability of local authorities to make plans according to the unique characteristics of each area and the legislative mandate councils have to resource risk reduction. We note that Options B and C are not mutually exclusive, so a combination may be prudent.

39. In Canterbury a decentralised model works well, and we have a high level of cooperation between emergency management staff in CDEM Group and local authorities. However, we acknowledge that provision of emergency management services under such a model may not be the same across regions. We favour options that produce nationally consistent arrangements. Making the CDEM Group responsible for organising emergency management functions (Option 3) seems most conducive with achieving that consistency and ensuring more alignment in capacity and capability across regions. However, it may not sufficiently consider territorial authorities often being best positioned to work with local communities to deliver emergency management initiatives but potentially constrained in doing so due to resource challenges.

40. Making the chief executive of each local authority hold the role of Controller and Recovery Manager may address the need for local specificity while increasing accountability but wouldn't address resource issues – if anything it could further constrain already limited Council resources and attention. Further, in an event, Councils also have business continuity needs outside of CDEM so need to retain some agility to carry out other functions. We prefer an option which provides the clear accountabilities and consistency of Option 3 while making local authority chief executives accountable for Controllers and Recovery Managers but without the need to be the Controller and Recovery Manager.

41. Environment Canterbury backs options to bolster the functioning of Coordinating Executive Groups. We prefer a legislative hybrid of Options 2, 3 and 4.

*Keeping emergency management plans up to date*

42. As a region that has experienced significant emergencies and has an active hazard profile, we encourage less administratively cumbersome approaches for integrating lessons learned or reflecting updated hazard information in key emergency planning documents, where such updates are under set thresholds. We encourage NEMA to consider how substantive amendments need to be to require consultation, and how this will be consistently applied. Setting such thresholds requires balancing the need for flexibility with the level of engagement needed for a whole-of-society approach to emergency management.

**Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management**

*Stronger national direction and assurance*

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43. We are highly supportive of strengthened monitoring and assurance, and for expectations and standards being consistently applied across regions through a combination of Options 3 and 4, with assurance and oversight for Director functions being provided external to NEMA.

*Strengthening local hazard risk management*

44. We agree that 'acceptable risk' and how it is managed is ambiguous in the emergency management context. CDEM Groups can reduce risk through readiness and response but have limited levers for reducing physical exposure to risk. Risk reduction requires integration across regulatory planning documents at the regional and local council levels (particularly Regional Policy Statements and District Plans) and CDEM Group Plans.
45. Greater clarity is needed about the scope CDEM Group should have in driving risk reduction actions in regional councils and local councils, including planning and policy decisions, and determining the primacy given to CDEM Group risk profiles within wider planning domains.

46. 'Acceptable risk' being determined at a local scale may not be the most appropriate way of achieving more equitable outcomes across the country or greater integration and consistency between national and local levels. It would be valuable to have clear, unambiguous guidance or tools to quantify levels of risk, and we encourage central government to establish a robust and consistent framework for assessing and determining the risk posed by hazards.

*Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies*

47. Environment Canterbury acknowledges the important relationship mana whenua have with their ancestral land, waters, wāhi tapu, wāhi taonga. Environment Canterbury **supports** efforts to give greater consideration to taonga during and after emergencies, in line with Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi to uphold the authority that iwi Māori have over their taonga.

48. In Canterbury, the CDEM Group Plan acknowledges that recovery involves collaboration with mana whenua to build resilience and ensure the protection for wāhi tapu, ngā taonga tuku iho (treasures of the ancestors) and kaitiakitanga of the environment in the recovery phase.

49. Environment Canterbury generally supports Option 3 and the added rigor that legislated requirements would bring to ensuring taonga are given due consideration in CDEM Group Plans. It is essential for CDEM Groups to work closely with iwi Māori to ensure the inclusion of any wāhi taonga and mātauranga Māori is appropriate and ensures its protection.

50. As above, it is essential that iwi Māori are appropriately resourced with adequate funding to build capacity and support participation in the emergency management system. Mana whenua must not be put in the position of having to fund participation from financial redress received as part of negotiated Treaty Settlements.

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51. Environment Canterbury supports options that expressly provide for the welfare of animals in emergencies. The health and safety of animals during emergency events has been strongly linked to the health and wellbeing of their owners and a positive recovery post-emergency event.

52. There is a need for additional clarity around how agencies interact to meet their responsibilities for animal welfare. Environment Canterbury supports guidance and legislation that clarifies the classification and care of animals, including reducing confusion about productive and companion animals, and the lead agencies for different classifications. However, we do not support CDEM Group performing this function.

**Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services**

*Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services*

53. Environment Canterbury recognises the cascading impact infrastructure disruption in an emergency can have on the provision of essential services and agrees that as infrastructure becomes increasingly interconnected and interdependent, the impact from disruption is amplified.

54. We agree that providers of infrastructure that underpin essential services who are not recognised as lifeline utilities under the CDEM Act is a problem. As such, and given the criticality of flood warning and protection infrastructure to the continued provision of essential services, we are surprised that its importance has not been explicitly and strongly signalled in the discussion document. It is our strong view that flood telemetry, and flood and erosion protection infrastructure must be considered essential infrastructure.

55. Interdependencies between flood warning and protection infrastructure and the safety of other critical infrastructure needs to be better recognised and better provided for in terms of resourcing. Flood warning and protection infrastructure is primary critical infrastructure, providing the first line of defence and resilience to other essential infrastructure.

56. The assets, networks, and services provided by Environment Canterbury (and other regional and unitary authorities) for flood protection provide a benefit to essential infrastructure beyond the rating districts, including to Crown assets. Yet the funding received to these schemes does not reflect this. Protected infrastructure asset owners do not contribute funding to schemes, placing the burden of protection for nationally significant assets on a small number of ratepayers.

57. We support options that allow for easier recognition of a wider range of essential infrastructure and the interplay between flood protection infrastructure and the enabling of other essential infrastructure and the provision of essential services. The principles-based definition of ‘essential infrastructure’ in Option 3 provides the most flexibility for doing this.

58. We note that under Option 3 a potentially widened scope of essential infrastructure providers could include the provision of hazard warning services such as flood warning and advisory. We encourage consideration of the ability of other essential infrastructure to be provided without the flood protection currently afforded to bridges, rail, and roads by regional council-owned assets.

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59. Being recognised as an essential infrastructure provider may have an attendant cost burden on ratepayers, through the additional compliance requirements. Investment in flood telemetry and flood protection assets that contribute wider system resilience is a prerequisite for the efficient functioning of the economy and our communities and is a responsibility that should be shared between regional councils and central government. We encourage consideration of equitable and sustainable funding models and support efforts of providers of flood protection infrastructure to secure on-going central government co-investment in these assets.

**Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens**

60. We recognise the need to ensure that emergency declarations, and the functions and powers that accompany them, are fit for purpose. We support legislative changes to enable clarity around roles and responsibilities around access to emergency powers and functions, and support Canterbury CDEM Group's submission on the operative details of this objective.

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13 May 2025

Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6140
Email: emergencymanagementbill@nema.govt.nz

Dear Sir or Madam

## Bank of New Zealand's submission on *Discussion Document: Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation*

### 1 Introduction

1.1 E mihi ana te Pēke o Aotearoa ki te whai wāhi ki te tuku urupare ki Te Rākau Whakamarumaru i te Mate Ohatata mō te pepa whakawhitiwhiti whakaaro a Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation. E whakamihi ana mātou ki tēnei pepa whakawhitiwhiti whakaaro nui, i te mea ka whai painga tēnei anga ki ngā tāngata katoa o Aotearoa.

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inclusive and empowers communities in their determination of what course of action is most appropriate for them.

2.3 BNZ believes minimising disruption to essential services and enabling a higher standard of emergency management should be the overarching objectives for legislative reform. BNZ submits this can be achieved and enabled through strengthening community and iwi Māori participation, providing clear responsibilities and accountabilities across the national, regional, and local levels, and through ensuring agencies have the proportionate powers available to enable effective and efficient response.

**3 Defining "lifeline utility"**

3.1 BNZ supports the proposed expansion of the lifeline utility definition to include additional essential infrastructure provider. We also support the requirement for these utilities to maintain adequate business continuity plans.

*3.2* We believe expanding the definition to include provision of cash and payments aligns with existing community expectations and recommendations made in the 2024 *Report of the Government Inquiry into the Response to the North Island Severe Weather Events* and the Government response document *Strengthening Disaster Resilience and Emergency Management.*

3.3 As *Figure 5: Fragility of an interconnected system* (p.49) shows, there are significant interdependencies. The New Zealand infrastructure network is highly interconnected, with very few lifeline utilities able to operate independently. The disruption caused by Tropical Cyclone Gabrielle in 2023 highlighted the critical need for access to cash during significant disruptive events. We submit that the New Zealand payments infrastructure is essential for maintaining commerce during these events.

**4 Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning**

4.1 BNZ supports the proposed legislative requirement for defined lifeline utilities to maintain business continuity plans. This will help ensure that critical services continue to be delivered in the event of an emergency. We believe this requirement acknowledges the highly interconnected nature of New Zealand and the reliance on external lifeline utilities and critical infrastructure in delivering these services.

4.1.1 We recommend clarity of the standards which each lifeline utility need to attain for business continuity planning. This should include linkage to other key essential services.

4.1.2 We also consider the prioritisation of utilities may be necessary in an emergency. For example, to enable the successful movement of cash, access to fuel, transport, safe storage and safe transit may be required. We believe a pathway to allow this will be the guiding principles required.

4.2 We support the proposed approach for the Minister to exempt a lifeline utility from this requirement where it has existing regulatory obligations for business continuity. We submit this will reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens whilst ensuring appropriate planning is in place.

**5 Barriers to cooperation and information sharing**

5.1 BNZ believes effective disaster response can be hindered by barriers to cooperation and information sharing, which often create situational awareness gaps and slow response



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efforts. We consider the proposed non-legislative option is the most appropriate means of addressing these challenges by setting clear expectations on organisations through the development of standards and guidance.

5.2 BNZ submits that banks are highly regulated regarding information sharing. There are cooperation protocols and established industry bodies which allow for banks to engage and share non-sensitive information within a controlled environment.

5.3 BNZ believes that industry collaboration is essential during times of finite resources. We support the removal of barriers under the Commerce Act, which limits parties working together, if the purpose aligns with achieving outcomes for the greater good.

5.4 In regards to sensitive payment-related data, BNZ believes that regulatory bodies, such as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, in its role as Kaitiaki of the financial system, is best placed to collate and share aggregated information to support an informed and coordinated response.

5.5 We believe the Reserve Bank, as part of that stewardship role, should be at the core of strengthening industry collaboration with clear guiding principles and ownership of reporting on behalf of the Cash and Payments sector.

Should the National Emergency Management Agency have any questions in relation to this submission, please contact Paul Hay on the details below:

Yours sincerely



Paul Hay
Āpiha Matua: Waeture me te Tūtohu (Chief Regulatory and Compliance Officer)
Bank of New Zealand

DDI: s9(2)(a)
Mobile:
Email:

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Catherine Hall |
| Email address: | policy@alzheimers.org.nz |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Alzheimers NZ |

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Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

These are the right objectives. Strengthening community involvement is important and will make emergency management more inclusive. Clear responsibilities and higher standards will improve responses and giving agencies the right powers will help them act quickly. Minimising disruption to essential services is also key for maintaining stability during emergencies.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Alzheimers New Zealand agrees with how the problem is described and supports the focus on communities and those who are at particular risk during emergencies. Their

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needs, including the needs of people living with dementia require specific attention in emergency plans, to ensure that the challenges they face, like confusion, difficulty following instructions and disorientation in unfamiliar environments, are minimised. Including people living with dementia and other cognitive impairment conditions in emergency planning would ensure that appropriate support is in place before, during and after emergencies.

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, in addition to the reasons mentioned, the following factors can also lead to disproportionate impacts:

- Cognitive impairment: People with dementia may not understand warnings, remember emergency steps, or know how to evacuate safely.
- Dependence on familiar environments: Changes caused by emergencies like evacuation can increase anxiety and behavioural issues for people with dementia.
- Carer, family/whānau dependence: If carers, family/whānau are injured, displaced, or unavailable, people with dementia may feel afraid as others helping are not known to them, and they may not get support they need.
- Inaccessible communication: Emergency messages are often too complex to be easily understood by those with communication or comprehension challenges.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support Option 2: Develop guidance on meeting diverse needs and Option 3: Require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for. These options would lead to better outcomes and coordination, and less traumatic for those most at risk. While they may require more time and resources, leaving these voices out could lead to greater harm and higher costs during and after emergencies. Alzheimers NZ and similar groups have strong connections with vulnerable people and should be involved in planning at all levels.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Inclusive planning would mean:

- Involving community organisations like Alzheimers NZ in advisory and planning groups.
- Including people with lived experience of dementia or cognitive impairment in emergency response planning.

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- Training emergency staff to support people with cognitive impairments.
- Ensuring messages are clear, simple, and available in different formats which everyone can understand.
- Identifying at-risk people ahead of time and linking them with local support.
- Providing dementia-friendly safe spaces in evacuation centres.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. We suggest:

- Creating national guidelines for supporting people with cognitive impairments including people with dementia during emergencies.
- Developing a safe registry to help provide support to people with dementia.
- Including people with dementia and their carers, family/whānau in emergency drills to test how inclusive plans are.
- Designing emergency spaces like shelters to be dementia-friendly, with clear signs and simple layouts.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

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**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that communities and community-based organisations, including those supporting people with dementia, are not engaged enough. This makes it harder for these groups to prepare for and respond to emergencies.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support Option 2: Develop and update guidance and strengthen public education, because it focuses on community-led emergency responses and helps people understand what to do in an emergency. This option is simple and can work well if clear

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procedures are in place. In an emergency, communities can connect directly into the emergency system, which can speed up the response. This option is also cost-effective over time. Local groups like Alzheimers NZ and our regional teams can play a strong role in making communities more prepared and resilient. It also helps communities identify people who may need extra support, like those living with dementia, and be better prepared to support them before, during, and after an emergency.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, there should be specific ways to fund and involve health and disability support organisations in local emergency planning. They should also be included in the strategy development and risk assessments.

### Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

We strongly support the modernisation of the emergency management system. It is important that the new legislation recognises the needs of all groups in the community including people living with dementia and older people, who may need additional support during emergencies. We recommend continuing engagement with health and aged care sectors, including dementia advocacy organisations, to ensure emergency planning is inclusive and effective for all New Zealanders.

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# MEMO

**DATE** 12/05/25

**TO:** National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)

**FROM:** Iarau Ltd, on behalf of Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Kearoa Ngāti Tuara

**RE:** Submission on the Emergency Management Bill 2025

---

## PART 1: OPENING COMMENTS

Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Kearoa Ngāti Tuara present the following submission on the reform of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (the CDEM Act).

The CDEM Act provides:

- government agencies, local government, emergency services and lifeline utilities (such as the electricity network) with emergency management roles and responsibilities
- extraordinary powers that can be used to protect people and manage the consequences when an emergency happens
- requirements for national and local emergency management planning
- the ability to set more detailed expectations and standards for emergency management through regulations or non-legislative documents.

An inquiry after Cyclone Gabrielle and other reviews have shown that improvements are needed to the CDEM Act and the approach to emergency management on the ground. The Government intends to respond to the inquiries and reviews by delivering new legislation as well as non-legislative improvements.

The reforms include five new objectives which respond to a variety of issues identified in existing emergency management structures and previous events requiring emergency response, these are:

1. strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
2. provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
3. enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
4. minimise disruption to essential services, and
5. ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Kearoa Ngāti Tuara supports the reform of the CDEM Act. The objectives aim to strengthen partnerships, provide better outcomes for communities in the face of emergencies, increase clarity and direction and overall improve our systems for emergency management at both a local and national scale in Aotearoa.

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## Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Kearoa, Ngāti Tuara

We support the Government's intent to strengthen the emergency management system, and we seek to ensure that Te Tiriti o Waitangi and its principles are embedded throughout this reform in governance, planning, decision-making, and resourcing.

**PART 2: KEY POINTS**

Central to our position is that iwi Māori must be acknowledged as key partners in emergency management in Aotearoa. As such, we must be included at a governance and decision-making level and appropriately resourced for our contribution to strengthening emergency management responses.

We support a combined approach of Options 2,3,4, and 5 under Issue 2, Objective 1. The points below further expand on our perspective in relation to these options and more broadly across the reform as a whole.

**Iwi Representation in Governance**

We support the legislative requirement for iwi Māori representation on Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and Coordinating Executive Groups (CEG). However, we recommend:

- Iwi nominate their own representatives to the CDEM Group, not have them appointed by external bodies
- each iwi within the applicable CDEM Group has the opportunity to appoint a representative to ensure each iwi voice is represented
- each iwi representative should have the option to engage an additional support person from their iwi to assist with engagement with hapū and Marae who play a key role in emergency management
- CDEM groups should be encouraged to connect regularly with Marae, hapū and key community groups to strengthen relationships and build understanding about what these groups offer to the community
- representation comes with decision-making powers, not just advisory capacity, and
- resourcing must be provided to support participation, including travel, staff time, and coordination roles.

**Mandatory Engagement in Planning**

We strongly support requiring CDEM Groups to engage with iwi Māori during the development of Group Plans, and we recommend:

- Engagement is defined as co-designing the Group Plan, not post-drafting consultation
- planning processes acknowledge mana whenua status, regional iwi structures, and tikanga
- Iwi priorities, such as marae-based evacuation planning and cultural welfare practices, are embedded in the Group Plans, and
- koha and reciprocal renumeration are considered when engaging with hapū, Marae, and other key community groups to acknowledge their contributions.



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### Mātauranga Māori and Tikanga

We support legislative recognition of mātauranga Māori and Māori world views and recommend that:

- Mātauranga Māori should be acknowledged as a legitimate and protected knowledge system
- policies are established that protect the intellectual property of iwi and hapū mātauranga and its application
- CDEM staff and responders should be trained in tikanga-based engagement, and
- local and national plans include cultural protocols for manaaki, urupā protection, and whānau-led support.

### National Māori Advisory Group

We support the establishment of a national Māori emergency management advisory group, provided that:

- Members are nominated by iwi, not appointed centrally
- the group influences national plans, funding frameworks, and policy direction, and
- the group operates independently, with direct lines of communication to the Director of Emergency Management.

### Resourcing and Capability

We seek guaranteed and sustainable resourcing for iwi to participate effectively, including:

- Dedicated funding for iwi emergency management coordinators
- investment in Marae-based response hubs and communications, and
- support for iwi-led training, exercising, and response planning.

## PART 3: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

- Mandate iwi representation on CDEM Groups and CEG's with full participation rights.
- Require iwi co-design in Group Plans, not just consultation.
- Recognise and embed mātauranga Māori and tikanga across the CDEM Act, including key components such as the 4R's.
- Establish a National Emergency Management Māori advisory group with iwi-nominated membership.
- Fund iwi participation, training, infrastructure, and leadership roles.

## PART 4: CLOSING COMMENTS

Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Kearoa Ngāti Tuara supports the proposed reforms to the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM Act), particularly the intention to strengthen community and iwi Māori participation, clarify responsibilities, raise emergency management



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standards, minimise service disruption, and ensure appropriate powers are available during emergencies.

This support is conditional on the feedback and recommendations provided being implemented. At the heart of our submission is the unwavering perspective that iwi, hapū, and marae must be recognised as key partners in emergency management, with meaningful roles in governance, planning, and sufficient resourcing. It is of the utmost importance that Te Tiriti o Waitangi and its principles are embedded throughout the emergency management system and implemented effectively.

Ngā mihi,

Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Kearoa Ngāti Tuara

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## Submitter information

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### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Jack Stewart |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
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**Please refer to the attached submission.**

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Channel
Infrastructure NZ

14th May 2025

**Emergency Response Bill NEMA consultation**

https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/cdem-sector/legislation/emergency-management-bill

**Introduction**

Channel Infrastructure NZ welcomes the opportunity to engage with this NEMA consultation on the Government's new Emergency Management Bill. This is a critical piece of legislation, which will further strengthen New Zealand's emergency management processes and procedures. We have already provided similar feedback to the Governance and Administration Select Committee when they called for public submissions on the 2023 version of this Bill, and we welcome amendments to the Bill's objectives, based on the Select Committee process.

While many of the consultation questions do not directly relate to Channel, there are two areas on which we offer comment. We welcome further efforts to consider a broader scope of Lifeline Utilities, which captures a wider range of services and assets that are required to function interdependently in the event of an emergency. We also welcome moves to introduce mandatory business continuity planning for lifeline utilities. However, we urge NEMA to adopt a moderate approach to reporting requirements, that does not over-burden reporting entities.

**Channel Infrastructure's role as Critical Infrastructure**

Channel Infrastructure is the operator of New Zealand's largest fuels import terminal infrastructure, providing the fuel needed to power New Zealand's economy. We are a designated Lifeline Utility. As well as our Marsden Point site, which includes extensive fuel storage, a deep-water harbour and jetty, and electricity grid connections, Channel owns and manages the only fuel pipeline direct to Auckland and the only supply route for aviation fuel to Auckland International Airport. The Marsden Point to Auckland pipeline can deliver c.3.6 billion litres of fuel annually to the Wiri Fuel terminal, which is jointly owned and operated by Channel's three fuel company customers.

To maintain operations in the event of an emergency, Channel is dependent on electricity supply for the Marsden Point site and pipeline pumping stations, fibre or cellular communications services for the pipeline and to access the cloud, and roading access to our Marsden Point site and pipeline pumping station and valve sites. Thus, it is important that operators of these sectors are equally ready to respond to emergencies and that there is tight co-ordination, understanding of each other's needs, and prioritisation across sectors during an emergency, to support continued operation of Channel's infrastructure. At the same time, we recognise that many of these infrastructure operators are, in turn, dependent on fuel supply in order to maintain and restore their infrastructure.

This interdependent network was tested in 2024, during the Northland power outage, caused when a power pylon toppled over, cutting electricity to the North. Given Channel's Lifeline Utility status, and the need to continue to supply Auckland International Airport with jet fuel to prevent a shutdown of airport operations, we were quickly prioritised by network operators for power restoration. This event, while disruptive for the community, demonstrated the importance of Lifeline Utilities working together to understand and address each other's needs in a timely fashion, as part of the overall emergency response and the significant interdependencies between utilities to ensure prompt restoration of services.

In 2017, the Auckland fuel supply disruption caused by a rupture to our fuels pipeline was another example of utilities needing to work together during an emergency situation. In its report on the 2017 pipeline outage, the Government Inquiry into the Auckland Fuel Supply Disruption concluded that Channel (then Refining NZ) had operated the pipeline properly and that our response to the outage was "swift, well-coordinated, careful, thorough and effective". Subsequent to the Inquiry, Channel has addressed all recommendations pertaining to our

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operations. While there have been recent steps taken by the Government to address the outstanding recommendations, there remain a few areas where we continue to advocate for Government and industry to address these issues, including through stronger protections for critical infrastructure such as the Marsden Point to Auckland Pipeline.

**Channel supports the overall ambitions of this Bill – in particular the expansion of Lifeline Utilities**

We support the ambitions of this Bill, and welcome efforts to strengthen New Zealand's overarching emergency management legislation for the good of New Zealanders. Fuel security is critical, particularly in emergency situations, and it is important that assets involved in the wider fuels supply chain, have the right tools and plans in place to ensure they can continue to operate together at a time of crisis.

Channel welcomes the expanded scope of Lifeline Utilities to encompass all infrastructure that is essential to the functioning and stability of New Zealand. Taking our operations as an example, we rely on a range of external service providers to ensure we can function. Therefore, moves to expand the range of services captured by Lifeline Utilities requirements would be a welcome step to account for services that enable essential infrastructure such as ours, which in turn have a critical role to play in keeping other services functioning. Expanding the definition of critical infrastructure and requiring the same level of emergency preparedness across sectors will better enable a swift and coordinated response to emergencies.

As a lifeline utility, Channel participates in the MBIE-led fuel sector coordinating entity (Fuel SCE) during responses to an emergency, and in advance in the planning and preparation for an emergency through the development and regular update of the National Fuel Plan. In Channel's view, the National Fuel Plan has proven effective in preparing the sector for emergencies and in the continuous improvement and adaptation of the sector's response to incidents.

We support the introduction of mandatory business continuity planning requirements for lifeline utilities, recognising the importance of ensuring service resilience during emergencies. However, we are concerned that prescribing specific requirements for business continuity plans in legislation could reduce flexibility and lead to obligations that may not be well-suited to the operational realities of different sectors. The scope of business continuity planning should be founded on an objective risk assessment and, given the broader variety of circumstances that can lead to an emergency, continuity plans should focus broadly on the resources and processes that need to be in place to respond. The effectiveness of detailed plans can be quickly undermined by slight changes in circumstance. The efficacy of comprehensive plans can be rapidly compromised by minor alterations in circumstances. This is particularly relevant in cases where it becomes essential to execute and adapt one or more Business Continuity Plans (BCPs) in response to the nature, magnitude, consequences, and duration of the incident. Situations that may require such adjustments include the interruption of a single vital function, several critical functions, or a major disaster or emergency.

**Avoiding unintended consequences**

We urge moderation in the implementation of reporting and compliance obligations – by developing a standard, across sectors and regions, we can ensure that we do not create unnecessary burdens and costs on reporting entities in efforts to foster greater information sharing. We agree that information sharing is critical, and if this can be done prior to an emergency event to ensure greater understanding cross-sector and regional requirements, then this will absolutely lead to better outcomes during an emergency.

Taking the example of the MBIE-led National Fuel Plan process, we suggest this model could be adopted in other sectors. Having a responsible department delegated to manage and run the coordination process would ensure a standard approach to reporting on preparedness, as well as maintaining vital contact sheets and connections, while also minimising the burden on individual companies to individually and extensively report on their preparedness for emergency situations. In holding the information centrally, you also avoid regional silos developing, which in this

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increasingly interconnected world, is important. We do not recommend going down the legislative change route, to compel organisations to participate. By ensuring this process is not burdensome or costly, but sets clearer expectations, and is centrally managed, you are more likely to achieve buy-in from the industries required, and ultimately achieve a better outcome during emergency events.

**Final reflections**

We are supportive of learning lessons from previous emergency events to strengthen New Zealand's overarching emergency management legislation. We urge the Government to be pragmatic in its implementation of changes, and not to create an over-regulated system that discourages collective cooperation on-the-ground, when it is in businesses best interest to get back up and running as quickly as possible in the event of an emergency situation.

Nga mihi nui



Jack Stewart

GM - Operations

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**Submission on Community-Led Emergency Response and Resilience**

In the wake of Cyclone Gabrielle, our community experienced unprecedented destruction. Yet amidst the chaos, we found strength in our shared determination and the deep connections that bind us together. Our community rallied swiftly, offering support and solidarity as Gabrielle tore through our midst.

From the very onset, we mobilized with remarkable speed and coordination. Immediate efforts focused on rescue operations, evacuations, and ensuring the welfare of those affected. We established an evacuation center, coordinated responses, and maintained a missing persons register—critical actions undertaken with urgency and resolve.

As the immediate danger passed, our community's spirit endured and evolved. A robust, volunteer-led initiative emerged, focused on addressing the ongoing welfare needs of residents. Volunteers carried out welfare checks, organized supply deliveries, coordinated manpower, and maintained essential communication channels. These efforts were—and continue to be—driven by those who live here, understand our people, and care deeply for their well-being.

Recognizing that recovery is a long road, we have transitioned into a phase of sustained support and planning. Working Groups have been established, led by local volunteers, to guide long-term recovery and resilience efforts. This momentum continues today, powered by a shared commitment to building a more resilient future.

## What We Want from This Submission

We do **not** want another lengthy, bureaucratic piece of legislation—one that consumes time, resources, and taxpayer dollars only to become a forgotten document filled with platitudes, guidelines, and inflexible rules.

What we **do** want is immediate, practical support for communities on the frontlines of disaster response.

This includes:

- **Direct funding** for community-led emergency preparedness.
- **Training and equipment** for local responders and volunteers.
- **Support for the development of local resilience hubs**—safe, secure shelters stocked and prepared to sustain isolated communities for 72 hours or more.

Nobody knows a rural or urban area better than the people who live there. Local communities understand their geography, their risks, their people—and they know what's needed to stay safe when disaster strikes. In many cases, they are also best positioned to lead the initial response in times of crisis, often well before outside help can arrive.

Every community has individuals willing to step up and take responsibility. The government must recognize and empower these local leaders by providing them with the support they need to prepare their

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communities. That means resources to create safe shelters, stock emergency supplies, train volunteers, and maintain critical communication systems.

When the immediate crisis has passed and external help arrives, communities also need **financial and practical assistance** to return to some form of normality. Recovery doesn't end when the water recedes, or the winds die down.

### What We Don't Want

We don't need more government reports, consultant briefings, or agency-led initiatives that fail to reflect on-the-ground realities. These often result in costly processes and policies that lack practical implementation or community input.

We don't need officials and agencies—no matter how well-intentioned—telling communities what they need, how they should operate, or what is best for them. That approach risks demoralizing volunteers, discouraging local leadership, and eroding the very resilience we're trying to build.

If we want to strengthen community-led emergency management (CDEM), we must start by **listening to communities**, not prescribing solutions from afar.

### A Better Path Forward

The answers are not complicated. Resilience begins with common sense, community input, and a commitment to learning from past experiences.

We must not repeat the mistakes of relying solely on centralized control, inflexible regulations, and a lack of real-world consultation. Instead, let us build a partnership between government and communities—one rooted in trust, collaboration, and mutual respect.

**Communities are ready to lead. We now ask that the government be ready to support**

**Quent and Mel Swayn**

Bay View, Eskdale, Esk Valley and Whirinaki Resilience team

s9(2)(a) s9(2)(a)

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**From:** Zoe Juniper <s9(2)(a) @mpi.govt.nz>
**Sent:** Thursday, May 15, 2025 8:02 AM
**To:** Emergency Management Bill [NEMA] <EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz>
**Cc:** Susan Keenan <s9(2)(a) @mpi.govt.nz>; ^MPI: Andrew Curtis s9(2)(a) @mpi.govt.nz>; s9(2)(a) @mpi.govt.nz>
**Subject:** RE: EM Bill: DRAFT analysis for feedback (Batch 1) and update on Next steps

Mōrena Beth & Team,

Ahead of the workshop this morning we are pleased to provide you with the formal agency feedback (attached).

Thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback on the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) preferred options outlined in the public consultation document Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation. MPI has coordinated this feedback across all branches and the comments reflect our formal agency views.

In considering the proposed options, MPI has considered the overall appropriateness of the options, with a particular emphasis on areas reflecting MPI's interests in:

- animal welfare, and the inclusion of primary sector and rural communities (including iwi Māori) in planning and decision-making to ensure proposals will acknowledge their specific needs;
- proposals around lead or control agency responsibilities, given MPI currently leads on government's responses to drought, biosecurity, food safety, and trade disruptions; and
- ensuring that proposals facilitate cross-agency arrangements to manage all hazards and threats not only the hazards NEMA is responsible for.

MPI remains concerned that the proposed legislative reforms may not improve how the needs of the primary sector and rural communities (including remote communities, Māori iwi) will be met. These groups are often under-represented in current CDEM arrangements and forums. Furthermore, assumptions have been made by NEMA and CDEM Groups that rural communities have less need as they are inherently more resilient. But resilience does not equate to lesser need, with rural communities facing distinct vulnerabilities, including isolation, access to infrastructure, economic dependence on primary industries, etc. Many of the options proposed in the consultation document have decision-rights and resources allocated to regional (rather than local) CDEM Groups and nationally which, if adopted, may make it harder for these groups to connect, be heard, participate and have their unique needs met and could perpetuate inequalities. The opportunity to fully acknowledge the role of these groups in the emergency management system has also been missed.

MPI appreciates animal welfare being acknowledged in the proposals, recognising that animals need prioritisation above property. The proposals do not, however, raise the known issue of reimbursement of animal welfare costs incurred in responses. MPI would like to see some equivalency with the arrangements for human welfare reimbursement of costs given that CDEM still treats animal welfare support as different to other welfare sub-functions. Some statement on this would remove ambiguity.

The proposals still reflect a narrow view of emergency management to focus on immediate life and safety when a more holistic approach encompassing prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery is required. Ignoring these other aspects of emergency management can lead to long-term consequences and exacerbate pre-existing issues.

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It also remains unclear if or how the reforms will enable other lead agencies to access the new frameworks proposed (e.g., Māori iwi, essential services, etc) when leading a response to a hazard. For example, would the Māori iwi forums created be enabled to support hazards not led by NEMA, such MPI leading on drought or a biosecurity incursion?

Kia pai tō rā
Zoë

**Zoë Juniper** *(She / her)*
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The MPI National Operations Centre has a 24/7 duty officer who is on-call to assist with urgent issues.

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Agriculture & Investment Services
Ministry for Primary Industries
Manatū Ahu Matua

# Emergency Management Bill MPI preferred options

Thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback on the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) preferred options outlined in the public consultation document *Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation.* MPI has coordinated this feedback across all branches and the comments reflect our formal agency views.

In considering the proposed options, MPI has considered the overall appropriateness of the options, with a particular emphasis on areas reflecting MPI's interests in:

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## General comments on the proposals

1. A stronger policy rationale is needed for deciding between primary and secondary legislative instruments.
2. Any legislative instruments need to balance accountability by local groups while allowing for flexibility and responsiveness for local groups to self-determine the best arrangements for their communities.
3. Primary legislation and regulations will need provisions setting out how failures to meet the requirements will be monitored and addressed/penalised. Any penalties should be proportionate, non-fiscal and not punitive given much of the work in communities is done on a voluntary basis.
4. There is a lack of independence and transparency if NEMA is the regulator, the implementor of regulation, and is also providing monitoring of performance for assurance purposes.
5. More consideration is needed on how legislative proposals will sit alongside other legislation. The consultation document does not cross-reference other legislation to any great extent and the Emergency Management Bill may not be the best legislative instrument to use in some cases.
6. More consideration is needed on enabling the transition and adoption of new guidelines and obligations, with additional resources, guidance and support from central Government. Additional costs to ratepayers, especially rural communities, should be avoided.
7. Decision making, engagement and resources are top-down as regional CDEM Groups will determine how these are provided for at the local CDEM level. By comparison, the NISWE review recommended more engagement with community, which local government is best placed to do.

## MPI preferences on the options

8. The proposed MPI preferred options are set out in the table (**Appendix One**). MPI agrees that the status quo option as outlined for all issues is not sufficient.

## MPI Contacts

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## Appendix One: MPI Preferences on options for each issue

| Issue, MPI specific interest * | | MPI preferred option(s) | Justification and comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities | **2**: (non-legislative) Develop guidance on meeting diverse needs, and<br>**3**: (legislative) Require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for | Ensures obligation to engage with disproportionately affected people and communities and provides guidance to ensure local level engagement and some level of consistency in Group plans and avoid duplication.<br>Proposed increased monitoring of local and regional CDEM performance will support compliance.<br>Option 4 (requiring Director to consult) risks bias towards national institutions and existing relationships, and doesn't support regionally led approach<br>The definition of 'disproportionate' requires criteria set out in legislation to avoid inconsistent interpretation. MPI considers that rural communities and people with animals should be acknowledged, and needs taken into consideration in the guidance. Use of disproportionately affected has merit over "vulnerable" given some groups are usually not vulnerable, but in an emergency may be badly affected. |
| 2 | Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management (EM) | **2**: (non-legislative) Address the roles of iwi Māori in guidance, plans, policy settings, and<br>**3**: (legislative) Require iwi Māori representation in CDEM decision-making structures, and<br>**4**: (legislative) Require CDEM Groups to engage with iwi Māori during the development of CDEM Group, and<br>**5**: (legislative) Require the Director to seek advice on Māori interests and knowledge to inform national planning | Options 3 to 5 will ensure that this is written into legislation, and option 2 will provide guidance and support a clear definition of roles of iwi Māori. Legislated obligations will ensure accountability, and that responsibility is taken to meet requirements to ensure national consistency and uphold Treaty principles.<br>Note: iwi Māori should be able to choose to opt in.<br>Ensuring a balance so rural Māori iwi have opportunity to participate in arrangements is needed.<br>Option 5, a mandated, resourced and funded independent iwi Māori governance role at the national level, would ensure iwi Māori have a formal voice at strategic and national level and be available to all "risk coordinating" and "response" agencies. |

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| Issue, MPI specific interest * | | MPI preferred option(s) | Justification and comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | Strengthening and enabling community participation in EM | **2**: (non-legislative) Develop and update guidance and strengthen public education, and<br>**3** (legislative) Require CDEM Groups plans to state how it will manage offers of resources from public | Additional and clear guidance and education will help to reduce the disconnect between communities and CDEM/other agencies. Any legislative requirement (option 3) would need to be flexible enough to allow CDEM Groups to determine the best arrangements for their community.<br>The primary sector and rural communities need to be proactively included in community participation and engagement. This may require CDEM to reach out and go into these communities to better understand needs and resources. |
| 4 | Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency | **2**: (legislative) Provide for protection from civil liability (*could also enable use as a defence*)<br>**3**: (legislative) Enable compensation for labour costs (*with amendments*) | Policy problem is not clear enough nor gives an indication of scale. Option 3 (compensation) should not be limited to labour (could detract from voluntary culture) but enable reimbursement for consumed resources (e.g. a marae providing food and shelter, a group of farmers providing tractors and graders to clear roads, etc).<br>If a Controller directs work this should be funded.<br>Rural communities are more likely to be in remote areas and therefore more likely to be the first to respond to emergency, so option 2 protects them.<br>For rural communities, primary sector and those with animals, the ability to shelter in place also needs to be enabled and considered alongside evacuations. Actions taken to protect and enable recovery options should also be recognised in response.<br>Blanket indemnity is a risk and there should be an element of "what is reasonable." This requires careful policy and legal analysis as likely to overlap with other legislation e.g. Health and Safety at Work Act. |

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| Issue, MPI specific interest * | | MPI preferred option(s) | Justification and comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | Clearer direction and control during an emergency | **2:** (legislative) Require the agency dealing with the specific hazard to be the "Control Agency" | All models should be fully tested, especially with complex scenarios, and from a legal point of view around the interaction between legislations, especially ones with emergency powers. The final model needs to be work across all hazards.<br>MPI notes option 3: (legislative) Require Group Controllers (local emergency) of the Director (national emergency) to be the "Control Agency", may not sit well with some "lead" agencies, including MPI, for more complex events and would be inappropriate as the hazard agencies are experienced and should lead their response, with CDEM not holding relevant delegations, experience, liabilities and/or financial controls under other Acts.<br>MPI instead should, as the agency controlling a hazard, have the right to seek assistance from CDEM Group and/or NEMA or other parties and for that assistance to not be unreasonably withheld. In FMD or significant drought, for example, MPI should be able to draw on existing welfare arrangements in CDEM and nationally. |
| 6 | Strengthening the regional tier of EM | | |
| | 6.1 resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities | **2:** (legislative) Provide distinct responsibilities for CDEM Groups and their local authority members<br>*(MPI considers this is really a matter for CDEMs to confirm, noting that MPI is more usually involved at the regional rather than local level in response and not well resourced for the latter).* | Option 2 would enable clarity of roles and responsibilities but needs flexibility to recognise that some local authorities (including rurally based) may need more assistance than others, but that should not diminish their decision-making in respect of their own communities.<br>Option 3 (legislative) Require CDEM Group plans to state how each member will fund and deliver on the functions and decisions of the CDEM Group, is very top down and counter to recommendations around greater participation of communities in decisions that affect them.<br>MPI would like greater acknowledgement and resourcing for local CDEM, particularly where under-resourced, such as geographically isolated and rural communities) to carry out responses with assistance from CDEM Group and arrangements need flexibility to reflect what works best for them and for their communities. |

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| Issue, MPI specific interest * | | MPI preferred option(s) | Justification and comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 6.2 clear and consistent organisation and accountability for EM | **2:** (non-legislative): Update guidance and provide models for how CDEM Groups and local authorities could organise emergency management in their region | Flexibility and acknowledgement of local CDEM with their links to communities remains important and guidance would do this.<br>Option 3 (make CDEM Group responsible for organising EM) is likely to reduce decision-making and resourcing at local level and could lead to unintentional bias (e.g. CDEM Groups are largely sourced from urban centres and may not have the necessary understandings of rural needs) unless there are ways of addressing concerns.<br>Some regions are diverse and extensive, so in an event could reduce coordination capability in isolated areas (seen in Cyclone Gabrielle).<br>Option 4 (the CE of each local authority is Controller and Recovery Manager) may be applicable in small councils only or highly dependent on the skills of the CE – existing arrangements can allow for this now. |
| | 6.3 Performance of Coordinating Executive Groups ( CEGs) | **2**: (legislative) Provide more specific expectations on members of the CEG supported by good practice guidance, and<br>**3**: (legislative) Require the CEG to report to the Director on how and to what extent it has delivered on its functions under the CDEM Act | CEGs (consisting primarily of mayors + some additional representatives) usually do not have MPI or other rural representatives as a member. Solutions for this issue proposed are to increase accountability to the Director and to reduce sub-delegation.<br>MPI would like CEGs to ensure some representation of Māori/iwi and rural interests, particularly in areas where they are a sizeable proportion of the population, but see this issue for NEMA, CDEMs, CEs and mayors of councils to address.<br>Access to expertise (e.g. around animal welfare, primary sector, rural communities, and across hazards, such as biosecurity) would also be useful. |
| 7 | Keeping emergency management plans up to date | **2:** (legislative) Enable targeted, "more than minor" amendments to the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, and<br>**3:** (legislative) The National CDEM Plan isn't required to be made by Order in Council, but retains its legislative status | Currently CDEM Group Plans and National CDEM Plans must be updated every five years, but any significant changes cannot be made in a lesser timeline (and often the five years is exceeded). Plans should be able to be amended and changed within reason.<br>MPI would like to ensure that changes (particularly to roles and responsibilities) continue to be made by agreement with the parties concerned. NEMA and CDEM should not be able to impose or change a responsibility without a due process. |

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| Issue, MPI specific interest * | | MPI preferred option(s) | Justification and comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8 | Stronger national direction and assurance | | |
| | 8.1 Strengthen Director's Mandate for assurance | **2**: (non-legislative) Increased guidance and strengthened governance, and<br>**4**: (legislative) Give the Director the function of monitoring the performance of the emergency management system (*MPI supports with caveats*) | Increased guidance and governance will recognise that participants are generally not paid to perform functions. If a mandate is given it needs to be associated with resources or formalised arrangements that are agreed so performance measures are transparent.<br>MPI note cross over work being led by DPMC around system steward roles. NEMA's system stewardship role is to lead the emergency management system in operational readiness, response, and recovery at the national level as well as NEMA being the regulator of, and provides assurance of, the devolved, local government-led emergency management system.<br>Who manages performance of NEMA with some independence? MPI note many other international jurisdictions have an independent monitoring function of the national body. MPI feel improved governance by more independent authorities would lead to more consistent outcomes and system improvements. |
| | 8.2 Strengthen mandate to intervene and address performance issues | **2:** (legislative): Provide the Director with the power to issue Compliance Orders (*MPI would support only if this is balanced by guidance, pre-agreement and funding to support meeting obligations)* | MPI would be concerned if new rules and obligations can be imposed on agencies without associated funding or support, and then those agencies are held to account for delivering at their cost.<br>Currently MPI does more than its minimum obligations, but a performance-based system could impose significant reporting/auditing costs – this would be of particular concern if MPI also had to build its own separate, bespoke systems because it cannot utilise the EM system arrangements. If Director can monitor performance of all parties or issue compliance orders (option 2), this could lead to a more embedded blame culture and reduce willing collaboration.<br>MPI notes that currently CDEM work and operate under local government arrangements. It may be appropriate that the Minister of Local Government as well as the Minister for Emergency Management and Recovery have join responsibility in this area if an independent model is not utilised.<br>A mechanism to raise concerns about performance (for example if there is a lack of community engagement, or the needs to groups are not being met) would also be useful. |

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| Issue, MPI specific interest * | | MPI preferred option(s) | Justification and comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9 | Strengthening local hazard risk management | **4**: (legislative) Enable the form and content of CDEM Group plans to be prescribed through secondary legislation | MPI recommends that care is taken to avoid perceptions that local authorities have the mandate to set acceptable levels of risk for all risks. For example, biosecurity, food safety, health or water quality often need a nationally consistent approach set by central agencies and implemented locally.<br>There is some merit in the form and content of CDEM Group plans better prescribed through secondary legislation (Option 4) to ensure national consistency.<br>There is a lot of duplication that occurs in regional plans and arrangements so some efficiencies through having templates and consistent approaches. For example, explicit requirements around animal welfare, rural communities and primary sector (needs, participation, or need to include 4Rs considerations)<br>This may be a matter best addressed at the National Hazards Board level in terms of guidance with input from all CEs.<br>However, it is likely to be too operational to expect the Minister of Emergency Management and Recovery to have a role in reviewing/approving CDEM plans (Option 5). |
| 10 | Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies | | |
| | 10.1 Māori taonga | **2:** (non-legislative) Develop guidance on considering taonga and other culture heritage | In line with other legislative obligations (e.g., RMA and Heritage NZ Pouhere Taonga Act) and the Treaty relationship responsibility of active protection, it will be important that taonga Māori and cultural heritage are appropriately understood and considered in terms of emergency management.<br>Guidance will support iwi/Māori, councils and other parties to plan for the protection of taonga and other cultural heritage, and enable responses to be planned and enacted at place |

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| Issue, MPI specific interest * | | MPI preferred option(s) | Justification and comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 10.2 Animals | **2:** (non-legislative) Develop guidance on considering animal impacts, and<br>**3**: (legislative) Strengthen planning expectations through secondary legislation, and<br>**4:** (legislative) Expand emergency powers to enable mitigation of pain and distress to animals | Animal welfare needs to be in legislation, while providing guidance on how to consider animal impacts.<br>Option 4 is necessary to provide enforceable powers to enter premises to mitigate pain and distress (animals are sentient).<br>MPI agree that humans take top priority, but an 'all of welfare' approach where, if people are being evacuated, then animals will be evacuated alongside. This also recognises the importance of the animal-human bond to support human welfare.<br>Animals should be prioritised above the protection of property as animals are sentient beings. |
| 11 | Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services | | |
| | 11.1 Narrow definition of lifeline utility | **3:** (legislative) Replace the lifeline utilities with an expanded, principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure" | Inclusion of emergency services (taken as a given as not listed?).<br>MPI prefers a more comprehensive approach that includes the whole food system and not just distribution centres as essential, and human and animal medicine needs should also be essential, possibly animal control?<br>The earlier discussions on this option was that a balance between ensuring those providing essential services were prioritised early to enable them to restore those services quickly. The legislative arrangements seem to be more focused on imposing obligations of supply on providers. A balance needs to be kept.<br>The Energy sector model has some merit (opt in and accept obligations). Like for the CDEM Group Plans some coordinated nationally consistent components of lifeline utilities in plans (issue 7) could be helpful particularly for national organisations providing lifeline utility services (e.g. public health, electricity grid, etc.). A consequence management approach (hazard agnostic, based on disruption to service) also has merit.<br>MPI note that the food system is currently restricted to just distribution centres and a more broader food system approach (i.e. businesses such as abattoirs, farms, milk collections) should be sought to enable continuity of domestic and export food sectors.<br>NZVA asked that if animal health and medications were included in lifeline utilities, would there be some financial assistance from central government to offset additional costs. |

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| Issue, MPI specific interest * | | MPI preferred option(s) | Justification and comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 11.2 Strengthen lifeline utility business continuity planning | **2:** (non-legislative) Increase assurance of lifeline utilities' business continuity plans, and<br>**3**: (legislative) Introduce financial penalties and enable detailed business continuity planning requirements to be set through regulations | As previously stated in earlier submissions there are other means to ensure BCPs are enabled and a risk of duplication with other existing obligations. MPI prefers any legislative requirement enables lifeline utilities/essential services to opt into New Zealand's Protective Security Requirements (PSR). |
| | 11.3 Barriers to cooperation and information sharing | **2:** (non-legislative) Strengthen assurance and develop standards, and,<br>**3:** (legislative) Explicitly require CDEM Groups to involve the lifeline utilities in their areas in the development of CDEM Group plans, and<br>**4:** (legislative) Require lifeline utilities to contribute to national response plans | Some national consistency around information sharing would be helpful. Lifeline utilities are critical in recovery too, so any arrangements need to cover the 4Rs not just response.<br>It may be more efficient for national utilities to participant in national plans (which cascade down or cross reference into regional CDEM Plans). Care around commercial sensitivities must be taken, and for those with access to sensitive material to ensure conflicts of interest are managed.<br>Use of Arc GIS for mapping given most councils do already and many other organisations? Different organisations use different tools (EMIS, Teams/Sharepoint).<br>Needs changes to the Privacy Act so that in the event of an emergency (declared or otherwise) recognised parties like MPI can access data provided. Data sharing is not easy to determine or enable in an event quickly, especial when restrictions of use of data are often set in legislation under many acts. Note there is other work underway across government around privacy and data sharing. |
| 12 | Strengthening central govt. business continuity | **3:** (legislative) extend current business continuity requirements through an opt in model (*with amendments*) | MPI recommends that duplication of reporting is avoided and option 4 (legislative) Extending business continuity requirements to a broader group of central government entities, with a mechanism to exempt specific Crown entities would add compliance costs.<br>Extending the existing Protective Security Requirements (PSR) would be the most effective way forward rather than an EM bespoke approach.<br>Allowances for exemptions (including equivalence) rather than an opt in model would be preferable. Additionally, this should be extended to the new Public Research Organisations, Crown Entities and possibly local government. |

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| Issue, MPI specific interest * | | MPI preferred option(s) | Justification and comment |
|---|---|---|---|
| 13 | Managing access to restricted areas | **2:** (non-legislative) National guidance and training on managing cordons, and<br>**3:** (secondary legislation): Prescribe the form of identification passes through regulations**,** and<br>**4**: (legislative) Clarify access can be restricted to any class or group of persons *(only if necessary)* | In Kaikoura earthquake 2016, those living along the inland Kaikoura route did not have their needs considered in the road cordon. This issue could be addressed by reflecting in Issue 1 (needs of disproportionately affected communities). Giving Police/CDEM greater ability to recognise who can enter would be more valuable than often blanket bans while pre-approval will save time in a response for recognised groups.<br>A process to enable identification passes could utilise schedules to enable those with recognised existing ID/accreditation to get access e.g. a medical doctor, police officer, etc. MPI would need to consider if Animal Welfare Inspectors, Biosecurity Officers, or other accredited persons should be enabled in this way. |
| 14 | Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level * | **2**: (legislative) Tidy up existing functions and powers related to CDEM Groups, Controllers, and Recovery Managers | Preferred over status quo and would remove confusion of different participants exercising same powers (collaborative discussion across parties should be encouraged). |
| 15 | Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period | No preference | This issue raises the ability to accept an electronic signature rather than requiring a written signature (option 2) or to make an oral declaration (option 3) of a state of emergency. MPI would seek merit in option 2 but would leave to those who have ability to declare a state of emergency under the Bill to determine what is best. |
| 16 | Mayors' role in local state of emergency (LSOE) declarations and transition period notices | No preference | Like issue 15, MPI has no particular preference with either option 2 (legislative) Mayors or option 2 (legislative) CDEM Groups have primary responsibility for declaring a LSOE or giving notice of a local transition period, and consider this be left to those best placed to determine preference.<br>An observation is that some Mayors are declaring local states of emergency (LSOE) in anticipation of an emergency, partially because it means greater likelihood of central government support – this was not canvassed in the document. |

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Russell Wood |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Russell Wood Consulting |

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### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, I believe so. Having experienced the more recent events of Cyclone Halle, Auckland Anniversary Floods, Cyclone Gabrielle and CrowdStrike (through a response leadership role) and through presenting to the NISWE Review Panel I believe the various objectives being consulted on have generally hit the mark as to where both the legislation and the broader system needs to focus to ensure we are better prepared, more capable and competent and more inclusive (at various levels across the system) to ensure better emergency management going forward, before, during and after major events.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Generally, yes. There are certainly various factors at play that have raised the likelihood and potential consequences for a significant event(s) to negatively impact New Zealand and its citizens. In addition, the more general global move of countries taking a much more self-interested approach to how they exist and deal with hazards and threats will likely mean NZ will not always be able to rely on international support in our hour of need to the same extent that we have in the past. Recent discussions and investment proposals in the defence spend area are an example of where NZ may need to head with regard to better enabling preparation, response and recovery to meet significant natural hazard disasters in the future.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Yes there are various reasons some of which are included in the discussion document. Examples include socio economic status whereby individuals, households and communities do not have the financial resilience to either invest in planning and preparation or timely recovery from significant events. Isolated individuals and households, both geographically and socially (with little or no support networks) will likely also be hit harder by natural events/disasters and may create unmanageable demands on local and national response and recovery capacity.

There is a more general challenge with the (poor) levels of public engagement, awareness, education and readiness in anticipation of greater and more frequent significant natural disasters. I'm not convinced that we have the wider public fully cognisant of the fact that households and communities need to prepare to respond and recover with little (perhaps no) assistance from regional and National response and recovery resources. There appears to be a continuation of a perhaps naïve expectation that the Local Authority or various Government agencies will always be able to assist everyone and anyone that is impacted. Investment (likely significant) in household and community awareness, understanding and preparation for major events will be required over and extended period of time if there is to be a lift in awareness and behaviour change.

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I think the most benefit will come from a combination of options 2, 3 and 4. The focus across these options will need to be both local and national. The challenge will be the required level of investment to make a meaningful difference ensuring that such investment doesn't result in materially less being available for the response component. Fully appreciate that available funding is finite, so a careful balance required across reduction, readiness AND response. Lifting the general awareness and capabilities of households and communities will be multi-generational in nature.

I also agree with the statement that there needs to be flexibility to ensure the focus is on those who face the greatest risk. There will be tough choices to be made so everything needs to be founded on a strong risk-based set of principles and criteria.

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5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Clear principles and criteria. Appropriate, targeted consultation to better enable understanding of those at greatest risk and the reality of having make difficult choices. Education on how communities can raise their own levels of planning and preparedness to reduce reliance on Local and Central government. Identify credible and strong local "champions" and representatives to ensure a better chance of tough messages being understood and accepted.

I think government needs to take a bi partisan approach wherever possible to ensure this important work doesn't become overly politicised and therefore at risk of delay or frequent reversal or direction change.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I'm comfortable with the proposed options.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We saw during the NISWE how effective and quickly some Iwi were able mobilise to support and assist their communities. I think there was also frustration at times from Iwi when they felt they weren't being fully involved or perhaps were being required to ask permission every time they wanted to take action to assist. I think there are also challenges when speed of action becomes hampered by appropriate levels of accountability required from public agencies particularly when scarce resources and funding is being sought.

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Generally yes. I think it should be noted that it wasn't always just their own communities that Iwi were supporting and assisting during some of these significant events.

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9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

My sense is that if a legislative solution is sought then the concept/proposal may become overly politicised, create division and be significantly delayed. While that does not necessarily make it a lesser option, I simply think it is a risk that could delay implementation.

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Recognition must be formalised to a greater extent, so all players have a clear understanding s to respective roles and responsibilities **before** an event occurs. If any solution is deemed to be just lip service to iwi Māori involvement, without the supporting decision making and accountability type mandates then I believe it will be perceived negatively and ultimately people will not engage fully and appropriately.

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

I think it needs to be formalised and present as a true partnership with appropriate decision-making rights that will also come with clear accountability processes, some of which will be enshrined in legislation.

We must find the right people at both the local and central levels to ensure an effective partnership can be entered into and each level understands where its respective mandate/accountability starts and finishes.

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

I'm leaning towards formal representation on CEG by iwi Māori but am concerned that large geographic areas that may be unworkable. It will be critical to ensure that any iwi Māori representatives on CEG have a clear and explicit mandate that they are representing their broader iwi groups. The challenge will be achieving a genuine and enduring commitment to that mandate especially in times of major events where dissatisfaction at various levels will become apparent and some may choose to act independently and not in accordance with the direction that CEG has set.

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Identify capable, trusted and truly representative iwi leaders to advise the Director. The Director will also need to ensure their presence is felt at the local level and will need to ensure he/she is appropriately represented when engagement with iwi occurs at the more local level. Not a role that can be conducted just from Wellington via Teams and e mails I think. The Director may also consider the benefit of a somewhat independent voice of Māori to ensure they are appropriately understanding what iwi representatives are saying, and meaning.

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**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I'm comfortable that a combination of the proposed options will improve the system and the meaningful role iwi Māori must play across it.

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This problem statement is both real and practical. During a significant event when stories inevitably emerge (e.g. social media) of appropriate capability and capacity from within a community sitting idle or never called upon the ensuing narrative serves to undermine public trust and confidence in our formal structures, processes and the agencies tasked with planning for and responding to such events. This makes it doubly difficult to then roll out effective community awareness and education campaigns as the public no longer fully trusts the messenger.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Strengthening public guidance is important but it can't be done just once and solely via a "pamphlet drop". It requires boots on the ground out and about in communities building support, making contacts, supporting initiatives and assisting with resourcing where appropriate. There is a real risk of failure in not taking such a comprehensive approach and therefore will need to be resourced appropriately and with the right people.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Nothing material to add other than it will be important to test and audit plans, processes and arrangements to ensure they are practical and will survive the first onslaught of the "enemy" e.g. a significant natural hazard.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, a real problem I have observed during significant natural disaster events and can result in protracted, politicised and harmful debates and litigation post the event.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I think the risks and costs of the various options included in Table 5 provide a good sense of the potential if things don't go to plan, as they invariably don't. I think there are benefits to be had here but any options/proposals do need to take a somewhat cautious and considered approach otherwise the unintended and unforeseen (negative) consequences will be many and varied.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Nothing specific other than the need to ensure other existing legislation that may come into play is fully considered if civil liability protection and compensation are to be implemented.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Obviously, I think Issue 3 is also related to Issue 4 and any solutions arising from Issue 4 must be considered in the context of iwi Māori actions and involvement.

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This is a perennial issue in my view and has generally been summed up well in the two review reports referenced in the discussion document. I don't believe the status quo is a viable option if we are seeking to improve the wider emergency management response system.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I think Option 4 has the most potential to provide the outcome and benefits to address the problem. NZ is a small country and none of our emergency response agencies, including Local Authority CDEM groups have significant depth or breadth in my view to take on the Control Agency role for any length of time.

I think the Unified Control Model option could work well for a small nation like New Zealand particularly if the key agencies/players come to the preplanning and exercising tables with a genuine commitment to make such a system function effectively and without it becoming an attempt to secure significantly more resource to make it function. Any political agendas will need to be minimised.

The model also needs to be considered in terms of the political oversight and direction setting processes associated with ODESC and Watch Groups, for example.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I am comfortable with what is proposed in Option 4

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I believe Option 4 supported politically and by all response agencies can be effective if sufficient commitment, time and energy is put into the model **before** it is implemented in response to significant events. Any cross-agency "politics" must be minimised, and this will require strong commitment and leadership at the national political level as well.

Proactively Released

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes I thought it was a good description that went to the nub of the issue(s). I don't see Options 2 and 3 as being mutually exclusive and

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I think both Options 2 and 3 have merit and may well be combined to a degree to ensure the necessary strengthening and accountability of the regional tier is delivered. There may well be upfront costs to implementing these options and this may cause distress amongst small authorities (and their ratepayers) so co-funding, cost sharing and even consolidation are all options that may need to be considered to enable effective delivery of the proposed change.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

See comment below at 29. Also, at this stage I **don't** think the examples of national delivery and voluntary establishment of CDEM groups are appropriate.

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Consideration of the significant number of existing Territorial Authorities and their ability (particularly the smaller ones) to fund, resource and deliver what New Zealand needs by way of a fit for purpose comprehensive emergency management system.

### Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, happy with the problem statement

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

My preferred option is Option 3 as I think that has the greatest potential to deliver the necessary benefits to address the problem statement. I note the stated risks and costs of Option 3, but I think fundamental change (Option 3) is required here and I don't see the other described options as delivering on that requirement. In terms of costs and which agencies might bear these, once implementation costs are quantified there may need to be a centralised funding pool to assist any smaller players with implementing the necessary change.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No new options but if Option 3 is not confirmed then my next best scenario is a combination of Options 2 and 4.

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I agree with the analysis presented.

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

My preference is for a combined set of actions across all of Options 2, 3 and 4 as I do not see them as being mutually exclusive. I do note the identified risk in Option 3 of shifting responsibility of CEG performance to the Director and suggest this could be more akin to an auditing or assurance role to ensure accountability for day to day delivery clearly sits with the CDEM group leaders

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Combination of the various elements across options 2, 3 and 4.

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## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

It seemed reasonable. I wasn't aware of some of the detail/examples.

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I tend to prefer Option 3 as it appears to deliver on the required agility for changes and updates in a timely manner whilst still retaining legislative status. I note the potential for changes to potentially be too frequent and consider this would have to be carefully controlled and directed by the proposed NEMA Director General and the responsible Minister.

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

None proposed

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

May need to consider the alignment and potential integration of significant response plans (including Business Continuity Plans) of our primary emergency responders such as Police, FENZ, Defence, St John etc. Some form of regular alignment, integration and quality assurance testing might be considered.

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, problem is clear.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

My preferred option is a combination of the elements of Options 2, 3 and 4 although I note that this will likely require additional investment and may therefore need to be phased in over a multi-year period. If a choice is required about where to start first I would suggest Option 3.

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

I think both Readiness and Response areas would benefit the most from this proposal, enabling the achievement of meeting consistent standards and providing assurance that the system as a whole was meeting performance expectations.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

See comment above about a combination of three options albeit staged and phased.

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

I understand the problem as described but not fully aware as to the extent this is a problem, real or imagined particularly if the various other options included in the discussion document end up being implemented.

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 is preferred and so as not to place undue powers into the political domain.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No suggestions

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

There were elements from all Options 2-5 that I thought looked appropriate and beneficial. I note the stated risk around achieving balance between local flexibility and national consistency and the likely time and cost challenges on NEMA for Options 4 and 5. For that reason any combination of options would again need to be prioritised, staged and phased.

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

No specific comment other than that I would favour a prioritisation of national consistency which I believe would still allow for a degree of local flexibility while still maintaining the meaning and integrity of the local hazard risk assessments i.e. I don't believe they are entirely mutually exclusive.

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**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Lack of capability; poor data and intelligence; different and unintegrated platforms/systems; process deficiencies; unrealistic timeframes; lack of or rushed consultation.

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No suggestions

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This sentence particularly resonated "Māori also have a special relationship with their ancestral lands, water, sites, wāhi tūpuna, wāhi tapu, and other taonga"

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 is preferred, again noting potential costs to implement so would need to be considered and prioritised against other elements of the final Bill proposal.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

None proposed

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## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This is probably an area of emergency management that we have lacked good knowledge, systems and processes for over a long time.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

My preference is to introduce Options 2 and 4 initially and perhaps at some point in the future consider whether Option 3 is required. I'm mindful that we might end up with a lot legislative strengthening all at the same time which may become a bit overwhelming in terms of cost, capability and workload required at both NEMA and at the local level.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Nothing specific other than such a prioritisation process will never be a one size fits all and will always result in significant variance of views about prioritisation of animals over property, and vice versa. Many no-win situations here I think.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Lots of communication and consultation with communities and farmers etc to ensure a good understanding of the desired approach(es) to this matter.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

I think a public/political conversation is necessary to ensure a good understanding of the current capability and capacity of some of our frontline first responders such as Police and Fire and Emergency and to some extent the NZDF as well.

It seems that during a significant emergency expectations of these agencies are very high (locally and nationally) when the reality is responders are not always appropriately resourced or have the requisite capability/capacity to undertake specialist or geographically widespread emergency response functions beyond the first 48-72 hours.

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In times of no significant emergencies, they can be the subject of regular criticism as to "why do things cost so much?" and "why aren't you more efficient?". This is in the context of lower likelihood but extremely high consequence natural hazard events and it seems people can have fairly short-term memories after a significant event when our first responders were designated "hero" status.

New Zealand does not have a Civil Defence "standing army" similar to the Australian model of the State Emergency Service (SES) workers and volunteers. This means that the initial and extended response falls to our business-as-usual personnel and they are expected to deliver under at times extreme pressure, for extended periods and dispersed locations, and at times with little or no regard to how they and their families have been personally impacted by the disaster that has occurred. The problem is exacerbated when numbers of smaller communities are impacted simultaneously as such communities are generally serviced day to day by relatively small volunteer contingents e.g. FENZ Volunteer Brigades.

Beyond the Emergency Management Bill, it may be prudent to look at the legislative mandates of our first responders, how well the various legislative mandates are integrated across the system, their respective funding models and to what extent they are appropriately resourced to deliver on the day to day as well as rapidly scale up to respond appropriately to significant events. Ultimately the NZ public will receive the level and scale of service during major events that they are willing to pay for in "peace time".

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, good description based on real experience of Cyclone Gabrielle I think.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I like Option 3 at this point as it provides flexibility and the shifting reality of what might constitute an essential service in future albeit noting potential increases in implementation and compliance costs.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Nothing to add

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Nothing to add.

#### Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

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*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Agree with the Inquiry observations that perhaps some Lifeline Utilities had only focussed on their initial continuity without fully thinking it through from a true business continuity perspective and their reliance on other services in times of a significant emergency.

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preference is Option 3 as something of a compromise between non legislative and primary legislation. The option seems practical, pragmatic while sending a clear signal and providing NEMA with more effective levers to enable compliance and commitment. Assuming the financial penalty regime will ensure a degree of focus on the issue for these businesses.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Nothing to add.

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

General agreement and note the comment about commercial and/or anticompetitive behaviour being perceived as possible reasons why information may not be being shared. This may require government intervention to ensure lifeline utilities understand the need and that government won't view sharing in a negative context outside of emergency planning and business continuity.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

My preference is an initial prioritisation of a combination of the proposed elements included in Options 2 to 4. Options 5 and 6 to be further considered at a later date if determined to be warranted. I note the possible implications and costs etc on Lifeline Utilities but this may well be just the cost of doing business as a Lifeline provider in future.

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**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Approaches to communication and coordination at various scales to be included in response planning so the required approach (at whatever scale) is clear including associated accountabilities for leading and facilitating the necessary coordination particularly where that involves NEMA and CDEM Groups.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Nothing to add.

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I would have thought that Fire and Emergency NZ might have been included in paragraph 192 as another Crown entity that provides critical functions and services to other public service agencies.

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preference is Option 3, the "opt in" model although I assume this could be in combination with Option 5 whereby taking account of guidance issued by the Director provided for in the legislation. I think there are real risks in assuming that all agencies have sophisticated BCPs in place currently.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Nothing to add

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Consideration needs to be given to balancing the the integration and efficiency benefits of some public sector agencies operating on shared/common platforms for business-as-usual service delivery and what that might mean in the event of a significant cyber event, for example.

There might be benefits from agencies operating separately and independently when a significant event occurs but from a day-to-day perspective this could be expensive to run and miss opportunities for better integration and cost sharing efficiencies etc.

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

It's difficult to understand the scale of this problem and whether any of the options would effectively solve it. Don't have enough knowledge to comment further.

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Personal preference is to take the approach of guidance and training (Option 2) as well as including in the legislation the necessary clarification about restrictions being able to be applied to a class or group of persons (Option 4). Both options have merit.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Nothing to add.

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This does appear to be confusing and agree that it confuses/overlaps Functions with Powers. Functions and Powers may need to be considered further in the context of information technology, cyber security and possibly even social media.

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 is the obvious course of action, but it remains to be seen whether just a "tidy up" will suffice or if something more fundamental is required.

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**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Nothing specific.

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

As stated, the current process seems antiquated and certainly not 21st century.

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preference is Option 2 to ensure responsibility and accountability remains with key (authorised) persons. I suppose there could be a combination of Options 2 and 3 i.e. verbal declaration first followed within a certain timeframe by a signed (electronic) declaration.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Nothing to add.

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 preferred so that accountability sits with the primary elected official i.e. the Mayor.

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**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Nothing to add

### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Nothing to add

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Significant effort and resourcing required to deliver consistent and ongoing public knowledge and awareness of what the country is facing in the future and how critical it will be to ensure that as many individuals, households and communities take responsibility for managing their own safety, health and welfare for at least the first 72 hours of major natural hazard event.

Responsibility for delivery of such a campaign needs to be shared and integrated across a range of agencies and not just left to NEMA. That said I believe NEMA is best placed to take the lead to ensure the approach is quality, integrated and well coordinated, and measured as to its effectiveness.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Rob Bell |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Bell Adapt Ltd |

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### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I agree with the need for clarification or roles and responsibilities and improvement of standards for CDEM as listed in the Discussion Document, but one of the key needs of integrating the 1st R (Risk Reduction) with the last R (Recovery) is buried into a single Issue 9.

The Document never once mentions the escalating impacts climate change on natural hazards and how that should inform Recovery. This disconnect has repeatably been exposed after each of major storm in the last decade, yet we have ad-hoc bespoke approaches applied with no certainty or consistency (including with the recent FOSAL process after the 2023 events). This disconnect needs to be squarely addressed under its own Objective, as the first two strands of the Purpose of the existing CDEMA [s3] are about sustainable management of hazards and implementing cost-effective risk reduction, yet the focus of CDEM has continued to focus on nuts & bolts ([s3(c-f)], with no direction and clarity on the underlined longer-term aspects of recovery and its direct link back to risk reduction in the face of rising weather-related risks: [s4] "*recovery* means the co-ordinated efforts and processes used to bring about the immediate, medium-term, and long-term holistic regeneration and enhancement of a community following an emergency".

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

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## Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Home dwellers who are renters are usually not specifically catered for compared with property owners (some of these will be the landlord).

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**5. What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Insert response

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I would prefer to see the role of iwi/hapū encapsulated in legislation (rather than via guidance and goodwill) to recognise and implement the Crown-mana whenua partnership under the Tiriti, which should be a fundamental relationship in emergency management, recovery and adaptation. We saw this to some extent with the separate FOSAL process for Māori in resolving the Category 2 & 3 properties and cultural facilities after the 2023 events

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

While I agree there needs to be greater and more immediate coordination by local authorities during an event for using marae and facilities in responding to an event – it needs to be pre-arranged taking into account risk assessments to ensure the facilities are not exposed to risk that would compromise safety of those seeking shelter eg, a few marae in Tairawhiti (and probably elsewhere) were significantly flooded or isolated in ex TC Gabrielle.

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, the community needs to be a participant in pre-planning, preparedness and roles/responsibilities for responding BUT the participatory collaboration needs to also include pre-agreed recovery processes linked in some way to tolerable risks and longer-term adaptive pathways planning by councils in preparing for climate change and sea-level rise. At present there is a complete disjoint on this nexus.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

It needs one overall group (such as the CDEM Group) to be responsible for organising emergency management functions through legislative direction, so it is clear on responsibilities. But as I outlined in #1, it is imperative that the CDEM Group's role and mandate on pre-agreed post event recovery and risk reduction (1st and last R) are sheeted back in a clear and integrated processes to local and regional council functions for managing significant risks from natural hazards including climate-change adaptation planning. Otherwise, the Group's priority areas for risk reduction are often "drowned" in other priorities of local authorities (eg, in LTP's and Infrastructure Strategy Plans).

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I agree with what has been described but the Document misses the present disjointedness between the 1st and last R (Recovery) in achieving sustainable risk reduction in the face of escalating climate-influenced hazards (ie, most of the natural

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hazards incl tsunami and EQ-via liquefaction). Having clearer national direction on integrating CDEM with land-use planning and climate adaptation functions of councils, then could be followed up with officials or auditors addressing shortfalls or "hand waving" in Group Plans for this crucial aspect of joining short- to long-term planning (and meeting purpose of the Act – if like the present CDEMA).

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

See my initial comments in #1. Further ....

Responsibilities for Risk Reduction (RR) are currently passed across to councils, which can reset the dial on new development but the elephant in the room is the extensive existing development (including assets and engineering lifelines).

Until a CDEM Act provides a seamless, well-structured and mandated handover to councils via the RMA replacement and the Natural Hazards Commission/insurers role on how recovery proceeds from d-day, we will always struggle to reign in RR of the existing asset stock in the face of rising climate-influenced hazards.

Recovery needs to be informed pre-emptively by a pre-agreed subset or short-circuit of a longer-term adaptive climate adaptation plan for a locality. It needs both collaborative engagement of those exposed before an event linked to thresholds (for risk, Levels of Service and ongoing adaptation), along with a pre-set contextualised approach or adaptive plan for Recovery, rather than another ad-hoc lengthy process (eg, FOSAL, Matatā managed retreat). True, there needs to be a heavily weighted process and focus to get things (or more likely, most things) "back to normal" in the aftermath of an event, but this seems to absorb all the energy and planning, which would be more holistic [s4(recovery definition)] if a pre-agreed reactive post-event adaptation plan (as a subset of the longer-term local or regional adaptation plan) could be activated in parallel to the immediate response activities.

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**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

1. Lack of any clear mandate for CDEM Group Plans to influence or even direct: a) risk reduction via council planning functions for new development (incl. lifelines) or subdivisions, or b) integrate long-term post-event recovery processed for "holistic regeneration" into council's climate adaptation planning.
2. The current CDEMA basically passes the baton for RR onto councils via the RMA, but there is no clear mandated hand-over process that links CDEM Group Plans with Regional/District Plans and the Regional Policy Statement, particularly what weight should be given to addressing RR for hazard-prone land relative to other council priorities (such as housing supply under the NPS-UD). I realise there is more to come on central government direction on managing natural hazards and the replacement RMA, but an attempt is needed now in the CDEM Bill to better integrate and join the dots to plug the escalating risks and cover the transition period to new policy (could be a decade to implement)

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

See comments above.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

It's not clear where the following would fit:

a) Drones for reconnaissance and supply drops

b) Soild waste is mentioned- but does this include liquid or viscous waster (eg, liquid contaminants (sewage, oil, chemicals etc) and muds/slurries, which can pose significant problems if disposal and dump sites are not pre-planned

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

1) See comments in #1

2) Planning time horizons matter greatly, now that ongoing climate change will continue to raise risks over time (ie, no longer fits a static framing of risk). Legislation around managing risks has disparate mandates for planning horizons to consider and assess. CDEM Group Plans mostly stick with a 5-year focus on current risks faced (as they have a 5-year life before being reviewed). However, that creates a substantial mismatch with other planning horizons associated with managing risk eg, LTP's and district plans (10 yrs); a council's Infrastructure Strategy (30 years) [s101B; LGA] – which is directly relevant to managing engineering lifeline resilience; Building lifetime (50 yrs); and assessment of coastal hazard risks (100+ years) [Policy 24, NZCPS].

   Consequently, the planning timeframe for CDEM Group Plans needs to be made more explicit in legislation (not just defaulting to a 5-year outlook) and outline how the disconnect with other hazard-related planning horizons can be bridged by the Group Plans. Otherwise, we will see a continuation of the disconnect, which mostly rears its head in the "panic" of recovering from an event if insufficient pre-planning for escalating climate-influence risks has not been expressly considered.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Melissa Linton |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Te Kotahi o Te Tauihu Charitable Trust |

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Te Kotahi o Te Tauihu Charitable Trust agrees that the objectives outlined; strengthening Māori and community participation, clarifying responsibilities, raising standards, minimising service disruption, and ensuring appropriate emergency powers, are the right foundation for reform.

However, we believe there is a critical underlying principle missing: the need to **embed Te Tiriti o Waitangi throughout all objectives**, not just within the first. Te Tiriti is not a standalone goal, it must guide the entire emergency management system, from governance to resourcing, planning to response.

The objectives should also explicitly acknowledge:

- The **mana motuhake of iwi**, including the right to lead and make decisions in our own rohe
- The need for **genuine, resourced partnership**, not just participation
- The importance of **local, culturally grounded solutions** in delivering resilience and equity

These reforms will only succeed if Māori and community leadership are not only included, but empowered.

Proactively Released

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Te Kotahi o Te Tauihu agrees that current emergency management approaches often fail to meet the diverse and layered needs of communities, particularly those already experiencing structural inequity. These needs go beyond communication access and include a lack of trust in agencies, culturally inappropriate response mechanisms, and exclusion from planning and decision-making processes.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Many whānau Māori face compounding systemic disadvantages including housing insecurity, under-resourced health systems, and limited rural access, all of which intensify in emergencies. A history of disempowerment and inconsistent engagement from government also impacts how likely Māori are to seek help or trust official channels.

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support options that require mandatory engagement with iwi and place obligations on agencies to plan with diverse communities. However, these must be resourced. Under-resourcing engagement (or placing the burden on iwi without support) risks undermining trust and perpetuating inequity.

**5. What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

It would involve iwi-led planning, regular wānanga, marae-based hubs, and solutions built from the ground up. Success means communities see themselves in the plans, their needs, language, leadership, and context reflected.

Proactively Released

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Resourcing and capability-building for iwi to lead local planning is essential. This includes direct funding, access to emergency technology and communications, and inclusion in national readiness campaigns.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Te Kotahi o Te Tauihu agrees that iwi Māori have not been consistently enabled or resourced to participate as partners in emergency management. The current system often treats iwi as stakeholders to be consulted rather than Treaty partners with mana motuhake and critical leadership roles. The absence of formal structures, resourcing, and obligations has led to uneven and sometimes tokenistic engagement.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The document underrepresents the depth of iwi leadership and infrastructure. In Te Tauihu, iwi not only provide support during emergencies, but they also hold standing emergency strategies, run marae-based welfare hubs, coordinate logistics, and act as trusted communicators for communities often missed by mainstream systems. Iwi do not simply contribute, we co-lead.

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the establishment of formal iwi representation with voting rights on Emergency Management Committees and Coordinating Executive Groups. However, representation alone is not enough, there must be clear decision-making powers, resourcing, and co-governance frameworks.

Preferred options include:

- Mandatory engagement protocols
- Direct funding mechanisms to iwi

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- A national Māori advisory group with operational and strategic authority

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Iwi should be recognised as **Treaty partners**, not stakeholders. This includes:

- Formal roles in governance, planning, response, and recovery.
- Shared decision-making powers through legislation.
- Recognition of tikanga and mātauranga Māori as valid and authoritative.

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

The relationship should be one of **co-governance and active partnership**. This includes:

- Formal partnership agreements
- Shared emergency planning and risk assessments
- Joint training and exercise programmes
- Ongoing relationship maintenance, not just engagement during response

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Coordinating Executive Groups must embed iwi at both the decision-making and implementation levels. This means:

- Iwi representatives must have equal status and voting rights
- Resourcing iwi participation as a core function
- Building CEG capability in tikanga and partnership practice

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Establish a **National Māori Emergency Management Advisory Group** comprised of iwi representatives from across the motu. This group should have a mandate to directly advise the Director and participate in the development of standards, policies, and reviews.

Proactively Released

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. The legislation should:

- Enable iwi to lead regional emergency management strategies where agreed
- Provide for marae-based hubs and iwi-led readiness programmes to be formally recognised and funded
- Include provisions for independent Māori review of the system's performance from a Te Tiriti perspective

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that current systems make it difficult for community organisations and individuals to contribute effectively to emergency management, despite often being first responders on the ground. In Te Tauihu, iwi, marae, and Māori service providers rapidly mobilise during emergencies, filling essential roles in welfare, comms, transport, and logistics, often without formal integration into the official response.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the proposed options, particularly those that reduce red tape and empower local response. However, these must not sideline or duplicate iwi roles. Instead, they should align with existing community structures, including iwi networks.

Preferred options include:

- Streamlined processes for community groups to pre-register resources and capabilities
- Integration of iwi response plans and community-led infrastructure into formal planning
- Long-term capacity-building, not just recognition during response

Proactively Released

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Community participation will only be meaningful if it is:

- **Resourced and trained** well before emergencies occur
- **Recognised in planning documents** (e.g., iwi response protocols, marae-based support roles)
- **Evaluated in terms of trust and cultural safety** — not just logistical output

The Crown must also acknowledge the different ways Māori communities mobilise — through whakapapa, manaakitanga, and existing informal systems that work. Legislation should enable these, not constrain them.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, this issue is clearly felt in Te Tauihu. In the first hours and days of an emergency, it's iwi, marae, and community-led organisations that step in before the official system activates. These responses are often faster, more agile, and more trusted by local whānau. However, these efforts are frequently under-recognised, unfunded, or hampered by bureaucratic processes.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support formal mechanisms to enable community-led responders to act without fear of liability or red tape. However, caution must be taken to:

- Avoid "outsourcing" responsibility to communities without proper **support or funding**
- Ensure formal responders **do not override iwi-led efforts**, particularly in areas where relationships with whānau are already established

Preferred options include:

- Pre-authorised community response plans
- Formal partnerships with iwi and trusted community networks
- Support for locally held supplies, communications gear, and welfare systems

Proactively Released

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. We recommend:

- Creating a **national iwi and community response fund** to be deployed directly to iwi and community-led teams at the onset of an emergency
- Recognising **mātauranga Māori-led models of response** and ensuring they are not marginalised by "command and control" frameworks
- Providing **training and legal clarity** for community responders, especially rangatahi and volunteers, so they are protected and valued

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

One of the most significant problems is the **lack of enforcement and accountability mechanisms** when it comes to iwi participation. Even when partnership principles are stated in plans, they are often not upheld in practice.

Additional issues include:

- **Over-reliance on goodwill** from iwi without resourcing or legal obligation
- **Inconsistent engagement** between regions, leading to inequity
- The system's failure to value **tikanga Māori** as an authoritative foundation for emergency management
- **Lack of investment in pre-event relationship building**, which is essential for partnership to be effective during a crisis

We recommend the legislation includes:

- **Enforceable obligations** for iwi involvement
- **Monitoring of partnership quality and outcomes**
- Resourcing for **iwi-led regional strategies and training pipelines**
- **Cultural competency requirements** for CDEM and other emergency leadership roles

Proactively Released

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes — the current system often lacks clarity about who holds operational authority during an emergency. This can cause confusion, duplication of effort, or delays — especially when community-led or iwi-led responses are already active on the ground.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Clearer direction will benefit coordination, but it must be **paired with clear roles for iwi and community partners**, who often operate outside official hierarchies. One risk is that improved clarity for state actors may inadvertently sideline iwi-led or grassroots responses unless co-governance is embedded.

Preferred options:

- Clarity around delegated authority, but with **mandatory iwi engagement protocols**
- Requirements for Controllers to **consult iwi leadership** on all decisions, especially when they impact Māori communities, marae, or whenua.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. A **dual-leadership model** should be considered, where iwi and CDEM work side by side, particularly in areas where iwi have existing emergency strategies or capabilities.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, because the current model reflects a **hierarchical, top-down approach** that often fails to reflect the realities on the ground. Māori responses are based on whakapapa, trust, and local infrastructure (like marae and iwi health teams). A more effective system would:

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- Enable **shared decision-making and locally embedded leadership**
- Recognise **mana whakahaere** alongside legal authority
- Encourage a **distributed leadership model** that reflects community capacity, not just state roles

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that overlapping roles between CDEM Groups and local authorities cause confusion, inefficiencies, and uneven outcomes across regions. For iwi partners, this duplication can be particularly frustrating — we're often caught between multiple agencies with unclear mandates, all expecting engagement but offering little coordination.

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the preferred option that strengthens the role of the CDEM Group as the lead regional entity. However, this must be contingent on:

- Clear expectations to **engage with iwi as co-governance partners**
- Accountability measures to **ensure consistent engagement across all local authorities**
- Funding that enables iwi to **engage effectively with a single, coordinated structure** instead of being pulled in multiple directions

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. The legislation should also:

- Enable iwi to **formally enter into agreements with CDEM Groups** that outline roles, funding, expectations, and authority

Proactively Released

- Require CDEM Group plans to include **iwi response structures** and **shared leadership arrangements** where appropriate

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes — because the current CDEM model reflects a local government lens that doesn't always prioritise or reflect Māori leadership, tikanga, or capacity. In many cases, iwi are ready and willing to lead or co-lead aspects of emergency management, but are not meaningfully integrated.

More fundamental changes could include:

- Transitioning to **iwi-Crown-Council partnerships** in the governance of emergency management
- Piloting **iwi-led regional hubs** within the CDEM system
- Creating legislative space for **Māori emergency management models** to operate alongside or within the official system

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes — inconsistency in how CDEM Groups are structured and operate has led to patchy engagement with iwi, varied preparedness across regions, and uneven resourcing. From an iwi perspective, this results in having to navigate very different systems depending on the region, despite holding consistent Treaty status and responsibilities.

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the option that strengthens national guidance and expectations for how CDEM Groups are structured and held accountable. Our preferred option would also:

- Require **co-governance with iwi at the regional level**, not just representation

Proactively Released

- Provide **ringfenced resources for iwi partners**, acknowledging the disproportionate demands often placed on them
- Include **performance indicators** that assess partnership quality and iwi participation, not just operational metrics

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. The legislation should allow for:

- **Regional partnership boards** involving iwi, CDEM, and key agencies to steer strategy and performance together
- **Iwi self-assessment mechanisms** where iwi can report annually on how well emergency partnerships and systems are meeting their needs
- A national toolkit for **building iwi-CDEM partnership frameworks**, adaptable to regional context but grounded in Te Tiriti

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes — from our experience, the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) varies widely across the country, and their ability to deliver on emergency management outcomes often hinges on leadership and relationships rather than structure. For iwi, this variability affects the quality of engagement, access to information, and ability to influence planning and decision-making at critical moments.

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support strengthening CEG performance through clearer expectations, capability building, and accountability. Our preferred options are those that:

- **Mandate iwi representation and participation** in CEGs — with voting rights and decision-making authority
- Set **standards for culturally safe practice**, including knowledge of Te Tiriti, tikanga, and equitable partnership

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- Provide **training and induction pathways** for all CEG members that include partnership with Māori and community groups

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. We recommend:

- Creating **shared leadership models** between CEGs and iwi in regions where iwi have capability and mandate
- Developing a **national performance framework** that includes iwi assessments of CEG effectiveness and relationship quality
- Resourcing iwi partners to participate fully in CEGs, including funding for staff, travel, planning time, and capability development

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Emergency management plans often become outdated and do not reflect evolving local risks, population changes, or the growing capability of iwi and community groups. In our experience, even when iwi are included in early planning, plans are not updated to reflect new iwi-led strategies, partnerships, or emergency response learnings.

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support streamlining the process to update plans and ensuring they are more dynamic. However, this must not come at the cost of **reducing iwi engagement** in the update process. In fact, we recommend:

- Making **iwi sign-off a requirement** for any plan or update affecting their rohe
- Including **tikanga and mātauranga-based emergency strategies** as core content in Group Plans
- Funding iwi to **review, test, and update their own emergency protocols** in sync with CDEM updates

Proactively Released

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Consider:

- Introducing a **legislative requirement for biannual hui** between iwi and CDEM Groups to review and update joint emergency planning
- Enabling **digital platforms or shared repositories** where iwi and CDEM can co-develop and edit live versions of emergency plans
- Embedding a **monitoring mechanism** that tracks whether updated plans are effectively implemented, including iwi feedback

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Current national leadership lacks the resources to ensure consistency or uphold quality across all regions. For iwi, this has meant variable engagement experiences, inconsistent recognition, and a lack of follow-through on commitments made in principle.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support strengthening the Director's mandate, particularly if it includes **clear expectations around iwi and community participation**. However, centralisation should not undermine local iwi-CDEM relationships that are working well.

Preferred options:

- Expand the Director's mandate to include **cultural and partnership performance standards**, not just operational ones
- Create a **dual reporting framework**, where CDEM Groups are assessed by both NEMA and their iwi partners

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

- **Iwi and community engagement expectations**
- **Resourcing standards** for iwi participation
- **Recognition of marae as emergency hubs**
- **Cultural competency training** for Controllers and CEG members
- Clear national guidance for **tikanga-based response models**

Proactively Released

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. The Director should have the mandate to:

- Intervene where iwi participation is absent or tokenistic
- Approve and promote **iwi-led strategies** as models of best practice
- Provide **national-level resourcing** directly to iwi organisations

## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

There is currently little recourse when performance in emergency management is substandard or when CDEM Groups fail to engage appropriately with iwi. As a result, iwi often carry a disproportionate burden during emergencies while having limited ability to influence how systems operate or are held to account.

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support options that give the Director more authority to intervene when poor performance is evident. However, we recommend extending that mandate to include:

- **Failure to engage with iwi or uphold Treaty principles** as a performance issue
- Provisions that allow for **independent Māori assessments** of system performance
- A mechanism for iwi to **trigger reviews or interventions**, particularly if they are being excluded or undermined by local systems

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Consider:

- Requiring **annual reporting on iwi engagement and partnership health**, led by both CDEM and iwi
- Establishing a **Māori performance advisory panel** to support the Director in monitoring the equity, cultural integrity, and effectiveness of emergency systems

Proactively Released

- Embedding **consequences for non-compliance** where partnership obligations are not met

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Hazard risk management currently does not reflect local Māori knowledge or the specific vulnerabilities of different communities. Risk assessments are often based on technical data only, missing lived experience, cultural considerations, or the impact of historical disconnection from decision-making.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support options that require greater integration of hazard risk management into emergency planning and broader local government strategies. However, to be effective, these must:

- Include **mātauranga Māori as valid knowledge**
- Recognise **iwi as holders of intergenerational data**, especially around whenua, wai, and ecosystem change
- Provide **resources and data access** to iwi to carry out their own risk assessments

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

There must be:

- **Strong national expectations** that Treaty principles and iwi engagement are upheld
- **Regional flexibility** to reflect iwi-led strategies, rohe-specific hazards, and tikanga-based responses

A one-size-fits-all model won't work — but consistent standards for **how iwi must be included** are essential.

Proactively Released

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

- Siloed planning teams and disconnected timelines
- Lack of understanding of **how to integrate iwi plans or mātauranga Māori**
- **Inconsistent capacity or resourcing** across local government
- Absence of **shared digital tools or platforms**

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Consider:

- Co-developing hazard risk management frameworks with iwi
- Embedding **iwi representatives within risk planning teams**
- Funding iwi to lead risk engagement in their communities
- Requiring **risk plans to be endorsed by mana whenua** where they apply to their rohe

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Hazard risk management currently excludes much of the valuable knowledge and leadership that iwi bring. Local authorities need more than technical tools, they need:

- **Cultural change**, to value iwi and community input equally
- **Te Tiriti-based frameworks** for partnership in risk assessment
- Legislative incentives to shift from a compliance mindset to a **relational, place-based approach** to risk

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The current system does not appropriately prioritise taonga Māori or cultural heritage in emergency planning or response. These values are often considered secondary to infrastructure and property, despite their fundamental role in Māori identity, wellbeing, and intergenerational connection.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the inclusion of taonga and cultural heritage as protected considerations. However, recognition alone is insufficient. Planning and response processes must:

- Be developed in partnership with mana whenua
- Include **protocols for protecting wāhi tapu, whenua rāhui, urupā**, and other culturally significant sites
- Respect iwi decision-making over how taonga are handled, stored, or restored after a disaster

Preferred options are those that embed **obligations to consult mana whenua** and include taonga protection in all levels of emergency plans.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. We recommend:

- Developing a **national cultural heritage response framework** co-designed with Māori
- Funding iwi to develop **taonga protection protocols**, including digital inventories and physical preservation strategies
- Including **cultural heritage specialists** (iwi-nominated) on response and recovery teams where relevant

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

The welfare of animals, including livestock, working animals, and pets, is often a key concern for whānau and rural communities during emergencies. For many Māori communities, animals are not only sources of livelihood but also part of whānau and daily life. The current system does not always prioritise this appropriately or equitably across regions.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the expansion of animal welfare planning as an integral part of emergency response. Māori communities, particularly those in rural or remote areas, need:

- Assurance that **livelihoods and cultural practices** involving animals are protected
- Emergency plans that include **stock management, evacuation logistics**, and welfare support
- Coordination with iwi to ensure cultural and practical values relating to animals are upheld

Preferred options are those that ensure **local, iwi-led coordination** of animal welfare responses.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, animals, especially in rural Māori communities, are often part of the extended definition of whānau and are closely tied to the mauri of whenua. While human safety remains the top priority, **animal welfare must not be treated as secondary to commercial or infrastructure-based property protection**. A balanced approach should include:

- **Evacuation and sheltering provisions for animals**
- **Planning for continuity of food, water, and vet care**
- Recognition of **mātauranga Māori perspectives** on the relationship between humans, animals, and land

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. We suggest:

- Involving **iwi and rural Māori in animal welfare planning**

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- Resourcing marae and rural hubs with **animal care equipment and planning tools**
- Partnering with Māori farming collectives and animal welfare organisations to **develop culturally responsive emergency protocols**

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The current definition of "lifeline utility" is too narrow and fails to reflect the essential services Māori and rural communities rely on. In many cases, iwi and marae-based providers are among the first to activate emergency welfare, food distribution, communications, and support. These networks should be treated as lifeline infrastructure alongside traditional utilities.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Expanding the definition will create a more inclusive and effective response system. However, care must be taken to ensure Māori providers are:

- **Recognised in legislation**, not just in guidelines
- **Eligible for planning, coordination, and infrastructure funding**
- Treated as **equal partners in emergency response**, not just informal actors

We support the shift toward a **principles-based definition** that reflects community reliance, vulnerability, and system-critical functions.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Essential services must include:

- **Marae-based emergency hubs**
- **Iwi health and social service providers**
- **Community-led food distribution and welfare networks**

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- **Digital communication systems used by isolated or rural whānau**

These are often the **de facto lifelines** for Māori communities, especially where government services are slow to reach or inaccessible.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

- **Marae with emergency infrastructure (generators, kitchens, accommodation)**
- **Mobile health and outreach clinics operated by iwi providers**
- **Satellite and rural communications gear maintained by community orgs**
- **Community-controlled food hubs, water tanks, and transport links**

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. We recommend:

- Creating a **category for culturally anchored essential services**
- Establishing formal recognition and **direct support channels for Māori-led lifelines**
- Including iwi partners in **risk analysis and investment decisions** related to lifeline resilience

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Lifeline utility planning often focuses on large-scale infrastructure providers and does not account for Māori or community-led services that many whānau rely on during emergencies. These providers often have little visibility or support in official continuity planning processes, despite playing a vital role in local response and recovery.

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**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support enhancing planning requirements and oversight, but this must include:

- A broader view of what constitutes an "essential service," especially in rural and Māori communities
- Support for **small-scale and iwi-led services** to develop continuity plans, not just corporates
- **Joint planning between CDEM Groups and iwi/Māori providers** to avoid duplication or exclusion

Preferred options:

- Require lifeline utilities to **engage with iwi as part of continuity planning**
- Provide **public funding or guidance** to help iwi and community-led providers build resilience plans and infrastructure.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Consider:

- Establishing **regional iwi-business-CDEM partnerships** to co-design continuity plans
- Funding pilots that support **whānau-owned critical service models** (e.g., power, comms, water storage)
- Requiring reporting on **cultural competency and equity in business continuity planning**, particularly for providers who serve Māori communities

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Information-sharing during emergencies is often delayed, inconsistent, or inaccessible to those who need it most. Māori and rural communities are frequently excluded from early warnings, resource coordination, and infrastructure status updates. This gap can have real consequences for health, safety, and trust.

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**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support options that remove legal and structural barriers to information sharing. However, these changes must be matched by:

- **Cultural competence**, so that data is shared appropriately with iwi and doesn't breach tikanga or rangatiratanga
- **Formal agreements with iwi**, ensuring real-time information sharing is reciprocal, trusted, and effective
- Protections so that iwi and community-held data (e.g., about vulnerable populations or marae assets) is not misused

Preferred options include:

- **Mandated communication protocols** between CDEM and iwi/Māori providers
- Shared platforms where **real-time data can be exchanged** securely during an emergency

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Effective coordination requires:

- A **national iwi-CDEM forum** to support shared learning and joint planning
- Regional-level **partnership boards** between CDEM, iwi, infrastructure providers, and key agencies
- Investment in **digital infrastructure and training** that allows Māori communities to access, contribute to, and act on emergency information in real time

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Consider:

- Requiring each region to have a **data-sharing and communication agreement with mana whenua**
- Funding **iwi comms and data coordinators** in each region
- Developing a **shared decision-making platform** for emergency response, with iwi access built in by design

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## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Central government agencies often experience the same vulnerabilities and unpreparedness during emergencies as other parts of the system. This is particularly concerning when Māori communities rely on these agencies for essential services (e.g., housing, health, welfare) and those services fail or are slow to activate.

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support expanding continuity planning requirements to a broader range of government agencies. In particular, it is critical that:

- Central agencies understand their **responsibility to maintain service continuity for Māori communities**
- Business continuity plans are **co-designed with Māori service providers and iwi**, especially in regions with high Māori populations
- The continuity of **partnership-based models** (e.g., shared service delivery with iwi) is also considered

Preferred options:

- Mandatory agency participation in **regional CDEM-iwi planning**
- Publication of business continuity plans with **explicit Māori impact statements**

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Consider:

- Requiring all central government agencies to **include iwi partnership continuity planning** in their BCM (business continuity management) strategies
- Establishing **regional government-iwi continuity forums**, especially for services like health, MSD, and education
- Auditing central agencies on **how well they maintained relationships and service equity** during past emergencies

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The current system often creates confusion and tension around access to restricted areas, particularly where that land is Māori-owned or holds cultural significance. Iwi and marae-based responders are sometimes denied access to their own whenua or to whānau in need, despite being better placed to provide support than formal responders.

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred options must:

- Ensure that **mana whenua are consulted before, during, and after access restrictions are applied**
- Provide a process for **local exemptions or dual-access protocols** for trusted iwi response teams
- Recognise that restricting access to marae or wāhi tapu without consultation is a **breach of cultural rights and Te Tiriti**

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

- Develop **joint access protocols** between iwi and CDEM prior to emergencies
- Create a category of **culturally sensitive access zones**, where mana whenua guidance must be followed
- Ensure all responders receive training in **cultural protocols and land access rights**

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

There is often a lack of clarity and consistency about who holds the authority to exercise emergency powers, especially across different territorial authorities. From an iwi perspective, this creates confusion about who to engage with, and can lead to delayed decision-making or exclusion from key actions taken in our rohe.

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support clarification, but caution that **centralising powers too narrowly** risks further marginalising iwi and local communities.

Preferred options:

- Assign powers clearly, but **require those exercising them to consult with mana whenua**, particularly when decisions affect Māori communities or whenua
- Introduce **mandatory partnership protocols** alongside emergency powers, ensuring they are used in a way that honours Te Tiriti and tikanga

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes:

- Establish a **shared leadership model** for use of emergency powers — e.g., dual advisement by Controllers and iwi reps
- Create a **Māori advisory role** within CDEM structures to provide guidance before emergency powers are invoked
- Require a **post-event review of powers used**, including iwi assessment of whether decisions upheld partnership values and cultural safety
- **Avoid over-centralisation of emergency powers**, as this risks disempowering local iwi and undermining existing partnership models that are grounded in local tikanga and relationships. Decision-making must remain flexible and responsive to regional leadership — especially where iwi have already demonstrated readiness and capacity to lead.

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The current requirement for a physical signature is outdated and can cause unnecessary delays, especially in fast-moving or digitally coordinated emergencies. This is particularly true in rural areas or during communications outages, which disproportionately affect Māori and remote communities.

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support options that allow declarations and transitions to be made using secure digital methods. However, speed should not come at the cost of **consultation with mana whenua**, particularly when declarations affect whenua Māori, marae, or iwi-led response operations.

Preferred options:

- Allow digital declarations, but require **formal notification and consultation processes** with iwi wherever possible
- Ensure the authority to declare or extend transition periods is exercised **with transparency and equity**, and not used to bypass local leadership

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

- Include a **requirement to document engagement with iwi** during the declaration process
- Ensure iwi emergency response leads are **immediately informed and involved** once a declaration or transition is made
- Provide **shared access to digital declaration tools** (e.g., secure portals or alerts) to iwi partners where appropriate
- Allow for delayed verification of declarations when immediate digital confirmation is not possible.
- Recognise alternative methods of documentation, such as verbal confirmations or written logs, as valid interim records until formal verification can occur.
- Ensure that these provisions are clearly outlined to provide guidance during emergencies when standard communication channels are disrupted. We recommend that it be **explicitly extended to include iwi-confirmed verbal or informal authorisation**, where appropriate.

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## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Greater clarity around the role of mayors is helpful, particularly in ensuring declarations are timely and appropriately authorised. However, we note that in some regions, the role of the mayor is symbolic, and the operational leadership sits with Controllers and CDEM managers. This creates inconsistencies in how declarations are approached and how iwi and other partners are engaged.

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support clarifying the mayoral role, provided it is accompanied by:

- Clear requirements to **consult iwi and other emergency leaders** where time and circumstances permit
- Recognition that **ceremonial or political roles must not override operational needs,** especially where mana whenua already hold relationships and response responsibilities on the ground
- Provisions that allow for **delegation of declaration powers** to Controllers in urgent or remote situations

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes:

- Require mayors to have a basic understanding of **Te Tiriti o Waitangi and local iwi structures** before authorising emergency declarations in areas with significant Māori populations
- Establish **joint mayor–iwi protocols** to guide emergency declarations and public messaging
- Create a **regional leadership briefing process** where mayors, iwi, Controllers, and CEGs come together in readiness to agree on local processes for declarations, transitions, and communications

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, but only if these additional powers are accompanied by **strong safeguards, partnership expectations, and accountability mechanisms**, especially when used in areas with significant Māori populations or where iwi hold established response responsibilities.

Controllers and Recovery Managers may need:

- Powers to **activate community-based assets and volunteers**, including those coordinated by iwi or marae, with appropriate legal protections
- Flexibility to **redirect or adapt central systems** to reflect on-the-ground Māori-led responses (e.g., where iwi welfare teams are already operating)
- Authority to **deploy resources across jurisdictional boundaries**, particularly where iwi rohe cross territorial lines — but only with appropriate iwi consultation

However, any expansion of powers must:

- Include **explicit obligations to consult mana whenua** before actions that affect whenua, marae, taonga, or whānau Māori
- Be subject to **transparent, post-event review** processes that include iwi perspectives on whether powers were exercised equitably and appropriately
- Be developed with **cultural guidance**, ideally through a Māori advisory group at both national and regional levels

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Te Kotahi o Te Tauihu supports the intent and direction of the proposed reforms, particularly the effort to strengthen iwi and community participation, improve coordination, and raise national standards across emergency management systems.

However, we hold a strong and non-negotiable stance that **any new provisions regarding Māori and iwi involvement must not diminish the existing power of iwi to make decisions for ourselves, within our own tikanga and structures**.

The reforms must **enhance, not control or co-opt** Māori leadership. Partnership must be based on equity, not assimilation into Crown frameworks. Our right to lead in our rohe — to respond to our people, to uphold the mana of our marae and whenua — must be protected in law, resourced in practice, and respected at all levels.

Finally, we reaffirm our readiness to continue working in partnership with the Crown to build a more effective, culturally grounded emergency management system — one that

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reflects the diverse realities of Aotearoa, and honours the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

**Nā mātou, nā**
*Te Kotahi o Te Tauihu*

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**From:** s9(2)(a)
**Sent:** Thursday, May 15, 2025 4:10 PM
**To:** Emergency Management Bill [NEMA] <EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz>
**Subject:** Submission-template-Strengthening-New-Zealands-emergency-management-legislation HHStJ CC

Dear Policy Unit members,

As you are aware we have been pleased to engage in the updating of New Zealand's emergency management legislation both by discussing this in person with representatives of the unit and now by being able to provide a written submission on the drafting of new Emergency Management legislation being proposed.
The attached document is written as the official Hato Hone St John submission.
We are comfortable that any of the information provided will be subject to Official Information Act requests to NEMA.

We would like to note how particularly pleased we are to discover cabinet's support to ambulance services that provide emergency ambulance response being included in the definition of 'emergency services'
This is something we have long advocated for and feel that this move will enhance the way we are able to provide response and support to New Zealanders in their hour of need.

If there are any points of our submission that you would like to discuss please feel free to contact:

s9(2)(a) : Emergency Capability Manager – Emergency Management at s9(2)(a) or on s9(2)(a).

Regards

s9(2)(a) **MStJ**
BA/LLB, Dip Bus (PMER), MHlthMgt (Hons), MHPrac.
Emergency Capability Manager - Emergency Management
St John Ambulance New Zealand | *Hato Hone Waka Manaaki o Aotearoa*
**T** s9(2)(a)
**M**
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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | s9(2)(a) |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Hato Hone St John |

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☐ NEMA may publish submissions or a summary of submissions to its website, civildefence.govt.nz. If you **do not** want your submission or a summary of your submission to be published, please tick the box and type an explanation below:

I do not want my submission published on NEMA's website because...

### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

5. The objectives for reform all appear to meet the gaps that have been identified as highlighted in the introduction. In addition to supporting the identified objectives, it is essential from an emergency service perspective to ensure that appropriate powers and responsibilities are in place to enable an efficient and effective response.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

   ☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

   ☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

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**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Hato Hone St John has advocated over many years for emergency ambulance services to be recognised as an emergency service in their own right, including during submissions made in previous iterations of the emergency management legislation. Consequently, Hato Hone St John is fully supportive of the decision to recognise ambulance services that are contracted to provide emergency ambulance response under the 111 system as an emergency service. Specifically, those services should be gazetted as such due to their responsibility to provide emergency ambulance response per contractual arrangements with the Crown.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We agree that emergencies require a significant and coordinated response that goes beyond agencies normal powers and resources. It is also vital that:

a. scarce resources can be prioritised to where they are most needed
b. there is clear leadership and decision-making
c. broader impacts are dealt with alongside the specific hazard

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Current legislation and also CIMS guidelines give models for 'Control' of an incident and 'Command' within agencies. As cited, however, this can at times lead to confusion and conflict due to the nature of the incident/s associated with the current wider emergency. To avoid such confusion and also potential conflict, maintaining a single (or joint) 'Control Agency' function is desirable for overall response. However, this assumes that all activity

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must occur through this mechanism, which can be unrealistic when considering multiple hazards, sites and agency responsibilities.
To that end, having a function of controllers (whole incident) with oversight but not necessarily specific control over agencies dealing with that specific hazard who then are additionally considered secondary level controllers may address the identified issues. Those agencies would then also have control over the activities of others assisting in the response to that particular hazard but still being accountable back to the primary control authority. Within a specific site of operations there would also be clear designation of agencies responsible for command of resources within their ambit of operations.

Examples:

1. At a major stadium fire which spreads fumes and risk out into the local community, the lead Control agency would likely be the local Director and CDEM due to the impact on the wider community and the need for community support, evacuation and potential environmental considerations. The lead hazard agency would however be Fire and Emergency New Zealand, with clear control of the site but with some accountability back to the lead control agency. Other functions would be required at site that would have their own command functions and requirements, for example environmental protection, with the authority going to a single designated agency but likely providing leadership (and command) to other government, local government and business organisations completing the required tasks. There would also clearly be a health response and in this instance the leadership (command) would be provided by the designated 111 provider 'emergency ambulance service' in conjunction with private health providers, including event medical services where present.
2. During a security incident the NZ Police would take this responsibility and the leadership of the security part of response including providing response direction to other agencies that may be involved such as private security organisations but also other government agencies such as NZ Customs.
3. In situations where response involves the need to provide on scene patient assessment, treatment and onwards transport, the designated 'emergency ambulance service' would take responsibility and command and control of medical response, including those provided by any other health care practitioners that may be present

This suggestion is essentially an amalgamation of options 3 and 4, but with additional clarity around command capability for support agencies. When considering the responsibilities of designated emergency services, it is suggested that beyond the current scope (described in appendix B) of the existing Act there is a need to clearly identify the role those agencies take in providing function specific leadership during an emergency incident. This may include areas that are already covered by legislation such as in the Policing Act 2008 or the Fire and Emergency New Zealand Act 2017, but where such legislation is not clear, there is a need to include the responsibility to undertake command and control of an incident within each agencies' designated area of responsibility.
In situations where different agencies may take a role in managing an incident, this approach would make clear that the designated emergency service agency has overarching command, responsibilities and accountability. Of course, this may also be established through the use of regulations or emergency powers if determined more appropriate (page 7 of discussion document).

Proactively Released

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

- Inconsistency in approach has led to inconsistency in response and levels of engagement not only at local authority level but also in the way those agencies engage with other parts of the emergency management community. To that end, we believe clearer direction as to how this engagement will happen and who will be engaged with is needed. With respect to CEG membership and delegated members there is a need to define who is responsible as a member but suggest that limiting delegated membership to just one primary and one delegated person may be too constrained practically and so suggest that delegation be defined by relevant role rather than specified person.

### Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

Proactively Released

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

- Risk management and plans are important, and having the required local knowledge and investigation is also essential. However, in order for these plans to be effective in mitigating the risk, they need to be easily available both locally and from a national perspective. This means that as part of the standards the plans must be on a centrally located data base that is accessible to all relevant agencies to access both during and before response to ensure improved response. The nature of emergencies means that sometimes the local teams will not be in a position to apply their plans and these need to be rapidly available to those who must then respond rather than isolated to local authority sites with variable lay outs. To that end, the plan format would also need to be mandated.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

- Providers of medical equipment and supplies including medical devices, medicines, disposable medical equipment and medical gases are not specified in the list of essential infrastructure and should be specified to ensure continuity of supply with relevant business continuity plans in place.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

In addition to the items listed under question 63, the list could also include devices that are not specifically for providing treatment to patients but also contribute to their care, including mobility and hygiene requirements.

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The section identifies the need for lifeline utilities to have good business continuity processes in place to ensure continuity of delivery. However, it also introduces financial penalties for failing to have this in place rather than balancing this with incentives to put it in place. It also doesn't appear to highlight the need for lifeline utilities to prioritise those who need access to their service as part of their BC processes. As a first response agency we need the assurance of continuity of lifeline utilities to enable the ongoing provision of life preserving service.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No consultation question is asked in relation to the above statement. However, we believe there is a need for the legislation to clearly highlight this through a prioritisation list of users of essential infrastructure or a clear system to identify and explicate this.

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

During an emergency there are occasions where doctors and nurses under the PRIME response arrangements may be asked to respond to patients. Unlike front line ambulance staff they generally respond in their own cars and their identity may be limited to a supplied reflectorised vest. While we do not have any direct knowledge of these people being excluded from restricted areas during response, we can see the potential for this to occur. To that end, a system of training those managing cordons to recognise these response staff and enabling them to safely respond to need is desirable as described in option 2.

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Insert response

Proactively Released

National Emergency Management Agency
Te Rākau Whakamarumaru

# Submission: Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Alexandra (Sasha) Borissenko, CAMA National Representative |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Community Access Media Alliance |

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### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

1. **Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The **Community Access Media Alliance (CAMA)** represents a national network of 12 independently operated, publicly funded stations across Aotearoa. While rooted in their local communities, CAMA stations share everyday infrastructure needs, a strong public interest mandate to facilitate media services **by, for, and about** underrepresented groups, and a proven capacity to support emergency communications.

Established over 40 years ago with the backing of UNESCO, Community Access Media as a sector was created to fill a critical democratic gap, serving diverse, minority, and underserved populations that are often excluded from mainstream media. These are the very communities most at risk of being left behind in an emergency, making CAMA's role in the emergency management system both unique and essential.

CAMA strongly supports the proposed objectives of the legislation, especially the focus on strengthening community participation and minimising disruption to essential services. However, to be effective, these objectives must **explicitly recognise Community Access Media as a critical partner in emergency communication**, given our sector's trusted role and public service function.

The Government's 2025 strategy, *Strengthening Disaster Resilience and Emergency Management*, highlights the importance of community engagement, transparent and inclusive communication, and integrating Māori perspectives. CAMA stations are uniquely equipped to deliver on all these priorities—broadcasting in over 50 languages, centring te reo Māori and Pasifika voices, and providing culturally attuned, localised information.

To truly realise the Government's emergency management goals, **CAMA stations must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and integrated into statutory emergency planning frameworks**.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

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## Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

2. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The description captures essential barriers. However, it could go further in highlighting how mainstream communication channels often fail to reach **multilingual, disabled, migrant, and Māori communities**, especially those who rely on **Community Access Media** for culturally relevant and accessible information.

CAMA stations produce over **4,000 hours of local content each month in more than 50 languages**, serving audiences who are traditionally hard to reach and who may be disproportionately affected during a crisis. For more information about our core services, see here: https://cama.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/2024-Reach-your-audience-1.pdf

Globally, agencies such as UNESCO, ITU, and UNDP emphasise the value of community radio (what we refer to as Community Access Media) in disaster risk reduction. Specifically:

- UNESCO recognises community radio as a key actor in achieving the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction's goal of "understanding disaster risk" by providing locally relevant and culturally specific information.
- The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) highlights the reliability of analogue radio in crises, noting it remains accessible when digital or mobile infrastructure fails.
- The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) advocates for the inclusion of community radio in recovery and preparedness efforts, acknowledging their role in amplifying the voices of marginalised people and disseminating life-saving information.

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Further factors include: Language and literacy barriers, disability, digital exclusion, and cultural mistrust of mainstream institutions. Community Access Media plays a critical role in overcoming these barriers by offering **trusted, localised communication in the languages and formats that communities rely on.**

For more information about our core services, see here: https://cama.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/2024-Reach-your-audience-1.pdf

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

We support the combined delivery of all four proposed options (a–d), particularly **options (c) and (d)**, which require both local and national emergency planning to be informed by the needs of communities that are disproportionately affected.

However, to ensure these needs are effectively met, we recommend the following:

- **CAMA stations must be formally recognised** as communication partners in both legislation and planning guidance.
- **Non-legislative guidance** (Option b) should include the role of Community Access Media and encourage their engagement by CDEM Groups.

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- **Local planning requirements** (Option C) should mandate engagement with broadcasters who serve minority and vulnerable groups.
- **National planning** (Option d) should involve direct consultation with CAMA as a representative of media providers serving these communities.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

- **Formal partnerships** with CAMA stations to co-design emergency messaging.
- **Dedicated funding** for station infrastructure resilience and broadcast continuity.
- **Emergency broadcast testing** and drills in multiple languages and formats.
- **Multilingual outreach campaigns** that reflect cultural nuances and local knowledge.
- **Representation of CAMA stations** in emergency advisory groups at the local and national levels.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Yes. To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks. To align with the goals of the Emergency Management Bill, we recommend:

1. **Statutory recognition of Community Access Media** as part of New Zealand's essential communication infrastructure.
2. **Inclusion of CAMA stations in emergency planning and advisory groups** at local and regional levels.
3. **Translation and distribution of all public alerts and warnings** through Community Access Media channels.
4. **Dedicated funding for multilingual emergency preparedness campaigns**, using Community Access Media networks to amplify life-saving information.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The description appropriately highlights gaps in recognising and resourcing iwi Māori contributions to emergency management. Māori communities are often early responders and offer essential cultural, environmental, and community knowledge.

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Māori are deeply embedded in the social fabric of their regions, often providing shelter, food, spiritual support, and communications during emergencies. The role of marae, iwi radio, Māori networks, and, by extension, Community Access Media, in disaster response is significant and underrecognised in national frameworks.

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9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Recognising iwi Māori as equal partners in emergency governance and planning would improve trust and resilience. The benefits of acknowledging mātauranga Māori and existing networks outweigh any additional coordination costs.

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Formally acknowledge iwi as partners at governance levels, with co-design obligations embedded in legislation and supported through resourcing.

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

CDEM Groups should establish partnership agreements with local iwi and hapū, ensuring Māori representation in decision-making and communications planning.

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Formally embedding iwi into emergency governance is essential for upholding the Crown's obligations under Te Tiriti o Waitangi, particularly around equitable access to information and resources.

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Create a national Māori advisory board or panel with direct reporting lines to the Director. This panel should include representatives from iwi broadcasters and local marae who already lead community communication and care.

14. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

The role of CAMA stations in broadcasting Māori perspectives and te reo Māori contributes directly to the Crown's obligations under Te Tiriti o Waitangi to ensure equitable access to public services and culturally appropriate communication during emergencies.

Any changes should prioritise Māori media, including iwi and Community Access Media, in official emergency plans to ensure culturally appropriate communication before, during, and after emergencies.

**Additional Māori-related facts:***

- An estimated 19% of all content across CAMA stations is produced in te reo Māori.
- CAMA member stations broadcast Māori-focused programmes across 12 different stations, supporting rangatahi, kaumātua, iwi leaders, and community groups.
- CAMA stations regularly collaborate with Māori health, education, and civil defence agencies to deliver culturally safe and accessible information.
- Māori-led content ensures that critical emergency messaging reflects tikanga Māori and acknowledges Māori responses and leadership.

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See more information about our core services here:
https://cama.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/2024-Reach-your-audience-1.pdf

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

15. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / ~~no preference~~

We agree that participation is uneven. Many community organisations already play key roles during emergencies but **lack formal pathways, protocols, or resourcing** to be effectively included. This is particularly true for the Community Access Media sector.

CAMA stations are regularly relied upon by local councils and national bodies during civil defence events. For example, **Radio Hawke's Bay** continued broadcasting during recent floods, even without backup power.

Yet, despite their clear value, CAMA stations are **not formally recognised outside of the current Memorandum of Understanding**, and **no dedicated funding exists** to support their emergency role. See CAMA's critical infrastructure case study and presentations for further information:

- https://cama.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Case-study-critical-infrastructure-3-1.pdf
- https://drive.google.com/file/d/11bXvoW8ZEMFhXFZ4NNcNR1fCmoPnltj_/viewr

16. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

CAMA strongly supports the proposals to:

- Develop formal arrangements with CAMA stations **before emergencies happen** (Option b).
- Require CDEM Groups to state how they will manage offers of help (Option C).

These would create opportunities for CAMA stations to be **included in emergency planning, with clear roles and expectations, and funding to address any additional capacity needs.**

Our preferred approach combines both non-legislative guidance and legislative requirements, so that stations are not only acknowledged in principle but also woven into planning frameworks.

CAMA also recommends:

- Formal recognition of CAMA stations as **emergency response stakeholders**, similar to existing lifeline utilities.
- Mandated consultation with **Community Access Media** in preparedness and recovery strategies.

17. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks. Specifically, CAMA recommends

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- **Incentivising formal partnerships** between CDEM Groups and local CAMA stations to build shared protocols and ensure resilience.
- **Training emergency responders** to work effectively with Community Access Media as trusted communication partners.
- Establishing a framework that **designates CAMA stations as "approved providers of warnings and notifications"**, building on earlier iterations of the Emergency Management Bill and the current Memorandum of Understanding.
- **Providing readiness grants and capacity-building support** to CAMA stations for emergency infrastructure, backup systems, and multilingual broadcasting capability.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

18. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ ~~Not sure / no preference~~

The description correctly identifies that individuals and communities are frequently first responders during emergencies. However, the current legal, operational, and resourcing frameworks do not reflect this reality for all community actors.

Community Access Media (CAMA) stations often continue broadcasting vital information throughout emergencies, sometimes without backup power or formal emergency direction, placing them in a **grey area in terms of legal liability and eligibility for compensation**.

Simplifying legal frameworks and recognising media resilience as critical infrastructure would ensure stations can act swiftly without risk. This includes ensuring sites, studios, transmission infrastructure, and generators are fit for purpose and subsidised. Operational guidance and funding tailored to media infrastructure resilience should be prioritised.

19. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Improving support for community responders, such as CAMA stations, would ensure the faster and more trusted dissemination of life-saving information.

**Benefits:**
- Enhanced community resilience and faster recovery.
- Increased public trust and engagement.
- More equitable access to emergency messaging.

**Risks of inaction:**
- Communication breakdowns for culturally and linguistically diverse communities.
- Continued reliance on overloaded centralised systems.
- Legal uncertainty deterring community-led response efforts.

**Preferred options:**
- Extend **civil liability protection** to media organisations acting in good faith.
- Ensure CAMA stations are eligible for **compensation or reimbursement** for emergency-related broadcasting, especially when acting without direct instruction.
- Introduce **funding mechanisms and asset planning tools** to reflect the infrastructure needs of community media.

20. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Yes.

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- Establish **formal recognition** for emergency responders at Community Access Media stations. This would enable access to critical services, resources, and legal protections during emergency response and recovery phases.
- Develop **templates and technical guidance** for emergency broadcast continuity planning.
- Allocate **dedicated funding** for readiness, including translation and targeted outreach campaigns.
- Explore a framework for designating CAMA stations as "**approved providers of warnings and notifications**" to support the national alerting system (in addition to and above the current Memorandum of Understanding).

### Other problems relating to this objective

21. **Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Yes. There are still barriers to ensuring that Māori-led and community-led responders—like iwi media and CAMA stations—are integrated as strategic partners. This includes:

- **Formal inclusion in emergency planning frameworks**
- **Resourcing models** that enable the delivery of culturally grounded and locally responsive information
- **Trust-based engagement**, rather than ad hoc consultation.

Failing to recognise these entities as **core partners** risks excluding some of the most trusted and responsive actors in our emergency ecosystem.

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it more straightforward to determine who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

22. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

CAMA stations regularly engage with Civil Defence during emergencies, but inconsistent clarity around who is in charge of communications, along with staff changes, creates challenges. Better direction, control, oversight and increased engagement at the operational level would support consistent messaging, coordination, and quicker responses.

23. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

We support clearer delegation and communication protocols. The benefit would be improved timeliness and effectiveness of public messaging, especially via local broadcast networks.

24. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Continue to include communication partners, such as CAMA stations, in decision trees and pre-scripted alert processes. Increase dedicated liaison and community engagement roles

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within CDEM Groups to ensure information flows effectively to local media, such as CAMA stations.

25. **Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

More centralised coordination and community engagement, combined with clear local implementation pathways, would improve consistency and effectiveness. This includes recognising CAMA stations as trusted partners that must be integrated into communication chains and emergency preparedness awareness campaigns.

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

26. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Confusion around responsibilities and staff changes among officials contributes to delays in community messaging and engagement. Clarifying these roles and increasing community engagement efforts will help ensure that information is disseminated quickly and reliably.

27. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Preferred options include more unified protocols for engagement with community partners. The benefit would be stronger accountability and less duplication.

28. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Create explicit obligations for CDEM Groups to consult, engage, and campaign with locally relevant communications partners (such as CAMA stations).

29. **Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The model should be adjusted to prioritise community engagement and communication readiness, including stronger partnerships and emergency preparedness awareness campaigns with local public interest broadcasters, such as CAMA stations.

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## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

30. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

We have observed inconsistent performance across regions, in part due to limited community engagement and resources, as well as staff changes. Consistent and streamlined structures, along with increased capacity and resources, would improve service delivery and awareness.

31. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Preferred options should strengthen local leadership and clarify responsibilities, particularly in communications planning and outreach, which should include increased public investment in emergency preparedness campaigns.

32. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Ensure that accountability frameworks include engagement with diverse communities and partners, especially communication providers (such as CAMA stations) that have local access.

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

33. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

This section discusses how decision-making groups can better implement emergency plans in collaboration with local communities and trusted communication partners.

There is a need for more operational clarity and accountability. Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) are key connectors between policy and implementation—yet they are often disconnected from community-level delivery.

34. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

We support options that improve the functioning of Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) and enable them to work more directly with local stakeholders, such as CAMA stations. This would benefit public confidence and service responsiveness.

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35. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks. Specifically, CAMA advocates for:

- Requiring Coordinating Executive Groups to establish formal communication frameworks that include designated CAMA partners.
- Allocating further public investment into emergency preparedness awareness campaigns and other strategies.

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

36. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Plans must keep pace with evolving roles, technology, and community needs. Updating plans and increasing community engagement are essential to effective and inclusive emergency management.

37. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Faster and more iterative planning updates, along with increased community engagement and outreach campaigns, would allow for the timely integration of new risks and partners, such as social service agencies (including CAMA stations).

38. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Provide dedicated funding (for emergency preparedness campaigns, infrastructure upgrades, and community engagement) and staffing to maintain plans and engage stakeholders in the update process, especially those involved in communications.

## Other problems relating to this objective

39. **Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Communication responsibilities are often assumed but not formalised. There is no national or regional clarity on how diverse communities will be reached, nor who is accountable for ensuring emergency communications are inclusive. Formalising partnerships with Community Access Media stations, in addition to the current Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), would address this gap and improve the equity of access to information.

# Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

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## Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

40. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The need for stronger national direction is clear. CAMA stations frequently face inconsistencies in engagement, access, and awareness of civil defence information across regions. A more standardised framework (including further investment in awareness campaigns, community outreach, and critical infrastructure) would improve coordination and information dissemination, and ensure equitable treatment.

41. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

We support options that increase accountability and set national expectations. However, any additional compliance or reporting requirements placed on CAMA stations or their service providers must come with corresponding support or funding.

42. **Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

- Definitions of essential communications infrastructure.
- Additional standards and investment in public alerting and messaging.
- Involvement of Community Access Media (and other media providers) in response planning.
- Criteria for designating lifeline utilities, which should broaden to include CAMA stations.

43. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Yes. National direction should include guidance on the role of Community Access Media, with expectations for how Civil Defence Groups will engage with them.

### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

44. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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There must be mechanisms in place to address performance gaps, mainly when failure to act affects vulnerable communities. Too often, local variations result in inconsistent communication during emergencies.

45. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Strengthening the Director's mandate is appropriate. However, this mandate should include community feedback loops and transparency around interventions.

46. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Enable public-interest media outlets (such as CAMA stations) to raise performance issues directly with NEMA when local coordination fails, with assurance of follow-up and necessary resources.

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

47. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Current local hazard planning often lacks meaningful community input and overlooks communication infrastructure gaps, particularly those experienced by Community Access Media stations. These limitations directly impact the ability to reach vulnerable communities with critical risk and preparedness information effectively. CAMA stations are an underutilised but essential part of local risk communication networks.

48. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

We support improvements to planning tools, enhanced public education, and stronger coordination between hazard planners and communicators. A key benefit would be improved public understanding of local risks, more effective messaging, and increased readiness, especially for underserved communities.

However, recognising CAMA as a key communication partner will require **increased capacity, infrastructure, and coordination at the local level. These new expectations must be backed by dedicated funding**. Otherwise, the burden will fall on already under-resourced CAMA stations. This could undermine the effectiveness of any proposed changes.

49. **What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

We support national consistency in the core aspects of hazard identification, risk assessment, and communication protocols. However, regional flexibility is essential for tailoring engagement strategies and using trusted local communication providers, such as CAMA stations.

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50. **What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

- Limited staffing and resourcing.
- Fragmentation between council departments.
- Gaps in training around community-led communication strategies.
- Underuse of locally embedded media platforms.
- CAMA stations are underutilised in the current local and national awareness campaign budget allocations.
- Low awareness of the role Community Access Media can play in risk communication.

51. **Are there other options that should be considered?**

Yes. CDEM Group plans should be required to:

- Formally integrate local communications partners such as CAMA stations.
- Include these partners in risk mapping, planning exercises, and scenario testing.
- Allocate specific funding to support their participation and infrastructure development.
- Develop and increase funded public education campaigns in collaboration with trusted local broadcasters, such as CAMA stations, to improve awareness among vulnerable or hard-to-reach communities.

52. **Are more fundamental changes needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Current structures rely heavily on discretionary engagement. There needs to be clearer statutory obligations to involve community organisations, improve data sharing, and integrate communications in risk planning.

There should be clear statutory obligations for CDEM Groups to engage with Community Access Media as critical communication providers. This would ensure consistent, two-way risk communication, particularly with groups who are often left out of mainstream channels. However, **this will not be effective without adequate resourcing.** CAMA stations cannot take on greater responsibilities in emergency planning without support.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage are considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

53. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The protection of taonga Māori and cultural heritage is vital during and after emergencies, not only for iwi and hapū but for the nation as a whole. These assets hold deep spiritual, historical, and identity-based value and must be safeguarded through intentional and culturally informed planning. The recognition of such heritage in emergency planning frameworks is overdue and well supported.

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54. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

We support approaches that embed iwi leadership in identifying and prioritising taonga and cultural assets before emergencies occur. The benefit is a system that reflects local values and enhances intergenerational resilience. The risk of inaction is irreversible cultural loss. The preferred option is the development of mandatory protocols for taonga protection in CDEM Group plans.

55. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Yes. Require emergency communication partners, including iwi and Community Access Media, to collaborate on cultural asset alert systems and post-event reporting. Ensure CAMA stations are trained (and funded to meet the additional capacity required) to communicate the cultural significance of protected sites and practices during a response.

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

56. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Animal welfare is intrinsically linked to human well-being during emergencies. Clear protocols and resources for protecting pets, working animals, and livestock are essential for reducing trauma and supporting recovery.

57. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

We support options that expand planning requirements to include animal evacuation, sheltering, and public communication. The benefit consists of greater public cooperation and reduced harm.

58. **Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Yes. Animal welfare should be considered second only to human safety, prioritised above property protection. Public communication should reflect this hierarchy, especially in communities that rely on animals for their livelihood and companionship.

59. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Yes. Leverage local Community Access Media stations to deliver real-time updates on animal evacuation centres and safety advice. Establish partnerships between animal welfare organisations and CAMA stations to develop emergency content and resource awareness campaigns in advance.

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### Other problems relating to this objective

60. **Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Yes. The communications infrastructure required to deliver culturally inclusive, accurate, and accessible emergency information is not formally recognised, and in some cases, the critical infrastructure required to disseminate information is lacking or inadequate (e.g. obsolete or inadequate generator support, high transmission costs, over-reliance on the internet, AM/FM limited frequency availability). Without this critical infrastructure, community and iwi-led media organisations remain underutilised and under-supported despite being essential to maintaining community cohesion and trust during crises.

For more information about the current status of the sector's critical infrastructure, see here: https://cama.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Case-study-critical-infrastructure-3-1.pdf

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

61. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

This section is critical to CAMA's submission. The definition of 'lifeline utilities' must reflect 21st-century communication realities, including publicly funded, culturally embedded media services relied on during past disasters.

The current definition of lifeline utilities **excludes key communication services,** such as Community Access Media. While RNZ and TVNZ are recognised, CAMA stations—despite providing trusted, multilingual, and localised content to communities underserved by mainstream media, including Māori, Pasifika, people with disabilities, rural populations, and migrant communities—are not. Although our structures may differ, CAMA stations share the same public service and emergency communication objectives. Our role as signatories to the national Memorandum of Understanding on emergency broadcasting underscores this.

This narrow designation fails to reflect how communities **receive and rely on information** during emergencies. During recent engagements with officials, this omission was raised as a serious concern.

Although the earlier Emergency Management Bill proposed more prescriptive definitions and support for transmission services, the current direction instead **imposes obligations on infrastructure entities without additional funding**. This risks **costs being passed onto CAMA stations** by providers such as Kordia and Chorus, threatening their operational capacity.

A recent Cabinet paper acknowledged the lack of structural or funding reform to address systemic gaps in risk reduction and community resilience. Without formal inclusion of CAMA stations as essential infrastructure, these challenges will persist, **leaving frontline community broadcasters unsupported** in future emergencies.

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62. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Yes. CAMA strongly supports **Option C**: a **principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure"** that recognises the importance of community-based public media.
This would:

- Enable inclusion of publicly funded CAMA stations in planning and funding systems.
- Acknowledge their role in business continuity and emergency broadcasting.
- Reduce reliance on centralised systems by empowering trusted local providers.

Without such inclusion, the system risks **communication failures and inequitable outcomes**, particularly for vulnerable groups.

63. **If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

~~☐ Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

**Broadcast services from Community Access Media** should be added as critical communications infrastructure. These services:

- Provide life-saving information in over 50 languages.
- Are trusted by local communities across Aotearoa.
- Support Māori, iwi, and Treaty-aligned outcomes in emergency response.
- Have already demonstrated their importance during major events (e.g., Cyclone Gabrielle, Auckland floods).

For more information about our core services, see here:
https://cama.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/2024-Reach-your-audience-1.pdf

64. **If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

**Community Access Media infrastructure**, including broadcast sites, transmission networks, studio equipment, and backup power, should be covered.

This infrastructure:

- Delivers 24/7 localised information across FM, AM, and digital platforms.
- Serves over 1 million people annually via 12 regional stations.
- Produces over 4,000 hours of content per month, with a focus on equity and local connection.
- Serves as a **trustworthy bridge** between emergency services and the community.

65. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Yes. To meet the Emergency Management Bill's objectives, CAMA recommends the following additional steps:
**1. Formal recognition of Community Access Media as essential infrastructure**, with a role in statutory emergency frameworks.
**2. A tiered framework** that recognises CAMA services as essential at local and regional levels, allowing flexible inclusion in emergency contexts.
**3. Infrastructure and readiness support**, including:

- Transmission and generator upgrades
- Resilience training and emergency planning resources
- Emergency communication templates and multilingual campaign funding

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**4. Representation on emergency advisory groups** to ensure equitable planning and delivery.
**5. Dedicated investment** to future-proof the sector, including technical, staffing, and resilience planning support.

Community Access Media aligns with international best practice, including UNESCO and UNDP guidance, and delivers on Aotearoa's own Treaty, equity, and resilience commitments. Without formal inclusion in emergency management systems, the government risks overlooking one of the most effective, local, and trusted sources of communication during disaster. **We urge recognition, investment, and inclusion of CAMA as a cornerstone of Aotearoa's emergency response infrastructure.**

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

66. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ~~☐ Not sure / no preference~~

Community Access Media (CAMA) stations play a vital role in providing localised, culturally relevant information during emergencies. However, CAMA stations are currently excluded from the lifeline utility framework, despite being relied upon during crises. While CAMA stations are committed to service continuity, most lack the necessary infrastructure and funding to meet the high business continuity standards expected of lifeline utilities.

CAMA stations are already operating under significant financial constraints and resource limitations, and we urge that any new business continuity obligations come with **adequate funding** to enable compliance.

67. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

CAMA supports **Option (b): increasing assurance through non-legislative guidance and monitoring**. However, this option must be coupled with **dedicated funding** to enable CAMA stations to meet the infrastructure and resilience standards required for emergency continuity. Without this, there is a risk that smaller broadcasters will bear the costs, which could lead to financial strain and increased service costs for our stations.

We strongly caution against Options (c) and (d), as financial penalties or legislative mandates without corresponding funding will disproportionately burden smaller, underfunded organisations like CAMA stations. The increased transmission costs and compliance requirements could be passed on by infrastructure providers, placing further financial pressure on stations that are already operating on tight budgets.

Without funding support, such measures would effectively penalise essential emergency broadcasters for circumstances beyond their control.

We recommend introducing **safeguards to protect public interest broadcasters** from cost escalation due to new obligations placed on infrastructure providers, such as Chorus and Kordia.

68. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Yes. In addition to the current options, we recommend:

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- **Access to central government infrastructure funding** for the installation of backup transmission systems, off-grid studios, and other emergency readiness tools.
- A **tiered approach** to lifeline utility obligations, recognising the varying capacities of regional and community-based broadcasters and ensuring funding levels reflect these differences.
- The development of **a dedicated funding mechanism** specifically to support the emergency preparedness needs of CAMA stations. This could be managed through the current NZ On Air allocation or a separate funding stream aimed at emergency broadcasting needs.
- Recognising the **value of existing MOU partnerships** and integrating CAMA into the national business continuity planning framework.

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

69. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The problem is accurately described. Community Access Media stations are often left out of formal emergency coordination forums and education communication campaigns despite playing an essential role in disseminating localised, multilingual, and culturally attuned information.

70. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

We support the development of more formalised coordination structures and information-sharing channels at both regional and national levels. This would ensure CAMA stations can be part of coordinated messaging strategies and awareness campaigns, and quickly access critical information in emergencies. However, to effectively engage in these partnerships, CAMA stations will require **dedicated funding for training, simulation exercises, awareness campaigns, and infrastructure upgrades** to ensure they meet the demands of emergency response roles.

71. **Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

We advocate for the expansion of the **national emergency broadcasting MOU,** with clearly defined and resourced **local implementation protocols** between CEMA Groups and CAMA stations. This ensures that CAMA stations can quickly respond to local needs while remaining integrated into the broader national emergency response framework.

72. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks. Specifically, CAMA recommends:

- **Embedding information-sharing expectations within service-level agreements** between CEMA agencies and Community Access Media, backed by clear, resourced commitments.

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- **Funded joint training, simulation exercises, and awareness campaigns** to strengthen partnerships and ensure readiness for emergency communications.
- **Formal recognition of CAMA stations as essential communications infrastructure**, with corresponding funding to support business continuity planning and emergency preparedness.

Ultimately, essential services must include the communications ecosystem—not just telecommunications providers, but also publicly funded community broadcasters, such as CAMA stations, which act as conduits for critical information. These services are essential to public safety and cohesion during emergencies, particularly for Māori, Pasifika, people with disabilities, migrants, and rural communities.

Business continuity planning must formally acknowledge public messaging as an essential function and provide the resources and infrastructure protections needed to deliver on that obligation. To fully realise the goals of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks, not just as a partner, but as an operationally necessary asset.

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

73. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / ~~no preference~~

We agree with the problem definition. The COVID-19 pandemic and recent severe weather events have highlighted the critical need for all central government organisations to be prepared to maintain essential services during emergencies. These services include not only operational and infrastructural continuity but also the ability to effectively communicate with the public, primarily through trusted and accessible channels, such as Community Access Media.

74. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

We support the proposal to expand the scope of organisations recognised in the Act. In particular, we endorse extending business continuity obligations to Crown agents, Autonomous Crown Entities, and Independent Crown Entities, as well as requiring all recognised agencies to take account of Director-issued guidance. These changes will increase clarity, improve coordination, and enhance operational resilience across government.

However, **the inclusion of communication-related agencies must be explicit**, especially those that fund or rely on community broadcasters. Community Access Media (represented by CAMA) plays a frontline role in public messaging during emergencies, providing multilingual, localised, and culturally relevant information to vulnerable communities.

While CAMA is currently acknowledged through a discretionary Memorandum of Understanding, this is not sufficient. It lacks enforceability and integration into emergency frameworks. **Formal recognition and obligations are needed to ensure that CAMA can fulfil its essential communications role during a crisis**.

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75. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Yes. We recommend the following additional actions:

- **Extend business continuity requirements** to include government agencies that fund, oversee, or depend on public-interest media, such as NZ On Air and the Ministry for Culture and Heritage.
- **Require central government departments** to identify their communications partners (e.g. CAMA stations) as part of their business continuity planning.
- **Include Community Access Media** in inter-agency contingency frameworks for emergency communications.
- **Allocate dedicated funding** to support business continuity planning, readiness, and restoration for the community media sector.
- **Prioritise communications infrastructure** (e.g. studio and transmitter sites used by CAMA stations) for protection and restoration in emergencies.

**Funding and resource needs:**
To effectively integrate CAMA into emergency communications frameworks, additional funding and resources will be necessary. Currently, CAMA stations face significant challenges in terms of staffing, equipment, and infrastructure resilience. The following should be considered:

- **Targeted funding streams** to support CAMA stations in maintaining emergency-ready operations, including staffing, training, equipment, and infrastructure upgrades.
- **Resourcing for community-based outreach and preparedness**—CAMA stations often provide localised information that bridges gaps in national communication strategies. Funding should support these initiatives (and awareness campaigns) in high-risk areas and vulnerable communities.
- **Investment in secure and resilient broadcasting infrastructure**, including backup power systems and transmission equipment that can operate in the event of natural disasters or other emergencies.
- **Training and capacity building** for CAMA staff in emergency management, media protocols, and crisis communication.

### Other problems relating to this objective

76. **Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Yes. The current framing of "essential services" must be expanded to include **the broader communications ecosystem**, beyond just telecommunications infrastructure. Publicly funded community broadcasters like CAMA stations act as vital conduits of critical information to diverse and underserved populations.

Yet, without formal statutory recognition, these broadcasters remain excluded from the planning and protection frameworks they need to function in emergencies. Their omission puts public safety, community cohesion, and equitable access to emergency information at risk.

To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, **Community Access Media must be recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in emergency legislation, not just as partners, but as operationally necessary assets.**

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

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*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

77. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The process for managing access to restricted areas must be clear, consistent, and adaptable. This ensures safety while allowing essential personnel, including CAMA station staff and content creators, to continue operating. During past emergencies, such as Cyclone Gabrielle and COVID-19, confusion around access restrictions has led to unnecessary disruption of critical communication services. This has hampered the ability of CAMA stations to disseminate vital information to vulnerable communities that rely on them for local, multilingual, and culturally relevant updates.

78. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

We support options that provide a more transparent and coordinated process for designating access rights, particularly for media personnel working in public-interest Community Access Media. Preferred options should include clear protocols for issuing passes or access rights to media staff, ensuring that **CAMA stations are explicitly recognised as essential communication services**. The key benefits include:

- **Reduced downtime in the dissemination of critical information**.
- **Improved public trust** through consistent access for CAMA station personnel to serve their audiences during emergencies.

Without a formal accreditation process, CAMA stations may continue to face delays or restrictions in accessing their infrastructure and facilities, which can delay their ability to perform their essential communication role.

79. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Yes. A key recommendation is to **develop a national template for rapidly accrediting essential communication personnel during emergencies**. This framework should explicitly **include CAMA stations** as part of the vital communications infrastructure. Accreditation should guarantee access to broadcast towers, transmission sites, and studio facilities, enabling stations to continue operations uninterrupted during emergencies. Additionally, this framework should ensure that CAMA stations are recognised and protected as critical assets, prioritised for access and repair when necessary.

## Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

80. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The responsibilities for using emergency powers must be unambiguous. Confusion can delay decision-making and negatively impact response time, including the timely dissemination of emergency information through **CAMA station channels**. Without clarity in who holds the authority, **CAMA stations** may face delays in receiving necessary permissions to broadcast vital updates to the public, particularly in areas requiring restricted access.

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81. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

We support the option that delineates authority and promotes consistency across local government boundaries. This reduces confusion and improves confidence in leadership. Clear roles for **CDEM Groups**, **Controllers**, and **Recovery Managers** should explicitly include media, especially **CAMA stations**, in the decision-making process. This ensures **CAMA stations** are integrated into the emergency management ecosystem, reducing the likelihood of disruption to essential communication services during crises.

82. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Yes, we propose that all local emergency declarations include a **communications liaison officer** tasked with managing the dissemination of information through approved media channels, including **CAMA stations**. This would ensure a consistent flow of critical information and further integrate Community Access Media into the emergency response framework.

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

83. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

~~☐ Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

In a digital era, requiring physical signatures for declarations creates unnecessary delays. Transitioning to electronic methods is practical and increases the agility of emergency response processes. For **CAMA stations**, the lack of timely access to emergency powers or declarations can cause delays in broadcasting critical information. Moving to electronic signatures would expedite decision-making, ensuring that **CAMA stations** can continue providing essential updates to the public without unnecessary delays.

84. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Preferred options should support digital authorisation mechanisms with appropriate checks and balances. This ensures speed without compromising legitimacy. This digital shift would also enable **CAMA stations** to receive timely notifications regarding the activation of emergency powers, allowing them to adjust and broadcast accurate information to the public quickly.

85. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Yes, include an **automated communication protocol** tied to the declaration system that immediately alerts designated media partners, including CAMA stations, when emergency powers are activated. This would ensure that **CAMA stations are promptly informed and can start their crucial role in disseminating emergency information immediately.**

**Funding Consideration:**
Increased reliance on CAMA stations for timely and accurate emergency information dissemination will require enhanced **funding to ensure their capacity can meet the demand**. This includes expanding their ability to cover additional personnel, technological tools (e.g., emergency broadcasting equipment and redundancy systems), and training staff in emergency

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communication protocols. Therefore, **funding support for CAMA stations should be included in any legislation or policy that enhances their role in emergency management.**

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

86. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ ~~Yes~~ ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Mayors hold a visible leadership role and are often perceived by the public as the face of local government. Making their roles more explicit in the legislation would support transparency and help streamline response coordination. This more precise definition can also strengthen the integration of CAMA stations in the local communication framework, as it clarifies who is responsible for directing public information during emergencies.

87. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

We support codifying mayors' responsibilities and communication duties, especially regarding public information and local coordination. This would increase public understanding and accountability. Additionally, requiring mayors and **local authorities to include CAMA stations in their communication plans** would **significantly enhance the dissemination of information, particularly in areas where traditional media are less effective.**

88. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Yes, provide mayors with **briefing materials** and **communication templates** tailored for multilingual outreach, specifically for CAMA stations and iwi media. This would ensure that **emergency messaging reaches all segments of the population, including underrepresented communities.**

**Funding Consideration:**
To support the expanded role of **CAMA stations** in emergency communications, dedicated funding for equipment, staffing, and operational costs is necessary. Without this, there could be gaps in coverage or the ability to deliver timely messages, particularly in communities with limited access to traditional media.

## Other problems relating to this objective

89. **Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Yes. Controllers and Recovery Managers may require the power to requisition or prioritise access to local media infrastructure to ensure the continuity of critical broadcasts. They should also be empowered to directly engage with CAMA stations in planning and message dissemination during the response and recovery phases, particularly when mainstream channels are compromised or less effective for targeted communities.

**Funding Consideration:**

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To enhance CAMA stations' ability to contribute effectively in emergencies, funding should be made available for establishing e**mergency response capacity**. This would include ensuring that **CAMA stations have the necessary resources to maintain their infrastructure, personnel, and technology, allowing them to operate effectively during emergencies**.

## Other comments

90. **Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

**CAMA's role in emergency management**

Community Access Media (CAMA) is a signatory to the national Memorandum of Understanding on emergency broadcasting and has longstanding relationships with emergency management agencies. Despite this, the nature of our public funding and our UNESCO-backed origins, we lack formal recognition as lifeline utilities in emergency management frameworks.

CAMA serves over 1 million New Zealanders annually through 12 member stations. Collectively, we produce over 4,000 hours of locally made content monthly in more than 50 languages. We reach more than 200 community groups through a mix of AM, FM, and digital platforms, with a strong emphasis on **te reo Māori**, Pasifika languages, and languages from ethnic communities.

**Critical role in emergency response**

CAMA stations are integral to the emergency management system, providing:

- **24/7 broadcast capacity** to ensure the timely dissemination of emergency information.
- **Localised, culturally attuned communication**, including support for communities traditionally underserved by mainstream media, such as Māori, Pasifika, ethnic minorities, youth, disabled, and rural groups.
- An **established trust network** developed through decades of consistent local programming.

In times of crisis, CAMA stations often serve as the **sole source of emergency information**. For example, during the 2023 flooding in Hawke's Bay, radio was the only available platform for crucial emergency information for some residents.

**Funding and infrastructure needs**

Our sector makes a significant contribution to emergency communications. Stations collectively pay **$366,000 annually** in transmission costs, with some stations spending over **$50,000 per year** on transmission alone. Infrastructure and generator costs vary widely, and these disparities represent significant barriers to maintaining consistent emergency readiness across the sector.

While **wages account for over 70% of sector overheads**, many stations operate with minimal staff and rely heavily on volunteers. Despite receiving a **$3.6 million NZ On Air allocation for 2023/24**, the current funding model, which is based on population reach, fails to reflect the **emergency communication value** that CAMA provides. **Additional funding** is essential to support infrastructure upgrades, such as backup generators and transmission systems, and to **enhance preparedness** in meeting the unique needs of the communities we serve.

**Recommendations for strengthening CAMA's role**

To ensure that CAMA can continue its vital role in New Zealand's emergency management framework, we strongly recommend the following:

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1. **Formal recognition as a lifeline utility** in the revised framework to ensure CAMA is integrated into emergency planning and receives appropriate support during emergencies.
2. **Dedicated funding** for infrastructure upgrades, including the provision of backup power systems and improved transmission resilience.
3. **Representation on emergency advisory and planning bodies**, ensuring equitable inclusion of CAMA in national and local civil defence strategies.
4. **Funding for training, equipment, and readiness**, as well as **awareness campaigns** to enhance emergency preparedness within communities.
5. **Support for capacity-building initiatives** that promote national coordination and infrastructure investment in resilience planning and training for emergencies.

**Supporting Māori engagement and global best practices**

CAMA stations directly support the government's objectives for iwi engagement in emergency planning, primarily through our **broadcasting in te reo Māori** and our amplification of Māori voices, environmental knowledge, and traditions. Our sector's ability to deliver information in **culturally relevant ways** ensures that Māori communities are prepared and informed during emergencies.

Internationally, community radio (CAMA) is **recognised as a key element of disaster resilience** by **UNESCO, UNDP**, and the **International Telecommunication Union (ITU)**, all of which highlight the unique reliability of radio in reaching underserved and high-risk populations. Formal recognition and support for CAMA stations align with **global best practices** for emergency communication and resilience building.

**Conclusion: Ensuring equitable and inclusive emergency management**

CAMA stations are a cornerstone of Aotearoa's **democratic infrastructure** and **emergency resilience**. Formal recognition of our role in emergency management legislation, supported by **infrastructure investment, planning integration, and dedicated funding**, will ensure that our diverse and vulnerable communities are not left behind during times of crisis.

We look forward to working with NEMA to strengthen the system and ensure a more **inclusive, responsive, and resilient** emergency communication framework.

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**From:** Bill Obers s9(2)(a)
**Sent:** Sunday, May 18, 2025 11:06 PM
**To:** Emergency Management Bill [NEMA] <EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz>
**Subject:** Submission on Bill by Grey Power NZ Federation Inc.

Hello,

It is with pleasure that the Grey Power Federation submits to the Emergency Management Bill. I make this submission on behalf of Grey Power Federation in my capacity as Chair of the Emergency Management Portfolio, with the approval of the Board.

In preparing this submission, the authors reflected on recent emergency events, in particular those covered in the report on the North Island severe weather events of January and February 2023. These events also inspired Grey Power Federation to create a submission to Government regarding the use of sirens as early warning to the local communities for any imminent disaster event, in 2024. This submission is still appropriate and available, if wanted.

I have some considerable experience myself, being the Civil Defence Officer, and then Emergency Management Officer for the Invercargill City Council from 1984 until mid 2010. I was a volunteer with 10 years experience when the Southland Floods occurred in 1984 and was in charge of the local Rescue Teams at the time. I was employed by the Council shortly thereafter, as the Deputy Regional Civil Defence Officer, and then both Regional Civil Defence Officer for Southland and also for Invercargill City Council in mid 1985. I was involved with the Ministry of Civil Defence at the National Civil Defence School as an instructor on a number of courses and also with Local Government Industry Training Organisation on the Civil Defence for many years, developing Unit Standards, training and assessment materials, etc. But enough about me!

I firmly believe that a good number of the public who volunteered for local Civil Defence started to lose interest when it became Civil Defence Emergency Management, with the emphasis on Emergency Management. Many volunteers were ordinary people who did not believe that they were, nor wanted to be, Emergency Managers. It was a perception, but perceptions carry a lot of weight in many people's mind. I know from experience that many of our valuable volunteers 'retired' shortly after this. At the time I had argued that the change in name, while considered by some to be necessary and the next phase for New Zealand, could/should have been Civil Defence AND Emergency Management. Civil Defence for the local people to help their community, and Emergency Management for the Councils, Emergency Services, etc. who did 'manage' the event, while the Civil Defence Volunteer helped their neighbours and their community at the grass roots level.

Back in the day, there were a number of nationwide companies which provided significant resource to New Zealand's Civil Defence preparedness. One that springs to mind was the AMP promotion, where they provided a travelling roadshow, give-aways for local communities, tee-shirts, and more, while promoting the 'Being Prepared' message to the people. This was very well received at the time.

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The Invercargill City Council sponsored a Lifelines Project, which was very well supported by the agencies in Invercargill and Southlands, to the point where, for the purposes of the project, competition did not seem to exist. There were no 'secrets' divulged, but the people worked very well together and shared information quite freely. To them, it was about being prepared for, and then being able to respond to and recover from and emergency event, helping each other along the way.

From around 1999 and the early 2000s, there was also a significant project undertaken in the Southern part of New Zealand, led by the then Manager for St John in Southland, where a group of people representing the Emergency Services and Councils through their Civil Defence Officers, and others met, discussed, researched and prepared the Otago Southland Emergency Response Plan. This plan contained a list of all communities, small and large, throughout the area. Listed against the relevant community was a list of assets in and surrounding that community, such as Police, Fire and Ambulance Stations, Council utilities and services, contractors, builders, electricians, engineers, etc. It was a valuable resource and used many times during the planning of exercises in preparation for a major emergency. Thankfully, in my time there was not another major emergency, but a number of smaller events where this information was used and appreciated.

Back to the submission. There are many comments in the submission relating to references both from within the Civil Defence realm, Government and other sources. If there is a reference that a source is not readily available to NEMA, pleas feel free to ask and we will be able to provide that for you.

If you have any questions or would like any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Regards,

*Bill Obers*
**Zone 7 Representative**
**Grey Power New Zealand Federation Inc.**



***Join Grey Power before you need us!***

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Mob: s9(2)(a)
Email:
Email:

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Bill Obers |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Grey Power New Zealand Federation inc. |

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### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management.
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels.
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management.
- minimise disruption to essential services.
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Do you agree with how we have described the problem?**

***No**, Simply because NEMA have not identified interlacing roles of New Zealand Defence force, Fire Emergency New Zealand, Hato Hone St John, Health New Zealand – Te Whatu Ora, and others as in the need of strengthening their roles in a community led management.*

*NEMA has focused on the inclusion of IWI and has not been overly inclusive of other emergency management contributors**. Reference:** The REPORT: Recommendation 1 'Legislate for and invest in an inclusive community -led emergency management model.*

**• Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified?**

The focus on **"community and iwi Māori"** is strong, but other **diverse or disproportionately affected groups** (e.g., disabled, elderly, ethnic minorities, migrant communities) are **not specifically mentioned**. Therefore, the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options NEMA has identified are unable to be established or realised as being impactive both in legislative changes and cost.

***Do you have any preferred options?***

***Yes,** Inclusivity in the use of language when identifying the 'strengthening of the community.'*

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• Are there any other options that should be considered? The document can be improved by:

- **Explicitly naming and addressing the needs of a wider range of communities** beyond iwi Māori
- Embedding **equity and accessibility** into each objective, particularly around participation and service delivery

With reference to using pages 8-9 there are no "options" to select

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation.

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities.

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The Reference to pages 10-13. The section touches on the diverse needs of communities but does not fully identify sections to ensure the system better meets those needs – particularly for groups disproportionately affected during emergencies.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

The document relies heavily on iwi Māori engagement (which is essential) but lacks equivalent detail or commitment for other at-risk groups. Such as: Disabled persons, Migrant and refugee communities, Pacific peoples, Children, and elderly and Rural or low-income populations

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**The Status Quo ~~CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION~~.**

**Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities.**

Preferred Options are:

**Option 2 (**non-legislative): Develop guidance on meeting diverse needs. **Preferred**

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**Option 3** (legislative): Require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for. **Preferred**

**Option 4** (legislative):

Require the Director to consult with representatives of disproportionately affected communities to inform national planning. **Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: **Preferred.**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: **Preferred**.

**5. What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it were better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

The process of change must first identify the makeup of each community before asking what effective planning should look like?

An inventory of available services and equipment support is essential to determine which plans can be formulated and developed. Understanding the unique composition of each community is a key priority. Each community must first assess its existing resources before initiating any planning activities.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The document can be improved by:

• Explicitly naming and addressing the needs of a wider range of communities beyond iwi Māori

• Embedding equity and accessibility into each objective, particularly around participation and service delivery

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management.

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The document expresses a desire for a whole -of-society approach, including Iwi Māori, to identify the roles and inputs before, during and after emergencies. The document does not identify what roles and inputs that are needed in any of the tiers of management during emergency conditions. The development of Key Performance Indicators (KPI's) and Legislative

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Delegated Authority companion documents would be helpful in strengthening and enabling Iwi Māori participation in emergency management.
There are no specific details on the knowledge requirements, skills, resources, and historical experience Iwi Māori bring to all phases of emergency management. Key Performance Indicators (KPI's) would be needed.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert responseThe document identifies conceptual planning with no specific 'roles' for Iwi Māori, which is legislative-outcomes dependant.
This section needs to be reviewed to identify what potential roles are contemplated.

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management: Options.**

~~**Option 1: Status Quo – CANNOT REMAIN**~~

**Option 2** (non-legislative): Address the roles of iwi Māori in plans, guidance, and other policy settings **Preferred.**

**Option 3** (legislative): Require iwi Māori representation on CDEM Group decision-making structures. **Preferred**
**Option 4** (legislative): Require CDEM Groups to engage with iwi Māori during the development of CDEM Group plans. **Preferred**
**Option 5** (legislative): Require the Director to seek advice on Māori interests and knowledge to inform national level planning. **Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: **Preferred**.

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

The government report acknowledges the significant contributions of iwi Māori during the Gabrielle event. However, such recognition should not be construed as implying exclusivity within any organisation or government agency, as numerous other New Zealand nationals (Kiwi's) also demonstrated substantial expertise and played critical roles in emergency management efforts. Iwi Māori has a place at the emergency management table along with all Kiwi's.

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**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

The relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori should be based on mutual respect, partnership, and shared responsibility in emergency management. The government report acknowledges the significant contributions of iwi Māori during the Gabrielle event, which reflects the value of Indigenous knowledge and community leadership in crisis response. However, such recognition should not be interpreted as suggesting exclusivity within any organisation or government agency. It is essential that all relationships within the emergency management framework—whether with iwi Māori or other stakeholders—are inclusive, non-discriminatory, and recognise the contributions of all New Zealanders who possess the expertise and commitment to support emergency management efforts effectively.

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

The relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori should be based on mutual respect, partnership, and shared responsibility in emergency management. The government report acknowledges the significant contributions of iwi Māori during the Gabrielle event, which reflects the value of Indigenous knowledge and community leadership in crisis response. However, such recognition should not be interpreted as suggesting exclusivity within any organisation or government agency. It is essential that all relationships within the emergency management framework—whether with iwi Māori or other stakeholders—are inclusive, non-discriminatory, and recognise the contributions of all New Zealanders who possess the expertise and commitment to support emergency management efforts effectively.

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

It is important that iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga (knowledge, wisdom, understanding and skill) in emergency management are communicated to the Director through structured, transparent, and merit-based channels.

Establishing formal advisory mechanisms—such as an inclusive advisory panel or working group that incorporates iwi Māori representatives alongside other emergency management stakeholders—would ensure that these perspectives are considered fairly and effectively.

This approach enables the integration of valuable Indigenous knowledge without implying preferential access or influence, and supports balanced, evidence-informed decision-making in line with national emergency management objectives.

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No Comment

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## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management.

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The importance of communities developing self-sufficiency and resilience has long been understated and is largely absent from the public mindset, where reliance on "government" & "agency" assistance has become the norm. Re-educating the New Zealand population to understand that they may need to manage independently until external support becomes available is a significant undertaking—one that requires long-term investment in public education. NEMA and other government agencies must critically review and enhance their educational programmes to ensure the public is well-informed, empowered, and prepared to actively participate in emergency preparedness and response exercises.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management.**
**Options:**
~~**Option 1:** Status quo -CDEM Groups have flexibility in how the work with their communities – **CANNOT REMAIN**~~
~~**Option 2** (non-legislative): Develop guidance on meeting diverse needs – **CANNOT BE AN OPTION**~~
**Option 3** (legislative): Require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for. **Preferred**
**Option 4** (legislative): Require the Director to consult with representatives of disproportionately affected communities to inform national planning. **Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: preferred.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**Reference: The Report.**
Recommendation1: Put people and their communities at the heart of an integrated emergency management system.
**C.** Build networks of trained and accredited local community leaders and volunteers, which extends beyond the currently recognised volunteer groups.

Proactively Released

**D.** Develop and invest in a comprehensive and ongoing education and public awareness programme to ensure people have a common understanding of how to prepare for (readiness planning) and what to do in an emergency.

The NEMA survey document does not expand sufficiently on this particular recommendation or how it might be achieved.
If the goal is to have a community – led emergency management model there is a need to establish if the community is capable of this.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency.

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency.**
**Options:**
~~**Option 1: Status quo – CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~
**Option 2** (legislative): Provide for protection from civil liability. **Preferred**
**Option 3** (legislative): Enable compensation for labour costs. **Preferred**
**Option 4** (legislative): Enable compensation for injury and/ or death over that covered by ACC. **Preferred**
The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: preferred.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

An opportunity is provided to recognise a **"spontaneous emergency responder"** who initiates emergency actions based on local circumstances - not under the direction control of any "Officer/Group or Unit." In "good faith" they initiate a "safety response" as being "Johnny-on-the-Spot." Such a person would be enabled for:

- protection from civil liability,
- compensation of labour costs,
- compensation for machinery and or equipment loss.

Proactively Released

## Other problems relating to this objective.

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

No Comment

Proactively Released

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels.

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels,**
Preferred Options:
~~**Option 1: Status quo - CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~

**Option 2** (legislative): Require the agency dealing with the specific hazard to be the "Control Agency. **Note:** only to be considered when an "event" has **NO** cascading/ "knock-on influences."

**Option 3** (legislative): Require Group Controllers (local emergency) or the Director (national emergency) to be the "Control Agency".

**Option 4** (legislative): A unified control model between the agency dealing with the hazard and the Group Controller or Direct. **Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: preferred.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

All legislative options must identify empowerment from the local 'Mission Control" to the embody Community participation in emergency and recovery activities.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

**Just thoughts:** The importance of communities developing self-sufficiency and resilience has long been understated and is largely absent from the public mindset, where reliance on government assistance (in whatever form) has become the norm. Re-educating the New Zealand population to understand that they may need to manage independently until external support becomes available is a significant undertaking—one that requires long-term investment in public education. NEMA and other government agencies must critically review and enhance their educational programmes to ensure the public are well-informed, empowered, and prepared to actively participate in emergency preparedness and response (including practice exercises).

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management.

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities.

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management.**
**Options:**
~~**Option 1: Status quo – CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION.**~~
**Option 2** (legislative) Provide distinct responsibilities for CDEM Groups and their local authority members.
**Option 3** (legislative) Require CDEM Group plans to state how each member will fund and deliver on the functions and decisions of the CDEM Group. **Preferred Option**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: preferred.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

There may be additional options to consider, depending on the specific circumstances and any evolving legislative prescriptions.

Proactively Released

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The Report on the North Island Serve Weather Events identified with the Recommended - Emergency management system design and structure.
**Recommendation 1: Put people and their communities at the heart of an integrated emergency management system.**
The current Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group model limits meaningful community engagement. Local councils often lack the mechanisms or capacity to assess and support effective civil protection measures at the community level.
The current CDEM model should be re-evaluated and aligned with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030. NEMA's traditional "4Rs" approach—Reduction, Readiness, Response, and Recovery—does not fully reflect the more comprehensive priorities outlined in the Sendai Framework (**out of date**):
(a) Understanding disaster risk,
(b) Strengthening disaster risk governance,
(c) Investing in risk reduction for resilience, and
(d) Enhancing preparedness for effective response and recovery, including efforts to "Build Back Better."
A shift toward these priorities will ensure a more holistic and future-proof emergency management system

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management.

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management**
**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~

Proactively Released

**Option 2 (legislative): Provide distinct responsibilities for CDEM Groups and their local authority members. Provide for legislative inclusion of Option 3**

**Option 3 (legislative): Require CDEM Group plans to state how each member will fund and deliver on the functions and decisions of the CDEM Group. Provide for legislative inclusion of Option 2**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: preferred.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

There may be additional options to consider, depending on the specific circumstances and any evolving legislative prescriptions.

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups**

**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~

**Option 2 (legislative) Provide more specific expectations on members of the Coordinating Executive Group supported by good practice guidance. Preferred. In conjunction with Options 3 & 4.**

**Option 3 (legislative) Require the Coordinating Executive Group to report to the Director on how and to what extent it has delivered on its functions under the CDEM Act. Preferred. Reporting lines to be established. Historic reporting on achievement of functions required. Future reporting lines to be re-established.**

**Option 4 (legislative) Remove the ability for Coordinating Executive Group members to delegate membership, or require these entities to have a single, specified delegate. Preferred. A "Delegated Authority Matrix" is needed. A parallel legislative authority of hierarchical "Delegated Authority" is required to identify the legal authority of each "named position" within the (A) Legislative Build & (B) NEMA – Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS).**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: preferred.

Proactively Released

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

There may be additional options to consider, depending on the specific circumstances and any evolving legislative prescriptions.

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

It is still too early to fully determine the likely impacts, a balanced assessment of potential benefits, costs, and risks, guided by ongoing legislative developments, will be essential as the options continue to evolve.

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date.

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date:**

**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo – CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~

**Option 2: (legislative) Enable targeted, "more than minor" amendments to the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans. Preferred. Introduce the term "Minor & Mechanical Changes," which allows for legislative changes and document correction in layout, formatting, presentation (including digital access).**

**In legislative terms make provision for a "Disallowable Instrument" process to enable "quick change" to legislative anomalies and introduce temporary new legislative empowerment.**

**Option 3 (legislative): The National CDEM Plan isn't required to be made by Order in Council but retains its legislative status. Preferred. Clearly identify a more appropriate level for "sign-off" and assign enabling legislative Authority. The ability to add/subtract against a new threat is an administrative necessity. Waiting for "pedestrian" changes in legislation when lives are at risk is not acceptable.**

Proactively Released

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: preferred.

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Develop a legislative suite that enables flexibility to combat threat & risks.

## Other problems relating to this objective.

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, it's important to assess whether roles and responsibilities across all levels are clearly defined and well-aligned to ensure effective coordination and avoid gaps or overlaps

Proactively Released

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management.

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance.

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Provide legislative change to enable the Director to mandate expectations and to monitor performance and accountability.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management.**

**Options:**

**Option 1: Status quo – Preferred to remain. Strengthen the companion legislation requiring the Director to fulfil accountability through Key Performance Indicators (KPI's) for the Directors position.**

**Option 2: (non-legislative) Increased guidance and strengthened governance. Preferred. Currently there is a noticeable lack of guidance material.**

**Option 3: (legislative) Enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set through rules. Preferred. Incorporate the principles of empowerment & accountability.**

**Option 4: (legislative): Give the Director the function of monitoring the performance of the emergency management system.** preferred

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

(1) Require the development of Key Performance Indicators (KPI's) for each "named" position with the emergency management structure.

Proactively Released

(2) Ensure a common use language of Emergency Management Employment Positions is established.

(3) Ensure that "Delegated Authority" is provided to "named positions" and not to named individuals. The provision of "Delegated Authority" to named individuals is an administrative, burdensome, nightmare.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

There may be additional options to consider, depending on the specific circumstances and any evolving legislative prescriptions.

## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues.

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues.**

**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo – CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION.**~~ **Increase the powers of intervention via legislative means of the CDEM Act and any other legislative paths.**

**Option 2 (legislative) Provide the Director with the power to issue compliance orders. Preferred. Provide the Director with a fine & penalty schedule for failure to comply with issued compliance orders.**

**Option 3 (legislative) Expand the Minister's existing powers of intervention. Preferred. Additionally provide the Minister with retroactive legislation to empower enquiry into failure to comply and failure to act.**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

There may be additional options to consider, depending on the specific circumstances and any evolving legislative prescriptions.

Proactively Released

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management.

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups, and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The 4r's Principles need to be replaced with the principles of:

(a) Understanding disaster risk,
(b) Strengthening disaster risk governance,
(c) Investing in risk reduction for resilience, and
(d) Enhancing preparedness for effective response and recovery, including efforts to "Build Back Better."

Local Risk Management is required to identify known weak points and recurring known risk areas. E.g. Known flooding areas, known road flooding. Local Risk Management must put in place safe mitigation strategies and a process to review and plan to overcome recurring risk areas. Every known "risk" in a particular area/location requires tabulation into an information bank of known risk for local Councils and CDEM Groups. Plans are required to mitigate the "local" risk when known reoccurrence of the risk is identified.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management.**

**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo, CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION.**~~ **CDEM Groups and local Authorities (Councils) are required to record known areas of risk. Provide safe mitigation strategies in problematic areas and develop plans to overcome known risk areas. Councils are required to identify a Risk Register within Council's administrative domain.**

**Option 2 (non-legislative) Provide clearer guidance about what it means to achieve an "acceptable" level of risk. Preferred.**

**Option 3 (non-legislative) Update guidance and strengthen assurance of CDEM Group plans. Preferred.**

**Option 4 (legislative) Enable the form and content of CDEM Group plans to be prescribed through secondary legislation. Preferred**

**Option 5 (legislative) Strengthen the Minister's role in the CDEM Group planning process. Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

Proactively Released

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

This is as of "yet" an unknown. The build of the legislation will determine what is enforceable. All CDEM Group plans must identify a "minimum" standard of planning. All plans must identify what local Councils are able achieve within their own resources and what Councils may need to draw upon.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Each local Authority must produce a "Risk Register" which identifies know area(s)/location(s) and sites of repetitive risk. A "resources log" is required to identify what resources are required to mitigate known risks and repetitive risk(s). E.g. A roadway that repeatedly floods requires a mitigation strategy and identification of resources required to manage the risk. Long term strategies are to be investigated to eliminate the risk or live with the risk, with mitigation of the risk.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage, and animals during and after emergencies.

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies.

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The Issue title is incorrect and must be addressed under two separate subjects.
Māori cultural heritage and animal welfare are separate issues because they involve different values, responsibilities, and responses.

Proactively Released

Māori heritage concerns the protection of taonga (treasures) like sacred sites and ancestral knowledge, which require culturally informed approaches and recognition of Indigenous rights. Animal welfare focuses on the care and humane treatment of animals, needing different legal and logistical measures.
Treating them as distinct ensures both are properly respected and protected during emergencies.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga (treasures) Māori, cultural.**

**Heritage.**

**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo. CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION.**~~ **Commentary:** Taonga Māori (treasures) must be culturally recognised and protected with the same level of importance afforded to other national treasures of Aotearoa New Zealand. Many Māori pā sites, for instance, are located near coastal areas and lakeshores—regions that are increasingly vulnerable to flooding. These locations should be assessed for their risk exposure and, where necessary, measures should be taken to strengthen and preserve them. Emergency and risk management plans must also include alternative or backup strategies to safeguard taonga at sites known to be at considerable risk.
**Option 2 (non-legislative): Develop guidance on considering taonga (treasures) and other cultural heritage. Preferred. Commentary:** As noted in the commentary under Option 1 – Status Quo, any guidance material must be developed in accordance with contemporary interpretations of the Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga Act 2014.
**Option 3 (legislative): Strengthen planning expectations through secondary legislation. Preferred. Commentary:** Making the planning expectations of taonga Māori, through secondary legislation, by capturing cultural heritage, enforceable within emergency management planning is essential to safeguarding Aotearoa New Zealand's cultural identity, biodiversity, and ethical responsibilities. This approach strengthens emergency resilience and reflects national values.

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

There may be additional options to consider, depending on the specific circumstances and any evolving legislative prescriptions.

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies.

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Commentary:** While animal welfare is acknowledged in New Zealand's emergency management framework, it is often not sufficiently integrated as a core subject in Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) planning. The prevailing notion that animal care is solely the responsibility of owners is inadequate and does not reflect the cultural values of Aotearoa New Zealand, where the welfare of animals is closely tied to community wellbeing and resilience. Emergency planning must evolve to systematically identify farm-specific emergencies and designate known safe areas, such as high ground, to protect both animals and livelihoods.

Farm emergency plans are recommended to consider a range of scenarios, including fire, flood, and evacuation, and should include diagrams identifying safe areas and resources related to each emergency type.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo – CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~ **Commentary:** While animal welfare is acknowledged within New Zealand's emergency management framework, it is not yet sufficiently integrated as a core subject in Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) planning. The prevailing notion that animal care is solely the responsibility of owners is inadequate and does not reflect the cultural values of Aotearoa New Zealand. To better protect both animals and livelihoods, emergency planning must evolve to systematically identify farm-specific emergencies and designate known safe areas, such as high ground.

**Option 2 (non-legislative) Develop guidance on considering animal impacts. Preferred.**

**Option 3 (legislative) Strengthen planning expectations through secondary legislation. Preferred.**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Animals should always be prioritised above inanimate property, such as buildings, vehicles, and equipment.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Other problems relating to this objective.

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

The higher minimum standard for emergency management cannot be properly validated as the appropriate standard unless there is an opportunity to test it in conjunction with the relevant legislation.

Proactively Released

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services.

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

(1) A principle- based definition has not been provided. A principle-based definition with redefined wording of what constitutes "essential infrastructure" based on a 'National,' Regional, and local infrastructure would have been a great start. It is critical to identify **Regional** and **Local Infrastructure** needs of what constitutes "essential infrastructure." Each Community needs to identify what is going to sustain them in an Emergency and create their own Schedule of "essential services and infrastructure" to fulfil the recommendations of **THE REPORT**.

(2) For future development/discussion a link to the CDEM Act and the Schedules identifying the current "essential infrastructure" Lifeline Utilities is required.

(3) Contributors to the discussion document need to know what the current Schedule Lifeline Utilities contains rather than having to refer to another document. i.e. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act. There is a need to replicate, for the purposes of discussion, what is currently in place. i.e. A copy

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services.**

**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~ **Commentary:** The fundamental purpose of reviewing the CDEM Act and the Bill is to strengthen legislation that has, to date, failed to adequately serve communities and the country. Repeating status quo recommendations in response to each new issue/disaster is redundant and ineffective. NEMA is not the sole agency that must continue encouragement of voluntary infrastructure providers.

**Option 2** (secondary legislation): Add additional sectors to the CDEM Act's Schedule of lifeline utilities. **Preferred.**

**Option 3** (legislative) Replace the lifeline utilities framework with an expanded, principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure". **Preferred with Caution. A principle- based definition has not been provided. A principle-based definition is required along with redefined**

Proactively Released

**wording of what constitutes "essential infrastructure" based on a 'National,' Regional, and Local infrastructure needs.**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure," are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

**ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO BE INCLUDED.**

**SUBJECT: AIRPORTS: Outdated Infrastructure Listings: Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 + Appendix C of the discussion document**

The current listing under the **Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 – Schedule 1 – Part A – Specific Entities** is outdated and requires urgent revision:

- The format and pagination of the schedule should be modernised for ease of reference and operational use.
- The list should reflect current infrastructure capabilities, including emerging transport and utility hubs that have expanded in scope and function since the Act was enacted.

**Reclassification of Airports for Emergency and International Relief Use**

The classification of international airports within the current legislation (Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch) should be re-evaluated and expanded. The definition of "international airport" must include not only current commercial passenger hubs but also:

- Airports capable of accommodating international relief flights, military deployments, and humanitarian operations.
- Regional airports with the infrastructure and runway capacity to handle international aircraft, including those that have been upgraded or re-certified since the original schedule.
- All military airports must be listed in the "New" Schedule 1.

**Proposed Additions**:

- **Hamilton Airport** and **Rotorua Airport** now meet criteria that could qualify them as suitable for international relief flight operations. These airports should be evaluated for inclusion based on technical capacity, geographical strategic value, and logistical flexibility. Consideration of additional airports is required.

| Category | Example Entities | Reason for Inclusion |
|---|---|---|
| Secondary Airports | Taupō, Chatham Islands, Great Barrier, | Emergency access, regional resilience, |
| | Te Anau/Manapouri, Oamaru, Masterton, | redundancy if primary airports are affected |
| | Ryan's Creek (Stewart Island), etc. | |

**Note: The premise of review as related to airports/aerodromes needs to apply to the current list of Specific Entities. The failure to be able to refresh and restructure the Schedule is given as a good example of legislation that is inflexible.**

Proactively Released

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

**ESSENTIAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO BE INCLUDED**

**Subject: Communications -**

**Outdated Infrastructure Listings: Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (page 89) + Appendix C of the discussion document.**

**Reference: Part B Entities carrying on certain businesses.**

- The schedule (Part B) does not explicitly include major **internet service providers (ISPs)**, **mobile network operators**, or **data centre operators**.
- In modern emergencies, **digital communications** (internet, mobile networks, cloud services) are as critical as traditional broadcast media for disseminating information, coordinating response, and maintaining public safety.
- Any developing communications systems should be considered as worthy of adding to the list of "essential services." There is **no explicit mention of digital or satellite communications providers**.

**Gaps Identified**

**1. Digital Communications**

- **The schedule does not explicitly include major internet service providers (ISPs), mobile network operators, or data centre operators.**
- **In modern emergencies, digital communications (internet, mobile networks, cloud services) are as critical as traditional broadcast media for disseminating information, coordinating response, and maintaining public safety.**

**2. Satellite Communications**

- **There is no mention of satellite communications providers (e.g., Starlink, Inmarsat, or local satellite ground stations).**
- **Satellite services are vital for:**
    - **Backup communications when terrestrial networks fail (e.g., after earthquakes, floods, or other disasters)**
    - **Remote and rural connectivity**
    - **Emergency services, government, and critical infrastructure resilience**

**Recommended Entities for Addition**

**A. Major Telecommunications Providers**

- **Chorus Limited (national fixed-line infrastructure)**
- **Spark New Zealand, Vodafone New Zealand (One NZ), 2degrees (mobile and broadband operators)**
- **Kordia (broadcast and critical communications networks)**

**B. Internet Service Providers and Data Centres**

- **Major ISPs (e.g., Orcon, Vocus, Voyager)**
- **Key data centre operators (e.g., Datacom, CDC Data Centres, Spark Digital)**

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**C. Satellite Communications Providers**

- **Starlink (SpaceX): Now widely available in NZ, increasingly used as backup for rural and emergency communications.**
- **Inmarsat, Iridium, or other international satellite operators: Where they have NZ presence or partnerships.**
- **Local ground station operators: E.g., Rocket Lab, or any NZ-based satellite uplink/downlink facilities**

**D. Cloud and Digital Infrastructure Providers**

- **Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud: If they have NZ-based infrastructure or are critical to government/utility operations.**

**Rationale for Inclusion**

- **Resilience: Digital and satellite communications are now essential for emergency response, public information, and coordination.**
- **Redundancy: Satellite services provide crucial backup if terrestrial networks are damaged.**
- **Comprehensive Coverage: Including these entities ensures that all critical communication channels remain operational during emergencies.**

**Suggested Schedule Addition (Sample Wording)**

***8. The principal provider(s) of telecommunications services, including but not limited to fixed-line, mobile, and internet services, as designated by the Minister.***
***9. The principal provider(s) of satellite communications services, including those operating ground stations or providing satellite-based connectivity for emergency and public communications.***
***10. The principal operator(s) of data centres and digital infrastructure essential to the continuity of government and lifeline utility operations.***

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> 10. The principal operator(s) of data centres and digital infrastructure essential to the continuity of government and lifeline utility operations."

Summary Table

| Category | Example Entities | Reason for Inclusion |
|---|---|---|
| Telecommunications | Spark, Vodafone (One NZ), 2degrees, Chorus | Critical for voice, SMS, and data comms |
| Internet Providers | Orcon, Vocus, Voyager | Essential for internet connectivity |
| Data Centres | Datacom, CDC, Spark Digital | Hosts critical digital infrastructure |
| Satellite Communications | Starlink, Inmarsat, Rocket Lab (ground ops) | Backup and rural/remote comms |
| Cloud Providers | AWS, Microsoft, Google (NZ infrastructure) | Hosts government and utility digital ops |

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning.

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

It is deeply ironic—and concerning—that legislative consideration is being given to the imposition of financial penalties on businesses and the public when no minimum standard for business continuity or public service resilience has yet been formally established. In practice, very little guidance—if any—has been offered to define what preparedness looks like for those entities deemed "essential."

**For example:**
A critical question remains unanswered: *Should all petrol stations be required to maintain the capability to function during emergencies, either via permanent backup power systems or through infrastructure enabling the rapid connection of external generators?* Ensuring the continuity of fuel

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supply is fundamental for both emergency response operations and public mobility during crisis events.

This example reflects a broader issue—there is currently no legislated or enforced **minimum standard of self-sustainment** required for businesses or facilities designated as Lifeline utilities. If an entity is to be identified as essential to national or regional resilience, it should be held to a clearly defined baseline of operational continuity under emergency conditions.

Such a standard must extend beyond the private sector to include:

- All central and local government buildings.
- All facilities designated for emergency use by regional and territorial authorities.
- All **FENZ** stations, **New Zealand Police** stations, **Hato Hone St John** stations, and any other premises identified as public refuge or recovery centres.

Until such a framework is developed, implemented, and properly resourced, any discussion of **financial penalties** under a community-led emergency management system is premature and counterproductive. Without equitable standards of preparedness, the burden of resilience is unfairly shifted to those with the least clarity, capacity, or mandate to deliver it.

**Question 66: This section needs a considerable re-work to encourage being listed as Lifeline Utility Business.**

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Refer to the response in Question 66**

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**Refer to the response in Question 66**

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

Options:

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70. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Option 1: Status quo – Remains - NEMA promotes voluntary cooperation and joint planning between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies. Preferred**

**Option 2: (non-legislative): Strengthen assurance and develop standards and guidance. Preferred**

**Option 3: (legislative): Explicitly require CDEM Groups to involve the lifeline utilities in their areas in the development of CDEM Group plans. Preferred**
**Option 4: (legislative): Require lifeline utilities to contribute to national response plans. Preferred**

**Option 5: (legislative) Strengthen information sharing protections. Preferred**

**Option 6 (legislative): Enable data standards to be prescribed through secondary legislation. Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

71. **Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

**No Comment**

72. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**No Comment**

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity.

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

73. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity.

**Options:**

**Option 1: Status quo - Public service agencies have business continuity requirements under the CDEM Act. All Agencies are to be listed. Preferred**

**Option 2 (non-legislative): Promote best practice business continuity practices. Documented Guidance Required. Preferred**

**Option 3 (legislative): Extend current business continuity requirements through a 'captured' "opt in" model. All Government Agencies are captured "opt in" agencies unless specifically exempt. Preferred**

**Option 4 (legislative): Extend current business continuity requirements to a broader group of central government organisations, with a mechanism to exempt specific Crown entities. Preferred**

**Option 5 (legislative): New requirement to take account of guidance issued by the Director. Preferred**

The explanation of options for each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**No Comment**

## Other problems relating to this objective.

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

**No Comment**

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens.

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas.

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas.

Options:

**Option 1: Status quo. Preferred**

**Option 2 (non-legislative): National guidance and training on managing cordons. Preferred**
**Option 3 (secondary legislation): Prescribe the form of identification passes through regulations. Preferred**
**Option 4 (legislative): Clarify that access can be restricted to any class or group of persons. Preferred**
The explanation of options for (79) each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options." With use of the notation: preferred.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No Comment

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level.

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level.
Options:

~~**Option 1: Status quo – CANNOT REMAIN AS AN OPTION**~~

**Option 2: (legislative): Tidy up existing functions and powers related to CDEM Groups, Controllers, and Recovery Managers. Preferred**

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**No Comment**

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period.

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period.**

**Options:**

~~**Option 1: Status quo CANNOT REMAIN AS A SOLE OPTION.**~~ **Modernisation is a MUST.**

**Option 2 (legislative): Enable authorised persons to use electronic signatures. Preferred**

**Option 3 (legislative): Enable authorised persons to declare a state of emergency verbally. Preferred**

The explanation of options for (85) each issue is sufficiently detailed to support the identification and acceptance of preferred options. With use of the notation: preferred.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The introduction of the Electronic "Flimsy."

Historical Information: Military in Origin

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**Definition and Function:**

A "flimsy" referred to a thin, carbon-copied sheet of paper (often part of a multi-copy form) used to issue **orders, directions, or reports** quickly and efficiently. It was called a "flimsy" due to the lightweight, semi-transparent nature of the paper—typically duplicated using a typewriter and carbon paper.

**The Digital and Electronic World Equivalent:**

Today's digital and electronic environment, the **modern equivalent of a "flimsy"** would be any **rapid, semi-formal but authoritative digital communication** used to issue operational orders, instructions, or summaries.

**Samples to be considered:**

(1) Email with Operational Attachments
(2) Shared Documents – Microsoft Teams, Google Documents, SharePoint
(3) Command and Control (C2) Messages
(4) Situation Reports (SITREPS)/Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs), JChat, SIPRNet
(5) Mobile Messaging Apps – WhatsApp, Signal, GovComms, WHISPIR (notorious)

**Inter-Agency connectability, distribution and redundancy capacity would be a nice outcome for New Zealand.**

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

In the discussion between references 215 – 217. The issue of a Mayor not wanting to declare an emergency is an unstated issue that is required to be addressed. If a Mayor or an Elected Substitute cannot/ will not declare an emergency when there is evidence of need that a declaration of emergency, must be bad. The One over One" Rule needs to be applied – In that a CDEM Group can override.

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**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices.**
**Options**
**Option 1: Maintain the Status Quo**
The current framework can remain; however, **the Council's Code of Conduct must include provisions enabling intervention when the Mayor is unwilling or unable to declare a state of emergency—despite clear evidence justifying such a declaration.**

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Consider a Council Group Decision on an Emergency Declaration.

### Other problems relating to this objective.

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

**No Comment**

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

**Upon reviewing the supplied documents, along with any supporting or companion materials, several observations have been identified.**

It is hoped that these observations, along with the accompanying suggestions and recommendations, will be carefully considered to enhance the quality of the current legislative documents, guidance materials, and inquisitorial content provided.

**(1) Removal of Lazy Legislative Terms**

A review of the legislative documents is required to eliminate the use of the term "*may*" where it creates ambiguity or weakens enforceability. Its discretionary tone can inadvertently support a "do-nothing" culture and has done so for years. Clear and precise language—such as "*shall*" or "*must*"—should be used to ensure obligations are unambiguous and legally sound.

The following documents significant review to remove the word *"may."*

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**(a) National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015,**

**(b) Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002**

**(c) Emergency Management Bill**

**(d) NEMA Documents**

**(e) NEMA CSIM's Documents**

**Note:** All draft legislation must be reviewed and approved by the Ministry of Regulation prior to its public release. All Legislative material to be written plain English, with **no** "code-shifting" embodied. If an additional language document is required, it should be produced **without** "code-shifting."

**(2) Removal of the reference of CROWN from Legislation.**

Since the adoption of the Constitution Act 1986, which severed the remaining legislative ties to the United Kingdom, it is timely to review all legislative documents to ensure they clearly affirm that the authority to govern New Zealand resides with the Executive Branch of the New Zealand Government. Traditional references to the Crown should give way to neutral, institutional language that supports the development of a modern, future-focused legislative framework for Aotearoa New Zealand.

**New Zealand Defence Force Bases Review**

**Review and Recommendations: Defence Force Resilience in the Wake of Cyclone Gabrielle**

The Government Inquiry into the Response to the North Island Severe Weather Events (released 23rd April 2024) provided a comprehensive review of emergency management but did not specifically address the resilience or self-sufficiency of Defence Force assets such as bases, barracks, or supply autonomy. The report focused on improving the emergency management system, identifying systemic weaknesses, and recommending better use of the wider government ecosystem, including expanding the NZDF's role in logistics and coordination during civil emergencies.

**Gaps Identified:**

- The report did not assess the technical or operational autonomy of Defence Force establishments, nor their capacity for independent power, water, medical, fuel, or food supply during emergencies.
- There was no explicit requirement for Defence Force bases to be self-sustaining or to report on their ability to support civilian populations during crises.

**Recommendations**

- **Commission a Secondary Inquiry:** Conduct a dedicated review to assess the operational autonomy and resilience of all NZDF bases, ensuring no base is solely dependent on civilian infrastructure for critical supplies during emergencies. Including external power, water supplies and Fire Emergency Services.
- **Mandate Civil Support Capacity Reporting:** Require each Defence Force establishment to regularly report its capacity to assist civilian authorities with personnel and resources, in alignment with the Inquiry's recommendation to leverage the wider government ecosystem.
- **Enhance Certification and Preparedness:** Ensure NZDF assets (e.g., water/power supply and sewage disposal) meet civilian standards and that personnel are fully equipped and trained for rapid, safe deployment in disaster scenarios.

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This approach would close the current gap in national resilience planning and ensure Defence Force assets are fully integrated into New Zealand's emergency preparedness and response framework.

**Questions to be asked and reported on:**

**NZDF Response to Cyclone Gabrielle:**

- How many assets /resources did NZDF deploy, including personnel, ships, aircraft, and logistics, to aid affected communities during the Gabrielle emergency.
- Did any Internal reviews reveal challenges: such as water, PPE, Communication, and training Gaps. Did any of the challenges impact on deployment.
- Were any areas of improvement identified and can they be reported on?
- Does NZDF have sufficient resources to overcome any tactical or systemic issues, including self-sustainability and resilience with its bases?

**Utilise the value of the wider government ecosystem.**

**Recommendation: 2** Utilise the value of the wider government ecosystem

The report recognises that there is value in the utilisation of the Government's Ecosystem, specifically identifying New Zealand Defences Forces and New Zealand Weather Support Services.
The report falls short of recognising Fire Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) and Hato Hone St John Ambulance Emergency Services, and New Zealand Police.
As recommended in the: **New Zealand Defence Force Bases Review,** the aforementioned agencies are required to file a report on their self-sufficiency and resilience on the bases and premises they utilise. With the view that all bases and premises are self-sustainable. e.g. Establish how FENZ/Police Station/and Ambulances bases can take in external generator power?

**Definition: Spontaneous emergency responder**

An opportunity is provided to recognise a **"spontaneous emergency responder"** who initiates emergency actions based on local circumstances. Not under the direction control of any "Officer/Group or Unit." In "good faith" initiates a "safety response" as being "Johnny-on-the-Spot." Such a person should be entitled to:

- protection from civil liability,
- compensation of labour costs,
- compensation for machinery and or equipment loss.
- Re-imbursement in accordance with the emergency circumstances.

Final Note: When requesting information please make provision for attaching media, PDF, Video, Photo, etc. You know the ability to upload something that is contributory to the discussion.

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**From:** Robo Mclean s9(2)(a)
**Sent:** Saturday, May 17, 2025 9:16 PM
**To:** Emergency Management Bill [NEMA] <EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz>
**Subject:** My submission

To whom this may concern.
Greetings ,
I'm a 71 year old person living on 8 k of metal road on the southern boundary of Central Hawkes Bay ..

How did I hear about this bill?

Sandra Faulkner ,adverse events spokesperson for federated farmers wrote an article in the Farmers Weekly may 12th.

She highlights the fact that the discussion document makes no mention of
Primary sector farming or isolated communities .
She mentions in 2023 highlighting the lack of recognition even, that long ago?

What did I do to find out how to.make a submission ??

I rung our Napier Emergency person to ask ..how do I make a submission ?
Question?
Why didn't our Napier Emergency office in the HB Regional Council let us rural people know to even make a submission.??
This person I and our local group know .
She got together our emergency kit !!!

Why weren't we informed to make submission by our co ordinator???
We are on the southern boundary of Hawkes Bay..and hour and a half drive from Napier .!!!

My personal views for this Bill.!!!!

1/ Clear speaking people !!?
The phones be managed by clear English speaking people.
Why?
So often in our organisations people aren't articulate ..many are new New Zealanders .
They don't say their own names ( call me old fashioned )
This is critical, that we have articulate clearly spoken emergency people on the Phones .

2/
Revamp NIWA
many private people have done their own research as to this climatism ideology..
They have dug up data that NIWA no nothing about ??
Example
the recent deluge in Christchurch .data was discovered by individuals
Going back over 150 years ..not by NIWA tho ..
I wonder if this Climatism agenda is government sponsored by policy makers ..
here's an example of how hot our HB sun has been since the 1800s.
My father's grandfather from Napier
Used to say that the English furniture cloth :"

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would not be guaranteed in the Hawkes Bay New Zealand sun "
We have old tree stumps on my wee beach exposed in ruff seas ..6000 yrs ago ..
evidence of old burnt forests that went right threw Hawkes Bay 600 years ago .Old stumps appear all over farms when excavating for stock dams .

3/
Media!!!
Sensationalise ..events and don't have the necessary data .
Therefore the ""Media "" this new Age Climatism histeria gets completely twisted .
The need for a completely independent, non government Media

4/Decisions
Discisions to be made by local people !!
The regional councils representatives are too far away in their eiffel towers.
Eg ,"the wairoa river bar debacle ""
The little river ,Banks peninsula flood with the blocked outlet ..

5/ Powers out??!!!
How is communication going to happen when the power is out ?
Walkie talkers on each road ..some alternative communication system..
Set up ..?
Radio ?

6/Culture!!!
Is their too much emphasis on culture /tikanga .
When I grew up we were ALL ONE PEOPLE ..
Today their seems to be so much paper work, discussion ,meetings .
When the quick Discission needs to be made ..it needs the fire service people ,police ,ambulance qualified people .

7/
Accountability

I Highlight this Road closure .."April 2025
As an example of lack of accountability..of ordinary care ..concern?..

The Napier / wairoa main highway was closed for 13hours due to a fatality .

Their were hundreds in the queue for hours and hours ..
NOT ONE Police ,emergency management person from.NAPIER / HASTINGS ..got threw to drive for the miles and miles long Queue to.ask.if everyone was OK..
Not ONE PERSON .
I wrote to.Mayor Kirsten Wise
And Police Complaints ..

What happened after this ???
No one put out anything in response ..
8/
Road Signage ? SAFTEY

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State Highway 2..from woodville to Napier.
Even after I rung the 0800 number for Transit ..some signs had been cleaned not very well ..most signage on the state highway are abysmal still.
Some are damaged not sitting straight .
""Clear names ,Clear numerals..""
This Signage is so basic to safety
Let's focus on this !!!

9/ Empower each citizen ..!!! Volunteers
CHB council had great community meetings ..after cyclone Gabrielle
Well I might be based as I didnt have my home flooded like 33 homes in Porangahau village .
Farmers with tractors ,trucks turned up in Porangahau ..to.scrap mud ..take household goods away to be dumped .

10/
Finaly ,the Covid vaccine medical Emergency Experiment !!!

31,000 people submitted and myself to this Enquiry that closed the other night .
May this type of state sponsored fear ideology never ever happen again .
That One Leader of my Country could have the TRUTH ..follow MY TRUTH..
I was bought up...by my mother saying " Jesus Christ is the TRUTH .
STILL .AFTER 5 YEARS
this Emergency has left such a mistrust in Government in local doctors ,hospital mangament ,Health professionals, Nursing establishment.
And our Police.


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Yours Sincerely Robert McLean Whangaehu,




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Porangahau Hawkes Bay Coast .



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**From:** Hessel Vanwieren s9(2)(a)
**Sent:** Saturday, May 17, 2025 3:37 PM
**To:** Emergency Management Bill [NEMA] <EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz>
**Subject:** Emergency management bill Submission

Hi.
My name is Hessel Van Wieren, and i live in Christchurch .I am retired after over 35 years as a self employed Carpentry/ property maintenance contractor , mostly in Cromwell Central Otago 26 years. Previously to that i worked in the NZ post office and Postbank , prior to privatisation, for 14 years, during which i was seconded to Wellington, for 18months to work on a new Computer system project called Bankmaster. It I was cancelled after several years of problems at a cost of over $30 million in 1987 $. ( i mention that only because ive seen first hand how the Political and Private enterprise can get so convoluted and bogged down!!!! )
During those decades i was involved in a Minor Monetary reform Party and stood for Parliament 4 times between 2008 and 2017.
That and also after dealing with the inner workings of Political party machine and attending many election meetings, has equipped me to gain much experience and insight. I also got aquainted with Local body mayors and councilors in Central Otago, through participation in Local Body issues and works with Council infrastructure.

My submission is not based on the Submission Document for 2 reasons.

1. After looking at parts of the document , and Submission Template, it just seems overly onerous with 91 parts/questions.
Much of the questioning is so wide ranging and would mostly only answerable by those who have been closely associated with emergency response, and not by many who have been affected, or could be in future.

2. With that in mind and reading the Objectives for Reform , i'm just really alarmed by the statement in the preamble about the bill. Specifically in relation to why the CDEM act is not amended . Being 22 years old is not a long time!!!!!
You mention the NISWE Inquiry march 2024 . Its 164 pages and has recommendations.!!! Why is this and others not used as a base for change

Here are just some of the reports in the last decades.

--- Response Planning in CDEM ( directors guideline for Civil Defence Emerency Management Groups)
Dec 2015 154 pages

----- National Disaster Resilience Strategy ( Vision and long term goals for Civil Defence EM NZ ) April 2019
32 pages

------ Report of the Expert working Group on Managed Retreat 2023 284 pages !!!.

These are some of those ive kept track of.
This really begs the question, with this expensive and wide ranging information, why cannot the NEMA and the relevant agencies with all the advisers who have written these huge volumes of information PULL together a ROBUST ammendment to the Act, if needed. Their is already plentifull data and information, without yet ANOTHER consulation doc.

This all seems another exercise of " Kicking the can down the Road" at the large expense to the tax payer. I believe the real agenda and ignored issue, here is FUNDING and lack there of !!!!

I have a real reason for this argument.
EG. About over a year ago, various volunteer groups in the area near where i live ,on the East of ChCh near the Coast , were asked by CHCH Civil Defence to engage with the community to come up with THEIR plan of Disaster Response using the community connections.??

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I saw the Report and it is not in reality robust enough and relys on a lot of volunteers to step into action, and for that reason i don't believe it will work in reality This is despite the fact that in the 2015 Response Planning for Civil Defense Doc., the local Councils have a greater responsibility than what they have expected of the East chch community. Just Bizzare. An Ex Councilor friend expressed her similar DISMAY also.

BUT we know why , because Civil Defence staff ,have expressed the problem of LACK of resources to provide a Robust Response the wide ranging strategy required.

Another alarming issue i became aware recently while in the North Island attending my younger Sisters funeral, was a discussion with someone who was the Lead person for a Regional Council Enivronmental Impact Report. But when it was presented to the Regional Council (with District Councilor representation) they voted to keep a lid on it and not made public!!!!
NOT good??

About 8 years ago i had a conversation with a new Civil Defense Controller in a STh Island area, and he plainly stated they were NOT ready for a natural disaster, due to resource constraints. This is an area of Earthquake Fault lines.
Additionally a year or 2 before that when the Yellow CD Booklets were dropped off to letter boxes, inside was reference to a local large new church, as a CD emergency location. Except the church Board of Managers knew NOTHING about it?????

These are the coal face issues that need attention. The amount .of funds used for these ENDLESS reports could fund many Local CD resources/staff.

That is why im not responding to the actual questions ,due for the above reasons, this seems a waste considering the HUGE amount of information already AMASSED in the Bureaucracy.
The Ministry of CDEM would be better off using this existing information and get a group of NZ CD Controllers to contribute to construct Amendments if needed and or get their real feedback on the real issues they face!!!

But of course all this should be reflected in the Reports, or are they too visionary and not pragmatic????? Or is the bureaucracy so inexperienced, and bound by lack of funding, over regulated and too risk averse to the point of Gridlock. So that its main expertise is REPORT writing.

thanks

Hessel Van Wieren

s9(2)(a)

Ph s9(2)(a)

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Dr Nathaniel Janke-Gilman |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | *(submitting on behalf of myself)* |

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Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Objective 2 (clear responsibilities and accountabilities at all levels) and Objective 3 (higher minimum standards of emergency management) are the correct approach. This is entirely in line with the UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, especially Priority 4 of the Sendai Framework (strengthen disaster risk governance) which is often seen as a weak point in post-disaster reviews all around the world (UNDRR, 2022).

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

   ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

   ☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

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**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I believe Option 3 is the right way to go. I think animal welfare during a rural fire emergency is a great example. If an operational agency like FENZ were to be overall in control of the event, then other stakeholders like MPI animal welfare officers could be sidelined. CDEM Group Controllers have an overall view that includes all stakeholders.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I prefer Option 3, page 24 of the consultation document

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Insert response

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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### Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I prefer Option 2 (specify expectations) as this supports good governance.

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I prefer Option 3 (remove the Order in Council requirements to enhance flexibility).

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I prefer Option 3 (enforceable mandatory requirements, while allowing flexibility)

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

New Zealand Response Teams (NZRTs) are a vital (often forgotten) emergency service of qualified emergency first responders, alongside police, FENZ, ambulance services, coast guard, etc. NZRTs provide rapid response, area reconnaissance and light USAR duties that are hugely helpful in the response phase of an emergency. But not every region hosts an NZRT team, and NZRTs need both stable funding and national alignment in methods.

Please see further detail at the end of this submission.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

We need CDEM Group plans and council-level risk reduction and land use planning to be directed by plans at national and regional levels. Otherwise, there is a risk that local politics could undermine strategic risk reduction.

For example, under current rules landowners who are upset at how their house prices are affected by hazard mapping are using lawsuits as a mechanism to impede progress in local and regional hazard reduction. Councils and local authorities need top level support to enable them to participate in strategic risk reduction.

Please see further information at the end of this submission.

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**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Please see more information at the end of this submission.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

Proactively Released

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Animal welfare has so much of an effect on human wellbeing – as noted in the discussion document, this is one of the main reasons for people to sneak past cordons. Therefore, animal welfare should be considered as a sub-category of human welfare, rather than merely considering animals as a form of property.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I prefer Option 3 (principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure").

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I believe Appendix C does a good job of redefining essential services. We all discovered during COVID lockdown that certain undervalued roles (supermarket workers, care workers, waste disposal) are more essential to society than previously recognized.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

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*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Penalty provisions must be carefully worded so that future disasters aren't immediately followed by frenzied lawsuits and finger-pointing to allocate blame for lack of foresight. Nobody should be penalized when planning in good faith does not accurately predict unforeseen events. This would dampen cooperation and knowledge sharing (Issue 11.3)

Please see at the end of this submission for further views on this matter.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Our approach for cooperation and information sharing relating to disasters should follow the "Just Culture" model of open knowledge sharing for industrial safety where accountability does not come at the expense of knowledge sharing (Dekker, 2012).

This model for balancing accountability with open knowledge sharing comes from the fields of aviation and industrial safety, building on older work by James Reason. People must feel free to admit mistakes and share learnings without fear of reprisal for admitting imperfection. This is also called the Safety-2 approach (Hollnagel, 2014), which shifts the focus towards working together to create positive outcomes rather than allocating blame and punishing mistakes.

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**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I prefer Option 2 (national guidance and training about cordons).

Requiring particular ID could exacerbate the issue.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I prefer Option 2 (tidy up existing powers)

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I prefer Option 2 (electronic signatures allowed)

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

It's important for emergency declarations to be made by an elected official, so there are checks on the use of emergency powers.

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

See below

### Personal context

I am a scientist, I have worked in industrial safety and risk reduction for over a decade, and I am half-way through studying for a Masters in Emergency Management at Massey University. I am a volunteer member of NZRT-18 Hutt City Response Team, but submitting in my personal capacity.

### Governance and minimum standards are the correct approach

Objective 2 (clear responsibilities and accountabilities at all levels) and Objective 3 (higher minimum standards of emergency management) are the correct approach. This is entirely in line with the UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, especially Priority 4 of the Sendai Framework (strengthen disaster risk governance) which is often seen as a weak point in post-disaster reviews all around the world (UNDRR, 2022).

### Don't just target councils, empower them

We all have a part to play in adapting to hazards and reducing natural hazard risk (NZ National Adaptation Plan, 2022). Government needs a mechanism of enforcement to deal with those to refuse to play along. Regulatory enforcement is one means of ensuring local councils get on board with disaster risk reduction, effective land use planning to lower community exposure to natural hazards, and emergency response planning. However, we must avoid creating conditions where emergencies become immediately followed by a series of lawsuits and inquiries centred on finding who to blame for the disaster, along with legal penalties.

Many local councils are trying to do the right thing by adding natural hazards to local GIS land use maps, which is in line with Actions 3.4 and 3.6 in the National Adaptation Plan 2022. In response, some of these councils are being targeted by lawsuits from landowners who fear the information on their LIM reports will lower property values or make their property uninsurable.

Examples:

- Legal action against Nelson Council by landowners and property developers opposing science-led geotechnical reports of the Tāhunanui Slump (RNZ News, 2024).

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- Legal action by Kapiti ratepayers opposing science-led coastal erosion scenarios being included in LIM reports—these ratepayers found and funded their own retired scientist who was willing to author a report in opposition to prevailing research (The Post, 2025)

Now under this bill the government proposes fining lifeline utility providers (including councils) for poor business continuity planning (**Issue 11**).

We must not allow local authorities to be targeted at both ends—for adding hazard zones to a landowner's LIM report, and also for not protecting people sufficiently against natural disaster. To be clear, **mandatory minimum standards for risk reduction are a good thing**.

Moreover, not all hazard scenarios can be anticipated, and not all scenarios can be prepared for with a limited budget. Councils and lifeline utility providers need support from central government while complying with risk reduction standards and disaster planning in good faith. Implementation of minimum standards and science-based risk reduction practices *and punishment for getting it wrong* must not become driven by lawsuits or political whim.

The fields of aviation and industrial safety have a working model for balancing accountability with open knowledge sharing, this is called the Just Culture model (Dekker, 2012). People must feel free to admit mistakes and share learnings without fear of reprisal for admitting imperfection. This is also called the **Safety-2 approach** (Hollnagel, 2014), which shifts the focus towards working together to create positive outcomes rather than allocating blame and punishing mistakes.


## We need Emergency Response Teams, and they need stable funding

New Zealand Response Teams (NZRTs) are a vital (often forgotten) emergency service of qualified emergency first responders, alongside police, FENZ, ambulance services, coast guard, etc. NZRTs provide rapid response, area reconnaissance and light USAR duties that are hugely helpful in the response phase of an emergency. But not every region hosts an NZRT team, and NZRTs need both stable funding and national alignment in methods.

The following map shows the distribution of NZRTs across New Zealand:

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Figure 1: Response teams across NZ (Civil Defence, n.d.)




Notably, not every region or local authority hosts an NZRT and not every NZRT is funded by their local council or territorial authority. This needs to change. The Hikurangi Response Planning Toolbox for example (East Coast LAB, 2020) assumes that any major earthquake/tsunami event may lead to regions becoming cut off from each other and effectively "islanded" by slips and broken bridges, ports, and transport infrastructure. In the response to Cyclone Gabrielle, Hawke's Bay and Tairāwhiti were reliant on outside help (see Figure 2), which simply would not come to the rescue in a major future event where regions became islanded from each other.

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Figure 2: Hutt City NZRT volunteers in Hawke's Bay after Cyclone Gabrielle (Ombler et al., 2024)



New Zealand relies on volunteers to staff NZRT teams (just as we rely on volunteers to staff rural ambulance and fire crews), and we rely also on the good will of the companies who employ those volunteers to allow them to respond to emergencies. People who volunteer their time as first responders in their local NZRT should focus on capacity-building, not fundraising or begging for donations.

Local authorities (or possibly regional authorities) should be required (and supported!) to host and fund an NZRT as part of their local efforts towards risk reduction, readiness, response, and recovery. Emergency volunteers should be given leave provisions under law to provide job and income security while their NZRT team is deployed for a declared emergency (similar to volunteer defence force leave and other NZ leave provisions).

Government has agreed that ambulance services should be recognised as an emergency service in this Emergency Management Bill. So too New Zealand Response Teams (NZRTs) should be recognised (and funded and supported) as emergency services in this bill.

## Rename "Civil Defence"

New Zealand is an outlier in using the term "civil defence" for emergency management and disaster response. Internationally, these standard definitions apply (Alexander, 2002).

- **Civil defence** = civilian response to foreign armed aggression or terrorism
- **Civil protection** = civilian response to natural hazards (e.g. volcanoes, earthquakes, floods) and technological disasters (e.g. dam collapse)

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We must clearly position our emergency management personnel as non-combatant civilian emergency responders. **Now is the time to retire and replace the acronyms CD and CDEM** and come up with new acronyms which fairly and accurately represent efforts across all 4R functions of the emergency management sector. I'm sure someone at NEMA has a good idea.

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Note in particular:

- Action 3.4: Raise awareness of climate hazards and how to prepare
- Action 3.6: Improve natural hazard information on Land Information Memoranda

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I like hundreds of people, wrote a submission at the end of last year. With a change of government shortly after. it seems the submissions became redundant; at least it is not obvious that a major component of those submissions which insisted on the inclusion of animals in any new Emergency legislation or planning has not largely been ignored in the forming of this new Emergency discussion.

I only found out a couple of days ago that I need now to do another submission in a very short space. Most members of the community would not have known or got the chance to do yet another submission. Furthermore, the discussion is long and not in layperson's language. I feel therefore that the community and issues important to it are really is not included in this process.

Many people see their pet as a member of their family and therefore the inclusion of animals in Emergency Management legislation, discussion and preparation is essential to the wellbeing of all concerned.

Below are some of the issues which I believe should be included in with particular reference to animals:

- power to enter property - to check for animals, rescue. evacuate or help. Thousands of animals get left behind in emergencies, often with no chance for owners to evacuate them eg Edgecumbe floods. In the Christchurch red zone many people were required to evacuate and had to leave animals behind with no way of then taking care of or feeding them as they were forbidden to revisit homes in red zones. People broke cordon for their pets. Even with evacuation happening alongside humans , a good proportion of cats will run off or go into hiding and need to be fed, cared for or rescued at a later date. This needs to be included in any planning.

- power to microchip, share chip information in order to reunite
- power to requisition
- for public to be able to take pets on public transport
- an openness for landlords to allow pets for people who have lost their homes This was a major problem in Christchurch after the 2011 quake. The community around my family's house has still not recovered from the amount of cats left behind, often abandoned as there was no suitable and legitimate housing to take them to, which led to strays, hunger , starvation and suffering , as well as breeding and multiplication. There was already a problem before this, as there is in most parts of the country.

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- vets worked tirelessly during Cyclone Gabrielle often with no official mandate or recognition

  - power to euthanise seriously injured animals in emergency is ethical and very important; power to search for these suffering animals in the first place is crucial.

Other countries are recognising animals in Emergency Preparedness. NZ should not lag behind.

Community Based Response:

Emergency Response needs to be local with locals empowered to use their skills. First responders will nearly always be local and essential for the saving as many lives as possible in the shortest time frame. Local skills and knowledge of areas should not be allowed to be wasted ( e.g. farmers stopped from saving own or neighbours animals , where police with little knowledge of the area or livestock situation have overruled . where ridiculous scenes have been respectively played out across the country where people are not allowed to help and watch helplessly while bureaucracy rules and has allowed death of animals and even humans . Enough of this. Let common sense prevail and community along with localised training and proven local alarms and sirens be used accompanied with technology.

Rhonda Findlay

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Jessica Donaldson |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Consultant – Ocean to Peak Collective |

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I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

**FOCUS AREAS This submission provides responses to the following issues within Objectives 1, 2, and 3:**

- **Objective 1: Issues 1, 2, 3, and 4**
- **Objective 2: Issues 6.1 and 6.3**
- **Objective 3: Issue 10.2**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

- **Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The objectives identified for reform are appropriate and necessary — particularly in centring community participation, clarifying responsibilities, and lifting minimum standards — and I support their direction as a foundation for more inclusive, coordinated, and effective emergency management

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

- **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, the problem has been accurately described. The current system does not consistently identify or plan for people and groups who may be disproportionately impacted by emergencies. From my experience in emergency management and community-focused work, I have observed significant gaps in how we recognise and respond to diversity — particularly

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in disability, transient, and migrant populations. These gaps result in inequities in preparedness, response, and recovery outcomes.

- **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

In addition to those outlined in the discussion document, the following groups are often overlooked or insufficiently planned for:

- People who are homeless – often excluded from formal systems of preparedness and recovery support.
- International students - they may receive inductions from universities but there is minimal engagement with this group on the ground.
- Tourists and working holiday visa holders – they may not identify as "tourists" yet have limited English, low awareness of New Zealand emergency systems, and limited access to support networks.
- Young adults (late teens to 30s) who flat or rent – frequently overlooked in emergency preparedness messaging and recovery planning. Many do not know where to go for help or assume they are not entitled to assistance. This group is also often digitally connected but can be disconnected from formal systems or face barriers to accessing support.
- Behavioural and cultural nuances – For example, some ethnic communities (e.g. parts of the Chinese community) may not trust government messaging and instead rely on platforms like WeChat. Without proactive engagement and culturally informed communication, emergency messages may be missed.
- People with pre-existing trauma – may experience re-traumatisation if their needs are not considered in planning. An example of this, is in Civil Defence Centres (CDCs) where shared sleeping spaces, lack of privacy, and unknown others in the space (including those with histories of violence or abuse) can significantly worsen psychological outcomes.

Blanket approaches to "ethnic communities" can be misleading. An affluent migrant has vastly different needs to a newly arrived refugee or asylum seeker. These distinctions matter for effective planning.

- **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I support Option c (legislative requirement for CDEM Group plans to consider the needs of disproportionately affected groups) and Option d (require the Director to consult representatives of those communities during national planning). These options move beyond guidance and make inclusive planning a consistent national requirement.

The benefits include more equitable emergency outcomes, improved trust and uptake of services, and stronger relationships between emergency management agencies and the communities they serve. These changes would reduce the likelihood of people being left behind, particularly those with less access to support or information.

The primary risk is insufficient funding or capacity within CDEM Groups to engage meaningfully with these communities. To mitigate this, the legislative changes must be accompanied by investment in capability and resourcing to support co-design processes, accessible communication, and outreach.

- **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

At both levels, planning would become more evidence-informed, inclusive, and community-led. Key features would include:

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- Nuanced engagement by population group – directly involving youth, renters, migrants, and longer-term tourists in scenario planning and preparedness activities.
- Targeted communications – co-designed with community representatives and delivered in multiple formats and languages, including digital platforms like WeChat where relevant. This should be done alongside ethnic leaders to reduce the capacity pressure.
- Risk mapping and social vulnerability assessments – incorporating data on age, mobility, tenancy, language, and access to support, so plans are tailored and targeted.
- Safe and trauma-informed CDCs – including separated sleeping areas, protocols to protect vulnerable individuals, and training for CDC staff to identify and respond to trauma-related needs.
- Sustained partnerships with community leaders and service providers – rather than relying on one-off consultations, planning would be grounded in ongoing, trusted relationships.

This would result in a system where communities are not only better prepared, but also more confident and connected to the agencies who support them.

- **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. An additional option to consider is requiring CDEM Groups to develop and maintain a Community Inclusion and Engagement Strategy as part of their planning framework. This strategy would:

- Identify under-represented or high-risk groups in the region
- Outline tailored engagement and communication approaches
- Define how feedback from these communities will influence planning and decision-making
- Be reviewed and updated at regular intervals

This would provide practical guidance on how legislative intentions are operationalised on the ground and ensure that inclusion becomes a normalised part of emergency management, not a reactive or token gesture.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

- **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, the problem has been well identified. The emergency management system has not consistently recognised or supported the role of iwi Māori as partners in this space, despite their proven leadership, capability and capacity in response, coordination, and community care. However, the current framing could go further by addressing the systemic barriers that prevent effective engagement — particularly resourcing, structural power imbalance, and lack of continuity in partnership-building across regions.

- **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

While the general roles have been acknowledged, they are not captured with sufficient depth or clarity. In practice, iwi Māori often fill critical gaps during emergencies — from hosting evacuees and coordinating welfare, to mobilising resources and disseminating trusted information — but this is rarely reflected in formal structures or planning. These roles are too often ad hoc, rather than being resourced and embedded as part of a shared response model.

I would also recommend ensuring that the diversity of iwi, hapū, and whānau roles are reflected, as these vary significantly by region and context. The language could be strengthened to recognise that iwi Māori are not just "contributors" but rightful partners in emergency management, grounded in Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

- **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

There is concern that some of the more meaningful options (e.g. Options 4 and 5, which provide for formal representation or statutory recognition) are dismissed too quickly due to concerns about capacity. The document assumes these may not be viable without first exploring how capability could be strengthened. That approach is problematic.

The preferred approach should be:

1. Determine whether meaningful partnership is achievable (e.g. through Option 4 or 5);
2. Then invest in building the conditions (resourcing, relationship management, time, and capacity) to make it work.

The key risk is failing to act due to assumptions about capability, which reinforces the current inequities. The benefits of enabling iwi Māori leadership include increased community trust, culturally safe support environments, and response coordination that aligns with Māori worldviews — all of which benefit the entire population during a crisis.

- **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Iwi Māori should be recognised as strategic and operational partners in emergency management, with clear, resourced roles embedded across planning, governance, and delivery. This includes statutory recognition of iwi/hapū within CDEM legislation and Group structures, alongside clear expectations for co-governance and co-design where appropriate.

Recognition must move beyond consultation and into active partnership — grounded in Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and supported by mechanisms such as memoranda of understanding, joint planning arrangements, and funding pathways that are determined in partnership with iwi Māori.

- **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

The relationship should be based on ongoing partnership and co-design, not event-specific engagement. This includes shared planning processes, defined roles in emergency governance and response, and culturally appropriate communications and decision-making protocols. CDEM Groups must be funded and equipped to engage meaningfully — relationship-building cannot be left to individual discretion or happen only in response mode.

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- **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) should include iwi Māori representation as a matter of course. The current lack of meaningful engagement has already impacted the effectiveness of these groups in making timely and representative decisions (e.g. on staffing, budgets, and planning). Including iwi Māori at this level would bring valuable expertise and ensure community-informed leadership is embedded at the highest level of regional coordination.

- **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

A structured and resourced national advisory mechanism would be the most effective model — for example, a Te Ao Māori emergency management rōpū that meets regularly with the Director and has a formal mandate to influence national planning, strategy, and evaluation. This would ensure consistent Māori input across all levels and provide a direct line of communication for issues, innovations, and feedback from iwi/hapū across the motu.

Additionally, any mechanism should include kaupapa Māori approaches to knowledge-sharing — recognising mātauranga Māori, storytelling, and lived experience as valid and essential forms of evidence.

- **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. The Crown should actively explore models of joint emergency governance or parallel structures where iwi Māori can operate alongside traditional CDEM structures — particularly in regions with existing iwi emergency response capacity.

There should also be investment in building iwi emergency management capability outside of crisis periods, so that partnership is not dependent on limited capacity or burn-out-prone individuals. Funding for Māori-led training, scenario exercises, and dedicated iwi EM coordinators could be established to support this.

Finally, it would be useful to create a formal review mechanism post-legislation that assesses how well iwi Māori partnerships are being implemented across regions — including feedback from iwi on the quality of engagement and outcomes delivered.

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

- **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes — the problem has been described accurately. In my experience supporting both community and institutional emergency management efforts, communities are often ready and willing to participate but lack the pathways, recognition, and support to do so effectively.

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Current structures are unclear about how communities can formally engage with the official emergency system. There is a persistent perception that emergency response is something that happens *to* communities, rather than *with* them — which creates missed opportunities, erodes trust, and undermines resilience.

- **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 — to enhance community participation through CDEM Group planning and local mechanisms — is the most pragmatic and scalable approach. However, it must be implemented with clear expectations, practical guidance, and dedicated resourcing.

Benefits:

- Strengthens community ownership of preparedness and response
- Builds trust and mutual understanding between communities and CDEM groups
- Improves the relevance and uptake of emergency plans and communications

Risks:

- If engagement is tokenistic or poorly coordinated, it may backfire — leading to disengagement and loss of trust.
- Communities may expect compensation or support in exchange for their contributions, which introduces legal, financial, and ethical complexities.
- Without clear guidance, there's a risk of uneven application across regions, creating further inequity.

Clarifying expectations and roles is key. For example, while I agree that CDEM groups should not be responsible for sorting donations, this can be a powerful role for local community networks when appropriately supported. Education for CDEM staff about how to enable — rather than control — community contributions would help bridge this gap.

- **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. An additional option would be to formalise community engagement roles within the CDEM structure — such as "community liaison officers" or "resilience coordinators" — who act as a bridge between official response agencies and community groups before, during, and after emergencies.

There should also be a clear mechanism within the CDEM framework for community knowledge, feedback, and lived experience to inform formal emergency plans. This could include:

- Community representation on planning committees
- Public workshops or scenario planning sessions
- Dedicated funding for community-led emergency preparedness initiatives

Lastly, for communities to participate meaningfully, there must be clarity on what participation looks like, how information and support will flow in both directions, and how decisions involving community offers of help will be made — especially during fast-moving response phases.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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- **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes. The description reflects a known challenge: while communities are often the first to act in emergencies, legal uncertainty and fear of repercussions can deter individuals and businesses from stepping in. In my previous CDEM roles, many community members expressed concern about potential liability if they attempted to help and something went wrong. This fear is a barrier to life-saving action and delays critical early response efforts.

Community members are highly motivated to support one another, especially in the immediate hours and days before formal services can scale up. However, this willingness is undermined when people are unclear about their legal standing or feel unsupported by formal systems.

- **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I support Option 2, which offers greater protection from civil liability for individuals and organisations acting in good faith during emergencies. This is a necessary step to remove a critical barrier to community-led response.

Benefits:

- Encourages faster community response in the critical early stages of an emergency
- Reduces hesitation among individuals, community leaders, and businesses to assist
- Normalises a shared responsibility model for emergency management

Risks:

- There may be concerns about people acting beyond their capability, which could inadvertently cause harm
- Misinterpretation of protections could lead to unsafe or uncoordinated actions

To mitigate these risks, legal protections should be coupled with community education and basic emergency training. Offering access to first aid, disaster response basics, or bystander action training would help ensure that community responders feel confident and capable — not just protected.

- **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. In addition to legal protections, the system should:

Promote and invest in public preparedness training — first aid, psychological first aid, evacuation safety, and neighbourhood coordination

Establish a national community responder recognition programme that validates and supports community contributions post-event

Develop clear guidelines for coordination between spontaneous volunteers and official responders — including simple tools (apps, hotlines, designated drop-in centres) to enable real-time connection during response phases

These changes will help legitimise and strengthen community response without replacing formal emergency services — creating a more integrated and effective model.

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### Other problems relating to this objective

- **Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. A key problem is that community and iwi participation is often treated as supplementary rather than foundational. This framing needs to shift.

Current planning frameworks often rely on consultation after strategies have been drafted, or only engage with communities during or after a response. This approach misses the opportunity to embed community knowledge and capability into preparedness and planning.

It would be beneficial to reframe participation not as a risk to be managed, but as a core asset to be nurtured, funded, and incorporated through co-design processes at every stage of the emergency management cycle.

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

- **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes. The problem has been clearly identified. In practice, there is frequent confusion between CDEM Group responsibilities and those of individual local authorities — especially where hazards, infrastructure, and emergency planning overlap.

The lack of clarity undermines confidence, reduces efficiency, and delays action at critical moments. It also creates challenges for communities who may be approached by multiple departments for similar issues, often without a clear explanation of roles.

- **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I support Option 3 — requiring clear responsibilities to be set out in CDEM Group Plans, including agreed funding and delivery expectations. This option balances structure with flexibility and ensures accountability across all members of the Group.

Benefits:

- Increases role clarity and reduces duplication or gaps
- Supports better collaboration and efficient use of resources

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- Provides the public and other partners with a clearer understanding of who to go to and what to expect

Risks:

- Risk of resistance from local authorities reluctant to cede control or adjust funding allocations
- Potential for misalignment if clear national guidance does not accompany this requirement

To maximise impact, Option 3 must be supported by strong national guidance from NEMA and a requirement for regular joint review of Group Plans that includes community and partner input.

- **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. In addition to clarifying roles in Group Plans, consider requiring the development of joint operational protocols or "role clarity matrices" at the regional level. These would outline specific responsibilities for preparedness, response, and recovery functions — including who leads, who supports, and how coordination occurs.

Such protocols could be made publicly accessible to improve transparency and understanding across communities, partner organisations, and emergency volunteers.

- **Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

While the CDEM Group-based model remains a valid and functional structure, it requires strengthening — particularly in governance consistency, role clarity, and regional coordination. Any move toward more fundamental reform would need to carefully consider the value of local knowledge, regional autonomy, and existing relationships.

Rather than a full structural overhaul, the priority should be refining and resourcing the current model to ensure it can meet today's emergency demands, especially in light of climate impacts, complex hazards, and shifting community expectations.

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

- **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes. The problem is well described. Inconsistent engagement and unclear expectations within Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) have contributed to delays in decision-making, reduced effectiveness, and missed opportunities for strategic alignment.

This plays out in key areas such as the appointment of Controllers, agreement on budgets and resourcing, and delays in endorsing planning timelines or training programmes. Without clear

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commitment and accountability from all members, CEGs risk becoming administrative rather than strategic bodies — which weakens emergency preparedness and response capability at the regional level.

- **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 is strongly preferred — requiring CEGs to develop Terms of Reference that clearly outline roles, responsibilities, expectations, and decision-making processes.

Benefits:

- Improves accountability and clarity across agencies
- Encourages more consistent engagement from CEG members
- Enables more timely and effective implementation of CDEM Group decisions
- Supports stronger regional governance, particularly where staff turnover is high or inter-agency collaboration is historically weak

Risks:

- Without enforcement or follow-up, Terms of Reference may exist in name only
- Some members may resist formalisation if there is no perceived benefit or consequence for non-engagement

To mitigate this, NEMA could provide a national framework or template for Terms of Reference, and require periodic review or evaluation to ensure CEGs remain effective and aligned with Group priorities.

- **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Consider introducing a minimum competency or training requirement for CEG members — particularly in relation to emergency management principles, governance roles, and Treaty obligations. This would ensure a consistent baseline of understanding and reinforce the seriousness of CEG responsibilities.

Additionally, it may be beneficial to create a national performance dashboard or peer review system that allows CEGs to benchmark their performance against agreed criteria and identify areas for improvement. This could promote a culture of continuous learning and shared best practice across regions.

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

#### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

- **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Yes. The description accurately captures the ongoing challenge of integrating animal welfare into emergency planning and response. Animals — including pets, working animals, livestock, and wildlife — play a critical role in the emotional, social, cultural, and economic wellbeing of individuals and communities.

However, in many regions there is still limited guidance, inconsistent coordination, and a lack of clear responsibilities in this area. This often results in delayed or reactive animal-related support during emergencies, which can increase stress for owners, complicate evacuations, and contribute to long-term mental health impacts.

- **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I strongly support Option 4 — to legislate that emergency management plans must consider animals. This step would embed animal welfare into the emergency management framework and ensure consistency across the country.

Benefits:

- Improves planning for evacuation, sheltering, and care of animals — leading to better outcomes for both animals and their owners
- Reduces delays and confusion during responses involving livestock or companion animals
- Supports mental wellbeing and encourages compliance with evacuation instructions (people are more likely to evacuate if they know their animals are safe)

Risks:

- Potential resourcing pressure on councils and CDEM groups to build or coordinate animal response capacity
- Risk of uneven implementation if not supported by clear national guidance

To address these risks, legislation should be accompanied by a national animal welfare emergency plan, template planning tools for councils, and defined roles for agencies such as MPI, SPCA, and local animal services.

- **Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Animal welfare should be prioritised above the protection of property but below human life and safety. This is consistent with both public expectations and international good practice.

Many people view their pets as family, and others rely on animals for livelihood, cultural connection, or community resilience. Property can be replaced — lives and relationships, human or animal, cannot. Prioritising animal welfare in planning supports humane, ethical emergency management and prevents secondary harm.

- **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. An additional option would be to integrate animal response partners formally into CDEM Group planning structures. This could include developing MOUs or response protocols with organisations such as the SPCA, veterinarians, rural support trusts, and iwi or community-based animal care groups.

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It may also be valuable to require animal-inclusive scenario planning and exercises as part of CDEM Group readiness activities — ensuring this is not a theoretical inclusion, but something operationalised and tested.

## Other comments

- **Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Yes. I acknowledge that my submission includes several suggestions that require significant effort and resourcing — and that capacity is something the emergency management system is often short on. This work is not straightforward. However, I've seen time and again that energy is spent trying to solve problems with the same approaches that created them — because "that's how it's always been done." What if we took a step back to ask: how can we do this better? What would it look like if the system truly worked for the people of Aotearoa?

While the proposed reforms are largely well-targeted, it is essential that they are accompanied by adequate investment in capacity-building, training, and relationship development across the sector — particularly at the community, iwi, and local government levels. Legislation alone will not deliver transformation. To truly strengthen Aotearoa's emergency management system, reforms must be underpinned by practical implementation support, national consistency, and a shift in culture toward collaboration, inclusion, and shared responsibility. This includes recognising and resourcing the strengths that already exist in communities and ensuring that local knowledge and lived experience continue to inform system-wide decision-making.

In my experience, the sector can feel overwhelmed by the scale of the problems, yet often the most effective solutions are more straightforward than we think. Rather than forcing a square peg into a round hole, let's pause, reflect, and collaboratively explore the possibilities. If capacity is stretched, consider how short-term consultant support could offer valuable insights — not just to deliver work, but to help diagnose issues, build clarity, and design fit-for-purpose solutions. I understand consultants are already part of the system — this is simply a reinforcement of their value when used well.

Finally, I strongly encourage that this bill embeds the principles of the Sendai Framework throughout, to ensure our system shifts from primarily responding to disasters to actively reducing risk and building resilience from the outset.

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**16 May 2025**

**To:** **Policy Unit**

**NEMA**

**Public Submission to NEMA Consultation Document: Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation.**

Please find below my recommendations to the above consultation document. I do not support the options provided as there is a lack of meaningful strategy to underpin legislative reform. New Zealand through its elected representatives needs to determine what the future state should be, then develop legislation that enables it. However, should the government choose to continue on the current path to reform, the following recommendations are made.

### 1. Accountability and Professionalisation

The document identifies the need for stronger national direction and assurance (NEMA, 2025, pp. 35–38), but current post-event reviews lack technical expertise and independence. No national review has been led by a certified emergency manager (CEM) (Glassey, 2023c) or those holding specific postgraduate qualifications in emergency management. It is not appropriate for NEMA to be the system assurance body when there are often issues which it is responsible for creating. This also undermines the partnership nature that NEMA should have with local government, rather than a superior power. Reviews appear to be constant and repetitive in their recommendations, yet fundamental reform has yet to be seen.

**Recommendations:**

- Establish an independent **Inspector-General of Emergency Management** to oversee assurance, lessons management, and mandatory After Action Reports. This model has proved successful in Victoria and Queensland following major post-disaster inquiries. This would ensure all levels of EM have external assurance to enhance public confidence.
- Require all EM mandated entities, to achieve and maintain accreditation of their emergency management programs via the international **Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP)** standard. This requirement would apply to NEMA, emergency services, CDEM Groups and other mandated entities.

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This would ensure an independent and internationally recognised standard is met without the need to create a new system (like the failed MCDEM Monitoring & Evaluation Program) and reduce political interference. The percentage of EMAP compliance could then be proportional to the amount of central government funding provided for response and recovery costs. Each entity would have to publicly post their EMAP accreditation audit report for transparency.

- Each EM mandated organisation needs to have a responsible person accountable for the EM programme and accreditation and be suitably qualified to fulfil this role.
- The responsible person for an EM mandated entity, would need to be qualified as per specification set by the Director, in the **Gazette.** This would include but not limited to IAEM **Certified Emergency Manager** (CEM).
- The title "emergency manager" become a restricted term, like many other professions in New Zealand, and only be able to be used by persons who meet the qualification requirements prescribed in the Gazette. Registration as an Emergency Manager may also be an option. National security vetting is consistently applied to emergency managers, facilitated as part of the national workforce model to ensure threats of terrorism, **disaster-terrorism** and war can be discussed in confidence.
- Any private or charitable entity receiving government funding for EM activities, such activities are subject to the oversight of the Ombudsman (as per their submission), and the Official Information Act to ensure accountability, especially entities exercising emergency powers.

**2. National Workforce Model**

The EM sector has been plagued for decades for an inconsistent approach to workforce development and professionalisation. A successful model is found within the education sector, where schools are allocated teacher numbers/bands and centrally funded. Schools have a Board of Trustees to ensure local ownership and engagement, operating to national standards and policies. This model should be applied to EM, with NEMA being the national workforce funding body, against a national collective employment agreement that ensures only registered emergency managers are employed in key roles. The Coordinating Executive Group (as it is currently known) becomes the “Board of Trustees” to ensure the local EM arrangements are meeting community expectations and other requirements including external accreditation through EMAP.

Currently, to become a hairdresser requires more qualifications than an emergency manager (as least their occupation has minimum qualifications and regulation), and

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this is reflected in the variance of competence and performance within the sector. New Zealand can do better.

**Recommendation:**

- A national workforce model be implemented with payroll and collective bargaining managed by NEMA.
- Levels of registered emergency management are defined

o Assistant (i.e. AEM®)

o Advisor (i.e. CEM®)

o Executive (i.e. CEM® and Masters EM)

- EM Groups are allocated and funded "seats" for emergency managers, at various levels. Such funded positions are recruited and selected locally, funded centrally, managed directly by the EM Group. For example, small CDEM Group

o 4 Assistants

o 10 Advisors

o 1 Executive

- EM Groups maintain responsibility and local ownership of arrangements and capacities in accordance with nationally set standards.
- EM Groups and NEMA subject to the purview of the Inspector-General.
- An alternative model is to support a Trans-Tasman certification for emergency managers that is administered by an independent body (IPSQA or AIES), that has a series of state level examination options above baseline requirements (i.e. educational qualifications in EM). This would allow for a specialised knowledge of the EM system in each state the practitioner works, and allows them to simply take another state specific examination (i..e law, plans and policy) if they transfer to another state (including NZ). New Zealand is too small to develop these structures in isolation. If AIES was to be used, they would need to become more representative of the membership such as NZ representatives and a logo that includes NZ.

**3. Reforming Animal Welfare Function**

Animals require cross-cutting support beyond agriculture mandates (NEMA, 2025, p. 42; Glassey, 2023a). The document recognizes the importance of animals but does not sufficiently address systemic gaps in animal welfare coordination (NEMA, 2025, p. 42). Evidence from recent events demonstrates that the welfare of animals directly affects human safety and evacuation compliance (Glassey, 2023a).

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Local government was mandated with the care and transport of companion animals during civil defence emergencies in past legislative change, but not provided any funding. This has led to inconsistent approaches, mainly a lack of capacity often being filled by well meaning unmandated volunteer charities that are not scalable and sustainable in the event of national level states of emergency, nor are they publicly accountable like councils.

**Recommendation:**

- Mandate that NEMA coordinates animal welfare in emergencies (as it does for human welfare at the national level), FENZ mandated and funded to lead companion animal rescue, Local Government mandated and funded for care of rescued and displaced companion animals, MPI mandated and funded for emergency preparedness of livestock, captive and research animals, and DOC covers wildlife and marine mammals in the wild state. Funding made available to for related reduction, readiness, response and recovery activities.
- NEMA collaborates with **Animal Evac New Zealand** to draft a specific part in the next iteration of the Emergency Management Bill to ensure identified issues are addressed.
- New legislative arrangements recognise the value and importance of local government animal management and amend the **Dog Control Act 1996** to allow registration fees collected by councils to be used for their mandated function under emergency management law.

**4. Strengthening Iwi Māori Participation**

The document highlights the need to strengthen iwi Māori participation (NEMA, 2025, pp. 13–16), yet fails to address the cultural significance of Mokai Kuri (companion dogs) and other animals as taonga. The omission of animal welfare from iwi-led emergency management planning is inconsistent with Treaty obligations and the lived experiences of Māori communities during recent emergencies, such as Cyclone Gabrielle (Government Inquiry, 2024).

**Recommendation:**

- Companion animals should be explicitly mandated to be in CDEM Group plans as part of Treaty partnership obligations, and such plans ensure arrangements are developed, tested and maintained for the rescue, transport and emergency care of such disaster affected animals. Funding should be made available to enable mandated agencies to perform these functions.

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**5. All-Hazards Approach: Nuclear and Radiological Threats**

The previous Bill omitted explicit reference to nuclear and radiological hazards, despite ongoing global tensions (NEMA, 2025, pp. 5–6). This omission is inconsistent with New Zealand's original civil defence mandate and the current risk environment (Glassey, 2023b).

The shift toward satellite based communication systems such as StarLink creates an unintended consequence of dependency. Such highly technological systems (and everything else we have become accustomed to since the 1960s) are prone to Electro Magnetic Pulse (EMP), created by nuclear detonation and solar fare. Traditional alternate communication systems should be re-instated following MCDEMs decision to abandon the Civil Defence HF radio network. Modern society is critically dependent on EMP prone electrical eco-systems and are at catastrophic risk now, in comparison to the original threat in the 1960s - the consequence level of risk has exponentially increased, yet risk assessment and emergency planning has not recognised this.

**Recommendation:**

- **Reinstate nuclear preparedness in the national risk assessment** and develop public education campaigns on radiological emergencies.
- Ensure NEMA is clearly mandated with responsibility for the protection of the civil population for such catastrophic events and associated planning.
- National HF radio network be re-established.
- New government capital build projects (buildings and infrastructure) should consider integration of fall out shelter design and functionality like done in countries such as Singapore, Switzerland and **Finland (the later having 54,000 shelters**).

**6. Flood Risk Management**

Flood-related vehicle fatalities remain high, and current public safety measures are inadequate (NEMA, 2025, p. 48; Glassey, 2023d). Despite technology available, New Zealand still operated outdated doctrine in using sandbags and primary tool to defend property inundation.

**Recommendations:**

- NEMA is mandated the lead for flood fatality prevention in partnership with other agencies.
- **Implement color-coded flood depth gauges** at all flood-prone intersections.
- Introduce penalties for unsafe vehicle use during floods and require emergency services to justify protocols for floodwater driving.

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- Establish national stockpiles of flood barrier systems that could be deployed by private contracts, Task Force Kiwi, FENZ or NZRTs.

**7. Artificial Intelligence and Technology**

The previous Bill did not address the use of **artificial intelligence (AI) for emergency management**, despite its growing role in prediction, situational awareness, and response (NEMA, 2025, p. 19; Glassey, 2023e).

**Recommendation:**

- Include provisions for ethical AI integration in the National CDEM Plan, with oversight by the Privacy Commissioner.

**8. Public Warning Systems**

The document discusses the need for robust public warning systems (NEMA, 2025, p. 61), but current systems **may lack cybersecurity safeguards**, risking malicious activation (Glassey, 2023f).

**Recommendations:**

- Mandate encryption and multi-factor authentication for all emergency alert platforms.
- Implement a two-person rule for national warning activation.

**9. Volunteerism**

Volunteering is the cornerstone of EM capability and ensures strong community connectivity at the local level. It is imperative that volunteers are encourage, supported and protected by future legislation. Current law only protects employment status, with no financial assistance. Presumptive cover does not apply to volunteers who may be working in contaminated flood water or in the aftermath following fires. There also is little support, resource of funding for community level preparedness initiatives like "**Community Emergency Response Training**" (CERT).

**Recommendations:**

- Employer subsidies are made available to volunteers who carry out an EM function during a declared emergency, where directed by an EM mandated entity (not just when directed by a controller).
- Presumptive legislation ensures volunteers exposed to carcinogens during response and recovery efforts are protected financially.
- A national CERT programme is established and supported, using the model already proven successful by FEMA.

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**10. Role of NZ Defence Force**

The role of the NZDF in EM is often debated. NZDF has historically benefited from purporting a role in EM, often citing this as part of their justification for significant capital purchases. However, the NZDF appears to have significant challenges with minimum staffing and retention, and with increasing global tensions, the force maybe better focused on its core function. There needs to be an updated policy position over the role of the NZDF in aid to the civil power. If NZDF are to be a key operational partner, then it should guarantee a level of meaningful capability and ensure such capability meet civilian requirements like expected of CDEM volunteers (i.e. NZRTs). If it is to continue a domestic EM role, then it may well be served to create specialist humanitarian assistance forces that act as national surge capacity. This however is unlikely given existing challenges for the NZDF, and so alternative national surge capacity models such as Task Force Kiwi being funded and resourced in substitute for domestic EM response and recovery should be considered.

**Recommendations**

- NZDF role in EM be clearly defined.
- Non Military Surge Capacity be mandated and funded (i.e. Task Force Kiwi)
- All response actors (civil and military) to meet common standards (i.e. TFK, NZRTs, SAR, Surf, Coastguard etc) such as those offered by IPSQA.

**11. National Mitigation Fund**

For every dollar spent on disaster mitigation, 7 dollars is saved in response.

There needs to be a major re-think by central government to shift focus from unsustainable response to proactive hazard mitigation. This needs to be a billion dollar campaign to prevent disasters from happening in the first place.

**Recommendations:**

- A multi-billion fund is established and managed by the Natural Hazards Commission or another (but not a new) body, to provide funding to reduce risks of national significance.

**12. Resilient and Responsible Citizenship**

Disasters are not natural, nor are they an event. They are a process and the consequence of human decision or indecision and therefore can be prevented or mitigated by humans (Kelman). A culture of shared responsibility is needed following disaster affected communities pointing the finger for "civil defence" to do more. Beyond CERT, we need to create a new generation of resilient and responsible citizens. Countries like Finland and Sweden have compulsory national service programs that

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incorporate disaster preparedness. Though this may be a solid option for New Zealand, it is likely to be unpalatable. This approach also negatively reinforces emergency management to a militaristic command and control culture.

New Zealand could lead the way with novel programme that bridges CERT and National Service, with a Resilient Citizenship programme that would be undertaken by those between 18-21 years of age, and any new immigrant seeking citizenship. A suggested four week course available in main centres would not be a "boot camp" with drill or gruelling physical training, but an immersive programme that cover good citizenship, community preparedness, disaster response and recovery. First aid, basic rescue, fire safety, radiological safety, impacts of war, water safety, cyber security etc could all be covered. A funded programme like this should be delivered nationally, by organisations such as FENZ or Task Force Kiwi. New Zealand has lost social cohesion and we need to find tangible mechanisms to reunite citizens and create meaningful resilience and surge capacity to disasters. Naturally, there would be adjustments or exemptions for the above course as appropriate for persons of determination and the likes.

This proposed programme is also not a revamped Limited Service Volunteer (LSV) course. It is important this course is for all young persons, and those wanting to become citizens or even renewing residency. This then encapsulates all part of society and workforces from hospitality workers through to professionals such as doctors. Given the high unemployment, without saturating each course, those on benefits who are more vulnerable to the impacts of disaster should be sent to attend as part of meeting job seeking obligations. A number of certifications should be awarded to graduates including first aid that can also help with increasing employment opportunities.

**Recommendations:**

- A Resilient Citizen programme be scoped and recommendations made to government.
- National emergency management reform look at international models and research such as by the President of the Republic of Finland in his report "**Safer Together**" (Niinistö, 2024). This would provide more visionary change to emergency management in New Zealand.

**Conclusion**

These recommendations address critical gaps identified in the NEMA discussion document and align with its objectives to strengthen participation, clarify accountability, and enable higher standards (NEMA, 2025, pp. 10–69). Incorporating these changes will ensure a resilient, inclusive, and modern emergency management system for all New Zealanders.

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Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission.

Nga mihi nui.

**Dr Steve Glassey** PhD MEM PGDipEM FInSTR CEM®

**Director**

**Public Safety Institute**

Email s9(2)(a)

**Acknowledgement**

This submission is taken from the Linkedin Article

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/rearranging-deck-chairs-titanic-real-change-document-steve-0soec?trackingId=4B%2FjGKhnSiaFTQbNz%2FWzNg%3D%3D&lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_detail_base%3B%2B2Zvr%2FqlSSap0qjqYGTLgA%3D%3D

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Volunteering CANTERBURY

Make Your Mahi Have Meaning

Submission on Emergency Management Bill

Volunteering Canterbury has been supporting volunteers and volunteerism since 1988. Member organisations of Volunteering Canterbury contributed some 1,289,000 hours to the community during 2024, and 383,300 Cantabrians were directly helped by those member organisations' volunteer teams. Additionally Volunteering Canterbury provides an annual training programme which supports volunteer management.

Volunteering Canterbury acknowledges the critical role of spontaneous volunteers in emergencies and emphasises the need for effective integration of those volunteers during an emergency.

Volunteering Canterbury, with its expertise in connecting volunteers, can offer valuable insights and recommendations for improving the legislation and advocates for a proactive approach to managing spontaneous volunteers, including clear communication channels, streamlined registration processes, and robust training programs.

1. Acknowledging the Importance of Spontaneous Volunteers:

- Volunteering Canterbury recognizes that spontaneous volunteers are often the first responders, arriving on the scene before professional services, and can play a vital role in community support and recovery. Effective use of these volunteers' skills, energy and resources will enhance the overall emergency response.

2. Addressing the Challenges:

- Volunteering Canterbury acknowledges the potential challenges associated with managing spontaneous volunteers, such as lack of training, safety concerns, and logistical coordination and that there is a need for a comprehensive and well-defined process to address these challenges to maximise these volunteers' contribution.

3. Recommendations for the Emergency Management Bill:

- **Clear Communication Channels:**

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Advocate for the establishment of clear and consistent communication channels for informing the public about how to volunteer during an emergency, including online platforms, social media, and community networks and utilisation of supported Volunteer Centres for this purpose.

- **Streamlined Registration:**

  Support for Volunteer Centres to access technology to facilitate rapid online registration and verification of spontaneous volunteers.

- **Training and Resources:**

  Development of training resources for spontaneous volunteers, including online modules and in-person workshops, which can be offered by supported Volunteer Centres to those interested so that at the time of an emergency there is a cohort of spontaneous volunteers who are equipped with basic skills and knowledge for effective participation.

- **Partnerships with Volunteering Organizations:**

  Encourage the collaboration between CDEM and Volunteer Centres such as Volunteering Canterbury to establish clear lines of communication and support.

- **Liability and Insurance:**

  Advocate for clear provisions regarding liability and insurance for spontaneous volunteers, ensuring that they are covered while providing assistance.

- **Post-Emergency Support:**
  Recommend the development of programs to support spontaneous volunteers after the emergency, acknowledging their efforts and providing opportunities for recognition and appreciation.

4. Volunteering Canterbury's Expertise:

   - Acknowledge Volunteering Canterbury's role as a central hub for volunteer management and support in the Canterbury region and similarly, other Volunteer Centres which form part of the Volunteer Centre Network Aotearoa, who play a similar role in their regions.
   - Acknowledge Volunteering Canterbury's ability to facilitate communication, coordination, and resource allocation between CDEM, local authorities, and the volunteer community if it is included in relevant communication channels while planning/preparing for an emergency, during an emergency, and in the ensuring recovery phase of an emergency.

5. Call to Action:

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- Volunteering Canterbury urges the government to embrace a proactive approach to managing spontaneous volunteers, recognizing their potential and investing in resources to support their contributions and utilising specialists in volunteer engagement, such as Volunteering Canterbury and other Volunteer Centres around Aotearoa New Zealand which have similar experience and ability.
- Volunteering Canterbury urges that the Emergency Management Bill includes provisions that promote collaboration between CDEM, local authorities, and volunteering organizations.

Volunteering Canterbury
General Manager: Glenda Martin
s9(2)(a)

CC: 20249

16 May 2025

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Frances Anderson |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Te Kāhui Tika Tangata NZ Human Rights Commission |

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### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

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### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We support the identified objectives but consider that additional standalone objectives are needed to uphold the rights in Te Tiriti o Waitangi and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("UNCRPD"). These objectives need to:

1. make explicit the specific rights and role for Māori as Tangata Whenua, and
2. make an explicit commitment to ensuring equitable protection for all communities.

As currently written, iwi Māori are not recognised as Te Tiriti partners with specific rights of self-determination including over lands and taonga but rather are simply named community among others.

The broad-based objective "Strengthening community and iwi participation in emergency management" also lacks the specificity to authorise and prioritise intentional consideration of the needs and barriers faced by marginalised communities such as disabled people, or ethnic minority communities.

Experience shows (for example, in the UNCRPD Independent Monitoring Mechanism report on Making Disability Rights Real in a Pandemic, 2021 and the Human Rights Commission's Inquiry into the Support of Disabled People and Whānau during Omicron) that unless explicitly named and included, default settings work to exclude communities who are already marginalised, and this marginalisation is exacerbated in times of crisis.

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To succeed in the stated aims of strengthening participation of marginalised communities, enabling practical change to lift the standard of emergency management, and providing the necessary powers and tools to achieve this, the Bill needs to include equitable protection from the 'highest level' objectives which cascades through all provisions.

Taking all measures to ensure the protection and safety of disabled people is an obligation of the UNCRPD (Article 11 - Situations of risk and humanitarian emergency).

Helpful guidance on the requirements of that obligation can be found in this International Disability Alliance publication State Obligations on Disaster Risk Reduction Under Article 11 on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We welcome recognition of the diversity and differing needs of communities.

The Discussion document gives some recognition of the way in which the existing emergency management systems do not adequately understand and consider the needs of different groups. However, the preponderance of the commentary appears to focus on individual circumstances or vulnerabilities, and geological risks and less on the way that systems create the vulnerabilities.

This needs to be recognised to ensure the right systems levers are part of legislation.

For example, it is important to recognise the lack of accessibility and capability to accommodate peoples' diverse needs across many local and national agencies, not solely emergency management. Current processes, such as a lack of information in accessible formats and languages, effectively exclude communities from engaging with agencies which can affect the information, resource and networks that people bring to an emergency situation.

An Emergency Management Bill may not be able to address all of the marginalising systemic factors, but the Bill needs to allocate responsibility to identify these factors in order to maximise the positive impact it can make in affording all communities equitable protections and thereby upholding the right to life. Accountability for identifying marginalising systemic factors is essential to ensure those factors are addressed and mitigated.

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3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

The Discussion document does recognise that people can be part of multiple and intersecting communities that experience greater barriers to achieving emergency preparedness. The document recognises that among people less equipped to make household-based preparations, are people with low incomes.

But there needs to be stronger recognition of, and response to, the compounding impact of being part of more than one of these communities. In particular, the impact of household poverty extends beyond less ability to prepare individually.

The intersection between poverty and disability is a pertinent example. Poverty and impairment have wide ranging and interconnected impacts, for example the digital divide *and* lack of alternate formats *impede access to information*. Many disabled people experience barriers to access and to participate in their local community, which in turn leads to isolation with little recourse to community support. When these barriers and impacts are combined with a lack of economic and other resource, this means many disabled people have less options or ability to remove themselves from hazards when they arise. Overarching these issues is a lack of systems to secure continuity of vital supports. Limited visibility of disabled people within existing systems can reduce trust, hope and/or resource to for people to engage with decision makers; meaning those most affected are often not involved in decisions about what services are essential in their contexts.

The definition of a lifeline utility needs to consider services essential for some communities such as services providing support to older people and disabled people. Any business continuity requirements placed on agencies during times of emergency should include these kinds of lifeline services. Agencies providing these services should also be required to involve the communities they support in their emergency and business continuity planning and preparation.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Our preferred option is a legislative one, but the current Options 3 and 4 should be re-worded to require both national and local-level decision-makers to actively involve affected communities in planning, design and implementation - rather than simply consult with these communities.

To be effective in reducing the disproportionate burden some communities currently bear, emergency management decision-makers need to meaningfully engage with and involve affected communities, including in particular disabled people and ethnic minority communities in barrier identification and solution design.

A comprehensive Guide to disability inclusive emergency management can be found in this Australian toolkit, which would provide a good basis for adaptation to the local environment, by and with disabled people and tāngata whaikaha Māori.

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Legislation alone will not ensure that diverse needs will be met, or equitably protected, in practice, across the four R's. However, legislation provides an authorising environment at the highest level to prioritise and legitimately resource the involvement of diverse communities. This is necessary to provide a mandate for those already doing so informally or wishing to do so, and to direct action from those not already doing so.

While legislation will set requirements at a national level, this must be reinforced by requirements for planning, design and implementation at a community and local level. All members of the preparation and response 'chain' need opportunities to work and learn together in situ, so that decisions are directly informed by the communities they are intended to benefit and can respond to both community and locality needs. Building accessibility and capability over time will be the most effective way to ensure these practices are well embedded and able to activate smoothly in times of emergency.

General guidance for discretionary action (Option 2) is unlikely to strengthen participation and address current barriers to participation. This is particularly so with no indication of 'audit' or oversight of actual practice.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Local and national planning bodies would both (internally) employ staff and (externally) establish and connect with dedicated emergency preparedness local/regional networks (of civil society organisations) with diverse and intersectional representation. In turn these local networks would link to a similarly constituted national network that informs national mechanisms.

Ensuring inclusive practice becomes the default mechanism at a time of crisis will require time to build trust, understanding and accessibility. Establishing and maintaining a permanent network that is actively involved in communication, issue identification and solution design would be the best way to address the barriers that diverse communities face prior to, during and in recovery from emergencies. These networks could meet more frequently at a local level (e.g. monthly or bi-monthly) and periodically at a national level (e.g. quarterly or twice-annually) to ensure regularity, continuity and consistency.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The Discussion document does not include in its problem description, nor recognise in its proposed solution, Te Tiriti rights and responsibilities. The document takes a somewhat reductionist and extractive approach -recognising only the knowledge, skills and resources of Māori to make use of, but not giving due recognition to the inherent rights and values of Tangata Whenua as Tiriti partners that are inextricably linked to the critical and effective responses acknowledged in the Inquiry report.

The Bill, in alignment with Te Tiriti rights and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, should recognise the rights of the collective, provide for self-determination, participation in decision-making and adequate resourcing by and for Māori. The Sendai Framework explicitly encourages the incorporation of indigenous knowledge.

Iwi and indigenous knowledge and communication needs to be actively recognised and fostered.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Partnership of the form chosen by Iwi Māori

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

An integral part of involving communities in advance planning is considering the resources available in the community and how these can be supported to better inform planning and design.

While there needs to be explicit focus on ensuring processes for participation and community input are accessible to and inclusive of diverse communities, strengthening connections across the whole community including those with resources to offer could strengthen preparedness.

Therefore, we suggest that facilitating interaction between diverse communities and businesses and other community groups with resources should occur as part of community resource mapping, activation, and any cost recovery policy developments.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

It is not clear whether assistance animals, such as disability assist dogs as described in section 2 of the Dog Control Act 1996 would be considered as pets or working animals. For disabled people, assistance dogs are critical elements of their emergency protection and response. The status of assistance dogs should receive special consideration,

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aligned with their status in the Dog Control Act and the fact they provide lifeline services to the people they assist. This may need to be separate from a general category of animals.

We note that under the Human Rights Act 1993, unlawful discrimination on the ground of disability includes discrimination based on a person's reliance on a disability assist dog (section 21(1)(h)(vi)). The UNCRPD and, domestically, the Human Rights Act recognise that failing to provide reasonable accommodation to a disabled person, including for example enabling access for a disability assist dog, may constitute unlawful discrimination. These obligations reiterate the need to give special consideration to the status of disability assist dogs in times of emergency.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

We have focussed on responding to aspects of the Discussion document that address Te Tiriti and Tangata Whenua rights, as well as the rights of disabled people and those from ethnic minority communities who are particularly impacted in emergency response situations. Accordingly, we have only provided responses to some of the consultation questions in the Discussion document.

However, there are broader Human Rights and Te Tiriti o Waitangi provisions that should be embedded throughout the Bill.

The Commission notes the absence in the Discussion document of an overarching human rights and Te Tiriti-based approach to emergency preparedness and response. We know from experience, including from responses to the Canterbury earthquakes, Covid-19 and Cyclone Gabrielle, that ensuring a human rights approach, grounded in te Tiriti, to planning for and responding emergencies is critical to protecting the most vulnerable in our communities.

Te Kāhui Tika Tangata Human Rights Commission has a role in monitoring the human rights impact of emergency situations. The displacement and isolation of people and communities, the destruction of homes and property, the damage to critical infrastructure and the ongoing socio-economic impacts, create new human rights challenges and exacerbate existing human rights problems and inequities experienced by vulnerable groups. These include impacts on the right to life, self-determination, a healthy environment, health, an adequate standard of living, housing, water, sanitation and food, cultural and indigenous rights, access to information, and to an effective remedy.

A human rights approach is recognised internationally as central to emergency preparedness and response. Both substantive solutions and, equally, decision-making processes must align with human rights obligations. *The Guiding Principles of the UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030* state that the management of disaster risk must promote and protect all human rights and requires all-of-society engagement, partnership and empowerment and inclusive, accessible and non-discriminatory participation. Ensuring meaningful participation of affected communities is important not only because people have the right to have a say in what affects them, but also because hearing diverse perspectives leads to good decisions, fosters buy-in and can mitigate against problems arising at later stages.

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Disaster recovery and risk reduction must also reflect the Government's duties under Te Tiriti o Waitangi. These duties include both the active protection of the human rights of Tangata Whenua affected by emergency situations, and the upholding of tino rangatiratanga in the decision-making processes that take place. Te Tiriti and human rights provide complementary yet distinct participatory principles that must be applied in decision-making processes that affect Māori. This has clear, tangible benefits for recovery efforts.

We also wish to emphasise that specific consideration must be afforded to the rights of children in emergency preparedness, including their right to participate in decision-making. In this regard, we refer to the guidance form the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child: *General comment No. 26 (2023) on children's rights and the environment with a special focus on climate change*.

Relevant resources from the Commission provide useful prior experiences and human rights guidance:

1. Monitoring Human Rights in the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery (2013) and Staying in the Red Zones (2016)
2. Best practice guidelines for the prioritisation of vulnerable customers (2016)
3. Human rights checklist for disaster preparedness, prevention and recovery responses (2020)
4. Checklist on making human rights real in a disaster: Checklist for integrating human rights during relief and recovery efforts (March 2023).

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TE RŪNANGANUI O TE ĀTI AWA

16 May 2025

Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency
EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

Tēnā koe

**Submission on 'Discussion document: Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation'**

Te Rūnanganui o Te Āti Awa ki te Upoko o Te Ika a Māui (Te Rūnanganui) welcomes the opportunity to provide feedback on the Discussion document 'Strengthening New Zealand's emergency mangement legislation' released in April 2025.

We support legislating to strengthen community and Iwi/Māori, Mana Whenua, and Ahi Kā representation and participation in the emergency management system, and establishment of clearer responsibilities and accountabilities across the system.

> Whaikorōūia ki te Atua i runga rawa
> Maungārongo ki runga i te whenua
> Whakaaro pai ki ngā tāngata katoa

Te Rūnanganui aspires to be a leader supporting the wellbeing of all people within our takiwā. As Mana Whenua, we are responsible for assisting Māori to achieve equity with non-Māori, building on our unique strengths, cultural knowledge, language and values. We aim to: reduce inequity; support the marae to enhance community wellbeing; and be the first point of contact for people looking for help.

The Waiwhetū Marae is not only at the heart of our Waiwhetū papakāinga, the oldest traditional communal occupation of Te Āti Awa people in Te Whanganui a Tara, it also serves as a hub for mātāwaka and the broader community within our takiwā.[1] Within the Marae complex, Te Rūnanganui and our team were the driving force behind managing the COVID-19 response for the wider community. Our success as a response unit during the pandemic was largely due to the leadership and capability within Te Rūnanganui, which includes significant expertise in manaakitanga, health services, and effective communication, including our own radio station, Āti Awa Toa FM. We leveraged our existing networks and resources at the Marae, both locally and nationally, to ensure a swift and efficient response. In an emergency, it is essential that Te Rūnanganui and the Marae have autonomy and the right to self-govern in times of crisis.

[1] Te Taupā Ruru o te Āti Awa Taranaki Whānui COVID-19 Response Plan describes Te Āti Awa Taranaki Whānui Takiwā (tribal boundaries) and sets out a coordinated and planned approach to supporting Mana Whenua and all iwi who reside within the takiwā, during the COVID-19 pandemic.

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Our experience and expertise, combined with the outcomes of scenario planning and regional response strategies, should guide national and regional priorities, actions, and investments. While we are well-prepared for emergencies, we recognise the importance of regular planning to cater for various potential emergency scenarios. Planning allows us to stress-test our capabilities and identify the resources needed for different types of emergencies. We see value in participating in national as well as regional planning, and engaging at a national level on response and recovery efforts.

We consider that every marae should be engaged and enabled to participate in planning processes to be able to determine how best to support its people and the wider community. Iwi/Māori involvement, whether engagement or formal governance roles, must be properly resourced to be effective. This includes funding to ensure marae are appropriately resourced for the emergency function they may provide (eg, with appropriate facilities and supplies). We recommend a dedicated, centrally held fund that supports Iwi/Mana Whenua and Marae organisations to have the resource they need to deploy effectively.

We note that a public investment and implementation roadmap will detail the future work programme for operational activites and that the implementation costs of the Bill will be considered in final advice on policy options. Understanding the extent of resourcing for not only implementing the Bill, but also how functions, roles, and practical matters like equipment and facilities will be funded, is collectively important to enable a successful emergency management system.

More detailed commentary is provided below in response to the questions raised on each issue within the Discussion Document. If you have any questions on our submission, please contact Te Rūnanganui via the following email s9(2)(a)

We look forward to continuing to engage in the next steps of the reform process.

Nāku iti noa, nā



Wīrangi Luke
Te Tumu Whakarae | Chief Executive Officer
Te Rūnanganui o Te Āti Awa o Te Ika a Māui

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**Te Rūnanganui o Te Āti Awa Submission on Discussion Document April 2025**

| Page | Section | Feedback |
|---|---|---|
| 8 | Objectives | Te Rūnanganui considers that the objectives for the review are adequate, although we note that resourcing for participation, responsibilities, and accountabilities is to be dealt with separately. We look forward to seeing more detail on the investment approach that, alongside legislative change, will support the objectives being realised and enable the system to be effective. |
| 10 | Objective 1 | Te Rūnanganui supports this objective of strengthening community and iwi Māori participation. |
| 12 | Issue 1 Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities | Te Rūnanganui agrees with how the problem is framed. In terms of the options presented, we are in favour of the legislative option (c) to require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproprortionately affected will be planned for, with the explicity requirement for CDEM groups to identify diverse needs, and engage with people and communities with diverse needs to inform Group plans.<br><br>We support engagement and planning occuring at both local and national levels. |
| 14 | Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management | Te Rūnanganui considers that clear direction and guidance to CDEM Groups and local authorities on maximising the use of comunity and Iwi Māori resources during a disaster response is essential. We support the statement referenced by the Report of the Government Inquiry, and the articulation of the statement that partnering with iwi Māori is essential to building New Zealand's disaster resilience.<br><br>As noted above, the Waiwhetū Marae complex is not only at the heart of the Waiwhetū papakāinga, the oldest traditional communal occupation of Te Āti Awa people in Te Whanganui a Tara, but it also serves as a hub for mātāwaka and the broader community.<br><br>Importantly, within the complex, Te Rūnanganui and our team have been the driving force behind managing the COVID-19 response project for the wider community. Our success as a response unit during the pandemic was largely due to the leadership and capability within Te Rūnanga, which includes significant expertise in manaakitanga, health services, and effective communication. We also leveraged our existing networks and resources at the Marae, both locally and nationally, to ensure a swift and efficient response. The<br><br>In terms of articulation of the problem, we agree with the points made. Te Rūnanganui's experience is that whilst we involved in planning activities with the Wellington Regional Emergency Management Office (WREMO) and via the Coordinating Executive Group, we are not actively engaged in emergency responses. |

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| Page | Section | Feedback |
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| | | The Discussion Document presents 5 options:<br>a. Status quo: no legislative requirement for representation<br>b. Address roles in plans, guidance, and other policy settings (non-legislative)<br>c. Require Iwi Māori representation on CDEM Group decision-making structures (legislative) either on CDEM Groups or Coordinating Executive Groups<br>d. Require CDEM Groups to engage with Iwi Māori during the development of CDEM Group plans (legislative)<br>e. Require the Director to seek advice on Māori interests and knowledge to inform national level planning (legislative)<br><br>Of the five options, Te Rūnanganui supports a combination of the three legislative options: d, e, and f. Engagement and representation should not be at the discretion of CDEM Groups/Director.<br><br>Option d (representation) is important to enable Iwi Māori to bring experience, knowledge and resources to inform emergency management across the 4Rs. We acknowledge that the nature of representation for Iwi Māori on CDEM Group decision-making structures may differ relative to others who have specific functions such as declaring a state of emergency. Similarly, others on the CDEM Group will not have decision-making rights for how we operate our Mārae complex. Our response to COVID-19 was self-initiated and managed. We initiated daily communication with our local, regional, and national Iwi/Māori networks. WREMO and Council were invited to join in our hui, but we were not part of any WREMO-led hui.<br><br>Option e (engagement) is critical to ensure local plans cater for Iwi/hapu and Mātāwaka in communities, and we are able to plan for how we will support our people and the wider community.<br><br>Option f (national planning) is important to shape and influence national-level decisions about the priorities, how to consider the impacts of emergencies on Māori, and engage Māori, and inform priorities and resource allocation.<br><br>We do not see a combination of these activities resulting in duplication, as there are likely to be different areas of focus at a national or local level for both planning and operational matters.<br><br>We are happy to participate in in-person or online hui with the Director to share our experiences and insights.<br>We support development of an action plan. This is critically important including to ensure that functions are appropriately resourced. We woudl even go further and request the establishment of a dedicated, centrally held fund that supports Iwi/mana whenua and Marae organisations to have the resource they need to deploy effectively. Local authorities could be required to contribute this fund and/or it could be directly funded from central government. |

Proactively Released

| Page | Section | Feedback |
|---|---|---|
| 16 | Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management | Of the options presented, Te Rūnanganui considers there might be a balance between option b and option c (or a combination of both where CDEM Group plans are required to consider how the Group will manage offers of resources but this information doesn't need to be prescribed within the Plan. Rather than the Plan gives guidance, and could refer to more detailed information. Such information could sit on the relevant CDEM Group and/or Council website; it also might require more frequent updating, or new processes may need to be specified at the time of emergency (depending on what unforeseen circumstances arise).<br><br>The key point here is that in order to be 'ready' for an emergency, there may need to be advance investment in facilities and equipment, to enable different organisations who may play a role to have sufficient capacity to carry out that role. We recommend this be explicitly noted.<br><br>In our local situation for example, we are well-equipped with to deal with an emergency for up to 5 days as we have expended a lot to ensure we are prepared, including on drinking water facilities. We also know that we call on a number of local families and businesses to supply equipment (eg, generators). We are also very fortunate in having Āti Awa Toa FM but we need more support in promoting this as a channel. Through COVID-19, we also invested time and money in developing a Business Continuity Plan that established protocol and document many of our systems and processes for dealing with a local issue.<br><br>However, we have identified some basic resource gaps. For example, our generators need to be bigger; our containers need to be fully fitted out; we need Starlink connected radios; tents and body bags.<br><br>In order to inform exactly what we might require under a range of emerency scenarios, we would like to be actively involved in planning, and assess the gaps under a range of different types of emergencies. |
| 18 | Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency | Te Rūnanganui supports both option b, providing for protection from civil liability; and option c, enabling compensation for labour costs, particularly more specialied skills that are in short supply.<br><br>We support the establishment of clear expectations for CDEM groups and local authorities, potentially in the form of a regulatory framework or set of guiding principles, on how to make the best use trained community volunteer groups including those at marae.<br><br>We also recommend the establishment of a suitable accreditation pathway for current non-accredited volunteer groups such as Taskforce Kiwi and Land Search and Rescue to be formally recognised and utilised by local authorities and emergency services during a disaster responses. |

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| Page | Section | Feedback |
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| | | We would support legislating for the provision of explicit funding pathways for volunteer groups and iwi Māori to be compensated for expenses incurred during and after a disaster.<br><br>We agree with the benefits noted in option 3, less so with the risks/costs. We don't agree that getting compensated for activities undertaken at the direction of a Controller or Constable would incentivise unsafe or unnecessary actions. Although there could be some minor issues with unpredictable costs, this provision should support leveling the playing field by recognising equal where action is needed, but there is not time to enter into a contract. How predictable costs will also be influenced by how clearly the commissioning direction is communicated. Guidance to support the Controller or Constable in making directions would be useful. |
| 20 | Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency | Te Rūnanganui does not have a particular view about the options presented, but notes the importance of it a local view being to be heard within the whatever model may be chosen. |
| 25 | Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management | Whilst Te Rūnanganui is represented in the Coordinating Executive Group (CEG) and engaged on planning activities, our experience is that whilst we have are informed on planning activities, we are not involved in response situations.<br><br>Te Rūnanganui has an excellent relationship with Hutt City Council (HCC), which is supported by Takai Here, our partnership agreement.<br><br>Currently our participation in emergency management planning is not funded by either HCC or WREMO (although we have been the recipients of grants through the HCC Community Resilience Fund).<br><br>As noted earlier, response to COVID-19 was entirely self-initiated and managed. Through this we drew together our networks, and were in daily communication with our local, regional, and national Iwi/Māori networks. WREMO and Council were invited to join in our hui, but we were not part of any WREMO-led hui. We have commented earlier on Iwi/Māori participation, but reiterate that point here, for the need to further consideration about the specific role of Iwi/Māori in managing their domain (eg, at marae) and would welcome further discussion about this specific role is recognised in a regional tier of emergency management. |
| 33 | Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date | Te Rūnanganui is neutral about the options, but considers it mandatory that Iwi/Māori must be consulted on all National CDEM Plans and CDEM Group Plans. |
| 35 | Issue 8: Stronger national | Te Rūnanganui supports stronger national direction and assurance above the status quo (either b or c), and support to give the Director the function of |

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| Page | Section | Feedback |
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| | direction and assurance | monitoring the performance of the emergency management system (excluding their own role). |
| | Issue 9: | No specific comment at this stage. |
| 42 | Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies | This section of the document groups taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals together in one isuse. This is not appropriate and even within this document, it is important to address these issues separately.<br><br>We support option 3 outlined in the document. |
| 48 | Issue 11: Reducing disruption to infrastructure | We support expansion of the definition of lifeline utility as proposed. |
| 57 | Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity | No specific comment at this stage. |
| 61 | Issue 13; Managing access to restricted areas | No specific comment at this stage. |
| 63 | Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level | Te Rūnanganui supports reducing duplication and tidying up provisions. |
| 65 | Issue 15: Moderning the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period | Te Rūnanganui supports this provision to modernise the process of declaring a state of emergency. |
| 66 | Issue 16: Mayor's role in local state of emergency declarations and | No specific comment at this point. |

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| Page | Section | Feedback |
|---|---|---|
| | transition period notices | |
| 69 | Other questions / comments | Te Rūnanganui wishes to comment on the sensitive issue of managing loss of life during civil emergencies. We wish to assert that we are strongly opposed to mass burial in the event of a large-scale disasater. Each individual should be identied, and families must be notified to allow for the preparation of appropriate rites. This approach aligns with our Tikanga and cultural responsibilities and ensures dignity and respect are maintained during crisis situations. |

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# IrrigationNZ Submission on the Emergency Management Bill

Emailed submission to: EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

**20th May 2025**

IrrigationNZ welcomes the opportunity to provide feedback on the Discussion Document: Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation.

## Executive summary

IrrigationNZ is well aware of New Zealand's vulnerability to a wide range of hazards that can cause disasters—floods, wildfires, pandemics, earthquakes, infrastructure failures, and climate-driven events. Past emergencies have demonstrated the critical importance of irrigated food production systems and the cascading consequences their disruption can have on our economy, food security, and the wellbeing of both urban and rural communities.

The Government's proposal to replace the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM Act) with new legislation later in 2025 is a timely and necessary step. However, it also presents a pivotal opportunity to strengthen New Zealand's emergency management system through more inclusive, risk-informed, and locally grounded approaches.

IrrigationNZ has consistently submitted on reforms relating to climate change adaptation, natural hazard assessment, and the need for consistency in defining critical infrastructure, especially for irrigation and water storage systems that underpin food production. These efforts have revealed that rural infrastructure and communities are frequently overlooked or inconsistently accounted for in national frameworks.

New Zealand's rural communities are not just stakeholders—they are **vital first responders** and central to the long-term resilience of our entire nation. They provide the food production capabilities required for immediate humanitarian response and long-term economic recovery. The Emergency Management Bill must recalibrate the relationship between government—both national and regional—and the rural sector.

This recalibration must include:

- **Stronger legal protections** for rural individuals and businesses who act in good faith during emergencies;
- **Clearer processes** to enable rural community contributions (skills, resources, and local intelligence) to be recognised and integrated into official responses;
- **A broader understanding of essential services**, ensuring food and water production are defined as essential lifelines alongside other utilities.

Too often, rural communities are underrepresented in planning, overlooked in response strategies, and left with inadequate recovery mechanisms. The new legislation must recognise their unique capabilities and risks, and provide:

- **Legislative requirements** for Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group Plans to include engagement with rural communities;
- **Clear and simple mechanisms** for rural people and businesses to connect with the formal emergency system;
- **Mandated inclusion of rural expertise** in hazard risk assessments and emergency planning.

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Additionally, we urge:

- **Strategic alignment** of emergency management reforms with related legislation, including resource management and climate adaptation law;
- **National risk frameworks** that reflect cumulative and gradual climate impacts, not just short-term events;
- **Improved research funding and communication**, with a focus on applied, outcome-oriented innovations in infrastructure resilience and emergency preparedness;
- **Consistency with international best practices**, such as ISO 31000 and all-hazards frameworks, to strengthen planning and decision-making across the system.

If implemented well, this reform will lay the foundation for a more responsive, equitable, and effective emergency management system—one that truly reflects the interconnected reality of modern New Zealand and fully values the contributions of our rural communities.

## About IrrigationNZ

Irrigation New Zealand (IrrigationNZ) is the national representative body endorsed to represent over 4,500 members, including 45% of irrigated land across a membership base representative of irrigation schemes, individual irrigators, and the irrigation service sector across all regions of New Zealand.

Our irrigator members include a wide range of farmers and growers – sheep and beef, dairy and cropping farmers, horticulturalists, winegrowers, as well as sports and recreational facilities and councils. We also represent over 120 irrigation service industry members – manufacturers, distributors, irrigation design and install companies, and irrigation decision support services for both freshwater and effluent irrigation.

We are a voluntary-membership, not-for-profit organisation whose mission is to create an environment for the responsible use of water for food and fibre production for local and international consumers and to sustain the wellbeing of our communities.

As an organisation we actively take a technical leadership role in promoting best practice irrigation and carry out a range of training and education activities associated with freshwater management. Over the last several years, we have trained many irrigators on different aspects of irrigation best practices to improve water use efficiency (lowering consumption) and better manage environmental effects (improved soil moisture management).

IrrigationNZ members share many of the same goals as other New Zealanders:

- Reduce their environmental footprints and see improvements in the health of the natural environment,
- Contribute to the wellbeing of their communities, and
- Provide for a sustainable future for New Zealand.

## Key Contact

We would appreciate the opportunity to discuss the responses in this letter or to provide additional information needed.

Please, direct any inquiries to:
Karen Williams

IrrigationNZ
Level 6 342 Lambton Quay
Wellington

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CEO, IrrigationNZ
Level 6 342 Lambton Quay Wellington
s9(2)(a)

## Information Sharing Statement

IrrigationNZ understands that this submission is subject to the provisions of the **Privacy Act 2020**, and that our name and other identifying information may be included in any information about submissions that the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) may publish.
We understand that:

- NEMA may publish this submission or a summary of it on its website (civildefence.govt.nz);
- Our submission contains **no confidential information** that we seek to restrict under section 9 of the **Official Information Act 1982**;
- This submission will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and contribute to advice provided to Ministers;
- Our submission (including identifying information) may be shared with other government agencies working on emergency management-related policies;
- NEMA may contact IrrigationNZ directly for clarification or to request further information in relation to this submission.

## IrrigationNZ General Statements of Principle– Enabling Rural and Community Resilience

IrrigationNZ supports the initiative from the government coalition to revitalise discussion around the improvements needed to the CDEM Act and the approach to emergency management on the ground.

IrrigationNZ agrees an improvement is needed in the current system of engagement on risk issues and planning for response or recovery, and our perspective as a representative body for irrigators across New Zealand, are detailed below.

Overall, IrrigationNZ would like to see a wider acknowledgement in legislation that our members and their communities are important as they are embedded in the rural fabric of New Zealand and are frequently among the first to respond when emergencies arise.

### *1. Enabling Community-led Resilience and Recognising Rural Realities*

**Issue 1: Meeting Diverse Needs and Supporting Local Capability**

IrrigationNZ strongly supports legislative recognition that a "one size fits all" approach fails to address the diverse needs and capabilities of New Zealand's rural communities. It is concerning that the word "rural" appears only once in the consultation document, and while that is in relation to acknowledging New Zealand's diverse communities, the proposal offers no further substantial reference to targeted solutions for the rural communities it acknowledges.

Rural communities in particular are highly adaptive, with in-depth understanding of local geography, hazards, and response capabilities. They are accustomed to operating independently, in isolation, and their risk profiles often differ significantly from urban populations.

Engagement with rural communities before emergencies occur, as part of long-term planning and risk profiling, is therefore a critical element to ensure their capabilities are leveraged rather than sidelined.



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This includes recognising practical needs, such as navigating the complexity of layered agencies in emergency management control, accessibility of remote families and businesses, the tight knit local community values on land disruption, and even possible language barriers of RSE workers. These factors along with the long term impacts on natural resources disrupted by emergency events, must be embedded in emergency planning processes.

We support:

- Legislative requirements for CDEM Group Plans to include processes for identifying and supporting groups such as rural communities who are often disproportionately affected by emergencies.

- Early and sustained engagement with rural communities to avoid them being underrepresented in shaping local emergency response plans.

**Issue 3: Enabling Effective Use of Community Resources**

Rural individuals, organisations, and businesses are typically willing and able to contribute significant expertise, equipment, and manpower in response to emergencies – that collaborative spirit is fundamental to how they deal with risk and responses in their normal activities. Yet, barriers in formal emergency management structures may result in delayed, under-utilised, or dismissed offers of help.

The Emergency Management Bill must require:

- EM Group Plans to explicitly state how offers of help (skills, resources, local intelligence) from the rural sector will be incorporated.

- Clarity and simplicity in processes for rural communities to connect with the formal emergency system during both planning and response stages.

**Issue 4: Recognising Rural Communities as First Responders**

People in rural areas regularly take immediate action to save lives and prevent damage using their own equipment, especially before official responders are on the ground. These actions must be recognised, supported, and legally protected.

Imposition of overly complex and time-consuming retrospective consents or threats of having conducted “non-compliant activities” for things such as placing emergency culverts, pushing in road access or rubble stockpiling, has the effective of being punitive and disrespectful of the very communities that reacted most rapidly and with good intentions under pressured situations.

We support provisions to:

- Extend civil liability protections to individuals and businesses acting in good faith during emergencies, even without official direction.

- Provide compensation for reasonable use of personal property and specialist labour where directed or necessitated by the emergency situation.

- Avoid punitive and disrespectful retrospective compliance actions post-emergency.

**Issue 9: Strengthening Local Risk Management and Planning**

The Emergency Management Bill must empower and require local authorities—particularly Regional and Unitary Councils—to work in closer partnership with those who know their local hazards and landscapes best, including farmers, growers, and rural landowners. These individuals have



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intergenerational knowledge about river systems, flood-prone areas, drought impacts, and land behaviour during extreme events.

We support:

- Mandatory inclusion of rural expertise in local risk assessments and emergency planning.

- Investment in consistent risk planning standards, such as ISO 31000 or Australia's all-hazards frameworks, to guide adaptation strategies across regions that take into account well informed risk and response allocation profiles for rural communities.

### *2. Recognising Food and Water Production as Essential Services*

A glaring omission in the current framework, and across several other pieces of legislation related to infrastructure services, is the failure to explicitly classify food production, particularly those operations that rely on irrigation infrastructure, as essential services. During recent emergency events, food producers (farmers, growers and distributors) faced delays in recovery prioritisation, severely impacting production and supply chains, instead shifting national food security onto international suppliers.

We recommend:

- Amending all references in legislation that address the nature of critical or lifeline infrastructure to reflect the critical nature of food production particularly to include irrigation infrastructure, food processing, and food distribution as essential services.

- Developing clear recovery protocols that prioritise restoring rural productivity and essential irrigation infrastructure.

### *3. Other matters in relation to Emergency Management reform.*

The consultation document suggests consideration of other policies and legislative reforms in relation to Emergency Management reform. We highlight that the following notes on other matters and the approaches suggested are severely hindered by the lack of a national freshwater strategic approach across government agencies. We encourage a better cross agency approach is adopted.

#### *a. Climate Risk Planning and Longer-term Adaptation Thinking*

While emergency events like floods and cyclones are often the public face of climate change, the less visible impacts—such as shifting rainfall patterns, soil degradation, and extended drought—pose long-term risks to food production and land use.

IrrigationNZ urges:

- Broader framing of a nationally considered risk profile in legislation to include the gradual and cumulative climate impacts. This is already reflected in other country's emergency management legislation as the most significant global risk megatrend.

- Adoption of better-informed multi-criteria risk assessments that consider not only lives and infrastructure, but also rural businesses at risk of emergencies on productive land particularly where they rely upon freshwater access.

- Standardisation of climate risk information-sharing, drawing on tools such as ISO 14091 which recognises community relocation, land-use planning, and productive assets in decision-making models.

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### b. *Research, Innovation and Communication Gaps*

To support a more resilient emergency management framework, the Bill must better interface with the science and innovation ecosystem.

We recommend that Government address the following systemic issues:

- Applied research funding for irrigation infrastructure resilience and critical lifeline recovery, and land-use adaptation in relation to natural hazards planning.

- Private sector access to public research grants to accelerate the development of resilience tools, such as flood flow prediction for water retention in irrigation storages, and sediment deposit management within productive food systems.

- Outcome-focused research delivery, ensuring tangible benefits in emergency management planning for rural communities and their related industries.

- Improved science communication, budgeted from the outset, to ensure practical understanding and uptake across stakeholder groups at risk from natural hazards.

- Cross-agency alignment of research and policy, integrating emergency management goals with MBIE, MPI, DPMC, and regional councils, all of whom have interests in rapid recovery of land based activities.

## 4. *Support in Principle, With Concerns Around Scope and Timing*

IrrigationNZ supports the general intent of the reforms of the Emergency Management systems and the move towards more community engagement, coordination, and responsive emergency legislation.

However, we remain concerned that:

- The current focus is overly narrow, often centring on residential and urban needs while neglecting the food and fibre sector operating in our important rural communities.

- Timing of consultation processes risks rushing critical decisions before broader reform of the RM legislation and Climate Adaptation policies are complete.

- The lack of cohesion between local and national planning instruments introduces uncertainty and inefficiency.

We urge that:

- Emergency management reforms or implementation be sequenced strategically with related RM legislative reforms.

- The Ministry for the Environment and NEMA engage with rural and agricultural sectors with the same rigour and intent as engagement with residential and iwi Māori stakeholders.

**--- End of submission ---**

IrrigationNZ
Level 6 342 Lambton Quay
Wellington

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Charlie Littlewood |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Enable Fibre Network |

☐ The Privacy Act 2020 applies to submissions. Please tick the box if you **do not** want your name or other personal information to be included in any information about submissions that NEMA may publish.

☐ NEMA may publish submissions or a summary of submissions to its website, civildefence.govt.nz. If you **do not** want your submission or a summary of your submission to be published, please tick the box and type an explanation below:

I do not want my submission published on NEMA's website because...

### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Enable supports the objectives and also recommends also adding an efficiency/ cost benefit objective. I.e. reforms should aim to improve the overall efficiency of the system, reducing duplication, allocating responsibilities where it is most effective, and taking into account the cost vs benefits of any changes.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

   ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

   ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

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**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

While Enable only works with Canterbury Civil Defence, we note many telecommunications businesses work nationally, and are frustrated by the duplication and inconsistency across different regions.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Enable supports Option 2, as it provides a single point of accountability, the most clarity upfront, and because NEMA is better placed to deal with wider emergency response than a hazard agency. It would be difficult for a specific hazard agency to oversee all aspects. However, the success of option three will be contingent on there being additional investment and training for NEMA and CDEM group controllers to carry out this role.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that overlapping CDEM group and local authority roles and responsibilities is a problem, and support the various proposals to address this. However the discussion document does not talk about the role of lifelines groups, alongside CDEM groups and councils. The role of lifelines groups should also be clarified as part of this work.

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We can see the benefits of options 2 and 3.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that there needs to be an overall lift in the performance of the emergency management system, and understand that NEMA is still considering which organisations across the "4 Rs" the various proposals under objective three would apply to. Our view is that proposals concerning stronger national direction and assurance and strengthening local hazard risk management, are most relevant to those involved in the management and coordination of emergencies, including local government, CDEM groups and statutory officers such as controllers and recovery managers.

We see the issues under objective four as being more relevant to essential infrastructure such as telecommunications. Put another way, the distinction is between those who manage emergencies and response efforts, and those who provide critical infrastructure and services the emergency management system relies upon. These are different activities that require different approaches under emergency management legislation.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Option two**, increased *guidance,* sounds like a useful place to start then evaluate if more is needed. While our assumption is that the proposals in this section would not apply to essential infrastructure, if a decision was made to include essential infrastructure in option two, it would not be appropriate to have *governance* of privately owned infrastructure risks by the National Hazards Board, which we understand is a group of senior public servants

**Option four,** giving the Director a new function to monitor performance of the system, would probably become a resource intensive administrative reporting exercise that would divert resources (NEMA and system participants) from actual emergency preparedness work. We do not support option four.

Proactively Released

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We do not support the application of **option two** (giving the Director power to issue compliance orders) or **option three** (ministerial power to intervene outside an emergency) to essential infrastructure because the Director or a minister would be substituting their judgement for those with more technical or infrastructure specific expertise. The Director, NEMA or a minister are unlikely to be experts about the operation of telecommunications networks.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Enable has no objections to other sectors being added to the emergency management regime.

However, we do note some prioritisation should occur. For example, on day one the priority is to get electricity and telecommunications restored. Supermarkets will still have food at this point. For this reason we like the idea of having different tiers, such as "essential infrastructure" and "other essential services". This difference between lifeline utilities and others has played out at the exercises run by NEMA

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Enable agrees that (a) there are interdependencies, and these need to be considered; and (b) essential services go wider than current "lifeline utilities". However, we have not seen sufficient evidence that there is inadequate business continuity planning, or barriers to co-operation and information sharing.

We have the following questions:

a) Have BCPs across essential infrastructure sectors been reviewed, and if so, what were the issues found? It does not sound like NEMA has reviewed any telecommunications business BCP

b) BCPs go beyond emergency response – so is this the best tool to review if needed? E.g. reviewing incident response processes, and sector response plans seems more focused and useful.

c) Does NEMA have the capacity and capability to assess the significant number of plans?

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

With the lack of evidence presented on the problem, it is hard to justify regulation intervention beyond the status quo.

If the Government decides to go down the BCP route our preferred option would be a variation of option two, to bring in guidance on emergency management aspects of BCPs and discuss these with sectors. This option might look more like option two for the public sector, which is to promote best practice business continuity practices. Sectors would need to be involved in the development of the guidance to ensure it met their needs. Having NEMA do quality assurance is unlikely to add value if NEMA does not have the necessary expertise.

Enable opposes option 3 as there does not seem to have been any review of telecommunications BCPs to see if there is an issue, and a voluntary approach should be applied before moving to regulatory solutions.

Proactively Released

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We recognise these problems occur, particularly at the national level.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Enable supports non-regulatory approaches first, given voluntary solutions have not been used yet. We also note that information shared needs to be protected and used for the right purposes.

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Enable only works with the Canterbury region, and this works well.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We understand getting access to restricted areas to restore networks was a major problem for telecommunications during the North Island weather events, which had flow-on effects for the wider emergency response. We therefore support changes to better facilitate access

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support option 2. Option 3 is our second preference, and this worked well during the Canterbury earthquakes. However, it worked well as there was a practical element of making it work. At a national level, it might be more complicated to implement.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Insert response

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# Hamilton City Council – Staff Submission

# Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation

## Civil Defence National Emergency Agency

19 May 2025

Proactively Released

Hamilton City Council
Te kaunihera o Kirikiriroa

## Improving the Wellbeing of Hamiltonians

Hamilton City Council is focused on improving the wellbeing of Hamiltonians through delivering to our five priorities of shaping:

- **A city that's easy to live in**
- **A city where our people thrive**
- **A central city where our people love to be**
- **A fun city with lots to do**
- **A green city**

The topic of this staff submission is aligned with all of Hamilton City Council's five priorities.

## Council Approval and Reference

This staff submission was approved by Hamilton City Council's Chief Executive on 19 May 2025.

Submission # 802

Proactively Released

**It should be noted that the following submisison is from staff at Hamilton City Council and does not, therefore, necessarily represent the views of the Council itself.**

# Key Messages and Recommendations

### INTRODUCTION

1. Hamilton City Council staff welcome the opportunity to make a submission to the Civil Defence National Emergency Agency on its April 2025 discussion document **Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation.**

### SUBMISSION FROM THE WAIKATO CIVIL DEFENCE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT GROUP

2. Hamilton City Council is a member council of the Waikato Civil Defence Emergency Management Group (Waikato CDEM Group).

3. The Waikato CDEM Group comprises the following 11 member councils: Hamilton City Council; Waikato Regional Council; Hauraki District Council; Matamata-Piako District Council; Otorohanga District Council; South Waikato District Council; Taupo District Council; Thames-Coromandel District Council; Waipa District Council; Waikato District Council; and Waitomo District Council.

### SUPPORT FOR THE WAIKATO CDEM GROUP SUBMISSION

4. Overall, Hamilton City Council staff support the comprehensive submission made by the Waikato CDEM Group to the Civil Defence National Emergency Agency on its April 2025 discussion document **Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation.**

### EMPHASIS ON KEY SUBMISSION POINTS

5. The Waikato CDEM Group's submission provides extensive commentary on all 16 Issues raised in the Civil Defence National Emergency Agency's April 2025 discussion document.

6. While Hamilton City Council staff support all the points outlined for these 16 Issues, we would particularly like to emphasise/support the points raised in Issues 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 16.

### OTHER COMMENTS

7. Pages 25-26 of the Waikato CDEM Group submission outlines eight further key points relating to the reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation.

8. Hamilton City Council staff also fully support these eight points (as outlined below) and recommend that they be addressed by the Civil Defence National Agency.

   i. ***Lack of Proposed Funding Structures****: The absence of clear funding structures at national, regional, and local levels raises concerns about the effective delivery and implementation of emergency management.*

   ii. ***Impact on Ratepayers****: Without clarity on the funding structure, the potential impact on ratepayers remains uncertain. If there is significant impact this necessitates council consultation with communities to address these concerns.*

   iii. ***Resource Allocation and National Support****: Many options are currently under-resourced, and additional spending proposals require clarification on whether there will be national support to ensure these initiatives are feasible.*

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iv. ***Bill Timeline and Budget Alignment****: The proposed Bill timeline does not align with the local authority budget setting (late 2026) for long term plans (2027-2037), which could complicate financial planning and implementation.*

v. ***Nationally Consistent Long-Term Plan Measures****: Establishing nationally consistent long-term plan measures across the 4Rs (Reduction, Readiness, Response, Recovery) and integrating them with the Local Government Act can provide better assurance on delivery and avoid siloed emergency management.*

vi. ***Clarity on Powers Outside of Declaration****: There is a need for clear guidelines on the powers that can be exercised outside of a formal declaration to ensure proper governance and accountability.*

vii. ***Consultation with CDEM Groups****: Any emergency management secondary legislation and rules should mandate consultation with Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups before being set, ensuring that local insights and needs are considered.*

viii. ***Issuance of a Roadmap Post-NDRS Review****: A roadmap following the National Disaster Recovery Strategy (NDRS) review would provide a clear plan for future actions and support coordinated recovery efforts. Will a roadmap be issued?*

## Further Information and Opportunity to Discuss our Submission

**9.** Should the Civil Defence National Emergency Agency require clarification of the submission from Hamilton City Council staff, or additional information, please contact **Kelvin Powell** (Safety and Resilience Unit Director / Civil Defence Controller) on s9(2)(a) or email s9(2)(a) in the first instance.

**10.** Hamilton City Council representatives would welcome the opportunity to discuss the content of this submission in more detail with the Civil Defence National Emergency Agency.

Yours faithfully



**Lance Vervoort**
**CHIEF EXECUTIVE**

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**FURTHER INFORMATION**
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0800 800 401

15 May 2025

National Emergency Management Agency
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6140

Email: emergencymanagementbill@nema.govt.nz

Dear Sir/Madam

**Waikato Regional Council staff feedback to Emergency Management Bill Discussion Document**

Thank you for the opportunity to submit on the proposed Emergency Management Bill Discussion Document. Please find attached the Waikato Regional Council's staff comments, signed under delegation.

Should you have any queries regarding the content of this document please contact Leah Newman, Policy Advisor, Policy Implementation directly on s9(2)(a) or by email s9(2)(a)

Regards,

Lisette Balsom
**Manager, Strategic Policy implementation**

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Staff submission from Waikato Regional Council on the Emergency Management Bill Discussion Document

## Introduction

1. We appreciate the opportunity to provide feedback on the Emergency Management Bill Discussion Document.

2. Waikato Regional Council staff recognise the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act is New Zealand's overarching emergency management legislation.

3. Regional councils play a crucial role in working with territorial authorities and communities to coordinate effective emergency response and preparedness.

4. Our feedback has answered several questions from the discussion document, focusing on issues that impact the functions of Waikato Regional Council. The Waikato Civil Defence Emergency Management team have also submitted feedback and provided further comments on all issues.

5. We look forward to future consultation processes to incorporate the proposals into relevant statutes and would welcome the opportunity to comment on any issues explored during their development.

## General Comments

6. Overall, we support the proposal to amend legislation and are generally supportive of the objectives identified in the discussion document.

7. We suggest the lack of consistent, dedicated funding to support iwi and community-led emergency management is a barrier that needs to be addressed in this legislation.

8. We consider legislation should seek to define risk thresholds, specifying how to determine what is considered acceptable, tolerable and intolerable.

9. We recommend the legislation recognises and accounts for the significant resources and expertise provided by local authorities to Civil Defence during emergencies.

**Submitter details**

Waikato Regional Council
Private Bag 3038
Waikato Mail Centre
Hamilton 3240

Contact person:

Leah Newman
Policy Advisor, Policy Implementation
Email: s9(2)(a)
Phone: s9(2)(a)

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**SUBMISSION ON EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT BILL DISCUSSION DOCUMENT**

| **Objective 1: Strengthening community and Iwi Māori participation** | |
|---|---|
| *Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities* | |
| Do you agree with how we have described the problem? | The problem description accurately identifies how emergency responses often lack consideration of vulnerable people and communities. The proposed Waikato CDEM Group Plan 2025-2030 currently out for consultation similarly recognises the inequalities in outcomes for these groups and calls for inclusive, community-informed planning and readiness. |
| Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) or the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options? | Our preferred option is Option 3 (legislative – Require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for): this option leverages existing capability and knowledge, particularly in areas where engagement and relationships are already in place. Additionally, it encourages community connections and preparedness. |
| Are there any other options that should be considered? | We suggest strengthening collaboration with vulnerable communities and leveraging existing relationships where possible could be utilised to enhance preparedness and response efforts. Connections through regional community panels or iwi forums are already in place and could be utilised to avoid engagement fatigue and capacity issues. |
| Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies? | Yes. Systemic underinvestment in infrastructure, digital exclusion, housing insecurity, limited access to transport options and lower socioeconomic status all contribute to increased vulnerabilities. |
| What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies? | Better informed planning would involve actively collaborating with groups disproportionately affected by emergencies and utilising relevant data at both a local and national level to develop tools that encompass the 4Rs (reduction, readiness, response and recovery). |
| *Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management* | |
| Do you agree with how we have described the problem? | Yes. |

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| | |
|---|---|
| Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) or the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options? | We support options 3 (legislative – Require iwi Māori representation on CDEM Group decision-making structures) and 4 (legislative – Require CDEM Groups to engage with iwi Māori during the development of CDEM Group plans): as they provide a legislative mandate that includes iwi Māori representation and engagement at decision making levels. However, we note that these options need to be supported by capability and capacity funding from central government. |
| Are there any other options that should be considered? | A key responsibility of Waikato Regional Council is to consult with iwi Māori and establish partnerships. We do this through forums like community panels and formal agreements such as Joint Management Agreements (JMA). We believe Civil Defence should also form lasting partnerships with iwi Māori. This could lead to recognising iwi Māori as responders under legislation, allowing them to declare emergencies on the land they manage or co-govern, and enabling formal roles for rūnanga, marae, and hapū in local planning. |
| Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies? | No. We recommend the roles and description need to better reflect the cultural, spiritual and relational roles of iwi Māori and the resource they provide such as marae-based response centres. Iwi need to be recognised not just as contributors but leaders before, during and after emergencies. |
| How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system? | Iwi should be recognised at both governance and operational levels with funding and decision-making rights. We suggest a similar approach to JMAs under the Resource Management Act (RMA) where iwi and council share responsibilities and which demonstrates the benefits of collaborative decision-making and strengthened relationships. This approach could be beneficial in recognising Iwi Māori in the emergency management system. |
| What should be the relationship between CDEM Groups and iwi Māori? | We suggest a formalised partnership based on the approach grounded in Te Tiriti o Waitangi obligations. Through formalised partnerships, co-development emergency strategies and responses could be developed and shared decision-making and funding iwi-led resilience initiatives could be implemented. |
| What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori? | Upholding a partnership-based approach under Te Tiriti o Waitangi obligations could enable iwi Māori to be represented in Coordinating Executive Groups as voting members with resourcing supporting participation. |
| What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and matauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director? | Upholding a partnership-based approach under Te Tiriti o Waitangi obligations could allow for the creation of a national iwi-CDEM rōpu with regional input, established under legislation. This group should be resourced and supported to engage directly and regularly with NEMA leadership. |

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|---|---|
| *Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?* | |
| Are there any other options that should be considered? | We consider the lack of consistent, dedicated funding to support iwi and community-led emergency management is barrier that needs to be addressed. Iwi Māori often face capacity and resourcing constraints due to the demand for engagement with local and central government across other processes. We encourage legislation providing dedicated operational resourcing alongside planning mandates. |
| **Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional and local levels** | |
| *Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management* | |
| Do you agree with how we have described the problem? | Yes, we strongly agree that locally led delivery of emergency management is a strength of the current system. |
| Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) or the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options? | Option 3 ( legislative – Require CDEM Group plans to state how each member will fund and deliver on the functions and decisions of the CDEM Group) is preferred but could benefit from incorporating elements of option 2 (legislative – Provide distinct responsibilities for CDEM Groups and their local authority members).<br><br>Option 3 allows for better coordination of responses that align with the available capacity, capability and funding. Option 2 focuses on strengthening the performance of both local authorities and CDEM groups, encouraging effective communication and collaboration.<br><br>A combined approach would strengthen the performance of CDEM groups and local authorities through encouraging effective communication and collaboration, reducing duplication of work, and allowing for local flexibility when delivering emergency management. This approach would also improve accountability and ensure responsibilities are clearly met through CDEM Group plans. We suggest this hybrid approach would align expectations, capacity and capability of local authorities and CDEM groups, supporting more efficient use of resources while reducing overall costs during and after emergencies. |
| Are there any other options that should be considered? | We suggest there is a current disconnect in how local authorities and CDEM work together. Local authorities have technical capabilities but are often constrained by capacity. Legislative direction on responsibilities could assist in clarifying roles and accountabilities at the national, regional and local levels. |
| **Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management** | |
| *Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management* | |
| Do you agree with how we have described the problem? | Yes. |

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|---|---|
| Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) or the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options? | We recommend a combination of option 1 (status quo), option 2 (non-legislative – Provide clearer guidance about what it means to achieve an "acceptable" level of risk) and option 4 (legislative – Enable the form and content of the CDEM Group plans to be prescribed through secondary legislation).<br><br>Within our rohe, option 1 has worked well though effective consultation with communities, encouraging conversation and enabling decision making at the local level regarding work such as adaptation plans.<br><br>Option 2 facilitates discussion about hazard mitigation and engagement between various stakeholders. We consider that costs associated with identifying hazard mitigation currently largely sits with local authorities. Therefore, clarity regarding funding, labour and capacity is essential when considering option 2.<br><br>We agree with the benefits outlined in option 4 and support a consistent standard of emergency management across New Zealand. However, there is a need to still maintain flexibility for regional variation.<br><br>A combined approach would continue to encourage consultation with communities, allowing for local-level decisions, supported by clearer guidance on "acceptable" levels of risk. Enhanced consistency would be provided through updated guidance and strengthened assurance of CDEM group plans. Combining these options supports practical implementation, utilises existing relationships and ensures better alignment both regionally and nationally while still allowing for flexibility to reflect regional variation. |
| Are there any other options that should be considered? | The Waikato Regional Policy Statement (WRPS) defines natural hazard risk, with three levels of risk tolerance identified. We recommend legislation should define risk thresholds, specifying how to determine what is considered acceptable, tolerable and intolerable. Inclusion of risk-based thresholds in legislation ensures national consistency when planning and responding to emergencies. |
| What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group Plans? | The right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency relies on clearly defined parameters. We consider guidance should be provided on how to operate under the regulatory framework. This will ensure national consistency while accommodating regional variation. We encourage the intentional design of regulation to strike this balance. |
| What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans for being well integrated with other local government planning instruments? | Current barriers stem from a lack of understanding of the content and intent of various plans (regional plans, district plans and CDEM Group plans) as well as how current legislation compliments each other such as Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act, Resource Management Act and National Policy Statement for Natural Hazards. The current RMA framework is specific on considerations for planning decisions, which can limit the ability of local authorities to incorporate group plan provisions. We consider there is a need for central government to better understand how these legislative frameworks are interconnected. |
| Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable | Yes. |

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| | |
|---|---|
| local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why? | To enable local authorities to deliver effective risk management, it is essential that legislation recognises the role of local authority staff in emergency management across the four Rs (reduction, readiness, response and recovery). Currently, local authority staff, such as geotechnical and hydrology experts, provide essential knowledge to support Civil Defence during emergencies, helping to inform decisions, coordinate responses and mitigate risks. Without the expertise from local government staff during events, responses could be significantly delayed. We recommend that legislation considers the essential resources and capabilities provided by local authorities in emergencies as well as the capacity to inform and implement natural hazard risk reduction. |
| **Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services** | |
| *11.1 Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"* | |
| We consider the definition for "lifeline utility" must be carefully considered as the change in definition will impact on plan making and decisions at a regional level. The definition should be connected to physical infrastructure; a separate definition could be introduced to differentiate essential services that rely on lifeline utilities.<br><br>We support the inclusion of natural hazard management infrastructure as a lifeline utility, particularly those that accommodate critical infrastructure such as stop banks/spillways, flood gates, pump stations, telemetry and nature based solutions that are vital during emergency events. | |

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | s9(2)(a) |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Whanganui District Council |

☒ The Privacy Act 2020 applies to submissions. Please tick the box if you **do not** want your name or other personal information to be included in any information about submissions that NEMA may publish.

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☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Insert response

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3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

   As stated within the discussion document, everyone has a role to play in emergency management – before, during and after disaster strikes. Therefore, any change to the current status quo that creates and fosters an environment for participation within emergency management, is positive.

   Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

   ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

   ☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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As the document points out, there are many different groups representing Māori that are active, or might be called upon, in an emergency, all with varying mandates, representation, resourcing, funding streams and capacity. Identifying proportionate, effective and consistent representational engagement from multiple and at times conflicting or politically opposed groups can be problematic. Legislating representation may cause more division, resistance, and expense than expected.

Locally, while iwi Māori participation in CDEM has been actively pursued, encouraged and practiced for a decade, designated iwi level representatives rarely engage in the "before" environment and representation at the coordinating level in "during" can be difficult to achieve. If representation is legislatively mandated, caveats must be included to allow for variations in representation.

Insert response

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Support Option 2 (non-legislative): Address the roles of iwi Māori in plans, guidance, and other policy settings, allowing for local variations within CDEM groups.

   Insert response

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

    As community partner agencies, but with flexibility to allow for variations in circumstances and representation

    Insert response

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

    Please explain your views.

    Insert response

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

    Please explain your views.

    Insert response

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

    Please explain your views.

    Insert response

14. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

    Please explain your views.

    Insert response

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## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Emergency management in New Zealand is based on the principle that everyone plays a role in managing their own risks and helping their families, neighbours, and people in their own networks. Communities make significant contributions in the immediate aftermath of an emergency and have an important role in risk reduction and resilience. In past events communities have experienced difficulty in connecting with the formal emergency management system, therefore change is required to enable this connectivity.

Thjs is a significant part of local BAU Readiness effort for CDEM in our location. Public engagement in risk reduction and resilience pre-event is directly related to their awareness of risk, and this is tied to both education and (most heavily) recent personal experiences.

Flexibility in this area is needed, particularly at the Local level where operational decisions to utilise local resources are made rapidly. The ability and authority to engage with and utilise community support must be able to be done locally as well as at Group level.

Insert response

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

17. Support Option 2 (non-legislative): Develop and update guidance and strengthen public education

**18.**

Insert response

**19. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**20. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

People, businesses, and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency. They may need to take immediate action to help other people themselves before the official emergency management response starts. These actions may save lives or property or stop the emergency from getting worse. People and businesses may also need to use personal property to save lives before official responders arrive (for example, using privately owned inflatable boats to rescue stranded people).

There are numerous examples from past events of groups attempting to help during emergencies and their offers being turned away or ignored. The current legislative environment creates a risk adverse approach when considering community offers of assistance, change is required.

Insert response

**21. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Support Option 2 (legislative): Provide for protection from civil liability

Insert response

**22. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**23. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**24. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The discussion document defines the 'problem' as

78. Who has command and control of the overall operational response to an emergency is sometimes ambiguous – it is not explicit in the CDEM Act. This ambiguity is intensified when:
    - there is no declared state of emergency
    - the hazard that caused the emergency does not have a pre-determined lead agency
    - the emergency was caused by multiple hazards.

However as previously stated within the discussion document (page 6) the current CDEM Act 2002 defines the term 'emergency' and clearly states the trigger points for declaring a CDEM emergency.

The discussion document goes on to further define the 'problem' (points 79, 80) in particular "without an overarching command structure to which all participants subscribe – with one entity directing and leading the response – the result will always be confusion, duplication, and even conflict" (point 80)

The root cause of the confusion (even within the discussion document) seems to stem from a misunderstanding of Command v Control. The discussion document defines 'control' (note 10 bottom of page 21) yet indicates that the CDEM Act 2002 does not clearly state this definition (the definition is clearly outlined and taught with the Coordinated Incident Management System 'CIMS').

This confusion could stem from a lack of exposure to or training in CIMS. It therefore could be addressed by investment in the training of CIMS at all levels and agencies. (it could be construed that some agencies and their leadership structures are reticent to train or invest in CIMS "without an overarching command structure to which all participants subscribe".

The discussion document goes on to propose four options to address the defined 'issues', each with their own pros and cons. I would propose that regardless of the chosen option, failure will again occur if investment in training is not prioritised by agencies involved in future responses, CIMS as an Incident Command System is well proven when those involved in its use are sufficiently trained and experienced in its use. Lead Agencies and "Control" agencies whose staff are not well practiced in the use of Incident Command Systems will struggle to control or lead larger incidents.

The discussion document seems to have missed an opportunity to state clearly in law that CIMS is the national Incident Command System to be used by all agencies throughout New

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Zealand. It or any other identified replacement system must be mandated as such otherwise it will not be successful.

Insert response

**25. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Of the four proposed options, only option 3 specifically talks to increased investment and training.

Option 3 appears as an enhanced and defined 'status quo'. This lessens the inevitable training burden by building on the existing lessons learned, training, and investment of the past decades.

Whichever option is chosen, success or failure will be determined by the trained state and inter-operability of the Agencies involved.

Support Option 3 with emphasis placed on investment in training at all levels.

Insert response

**26. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**27. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**28. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The Government's response to the Inquiry noted that **locally led delivery of emergency management is a strength of our system**. Local authorities are better placed than central government to understand and manage the risks communities face and partner with them to build resilience.

This statement seems to contradict:

84. The 2018 Technical Advisory Group report into better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies (the TAG report) found that CDEM Groups have taken different

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approaches to providing emergency management which has impacted effectiveness and confidence in the system. The TAG report found that "approaches are not always collaborative" and that **some local authorities "do not buy-in to the joint planning and implementation activities".** The Government agreed that local authorities should engage fully in the regional approach that was the intent of the CDEM Act.

The discussion document goes on to state:

88 Coordinating Executive Groups have varied levels of engagement by their members which means that they are not as effective as was intended in supporting the CDEM Groups with planning advice and implementing CDEM Group decisions and plans.

Our observations of the variations in regional approaches is as follows:

Regions and Groups that have moved to a more centrally led Group models is that it is often done in a way to save costs as the primary driver rather than improve capabilities. It shifts or increases expectations of support from or between agencies or Districts. Local Councils will often reduce investment in their own capabilities on the assumption that the Region will provide when required, and therefore there are savings to be made. This also impacts on the representation level between Group and local Councils.

Regions with less centralised models vary widely in their local abilities, with some being very collaborative and others being less so. Strengthening the regional tier without reducing the requirement to strengthen or maintain local capability is critical..

Insert response

**29. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Recommend Option 2, with emphasis on empowering local authorities to develop aligned operational level or local plans and response capabilities.

Insert response

**30. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**32. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

96-98 outline perceived issues with the current models used to deliver CDEM throughout New Zealand.
99 states "The Government Inquiry noted that there needs to be clarity about roles and accountabilities between the regional (CDEM Group) and local levels (local authorities), including Group Controllers, CDEM Groups, and the Chairs and chief executives of regional councils."
100 "In particular, the Inquiry noted that the roles and accountability lines of Group Controllers and Local Controllers are unclear, with multiple reporting lines and layers of accountability."
102 notes the variability between CDEM Groups in particular how CDEM staff are employed.
As previously identified, locally led delivery of emergency management is a strength of our system**.** Only options 1 and partially 2 allow for local delivery of emergency management, and true engagement with community at the community level.
The perceived risks of options 1 and 2 could be substantially addressed through building the accountability of CEG as suggested above.
As mentioned within the discussion document (point 39 page 10, Page 30 Option 2 and Option 3) "Some people and groups have different needs that can't be met through a "one size fits all" approach." Option 3 would not provide the flexibility needed to manage emergencies across diverse locales.

Insert response

**33. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Support Option 1 as preference, then Option 2, both with emphasis placed on building the capabilities and responsibilities of CEG.

Insert response

**34. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**35. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Points 104-106 outline perceived issues regarding CEG, in particular point 105: "There are varied levels of engagement in Coordinating Executive Group throughout the country. In some cases, attendance at meetings is inconsistent or delegated.:

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In most areas observed by our team, the issues are around resourcing (including Council size and rate-payer base) along with the level of ownership of emergency management by the Chief Executive (CE), who is in reality the functional bottom line for committing operational funding and enabling local council capabilities and shareable resources rather than Elected members or delegated officers.
Resourcing issues are a root cause for the perceived failure of the current CDEM system in may circumstances. Of the four options presented Option 4 (legislative) removing the ability for CEG membership to be delegated, and requiring a single specified delegate would provide CEG with the impetus and financial commitment authority needed to address many of the perceived failings outlined throughout the document.

Insert response

**36. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Support Option 4 as preference. A strong, well represented CEG would address many if not all the perceived failings within the current system.

Insert response

**37. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**38. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The discussion document outlines a few challenges with the current requirements for updating CDEM planning. 112 outlines the administrative burden faced by NEMA and CDEM Groups when updating planning. Of the three options presented only option 2 addresses change, and allows for National and Group plans to be changed.

Insert response

**39. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Support Option 2

Insert response

**40. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**41. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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# Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

## Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**42. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Insert response

**43. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

**Support options 3 or 4**. The government inquiry found that the monitoring and assurance of the emergency management system needed to be strengthened (point 120) Options 3 and 4 provide legislative powers for the Director to prescribe rules for agencies involved in CDEM activities. It is considered that, without legislative authority, the status quo will remain regardless of the intentions of options 1 and 2.

Insert response

**44. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**45. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**46. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Insert response

**47. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views. 127. Under a state of emergency or the imminent threat of an emergency, the Minister may direct the Director, CDEM Groups, or any other person to perform or exercise or cease any functions, duties, or powers conferred on that person under the Act. The Minister can require these actions to be performed under the control and to the satisfaction of the Director.

128. Outside a declared emergency or imminent threat of emergency, there are few mechanisms for the Director or Minister to address performance issues when parties are not sufficiently meeting their responsibilities under the Act.

129. This means that even when parties are failing to carry out their functions and duties effectively, there is limited ability to take immediate action to address performance issues

It is considered that without legislative authority, the status quo will remain regardless of the intentions of option 1, thus support options 2 or 3

Insert response

**48. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**49. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**50. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

136. One of the reasons for the establishment of CDEM Groups were established was to bring the different hazard risk management tools held by territorial authorities and regional councils together, so they can be used in an integrated and coordinated way.

137. However, this isn't consistently happening in practice. For example, CDEM Group plans are key instruments for driving action across the 4 Rs, but some focus mainly on the activities of the Group Office instead of taking a whole-of-region view (including assigning specific responsibilities to local authorities, emergency services, and other regional agencies). It is also ambiguous what achieving an "acceptable" level of risk should look like.

In order to achieve national consistency legislative change is required to avoid versions of the status quo.

Support Option 4

Insert response

**51. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**52. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**53. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**54. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

Proactively Released

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**55. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

145. Emergencies can create irreparable loss or damage to things that the public values which can create negative consequences on the wellbeing and safety of the public. However, this is not always provided due consideration during and after emergencies. This is particularly true for: a. the loss of significant taonga and other cultural heritage b. the loss of pets, working animals, wildlife and livestock

Insert response

**56. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Support Option 2 Develop guidance on considering taonga and other cultural heritage. Regionally, work in this space is progressing well without the need for legislative change.

Insert response

**57. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**58. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

154. Research shows that the integration of animals into emergency management planning and arrangements is critical to human health and safety, as well as to the economy, biodiversity and ecosystem health.

155. The loss of pets, working animals, and livestock during emergencies can also cause emotional distress and trauma for owners and the loss of wildlife can have negative impacts on communities. Individuals may also put themselves in harm's way due to their concern about their animals.

MPI are the lead agency for animal welfare concerns, MPI are noticeable in their absence in the options presented, and MPI current published local and regional plans on this subject are examples of generic template plans that are of little use at the operational delivery level.

Care for animals falls by default to local authorities and is not currently covered under remuneration in the status quo.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**59. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Option 3 is the best fit for this, although special consideration needs to be taken for the differences between farm/production animals and pets or lifestyle block animals.

Insert response

**60. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**61. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**62. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**63. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**64. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Support Option 2

Insert response

**65. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**66. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**68. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**69. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Support Option 2

Insert response

**70. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**71. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Some providers have been very proactive in this area while others less so. This appears to be an improving area based on our interactions, but also can involve many different providers in different regions due to the privatised nature of some lifelines. Visibility of lifelines status in events is critical for all levels of emergency response coordination.

Insert response

**72. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Support Option 2

Insert response

**73. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

GiS dashboards and filters built and set at Local, Regional and National levels with information metrics appropriate to the information needs at each. Allowances for local variations but key metrics standardised (if numerical only).

Insert response

Proactively Released

**74. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**75. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**76. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**77. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**78. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**80. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The issue with delays in clearing agencies or responders for access is noted. This I would consider to be an example of where centralised or more distant Control and decision making reduces effectiveness in events, with risk averse local Controllers or decision makers requesting guidance or decisions from more remote (and potentially overwhelmed) Control agencies who have less accurate awareness of local conditions.

Flexibility in this area and delegation to local or incident controllers with the caveat of protection mentioned earlier in the document while still allowing for legislative enforcement should it be needed is preferred.

Insert response

**81. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Support Option 1. Status Quo

Insert response

**82. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**83. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

There is an inconsistent description of functions and powers between CDEM Groups, Controllers and Recovery Managers, which make roles and responsibilities unclear and potentially inappropriate in terms of accountability.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**84. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Support Option 2 (legislative): Tidy up existing functions and powers related to CDEM Groups, Controllers, and Recovery Managers

Insert response

**85. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**86. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period is impractical in some situations. During an emergency, this could delay crucial access to emergency powers needed to respond to an emergency, including those necessary to save or protect life and property. Obtaining a physical signature could also waste time and resources that could be better used doing something else. This can be partially resolved by training and experience, but may vary as a problem with the differences in elected member engagement or availability

Insert response

**87. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Support Option 2 (legislative): Enable authorised persons to use electronic signatures

Insert response

**88. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**89. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Each CDEM Group must appoint at least one person (an elected representative) authorised to declare a local state of emergency or give notice of a local transition period within the CDEM Group area.

The current overlap in who can declare or give notice over a single district or wards (either the mayor of the affected district or another elected member of the CDEM Group) may cause confusion and delay.

Insert response

**90. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Support Option 2: (legislative): Mayors have primary responsibility for declaring a local state of emergency or giving notice of a local transition period for their district or wards

Insert response

**91. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**92. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**93. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Insert response

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19 May 2025

Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency
PO Box 5010, Wellington 6140
EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

Tēnā koe

## Re: Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

Thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback on the National Emergency Management Agency's (NEMA) consultation document on the review of the emergency management system.

Engineering New Zealand is the largest professional body for engineers in New Zealand. This submission reflects the views of Engineering New Zealand. Engineering New Zealand represents over 23,000 engineers, including engineers that support the emergency management sector.

Engineering New Zealand welcomes the Government's commitment to reform. We agree that the enabling legislation for New Zealand's emergency management sector needs to be updated, clarified and amended to support a high functioning system needed to manage our growing disaster risk. Recent events highlighted several lessons, including areas where the system did not respond in the way that is expected or required.

This covering letter outlines the areas of the consultation document that are of greatest importance to engineers. Attached to this letter is our completed submission form that provides responses on the questions and options provided in the consultation document.

**Improving protections from civil liability for undertaking emergency management activity in good faith**

Engineers play a crucial role in emergency response, most notably in providing rapid assessments on the safety of various structures after an event. These assessments help protect the public and support the continued delivery of critical infrastructure. It is important that engineers are enabled to do this efficiently and this expertise can be accessed quickly.

Engineering New Zealand welcomes the focus on improving protections from civil liability for undertaking emergency management activity in good faith. Engineers who undertake rapid assessments have to do so with limited time, resources and information available to them. They act on their best professional judgment. This means that the conclusion of these assessments can change in the future if structures are re-assessed. This can lead to challenges for the engineers involved.

**Compensation for engineering professionals**

We also welcome efforts to enable compensation for labour costs. It is important that professionals who are required to provide services immediately during an emergency can be compensated for their time and expertise. We support a requirement at both a national and local plan level to address the procurement of specialist professional services.

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**Clear roles and responsibilities**

We consider that clarity of roles and responsibilities before, during and after an emergency is key. As the consultation document highlights, the current legislation does not always make these roles clear, which can lead to confusion and duplication. It is important that the legislation ensures the right people have the tools they need to plan for and respond to an emergency as efficiently as possible. A key aspect of this is clear processes and procedures to share information and communicate. This should also ensure that people have access to appropriate expertise (i.e.. engineers) when an emergency happens.

We support a whole-of-society approach to emergency management that draws on the expertise and resources of iwi, hapū, community groups, businesses, volunteers and others. Engineers often work alongside these groups in emergency response, and a system that better enables collaboration and values community led input is likely to deliver better outcomes. We see value in continuing to explore how the system can better support these kinds of partnerships in practice.

It is also important that the emergency management system is designed to enable the right people to take control, when necessary, to partner when appropriate, and to step aside when others are best placed to lead. Engineers understand the importance of this balance, particularly when working in complex, high stakes environments after a disaster. We support efforts to reflect this principle in future system settings.

**National direction**

We support the development of clear and robust national direction to lift the consistency and quality of emergency management across the country. In our view, national direction should set clear expectations for performance, regardless of where an event occurs. It will also support councils that may not have the capacity or capability to deliver a quality emergency management service on their own.

To be effective, this direction should be supported by practical guidance that clearly sets out what good practice looks like and how it can be achieved. This approach will support delivery and build confidence in the sector.

Engineering New Zealand would like to see a greater focus on emergency preparedness and activities to help support community preparedness. It is important to enable communities to practice responses, support response and recovery plans and develop enduring relationships. Some communities/regions already have robust processes and run comprehensive simulations to help ensure they are as prepared as possible. We would like to see a greater focus and expectation for this in national direction.

**Alignment with other regulatory regimes**

The design of buildings and infrastructure can greatly support efforts to reduce risk in an emergency. Engineering New Zealand continues to advocate for strong building and planning systems that support resilient infrastructure that reflects New Zealand's growing hazard risk. We would like to see NEMA play a stronger role in ensuring related systems also provide resilient infrastructure to support a robust risk management approach.

In particular, we would like to see better alignment and integration between the Emergency Management legislation and the Building Act. This must include ensuring better coordination between responsible agencies and processes, including the Rapid Building Assessment process and processes/plans provided in Emergency Management legislation.

We support the concept of a broadened definition of critical infrastructure and note that this aligns with the approach taken in other recent legislative reform processes (i.e.. Resource Management reform). We recommend that wherever possible definitions of critical or essential infrastructure are aligned to help reduce confusion and misinterpretation.

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**Conclusion**

Thank you again for the opportunity to contribute towards strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation. Engineering New Zealand has access to engineers with significant experience working within the emergency management system and would be happy to facilitate a conversation to provide NEMA with more detailed technical advice and experiences. Please contact us if this would help support your policy development. We look forward to continuing to support this work as it progresses.

Nakū, na



**Dr Richard Templer**
Chief Executive

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Dr Richard Templer (Chief Executive) |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Engineering New Zealand |

☐ The Privacy Act 2020 applies to submissions. Please tick the box if you **do not** want your name or other personal information to be included in any information about submissions that NEMA may publish.

☐ NEMA may publish submissions or a summary of submissions to its website, civildefence.govt.nz. If you **do not** want your submission or a summary of your submission to be published, please tick the box and type an explanation below:

I do not want my submission published on NEMA's website because...

### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We are generally supportive of the proposed objectives for reform.

However, we consider that a few areas should be better reflected:

- Recovery needs to be more clearly addressed. Legislation should set clear direction for the recovery phase following an event.
- Communication infrastructure, which is critical during response and recovery, must also be prioritised under minimising disruption to essential services.
- Ensuring access to expert resources when an emergency happens is clearly reflected, this can be included in objective e.
- Continued development in hazardous locations, such as near the coast or on unstable slopes, remains a concern and should be addressed to strengthen resilience.
- Coordination and consistency with related regulatory regimes could be included. This would help ensure alignment between the Emergency Management legislation, Building Act and Resource Management Act) and reduce misinterpretation.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

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## Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree with how the problem has been described and are supportive of efforts to plan for the needs of all communities and people, as this should help improve outcomes during emergencies.

In addition, we recommend greater focus on preparedness and readiness activities that make these plans effective in practice. This includes undertaking regular exercises, building relationships with partners, and developing joint response and recovery arrangements. These steps would help ensure that planning efforts are inclusive and result in a system that is ready to respond effectively when an emergency occurs.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support option 3 "require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for".
It is our view that legislating this requirement would ensure a consistent approach across all Groups and provide clarity for councils and communities.

**5. What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree with how the problem has been described. We support the focus on iwi Māori and efforts to reflect mātauranga Māori in the emergency management system, efforts to recognise and enable iwi Māori contributions will benefit all communities across Aotearoa. We defer any recommendations to those best suited to comment.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Engineering New Zealand has, among other things, previously helped provide information on suitable engineers to assist in an emergency. However, the process is often unclear and inefficient. Clear processes that help communities provide information and access resources will enable a better response after an emergency.

We would like to see more formalised relationships/plans to procure specialist expertise (i.e.. engineering) before an emergency occurs. This would help enable rapid access to critical advice in an emergency.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

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*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree with the description. However, to provide further context, engineers can face distinct challenges when operating in the emergency management system. Engineers play a role in providing rapid assessments on the safety of various structures after an event, particularly after earthquakes. This assessment helps protect the public and supports the continued delivery of critical infrastructure. It is vital that engineers are enabled to do this efficiently. Engineers who undertake rapid assessments must do so with limited time, resources and information available to them. They act on their best professional judgment. Because of this, the outcome of these assessments can change in the future and engineers can face significant backlash.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We are supportive of both legislative options (options 2 and 3).

**Protection from civil liability**

Protection from civil liability would help ensure that people (including engineers) can act quickly in emergency situations without fear of legal risk – this would improve the response phase overall. However, we have some concerns around how this would work in practice- particularly in relation to the overlap with Rapid Building Assessments (RBA) provided in section 390 of the Building Act.

It is important to ensure that people working under the direction/delegated authority of either the responsible person (BA) or controller (CDEMA) must be covered by this proposal. We would like to see all professionals who provide expert advice in an emergency or in preparation for one to be covered by this proposal.

We recommend that there is some form of safeguard around this proposal that ensures people who act quickly in emergency situations are properly qualified or competent to do so otherwise situations may arise where helpers endanger themselves or others (i.e. someone needing to demolish a building to ensure peoples safety is suitably skilled to do so). This could be some form of reasonable person test.

**Compensation for labour costs**

It is our view that enabling compensation for labour costs would formalise a process that is happening informally, where councils reimburse costs after the fact. Further, recognising labour as a public good while creating certainty around reimbursement would encourage faster action and support better outcomes. Current practice expects that RBA assessors volunteer their time. We would like to ensure that these assessors are fairly compensated for their work at a standardised/pre-agreed rate. As above, we would like to ensure that all experts who provide their services in an emergency context are able to access compensation.

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Both options would give CDEM controllers more certainty, streamline decisions, and support faster emergency responses. It would also enable engineers to continue to provide this critical service.

We note that there is still a role for informal/un-coordinated assistance in some cases, particularly in support of life-saving efforts, it is important that the system is flexible enough to acknowledge and recognise these cases.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Engineering New Zealand supports having clear roles and responsibilities, particularly during and after an emergency. It is important that the public and those involved in the response understand who is responsible for direction and coordination functions.

It is important that the legislation ensures the right people have the tools they need to plan for and respond to an emergency as efficiently as possible. A key aspect of this is clear processes and procedures to share information and communicate. This should also ensure that people have access to appropriate expertise (i.e.. engineers) when an emergency happens.

We support a whole-of-society approach to emergency management that draws on the expertise and resources of iwi, hapū, community groups, businesses, volunteers and others. Engineers often work alongside these groups in emergency response, and a system that better enables collaboration and values community led input is likely to deliver better outcomes. We see value in continuing to explore how the system can better support these kinds of partnerships in practice. We see the importance of a very

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strong relationship between NEMA and other agencies, especially MBIE for the RBA process.

It is also important that the emergency management system is designed to enable the right people to take control, when necessary, to partner when appropriate, and to step aside when others are best placed to lead. Engineers understand the importance of this balance, particularly when working in complex, high stakes environments after a disaster. We support efforts to reflect this principle in future system settings.

We defer detailed comments on where those responsibilities should sit or how they are structured to those with expertise in emergency management.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Please see response provided to issue 5.

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We understand that there is duplication between the roles of Sector Coordinating Entities (SCE) and Lifelines Group, as noted in the WaterNZ submission. We encourage further work to clarify these roles and how they should best interact. It is important that there is not duplication or misalignment with various roles across the system.

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Please see response provided in issue 5.

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Plans should be easy to update based on improved understanding, new information, technology or lessons learnt from recent emergencies. Engineering New Zealand supports improving the ability to make amendments as required.

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

Proactively Released

## Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Engineering New Zealand supports having national direction to lift the consistency and quality of emergency management across the country. This would help smaller councils and support more consistent interpretation and delivery. National direction should set clear expectations and be supported by practical guidance that defines good practice and how it can be implemented. Particularly, in relation to information sharing and notification systems for response coordination.

To be effective, this direction should be supported by practical guidance that clearly sets out what good practice looks like and how it can be achieved. This approach will support delivery and build confidence in the sector.

We agree with option 2 (non-legislative: increased guidance and strengthened governance). While we agree with a more easily enforceable option (legislative) in principle this can be difficult to operationalise.

It is important that national direction is flexible enough to be adapted to the needs of local communities.

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

We would like to see better recognition of the role that critical infrastructure providers play and clear expectations around working with them (particularly for large providers that work across multiple regions).

Information sharing and notification system for response coordination would benefit from additional focus.

Additionally, we would like to see a greater focus on emergency preparedness and activities to help support community preparedness in national direction.

Proactively Released

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We are supportive of clear and consistent processes. While we have no comments on the specific options. It is important that interventions are proportionate.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups, and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We are supportive of clearer and more consistent approaches to managing hazard risk, including having national direction that sets a required standard but allows flexibility to adapt to local contexts.

We defer detailed comments to those with expertise in this space.

Proactively Released

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support an approach that clarifies process and expectations. We support the proposed options. Better preparation in this space will help mitigate risk to people and preservation of what is important to communities.

Engineering New Zealand has members with significant expertise in heritage preservation and offer our support in developing content that relates to it.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support efforts to minimise the risk to people, and efforts to consider animals is a sensible way to help do this. This may require multiple approaches to reflect the difference between pets and livestock/working animals.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

### Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the legislative option (option 3) to replace the lifeline utilities framework with an expanded, principles-based definition of essential infrastructure. Clear accountabilities and strong supporting guidance will be critical. However, it must be clear which infrastructure is covered by this definition and who this applies to (i.e.. who is responsible for that infrastructure).

We note that there are a range of reforms happening across Government that utilise a definition of essential infrastructure or something similar. We recommend that wherever possible these definitions are aligned to help reduce confusion and misinterpretation.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We recommend including:

- entities that provide flood protection infrastructure (such as dams, stop banks/levees, and pump stations), as these are critical to improving resilience.
- essential community services such as hospitals and associated health infrastructure are notably absent and should be included.

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**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

As above. Flood protection infrastructure, including pump stations, stop banks/levees, and other flood attenuation or routing structure will improve resilience. Additionally, essential community services such as hospitals and associated health infrastructure are notably absent and should be included.

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Engineering New Zealand supports efforts to reduce the disruption to essential infrastructure. We support a regulatory approach to strengthen business continuity planning (option 3), as it allows for flexibility and can be updated as needed. Though it is important that these plans cover how lifeline utilities handle risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery efforts.

Compliance should focus on ensuring risk reduction activities are carried out, this should be monitored. We do not support financial penalties as they take resources away from already impacted people.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

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*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support a stronger, nationally consistent approach to cooperation and information sharing. National direction is needed to reduce duplication, address fragmentation across local government, and better support lifeline utilities engaging with multiple councils.

We do not have a preferred option but strongly support the need for national consistency and an approach that does not add undue burden to lifeline utility providers.

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

It is our view that having national direction is the most effective way to achieve coordination across local and national levels. National direction should establish clear expectations for performance and ensure consistency while supporting councils. Particularly smaller/less resourced ones, to deliver high-quality emergency management service. This should be backed by practical guidance that sets out what good practice looks like and how it can be achieved.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Engineering New Zealand supports efforts to reduce the disruption to essential infrastructure, including critical services provided by central government.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Engineering New Zealand supports efforts to reduce the barriers that make it harder for engineers to rapidly assess infrastructure and buildings post emergency. It is important that engineers can provide this service as quickly and efficiently as possible.

Our preferred option is option 3. We support improving access arrangements to restricted areas during emergencies. We recommend including "suitably qualified engineers" in the list of those eligible to receive identification.

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We support clarifying access powers and recommend the use of guidance to help those navigate the accreditation processes. Engineering New Zealand is happy to play a role in this space and assist as needed.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree with the issues identified. Clearer accountability for the use of emergency powers at the local level is needed. We support changes to clarify roles and responsibilities and emphasise the need for this to be reflected in national standards

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree with the issues identified.

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**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We are supportive of the need for clear and practical processes to enable responses to happen as quickly as possible. We support enabling both electronic and verbal declarations.

Additionally, it is important that more than one person be authorised to declare a state of emergency to avoid delays and allow response efforts to begin immediately.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

# Other comments

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**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

We recommend some thought is given to the integration of our laws and policies on infrastructure development and recovery. New Zealand has limited sources to address its growing infrastructure deficit. We know there are increasing efforts across Government to prioritise funding for maintenance of what we have and carefully choosing what new infrastructure we build across the country. Care is needed for any recovery to ensure a cost/benefit approach is still maintained.

It would be beneficial if the legislation clarified accountabilities, responsibilities and funding for preparing/coordinating and maintaining a national hazards map – which is needed to support all stages of emergency management.

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National Emergency Management Agency
Te Rākau Whakamarumaru

# Submission Form: Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

The Taranaki Emergency Management Group welcomes the opportunity to provide submission feedback on options to strengthen New Zealand's emergency management legislation.

Officers of the Taranaki Emergency Management Office (TEMO) have compiled submission information from key response and recovery leaders. We have also engaged in various national forums to form our views on the legislative reform process, problem statements and potential solutions, alongside a comprehensive review of the full discussion document and information about the legislative reform process on NEMA's website.

Due to the short timeframe and incompatibility with our committee cycles, we have been unable to validate submission feedback through our Coordinating Executive Group or Joint Committee. As per usual process, submission feedback will form committee papers to these respective committees as a noting item.

We have submitted this feedback by deadline of **5pm, 20 May 2025**, via email to EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | s9(2)(a) |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Taranaki Emergency Management Office, on behalf of the Taranaki Civil Defence Emergency Management Group |

☒ The Privacy Act 2020 applies to submissions. Please tick the box if you **do not** want your name or other personal information to be included in any information about submissions that NEMA may publish.

☐ NEMA may publish submissions or a summary of submissions to its website, civildefence.govt.nz. If you **do not** want your submission or a summary of your submission to be published, please tick the box and type an explanation below:

I do not want my submission published on NEMA's website because…

### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

N/A

### Use of information

The Taranaki CDEM Group understand that submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Our submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

The Taranaki CDEM Group officers have reviewed the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

Our submission responses are as follows:

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The five listed objectives are important matters and are well documented objectives to strengthen issues identified from previous inquiries and reform processes.

A gap however is identified in that recovery is missing as a key objective. Further work on a whole of govt approach to recovery, particularly beyond response and notice of transition periods, i.e. the short, medium and long-term recovery timescales is needed.

NZ has experienced significant long-term recoveries over the past decade, with differing structures, resourcing and outcomes, yet no formal reviews have been undertaken. While the identified "Decision-making tools for significant natural hazards" (paragraph 16) addresses the central government policy and tools settings, it does not address the fundamental gap of legislation defining the role and responsibilities of appointed recovery managers in extended recoveries. This is also not provided in secondary legislation, i.e. the National Plan Order.

We request the recovery is given greater significance in the EM Bill reform as an item for future policy and engagement rounds.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Other reasons for  some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies relates to the ability to pay for decisions that increase resilience. Examples

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include ability to afford to have a minimum of 3 days worth of food stored in the house, through to decision making ability for purchasing property, for example lower cost properties tendency to have increased hazard exposure (i.e. on a floodplain), or used as rental accommodation.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Option 2 (non-legislative) development of guidance is preferred to meet diverse needs, as this provides for the most flexibility to meet the diversity of issues across different communities. This also accounts for regional and local variation.

   Status que is unacceptable, NZ as a country can do better.

   Options 3 and 4, introducing legislative requirements is not seen as an effective way to address diverse needs. There are also significant barriers for communities to engage effectively and mandating these requirements, and or processes, does not acknowledge the capacity and capability differences.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   We would see greater identification and prioritisation of groups, i.e. location or interest based, for hazard risk and vulnerability assessments, leading to more appropriate and realistic planning and targeted mitigations via risk reduction, public education or response and recovery planning, to meet bespoke needs of identified groups.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

   Please explain your views.

   None identified.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

   ☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   The problem statement takes a homogenous view as to the willingness, expertise and capability of iwi Maori to participate and contribute within emergency management. Like most issues, there will be varying capabilities and interest in this engagement, however this is not reflected in the problem statement.

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8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We don't have the knowledge to canvas all available or undertaken roles for iwi Maori.

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The matter of who pays for increased iwi Maori participation in emergency management is not addressed.

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Acknowledged in operational arrangements within Group Plans, and response and recovery plans. This will also include readiness for response and recovery.

The iwi Maori role within risk reduction is less clear and needs further consideration. This is complicated by the legislative mechanisms across different Acts.

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

We don't believe that Iwi / Maori should be represented on CDEM Group Joint Committee (JC). This requirement is complicated by how many representatives on the CDEM Group and how selection is undertaken. This raises questions for iwi Maori representation and the number of member Councils on the JC. The diversity of iwi Maori structures makes the issue of representation complex and unworkable. This is in contrast with the clear representation requirements for Local Authorities within the CDEM Group area.

There is also a consideration for the input into decision-making where decisions are solely funded by member Councils, funded through Local Authority rating mechanisms. An option would be to make these positions non-voting.

There are similar representative complications for Coordinating Executive Groups, however the decision-making impacts are less due to decision items not including budgetary concerns (these matters are generally for the Joint Committee).

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

CEG is where strategic operational matters are addressed and is considered a more appropriate relationship for iwi Maori participation.

Representation could be based on operational considerations within the CDEM Group area. Legislation amendment may be required for inclusion as full voting members within the CEG.

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Again, the representation issue is raised as per item 11, however could be based on operational roles and responsibilities.

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Through a National Advisory Board structure.

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The problem definition does not acknowledge the resource scarcity within the emergency management sector at the CDEM Group or Local Council level to pre-establish agreements for management of offers of assistance.

The problem statement does not identify what is consider 'timely'. Is timely for lifesafety, or this timely from the perspective of the offerer?

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Options 1 and 3 are not agreed. Status quo should be improved.

Options 3 is considered too operational for inclusion in the Group Plan.

Option 2 is considered the most viable. It is pointed out the guidance already exists for the sector (Director's Guideline for Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups [DGL17/15]), which includes Offers of Assistance and donations, but that these is often not sufficiently prepared for in advance. Separate and more comprehensive standalone guidance is supported.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

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## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 is preferred, although concern is noted for potentially incentivizing unsafe or unnecessary actions. It is pointed out the existing personal safety and Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 obligations (i.e. Person Conducting a Business or Undertaking) should continue to apply should protection of civil liability for loss or damage be applied.

Option 3 is not supported. This is due to the high level of uncertainty of cost for compensation for labour. Verification processes to confirm actual cost incurred will also be problematic.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Objective 2 items 72-73 identify the reasons why clear responsibilities and accountabilities across national, regional and local levels are required. Issue 5 however is only focused on response arrangements.

There is no consideration for clarification for recovery in the CDEM Act or EM reforms beyond response and notice of transition periods, i.e. the short, medium and long-term recovery timescales.

We request the recovery is given greater significance in the EM Bill reform as an item for future policy and engagement rounds.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The identified options (table 6) response structure variations are already accommodated within CIMS v3 doctrine, as potential response organising structures. CIMS provides a modular, scalable and flexible response system that can be tailored to the particular circumstances of the emergency, and capacity and capability of response agencies.

The options for clarifying appropriate response or hazard lead fails to account for changing requirements of emergencies as they progress through time. For example, in the early stages of an urban fire, FENZ would be the appropriate lead agency for life safety. As the fire is controlled, secondary impacts increase in importance, such as public information management and care of people displaced from their homes. These wider issues are best lead by the local and regional emergency management system. This means that the appropriate structure changes depending on the conditions and timescale of the emergency and this is not well reflected or accommodated in fixed response leadership roles.

Of the options presented, option 4 'unified control' is preferred.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

We suggest more guidance is need in CIMS doctrine around appropriate selection of direction and control during an emergency, and how this may change in context and time.

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We recommend recovery is given greater significance in the EM Bill reform as an item for future policy and engagement rounds.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

It is unclear whether the problem statement is one of national inconsistency, or one of lack of performance due to unclear roles and responsibilities.

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Assumptions are made in both options 2 and 3 that clarifying roles and responsibilities will lead to increased performance by reducing duplication of effort, and that clearer expectations will reduce overall costs.

Costs will be introduced for monitoring and compliance (assurance costs) that are currently not undertaken.

These assumptions are not supported.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

We suggest that lack of regional and local resourcing is the fundamental issue behind performance. We recommend there is a significant uplift in funding for the emergency management sector, that is not sourced from rates funding.

Central government investment into the regional tier (CDEM Group Office) level is strongly recommended. Funding can be accompanied with key performance expectations, define items of focus for CDEM Groups and enable an overall uplift in resourcing and performance, on a consistent basis across the country.

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Central government investment will also assist the current reality of differing rating basis for CDEM Groups, resulting in differing capacity and capability.

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Central government cost sharing or resourcing, to provide base level funding that supplements rates funded emergency management.

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Similar to item 27 assumptions are made that variations in organisation and accountability in emergency management results in poor levels of oversight.

The problem statement does not canvas existing CIMS doctrine for response hierarchy between regional and local levels.

The problem statement seems to focus more on the business as usual arrangements on the CDEM Group and member councils.

There appears to be a more fundamental problem with acceptance of the regional and local hierarchy in play, rather than differing regional structures of CDEM Groups and member councils.

Further work is recommended to more clearly understand and articulate the root cause of the problem.

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Options 2 and 3 are supported, with option 2 preferred.

Option 3 places additional resource burdens on the CDEM Group office, which may not be able to be funded from existing rates of member Councils. See responses to items 28 and 29 re CDEM Group funding.

Option 4 is not supported. Chief Executives have existing roles within response and recovery as executive members of governance arrangements. CE roles are strategic across the range of council concerns and they should remain in this strategic capacity. CEs are unlikely to

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invest in capability development expected for Controller and Recovery Manager roles due to time limitations. Even where these roles are delegated to local Controller / Recovery Manager, there are potential unintended consequences of CEs overriding the delegated roles where they lack the training, experience and professional judgement.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Central government cost sharing or resourcing, to provide base level funding that is supplemented by rates funded emergency management.

### Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The problem statement does not acknowledge the difference in Council members (who fund CDEM Group activities) and emergency service members. There is a tangible difference to the influence in decision making at CEG due to this factor. This may also influence the level of engagement at CEGs throughout the country.

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 is supported and preferred.

Options 3 and 4 place respective restrictions on how CEG operates.

Options 3 clouds the relationship with the CDEM Group Joint Committee, given the potentially introduced reporting and accountability line to the Director.

Option 4 is too inflexible and appears unworkable given restrictions on single delegate attendance and quorum requirements under local government model standing orders. The option would have significant impacts on any Iwi maori representation at CEG and appears unworkable.

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No.

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

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*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Updating of national plans seems onerous and difficult, resulting in national plans not kept up to date. This has compounding impacts for CDEM Group planning.

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Options 2 and 3 are supported as both options will introduce efficiencies for national level planning requirements.

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Increase the frequency of updating the existing suite of directors guidelines, technical standards and information series. We would recommend stronger document control and revision arrangements at the national agency. This would likely benefit from increased national agency resourcing to achieve this.

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We suggest that lack of regional and local resourcing is an additional issue behind performance, monitoring and assurance.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

All combinations of options 2, 3 and 4 are supported. No preference is given.

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

NEMA should reintroduce the monitoring and evaluation processes that rated CDEM Groups and its members on consistent domains, standards and key performance measures. This process enabled CDEM groups to obtain an independent performance review and track progress through time. It is suggested this process occurs within the Group Plan 5 yearly cycle, with results required to be incorporated within a CDEM Group improvement plan with identified priority and associated resourcing.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

As proposed in item 42. We see this as a practical and useful part of the emergency management sector assurance process.

NEMA is in the unique position as system steward to reach across responsible central government agencies and to establish performance measures, track performance, and report in an appropriate manner within the National Risk and Resilience Framework.

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## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Well-articulated.

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 is supported and preferred. This appears to provide the most level of operational benefit at the lowest level of intervention.

Option 3 does not seem operationally effective. The current process of Group Plan input by the Minister is an example of an inefficient and problematic process.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Good summary of the problem of integrating all member Councils and additional legislative responsibilities.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 4 is supported and preferred. Strong clear requirements for the process and content of the Group Plan is needed.

Option 5, strengthening the Ministers role, is not considered required, especially if option 4 is undertaken.

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Options 1, 2 and 3 do not provide any more benefit to what already exists within relevant director guidelines.

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Mandate through secondary legislation. This achieves national consistency and clear states the requirements to be met.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

The complexity of legislation in relation to risk reduction, is identified as the main barrier.

Additionally, the variability between districts in how they manage risk and the variability of tools/capability and capacity each council utilises contributes to wide variation in practice. Variability in prioritisation that each council puts on risk management, what they regard is important to focus their risk management capabilities on (i.e. infrastructure, assets, landuse planning) and what level of understanding councils have in managing risks (i.e. do they have the right skillsets) significantly prevents integration.

Question 50 also begs the consideration of how local government planning instruments recognise CDEM Group Plans. This points to consistency in legislation and national requirements and raises the barrier of alignment across differing legislation.

Collaboration between CDEM and local government is critical to enhance involvement, knowledge sharing, and effective local hazard risk management.

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Providing guidelines specifically for Group Plan writing, collaboration between the right people in CDEM and local government to share knowledge, enhance awareness of the crossovers and relationships between CDEM Group plans and local government planning instruments is recommended.

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes more fundamental changes are needed.

A solid foundation of hazard and risk research, data and information that is consistent across New Zealand (covering all of NZ, CDEM Groups and districts) is key and should be a focus of central government to enable better and more equitable risk informed decisions.

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Additionally, having the right skillset within planning and policy teams is critical. Consistent training for teams (knowledge / training / capabilities) involved across the range of hazard risk management activity is key.

Robust legislative backing to enable consents to be declined if there is an issue. Currently under the Resource Management Act, district councils have S106 which acts as a backstop for subdivision consents, for example, if there are no triggers for considering hazards (i.e. no hazard overlay mapped). Requiring hazard risk assessment experts within councils to help undertake this consistently is recommended.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We are not sure whether there is sufficient evidence to highlight these as issues through the enquiry processes.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 seems the most appropriate and workable solution.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Seems to cover the impacts experienced in previous emergencies.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Options 2 and 4 are supported and preferred.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

No.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Covers the main issues for infrastructure resilience.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 is preferred and supported. Expansion of the organisations with responsibilities to those with essential services is agreed. Specific secondary legislation is more flexible and can be added to with greater ease, particularly should be coupled with issue 7 solutions. Secondary legislation would still require a clear working definition of essential services.

Option 3 is not supported, as there are concerns with potential scope creep from a looser principle-based definition. A principles-based approach is also open to interpretation and results in less certainty in which organisations and sectors are included.

Under options 2 and 3, additional resourcing will be required to establish and maintain relationships within national and regional emergency management.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Include the following:

- Data Storage / ICT – agree these would need greater definition of those that are essential.
- Flood Protection.
- Financial Payment Services (cash / EFTPOS).
- Solid Waste.

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- Hazard warning systems.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

We support the National Lifelines Councils submission of and expanded set of Essential and Enabling Infrastructure, with an inclusion of organisations that are not infrastructure providers but rather Essential Services ('critical customers' of lifeline utilities).

Additional essential services to include:

- Health and Aged Care.
- Emergency Management.
- Emergency Services.
- Financial Services (banking).
- Fast Moving Consumer Goods.
- Education.
- Corrections.

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Business continuity planning and emergency management, while overlapping, address different aspects of organizational resilience. Business continuity focuses on ensuring core internal business functions can be resumed after a disruption, while resilience to emergencies is more externally focused on the ability of infrastructure systems to withstand, adapt to, and recover from various stresses and shocks, ensuring essential services are maintained and disruptions are minimized. It involves the timely and efficient prevention, absorption, recovery, and adaptation of infrastructure to hazards, encompassing both the physical assets and the systems that support them.

Shared Risk Assessments are proposed to identify potential risks and threats that could affect both the immediate response and the long-term recovery, and take into account the significant interdependencies between essential infrastructure. This must be coupled with resilience action and investment plans to continuously build resilience over time.

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The problem statement does not address the complexity of the New Zealand's infrastructure sector faces a complex web of challenges and actors. The sector grapples with aging infrastructure, population growth, and climate change, all while navigating a complex mix of public and private ownership, fragmented planning, and diverse regulatory requirements.

The problem statement does not address the number of organisations within each infrastructure sector. This is a volume problem for proposed business continuity assurance processes for the regulator (who is not defined).

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Options 2, 3 and 4 all raise a question of who will be the regulator for essential infrastructure business continuity, and what resourcing is required to perform this role. Currently NEMA or CDEM Groups, such as through exiting Lifeline Advisory Groups or the regionally based Lifelines Programme Managers employed in various capacities through CDEM Group Offices, are likely candidates for a regulator role. Or a new work group is resourced to carry this out. The EM Bill Discussion Document is silent on how this will be practically given effect to.

No resource exists for CDEM Group / regional or local involvement in a regulatory role.

We don't believe the focus on Business continuity planning is significantly broad to encompass infrastructure interdependencies and cascading network and service failures. The term 'business continuity planning' is often used in a specific context by lifeline utility organisations. Business continuity planning is another method of understanding organisational vulnerabilities but tends to focus on internal business process disruptions such as loss of a data centre or major office. BCPs therefore tend to focus on keeping the business going, and don't necessarily provide full coverage of the readiness and response arrangements with associated outward interaction with other organisations that restore service after a disruption.

None of the proposed options are considered suitable or sufficient.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The 'lifeline utility sector' has an established 5-step process for undertaking vulnerability assessments, including identifying critical assets, assessing exposure and vulnerabilities to major hazards, assessing recovery times with consideration of interdependencies, and identifying mitigations to improve resilience. This work underpins lifeline utility emergency management and business continuity planning. It is suggested this approach could be strengthened through national consistency, director guidelines and funding to deliver this more comprehensively.

A suggestion therefore is to use the term 'lifelines emergency management plans' as a broad term encompassing plans for how lifeline utilities undertake risk reduction, readiness, response and recovery.

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

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*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The problem statement assumes that information sharing will solve the 'availability of information' problem. It does not address the difficulty of infrastructure providers to understanding network impact and accurately assess and communicate restoration times.

Accurate forecasts are problematic due to a complex interplay of factors, including unforeseen circumstances, the nature and extent of damage, and the availability of resources. These challenges can lead to significant variations in the actual restoration time compared to initial estimations.

Accurate restoration time estimates are crucial for scheduling repairs, managing resources, and communicating effectively with stakeholders. When these estimates are unreliable, planning becomes difficult, leading to delays and inefficiencies.

These issues are magnified multiple essential networks are affected.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Options 2 and 4 are supported. It is recommended that Lifelines Groups recognised as the mechanism for this to occur, noting that while many lifeline utilities are active, voluntary participants, we need to lift performance and funding across all lifeline utilities.

Option 3, legislative requirement for lifeline utilities to input into Group Plans, is deemed burdensome of both the utilities and the CDEM Group office. There are other planning processes to achieve a common understanding of interdependencies, such as the proposed 'lifelines emergency management plans' (response 68).

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Yes greater coordination and different scale is important. We have no suggestions for how this can be achieved.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

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## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The problem statement does not acknowledge the fundamental nature of accurate and considered risk assessment to inform cascading failures and interdependencies. As stated in item 66, business continuity planning (BCP) focuses on ensuring that internal critical business functions continue during and after disruptions. This is one consideration of a more expansive risk assessment and impact assessment.

Strengthening risk assessment processes to inform a more comprehensive BCP process will help inform resilience planning and action.

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

No specific comments.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

We support the proposal from the NZ Lifelines Council that recommend that those Central Government Agencies that provide essential services and are critical customers, be covered as appropriate through the 'Essential Services' requirements for business continuity planning.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This is a simple problem.

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Options 2 and 4 are supported.

Option 3 is not supported. The issuing of identification passes is problematic given the significant quantities required, and the complexity within lifelines utility organisations, contractors and subcontractor arrangements, and the costs associated with this, to make this solution unworkable.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We believe the problem statement is overstating the issue.

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

If a tidy up is deemed required, then option 2 is the preferred.

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**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 and 3 is supported.

Option 3 will require additional guidance of evidencing and recording requirements.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Group Plans are currently required to define the process for who can declare local states of emergency or notify periods of transition.

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88. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1, status quo is preferred, as this is not seen as an issue.

Option 2 appears to limit to ability of the CDEM Group to declare or notify for multiple districts or the CDEM Group boundary (region).

Option 3 states the CDEM Group to declare or give notice, however does not specify who or which role holder and is therefore unclear.

89. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, reinforce the requirement of CDEM Group Plans to define which members within the CDEM Group Councils can declare states of local emergency and notice of local transition periods, and include the range of options with a preferred process without placing undue restrictions on these processes.

### Other problems relating to this objective

90. **Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

None identified.

## Other comments

91. **Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

We wish to reiterate our statement is item 1 that the EM Bill discussion document fails to address recovery in any significant way.

Further work on a whole of govt approach to recovery, particularly beyond response and notice of transition periods, being the short, medium and long-term recovery timescales is needed.

NZ has experienced significant long-term recoveries over the past decade, with differing structures, resourcing and outcomes, yet no formal reviews have been undertaken. While the identified "Decision-making tools for significant natural hazards" (paragraph 16) addresses the central government policy and tools settings, it does not address the fundamental gap of legislation defining the role and responsibilities of appointed recovery managers in extended recoveries.

We request the recovery is given greater significance in the EM Bill reform as an item for future policy and engagement rounds.

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**From:** Bruce Horne s9(2)(a)
**Sent:** Monday, 12 May 2025 11:17 am
**To:** John Price [NEMA] <John.Price@nema.govt.nz>
**Cc:** s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(a)
**Subject:** Submission for the EM Bill

Kia ora John

I have attached a submission for the EM Bill. The attached document focus' on five themes, outlined below.

1. Much greater clarity is needed in respect of the "purpose" section of CDEM legislation, particularly in respect of the role of NEMA.
2. The EM Bill should also have a 'functions' section, similar to that found in both the FENZ and Policing Acts. That section should clearly articulate the roles and responsibilities of NEMA and other key partners in the emergency management system. The absence of a 'functions' section in the current legislation is both a significant omission; and the underlying cause of many of the problems identified in reviews of the sector in recent years.
3. The development of a new EM Bill provides an opportunity to consider how the 4R's of emergency management (Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery) might be better supported through legislation; and also provide greater clarity in respect of the roles and responsibilities of the various agencies that make up the CDEM community in respect of the 4R's.
4. Consideration should be given to making provision in the EM Bill for NEMA and/or local authorities to have more power to restrict development in high risk areas and/or provide greater support to the National Hazards Commission (NHC) in respect this problem. This is another issue that was identified in the North Island Severe Weather Events (NISWE) report prepared for Government in 2023.
5. The legislation should provide clarity on the distinctives between Civil Defence and Emergency Management. These two terms are often used interchangeably and as a result most New Zealanders are confused about both their role in the Civil Defence system; and the coordination and support functions of emergency management professionals. The multiple problems arising from this lack of clarity was another issue identified in the NISWE report.

The thrust of my argument is that by addressing the five points mentioned above – you will put a framework in place that will also help resolve and many of the discrete/detailed issues that have been mentioned in the feedback sessions that I have listened to – both in respect of the current EM Bill and the previous one back in 2023.

I also note that Minister Mark Mitchell has very recently written to the CE's of all TLA's seeking advice on matters that are related to the issues in respect of point 4 above. The Ministers letter ends with the sentence, *"… I am writing to all Council leaders to ask for your frank and honest assessment of your current decision-making processes to effectively manage local waterways to prevent flooding ahead of and during significant weather events. I would also like to hear of any issues and challenges that your Council is addressing to improve decision making, and additional regulatory levers that may be needed."*

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Out of courtesy, I have cc'd several people into this email including Stavros Micheal (my GM and lead Controller for RLC), Mark Crowe (Director EMBOP and Group Controller) and Lisa Glass (who has been coordinating the submission process for EMBOP). All are aware that I am making contact with you directly – and are supportive of that approach.

I would be very keen to discuss this submission with you once you have had time to read it. Ngā mihi nui.

**Bruce Horne**
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May 2025

**Feedback from Rotorua Lakes Council regarding**

# NEMA Discussion Document: Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

**prepared by Bruce Horne, Manager: Emergency Management**

**authorised by Stavros Michael,**
**General Manager: Infrastructure and Environmental Services**

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## Introduction

The discussion document, *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation* (April 2025) has been reviewed by several senior staff from both Rotorua Lakes Council and Emergency Management Bay of Plenty (EMBOP). The writer advises that the views expressed in this document are supported by both the Executive of Rotorua Lakes Council and Rotorua CDEM Controllers and Recovery Managers. It has also been endorsed by Lisa Glass (acting Director: Emergency Management Bay of Plenty (EMBOP) and James Jefferson (Principal Advisor, EMBOP) – both of whom have been tasked to collate the collective feedback from Bay of Plenty CDEM Group on NEMA's discussion document in relation to the new Emergency Management Bill.

This document was originally prepared to inform the development of the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group submission.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Joint Committee for Bay of Plenty CDEM Group will be making a submission on the Emergency Management Bill, the writer of this document was strongly encouraged by senior managers at both EMBOP and Rotorua Lakes Council to submit this document directly to NEMA for consideration. That recommendation was made on the basis that it was believed this document provides a level of analysis and detailed commentary that is difficult to include in a more collective summary of feedback from multiple stakeholders; but nevertheless raises some important issues that should be considered when drafting the new Emergency Management (EM) Bill.

The overall assessment of Rotorua CDEM and EMBOP staff who have read the discussion paper circulated by NEMA is the paper has identified most of the main issues – but failed to provide solutions to some of the fundamental issues confronting the sector. Those issues have been identified and discussed in numerous reviews of CDEM arrangements in New Zealand over the past decade, including the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) report prepared for the Minister of Civil Defence and Emergency Management in 2017.

Rotorua Lakes Council also submits that some of the solutions proposed in the 2025 *Discussion Document* are inadequate and do not address the short-comings identified during the feedback process for the previous draft Emergency Management Bill in 2023.

Legislation is meaningless when divorced from the practical achievement of desired outcomes. For that reason this submission includes commentary in respect of both policy and operational matters that we believe need to be considered in parallel with the drafting the new EM Bill.

There are five general themes discussed in this submission:

1. Much greater clarity is needed in respect of the "purpose" section of CDEM legislation, particularly in respect of the role of NEMA.
2. The EM Bill should also have a 'functions' section, similar to that found in both the FENZ and Policing Acts. That section should clearly articulate the roles and responsibilities of NEMA and other key partners in the emergency management system. We submit the absence of a 'functions' section in the current legislation is both a significant omission; and the under-lying cause of many of the problems cited in reviews of the sector in recent years.

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3. The development of a new EM Bill provides an opportunity to consider how the 4R's of emergency management (Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery) might be better supported through legislation; and also provide greater clarity in respect of the roles and responsibilities of the various agencies that make up the CDEM community in respect of the 4R's.
4. Consideration should be given to making provision in the EM Bill for NEMA and/or local authorities to have more power to restrict development in high risk areas and/or provide greater support to the National Hazards Commission (NHC) in respect this problem. This is another issue that was identified in the North Island Severe Weather Events (NISWE) report prepared for Government in 2023.
5. The legislation should provide clarity on the distinctives between Civil Defence and Emergency Management. These two terms are often used interchangeably and as a result most New Zealanders are confused about both their role in the Civil Defence system; and the coordination and support functions of emergency management professionals. The multiple problems arising from this lack of clarity was another issue identified in the NISWE report.

Due to the tight time-frame allocated for the provision of feedback on the discussion document, we have not been able to respond to all of the specific questions posed in in Appendix A of the discussion document. However, we have provided candid, but well intentioned advice in respect of three parts of the discussion document:

- **Objective 2:** Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional and local levels
- **Objective 3:** Enabling a Higher Standard of Emergency Management; and
- **Conclusion:** other comments relating to reform of New Zealand emergency management legislation.

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## Discussion and Overview

**Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels**

**Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency**
*Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?*

**Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities**
*Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?*

**Other problems relating to this objective**
*Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?*

### Our Response (General Comments in respect of Objective 2

We believe the issues signalled in the questions above are symptomatic of more foundational issues. For that reason, before offering responses to the specific questions listed under Objective 2, we suggest it would prudent to explore the under-pinning issues.

Most of the major issues that are adversely impacting on emergency management arrangements in New Zealand are **not** the result of poor legislation – but a lack of national consistency and operational support; particularly in respect of training standards, training resources and standard operating procedures. Support for that view can readily be found in most – if not all - of the CDEM reviews conducted in recent years, including the *Government Inquiry into the Response to the North Island Severe Weather Events* (2024)[1] and the 2017 report, *Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies.*[2] The TAG report was frequently cited in the NISWE report, usually in the context of expressing concern that recommendations made in the TAG report had not been adequately implemented.

We submit that collectively those two reports (TAG and NISWE) provide a clear summary of most of the key issues that need to be addressed in order to improve emergency management arrangements in New Zealand. Both reports mention gaps in respect of national leadership and coordination on matters such as:

- training standards and programmes,
- standardised operating procedures and
- standardised systems and equipment, such as radio channels and computer software.

[1] Commonly referred to as NISWE
[2] Commonly referred to as the TAG report



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None of those problems require a specific legislative solution. However where legislation can help is providing clarity about who has responsibility for leading the effort to ensure those critical operational support mechanisms are put in place. A weakness in the current CDEM legislation is that it does not provide that clarity. Similarly, the current legislation does not provide clarity on the purpose, function, roles and responsibilities of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). That issue is discussed in more detail in the final section of this report, under the heading "Conclusion/Final Comments."

We submit that it should be part of the role of NEMA to provide national leadership in areas such as training standards, training resources and standard operating procedures; and the Emergency Management Bill should provide clarity on both the role and functions of NEMA.

However the trajectory of the NEMA discussion document seems to push responsibility for those issues back to territorial authorities. That approach is not consistent with the recommendations made in a number of government reviews over the past decade, including the NISWE and TAG reports.

We believe it is important that CDEM Groups are involved in the development of national standards, however CDEM groups cannot lead this work. Achievement of national standards can only be achieved by a mandated national organisation, and we submit that coordinating agency should be NEMA.

Chapter One of the 2017 TAG report discusses 'National level functions and structure.' One of the findings of the Advisory Group that prepared that report was a lack of clarity about the role of the agency that preceded NEMA - the Ministry of CDEM. The TAG report stated that lack of clarity had resulted in an absence of national leadership in respect of best practice and standards for emergency responses in the CDEM sector.

An interesting comment appears on page 6 of TAG report concerning the dysfunction and confusion that had developed over the years between the Ministry of CDEM and CDEM Groups, particularly in respect of roles and responsibilities.

> *As one submitter noted, 'Wellington is good at writing guidelines and [Groups] are good at ignoring them'*

There are three possible scenarios that would give rise to such a comment.

(a) Group staff are belligerently independent and actively resist any interference from the national body (which *prima facie* would appear to be the intended meaning of the person who made the statement);

(b) The guidelines and other products produced by 'Wellington' were not fit for purpose; and consequently were not valued or utilised by Group staff;

(c) Elements of both (a) and (b) above.

Achieving clarity on that point is important. If there is a problem with the quality and usefulness of the products being developed by the national body, CDEM groups will continue to ignore them and carry on developing their own resources. In such circumstances it would be unwise to



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try and enforce compliance with national standards when there is a problem with the quality and operational usefulness of those standards.

Reviews of CDEM operational responses since the TAG report was published, in particular the NISWE report, express concern that almost a decade after the TAG report was released the quality and utility of national standards and national training products remain a problem. For example, several reports have identified the lack of capability in the Intelligence function to be of particular concern. It is impossible for a CDEM leadership team at any level to make good decisions if those decisions are not informed by good intelligence.

Due to the paucity of quality resources for the intelligence function, a number of CDEM Groups have engaged external contractors to develop and deliver intelligence training for their staff over recent years. We mention the issues concerning the lack of quality training products for the Intelligence function as it provides an example of the risk associated with compelling CDEM Groups to comply with national directives and guidelines through legislation, when there is a problem with the quality of the resources that have been approved at a national level.

That problem is not limited to training and resources to support the Intelligence function. We submit that much of the product that has been produced over the past decade or so at a National level - including a number of the CDEM Directors Guidelines - are not well written or constructed and not fit for purpose. We suggest the primary reason for the problem of national resources not being fit for purpose was inadequate engagement with experienced CDEM staff from around New Zealand when those resources were being developed.

As a result, many CDEM groups have resorted to producing their own training programmes and operating procedures. This approach is not only wasteful (duplicated effort), but counter-productive in respect of achieving national standards and consistency in approach.

In order to address that problem we recommend NEMA engage with CDEM Groups to both develop and facilitate a collaborative process to create high quality resources that are both fit for purpose and provide a national benchmark in respect of professional standards. That approach would have a number of benefits. In particular it would:

- Enable both NEMA and all CDEM Groups to avail themselves of the excellent work that has been undertaken by some CDEM groups in recent years.
- Assist in the development of revised and improved national standards, standard operating procedures and tools that support the operational implementation of good practice.
- Enhance the relationship between NEMA and CDEM Groups through increased collaboration and engagement.
- Improve operational response capability nationwide.

We were surprised to find the NEMA discussion document does reflect many of the key recommendations made in both the TAG and NISWE reports, particularly in regards to the leadership role that should be performed by NEMA in respect of national standards.

One of the key recommendations of the TAG review is clearly articulated on the first page of the Executive Summary:

> ***We recommend establishing a proactive national emergency management agency to provide national coordination and support in local emergencies, national control in national emergencies, and to lift CDEM performance overall. This includes***



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***professional leadership for the emergency management sector and a far stronger role in setting and enforcing national standards. The national agency must also provide assurance that those standards are being met.***

Although a national agency in the form of the NEMA was subsequently created, for reasons that are unclear to us, NEMA has **not** taken on the leadership role envisaged in the TAG review; particularly in respect of setting national standards.

That said, we are aware that in the annual report submitted by NEMA for the 2023/24 year, NEMA acknowledged its primary role was to *"lead and support Aotearoa New Zealand's emergency management systems so that risks are reduced and communities are ready to respond to and able to recover."* However the commentary in that same report reveals that most of NEMA's effort in respect of training and development over recent times has been focused on the 158 staff within the agency. There can be no argument that building the capability of NEMA staff is important.

As mentioned earlier, we are concerned about the paucity of engagement and collaboration by NEMA staff with operational staff in CDEM groups regarding the development of training programmes, policies and standard operating procedures. That concern was identified in both the TAG and NISWE reports as being a significant issue that needs to be addressed, particularly as it is hindering the need for greater professionalisation of the CDEM sector.

The current problems arising from:

- a lack of agreed national standards,
- inadequate investment and support at a national level in respect training resources, development of operational SOP's

are a long-standing issues. They are also among the most commonly cited reasons by CDEM staff for the recurring failures and mistakes in service delivery during an emergency response.

So what is the answer?

We accept that given the relatively small size of NEMA that it lacks the capacity – and in some areas - the capability to meet the national need in respect of the above issues. However, that does not absolve NEMA from its responsibility to lead, coordinate and more effectively collaborate with CDEM Groups in order to address the current gaps in standards, training and operational support.

The NISWE report acknowledged that some CDEM Groups are doing great work in developing local training programmes and other resources to enhance the capability of their staff. We recommend that NEMA exercise national leadership by working more collaboratively with CDEM groups to ensure the pockets of good practice that have been developed around the country are enhanced and woven into national standards, training and operational resources. We provide more specific commentary on those matters later in this report as part of our response to the "conclusion" section of the discussion document.

Returning to the specific questions posed in the discussion paper in respect of Objective 2, we offer the following commentary.

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**Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency**

*Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?*

**Our Response to Issue 5:**

No, at least not in the legislative context. However, the explanations of Command and Control in the CIMS handbook could be improved. The explanation for coordination in the current CIMS handbook is very long and confusing.

The current narrative for command and control does not clearly describe the distinctives of the two concepts. Nor do they reflect the more nuanced approach to 'command and control' being taught in the national Response and Recovery Leadership Programme (RRANZ) which has an emphasis on 'softer' leadership skills such as "situational humility" and creating "psychological safety".

We recommend using the following narrative as a guide for reviewing the definitions provided in the CIMS handbook in respect of command, control and coordination.

**Command, Control and Coordination:**

- Command = The authority to direct people and make decisions. It's about leadership, providing direction and giving orders or guidance.
- Control = The systems and processes used to ensure things happen according to plan. It's about monitoring, coordinating, and adjusting actions.
- Coordination is about teamwork and relationships. It is about achieving harmony across teams and functional groups.

**Practical Examples**

**1. Fire**

The Fire Chief is in **command**. He or she decides the strategy for tackling the fire, makes decisions and tasks teams. The operations officer is in **control.** They are monitoring the implementation of the strategy, tracking where the fire crews are, coordinating their movements and ensuring they have the right equipment and support to execute the strategy.

**2. Business/Corporate**

The CEO is in **command.** They decide how the company will pivot to a new digital strategy; and how the business will be structured and organised to achieve those goals. The CEO casts the vision and set direction. The managers that report to the CEO are responsible for **control.** They track performance metrics, budgets, and timelines, and give feedback to staff to ensure they stay on track. They use control mechanisms to enforce structure and accountability.

**Summary Analogy:**

Think of command as steering the ship — deciding where it's going.
Think of control as managing the sails and rudder — making sure it stays on course.

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Command is leadership (doing the right things), Control is management (getting things right).

**Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities**

*Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?*

**Our Response to Issue 6:1**

No. As outlined earlier in this report, the biggest gap at present concerns gaps and inadequacies in training programmes and other tools that enable an effective operational response.

Most of the resources available at a national level are either out of date, of poor quality and/or not fit for purpose. For example we do not have specific training programmes for all of the functions in the CIMS structure, in spite of the fact that CIMS in its current form has been the national operational framework for over a decade. As a result, most CDEM Groups around the country are developing bespoke training for their staff – which is inefficient, wasteful and under-mining the desired state of having consistent, national standards.

It is accepted that NEMA probably does not have the capacity – and in some cases the capability to develop those resources on its own. However NEMA could and should be playing a role in coordinating the work being undertaken by CDEM Groups; and use those collective resources to develop robust, high-quality products that can then be made available to everyone. That approach will also help create a good baseline national standard – which is an issue that has been repeatedly identified in various government reports over the past decade.

**Other problems relating to this objective**

*Other problems relating to this objective? Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?*

**Our Response – Other problems relating to this objective**

Yes. See earlier commentary in this submission.

Please also see comments later in this submission in response to the question, "*Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?*" In that section we have provided commentary on the problem of housing developments continuing to occur in areas where the hazard-scape is known to present a high level of risk to home owners.

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A third area where we believe the EM Bill should provide greater clarity concerns the 4R's of Emergency Management – Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery. One of the recommendations of the NISWE report was that responsibility for leading work in respect of all of the 4R's should remain in the CDEM system. However, the current 2002 CDEM Act is largely silent on the 4R's. They are mentioned once in general terms in the 'purpose' section of the current CDEM Act. In fact, that is the only place one of the 4R's (Readiness) is mentioned. Another - 'Reduction' - is only mentioned three times in the Act.

We submit that another fundamental weakness of the current legislation is that it fails to provide clarity in respect the activities that are expected to occur under each of the four headings of the 4R's. For example,

- What specific outcomes are sought?
- Just as importantly, what is the work that needs to be done in order to achieve those outcomes? And
- Who will be responsible for leading the various elements of that work at a national, regional and local level?

We submit that each of the 4R's should have a dedicated section in the EM Bill that addresses the issues outlined above.

**Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management**

**Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance**

*Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?*

**Our Response to Objective 3**

See earlier commentary on the role that NEMA should be playing and how that role might be clarified and empowered in the new EM Bill. However, we have also provided additional commentary under the 'Conclusion' heading in the final section of this submission.

**Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management**

- *What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?*
- *What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?*
- *Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why??*

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## Our Response to Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

In respect of the first two questions posed in "Issue 9", we submit that there is a general problem with many of the CDEM plans and planning formats as their design and format is more consistent with policy documents than plans for action. Given the old Ministry of CDEM was originally established with a focus on policy development, that outcome is not surprising. The TAG report identified the need for the national CDEM agency to move to a more operational focus. Steps have been taken towards that objective with the creation of the NEMA. However, it is apparent the transition from a Ministry focused on policy to a national agency providing leadership and support for CDEM operations still has some way to go; particularly in respect of developing greater clarity about policy documents and operational plans.

In the meantime, there are some problems and challenges associated with some of the current planning processes and planning documents:

- The density and complexity of the plans mean that few people read them;
- The methodology for their practical application is not always clear; and
- Both of the above factors become a barrier to engagement and integration with other agencies and other departments within a local authority.

We suggest that in order to strike "*the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency*" might require a re-thinking of the general approach – using a principles based approach rather than a detailed and prescriptive planning approach.

There is an old adage that there is far greater value in the planning process than the plan produced at the end of it; which is a variation of the famous quote attributed to General Dwight D. Eisenhower,[3] "*Plans are worthless, but planning is everything*." The point being made by Eisenhower was that even the most detailed and carefully crafted plans sometimes become redundant when confronted with the novelty and complexity of an operational problem. It is impossible to plan for every possibility – particularly given the fast pace of change in the 21st century. However when you engage skilled professionals who are equipped with sound critical thinking and problem-solving skills – and give them the flexibility to act within the range of a set of high level principles you are far more likely to achieve a good result. Which loops back to Eisenhower's point – it the planning process and the skill of the planners that is the key to success – not the planning document that might be produced.

The notion that thorough, prescriptive plans are often of limited value in the chaos and novelty of an emergency is supported to some degree by the findings of the NISWE and Bush[4] reports. All three reports found that some CDEM Groups had developed comprehensive planning documents, but nevertheless failed to perform well when tested by an emergency event. One of the identified issues was the plans were so wordy and complex, they could not be quickly digested and applied.

[3] Eisenhower was a five star general during World War II and later elected as the 34th President of the USA. He was the tasked with over-seeing the operational planning for the liberation of Europe during World War II, and operational commander for the famous D-Day landings in June 1944.

[4] Former Police Commissioner Mike Bush CNZM, was engaged to review both the response of Auckland CDEM to the Auckland Anniversary weekend severe weather event of January 2023; and the response of the Hawkes Bay CDEM staff to Cyclone Gabrielle (February 2023).



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However, it is well established that one of the most important success factors in both military operations and civil emergencies is the combination of good leadership and good teamwork – characterised by people who are able to quickly adapt to changing circumstances, problem solve and make good tactical decisions in tight timeframes. That assertion is supported by the findings of a number of CDEM operational reviews in recent years.

- *Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?*

Yes. Change is required. We also submit the most appropriate solution is legislation.

The National Hazards Commission (NHS) is frequently identifying areas where housing developments are being allowed to occur in areas where there is clearly a high risk danger to life and/or property, particularly in respect of the impact of severe weather events and/or climate change. We acknowledge this is a complex issue, particularly in respect of the competing priorities involved. On one hand, there is a clear need to build more homes to accommodate a growing population. On the other hand, there is significant risk to both home owners, insurance companies and local authorities when land that is vulnerable to some form of natural hazard is developed for housing. Data collated by the National Hazards Commission and findings of recent reviews into severe weather events clearly shows the current legislative frameworks in place are not adequate and more robust decision making criteria are required to ensure that planning for housing developments takes appropriate cognisance of the local hazard-scape.

**Conclusion (Discussion Paper – final question)**

**Other comments**

*Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?*

## Our Response to Conclusion (final question in discussion paper)

Yes. There are three areas in particular that we submit improvement is required in respect of the current legislation:

1. Clarity in respect purpose of the current Act,
2. Clarity in respect of the role of NEMA,
3. Clarity in respect of the distinctives between Civil Defence and Emergency Management.

## Clarity in respect of the purpose of the Emergency Management Bill & role of NEMA

Given the strong interconnectedness regarding the purpose of the new EM Bill and the role f NEMA, the following commentary discusses the first two bullet points made above in parallel.

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Something that is missing in both the current legislation (CDEM Act 2002) and the commentary in the discussion paper for the EM Bill is establishing a clear legal framework for emergency management arrangements – particularly in respect of the purpose, functions and responsibilities of the lead agency for emergency management in New Zealand – the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).

One of the major inadequacies of the 'purpose' section in the current (2002) legislation is that it is silent on the role of the national lead agency, which at the time that legislation was drafted was the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.

A recurring theme of reviews of CDEM arrangements in New Zealand for decades has been a lack of clarity in respect of the purpose, roles, responsibilities and functions of the Ministry of CDEM/NEMA.

We suggest that a solution to that problem might be found in looking at the legislation developed for other emergency agencies, in particular the FENZ Act 2017 and the Policing Act 2008.

A striking distinctive between the FENZ and Policing Acts and the current CDEM Act is the FENZ and Policing Acts both identify the national agency that will have responsibility for leading the work required to be enacted by the legislation. Although the current CDEM Act specifies the responsibilities of the Minister, local authorities and a number of other agencies – the section titled 'Purpose' is silent on the role and responsibilities of the Ministry of CDEM/NEMA.

Both the FENZ and Policing Acts have a number of sections in the first 'Part' of the legislation that clearly articulate the roles and responsibilities of the national agencies charged with the task of giving operational effect to the legislation. However the current CDEM Act is (again) largely silent on those important foundational elements.

Although the "purpose" section of the current CDEM Act does describe the outcomes that should be achieved through the legislation, it fails to provide clarity on who has the responsibility for leading the work required to achieve the "purpose" of the Act. The one exception is sub-section (d) of Section 3 that describes specific responsibilities of local authorities.

However no 'business owner' or lead agency is identified for the other five objectives articulated in the 'purpose' section of the current CDEM Act, namely:

(a) *improve and promote the sustainable management of hazards in a way that contributes to the social, economic, cultural, and environmental well-being and safety of the public; and*

*(b) encourage and enable communities to achieve acceptable levels of risk including, …monitoring and reviewing (processes)*

*(c) provide for planning and preparation for emergencies and for response and recovery in the event of an emergency; and*

*(e) provide a basis for the integration of national and local civil defence emergency management planning and activity*

*(f) encourage the co-ordination of emergency management, planning, and activities related to civil defence emergency management across the wide range of agencies and organisations*

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We submit that a weakness in the current Act is that it lacks clarity about national leadership and oversight of the activities required to ensure the purpose of the legislation is achieved. More concerning is that it appears that same flaw has been carried over into the proposed new EM Bill. We suggest a solution to this problem might be found in the approach taken by those who drafted the FENZ and Policing Acts.

We further suggest the FENZ Act is particularly useful as:

1. it was developed to help facilitate significant change in the NZ Fire Service, including an expansion of roles and responsibilities
2. Like CDEM, the Fire Service relies heavily on local 'volunteers' to deliver most of its operational services. (86% of FENZ operational staff are volunteers – 12,000 people).

Unlike CDEM, FENZ has managed to develop and implement standard operating procedures, policy, training programmes and standards and supporting operational systems such as radio channels and computer software to a **national standard**. Those national standards help ensure New Zealand communities are provided with a consistent standard of service delivery. It also means FENZ staff to be deployed to any region in the country without the need to learn how to use different equipment or adapt to different operating processes.

Theoretically, CDEM Groups do have a national framework and operating systems in the form of the *Coordinated Incident Management System* (CIMS). However that national framework is not adequately supported by training programmes, operating procedures and a host of other enablers that are required to operationalise the CIMS framework in a nationally consistent way. Given three of the core characteristics of the CIMS model are *common structures, roles and responsibilities*; and *interoperability* – the failure to operationalise CIMS in a nationally coordinated way by NEMA is puzzling. However that lack of national coordination and effective engagement does explain much of the dysfunction that has been described in government reviews of the CDEM sector in recent years.

For the above reasons we were surprised to discover the NEMA discussion paper on the new EM Bill is silent on CIMS; particularly so given CIMS forms part of the national security plan and is officially the national framework for achieving consistency in approach to emergency management.

We submit that a good starting point for addressing the abovementioned issues would be to include a simple statement in the new EM Bill that NEMA has a responsibility:

- to exercise leadership in ensuring the CIMS principles and structure are utilised in a civil emergency; and
- to exercise leadership by facilitating collaboration across the New Zealand emergency management community to ensure training programmes and other resources that are fit for purpose are developed and implemented.

We submit clarification in legislation about NEMA's leadership responsibilities would go a long way to resolving the issues identified in the discussion document.

Returning to the learnings that might be gleaned from the FENZ Act, we suggest that adopting and adapting the approach used in the FENZ Act, particularly in respect of section 3 (Purpose) and Section 11 (Functions), would go a long way to addressing the issues discussed above.

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We further submit that achieving greater clarity in respect of 'purpose' and 'functions' of NEMA would not only provide a solid foundation and framework for the entire EM Bill; it would also provide a framework and pathway for working through the more detailed issues outlined in the NEMA discussion document.

We suggest that by changing only a few words in the *Purpose* and *Functions* sections of the FENZ Act, you could address most the issues outlined above. A suggested (draft) narrative based on Section 3 of the FENZ Act follows:

> *The purpose of this Act is to—*
>
> *(a) reform the law relating to CDEM services, including the strengthening the role of communities and improving the support for local authorities in the provision of CDEM services, and, to that end,—*
>
> *(i) to unify CDEM Services by establishing the Emergency Management Act and*
>
> *(ii) to clarify the objectives, functions, and operating principles of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA); and*
>
> *(iii) to provide for CDEM emergency powers; and*
>
> *(iv) to provide clarity about how responses to different levels of emergencies will be funded:*
>
> *(b) clarify how local authorities, iwi and community volunteers will be supported when responding to civil emergencies.*

We also suggest the EM Bill include a section similar to:

- Section 11 of the FENZ Act which articulates the main functions of FENZ; and
- Section 9 of the Policing Act that likewise describes the core functions of the NZ police.

Both sections provide clarity about the role, responsibilities and functions of each respective agency in simple and unambiguous language.

Given the importance of inter-agency cooperation, relationships and community connectedness in respect of successful emergency responses, we also suggest a section similar to Section 10 of the Policing Act (acknowledging the roles of others) be incorporated into the new Bill. The inclusion of a section that acknowledges the role of 'others' would be particularly useful in highlighting the important role that individuals and communities play in giving meaning to the concept of *Civil Defence*.

Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Policing Act makes the following statement that we suggest could easily be adapted for the CDEM context:

> *It is also acknowledged that it is often appropriate, or necessary, for the Police to perform some of its functions in co-operation with individual citizens, or agencies or bodies other than the Police.*

**Clarity in respect of the distinctives of Civil Defence and Emergency Management**

Another issue that is not directly covered in the NEMA discussion document but clearly requires attention is clarity in respect of the distinctives of *Civil Defence* and *Emergency Management*.

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Problems associated with the lack of clarity in respect of *Civil Defence* is one of the recurring themes of the NISWE report.

The phrases *Civil Defence* and *Emergency Management* have often been used interchangeably over the years – which has resulted in considerable confusion about the distinctive roles of those who work in the emergency management sector and the concept of communities working together when confronted with a civil emergency – which is the contemporary meaning of *Civil Defence*.[5]

That confusion and the problems it causes were succinctly described by John Price, Director of the NEMA when he was quoted in the NISWE report as saying,

> *"There's a widespread assumption that Civil Defence is a standing army that will come rushing out of the woodwork when the balloon goes up. That's not how it works."*

Director Price's comments raise an important question. "Why are people so confused about what Civil Defence is; and how it is meant to work?" The answer to those questions can be found in the section titled 'interpretation' in the current CDEM Act. Instead of providing clarity on the distinctives between Civil Defence and Emergency Management, the current legislation mixes and muddles the two concepts. Section 2 of the current CDEM Act (interpretation) provides the following 'definition' for 'civil defence emergency management':

*(a) means the application of knowledge, measures, and practices that—*
*(i) are necessary or desirable for the safety of the public or property; and*
*(ii) are designed to guard against, prevent, reduce, recover from, or overcome any hazard or harm or loss that may be associated with any emergency; and*
*(b) includes, without limitation, the planning, organisation, co-ordination, and implementation of those measures, knowledge, and practices.*

The above definition provides no clarity whatsoever in respect of the distinction between Civil Defence and Emergency Management. Worse, it only serves to perpetuate the confusion in both the EM sector and wider community about the differences in purpose, role and function of those two over-lapping – but distinct concepts. Consequently, no one should be surprised that New Zealand communities are confused about how the emergency system works and their role in supporting an emergency response.

The 2025 NEMA Discussion Document also fails to provide any clarity on this matter. On page 2 there is a note made on terminology that will be used throughout the document:

> *Throughout this document, the term "emergency management" is used to refer to the range of activities carried out to improve our resilience to emergencies. This is consistent with the meaning of "civil defence emergency management" in the CDEM Act. This document only uses "CDEM" to refer to named things like CDEM Groups.*

We submit the above statement is not at all helpful. It is not only confusing, but is also deficient in that it fails to explain the roles that Emergency Management professionals have in respect of the 4R's of emergency management (Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery). It also fails to explain the distinctives of Emergency Management and the concept of Civil Defence. Nor does

[5] Ref. Nancy Swarbrick, 'Civil defence', Te Ara - the Encyclopaedia of New Zealand, http://www.TeAra.govt.nz/en/civil-defence/print (accessed 23 April 2025)



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it address the role and responsibilities of both individuals and communities in a civil emergency. In fairness to the person who crafted that note on 'terminology' – the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 does not provide any clarity on those terms either.

Why is this important?

Because when the terms *Civil Defence* and *Emergency Management* are used interchangeably you reinforce the common misconception that was succinctly described by John Price and cited above. The NISWE report in particular frequently referred to the problems arising from the fact that most New Zealanders have a very poor understanding of their personal responsibilities in the context of the 'Civil Defence' model. Likewise, few understand the role of Emergency Management staff or the purpose of an Emergency Coorindination Centre.

That lack of understanding results in several significant problems, including:

- Individuals, families and communities failing to adequately prepare for emergencies as they do not have clarity about their personal responsibilities and the concept of 'civil defence'. (i.e. people being 'first responders for their neighbours, family and friends).
- Anger arising from unmet expectations in respect of the level of direct support emergency services are able to provide in a civil emergency; and the lack of visibility of 'Civil Defence' personnel on the ground.

We acknowledge there are a number of contributing factors that have led to the confusion about the differences between 'Civil Defence' and 'Emergency Management', in particular the change in meaning of the term 'Civil Defence' and the relatively new emergence of the professional discipline of Emergency Management. During World War II *Civil Defence* was focused on protecting civilians an infrastructure from hostile threats such as bombing raids through the provision of air raid shelters and warning of imminent attacks. However over the past 80 years or so the role has both broadened and shifted focus to helping communities prepare for natural hazards such as severe weather events and earthquakes. In parallel with those changes to the role of *Civil Defence*, the new professional discipline of *Emergency Management* has emerged.

Another challenge associated with helping people understand the distinctives of these two concepts is that for most 'day to day' emergency situations, the public can easily access immediate support from police, FENZ or ambulance through the 111 emergency system. Consequently many people have a mistaken belief that in a major civil emergency ready access to those services will remain in place. Most New Zealanders do not understand that in a major event those services will be over-whelmed and communities will have to revert to only strategy that was available prior to the advent of modern emergency services – namely that of communities banding together to deal with the presenting emergency.

The new EM Bill provides an opportunity to provide clarity to both the public and those working in the Emergency Management sector about the distinctives of these two separate, but related functions.

We offer the following descriptions as a solution:

> ***Civil Defence*** is about the empowerment and mobilisation of communities to look after themselves in a civil emergency.



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***Emergency Management*** is the professional discipline of

- assisting communities prepare for civil emergencies,
- engaging with other agencies to identify opportunities to reduce the impact of natural hazards
- supporting communities during an emergency by co-ordinating the response effort
- supporting communities after an emergency by co-ordinating recovery.

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NZ PORK



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# Strengthening NZ's Emergency Management Legislation

19 May 2025

# NZPork Submission on options to Strengthen NZ's Emergency Management Legislation

## INTRODUCTION

1. NZPork is the statutory industry body for New Zealand's commercial pig farming sector, established under the Pork Industry Board Act 1997.
2. We represent pig farmers nationally, providing advocacy and advice on regulatory, biosecurity, market, and animal welfare matters.
3. Our work is funded through a statutory levy on pigs processed at licensed premises, with approximately 600,000 pigs processed in the year ending September 2024, most of which entered the domestic market as fresh, locally produced pork.
4. Commercial pig farming takes place across rural New Zealand, with approximately 65 farms in operation as of 2025. The highest concentration is in Canterbury and North Otago, with smaller clusters elsewhere. These farms are often located in remote areas with limited infrastructure and constrained access to essential services.
5. We welcome the opportunity to provide feedback on the discussion paper *Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Legislation*.
6. Our comments on selected issues raised under the paper's objectives are set out below.

## OBJECTIVE 1 / ISSUE 1: MEETING THE DIVERSE NEEDS OF PEOPLE AND COMMUNITIES

7. We support the general intent to modernise and strengthen New Zealand's emergency management framework.
8. We submit, however, that the proposed options could do more to address the operational, welfare, and logistical realities of farmers and rural communities, who can be disproportionately affected during emergency events.
9. Pig farms, like many agricultural enterprises, are commonly located in isolated areas with single-road access and limited services. They are also the site of the agricultural enterprise *and* the family home.
10. As recent catastrophic weather events have demonstrated, even minor infrastructure failures - such as a bridge closure or road slip - in rural areas can significantly impede critical access to properties for emergency services, key responders, veterinarians, and feed suppliers (e.g., South Canterbury floods).
11. In such contexts, delays can lead to rapid and wide-reaching consequences.
12. Emergency legislation that adopts a "one size fits all" approach risks overlooking rural realities. A rural-informed and operationally grounded framework is therefore essential to ensuring preparedness, response, and recovery efforts are practical and effective across all regions of New Zealand.

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## OBJECTIVE 1 / ISSUE 3: STRENGTHENING AND ENABLING COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

13. We support an inclusive approach to emergency management governance.
14. As such, we are of the view that rural and primary sector representation should be enabled and required on regional emergency management committees and relevant decision-making bodies.
15. Such representation would ensure that emergency planning reflects rural realities and agricultural needs. It would also allow livestock production systems to be properly integrated into risk assessments, planning documents, and training programmes.
16. Farm-based emergency scenarios, especially those involving animal welfare, feed continuity, and supply chain disruption, must be explicitly considered and are best addressed with input from local practitioners.

## OBJECTIVE 1 / ISSUE 4: RECOGNISING THAT PEOPLE, BUSINESSES AND COMMUNITIES ARE OFTEN FIRST TO RESPOND IN AN EMERGENCY

17. On occasion in rural areas, residents - including farmers – act as first responders, protecting people, animals, and property well before formal support arrives.
18. We believe that it is important to recognise that these actions, when taken in good faith and with the intention of mitigating harm, are vital during emergencies where professional services may be delayed or unable to access affected properties.
19. We submit that such contributions should be considered and formally recognised in the legislative framework, particularly to support rural resilience and community-based emergency response.

## OBJECTIVE 3 / ISSUE 10: STRENGTHENING DUE CONSIDERATION OF ANIMALS [LIVESTOCK] DURING AND AFTER AN EMERGENCY

20. The pig farming sector operates within an interconnected and time-sensitive production system that utterly depends on reliable access to transport, processing facilities, feed, veterinary care, and rural infrastructure.
21. Emergency-related disruptions to any of these elements can have immediate and serious consequences for animal welfare, farm operations, and livelihoods.
22. As experience tells us, in an emergency (e.g., COVID, South Canterbury floods), the situation on farm(s) can quickly escalate into a critical and distressing situation for livestock, and crisis for often isolated farming families and staff.
23. We therefore reiterate the position expressed in our previous submission on the Emergency Management Bill (Bill No. 225–1, 3 November 2023): While human life and safety must remain the priority, emergency legislation must also clearly define and resource the management of animal welfare, both during and after emergency events.

**END**

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06th of May 2025

Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6140

To whom it may concern,

**Submission: Emergency Management Bill**

**Common Operating Platform**

Regionally, there needs to be a common operating platform, the platform should be easy to access by agencies and councils alike.
The platform should have a place where all agencies are able to submit information from all their respective function areas, so that there are no double ups on resources and critical information during a response.
It would be beneficial to have a secure part within the platform where agencies can work on, and store information relating to their Emergency Management systems. This information is then easily available for putting into the group platform.

Apart from duplication of information and assets, the common operating platform world standardize processes and tools required to implement those processes.
There would be reduced costs with software licensing and therefore reducing IT management.

With a common operating platform, auditing of operations and processes would be made easier, as well as the scaling up and down of an operation.

**Responsibilities of a CEO and or CE**

CEO's and CE's should not take on the role of Controller, their role is to deliver strategic leadership and direction.

CEO's and CE's have got the important role of communicating with community leaders, stakeholders and managing public relations.
They need to maintain business continuity within their organization by relying on subject matter experts, such as controllers.

**Submission Support**

This submission also supports the Hawkes Bay Civil Defense Emergency Management and the Hastings District Council submissions.

**Blake McDavitt**
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICER

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**Submission: Emergency Management Bill – Inclusion of Iwi and Community Representation in Emergency Management Structures**

Legislation must reflect the diverse roles, responsibilities, and needs of all individuals and ethnic groups within our communities. Different communities have different perspectives, priorities, and capacities, and inclusive legislation ensures these are acknowledged. When communities are actively involved in decision-making processes, it fosters trust, enhances communication, and promotes greater acceptance of necessary changes during emergency responses.

In this context, the Bill should provide for a formal Iwi/Māori role to sit alongside the Controller. This role would not diminish the Controller's authority, but rather strengthen it by ensuring that decisions are informed by the perspectives and needs of Māori (the indigenous people of Aotearoa New Zealand), as well as those of other communities. This model mirrors the existing inclusion of the Recovery Manager, who also works closely with the Controller and is expected to consider the needs of affected communities.

Furthermore, the most appropriate representation for this role would be Mana Whenua. Their intimate knowledge of the local whenua (land), deep cultural insight, understanding of rural communities, and connection to marae would be invaluable. Mana Whenua are uniquely positioned to contribute local intelligence, cultural competency, and established networks across communities—all of which are critical to the effectiveness of an Incident Management Team (IMT) and Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) structures.

Recognising and embedding these roles in legislation will lead to more equitable, resilient, and responsive emergency management systems that better serve all New Zealanders.

Ngā mihi

**Hilary Prentice**
MĀORI PARTNERSHIP MANAGER
TE KAIWHAKAHAERE HONONGA MĀORI
TE WAKA RANGAPŪ

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Blake McDavitt |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Napier City Council |

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### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Under the CIMS structure the Iwi Māori role should be set closer to the Controller

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Continuous relationship building and comms.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3: Take all endeavours to make sure that communities don't have limited capacity to engage, case by case.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Change the roles within the CIMS structure

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

There should be a role within all CDEM groups as there are in most government departments.

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Iwi Māori should have a representative on CEG,

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

14. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Iwi Māori should be representative at all levels of Emergency Management.

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

15. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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16. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

17. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

18. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

19. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

20. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

21. **Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Regions should have a common operating platforms

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## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2:

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2:

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1:

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Insert response

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Neville Reilly |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | n/a |

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### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

These are all very useful objectives, but I do not feel that they are 'game-changers'. Most are incremental improvements on existing good practice. I think more is required to ensure the system is improved significantly. An important objective is the requirement to enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management. I do not believe this will be fully achieved through legislative amendments.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

CDEM Groups are well aware of the diverse needs of people and communities. The reason these needs are not always met to expectation is usually because CDEM staff are

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overwhelmed in an emergency. Legislation will assist in ensuring that the focus remains on the diverse needs of people and communities.

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   no

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Legislation requiring CDEM Group Plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will ensure this aspect remains an important focus for CDEM Group planning. . Option 3 is preferred.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Planning at the local level would need to involve members of all affected communities in the planning process, ensuring their needs and perspectives are considered. National policies along with some targeted funding to implement national campaigns to educate the public would assist.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

   Please explain your views.

   No

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

   ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Yes, but I do believe CDEM Groups are well aware that it is essential to partner with iwi Māori to build national resilience.

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

   ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Insert response

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

My experience has been that iwi Māori do not always have the resources to participate fully in CDEM planning. Consideration should be given to providing support so that iwi Māori can participate more fully in CDEM. Option 4 is preferred, subject to additional resourcing being provided.

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Iwi Māori should have a role on CDEM decision making structures.

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Iwi Māori should have membership of CDEM Groups, but not have the power to declare a state of emergency.

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Iwi Māori should have membership of Coordination Executive Groups.

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Consideration could be given to establishing a national working group so that iwi could discuss improvements to the relationship.

14. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This problem can be mitigated by working together to develop relationships in advance of an emergency.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

My preferred option is option 2, but this would require additional resourcing to achieve.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

There could be more NEMA guidance and leadership through nationally led programmes for community awareness, above what is done at present.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I prefer Option 1. People will nearly always do the 'right thing' to assist when faced with an emergency, and will generally operate as safely as possible. Option 2 and 3 open the possibility of unsafe actions and abuse of cost claim procedures.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

no

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I am not sure that there is confusion about who is in charge of making decisions. I believe current legislation is clear, and if there was confusion in Hawke's Bay (the example quoted) then it was probably because the interviewee was not aware of existing legislation/best practice through a lack of knowledge/training. The more complex and large the event, the more difficulty there will be in exercising command and control, regardless of whatever legislation is adopted.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I do not agree that a radical change in the model to address the perceived ambiguity in the command and control of the operational response to an emergency will necessarily solve this problem. There will still be ambiguity in complex events. I prefer an option which ensures the lead agency has the least restrictions placed on it during a response with the assurance that support from other agencies will be provided. I believe Option 2 would provide this.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

A simple command and control system is best, and one that is consistent, ie there should not be a radical change from 'peacetime' command structures during an event. Good command and control works best when respective commanders have developed relationships and are familiar with respective agencies' roles. Legislation does not achieve this, it relies on best practice by leaders and staff.

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## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I agree that locally led delivery of emergency management is the strength of the current system, and I believe Option 1 currently reflects this. There will naturally be differences between various locally led options throughout New Zealand, caused by differing geography, density of population (including rural versus urban) and funding. Any change that reduces the influence of locally led delivery should considered carefully.

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I prefer Option 1. Regardless of which option is decided, some CDEM Groups will experience tension. Option 1 is the most flexible option – Groups could still adopt the roles outlined in Option 2 and 3 if they wished.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I think the CDEM Group based model is best – it works well for a small to medium scale event. It does struggle in a large event, but I think any alternative structure would struggle equally. One improvement would be to establish cadre of well-trained CDEM staff at a national level that can deploy to assist a CDEM Group/TA during a large scale event.

### Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

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*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, but is there really a problem?

Regardless of what option is chosen, the three key problems identified (para 89) will still exist to varying degrees. Overcoming them relies on good leadership/management.

The paper has clearly outlined the advantages and disadvantages of each model (centralised, decentralised and hybrid). Given the wide variety in structure of CDEM Groups in New Zealand, ranging from unitary authorities, small Groups consisting of few TAs to Groups consisting of many TAs, it should be expected that 'not one size fits all'.

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

My preferred option is Option 1. Any change from Option 1 would likely require additional administrative/compliance costs, so requiring additional resources.

One of the strengths of the decentralised model is that the CE of a council does have direct involvement in the hiring of CDEM staff, and therefore some accountability. If staff are hired by the CDEM Group and allocated to a TA, there is a disconnect between the CDEM staff and TA staff, and the TA will feel little accountability if there are problems.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

no

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Strengthening the performance of a 'coordinating' group could be problematic. Coordination is a difficult function to assess. In my opinion, legislation in an attempt to strengthen the task of 'coordination' is unlikely to see much change.

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**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

My preferred option is Option 1. I believe the main disadvantages identified with this option, ie delayed decision making and ineffective implementing and monitoring of CDEM Group decisions and plans, can be addressed by closer liaison with NEMA Director and staff. This can occur without legislation to enforce it. The other options all involve a reduction in local management to varying degrees and greater accountability for NEMA.

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

My experience is that Plans have limited influence on the performance of a local response. Most staff (usually council volunteers) are not familiar with Plans, and in most cases, any 'Plans' are not viewed and would have limited value. Staff get on with the immediate and often overwhelming task of responding to minimise the impact of the emergency on the community.

The real value of Plans is the planning process that is involved in developing them. This requires staff from all agencies with a role in Emergency Management to come together to discuss risk and likely tasking for various localised threats. Therefore Plans play an important role in developing readiness.

I believe the focus should be on the planning process rather than the production of a glossy plan that is then ignored for five years. The procedure to amend plans should therefore be as simple and as flexible as possible.

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

My preferred option is the one that is the most flexible, which would appear to be Option 3.

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**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

no

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes there does need to be a method for the Director to set expectations and monitor performance, as well as intervene where necessary to address performance issues.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I believe it is necessary for there to be more monitoring of performance, and that the increased costs should be accepted. That leads to a combination of Option c and d. The Director should be responsible for achieving Option c.

Consideration should be given to establishing an external appointment eg an inspector-general, to be responsible for assessing whether the emergency management system is achieving the purpose of the Act (option d).

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

One area that would benefit from greater national consistency is training standards achieved through individual training and exercising. Currently, training is carried out on an *ad hoc* basis as organised by CDEM Groups. There is a wide variation in the level and quality of instruction. The sector would benefit by a greater national direction. This did occur with Controller training, and once this was directed at a national level, the competence of controllers improved considerably across New Zealand.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

n/a

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## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I have seen very few situations where a mandate to intervene might be required. For the occasional times that it might be required, it would be useful to have Option b in place.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

no

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, but I think risk reduction is achieved more effectively if local government works actively to develop plans in concert with CDEM Group Plans. CDEM Group planning does assist in bringing local government planners and CDEM staff together to carry our risk reduction planning, but I believe councils should retain the responsibility and accountability for developing risk reduction plans.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The options identified, except for option 1, would likely lead to increased tension between central government and local government. For that reason I prefer option 1, the status quo.

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**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

I think that NEMA should provide the framework design for CDEM Group Plans, but there needs to be regional flexibility in the way they are developed and produced. I believe that any perceived problems in recent responses to emergencies are not related to CDEM Group Plans.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

There are no real barriers that legislation would solve.

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

no

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

As noted in the question, local authorities (not only CDEM) are required to deliver effective risk management. Risk management is wider than CDEM, so cooperation within councils between planners and CDEM staff is required, and is something that must be worked at to achieve.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I prefer Option 2. This issue would best be addressed by iwi being closely involved in CDEM activities, eg representation on Joint Committee and CEG as well is being involved in CDEM planning and training.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

no

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

My experience is that there has been increasing focus on the integration of animals into emergency management planning and that some of the examples quoted may have arisen from isolated cases. I prefer Option 2

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Similar to the above comments, my experience is that whilst life and safety will always be top priority, CDEM has increasingly worked at prioritising animal welfare. The best way to ensure this continues to be achieved is through training and education. It often requires a judgment call by leaders in a response to make the best decision, showing again the requirement for capable leadership.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

no

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

One issue that gets little attention in reviews and consultations is the training and education for those involved in CDEM. I believe this could be much improved. Many of the criticisms listed in reviews of CDEM responses could be solved by implementing a more effective training regime for staff involved in a response.

Whilst there has been success in raising the standards of training for controllers, recovery managers and response managers (achieved only after NEMA intervention), the training for other supporting staff is limited. CDEM Groups are responsible for training their staff and there is a wide variation nationally. CDEM Groups operate under differing resource constraints and training is often carried out on an *ad hoc* basis utilising various training agencies.

NEMA needs to take a greater lead in training to enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management. .

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Whilst Option 3 would incur additional costs, it is the preferred option to ensure adequate business continuity planning.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I agree that the list of potential essential providers as listed on p75 should all be included. In addition, I think those listed on p76 should all be included.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

no

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

no

#### Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

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*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, but education is the key to business continuity. Whilst some petrol stations might be unprepared for power outages, as quoted on p 52, there are many examples of petrol stations that do have business continuity plans in place, eg having generators.

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 is preferred – it gives a greater assurance of continued service without compliance costs and increased bureaucracy.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

no

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes,

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

One of the existing problems is the way in which most CDEM Groups currently fund Lifelines Utility planning. Lifeline Utilities provide little or no funding for cooperation work with Groups, which means the onus is on Groups to fund this. Legislation will only work if additional funding is provided.

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**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

The current system of Lifelines Coordinators at Group and National level can achieve this. The problem is that during an emergency there is little surge capacity available to provide the support required.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

All relevant agencies should be held accountable for their business continuity planning.

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option c is preferred, and there would be cost impacts.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

no

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 is preferred. Education and training will assist in overcoming this problem

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

no

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 is preferred – it removes inconsistencies.

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

no

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 is preferred. Declarations are made following careful consideration and discussion with key leaders. Communication advances (mobile phones, computing) have made it much easier to make, record and publicise decisions.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

no

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 is preferred – Mayors know their communities best.

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

no

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

No

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Thank you for the opportunity to submit.

In this submission I have drawn on my experience as a CDEM Group Controller for 10 years. During that time, I led or supported other lead agencies in a number of responses to complex emergencies, including earthquakes, wildfires, and the impacts of severe weather.

I feel that there is not a lot wrong with the current legislation. Whilst some of the changes proposed in this document are relatively minor in nature, they will still go some way in assisting the development of more effective emergency management in New Zealand. Most in the sector are well aware of the issues raised and do attempt to address them. New legislation will not suddenly solve the problems identified. I believe that a lack of resourcing is the fundamental problem leading to the current conclusion that the system is not fit for purpose.

For example, the sector lacks a competent training regime. All other response agencies have nationally led training systems. In New Zealand, CDEM Groups are responsible for conducting training and exercising for staff, with little oversight from NEMA, apart from some guidance on subject matter and the occasional national exercise. This is a significant burden for CDEM Groups at the expense of other roles. It is accepted that this issue is outside the scope of this discussion document, but I feel it needs to be addressed. The increased focus on the issues identified in this discussion document will only add to the training burden for CDEM Groups.

One legislative change that does not seem to have been considered is the establishment of an inspector-general. This appointment would provide independent advice to the minister on the effectiveness of emergency management in New Zealand. Such an appointment could assist in addressing wider issues within the sector.

I also feel there needs to be some legislative change to facilitate more effective national support to local authorities. Local authorities are responsible for civil defence management in their areas. The problem is that a large scale event such as Cyclone Gabrielle is completely overwhelming for the average council which is not structured to manage a large emergency. Such an event requires an all of council response, yet many council staff often have a limited knowledge of what is required to manage and support a council led emergency response. The demands and increasing expectations for the myriad of concurrent tasks in an emergency such as support to communities, liaison with iwi, slick communication and coordination of lifeline utilities all require a large, capable and

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functioning staff capable of sustained operations. The proposed changes to legislation will make the work of council response staff even more complex and demanding. And it does need to be remembered that in many events, some council staff will be impacted and no longer effective as they deal with family issues. I believe there needs to be a system whereby national government (NEMA) can send in rapid assistance to support an overwhelmed local authority. There are existing mechanisms to do this, such as EMAT, but there could be a more effective system of national support.

There is a tension between national and local government responsibilities and accountability in emergency management. Legislation will not necessarily eradicate this tension, but any amendments that assist in an improved mutual understanding of roles and limitations will be good for the sector. As a generalisation, it appears that this discussion document seeks to impose greater legislative responsibility (and expense) upon local government, with national government (NEMA) being tasked to oversee and assess the performance of local government. This could create greater tension. I would be interested to see any submission from LGNZ.

I would have liked to have seen more focus on Recovery.

Concluding Comment: The test is this - if the proposed legislation had been in place at the time of the recent emergencies, would our responses (eg to Cyclone Gabrielle) have been any better? Would the reviews have been any better? I do not think so. I believe the main problem is a lack of capacity rather than a problem with legislation. Whilst these incremental improvements to the legislation will benefit the sector, I do not believe we will see a significant improvement without greater investment in emergency management.

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19 May 2025

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# Submission on Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

**RURAL WOMEN NEW ZEALAND (INC)**

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## Introduction

Rural Women New Zealand (RWNZ) welcomes the opportunity to submit on the Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation discussion document, designed to inform a new Emergency Management Bill.

RWNZ supports the intention of the Government to develop new, modern emergency management legislation. Recent events, particularly Cyclone Gabrielle and its aftermath, have proven current emergency management legislation is not fit-for-purpose, and in many respects can be a hindrance to local communities' own recovery efforts.

With severe weather events increasing in frequency, the risk of disasters to New Zealand is also increasing. Lloyds of London ranks New Zealand second-only to Bangladesh in our level of risk and expected loss through natural disasters (*A World at risk: Closing the insurance gap*).

RWNZ is concerned to ensure that rural communities and their unique needs are specifically addressed in future emergency management legislation. We do not consider the proposals in discussion document reflect that.

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## About RWNZ

RWNZ is a not-for-profit, member-based organisation that reaches into all rural communities to provide a credible and respected voice on rural issues, including health, education, environment and land use, rural connectivity and business, and community and social issues.

RWNZ strives to ensure that all rural residents, workers and families have equitable access to services, that inequalities are addressed by Government, and the wellbeing of rural communities is considered from the beginning of all policy and legislative development.

RWNZ is affiliated to the Associated Country Women of the World and as such upholds all United Nations, International Labor Organisation (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and World Health Organisation (WHO) conventions and outcome statements as they relate to women and rural women in particular.

## RWNZ Policy Manifesto

Rural Women New Zealand's Policy Manifesto calls for Government action across five priority areas – *Adequate emergency services* is a key part of our Community and Social Inclusion priority area.

## Policy frameworks for rural proofing and gender analysis

The Ministry for Primary Industries Rural proofing: guidance for policymakers provides the Government approved framework for rural proofing policies, by considering the needs of rural communities.

Welcome to Bringing Gender In | Ministry for Women provides the tools for government agencies to explore gender impacts during policy development.

When considering the development of new emergency management legislation, we request that these government frameworks are utilised to assess the impact of proposed changes for rural women.

## Method

We have not commented on each issue, or the specific questions posed. RWNZ is not an organisation with specific expertise in emergency management. Instead, we have focused on providing feedback from the experiences of our members and their communities. Much of this submission is informed by experiences in the aftermath of the 2023 North Island weather events, particularly Cyclone Gabrielle, as well as liaison with other rural sector organisations.

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**Objectives for reform**

RWNZ supports the objective to strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management, however we do not believe this adequately emphasises the challenges for rural communities in emergency management and disaster response situations.

Rural communities are unique, not only in their isolation but also in the physical, financial and wellbeing relationship many people within rural communities have to the land and livestock.

RWNZ would like to see rural communities specifically considered in the legislation (and across the whole emergency management system).

**Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation**

1. RWNZ supports the intention of the new legislation to explicitly consider how emergencies affect some people and communities in a disproportionate way, however we want to see rural communities specifically addressed.

2. Rural communities, while smaller in population, often face a higher level of risk than those who live in urban areas. This is due to the challenges of isolation and less-resilient infrastructure, as well as their financial and physical relationship to the land and animals and exposure to potential natural hazards such as large rivers.

3. Isolation can be a particular issue for older people in rural communities as well as those with disabilities and health challenges. Being physically cut off due to severe weather, flooding or fire is a real possibility and this can have an impact on the basic necessities of life, including access to medicines.

4. A better level of engagement with rural communities to understand where the greatest needs are before emergency events take place is required. RWNZ also supports the option to require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for.

5. RWNZ would support the creation of a rural liaison/representative role to assist with consideration of the needs of rural communities.

6. RWNZ supports strengthening and enabling greater iwi Māori participation in emergency management. This reflects not only the reality of the local community response and the role of marae and other Māori community groups in providing welfare to those affected, but also the experience and local knowledge of iwi Māori that can benefit emergency planning.

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7. RWNZ supports the intention to achieve a 'whole of society' approach to emergency management, where communities can act alongside the 'official' emergency system. This fits with the practical reality of emergency management, particularly in more isolated and rural areas, and where iwi Māori play a critical role in the response.

8. In the case of Cyclone Gabrielle and in many other disasters, the first response is community-led. This reflects the practical realities of being on the ground as, and immediately after, an adverse event takes place. RWNZ considers this to be an important practical principle that needs to be carefully considered in the development of the new legislation.

9. This community-led response, which emphasises swift action, often creates a natural tension with the more institutional processes that govern the response from central or local government.

10. Volunteers who support their communities in the aftermath of natural disasters often experience burnout that can be exacerbated by a lack of acknowledgement by authorities of efforts already undertaken and working, and unnecessary duplication.

11. Following Cyclones Gabrielle and Hale, RWNZ members were involved in the establishment of community hubs to store emergency provisions, information on the local area and local expertise, and emergency means of communication. RWNZ wants to see these sorts of community-led initiatives supported by future emergency management legislation.

12. RWNZ would like to see planning for response efforts in rural areas as well as the needs of rural communities provided for in the emergency management system through the formalisation of the Rural Coordination Group that includes Rural Advisory Groups, Rural Clusters and Rural Advisory Panels.

13. A primary industries group, similar to the Lifeline Utilities Group could also be established to provide expert risk management advice and assist with response arrangements.

14. RWNZ supports the options provided in the consultation to provide members of the community protection from civil liability for loss or damage and enable compensation for labour costs when carrying out emergency response activities. As described above, the initial response to an emergency management situation is often community-led and voluntary, and this is particularly true in rural areas. It is only right that people undertaking these emergency response activities are provided legal protection and compensation where that is appropriate.

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**Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional and local levels**

15. In the case of Cyclone Gabrielle, feedback from RWNZ members and others in affected communities was that many people felt inundated with representatives of various government and volunteer agencies. This was due to a lack of coordination between agencies and led to community concern that resources and their own efforts were being wasted.

16. Following Cyclone Gabrielle there were a number of instances where RWNZ members experienced uncoordinated aid and relief deliveries resulting in multiple deliveries of some items and none of others. We note that the discussion document discusses the overlap of functions across local government and CDEM Groups and agree that this needs to be resolved.

**Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management**

17. RWNZ strongly supports the proposal to strengthen consideration of taonga Māori, other cultural heritage and animals (including working animals and livestock).

18. The cultural heritage of communities, particularly many rural communities, is an important part of the fabric of the community. RWNZ does not have a view on whether consideration of this during and after emergencies should be pursued through legislative or non-legislative means.

19. The consideration of animals is extremely important to rural people, and farmers often put themselves at considerable risk during and after major disaster events to rescue or look after at-risk livestock and working animals.

20. RWNZ considers animal welfare is best achieved through legislative means and requires an expansion of emergency powers to enable the welfare of animals to be prioritised in emergency response situations.

21. We do acknowledge the tension between mitigating pain and distress to animals and not diverting resources from efforts to protect human life and property, however this can be mitigated through coordinated emergency planning involving rural liaison/representatives.

**Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services**

22. The issue of ‘lifeline utilities’ and the provision of essential services in the aftermath of natural disasters is important, and experiences from New Zealand’s recent natural disasters shows that disruption to this infrastructure and the services it provides has a major impact on the speed and ease of recovery at both a large-scale and household level.

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23. The importance of having reliable data that can be combined with local knowledge is underestimated. This was identified by RWNZ members as a weakness of the response to the 2023 North Island weather events and is necessary to locate people, access resources, help manage 'lifeline' infrastructure and quickly re-establish communications.

24. To this extent, RWNZ supports the strengthening of information sharing provisions within future emergency management legislation. We would like to see the legislation enable the use of data commons type arrangements, where information pertaining to a community, publicly and privately managed infrastructure, and resources is collected, governed and made accessible to local and central government as well as the community and infrastructure managers for shared use in times of emergency.

25. RWNZ believes there is scope to compel CDEM Groups and other emergency management authorities to involve lifeline utilities in CDEM Group plans. We also believe on principle, that these lifeline utilities, as part of the communities where they exist and in many cases profit from, have an obligation to contribute to national response plans.

26. RWNZ supports the extension of business continuity requirements to a broader group of central government organisations than what already exists. The reality is that government services across a wide range of areas are relied upon by New Zealanders and this reliance does not cease during and after an emergency event.


**Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens**

27. Regarding the management of access to restricted areas during an emergency, RWNZ supports legislative efforts to clarify this so that infrastructure and utility managers are not hampered in their efforts to repair or restore vital services quickly. This was a failing after Cyclone Gabrielle and negatively impacted many rural communities.

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Thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback.

Nāku iti noa, nā



Sandra Matthews
**National President**

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# SUBMISSION TO NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (NEMA)

## EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT BILL REFORM



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To: National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)
PO Box 5010
Wellington

By email: EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

This submission is made on behalf of Television New Zealand Limited.

Contact Details:

Josh Wolfe
GM Commercial & Government Relations
s9(2)(a)

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## Introduction

1. Television New Zealand Limited (**TVNZ**) is the country's leading free to air broadcaster. It reaches approximately 2 million New Zealanders every day, through broadcast channels, TVNZ 1, TVNZ 2, TVNZ DUKE and online services TVNZ+ and 1News.co.nz.

2. TVNZ is a crown owned company but receives no direct government funding. (It does receive a small amount of contestable funding for selected programmes when it is successful in those applications).

3. TVNZ's role in an emergency is to fulfil its obligations as a lifeline utility under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

4. TVNZ is also a party to a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management and Discovery NZ Limited for the provision of television broadcast support before and during Civil Defence emergencies (the **MOU**). Under this MOU, TVNZ has *"voluntarily committed to work with NEMA to provide broadcasts of alerts or warnings before and during an emergency, and as required and subject to studio capability at the time."*

5. TVNZ therefore has an interest in the proposed reform and this submission focuses on the implications of the new proposals in the Discussion Document as they would impact TVNZ's ability to support emergency management.

6. This document follows the headings and issues set out in the Discussion Document.

## Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

*Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance*

7. Options provided in the discussion document are:

    a. Status quo: the Director monitors those with responsibilities under the CDEM Act and has the power to issue guidelines, codes, or technical standards; certain mandatory requirements to be set through regulations.
    b. Increased guidance and strengthened governance (non-legislative).
    c. Enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set through rules (secondary legislation).
    d. Give the Director the function of monitoring the performance of the emergency management system (legislative).

8. The MOU is an example of a non-legislative guide to set expectations about administrative, operational, and other detailed matters. Under the MOU, TVNZ is required to take all reasonable measures to ensure that broadcast television is a reliable channel of communication for official warnings and emergency information messages, supplemented by online channels. Clear categories (e.g. "formal requests" vs "informal requests") are set out, together with agreed processes for each.

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9. TVNZ's position is that the status quo (Option a/1) remains appropriate. Each party's expectations are clearly set out in the MOU. Allowing the expectations to be considered and agreed by the parties themselves ensures that NEMA's expectations are able to be supported by TVNZ's technical and operational capabilities. The ability to review the MOU each year also ensures that, as technology and viewer habits change, the Broadcasters and NEMA can work together to ensure the most effective delivery of public information.

10. TVNZ's concern is that rigid expectations set by legislation (Options c/3 and d/4) may not have sufficient flexibility to account for TVNZ's evolving technical and operational capabilities, and will likely infringe on TVNZ's ability to meet its core mandate under the Television New Zealand Act 2003 (to carry out its functions and maintain its commercial performance).

11. Were Options c/3 and/or d/4 to be adopted, TVNZ's submission is:

    a. The Broadcasters should be given the opportunity to consider and submit on proposed legislation (whether secondary or primary) to ensure that requirements are technically and operationally possible.
    b. Any legislative standards should explicitly protect the editorial independence of each of the Broadcasters (as the MOU does).
    c. Any legislative standards as they apply to TVNZ must account for and should not inhibit TVNZ's ability to deliver to its core mandate as outlined in the Television New Zealand Act 2003 (above).
    d. Consideration of Options c/3 and d/4 should have regard to ensuring the maintenance of public trust in broadcasters, which is critical for the effective communication of official warnings and emergency information messages.
    e. TVNZ should be given the opportunity to consult and provide feedback on proposed legislative and regulatory changes with specificity (i.e. beyond the broad options proposed in the Discussion Document).
    f. Finally, the imposition on TVNZ of additional legislative or regulatory standards would lead to increased compliance costs. Unlike some other broadcasters party to the MOU, TVNZ is a commercial entity and does not receive government funding.

12. TVNZ would welcome the provision of more guidance and governance material where relevant to TVNZ (Option b/2).

## Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

*Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"*

13. TVNZ understands the preferred option is to replace the lifeline utilities framework with an expanded, principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure". TVNZ does not object to this proposed change but considers it critical that TVNZ and other lifeline utilities are consulted for input prior to implementation of legislation so that any associated legislative changes to the obligations of lifeline utilities / essential infrastructure are reflective of the



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expansion of the category (i.e. so that legislative amendments are relevant to the functions of utilities in the expanded category).

14. Alternatively, for the reasons set out elsewhere in this document, TVNZ considers one option may be to separate the broadcasters into a different category from other lifeline utilities.

*Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning*

15. Section 60 of the current CDEM Act places a general obligation on TVNZ to ensure it can keep functioning during and after an emergency. TVNZ understands the purpose of the proposals to strengthen lifeline utility business continuity planning obligations is to provide assurance that lifeline utilities can meet their section 60 obligation.

16. Options provided in the discussion document are:

    a. Status quo: Some detail about lifeline utilities' BCP expectations included in the National CDEM Plan.
    b. Increase assurance of lifeline utilities BCP (non-legislative).
    c. Introduce financial penalties and enable detailed BCP requirements to be set through regulations (legislative).
    d. Introduce financial penalties and prescribe specific BCP requirements in primary legislation.

17. TVNZ supports Options a/1 and b/2. It is critical to ensure that agencies are prepared for emergency planning, and TVNZ welcomes more guidance on NEMA's expectations for business continuity planning.

18. However, TVNZ's position is that Options c/3 and d/4 would not necessarily increase our resilience and accountability during national disasters and other emergencies. Our ability to comply with our section 60 obligation has been tested in recent years and TVNZ has a proven track record of continuing to broadcast both live and breaking news in a range of challenging situations. These include the Christchurch earthquakes, a significant fire at the neighbouring New Zealand International Convention Centre (which necessitated the evacuation of TVNZ's Auckland headquarters for two weeks), the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2023 weather events that prompted this reform.

19. In addition, as TVNZ is a broadcaster, how the business operates in these circumstances is already highly visible to all New Zealanders.

20. Were Options c/3 or d/4 to be progressed, TVNZ's submission is:

    a. It would be difficult to ensure that the regulation or legislation was sufficiently industry-specific to be useful (i.e. TVNZ's BCP is likely very different to that of a supermarket with long supply chains).
    b. Any regulatory or legislative standards would need to account for and should not inhibit TVNZ's ability to deliver to its core mandate as outlined in the Television New Zealand Act 2003 (above).

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c. TVNZ should be given the opportunity to consult and provide feedback on proposed legislative and regulatory changes with specificity (i.e. beyond the broad options proposed in the Discussion Document). In particular, TVNZ would want to ensure that any requirements were achievable and not duplicative of or contradictory to existing obligations.
d. Finally, the imposition on TVNZ of additional legislative or regulatory standards would lead to increased compliance costs that TVNZ may have difficulty meeting.

*Barriers to cooperation and information sharing*

21. In general terms, TVNZ is not opposed to the information sharing proposals set out in the Discussion Document. However, TVNZ would be concerned to ensure that any data standards required to be met are set at an appropriate level, and that appropriate additional funding is provided to enable compliance with any additional obligations.

[ENDS]

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**Go Eco | Waikato Environment Centre**
*Healthy environments supported by thriving communities*

**goeco.org.nz | fb.com/goecowaikato**

# Go Eco Response to the Emergency Management Bill Review.

## Introduction

Go Eco is a community organisation rooted in climate resilience, ecological restoration, and environmental education. We urge the government to shift from reactive crisis management to proactive, community-led resilience.
This bill must recognise that communities are not just responders but system-builders. It must centre tangata Tiriti, uphold Te Tiriti o Waitangi, and embed ecological and social justice throughout emergency frameworks.

We urge the government to:

1. Recenter communities and hapū as system-builders, not service users
2. Embed tangata Tiriti practice and rangatiratanga in emergency structures
3. Shift from reactive crisis response to preventive, regenerative resilience-building
4. Integrate climate adaptation, ecological wellbeing, and decolonisation in emergency frameworks.

We strongly support a legislative and funding shift that recognises communities not as passive recipients of state response, but as co-creators of resilience.

## Recognising Community as Infrastructure

The current framing of "essential infrastructure" misses the critical reality: community infrastructure, whānau networks, marae, schools, food sovereignty systems, and volunteer organisations are the first and often only responders in the crucial window after disasters strike.

We urge NEMA to reframe Emergency Management Around Justice and Resilience.

- Recognise communities, hapū, and whānau as core infrastructure, not peripheral

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actors.
- Expand the definition of essential infrastructure to include community and social systems.
- Shift from state-led crisis response to shared leadership and regenerative planning.
- Integrate climate justice, mātauranga Māori, and ecological wellbeing into national frameworks.
- Invest in permanent funding for grassroots resilience education and capacity building.
- Establish marae and community centres as legally recognised and resourced emergency hubs.

From a class and Indigenous perspective, emergency management often mirrors broader societal inequities. Many marae and rural communities remain physically vulnerable (e.g., located in flood zones), while disabled people are systematically excluded from emergency planning. A universal approach based on equity and dignity requires us to plan *with*, not just *for*, those most at risk.

## Centring Tangata Tiriti and Decolonisation

Emergency management must enact its Treaty obligations not through token consultation, but by restoring Māori authority and resourcing hapū-led climate planning.

We support:

- Legislative Options 3, 4, and 5 under Issue 2: mandating Māori representation and planning engagement
- Long-term investment in hapū climate adaptation and emergency systems, not short-term recovery grants
- Recognition of mātauranga Māori and tikanga as critical knowledge systems for climate resilience
- Mandate Māori representation on all Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups.
- Create a national Māori Emergency Management Advisory Council.
- Fund hapū-led emergency and climate adaptation systems grounded in tikanga and mātauranga.



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## Shifting from Crisis Response to Climate Justice

Emergency response is not enough. Communities like ours are already living in crisis, bearing the brunt of extractive economies, environmental degradation, and climate injustice.

We advocate for:

- A climate justice lens in all national risk frameworks
- Prioritising high-risk, low-income and Indigenous communities in adaptation funding
- Connecting this legislation to the National Adaptation Framework and Resource Management reform
- Permanently fund grassroots climate resilience, education, and emergency preparedness.
- Legally recognise marae, community centres, and local networks as emergency response hubs.
- Provide community organisations with training, infrastructure, and decision-making authority.

## Embedding Intrinsic Values and Regenerative Practice

Our work with communities, local biodiversity restoration, and zero waste education demonstrates that intrinsic values like reciprocity, interconnection, and kaitiakitanga are essential to long-term resilience. Emergency planning and funding models include non-economic resilience indicators, such as social cohesion, biodiversity health, and cultural continuity.

Legislate for Climate adaptation and Ecological Health.

- Ban building in high-risk zones (floodplains, unstable land).
- Include biodiversity, food security, and cultural continuity in recovery goals.
- Connect this bill to the National Adaptation Framework and Resource Management reform.

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**Issue 1 – Diverse Needs**
Support Options 3 and 4

- Require emergency plans to integrate disability, poverty, rural isolation, and colonisation impacts.
- Fund frontline organisations to lead planning in their communities.
- Ensure full accessibility in evacuation, alerts, and recovery.
- Co-design inclusive planning with lived-experience communities and frontline organisations.

**Issue 2 – Iwi Māori Participation**
Support Options 3, 4, and 5

- Resourcing, not consultation, is key. Iwi and hapū already lead in emergencies—support this with law and funding.
- Tangata whenua are Te Tiriti partners, not stakeholders.
- Restore Māori systems of environmental stewardship disrupted by colonisation.

**Issue 3 – Community Participation**
Support Option 3

- Mandate CDEM co-design with community groups, disability advocates, and tangata whenua.
- Integrate volunteer networks, food sovereignty systems, ecological restoration, and citizen science into emergency planning.
- Address past disempowerment by rebuilding support for community response groups.

**Issue 4 – Recognising First Responders**
Support Options 2 and 3

- Protect and support communities that act quickly in crises.

- Provide legal and material support to those who step up before official help arrives.
- Fund targeted community engagement led by those communities most impacted.
- Ensure that evacuation, information systems, and recovery services meet universal accessibility standards.

**Issue 10 – Protecting Taonga Māori and Cultural Heritage**
Support mandatory protections

- Recognise and resource the recovery of taonga, including spiritual and cultural values, not just physical assets.
- Recognition of ecological well-being as part of recovery goals

## Additional Recommendations

- **Fund Decentralised Emergency Education Hubs**: Support community centres and Marae that deliver place-based, inclusive emergency preparedness training.

- **Include Environmental NGOs in Planning**: Formalise their role in emergency response and long-term recovery.

- **Create Accountability Mechanisms**: Hold government and industries responsible for delays in climate adaptation that increase public risk.



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## Conclusion

The climate crisis is not coming. It is here. And it is not a weather problem, but a justice problem.
Communities, hapū, and nature-based organisations are ready to lead. But we cannot do it with ad hoc grants, top-down systems, and legislation that still centres control over care.

The Emergency Management Bill is a chance to shift from a model of protection to one of partnership and regeneration.

Ngā manaakitanga,

Jo Wrigley
Kaiwhakakaha| || CE

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**From:** s9(2)(a)
**Sent:** Monday, May 19, 2025 9:39 PM
**To:** Emergency Management Bill [NEMA] <EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz>
**Subject:** Submission on Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

Kia ora,

Drawing on a combination of professional experience within New Zealand's CDEM system and ongoing academic research, I have attached my submission on strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation in the requested .docx format. My submission focuses primarily on **Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation**, specifically addressing Issues 1, 3, and 4 which fall under this objective.

Although currently a PhD candidate at Monash University in Melbourne researching how community groups and emergency managers can collaborate to prepare for hyperlocal community-led disaster response initiatives, I have had extensive relevant experience. From January 2020 until early 2023 I was an Emergency Management Adviser (Community Resilience) with the Wellington Regional Emergency Management Office (WREMO) with responsibility for Community Emergency Hubs and other resilience activities in the Hutt Valley. I also spent considerable time in the Emergency Coordination Centre and Emergency Operations Centres in activations including the COVID-19 response and weather-related events in a variety of CIMS roles. I then moved to the Waimakariri District Council where I was one of two Emergency Management Officers and, in additional operational response activities, was responsible for community engagement, volunteer teams, and the introduction of the WREMO Community Emergency Hub model.

This submission is a result of my passion for and experience with community-led disaster response, and is grounded in my interaction with many inspiring community groups in New Zealand and overseas, and also by the previous 18 months of full-time academic research that I have undertaken on the topic. Drawing on this, the submission identifies specific gaps in current proposals and suggests alternative approaches for **strengthening community participation** and **recognising community-led response**.

Please note that I am content for this submission, including my personal details, to be published on NEMA's website and shared with other government agencies, as indicated by the absence of selections in the privacy/publication checkboxes in the submission template.

I would be happy to provide any clarification or further details that may be required and can be contacted on this email address (s9(2)(a) ) or my New Zealand mobile number s9(2)(a)

Nga mihi,

Paul Cull, CEM

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Paul Cull |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | |

☐ The Privacy Act 2020 applies to submissions. Please tick the box if you **do not** want your name or other personal information to be included in any information about submissions that NEMA may publish.

☐ NEMA may publish submissions or a summary of submissions to its website, civildefence.govt.nz. If you **do not** want your submission or a summary of your submission to be published, please tick the box and type an explanation below:

'

### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I agree that the proposed objectives for reform are appropriate and address critical areas for strengthening emergency management in New Zealand. In particular, I strongly support Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation. My current PhD research at Monash University directly highlights the importance of this objective, confirming the existing disconnect between emergency management organisations and their communities and the need for improved enabling mechanisms for community participation. My research is grounded in exploring how community-led disaster response initiatives can be better enabled and integrated with formal systems, which directly aligns with the intent of Objective 1.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Drawing on insights from my current PhD research at Monash University into enabling community-led disaster response initiatives, I agree with the problem description. This research, which explores skills and resources local communities could find useful when responding to a significant disaster and how such community-led response initiatives could be integrated with established emergency management systems, highlights additional factors contributing to disproportionate impacts that affect diverse groups within communities:

- **Varying capacity to engage with the formal system:** Communities and individuals possess varied abilities to connect with and effectively participate in the "formal" emergency management system across the 4 Rs. They may lack the networks or means to communicate their specific needs or to access assistance if the official response is not tailored to reach them effectively. Addressing this includes developing guidance on meeting diverse needs and also requires understanding the capacity of communities (including skills, knowledge, and resources) and connections (social capital) at a hyperlocal level.
- **Highly specific, localised needs:** Major emergencies often create nuanced, highly specific needs that vary significantly depending on the local context (geographical, demographic, exposure, vulnerability, etc.). A standard, 'one size fits all' emergency management approach may fail to adequately identify and meet these specific, localised needs. It is essential to explore the needs of local communities in preparing to undertake community-led response initiatives so as to understand and enable appropriate response capacity at this granular, hyperlocal level.
- **Challenges in integrating community 'first response':** Individuals, businesses, and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency, particularly when formal resources are stretched or delayed. However, effectively integrating these emergent community-led efforts with official systems presents significant challenges. Mismatched expectations around roles, tasking, or reimbursement can erode relationships and trust, and there are often limited levers for formal systems to direct or integrate spontaneous action.

These factors underscore the importance of approaches that recognise and enable diverse community capacities and facilitate their effective integration with the formal emergency management system.

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

While I agree with the problem description for Issue 1 regarding the diverse needs of communities not always being met, I am concerned that the proposed legislative options, such as Option 3, primarily focus on adding requirements to the CDEM Group Plan. The likely impact of this approach is that it may not sufficiently address the potential for individual local authorities to lack mandated responsibilities for local planning and community participation that is tailored to diverse needs. This focus on the regional Group level might allow for inconsistencies in delivery on the ground.

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I believe other options should be considered that include specific legislative requirements for local authorities to ensure robust local-level planning and consistent engagement with diverse communities.

**5. What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Effective planning for the needs of groups disproportionately affected by emergencies requires a robust, layered approach operating across national, regional (CDEM Group), local and hyperlocal community levels. At the national level, planning instruments like the National CDEM Plan and National Disaster Resilience Strategy should explicitly require consideration of diverse needs, ideally informed by input from representatives of affected communities. Regional CDEM Group Plans are essential for coordination and should mandate the identification of diverse needs and engagement with such communities. However, to ensure consistent and effective delivery on the ground, there must also be legislatively mandated response planning undertaken at the local authority level.

This local government response planning should be compatible with, and be required to implement, the diverse needs requirements of the Group Plan, but tailored to the specific contexts and demographics within each community. This would address the risk of inconsistent delivery on the ground if local authorities are not explicitly required to have their own actionable plans. Crucially, planning must extend to the hyperlocal community level through co-design processes involving community groups and emergency managers. Such a collaborative approach would allow for identifying local capacities, risks, and specific needs, leading to the co-creation of community response plans that leverage local knowledge and resources.

Implementing this multi-layered planning effectively necessitates legislative enforcement, appropriate resourcing at all levels (national, Group, local government, and hyperlocal community), and the provision of national guidance, standards, and best-practice models to ensure a baseline level of efficiency and consistency across the system.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I strongly agree with the problem description provided for Issue 3. My PhD research project directly investigates the challenges highlighted here, specifically the need to "improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management" and "mak[e] it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the 'official' emergency response".

The discussion document itself notes that there is a "disconnect between emergency management organisations and their communities" and that communities' ability to connect with the "formal" emergency management system is "varied". My research aims to investigate how community groups and emergency management authorities can collaborate to strengthen community capacity for disaster response and ensure its effective integration with formal systems.

Therefore, the problem description accurately reflects the critical need to strengthen and enable community participation and bridge the gap between community capacities and formal systems, which is fundamental to enhancing overall disaster resilience.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Regarding Issue 3, the problem statement accurately identifies that local communities' ability to connect with the "formal" emergency management system is varied. However, none of the options presented fully address the underlying need to build community capacity and enable meaningful participation.

The Status Quo (Option 1) is clearly inadequate, potentially leading to inefficiencies, mismatched expectations, and eroded relationships and trust between CDEM Groups and their communities. While Option 3 (requiring CDEM Group Plans to manage offers of resources) might improve the formal system's ability to accept spontaneous offers, its primary focus appears to be on the CDEM Group's administrative processes rather than on empowering communities to identify, develop, and offer effective, well-integrated contributions in the first place.

Similarly, Option 2 (developing guidance and strengthening public education) offers benefits such as better community awareness and improved relationships, but passive information provision may not be sufficient to build the capacity that communities require, and there is a risk the guidance may not be adhered to or that communities might have limited opportunity to engage. Therefore, none of these options, individually or together, appear sufficiently robust to achieve the objective of truly strengthening community participation in emergency management.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Rather than the suggested options of guidance and public education (Option 2) or simply managing offers of resources (Option 3), I would like to suggest enabling, co-designing, and supporting community capacity development through a structured, collaborative process. This would align with the objective of strengthening community

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participation by fostering a whole-of-society approach where communities are empowered to act alongside the "official" system.

Such a collaborative approach would empower hyperlocal community groups to identify, localise, and evaluate community-led disaster response capacities. It would move beyond passive awareness by actively building practical capabilities that are relevant to the local context and helping to strengthen relationships and build trust between communities and emergency managers while recognising, valuing, and leveraging the community's existing knowledge, social connections, and capabilities.

The outputs from such initiatives, including capacity development strategies and localised response plans, would provide emergency managers with better-defined community capacities that could be integrated into official structures and plans, thus making coordinating and managing community contributions more effective. Therefore, I believe that actively enabling community capacity development through a structured, collaborative process is a more robust pathway to truly strengthening community participation in emergency management.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I strongly agree with the description of the problem. It is a fundamental reality of emergencies that people, businesses, and communities are often the first to respond, particularly in the immediate aftermath before formal assistance arrives. The existence of potential barriers, such as the risk of civil liability, can indeed prevent or discourage individuals and groups from taking essential 'good faith' actions to save lives or property during this critical period. Recognising and addressing these barriers is vital for enhancing community resilience.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1, the status quo, carries the significant risk of discouraging crucial initial response actions by not explicitly protecting individuals who act in good faith. While it may encourage formal planning, it fails to adequately support the unavoidable reality of spontaneous community response.

Option 3, enabling compensation for labour costs, offers some fairness for those providing directed specialist services. Still, it does not address the broader issue of potential liability for general 'good faith' actions taken by community members or emergent groups.

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Option 2, providing legislative protection from civil liability for undertaking emergency management activity in good faith, is the most appropriate option to address the identified problem. This option directly supports the reality of community-led immediate response by removing a potential legal barrier. It acknowledges that individuals may need to act quickly to save lives or property without formal direction in the initial stages of an emergency. While there are potential risks regarding incentivising unsafe actions, these can be mitigated through clear definitions of 'good faith' and appropriate guidance, and they are less detrimental than the risk of inaction stemming from the fear of legal repercussions.

Therefore, I prefer Option 2 as it is critical to enabling the kind of spontaneous initial response that is intrinsic to effective community resilience. However, it is important to note that addressing civil liability is distinct from the proactive development and integration of community capacity for response - an equally important, although separate, issue that would directly support such 'good faith' community-led emergency response initiatives.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Another crucial option that should be considered under Issue 4 is the need for the Bill to explicitly promote the development of mechanisms for proactively identifying and nurturing community response capacities, i.e. local knowledge, skills, and resources. Such mechanisms are vital for equipping communities to undertake initial disaster response and ensuring these capacities can be effectively integrated with the formal emergency management system.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

A significant underlying problem related to strengthening community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management is the lack of proven mechanisms for proactively identifying, enhancing, and integrating the diverse capacities that exist within communities into formal emergency management structures and plans. While the discussion document acknowledges the "disconnect between emergency management organisations and their communities", there isn't a widely adopted, systematic process available for formal agencies to effectively collaborate with communities to map and strengthen their specific local knowledge, skills, resources, and social connections before a disaster occurs. This gap hinders effective collaboration and prevents the full potential of community-led action from being leveraged and coordinated during an emergency.

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**Submission on the Emergency Management Bill Discussion Document**

**Submitted by: Bruce Spedding**
**Date:** 17/5/2025

**Email:** s9(2)(a)

---

## Introduction

I am an elected community representative in a vulnerable coastal community in New Zealand. We are geographically isolated, backed by steep bush clad hills with a single sea-level access road passing through an industrial area. Our community faces disproportionate risks from earthquakes, sea level rise, storms, inundation, isolation, fire, service loss, industrial hazard events and landslides. We have planned on the basis that in the event of a major incident, we may be unsupported for a week or more.

We welcome the intent of the proposed Emergency Management Bill and appreciate the focus on stronger community and iwi Māori participation. However, to truly achieve resilience and practical effectiveness, the legislation must go further in addressing the realities on the ground.

---

## Key Points for Submission

### 1. Communication and Education Across the 4 Rs

The Four Rs (Reduction, Readiness, Response, Recovery) depend on timely, trusted communication. Current top-down communication models are often too slow, lack local context, and fail to support fast-moving emergencies.

**Recommendations:**

- Require local CDEM planning to support and incorporate locally-driven communication networks and street-level alerting mechanisms.
- Fund public education campaigns through trusted local institutions (boards, marae, associations, churches, schools, clubs).
- Ensure systems can operate independently of central systems for at least 7 days post-incident.

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### 2. Shift Away from Centralised Hubs as Primary Response Points

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The assumption that community hubs will provide food, water, shelter, or medical care is outdated and unrealistic (but still assumed by some). These hubs are now best seen as coordination centres, not as sources of physical aid.

**Recommendations:**

- Refocus resilience efforts on supporting family and street-level preparedness.
- Require CDEM Groups to support decentralised resilience nodes (e.g. container-based stores, household stockpiles, neighbourhood teams).
- Provide funding and technical assistance to communities to develop and maintain their own communications, emergency supplies and protocols.

---

**3. Local Knowledge Must Guide Emergency Response**

Our community, and others like it, often have the best understanding of what exists locally and what is needed. In past incidents, inappropriate resources have been delivered due to a lack of consultation.

**Recommendations:**

- Require formal community consultation in emergency response planning.
- Recognise and fund the role of community boards and grassroots networks in triage, logistics, and needs assessment.
- Create shared platforms for real-time local intelligence input to guide agency response.

---

**4. Recognise Self-Response as the First Line of Defence**

Communities are always the first responders. The law must reflect this and support the development of practical, locally-led solutions that can operate autonomously in the critical first 72 hours and beyond.

**Recommendations:**

- Provide legal protections and potential reimbursement for individuals and groups acting in good faith in emergency response.
- Train and support local volunteer teams to act independently if needed.
- Include household and micro-community resilience targets in CDEM standards.

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## Conclusion

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I strongly support the intent behind the proposed Emergency Management Bill, but it must move beyond policy language and into practical enablement of community-led action. The top-down model has shown its limitations. Communities like ours are ready to lead in building resilience — but we must be trusted, resourced, and supported to do so.

A national network of communities, solving their own problems and sharing solutions will empower communities and reduce the dependence and load on regional and national services, freeing them up for more strategic responses, coordination and support.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide input.

**Bruce Spedding**
s9(2)(a)

- Eastbourne Community Board - Board member
- NZ Response Team 18 (NZRT-18) Trust - Board member

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**Appendix**







https://eastbourne.nz/?s=expo

**Communications**

**To be resilient a community must be informed**, otherwise decisions and actions (or inaction) can lead to very poor outcomes. It has been repeatedly identified that slow alerting / notification is an issue with the current emergency management structures - bureaucratic networks and decision making slow down decisions and responses with sometimes catastrophic results (Why did it take so long for an emergency alert to be issued during Auckland's Easter floods? - RNZ 17/5/2025).

Communities often have minutes to respond, so fast, efficient, comprehensive and redundant local communication networks are important to ensure that important information is shared quickly and reaches all members of the community.

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**Potential community communications channels**

This diagram represents the range of ways we have identified to communicate within our community on a one-to-many relationship (does not include one-to-one). To ensure complete and timely communications and notifications the use of many of these channels are required to cover the way our community receives information. Only using one or two is not enough.

National, or even regional communications such as normal broadcast stations are not a great solution, as information critical to a community can be lost in the overall broadcast, or is too local to be included (c.f. weather forecasts). Local networks, with local information developed locally and shared quickly are essential to resilience.

There is a growing use and dependence on social media, websites, and sms - but as shown by Cyclone Gabriel the internet is not invulnerable, a localised for communication is needed. Modern systems like Starlink are also suggested, but these will not connect to many in the community, and the “last mile/kilometer” is the problem.

Accessibility also needs to be catered for - not everyone is internet or online savvy, and often the most isolated (geographically or socially) are the most vulnerable. People with vision or hearing issues also need to be able to be alerted.


Good networks can also serve through all 4R phases, by raising awareness and promoting mitigation action (Reduction), and doing the same for preparation (Readiness).

By using these channels regularly (also available for general community use) the community is aware of them as a source of information, plus they are under constant test. i.e. we know they are working, and do not have to carry out periodic checks and hope they function when needed like many emergency systems).

When an emergency is imminent these channels can be used to trigger preparedness in the community, and when needed, call to action. During the event they can be used to maintain active Response as the incidents occur, allowing a rapid and appropriate response led by local people who are fully informed.

Post emergency the same channels can be used to initiate and inform the community response and Recovery.

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* Note: Any form of communication can be used to work through community groups - and they in turn can use any method to contact their members (i.e. meetings, phone, visits, email, newsletters), but the key is using these already existing networks where possible, particularly to include those who may be otherwise isolated.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | David Elms |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | n/a |

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The objectives you've identified are right enough, but there are two important issues missing.

A major problem in practice is that there is an imbalance of focus. Of the "four R's", the main emphasis in the Discussion Document seems to be on Response, with far less attention given to Recovery. I don't think this balance is right.

The imbalance (as I see it) is probably because of a historical emphasis on Response. It may well be that there is an assumed belief that the main emphasis must always be on a reduction in loss of life, with secondary consideration of the recovery issue of returning a community to normality through restoring infrastructure functionality, rebuilding structures and so on. Yet it's at the recovery stage that the main costs arise. They can be huge.

A second general problem is that recovery often seems done, and costs far more than it should. A major reason seems to be that the legislation puts people in charge of recovery management who do not have adequate experience in the needs of recovery. It is not their normal expertise or understanding. There are indeed people with the necessary experience who could help, but there is no incentive to call on them for help and advice.

A third problem is that typically there is insufficient collaboration between the various actors involved. If they are used to a competitive commercial environment, they might not understand the need for collaboration, and indeed, whoever is managing the recovery might not understand it either. The result is unnecessary cost and unanticipated time delays.

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These can be major problems, and they are not addressed in the Discussion Document.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

It's clearly true that there are some people disproportionately affected by some emergencies. But it's not aways due to cultural issues. There are also physical reasons why some groups are disproportionately affected, and they should be included.

Take those living in Karamea for example. This is a substantial area whose only access is by a single road over difficult country. This road is seriously threatened by earthquake damage. I would imagine that those living locally would strongly value increased participation regarding reducing community risk.

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**5. What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Clarity is always desirable, and its major enemy is ambiguity.

Here again the focus seems to be on response, at the expense of recovery.
I'll not comment on suggested changes to the legislation except to say that the quality of the result doesn't depend only on organisational structure. An underlying problem is to ensure that those in significant management positions should be experienced and able to do the job. Or rather, get the job done, which could mean calling on outside experts to help. This was done well in Christchurch on the occasion of the first Port Hills Fire in 2019.

Being responsible for a task being done does not necessarily mean doing yourself. Can the legislation make the distinction between responsibility and action clear?

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I'd prefer Option 2: Provide the Director with the power to issue compliance orders.

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**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I'd prefer Option 2 (or b.): Provide clearer guidance as to what it means to achieve an "acceptable" level of risk. However, the definition of acceptable level is tricky. More work needs to be done here.

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

The consultation question begins with "Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority …" It's not clear to me that "human life and safety" should always be the top priority. Economic issues may sometimes be more important overall, or at least as important. Keeping the right balance is of course a general issue. However, I comment here because this is where priority of human life loss is stated explicitly in the Discussion Document.

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

A principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure" should be the preferred option. But if this approach is adopted, it would imply flexibility of definition at all levels, so changes to definitions of essential infrastructure might not be required.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

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*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

It is vitally important to have a standardised national information system. I cannot overstate the importance of this.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Fundamentally, it's rule-based legislation, as indeed it must be. But in practice, major causes of suboptimal performance lie elsewhere. Here are some:

1. People involved have other demands on their time and they may not have learned or remembered the details of the legislation.
2. Those involved at every level might not have the experience or expertise required in a disaster situation, for either response or recovery. Yet there are people who do have the necessary expertise, and who could be called upon for help and advice. All too often they are not brought in. Why? Several possible reasons are
    a. The idea of calling in help is not accepted
    b. There are cultural barriers to seeking help
    c. There is a lack of good thinking on relationships and costs
    d. There is no formal way of knowing who could be approached for help – that is, there is no information system that could be consulted (though there is clearly a place for informal contacts
    e. Dealing with emergencies needs a different way of thinking. Collaboration should be to the fore. A good (and internationally acknowledged) example could be found in the SCIRT activities in Christchurch after its earthquakes, where collaborative and the more normal competitive approaches were combined for a successful result.

Legislation should not inhibit ways of dealing with such performance issues.

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**From:** David Elms s9(2)(a)
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 20, 2025 4:54 PM
**To:** Emergency Management Bill [NEMA] <EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz>
**Subject:** A further submission

To whom it may concern

Although I have already made a submission, I wish to add a further point, which I think is important. It's this:

What is missing from the discussion document is an statement of the fundamental principles on which the legislation must rest. The foundation ideas, so to speak.

There's only one mentioned in the discussion, and that not directly: that precedence must always be given to minimising loss of life.

More principles would have been appreciated. I hope in your future work you give this some thought. It might give coherence to the final result.

Best wishes for the success of the project.

David Elms

David Elms
s9(2)(a)

Ph: s9(2)(a)
Mob: s9(2)(a)
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To: Policy Unit, National Emergency Management Agency

Email: EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

## 1. Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback on the proposed objectives and issues for the reform of the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act. We welcome the Government's intent to modernise and strengthen the emergency management framework in Aotearoa New Zealand. This submission provides commentary on the proposed objectives and issues. It also recommends additional objectives.

## 2. Who this submission is from?

This submission is made by the Northland Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group and its members.

The Group has a long-standing history of effectively coordinating emergency responses and ensuring the resilience of communities across the region. Northland has faced many significant events, including severe weather events, flooding, tsunami threats, wildfires, and infrastructure disruptions. Through proactive planning, strong community engagement, and inter-agency collaboration, the CDEM Group has successfully navigated these challenges. The Group has provided timely support to ensure that essential services remain operational during crises.

As part of its commitment to continuous improvement, the Northland CDEM Group welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the discussion on strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation. With firsthand experience in managing emergencies, the Group understands the importance of legislative frameworks that empower local and regional authorities to act swiftly and effectively. Coordinating resources, implementing response plans, and supporting recovery efforts are central to Northland's approach. This ensures that emergency management is adaptable and responsive to evolving risks.

Our submission provides insights drawn from practical experiences in disaster management. The submission highlights successful strategies, identifies areas for improvement, and advocates for effective legislative support. In providing this submission, the Group seeks to strengthen New Zealand's emergency preparedness and response capabilities. The lessons learned from past emergencies will be crucial in shaping policies that enhance resilience, safeguard communities, and ensure a coordinated national approach to disaster management.

## 3. Background and Context

The Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2002 was designed to establish a comprehensive framework for emergency reduction, readiness, response, and recovery in New Zealand. It set out roles and responsibilities for national, regional, and local authorities. It aims to create a coordinated approach to emergency management. However, despite the Act's intent, its implementation has been inconsistent. This has left critical gaps in the country's ability to effectively respond to large-scale emergencies. Many of the provisions within the Act have not been fully realised due to a combination of structural, funding, and governance challenges. This has resulted in fragmented responses and a lack of cohesion in disaster management efforts. These issues have been highlighted in previous reviews.



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One of the key issues has been the variability in how CDEM Groups apply the legislation across regions. While the Act intended to create a unified national strategy, local implementation has often been dictated by resource availability and regional priorities. This has led to a patchwork approach rather than a consistent, nationwide system. This disparity has meant that some areas are far better equipped to handle emergencies than others. This has creating vulnerabilities in regions which have fewer resources or less experienced personnel.

Uneven implementation has hindered sharing of best practices, making it harder for underprepared regions to learn from those that have successfully managed emergency events. The government Technical Advisory Group review in 2017 highlighted the inconsistencies in CDEM delivery, including disparity in training Controllers, Coordinated incident management variation, a lack of a common operating picture and inconsistency in the delivery of CDEM arrangements across regions.

The gaps in implementing the 2002 CDEM Act have exposed weaknesses in preparedness planning, resource allocation, and emergency governance. These gaps need to be fixed by the effective application of the Act.

Northland has consistently implemented the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2002 consistent with its intent. This has ensured a coordinated and effective approach to emergency management. The region has prioritised maintaining a comprehensive and current CDEM Group Plan. This serves as the foundation for preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.

The CDEM Group Plan plays a critical role in guiding operational responses, resource allocation, and inter-agency coordination. Through regular reviews, training exercises, and public engagement, the region continues to strengthen its emergency management framework, setting a strong example for other CDEM Groups across New Zealand.

**Community engagement** has been a cornerstone of Northland's approach to building resilience, with a strong emphasis on empowering local communities through **Community Response Plans** and **Marae Preparedness Initiatives**. These efforts ensure that communities are actively involved in emergency planning and equipped with the knowledge and resources needed to respond effectively to crises. Northland has worked closely with local groups, iwi, and marae to develop tailored preparedness strategies that reflect the unique needs and strengths of each community. Marae, as cultural and social hubs, play a vital role in emergency response, serving as safe havens during disasters and coordinating support for those affected. By fostering strong relationships and prioritising community-led preparedness, Northland has built a robust foundation for resilience.

The **Northland Lifelines Utility Group** has played a critical role in ensuring the resilience of essential infrastructure and services across the region since its establishment in 2004. The Group brings together key utility providers, including electricity, telecommunications, transport, water, and fuel suppliers and others. It assesses risks, identifies vulnerabilities, and develops mitigation strategies. By maintaining regular meetings and fostering strong interagency relationships, the Group ensures that Northland's lifeline services remain prepared for potential disruptions caused emergencies.

Integrated into **Northland's emergency response framework**, the Lifelines Utility Group plays a vital role in coordinating critical infrastructure support during emergency events. The group members have engaged during emergency responses, particularly in weather emergencies, such as the 2007 storms in March and June, storms in 2014, and more recently Cyclone Gabrielle and the Transpower tower failure in March 2024. In times of crisis, its well-established communication channels and planning efforts enable swift decision-making and resource-sharing, allowing emergency services and utility providers to collaborate seamlessly. The Group's ability to anticipate challenges and develop response



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strategies has been key in maintaining continuity of services for residents, businesses, and emergency responders. By consistently refining its operational plans and conducting resilience assessments, the Northland Lifelines Utility Group remains a cornerstone of regional preparedness effectively.

The **Welfare Advisory Group** has been a vital component of Northland's emergency response framework, ensuring that the welfare needs of individuals and communities are met during crises. The Group has strengthened its capabilities by fostering close collaboration with key agencies, including health services, social support organisations, and iwi representatives. This integrated approach has allowed it to deliver timely and effective welfare support, particularly during large-scale emergencies such as severe weather events and the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, the Welfare Advisory Group played a crucial role in coordinating essential services, ensuring access to food, housing support, and mental health resources, while also prioritising the needs of vulnerable populations. By continuously adapting its response strategies and maintaining strong community engagement, the Group has demonstrated resilience and leadership in crisis situations, helping Northland communities recover and rebuild.

While Northland has established a strong foundation in emergency management, we recognise that there is always room for improvement and development. The challenges posed by evolving risks, climate change, and the increasing complexity of large-scale emergencies highlight the need for continuous adaptation and refinement of our systems.

By refining existing frameworks and addressing operational gaps, we can ensure that Northland —and New Zealand — can effectively handle future emergencies.

We support the intent of the **Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation** discussion document. This submission makes recommendations that will further strengthen and enhance the legislation.

## 4. Objectives for Reform

The five objectives outlined in paragraph 35 of the discussion document provide a foundation for strengthening New Zealand's emergency management framework. They convey the need for clear roles and responsibilities, improved national coordination, enhanced community resilience, and a more consistent approach across all levels of emergency response. Northland supports these objectives, as they align with the principles that have guided our own emergency management practices.

### Additions to the objectives

**Resourcing and Investment: Addressing the underfunding of Emergency Management**

The group acknowledges the findings of the *Government Inquiry into the Response to North Island Severe Weather Events* (Para.36). These highlight insufficient investment in readiness planning, activities, equipment and supplies. The finding highlights **severe underfunding**, the disparities in capability, and burnout among many emergency management professionals. The Hawkes Bay CDEM Group independent review[1] by Bush International Consulting commented that "The national emergency management system is not fit for purpose and it sets good people up to fail."

[1] Bush International Consulting, Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Response to Cyclone Gabrielle, Independent External Review, March 2024



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While the consultation proposes improvements to structure and coordination, **resourcing and funding is not sufficiently addressed**. A legislative reform without a budget and funding risks embedding aspiration without implementation.

We submit that consideration be given to the following**:**

- Introduce baseline national funding for minimum service levels
- Fund training, surge capacity, and capability development
- Require local authorities to prioritise and transparently fund emergency management
- Address regional funding inequities, particularly in smaller or rural communities
- Embed the principle of investment in long-term capability within the new Act.

Apart from welfare costs during response and recovery, the Resilience Fund is the sole source of funding available from NEMA to CDEM Groups. While this fund has evolved from a direct subsidy in 2003 to its current contestable form, its value has remained unchanged. Initially each council received a Government grant based on expenditure to support their CDEM arrangements. Despite subsequent changes to the fund, the available funding value has remained unchanged.

The current level of Central Government funding for regional CDEM arrangements is insufficient.

We recommend that Central Government take a stronger role in funding regional CDEM arrangements.

**International Assistance**

While Northland acknowledges and supports the objectives outlined in the discussion document for the new Emergency Management Bill, we believe a crucial element warrants explicit inclusion: the proactive management of international assistance during major emergencies.

New Zealand's experience with large-scale disasters, such as the Christchurch earthquakes, underscores our reliance on international support for specialised resources. These include search and rescue teams, specialised medical professionals and essential equipment not readily available in New Zealand.

The review following the Christchurch earthquake highlighted significant challenges in effectively coordinating the influx of international rescue teams, including those with whom New Zealand does not have formal diplomatic relations. The review noted that the necessary processes for managing these offers of assistance were time-consuming.

In the context of rapid-onset disasters like earthquakes, the initial 72 hours are critical for saving lives. The ability to swiftly integrate international rescue teams and medical assistance into the immediate disaster zone, without undue delay caused by procedural complexities, is paramount.

Northland strongly recommends that the new Emergency Management Bill provides a framework for receiving and coordinating international assistance.

By proactively addressing the integration of international assistance, the new Emergency Management Bill can significantly enhance New Zealand's capacity to respond effectively and efficiently to major emergencies, ultimately improving our ability to save lives and minimise suffering.

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**Group Offices**

The current objectives and intent do not adequately address a key recommendation from the 2017 Ministerial Review – *Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies (TAG review)*.

The TAG review recommended more formalised shared service arrangements, implemented by regional or unitary councils, to strengthen a Group-wide approach and accountability.

Northland has successfully operated as a regional entity, utilising shared service arrangements across its four constituent councils to deliver emergency management through a single Group Office.

The establishment of Group Offices was initially recommended in the 2003 Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM), now NEMA, guideline to support the CDEM sector. Despite this recommendation, a divergent approach has developed to how Groups are structured and operate. We recommend that this issue be revisited. This would achieve greater national consistency in emergency management structures while preserving effective local delivery within our region.

To ensure consistent emergency management delivery across regions, the Emergency Management Bill should include a regional structure, and specify the roles and responsibilities of Group Managers.

## 5. Feedback on Issues in the Discussion Document

### Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

#### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We fully support **options 3 and 4** under **Issue 1** as they provide a strong framework for improving community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management.

**Consultation questions**

**Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionally affected by emergencies?**

Key reasons why some people may be disproportionately represented in emergency management planning and response:

- **Socioeconomic Barriers** – People from lower-income communities often face challenges in accessing emergency preparedness resources, information, and assistance. Lower incomes restrict their ability to invest in personal preparedness measures. Systemic inequalities can result in inadequate representation in decision-making processes.
- **Cultural and Language Differences** – Diverse communities, particularly those where English is not a first language, may struggle to engage with emergency planning efforts due to language barriers or a lack of culturally relevant communication.
- **Geographical and Accessibility Challenges** – People living in rural, remote, or high-risk areas may have less access to emergency management services, response teams, and infrastructure. Additionally, individuals with disabilities or mobility restrictions may not be adequately represented in planning discussions, leading to evacuation procedures and emergency support structures that fail to meet their needs.

In developing **Community Response and Marae Preparedness Plans** in Northland, we have successfully navigated and overcome these challenges.



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***What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?***

Northland has a well-established history of working closely with communities and iwi to develop robust emergency response arrangements that have been tested and proven effective. Our experience has shown that better-informed planning would achieve these benefits:

- **Community Empowerment and Ownership:** Encourages localised solutions that reflect the unique needs of each community while ensuring individuals, businesses, and local leaders are actively involved in emergency planning and response.
- **Stronger Iwi Māori Partnership:** Recognises the essential role of iwi Māori and marae as critical hubs in emergency response, incorporating traditional knowledge and values to enhance preparedness efforts.
- **Improved Coordination and Resource Allocation:** Establishes clearer communication channels between communities and emergency agencies, reducing fragmentation and ensuring resources reach those in need efficiently.
- **Consistent and Effective Planning:** Supports the development of standardised yet adaptable emergency response frameworks.
- **Long-Term Resilience and Recovery:** Builds capacity for communities to sustain recovery efforts post-emergency, reducing reliance on external support and fostering self-sufficiency.
- **Expediting Assistance and Response:** Advocates for legislation that removes bureaucratic delays in deploying emergency personnel and resources, including international aid, to affected communities.

**Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management**

We strongly support **options 3, 4, and 5** under **Issue 2.** They would ensure meaningful representation and engagement opportunities for iwi Māori at all levels—**Governance, Operational**, and, most importantly, in the development of **Group Plans**. These options reinforce the value of inclusive decision-making and collaborative emergency management strategies.

**Consultation questions**

***Have we captured the role that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?***

We support the discussion document's recognition of the crucial role that iwi Māori play before, during, and after emergencies. The outlined approach acknowledges the leadership, resilience, and community-centred response iwi bring to emergency management, and we endorse the inclusion of these perspectives in shaping a more effective and inclusive system. We endorse what has been outlined in the document in this area.

***How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?***

Iwi Māori should be recognised as key partners in New Zealand's emergency management system, with a formal role in governance, planning, response, and recovery efforts. Their leadership, knowledge, and deep connection to the land and communities make them integral to building resilience and ensuring culturally appropriate disaster responses. Strengthening this partnership will enhance national preparedness, improve community-led recovery, and ensure that emergency management strategies reflect the diverse needs of all people.

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***What should be the relationship between CDEM Groups and iwi Māori?***

The relationship between **CDEM Groups (Joint Standing Committees)** and **iwi Māori** should be built on a foundation of **genuine partnership, shared decision-making, and mutual respect**. Iwi Māori bring invaluable knowledge, leadership, and cultural expertise to emergency management, ensuring that responses are **community-driven and culturally appropriate**. By fostering a collaborative approach, CDEM Groups and iwi can work together to enhance regional resilience, improve engagement, and create emergency strategies that **reflect the diverse needs of all communities**.

We recommend that consideration be given to strengthening this relationship by enabling iwi Māori the option of either:

- full membership
- or observer status within CDEM governance structures.

Full membership would allow iwi representatives to actively participate in decision-making, shaping emergency management policies and strategies alongside local government and response agencies. Observer status would be a more flexible arrangement, ensuring iwi voices are consistently heard without conferring direct governance responsibilities. Whichever model is adopted, ensuring **formal representation** and recognition of iwi Māori within CDEM Groups is essential for a **more inclusive, effective, and regionally tailored** emergency management system.

***What should the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?***

The **Coordinating Executive Group (CEG)** and **iwi Māori** should have a strong, collaborative relationship that ensures Māori perspectives are integrated into operational emergency management. This partnership can be structured in several ways:

- **Formal Representation:** Iwi Māori could have a seat within the CEG, actively contributing to emergency response planning and decision-making.
- **Advisory Role:** Iwi Māori could provide strategic guidance on culturally appropriate emergency response efforts.
- **Flexible Engagement:** Offering iwi either full membership or observer status within CEG, ensuring representation at a level suited to their role.
- A **consistent, structured partnership** between CEG and iwi Māori would enhance **community resilience, operational efficiency, and culturally aligned response efforts**, ensuring Māori communities are well-integrated into emergency.

***What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and matauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?***

The most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director would be through the establishment of a Māori Advisory Board or similar structure. This board could ensure consistent representation and input, allowing iwi Māori to formally contribute their knowledge, experiences, and perspectives to national emergency management policy and decision-making.

A Māori Advisory Board would serve as a dedicated platform for iwi Māori to provide strategic guidance on emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. This would include integrating traditional Māori knowledge (mātauranga Māori), strengthening community-led resilience initiatives, and ensuring culturally appropriate emergency strategies. The board could also facilitate ongoing



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dialogue between iwi Māori and emergency management leadership, ensuring that their expertise is actively incorporated into national frameworks.

**Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management**

We support **Option 2** under **Issue 3.** It emphasises **Community Capability Building** as a vital component of strengthening emergency management. By enhancing local knowledge, training, and preparedness initiatives, we can empower communities to take an active role in disaster response and recovery, ensuring resilience at every level. **Community Capability Building** is a fundamental pillar of **effective emergency management**, helping communities become **proactive, prepared, and resilient** in the face of disasters.

**Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses, and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency**

We support **Option 2**, which strengthens **protection from civil liability** for individuals who act in **good faith** to manage an emergency **before or in the absence of a formal response**. Ensuring legal safeguards for those who take swift, responsible action helps encourage timely intervention, ultimately reducing harm and improving overall emergency management effectiveness.

We have numerous examples over recent emergencies, including in cyclone Gabrielle, in Northland where this protection would be applicable. Often, **local people — neighbours, passersby, and community members** — are the first to act before official rescue teams arrive.

We do not support Option 3 which sets a legislative approach to eligibility criteria for reimbursement of costs incurred by community members. This would be difficult to manage and could lead to uncontrolled or authorised funding issues.

## Objective 2: Providing for Clear Responsibilities and Accountabilities at all levels

**Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during emergencies**

We submit that the proposed options for incident management unnecessarily complicate what should be straightforward arrangement. Specifically, the introduction of the term "Control Agency" in Options 2 and 3 creates potential confusion and deviates from established best practices.

The term "Lead Agency" is well-established and consistently applied within the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) framework for New Zealand. This terminology is widely understood and forms the basis of effective inter-agency collaboration during emergency responses.

Therefore, Northland strongly recommends Option 1. The roles and responsibilities of lead and supporting agencies should be clearly defined within the National Plan.

The current *Guide to the National Plan 2015, Part 4, Appendix 1* already provides a valuable framework by listing hazard types and their corresponding lead agencies at various levels, along with references to their legislative mandates. This existing structure offers a sound foundation for further clarification.

Our experience in Northland has demonstrated the effectiveness of the Group, operating through the Group Controller, in assuming the role of lead agency when appropriate. This approach allows for flexible leadership, with various agencies providing support based on the specific nature and demands of the event.

To ensure clarity and avoid unnecessary complexity, Northland advocates for resolving the definition of leadership roles through specification within secondary legislation, such as the National Plan and its



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associated guidance. This approach will build upon existing frameworks, promote consistent understanding across agencies, and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency responses.

**Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management**

This issue was previously highlighted in the *2017 Technical Advisory Group (TAG) report*, specifically in *Chapter 3: Regional Structure*. The current section of the document appears to address the recommendations outlined in the TAG report, and we support its intent to **strengthen the performance of CDEM Groups and CEGs**.

In our submission to the **TAG review**, we advocated for a more **enhanced and structured regional approach**, recognising its importance in building resilience and improving coordination. Northland has consistently invested in this approach, resulting in **strengthened capability and capacity** across our emergency management framework. While we acknowledge the progress made, we also recognise that **there is always room for further improvement** to ensure the system continues to evolve and effectively meet the needs of communities.

**Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities**

Although this has been highlighted in the review it is not something that we have had to deal with in Northland. Since we have service level agreements and role clarity, there is our arrangements are unambiguous, compared to other regions.

We support the initiative to develop distinct responsibilities outlined in Option 2, ensuring clear definitions of roles, actions, and coordination. Establishing structured guidance on roles will strengthen accountability, efficiency, and emergency response effectiveness.

**Issue 6.2: Providing clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management**

We are aware that Emergency Management Groups operate based on what they believe works best for their region. This has resulted in 16 different groups each implementing emergency management in 16 different ways, despite having the same overarching objectives. This variation has led to inconsistencies in approach, coordination, and resource allocation, highlighting the need for greater alignment and standardisation, while still allowing regional flexibility.

**Option 3** proposes a one-size-fits-all approach to this issue, which we believe is not suitable given distinct regional variations.

**Option 2** is preferable as it preserves the flexibility of groups, allowing them to adapt to local needs while maintaining collaborative working relationships with their constituent councils.

We **do not support Option 4**. Appointing Chief Executives (CEs) as Group Controller and Recovery Manager with delegated responsibility is not an appropriate way to enhance accountability and responsibility. We believe other mechanisms, such as CEG arrangements, group plans, and increased intervention authority for the NEMA Director, offer better solutions.

To ensure successful implementation, clear and directive guidance will be necessary — particularly regarding expectations, resource allocation, funding arrangements, formal agreements, and sources of financial support. Establishing structured but adaptable frameworks will help balance national consistency with regional autonomy.

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**Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups**

We support **options 2 and 4** and agree with the summary outlined in the document. Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) are the backbone of emergency management, ensuring that regional preparedness, response, and recovery efforts function effectively.

Chief Executives (CEs) and councils must actively participate in Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) and ensure **their councils are fully engaged.** The ability to delegate this role and act independently must be removed from the legislation for CE's and other members of CEG's.

Strengthening CEG's is a better option than appointing CE's as Group Controllers and Recovery Managers.

At the forefront of decision-making and coordination, CEGs bring together key agencies — including emergency services, lifeline utilities, health authorities, and local government — to implement the CDEM Group plan. CEGs drive preparedness, overseeing risk assessments, planning frameworks, and capability-building initiatives that strengthen community resilience.

Without strong and engaged CEGs, emergency arrangements risk being disjointed, under-resourced, and reactive. Their leadership is essential to ensure that regional plans function cohesively.

The **effectiveness of the CEG** is a function of its membership and ensuring the **right level of representation** is essential. We strongly recommend that the legislation be amended to **elevate NEMA's role** from an **"observer"** to a **formal member** of the CEG. Furthermore, to ensure NEMA's contribution is aligned with the governance level of other members, the **Regional Emergency Management Advisor** should be replaced with a **more senior executive-level representative**. This would provide NEMA with the **appropriate authority and influence** to effectively engage in strategic decision-making and support regional emergency management efforts.

A similar approach should also be applied to **NEMA's membership within CDEM Groups**, ensuring a **more formal and appropriately senior level of representation**. Strengthening NEMA's role within CDEM Groups will enhance coordination, improve strategic engagement, and ensure that emergency management decisions reflect **national priorities alongside regional needs**.

**Consultation question:**

***Do you think fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at technical government level (for example the CDEM Group -based model) If so, why?***

We recommend that the membership of CDEM Groups, section 13, CDEM Act 2002, be amended to include the District Commander of Police and the Regional Fire Commander.

Our recommendation and experience supports this change. Since its establishment in **2003**, the **Northland CDEM Group Joint Committee** has included the **District Commander of Police** and the **Regional Fire Commander** as key members. No other CDDEM Groups have adopted this approach. Their inclusion has provided **critical expertise, leadership, and operational insight**, significantly strengthening emergency management governance.

These **senior emergency service leaders** have contributed to ensuring that decisions made at the governance level are **informed by frontline experience**. Their involvement has facilitated **stronger interagency collaboration**, streamlined **resource deployment**, and enhanced overall **community safety and resilience**.



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Implementing this change would **significantly enhance** the capability and effectiveness of **emergency management** nationwide. By formally integrating **senior emergency service leaders** into CDEM Group governance, emergency planning and responses would be **more informed, coordinated, and strategically aligned**. This approach would directly contribute to the **strengthening and uplift** of emergency management, addressing the key areas identified for improvement. It ensures that **leadership, expertise, and operational insight** are embedded at the highest levels, resulting in a **more resilient and well-prepared emergency management system**.

Expanding on this approach, **more operational representatives from Police and FENZ actively participate in our CEG**. Their direct involvement ensures that emergency management decisions are informed by **on-the-ground operational expertise**, strengthening coordination between governance and response agencies.

**Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date**

We support **measures to streamline and reduce administrative burdens** associated with updating emergency management plans. However, we are **concerned** that **the National Plan, due for review in 2015, has not been reviewed**, leaving critical gaps in preparedness and response frameworks. We support a combination of options 1, 2 and 3.

Furthermore, the **ability of CDEM Groups to deviate from established guidelines on plan processes and timelines** has contributed to inconsistencies in regional emergency readiness. Given the fundamental role these plans play in delivering effective emergency management, it is concerning that they are allowed to lapse and remain outdated. A structured, **mandatory review and update process** must be implemented to ensure that emergency management plans remain **consistent, current, operationally effective, and aligned with evolving risks and best practices.**

## Objective 3: Enabling a Higher Minimum Standard of Emergency Management

**Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance.**

We the options that promote national consistency in emergency management, a combination of **options 2, 3 and 4.**

The current permissive legislative framework has allowed CDEM Groups to deviate from national guidance, leading to inconsistencies in planning, response, and coordination. This lack of alignment weakens the system resilience. To address this problem, we support actions that strengthen governance, enhance national guidance, and establish a broader range of mandatory standards within legislation.

However, while stronger national standards are essential, we recognise the need for flexibility to allow CDEM Groups to tailor their approaches to the unique needs of their communities. A strengthened and enhanced CDEM system—nationally, regionally, and locally—requires firm leadership and engagement, consistent frameworks, and targeted guidance, ensuring both uniformity and adaptability in emergency preparedness and response.

**Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues**

Northland supports a combination of Options 2 and 3, recognising the critical and urgent need for greater consistency across the emergency management sector nationwide. The permissive nature of the current legislation has led to discrepancies in approach and capability between Civil Defence



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Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups, without any formal mechanisms for intervention or the enforcement of alignment.

Our experience indicates that the Monitoring and Evaluation reviews previously conducted by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) in 2015/16 were valuable in identifying inconsistencies and highlighting areas requiring improvement. However, the absence of explicit authority and a clear mandate meant that the Director lacked the power to compel changes to ensure a uniformly high standard of emergency management practice.

To effectively address this weakness, the ability to review, assess, and enforce improvements must be explicitly and linked to the CDEM legislation and the broader planning process. Therefore, Northland strongly recommends that the new legislation grant the Director a mandate to intervene in situations where there is a significant deviation from the outcomes outlined in a Group's plan or where demonstrable non-performance is identified in a CDEM Group.

Establishing a more structured and enforceable system of oversight will be instrumental in ensuring that national standards are consistently upheld, regional disparities in capability are minimised, and the overall emergency management capabilities across New Zealand are continuously strengthened. This enhanced accountability will foster a more resilient and unified national emergency management framework.

**Consultation question.**

***What aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?***

- **Funding and Resource Allocation:** Implementing **equitable and consistent funding models** to ensure all regions have the **necessary resources, personnel, and training** to maintain emergency readiness.
- **Clear Legislative Authority**: Strengthening legislation to provide **enforceable national standards** and a **mandate** for intervention when there are inconsistencies in emergency preparedness. This mandate should include the authority for the Director to intervene when necessary.
- **Standardised Emergency Planning and Coordination:** Establishing **mandatory national frameworks** for CDEM planning, response protocols, and coordination mechanisms to ensure **alignment across regions**.
- **Risk Assessment and Hazard Mapping:** Ensuring **nationally coordinated hazard identification, risk assessment, and early warning systems** to enable a **uniform approach** to disaster risk reduction.
- **National Training and Capability Development:** Introducing **standardised training** for emergency management professionals and community volunteers to enhance **skills, interoperability, and response effectiveness**
- **Monitoring, Evaluation and Enforcement**: Establishing a **national oversight mechanism** to regularly assess CDEM performance, **identify gaps**, and ensure improvements are **implemented across all regions**.
- **Community Engagement and Public Awareness**: Strengthening **national education campaigns** to **ensure all communities** understand their emergency risks, preparedness steps, and evacuation procedures.

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- **Integrated Response with Iwi Māori and Partner Agencies:** Embedding nationally consistent engagement models with iwi Māori, ensuring cultural perspectives and local knowledge are effectively integrated into emergency planning and response efforts

**Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management**

We recommend **option 4**, as it ensures the necessary flexibility to tailor local hazard risk management plans to the specific needs of each region. Also, we recognise that this approach will be a legislative requirement, requiring enforcement to maintain consistency and accountability. Balancing regional adaptability with clear legislative mandates will strengthen emergency management planning, ensuring both effectiveness and compliance

**Consultation questions**

***What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?***

Achieving the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency in CDEM Group plans requires a structured yet adaptable framework.

To maintain this balance, key considerations include:

- **Nationally Mandated Core Standards**: Establishing **minimum requirements** for emergency planning, governance, and response to ensure a cohesive national approach.
- **Regionally Tailored Implementation**: Allowing CDEM Groups the flexibility to adapt plans to their specific risks, infrastructure, and communities, ensuring practical local application while maintaining compliance.
- **Stronger Oversight and Guidance**: NEMA must provide ongoing monitoring, evaluations, and best practices, ensuring regional plans remain aligned with national objectives.
- **Mandatory Review Cycles**: Enforcing regular updates to keep plans current, effective, and responsive to evolving risks.
- **Equitable Funding and Resource Allocation**: Implementing fair funding models to ensure every region has adequate resources and personnel, while allowing local prioritisation based on unique challenges. Funding models that deliver on the government expectation and appropriately supported by funding from central government.
- **Legislative Strength and Regional Autonomy**: Strengthening legislation to enforce compliance, while ensuring CDEM Groups retain operational flexibility to respond effectively in their regions. Directors' powers to intervene and direct CDEM Groups to implement corrective actions or to complete work is recommended.

***What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Groups from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?***

Several practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Groups from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments, including:

- **Misalignment of Priorities**: Emergency management may not be **fully embedded** into broader local government **strategic planning**, leading to gaps in integration.



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- **Funding Constraints:** Limited or inconsistent funding for CDEM can **restrict collaboration** and prevent emergency management from being prioritised within wider council planning.
- **Legislative Gaps:** The **permissive nature** of current legislation has allowed councils to **overlook** CDEM requirements, resulting in **inconsistent application** of emergency planning guidelines. (The TAG review clearly identified this as an issue).
- **Lack of Clear Mandates for Coordination**: Without **formal requirements**, some local authorities may not see emergency management as an **integral** part of their **planning and governance processes.**

***Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?***

Yes, fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver more effective hazard risk management. Key areas for improvement include:

**Stronger Legislative Mandates**: Current frameworks allow too much discretion. Clearer legal obligations are needed to ensure hazard risk management is treated as a core governance priority. Tsunami readiness and response arrangements are examples of the inconsistency that has arisen, with variations in inundation mapping, inconsistency in tsunami warning and alerting systems from region to region. A standardised national system is recommended.

**Equitable Funding Models**: Many local authorities struggle with limited resources. This adversely affects their ability to conduct risk assessments, mitigation projects, and emergency preparedness programs. A national funding framework should be established to ensure consistent and adequate financial support. Again, a national funding model supported by central government is recommended.

**Improved Data and Technology Use**: Local authorities need access to better hazard mapping, forecasting tools, and risk analysis technologies to proactively manage risks. National investment in data-sharing platforms and advanced predictive modelling would support this.

**Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural herniate and animals during and after emergencies.**

**Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies**

We recommend **option 4.**

We support introducing secondary legislation as it will be essential in ensuring a nationally consistent approach to this critical aspect of emergency management. This framework must explicitly recognise and uphold Te Tiriti o Waitangi, ensuring that Māori perspectives, rights, and responsibilities are meaningfully integrated into decision-making and emergency response structures. Strengthening legislative mechanisms in this way will provide greater clarity, accountability, and equity, ensuring a more cohesive and inclusive national approach.

**Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies**

We recommend **option 2.**

Animal welfare must have clear guidelines to ensure well-defined roles and responsibilities in emergency situations. This will strengthen accountability while maintaining the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) as the Lead Agency, ensuring it retains its planning and response duties. A more



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structured but non-legislated approach will improve coordination, efficiency, and protection for animals, reinforcing the critical role of emergency management in safeguarding animal welfare.

**Consultation questions**

***Noting that human life and safety will be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be priorities relative to the protection of property?***

Given that human life and safety will always be the top priority in emergency situations, the protection of animals should be considered a high priority, recognising their welfare as an integral part of community resilience**.**

**Objective 4: Minimising Disruption to Essential Services**

**Issue 11: Reducing Disruption to the Infrastructure that provides essential services**

We **strongly agree** that our current **lifeline utility arrangements are inadequate** to ensure **the timely restoration of services** following disruption. Furthermore, we recognise the **urgent need** for some **Lifeline utility providers to build more resilient infrastructure** in response to the **increasing risks and consequences** posed by emergencies.

**Issue 11.1: Narrow Definition of "Lifeline Utility"**

We recommend **option 2** and support **amending the definition** to include a **wider range of infrastructure and service providers**, ensuring that **all critical systems essential to public safety and continuity** are recognised within emergency planning. Additionally, we recommend establishing **clear accountability measures** to require lifeline providers to **actively invest in resilience**, alongside national **funding mechanisms** to support infrastructure upgrades and continuity planning.

Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora is indispensable for community safety and well-being during emergencies. Our comprehensive health services, encompassing hospitals, urgent care, mental health support, telehealth, and ambulance coordination, form the bedrock of both daily healthcare and effective emergency response and recovery. The experience of Cyclone Gabrielle starkly illustrated the dual challenge faced by the health sector: while profoundly impacted by disruptions to essential infrastructure like power and transportation, it remains a crucial lifeline for the wider community.

Currently, the lack of recognition of Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora as a lifeline utility under the CDEM Act hinders its full participation in emergency planning and limits its access to the protections afforded to other critical sectors. The proposed shift towards a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure" presents a significant opportunity to rectify this. Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora demonstrably aligns with the intent of this broader definition, providing services fundamental to public health, safety, and societal function.

Formally recognising Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora as essential infrastructure would:

- Enhance its integration into national and regional emergency planning frameworks
- Foster improved collaboration and coordination with other vital infrastructure providers
- Extend the Act's protections and expectations to our crucial health services.

Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora is not merely a recipient of services during crises; it is a critical facilitator of effective emergency response and community resilience. Integrating Health New Zealand



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Te Whatu Ora within the revised legislative framework will ensure a more prepared, coordinated, and supportive system for all New Zealanders in times of need.

**Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning**

We recommend **option 2**.

Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning is critical to ensuring service resilience, rapid recovery, and long-term stability in emergencies. Some key areas for improvement include:

**Risk Assessments and Resilience Planning**: Lifeline utilities must conduct regular, structured risk assessments, identifying vulnerabilities and integrating mitigation strategies into their continuity plans.

**Stronger Legislative Requirements:** Current continuity planning is inconsistent across providers. Clearer mandates are needed to ensure all lifeline utilities follow nationally defined resilience standards.

**Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing**

We **recommend Option 3** and strongly emphasise the need for an **enhanced level of engagement and collaboration** between lifeline utility providers at both **regional and local levels**. While Northland has developed **strong, operational partnerships** with most lifeline utility providers — built over time through **relationships and goodwill** — this informal approach lacks **legislative backing** to ensure consistency and long-term resilience.

**Formalised Coordination with CDEM Groups**: Lifeline utilities must be **proactively integrated** into regional **emergency response frameworks**, ensuring **seamless collaboration** during crises.

To strengthen these critical relationships, **legislation must mandate structured engagement, strategic planning, collaboration, and information sharing**. A formalised framework will ensure lifeline utilities are **effectively integrated** into emergency management efforts, improving response coordination, infrastructure resilience, and service continuity in times of crisis.

## Consultation questions

**Issue 11.1**

***If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in appendix C?***

If a **principles-based definition** of "essential infrastructure" were introduced, we would support the current list of **essential services and infrastructure** outlined in Appendix C. However, we strongly recommend that **healthcare and hospitals** be explicitly included as **essential services**, given their critical role in emergency response and community resilience.

**If you think other essential services should be included into the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover.**

If other essential services were to be incorporated into the list, they should encompass **infrastructure that directly supports healthcare delivery**. This would include **hospital buildings, healthcare providers, medical supply chains, and supporting facilities** that ensure continuity of care during emergencies. Strengthening the recognition of these services within emergency planning will enhance national preparedness and safeguard public health.

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**Issue 11.3**

***Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination multiple levels?***

Some key elements of multi-level emergency coordination would be:

- **Common Operating Picture (COP):** A shared information system ensuring that local, regional, and national agencies have real-time visibility of an emergency.
- **Real-Time Data Integration and Information Sharing:** Secure, automated data feeds from emergency services and infrastructure networks for fast decision-making.
- **Coordinated Decision-Making and Multi-Level Governance:** Defined roles, responsibilities, and escalation points to prevent duplication and streamline response efforts
- **Stronger Legislative and Policy Frameworks:** Mandatory collaboration requirements to ensure local, regional, and national agencies work within a structured system
- **Interagency Coordination and Public Engagement:** Empowering local responders with decision-making authority while national agencies provide strategic support

**Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity**

We recommend **Option 4** as the most effective approach to ensuring that all government agencies with emergency management responsibilities implement robust business continuity plans. This option provides a structured framework that establishes clear expectations, accountability, and consistency across agencies.

**Objective 5: Ensuring Agencies Have the Right Powers Available When an Emergency Happens**

We **acknowledge and support** the Government's decision to allow **national and local states of emergency or transition periods** to be in place **simultaneously** within the same geographic area. This approach enhances **coordination, resource allocation, and response effectiveness**, ensuring that emergency management efforts at both levels are **aligned and responsive to local and national needs**.

We recommend a minor amendment regarding terminology in current legislation by changing the 'transition period' and renaming to 'Recovery period powers.' The term 'transition' is currently ambiguous, referring both to a specific point in time (the Response to Recovery Transition Report) and a duration (the period during which Recovery/transition powers are active). Furthermore, CDEM Groups and Councils informally use 'transition' in two other ways, creating significant confusion. Changing the name of the period granting Recovery powers would greatly reduce this ambiguity.

**Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas.**

We recommend **option 2** as this would enable a more flexible approach to managing cordons which on occasions is necessary to allow periodic access by residents or rural people to gain access to properties. Existing legislation can be used to restrict entry to areas – i.e. Police and FENZ have such powers.

**Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level**

We support **Option 2** and agree with the summary. We recognise the importance of clarifying the functions and powers assigned to CDEM Groups, Controllers, and Recovery Managers, ensuring clear



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roles, accountability, and effective coordination in emergency management. Strengthening this framework will enhance decision-making, response efficiency, and long-term recovery efforts.

**Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period**.

We support a combination of **Options 2 and 3** to expedite the declaration process and agree with the summary. However, we have concerns regarding some recent emergency declarations, particularly whether they were justified and made for the appropriate reasons. There have been examples in recent years where declarations have been made against the advice of Emergency Management professionals, and for reasons that sit outside the definition of emergency in the CDEM Act.

Currently, there is no threshold that must be met before declaring a state of emergency. We recommend that the Government investigate whether legislation should define such a threshold.

Additionally, a significant concern is that Mayors and other delegated officials have the authority to declare a state of emergency without necessarily consulting a Group Controller or other emergency management professionals. This creates the risk that declarations may be made without expert input or sufficient justification, potentially leading to inconsistent or premature decision-making. Establishing mandatory consultation requirements or clear justification criteria would strengthen the integrity and effectiveness of the declaration process

**Issue 16: Mayor's role in local state of emergency decelerations and transition period notices.**

We support **option 2** which clarifies and minimises confusion.

**6. Conclusion**

This submission highlights several key areas requiring attention to strengthen emergency management frameworks, improve coordination, and enhance community resilience. Three of these areas are:

1. **Strengthening Community Capability and Shared Services**: Communities play a **crucial role** in disaster response and recovery. Strengthening **local training, preparedness, and formalised shared service arrangements** will enhance national and regional resilience.
2. **Legislative and Funding Framework Improvements**: Clear **funding mechanisms**, structured **expectations**, and **better resourcing agreements** will provide stability and continuity for emergency response efforts.
3. **International Assistance:** Including clear **provisions for international assistance**, ensuring seamless **integration** into existing national response arrangements


In reforming the CDEM Act, it is crucial to build on the enabling aspects of the 2002 legislation, while ensuring that the new law strengthens accountability, consistency, and the capacity to deliver on its intent.

**7. Conclusion**

Thank you for taking the time to consider our submission. We appreciate the opportunity to contribute to this important deliberation on strengthening emergency management legislation. Please contact us if you would like to discuss, if seek clarification of, any aspects of our submission.

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Signed:



(Kelly Stratford)

Northland CDEM Group Chair.

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**Response to "Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation" Discussion Document**
***20 May 2025***

## 1. Radio Broadcasters Association

1.1 The Radio Broadcasters Association represents the interests of the commercial radio sector in New Zealand. This currently includes MediaWorks, NZME, Sports Nation Network, Rhema Media, Pacific Media Network, Radio Samoa, Free FM, Radio Southland, 95bFM, Best News Entertainment, Central FM, Peak FM, Brian FM & Radio Tarana.

1.2 The Radio Broadcasters Association and its members would like to speak to its submission if that option is available in due course.

## 2. NEMA MOU Partner Role

2.1 In an emergency, the effective delivery of public information is critical. Timely, accurate information supports emergency response and recovery and ensures that members of the public take appropriate actions to protect themselves and others.

2.2 Under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (the Act), government departments, Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups, local authorities, emergency services and lifeline utilities are required to maintain systems for the dissemination of, or reaction to, emergency-related information.

2.3 Under the National CDEM Plan, and the accompanying Guide to the National CDEM Plan, NEMA, RNZ and TVNZ are required to develop and maintain arrangements to ensure the effective and consistent broadcast of warnings and emergency information.

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2.4 Other broadcast media throughout New Zealand have volunteered to work together with NEMA, RNZ, TVNZ and other agencies involved in emergency management as partners to distribute messages to the public to protect life, health, and property. This relationship is of public benefit and founded on mutual respect and open communication.

2.5 The purpose of the MoU is to outline the principles and processes by which broadcasters agree to cooperate with one another and broadcast public safety messages during or before events of life-threatening or national or regional significance (e.g. a tsunami).

2.6 NEMA and each Broadcaster will take all reasonable measures to ensure that radio and television are reliable channels of communication for official warnings and emergency information messages, supplemented by associated online channels. The Parties will establish clear guidelines around their roles so that ongoing workable arrangements may be put in place.

2.7 NEMA, as Crown signatory, undertakes to champion and facilitate the principles and terms of this MoU to CDEM Groups and all government agencies involved in the dissemination of timely, accurate, relevant and consistent emergency information, and to work in close coordination with the Broadcasters and other emergency management agencies to enable the dissemination of timely, accurate, relevant and consistent emergency information.

2.8 Each Broadcaster undertakes to champion and facilitate the principles and terms of this MoU to its staff and members, and to work in close coordination with NEMA and other emergency management agencies to enable the dissemination of timely, accurate, relevant and consistent emergency information.

2.9 Broadcasters are invited to advise their audience that they are party to the MoU and during an emergency they will broadcast emergency messages. However, they must not state or imply they are “the” Civil Defence Emergency Management or NEMA broadcaster in their region, nor use their status as a MOU partner for commercial gain.

2.10 The MoU is not legally binding on, or enforceable by, either of the parties but the parties acknowledge that this MoU is intended as a statement of mutually agreed intentions. It is not intended to create legally enforceable rights or obligations. However, the parties agree that they will act in good faith to observe and perform their undertakings in this MoU to the best of their ability as if they were legally enforceable.

2.11 The Parties to the MoU are independent and no principal/agent relationship, partnership or contract is created by this document. This MoU does not create an employment relationship of any kind.

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2.12 The provisions of this MoU are subject to any government directive or policy change.

## 3. Discussion Document Feedback

3.1 We thank the Government for the opportunity to comment on the Discussion Document, *"Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation."* We strongly support the principles and intent of the review. Strengthening New Zealand's resilience to hazards and enhancing the systems that protect our communities is critical and timely work.

3.2 We wish to raise a significant concern: **The critical role of improving public information and communication** is not explicitly identified as a primary objective of the review.

3.3 Effective communication with the public is fundamental across all four phases of emergency management - reduction, readiness, response and recovery.

3.4 This was a key finding in all reviews following Cyclone Gabrielle, where the availability of timely, accessible, and locally-relevant information had a direct impact on community safety, coordination and recovery outcomes.

3.5 We submit that public information and communication should either be:

- **Recognised as a standalone objective in the new legislation; or**
- **Clearly embedded across all objectives, requiring that each objective is also viewed through a "public communication lens."**

For example:

3.6 Objective 2 (strengthening relationships and roles) and Objective 3 (building capabilities and capacity) currently make no reference to the need for formal plans and regular communications with Lifeline Utility Broadcasters and with NEMA Broadcast MOU partners.

3.7 While a national-level Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) exists between NEMA and broadcasters, there is no formal legislative requirement for these critical communication partnerships to be reflected in regional or local emergency response plans.

3.8 Without embedding these requirements at all levels, we risk inconsistent or incomplete communication readiness across different regions which is what has been evident in all recent emergencies.

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3.9 As you can see in the attached (**Appendix A)** RNZ and RBA presentation done annually with regional CDEM PIM forums, 64% of New Zealanders identify radio as their primary source of information during or immediately after a disaster. Research into media usage is done by GfK on behalf of the radio industry and independently by NEMA.

3.10 Radio's resilience - operating even when mobile and internet networks fail - was crucial during Cyclone Gabrielle, where radio networks delivered lifesaving updates despite widespread power and telecommunications outages. This has been evident since the Christchurch earthquakes and is a repeated theme in all recent emergency events.

3.11 The experiences of Cyclone Gabrielle provide real-life evidence of the differing readiness and relationships in place between CDEM's and MOU partners that had a significant impact on the information that was available to those impacted by the flooding. These differences were most notable in the neighbouring regions of Tairawhiti and Hawke's Bay where the communications response could not have been more different.

## 4. Recommendations

4.1 Whilst it may be too late, we believe the review should explicitly include *"Strengthening public information and communication systems across all phases of emergency management"* as a stated objective of the legislative reform.

4.2 Failing that, it should review each proposed objective to ensure that public information and communication responsibilities are properly articulated and embedded in each objective and outcome.

4.3 Establish formal legislative responsibilities for maintaining communication partnerships with Lifeline Utilities and Broadcast MOU partners or at least ensure Objective 3 provides for NEMA oversight of all public information and communications functions especially where an event is across more than one region and has the capacity to create confusion with mixed messages.

4.4 Ensure public information strategies are fully resourced, and that emergency communication planning is mandatory for all local Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups.


## 5. Conclusion

5.1 We strongly believe that a modern emergency management system must prioritise robust, resilient and coordinated public communication to ensure all New Zealanders are supported before, during, and after emergencies.

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5.2 We would welcome the opportunity to contribute further to this important work and are committed to supporting the development of a safer and more connected Aotearoa with the numbers of natural hazards that can create emergencies in New Zealand.

JANA
RANGOONI
CHAIR
RADIO BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION
s9(2)(a)
www.rba.co.nz



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# The power of radio in a crisis

## Media and PIM - working together

National Emergency Management Agency
Te Rākau Whakamarumaru

RNZ

RBA
RADIO BROADCASTERS ASSOCIATION

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# We’re all in this together


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## Social media and online messengers

## Internet and wi-fi



## Land line



## TV



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# Get prepared / *Me takatū*




Ensure you have a battery operated radio.

In an emergency find, and tune in to, your local radio station as they will broadcast official emergency management information that is appropriate for your community and situation.

**Record the frequency for your local stations in your Emergency Plan.**

National Emergency Management Agency
Te Rākau Whakamarumaru

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# When the power goes off

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# Digital disruption

## The power of radio in a crisis



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# Why radio matters in an emergency

## Right messages to the right people at the right time

**3.64 million**

**78.2 %** of New Zealanders aged 10 years and over listen to Radio every week

**3.43 million**

**73.5 %** of them listen to a commercial radio station every week

**595,716**

**12.8 %** of them listen to RNZ every week

**Radio** is still the most relied on media in an emergency

**64 %** of respondents nationwide say radio is where they can get information about what to do during or immediately after a disaster

The major networks and newsrooms are live 24/7.

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# Why radio matters in an emergency

## Which medium provides information about what to do during or immediately after a disaster




Source: GfK RAM S2/2024, Total NZ

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# Radio is here to help in emergencies

## But we need your help to ensure we let listeners know what is happening!

### In the planning stages

RBA and RNZ at regular planning days.

Meet your local teams and understand what role each other can play before and during emergencies

Visit the networks & newsrooms when in Auckland.

### In an emergency

Get information to radio before/ at the same time as social media.

Use the RBA/RNZ communications database

Provide information and spokespeople.

Tell people what's happening – and what to do!

### Not just NEWS

Planning for local emergencies.

Radio updates during emergencies:

- What's happened
- What you need to do
- Where you can find help
- Where to find shelter, water, petrol, food, etc
- How to contact friends and family.

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# Thank you

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ATAFU
TOKELAU COMMUNITY GROUP INC

**Submission from Atafu Tokelau Community Group Inc.**

**Re: Issue 3 – Strengthening and Enabling Community Participation in Emergency Management**

## Introduction

The Atafu Tokelau Community Group Inc. welcomes the opportunity to submit feedback on ***Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management***. Our submission is grounded in the lived realities of the Tokelau diaspora in Aotearoa, particularly in Porirua, and is guided by our *Taiuli 30-Year Strategic Masterplan*. We strongly urge central and local government agencies to prioritise and partner with grassroots Pacific communities in shaping emergency preparedness and response systems that are culturally anchored, trusted, and locally led.

## Authentic Voice and Pacific Realities

For too long, Pacific voices—particularly those of smaller nations such as Tokelau—have been underrepresented in emergency management planning and decision-making. The experience of Cyclone Gabrielle, the COVID-19 pandemic, and climate-driven events demonstrate the urgent need for inclusive systems that empower communities to activate and lead responses based on their unique strengths and networks.

Our community holds deep ancestral knowledge, social cohesion, and intergenerational wisdom that must be formally recognised as part of Aotearoa's civil defence capability. We are not just recipients of services; we are frontline responders. Our Matauala Centre in Cannons Creek has already served as an informal emergency hub, equipped with food storage, a 30,000-litre water tank, and space for up to 250 people. This infrastructure was established through community foresight and is now a vital regional asset.

During COVID-19 and the Omicron outbreak, our group was approach by Pasifika Futures - Pacific Whanau Ora Agency to provide support to Tokelau families across the greater Wellington region. In light of the group's cultural ability to reach at speed some of the hardest to reach and vulnerable Tokelau and Pacific families, we reach up to 250 plus families.

The community group was commended for the tremendous work undertaking to servicing our Tokelau and Pasifika families across New Zealand as part of the Government's response framework. The group facilitated for Tokelau families with the Porirua City Council/ WREMO during the COVID-19 outbreak to improve access and awareness to many families.

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## Alignment with Taiuli 30 Years Strategic Masterplan

The Taiuli 30-Year Masterplan clearly articulates the need to:

- Strengthen Tokelau community resilience to environmental and health pandemic.
- Invest in emergency-ready infrastructure.
- Ensure community governance and leadership are embedded in emergency response systems.
- Collaborate with Māori, Pacific and local government partners in a spirit of Te Tiriti-led transformation.

The vision is one where Tokelau people in Aotearoa are safe, self-determining, and equipped to mobilise in times of crisis—not as an afterthought, but as a central pillar in the nation's emergency strategy.

## Recommendations

1. **Resource Community-Led Emergency Hubs** – Provide sustainable funding to strengthen places like the Matauala Centre as designated Tokelau and Pacific Emergency Activation Hubs.
2. **Embed Tokelau and Pacific Leadership in Decision-Making** – Ensure Tokelau and Pacific representation, particularly from grassroots and ethnic-specific communities, in regional emergency planning and national resilience strategies.
3. **Co-Design Response Frameworks** – Work in partnership with Pacific organisations to co-develop culturally appropriate response protocols that reflect our values of *mafana*, *fakafetai*, and *tauhi vā*.
4. **Invest in Preparedness Education** – Support community-led education and simulation exercises that prepare whānau, elders, and youth in culturally safe ways.
5. **Enable Regional Partnerships** – Formalise collaboration with city councils, WREMO, and Māori partners to ensure cohesive and inclusive regional planning.

## Conclusion

Our submission is not just a call to be heard—it is a demonstration of readiness, capability, and a proactive vision for the future. The Tokelau community in Porirua and the largest Tokelau population in the world stands willing and able to lead and contribute meaningfully to New Zealand's emergency resilience. We urge government and emergency agencies to invest in what already works: trusted, community-embedded Tokelau and Pacific leadership.

We submit our submission and request an oral presentation accordingly.

**Zechariah Reuelu**
Project Lead Atafu Tokelau Community Group Inc.
Email: s9(2)(a) Website:
www.matauala.org.nz

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20 May 2025

Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6140
EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

**Subject: Consultation on options to inform the design of a new Emergency Management Bill**

Dear Policy Unit,

## 1.0 Introduction

GNS Science, NIWA, and MetService welcome the opportunity to contribute to the ongoing reform of New Zealand's Emergency Management (EM) system. Each organisation plays a vital role in supporting the EM system and responding to natural hazard events by providing critical data, models, tools, and scientific expertise that inform decision-making before, during, and after emergencies.

GNS Science previously submitted on the EM reform in October 2023. Building on that submission with NIWA and MetService, we have identified opportunities to improve the clarity and implementation of the EM Bill and to streamline future processes. As the future New Zealand Institute for Earth Science (ESI), this joint submission reflects our shared experience in science, forecasting, and EM.

## 2.0 Key recommendations

We consider further work is required to:

- demonstrate stronger and more consistent reference to scientific data, expert intelligence, and advice across all aspects of the 4Rs (Reduction, Readiness, Response, and Recovery).
- develop national consistency across scientific networks, models, and standards for monitoring, forecasting, and mitigation of hazards.
- ensure appropriate consultation, financial support and timing so that science organisations mandated to perform the roles of a critical infrastructure entity and/or a provider of essential services, such as warnings and notifications, can effectively operationalise those new roles.
- ensure more extensive immunities / protections for entities designated as critical infrastructure entities and/or as a provider of essential services.

## 3.0 Statements of Support

We support many of the principles and directions outlined in the discussion document:

- **Māori and Community Partnership**: We strongly support a central role for Māori and community partnerships in the design and delivery of the EM system.
- **Clarifying Local Government Roles:** Clarification of roles and responsibilities across local government is crucial, particularly in relation to the function and authority of Coordinated Executive Groups. We consider the options presented in Tables 7–9 are reasonable proposals.
- **Professionalisation of Emergency Management:** We support initiatives that promote a more professional EM workforce, supported by formal qualifications, training, and an evidence base aligned with best practices and current research.

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## 4.0 Science and Data in Emergency Management

To be effective, New Zealand's emergency management system must better integrate scientific insight into hazard planning, early warning systems, and legislative design.

### 4.1 Role of scientific data, expert analysis and advice in supporting the 4 Rs

We consider the proposed EM Bill should have stronger and more consistent reference to scientific data, expert analysis, and advice across all aspects of the 4Rs (Reduction, Readiness, Response, and Recovery).

There is a generational opportunity to coordinate this reform with the resource management and science systems reforms. Everything required by the EM system from the new ESI should be compatible with and explicit in the legislation for Public Research Organisations. As the future ESI, we consider that the organisation should be formally designated as the lead agency for scientific guidance on all natural hazards. We also suggest that the EM legislative framework formally designates official providers of natural hazard warnings (e.g. severe weather, flooding, tsunami, volcanic ash, etc) and we suggest that the ESI be designated as lead. The ESI should also have a stewardship role for mobilising science capability (including at universities) in support of the 4Rs.

The EM reform process should be aligned with wider reform efforts, including resource management and science system reforms. We consider that NEMA should develop a specific fiscal mechanism to resource data and operational advice in events. The current practise requires science organisations to incur costs upfront and rely on the possibility of future reimbursement.

### 4.2 Consistent National Approach

National consistency must extend to scientific networks, models, and standards. This includes consistent support for monitoring, forecasting, and mitigation of natural hazards such as severe weather and flooding.

Table 13, Option 2 provides a reasonable framework for strengthening local hazard risk management particularly in its emphasis on science and risk acceptability. Even if Options 3 or 4 are pursued, the science-based components and risk acceptability elements from Option 2 should be retained to ensure long-term risk reduction.

### 4.3 Additional points of note

- **Expanded Hazard Scope and Capability:** The successor to the CDEM Plan should broaden its scope to explicitly include climate change-affected and cascading hazards such as flooding, landslides and wildfire. Supporting this expanded remit will require resource within the ESI, to enable coordination of hazard response, robust forecasting, monitoring, and long-term hazard research.
- **Dynamic CDEM Planning**: Emergency management plans must be living documents. This includes ensuring regular updates based on current science, datasets, and hazard models to maintain relevance.
- **Legislative Durability**: New legislation should be designed for the next 20–30 years to remain effective to changing and evolving risks, including those driven by climate change, land use change, urbanisation and increasing population.

## 5.0 Impact-based Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems

While public alerting is addressed in the discussion document, there is insufficient focus on the underpinning science systems which enable effective science-based monitoring, forecasting and early warning systems.

As a Member of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), New Zealand is required to implement systems and services in accordance with WMO Technical Regulations and standards. We strongly encourage alignment with the global community under WMO frameworks, noting:

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- Amendments to the WMO Technical Regulations relating to **Early Warning Services**[1] are expected to be approved by an Extraordinary Session of the WMO Congress in October 2025. The updated Regulations will require Members (states) to ensure the provision of early warning services for meteorological, hydrological, climatological and related environmental hazards, and to designate one or more organisation(s) as official provider(s) of those early warning services.
- The **Early Warnings for All** (EW4All) initiative[2], that aims to ensure universal protection from hazardous hydrometeorological, climatological and related environmental events through life-saving **Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems** (MHEWS), anticipatory action and resilience efforts by the end of 2027.
- The global push to implement multi-hazard **Impact-Based Forecast and Warning Services** (IBFWS, see: WMO Guideline No. 1150[3]) in support of EW4All.

## 6.0 Organisational Responsibilities and Structure

We recommend formal recognition of the distinction between:

- **The Lead Science Agency** (e.g. the New Zealand Institute for Earth Science), responsible for monitoring, modelling, forecasting, warnings, and hazard advice, and
- **The Lead Government/Response Agency**, such as NEMA, MfE or FENZ, responsible for public messaging and response coordination. The role of councils should also be clear.

This model aligns the forecasting value chain[4] and existing practice for severe weather and could be applied across all hazards. A consistent national framework for flood and severe weather hazard management should also be established.

## 7.0 Critical Infrastructure and Liability

The definition of Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services may extend to the operational activities and supporting infrastructure at GeoNet and MetService. We support this prospect and are open to discussing this for the ESI, but it will need careful consideration and additional resourcing to match obligations. Consideration of the upstream boundary to science systems in terms of redundancy, up-time and resilience is critical.

- **Definition of Critical Infrastructure and Essential Services:** The EM legislative framework should clarify that scientific infrastructure, such as the national weather radar network, other elements of weather forecasting and GeoNet, may qualify as critical infrastructure. The ESI may also qualify as an essential service provider. The framework should also clarify whether hazard warnings are essential services.
- **Implications of Essential Designation:** Designating scientific services as essential must be accompanied by appropriate resourcing to meet obligations around business continuity, service-level agreements, and resilience. This should include consideration of any critical dependencies on the wider science system to deliver science advice.

While GNS Science, NIWA and MetService are not currently considered lifeline utilities, their current role with respect to natural hazards means they play an integral role in the EM system. Given the risks inherent in GNS, NIWA and MetService's current roles and in the context of the formation of the new ESI as a potential provider of multi-hazard notifications and warnings including their impacts, the case for providing immunity for civil and criminal liability under the new EM legislation needs to be considered. We reiterate the concerns outlined in GNS Science's October 2023 submission on the EM Bill regarding critical infrastructure and liability and provide further detail in Annex One.

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[1] Proposed amendment to the WMO Technical Regulations for Early Warning Services

[2] https://earlywarningsforall.org/site/early-warnings-all

[3] WMO Guidelines on Multi-hazard Impact-based Forecast and Warning Services

[4] https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/29613-weather-forecasting-system-review-final-report-pdf

## 8.0 Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We agree that the role of iwi / Māori in emergency managements needs to be formally acknowledged and recognised for in legislation. This will provide more certainty for both CDEMs and iwi / Māori of their role before, during and after an event. We support options 3 and 4 of the proposal where the iwi / Māori would be embedded into the emergency management system.

In terms of what the relationship between CDEM and iwi / Māori should be – we have seen and operated within some well-established relationships already formed between some CDEM and iwi / Māori. We highly encourage managers of CDEM to work together to learn from these relationships. We propose and support that the most effective way for iwi / Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director would be through:

- The establishment of a National Māori emergency management group – consisting of Māori Emergency Management practitioners, National Iwi Chairs Forum representation and the New Zealand Māori Council.
- Uplifting NEMA's Māori relationships capability to assist the Director with building relationships and seeking advice from iwi / Māori and groups not represented by National Māori emergency management group.

## 9.0 Concluding statement

This reform is an opportunity to create a modern, science-informed, and community partnership-based emergency management framework. Integrating scientific capability, national data consistency and standards, and risk reduction strategies will ensure that New Zealand is better prepared to address both sudden hazard events and long-term developing hazards in a changing environment.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this submission. We welcome the opportunity for further discussion or clarification of any of the points raised. Should you wish to discuss the content in this submission, please contact Graham Leonard by email at s9(2)(a) in the first instance.

Yours sincerely,

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Chelydra Percy | John Morgan | Stephen Hunt |
| CEO, GNS Science | CEO, NIWA | CEO, MetService |

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**Annex one: Additional comment on Liability and definition of lifeline utilities (GNS Science)**

The definition of the problem on "Barriers to cooperation and information sharing" is very much focussed on "lifeline utilities" even though paragraph 182 is specific that "Emergency management relies on strong relationships, coordination and cooperative planning between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, emergency services and government agencies".

While GNS Science (GNS) would not currently be considered a lifeline utility, its current role means it plays an integral role in the emergency management system. This is done via the monitoring, identification, and analysis of earthquake, volcanic activity and landslides hazards and threats and the subsequent issuing of hazard information to relevant government agencies, CDEM Groups, local authorities, and lifeline utilities.

Against the backdrop of the GNS' recent experience with the Whakaari prosecution, the risks inherent in GNS' current role (and in any proposed extension of that role), provide a case for considering immunity for civil and criminal liability for GNS and similar organisations. The new Emergency Management legislation needs to be clear in its intentions relating to:

- the risk of GNS being successfully sued and/or prosecuted.
- the costs of defending any such claim - and liability if successfully sued and/or prosecuted.
- the speed and efficiency at which these public functions can be executed where the only mechanisms to protect organisations such as GNS is through contracts which require negotiation and time to implement.
- the debilitating effect (emotional and reputational), and the "chilling" effect (on the ambition of the science undertaken) of any such litigation (or known risk of litigation) on GNS and its employees (with the resulting potential impact on GNS staff retention and recruitment).

Careful consideration of the implications for the new ESI's potentially expanded role in the emergency management system as a provider of notifications and warnings is also required.

There have been various attempts since 2018 to make GNS and other Crown Research Institutes and their staff immune from liability when performing public functions. Initial work was undertaken in 2018 following the response from Government on a report by a Technical Advisory Group (TAG) which provided options on how to deliver better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies. GNS collaborated with DPMC on a draft Cabinet paper on work to address the TAG report which proposed:

- "Change to provide immunity to GNS Science and its staff when they are performing public good functions such as issuing warnings. This is consistent with the situation for public servants who have a similar protection under the State Sector Act 1988. We recommend that immunity to GNS Science staff be added into the CDEM Act and that this work be done as part of the wider changes to this act that we have already agreed."

In July 2020, GNS collaborated with NEMA on a further proposal and Cabinet paper to progress amendments to the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002. Those proposed amendments had potentially broader application to Crown Research Institutes other than GNS. It specifically related to agencies that issue warnings e.g., severe weather and tsunami warnings and immunity from civil claims rather than any broader immunity for civil and criminal liability.

The Emergency Management Bill was introduced in Parliament in June 2023 and again provided some limited immunity in the context of civil defence roles and responsibilities for relevant entities, but that Bill was discharged in March 2024.

There is a paucity of statutory protection for Crown Research Institutes (such as GNS) in the context of the performance of their public functions. More extensive immunities/protections are conferred on other agencies in critical decision-making roles under other legislation e.g.:

- The Financial Markets Authority (FMA), Takeovers Panel, and Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) under their respective legislation.
- The immunity under section 163, Biosecurity Act 1993; and

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- The protections afforded the core Crown under the Public Service Act 2020 and the Food Act 2014.

There is a case for blanket immunity of GNS (its employees and directors) from civil and criminal liability (including under Health and Safety at Work Act 2015) for good faith performance of its EM roles. In this regard, GNS is likely to form part of a "class" along with NIWA and MetService, which may be similarly concerned regarding liability in respect of weather warnings.

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# WasteMINZ Disposal to Land Sector Group, Territorial Authorities' Officers Forum, and Disaster Waste Working Group submission on the Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation consultation

20 May 2025

This submission represents the views of the Disposal to Land and Territorial Authorities' Officers Forum Sector Groups and the Disaster Waste Working Group and not necessarily those of WasteMINZ. Sector and working groups have been established by WasteMINZ to ensure special interests in the waste, resource recovery, and contaminated land management sectors are adequately represented.

WasteMINZ is the largest representative body of Aotearoa New Zealand's waste, resource recovery and contaminated land management sectors. We are the authoritative voice on waste, resource recovery and contaminated land management in New Zealand, with 430 member organisations from small and large waste operators, materials recovery facilities, territorial authorities, community groups, researchers, food rescue groups, major supermarkets, tech companies, packaging producers, contaminated land specialists, consultants, and many others looking to make a difference to the environment.

## About the Disposal to Land Sector Group

The Disposal to Land Sector Group was established to promote a consistent and good practice approach to the management of waste disposal to land and represents over 800 members, technical and operational experts engaged within disposal of waste to land activities across Aotearoa New Zealand. The Disposal to Land Sector Group Steering Committee is elected to represent the common interests of the sector.

## About the Territorial Authorities' Officers Forum

Creating consistency and efficiency of service amongst territorial authorities through sharing knowledge and best practice around waste, recycling and resource recovery.

The Disposal to Land Sector Group, Territorial Authorities' Officers Forum Sector Group, and the Disaster Waste Working Group welcome the opportunity to submit on the strengthening of New Zealand's emergency management legislation. The sector groups have been advocating for change following the flooding in the upper North Island and Cyclones Gabrielle and Hale, recognise the need for local authorities and communities to have additional assistance, and support government's efforts to provide flexibility to facilitate, enable, and expedite recovery efforts.

WasteMINZ's Disaster Waste Working Group aims to support territorial authorities in their planning for and response to waste from disaster and emergency events. The following infographic details the scale of waste after recent disasters:

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The consultation draft discussion document covers a wide range of emergency management powers and considerations. This submission will primarily focus on:

- **Designation of waste management as essential infrastructure**: This submission supports the proposal for waste collection, treatment and disposal services to be either added to the schedule of lifeline utilities or designated as essential infrastructure in amended legislation.
- **Support for territorial authorities to minimise waste to landfill from disaster disposal**: Emergencies result in large volumes of waste, and historically much of this waste has ended up in landfill. We seek central government prioritisation of minimising waste to landfill by supporting and funding TAs for local pre-event planning, resourcing, training, and civil defence exercises, support for better regional collaboration and creation of intra-regional plans, and support in the response phase to enact diversion activities. We also support requirements for businesses to manage their waste in an emergency
- **Development of expert group to support disaster waste response: Individual** councils are unable to maintain capacity, capability, and specialist knowledge

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to support waste management challenges post an emergency event. Having an expert group that can support local government in the aftermath of an emergency can ensure best practice is followed, waste to landfill is minimised and recovery can be expedited.

**Designation of waste management as essential infrastructure**

**Issue 11 - Minimising disruption to essential services**

**Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"**

**1. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

Yes

**2. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

**3. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

Yes – Inclusion of waste management

**Please explain your views**

*The waste sector is critical in New Zealand's response to emergency*

WasteMINZ members operate key infrastructure that is a core part of everyday life in New Zealand. The waste sector operates seamlessly for most parts of the country, with the collection of waste so ubiquitous, that Kiwis are unaware of the scale of waste that is managed under normal conditions. It is only when these services are interrupted that we are confronted with the impacts.

This infrastructure is key for public health, environmental protection, and economic functioning across the country. In an emergency response, the ability of waste operators and local government to collect, treat, sort, and dispose of waste is critically important in the prevention of disease outbreaks and environmental contamination. This goes for both regular waste and the waste generated from the emergency.

Kiwis like to get stuck in quickly and clean up after an emergency – coordinated, planned and prompt collection of waste is necessary in the response phase to support sanitary conditions and diversion of this waste from landfill where appropriate. This waste can quickly amass post-event and alongside creating public health hazards, can also hinder recovery efforts.

The consultation's discussion document details that essential services address basic needs, keep us safe, and let us live our normal lives, and that we are often unaware of how much we rely on these services until something goes wrong *(Discussion Document - Page 53)*. As already outlined, the waste sector fulfills these criteria through supporting public health outcomes and protects water quality by managing potentially

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contaminating materials. Waste management also enables businesses and homes to continue to function through regular waste collection, something that is critically important for healthcare and food outlets (e.g. supermarkets), as well as supporting the move to recovery by managing debris and disaster waste.

Managing waste is already an around the clock job, and the waste sector (including but not limited to waste operators, waste professionals within territorial authorities, recyclers and resource recovery centres) is ready to respond in emergency scenarios, and this has been demonstrated nationwide. However, the ability for the waste sector to work with broader emergency response structures, is currently limited without the recognition as a lifeline utility/essential infrastructure.

Due to waste not being recognised as essential infrastructure:

- Waste is not automatically integrated into emergency planning processes
- Access to restricted areas during emergencies is not guaranteed
- Prioritisation of resources (fuel, access, personnel) is not formalised
- Coordination between waste services and other essential services lacks clear protocols.

These challenges increase the likelihood of service disruption during the periods when waste management is most critical.

This recognition would also support all issues relating to waste being better considered at the pre-event planning stage, not only with planning itself, but by waste representatives being involved in drills and preparation exercises.

WasteMINZ represents 66 of the 67 territorial authorities in New Zealand, many of which have faced head on the challenges from Auckland Anniversary flooding, Cyclone Gabrielle, Cyclone Hale, the Christchurch Earthquake, and localised flooding events across both the North and South Islands. Waste often is a large part of the response effort, and all territorial authorities are aware of how huge the job is to address these issues and are constantly increasing their preparedness.

Across the wider sector, waste infrastructure is owned and managed by a variety of different organisations. However, led by local government waste representatives, these organisations can provide a coordinated resilient response in an emergency scenario.

The sector groups recognise that being designated as essential infrastructure/lifeline utility comes with responsibilities, however, believe that the designation is necessary to better integrate the waste sector into emergency readiness and response.

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**Issue 8 - Stronger national direction and assurance**

**Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance**

**1. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

**2. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

**3. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

**Support for territorial authorities to minimise waste to landfill from disaster disposal**

Management of waste after a disaster is a lengthy process, although some items such as household's organic waste may be dealt with in the initial response phase, dealing with large amounts of silt and deconstruction of buildings can take months or years. The huge scale of waste cannot be understated; the Canterbury earthquake is estimated to have generated 8 million tonnes of waste.

Territorial authorities need central government direction, support and funding to deliver regional and local disaster waste management plans that prioritise diversion of waste from landfill. This can be achieved through pre-event planning and regional collaboration. There is currently a lack of guidance, information and best practice in this space to support territorial authorities in this planning, and greater national direction and support would be beneficial.

**Any queries please contact:**

Fiona Lavin – Sector Programme Manager WasteMINZ

s9(2)(a)

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Pete Armstrong |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | EA Networks |

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### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The objective of clear responsibilities for national, regional and local levels and ensuring a higher minimum standard of emergency management is important. As a Critical Infrastructure/Lifelines entity and a regulated electricity distribution business, we already have numerous requirements to satisfy government about our asset management, financial and operational practice. There is great strength in setting a standardised method and templated approach for satisfying the requirements for emergency

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management to avoid divergence approaches and either over or under delivering on expectations.

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Lower socioeconomic groups may live in housing that is in a poor state, and this may not stand up well to natural hazards (storm, wind) or may not be well insulated or heated/cooled for snow storms or increased hot weather as a result of climate change.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   We are in favour of legislated options, and think a combination of Option 3 and 4 would be helpful. There is an economy of scale in the Director to consult nationally and provide this into regional and local CDEM group plans with firm minimum requirements. This takes the guesswork out at a local level, being sure of what is required and having a framework and common starting point to address the needs of their specific communities.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Planning may involve specific groups in consultation or in delivery of emergency assistance given the specialised needs within groups, like iwi Maori, Pacifica, the medically dependent or elderly in homes or in care facilities (that may be heavily reliant on say electricity but don't have a standby generator installed). Plans would be more specific. Community groups like that in Brooklyn set up and encouraged by the ACORN trust may be sponsored, resource or supported locally to increase community resilience.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

   ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Insert response

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

More than the status quo appears justified. I think Option 4 requires engagement, which is appropriate, and if done at a CDEM Group level the relationships and engagement will be local and tailored to each region and iwi Maori group. Address the lack of time capability or resources by having assistance funded via NEMA to CDEM Groups and the iwi Maori groups being engaged with.

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

As participants and knowledgeable partners.

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

CDEM Groups engage with iwi Maori, offer them participation and assistance to participate where needed, value and enact their perspectives.

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

CEGs should consult and act on the advice offered by iwi Maori.

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

CDEM Groups engage with iwi Maori and they bring back together a model for how iwi Maori experience and matauranga in emergency management should be used nationally and regionally, for the Director to consider.

14. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I think the work of the ACORN trust in encouraging community led resilience to natural disasters and emergencies (e.g. in Brooklyn, Wellington) is a prime example of how communities can participate in disaster response and recovery and implement the 4Rs within their community. I think the risk of Option 2 is that it won't get the attention required to achieve the intended outcome without compulsion. Therefore I think that Option 3 is best, where a standardised method is thought through, centrally designed and mandated so it is adopted and used universally. Time, capability and resource will be found because it is compulsory.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I think formalising the position is helpful in ensuring that there are not disincentives to people acting as first responders in an emergency, preserving life and preventing damage to property. I favour both Option 2 and Option 3.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Funding for more community groups like the one started and supported by the ACORN trust.

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 does have a significant downside in that all lead agencies would have to develop the capability to manage the broader consequences of the emergency and that capability would not be called on as frequently than if Option 3 was developed. Under Option 3 with CDEM groups or NEMA nationally being capable of being the lead agency and understanding enough about the hazards to coordinated, this function would be called on more frequently and be strengthened by being exercised. It is more efficient, has a single point of accountability and gives clarity on roles and responsibilities up front.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I think that Option 2 is best because there will be a consistency in approach across NZ regarding the distinct responsibilities of CDEM Groups and local authorities, compared to Option 3 where there may be different approaches in neighbouring areas and it will lead to confusion amongst other organisations like critical infrastructure/lifelines providers etc. that may span multiple regions or areas.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We've been waiting for clarity about emergency management for a significant period, so let's not delay further by considering more complex approaches that haven't been solved yet.

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I think Option 3 is better than Option 2 or Option 4, as it provides for a consistent and unambiguous approach across all regions. However, some consideration to how local knowledge and approaches can be incorporated into CDEM groups and roles is crucial to ensure that the value obtained from those aspects are not lost.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Potentially a hybrid model to Option 3 with appointed Group CDEM roles parachuting into local EOCs in larger scale regional or national level emergencies would ensure local approaches and knowledge is retained but the increased competence and clear accountability is maintained by the appointed roles at a Controller or Recovery Manager level.

### Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 puts the onus via a formal mechanism for CEG to report to eh director on outcomes that deliver on its functions under the CDEM Act. The costs of this are worth it for the anticipated improved outcomes.

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I see the benefit in easier and less administratively burdensome review and update process. I think Option 3 is a good balance between flexibility and certainty. It is an effort to update and effectively implement changes across the system so it should not be constantly tweaked and good consultation is needed on proposed changes.

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I prefer Option 3, because of the clarity of mandated requirements, taking the guesswork out of complying and meeting a national standard.

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Clarity on responsibilities, content of plans, performance measures and expectations.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The status quo is an ambulance at the bottom of the cliff. I favour a combination of Option 2 and Option 3, where breaches can attract a compliance order, but ultimately powers of intervention are available as a last resort.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 4 is the right approach, provided that a pragmatic approach is taken and the prescribed approach is not too detailed or onerous. Clarity will be provided for preparing Group plans to a defined standard, and the effort of developing the regulation and guidance material by NEMA will be more efficient than each Group taking their own interpretation and in some cases exceeding what is considered good practice, or needing multiple attempts to make the grade.

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

National consistency is primarily what is needed, with some flexibility for regional differences. Differences can be accounted for by allowing minor deviations or exceptions to be declared and explained.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Where there are multiple local territorial authorities in a Group, their local government plans and approaches may be different, and reconciling them in a CDEM Group plan

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may not be possible in the short term, or desired by the territorial authorities, or dictated to be different by circumstances and realities.

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I expect the costs of implementing Option 3 will be lower than each CDEM group deciding on how to implement guidelines with less clarity, and a monitoring overhead on NEMA to develop and oversee the enforcement of a clear set of requirements under Option 3 should be worth it in terms of improved outcomes.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

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*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I think Option 2 is sufficient for this issue. Not every region has the same considerations regarding animals (urban versus rural, number of animals etc.). Option 2 allows authorities to apply the guidelines to their context and spend the appropriate amount of effort on it.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Animals as living things should be prioritised ahead of property. Animals' importance to people cannot be underestimated.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 is preferred because it allows a firm definition of essential infrastructure to be developed and applied, with future adjustments as necessary. Dependencies by other CDEM functions and lifeline utilities will be supported by having a wider definition of essential infrastructure.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Include all on the list. However, it is likely going to be difficult to determine what data storage or processing services, managed information technology services, cloud computing services are involved in the delivery of essential services, and those providers may end up treating all of their customers as essential, increasing robustness but also cost.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 seems a good approach, making clear, mandated requirements backed with financial penalties. Regulations can be developed with sufficient flexibility to ensure unintended consequences of conflicting legislative requirements do not occur.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I have seen good voluntary local coordination between lifeline utilities and CDEM groups, including desktop analysis of interdependencies, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, fuel and generator planning. However, there is merit in prescribing what lifeline utility contributions to CDEM group planning should be. Option 4 provides clearer and consistent expectations through legislation.

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**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Both local and national level coordination is required. As distribution networks, we have a standardised sitrep report that is used at local, regional and national level. A legislated approach will ensure a standardised approach is developed, at both a local and national level.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 should be sufficient to opt in agencies that need to have business continuity plans, and provide a consistent approach in what is required.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Lifeline utilities are sometimes price regulated (e.g. Transpower, electricity distribution businesses) and recovery of the costs required for bolstering responding to new emergency planning regulations may require price re-openers by those utilities, which is further administration in order to comply with new requirements. Perhaps a

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standardised application related to these costs could be developed by the Commerce Commission to reduce the burden on each organisation would be useful and more efficient.

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 should be sufficient to enable the benefits of a templated consistent approach without the additional administration of Options 3 and 4.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 is a pragmatic solution.

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is outdated and restrictive. Option 2 or 3 is an improvement, and the option for a verbal declaration is helpful, this could be verified by a recording and post-verification by speech recognition if needed.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 results in clear responsibility and accountability for CDEM Group to declare emergencies etc. and avoids issues with elected officials lacking training or capability/confidence to declare that may involve delay etc.

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**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

It would be helpful to progress this reform promptly to give certainty and to progress needed improvements. The changes to emergency management legislation and regulations have been mooted for a considerable period.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Madeleine Lottenbach |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Amazon Kuiper New Zealand Limited |

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

## Other comments

**1. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Amazon Kuiper New Zealand Limited, an affiliate of Kuiper Systems LLC (together, **Amazon**), extends its gratitude to the National Emergency Management Agency (**NEMA**) for the opportunity to provide comments on the Emergency Management Bill (**Draft Bill**) and the accompanying Discussion Document on Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation (**Discussion Document**). Amazon commends NEMA for its work to ensure emergency response efforts operate efficiently and effectively and encourages NEMA to recognize the important role that satellite technology can play in keeping lines of communication open for first responders, government officials, and community members. The consideration of satellite technology in strengthening New Zealand's emergency management directly aligns with the five objectives outlined in NEMA's Discussion Document with the primary goal of keeping individuals, families, and businesses in New Zealand safe, proactive, and prepared.

**I. Background**

Amazon's Project Kuiper will bring high-speed, low latency broadband to unserved and underserved communities globally, including in New Zealand. Amazon began launching its constellation of non-geostationary satellite orbit (**NGSO**) fixed-satellite service (**FSS**) satellites in low earth orbit (**LEO**) (**Kuiper System**) in April 2025.[1] Since committing to invest

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over 10 billion U.S. dollars in the Kuiper System, Amazon has made significant strides toward deployment, including the continued expansion of its terrestrial infrastructure and unveiling of innovative customer terminals (**CTs**) that will offer high performance in small form factors at affordable price points. Amazon plans to begin offering commercial service in certain areas of the world this year, including in New Zealand, further advancing its goal of providing affordable, accessible, and high-quality broadband services to residential, governmental, and enterprise customers in New Zealand and abroad.

The resiliency of Project Kuiper's NGSO network will be particularly important in maintaining connectivity in disaster-prone regions of the world, including in New Zealand, where earthquakes along the Alpine Fault are expected to harm connectivity for the South Island. Most recently, NGSO satellite communication was one of the only forms of connectivity available when Cyclones Gabrielle and Tam hampered terrestrial telecommunications services on the North Island. Kuiper services will be well-positioned to serve as primary and fallback connectivity options for emergency scenarios due to the system's reliable connection and widespread coverage of New Zealand.

## II. Comments on the Draft Bill and Discussion Document

Amazon supports all five objectives for NEMA's emergency management legislation. Of these five, Amazon most directly supports Objective 4 to minimise disruptions to essential infrastructure in the aftermath of natural disasters or emergencies[2] and urges NEMA to consider incorporating satellite connectivity in its disaster response initiatives. Because satellite networks are not as prone to weather- and disaster-related service disruption, satellite systems such as Amazon's Project Kuiper can be rapidly deployed to support disaster management efforts and improve national and local governments' crisis response efforts during natural disasters, such as earthquakes, landslides, cyclones, and severe flooding. NGSO satellite networks can also complement existing terrestrial networks by acting as a backup or failover system during natural disasters when terrestrial service is interrupted and can extend the reach of terrestrial coverage.

As NEMA notes in Objective 4 of the Discussion Document, "[t]he costs of outages can be felt far beyond the affected entities," disrupting first responders and "government agencies' ability to deliver their critical functions and services."[3] Satellite systems can help to alleviate the ramifications of telecommunications outages as the small, portable CT devices are easy to install and can be rapidly deployed proactively by government and community members alike, during or after an emergency to facilitate immediate connectivity. Such services not only help individuals connect with loved ones and emergency responders but also allow government and non-profit organizations to collect valuable real-time data to aid with rescue missions, recovery efforts, mitigation planning, and rebuilding efforts. Additionally, first responders can use NGSO satellite technology to quickly set up service in impacted areas and access low-latency broadband connectivity to facilitate mission-critical communication, supporting Objective 2 of the Discussion Document by strengthening regional management.[4]

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In addition to satellite broadband services, Amazon encourages NEMA to consider innovative satellite direct-to-device (D2D) technology in the government's emergency management planning to ensure consumers outside the coverage areas of compromised terrestrial networks remain connected following emergencies. D2D technology not only enables customers to contact emergency services, but also facilitates communication between emergency response services, allows individuals to connect with loved ones, enables the government to push critical alerts and post-disaster information to customers, and allows responders to locate customers in need of assistance. The availability of D2D services can improve safety and emergency response services and quality of life for users throughout New Zealand, including for communities in the hardest to reach areas.

Additionally, to further encourage preparedness, minimize disruptions, and ensure a higher minimum standard of safety management, in line with Objectives 3, 4 and 5 of NEMA for the emergency management legislation,[5] Amazon notes the importance of proactively establishing relationships between governments and satellite operators and encourages the incorporation of satellite communications into emergency management legislation, such as the Draft Bill. Proactive partnerships will facilitate rapid response and recovery efforts in the event of disaster and will ensure that governments are equipped with the latest technology to undertake critical communications and operations, like search and rescue. Satellite systems also support enterprise and government continuity plans by providing flexible and secure broadband to connect remote assets to the cloud. As a result, governments and enterprises across multiple sectors—including agriculture and maritime operations—can still access primary and redundant connectivity for remote sites, securely connect to cloud-based applications, and access online data storage, processing, and analytics. Amazon encourages NEMA to consider these critical services as it updates its emergency management legislation.

Further, satellite connectivity can strengthen community participation in disaster-relief efforts. As NEMA notes under Objective 1, "people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency[.]"[6] Providing these communities with tools to help them save lives and property and stay connected with other regions is incredibly valuable for recovery efforts. For example, in the aftermath of Cyclone Gabrielle, a community member with a fixed satellite connection used the service to provide safety updates to his neighbours' relatives outside of the region.[7] Amazon, thus, urges NEMA to support the adoption by customers of satellite-based broadband services to ensure connectivity during disaster recovery.

## III. Conclusion

Amazon is grateful to NEMA for the opportunity to contribute to the Draft Plan and looks forward to working with NEMA to improve the country's local and federal emergency management system. We welcome the opportunity to meet with NEMA to discuss these comments or any other issues of interest in this submission.

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[5] *See Id.* at 35-68.
[6] *Id.* at 18.
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Submitted electronically
EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

20 May 2025

Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency
PO Box 5010
Wellington 6140
New Zealand

**Re: Comments on the Emergency Management Bill**

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Respectfully submitted,

***/s/ Madeleine Lottenbach***

Madeleine Lottenbach
Senior Lead, Licensing & Regulatory Affairs
Project Kuiper
*On behalf of Amazon Kuiper New Zealand Limited*

[5] *See Id.* at 35-68.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | s9(2)(a) |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Office of the Privacy Commissioner |

☒ The Privacy Act 2020 applies to submissions. Please tick the box if you **do not** want your name or other personal information to be included in any information about submissions that NEMA may publish.

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The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

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- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

OPC supports the objectives. Our main concern is that key issues relating to privacy and personal information are missing from the discussion paper. We hope to see further analysis of privacy and upholding Privacy Act requirements as this work progresses.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that there are benefits in having a wide range of organisations participate in emergency responses. However, this also presents privacy risks to consider and manage.

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**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that information sharing is important for effective emergency responses. Policy work here needs to consider privacy interests and legal mechanisms and accountabilities that support appropriate and lawful information sharing, including alignment with the Privacy Act and the Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code 2020.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The options analysis does not include consideration of privacy interests, including potential privacy risks and mitigations.

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

We agree that coordination across multiple levels and agencies may be necessary. Upholding privacy requires clear legal mechanisms for information sharing under the Privacy Act and operational steps to support understanding and compliance across all agencies that will or might be handling personal information.

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Emergency powers include and depend on information sharing and other steps that can significantly intrude on New Zealanders' privacy. We think it is critically important to analyse privacy implications and consistency with the Privacy Act to ensure policy decisions here are fully informed and that there are clear, transparent, and accountable processes for handling of personal information in emergencies. That includes the conditions that allow for use of emergency powers, the scope of those powers when they are in effect, their duration, and reviewing and correcting handling of information afterwards.

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

We support steps to modernise emergency management legislation, but doing this policy work well will require more detailed analysis of privacy issues, particularly in the context of emergency powers and information sharing.

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Privacy Commissioner
Te Mana Mātāpono Matatapu

# Emergency Management Bill

We encourage NEMA to consider privacy as you work to modernise emergency management legislation

## 1 We encourage you to consider privacy in this work

1.1. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) welcomes the chance to submit to NEMA on your discussion document.

1.2. We encourage NEMA to consider privacy issues and compliance with the Privacy Act 2020 in this work. Changes to emergency management legislation are likely to affect New Zealanders' privacy, including how agencies can collect, use, and share personal information before and during emergencies.

1.3. We have answered relevant questions from your template document, but the key issues we see in this process are set out below. Our main concern is to ensure that you consider privacy where personal information is involved.

## 2 The Privacy Act 2020 enables information sharing needed for whole-of-society emergency management

2.1. The discussion document mentions privacy only in relation to submitter information. It touches on the need for information sharing and the responsibilities of agencies, but without reference to the Privacy Act 2020.

2.2. Where personal information is involved, the Privacy Act 2020 is the primary legislation enabling agencies to collect, use, and share personal information. It sets out a range of ways for agencies to work with personal information while upholding New Zealanders' privacy expectations. These include:

- **The Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code of Practice 2020.** Where a state of national emergency is in effect, this code of practice issued under the Privacy Act enables agencies to collect, use, or share personal information for emergency response purposes. The Code:
    - permits uses of information that directly relate to government or local government management or response to an emergency (cl 5).

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- allows for uses including identifying individuals who may be involved in the emergency; assisting those individuals to obtain help; assisting with law enforcement; emergency coordination and management; and ensuring those responsible for a person are appropriately informed.

- modifies information privacy principles 2, 10, and 11 to enable collection, use, and disclosure of personal information in a range of circumstances related to emergency responses. For example, an agency is permitted to disclose information if it believes on reasonable grounds that the permitted purpose applies and that disclosure is to a public sector or other agency involved in emergency response (cl 6).

- **The Telecommunications Information Privacy Code 2020.** Schedule 4 sets out specific permissions and safeguards enabling emergency services to access and use information about a person's location from telecommunications networks and cellular devices.

- **Information sharing agreements** allow for agencies to work through issues and enable information sharing in a transparent and controlled way.

- **Exceptions to Information Privacy Principle 11** can allow for sharing information in emergencies (eg to prevent or lessen a threat to a person's life or safety), but agencies should look at other mechanisms first.

## 3 Emergency powers raise potential privacy issues

3.1. The discussion document identifies information sharing and coordination as key challenges and priorities for modernising emergency management legislation.

3.2. From the discussion document, it is not clear to us whether this information sharing will involve personal information, or what current barriers to sharing are. If this sharing does involve personal information, privacy risks and mitigations should be fully considered, starting with a privacy impact assessment.

3.3. We think it will be important to consider privacy in more detail under Objective 5 (having the right powers available). While Issue 11.3 touches on information sharing it is framed within agency cooperation in a way that is unlikely to surface key privacy issues, including:

- The desirable scope of information gathering and sharing before and during emergencies, including information gathering powers, triggers to activate emergency powers, and privacy assurance steps like post-action audits.

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- How well existing legal authorities and safeguards for information sharing work, and what if any changes might be needed.
- Assessing and improving operational practices across relevant agencies to ensure safe information sharing and improve privacy and security.

3.4. We think it might be helpful to treat "Enabling appropriate information sharing of personal information" a separate issue under Objective 5 to cover these issues.

## 4 The Office of the Privacy Commissioner is here to help

4.1. To achieve a whole-of-society approach to emergency management, New Zealanders need to be confident agencies are looking after their information.

4.2. We encourage NEMA to work with your privacy or legal team to understand and analyse the privacy issues arising in this policy work.

4.3. We would particularly expect to be involved in policy work where proposals might interact with or override provisions of the Privacy Act 2020.

4.4. When you have considered those issues, we will be here to help. Please refer to our website's guidance on how to engage with us on policy issues and feel free to contact our policy team on s9(2)(a) .

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## Submitter information

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### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Corey Regnerus-Kell (GM Animal Services) |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Royal New Zealand Society for Prevention of Animal Cruelty (RNZ SPCA) |

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**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The proposed objectives are a welcome step toward improving the emergency management system in Aotearoa. However, they fall short of what is needed to drive the systemic change that the Government Inquiry and subsequent reviews have called for.

The whole-of-society approach is most commonly defined (e.g., by the UNDRR, WHO, and other global bodies) as:
*"An inclusive approach that engages all parts of society: governments, civil society, private sector, academia, communities, and individuals—to strengthen resilience and preparedness across all sectors."*

The key focus tends to be on:

- Inclusivity of people and organisations
- Shared responsibility
- Coordination across systems and sectors

At its best, this approach invites diverse voices into the system. However, without deeper reform, it can simply stretch a pre-existing system rather than redesign it. This is particularly important to acknowledge in Aotearoa New Zealand, where emergency management systems have been historically siloed, hierarchical, and human-centric.

**The Limitations of Whole-of-Society Alone**

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Whole-of-society approaches tend to focus on inclusion within the social system—communities, cultures, vulnerable groups. The purpose of the CDEM Act is to improve and promote the sustainable management of hazards in a way that contributes to the social, economic, cultural and environmental wellbeing and safety of the public and also property. Animals may be mentioned in the Bills interpretation of whole-of-society, but the lack of full integration of animals, ecosystems, environmental integrity, and the broader web of interdependency is absent.

To be truly adaptive and resilient, emergency management must go beyond whole-of-society. It must adopt a *whole-of-life* or *whole-of-system* approach that recognises the interdependency of people, animals, and the environment.

This means:

- Breaking down silos between sectors and disciplines
- Embedding ecological and animal welfare considerations into all levels of emergency management
- Empowering place-based, community-led knowledge
- Honouring Indigenous worldviews of connection and guardianship (kaitiakitanga)
- Seeing emergency management as a relational and ethical practice, not just a procedural or perspectival one

**A Holistic Consequence Lens**

While explicitly including animals in the legislation is an essential step, it will not, on its own, resolve the systemic challenges. Animals do not exist in isolation. They are woven into households, communities, livelihoods, ecosystems, and identities. If the broader emergency management system remains fragmented, decisions made by non-animal agencies will continue to create constraints and consequences for those responsible for animal welfare in emergencies.

Every agency involved in emergency management must adopt a big-picture, systems-level view of what they do. Without this, siloed decisions will continue to ripple across the system, often undermining efforts to protect animals, people, and environments.

If you view emergency management through the lens of the human-animal interface, it becomes clear that nearly every agency will encounter it, directly or indirectly, at some point in a response or recovery. It is not a marginal concern, but a systemic one. A holistic consequence lens is essential to enable shared responsibility and minimise the unintended impacts that occur when agencies act in isolation.

**The Opportunity Already Exists in Operational Doctrine**

This more integrated view is already embedded in operational doctrine. The Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS), 3rd edition, under the principle *Responsive to community needs / Urupare ki ngā hiahia hapori*, clearly states that responses must consider the wellbeing of individuals, families/whānau, communities, and animals. It also emphasises the importance of enabling communities to actively participate, rather than wait passively for help.

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If the legislative objectives genuinely mirrored this principle, and if "whole-of-society" was reinterpreted as "whole-of-system", many of the persistent gaps between policy and practice would begin to close.

**To strengthen the proposed objectives and ensure they enable the transformation required, we recommend the following additions:**

- Reframe "whole-of-society" as a **whole-of-system** approach, ensuring that emergency management recognises and plans for the interdependence of people, animals, ecosystems, and infrastructure.
- Emphasise adaptive capability over rigid minimum standards, allowing place-based, context-sensitive, and evolving responses to complex and dynamic events.
- Recognise *mātauranga Māori* not just as a partner perspective, but as essential to how we understand disruption, resilience, and interconnection across systems.
- Shift away from control-based paradigms, which often suppress flexibility, innovation, and shared responsibility, especially under pressure.
- Embed all of the CIMS principles, particularly the responsive, community-centred systems directly in legislation, not just in doctrine, so that communities and their self-organised efforts are recognised and resourced, not sidelined.
- Explicitly include animals and the environment as integral to emergency management systems, but ensure this inclusion is accompanied by a broader system lens so that the decisions of all agencies support, rather than hinder, human, animal and ecological wellbeing.

This is a rare opportunity to lay the foundations for a more integrated, adaptive, and inclusive emergency management system, one that better reflects the reality of how communities live, respond, and recover. The legislation must go beyond enabling tweaks within the current structure. It must challenge the structure itself, making room for a genuinely relational and integrated approach to emergency management.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

SPCA agrees — but would add that:

- The current framing **understates the impact of animal-related barriers** in emergencies.
- People often **refuse to evacuate or delay taking action** because they fear for their animals' safety or don't trust agencies to care for them.
- In many cases, people with strong bonds to animals **won't leave without them**, especially where past trauma, lack of housing options, or distrust of authorities exists.
- Vulnerable people — such as those experiencing homelessness, low income, social isolation or rural isolation — may have **deep mistrust of formal services**, particularly if animal-related fines, seizures, or enforcement are feared.

SPCA has seen this play out in real emergencies, where people **chose to stay in dangerous situations** because:

- Their dogs weren't registered and they feared being fined.
- The only option offered was the animal control pound, perceived not as safe refuge, but as punishment.
- Emergency responders didn't offer any solution for co-evacuating or co-housing with animals, including CDC Centres.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

**Yes**, and SPCA emphasises:

- **Human-animal interdependence** is a significant factor in decision-making in emergencies and must be considered as a systemic risk, not an afterthought.
- People with **intergenerational trauma** (e.g. from colonisation, institutionalisation, or enforcement) may not engage with authority figures, especially where animal compliance (registration, desexing, containment) is part of that relationship.
- **Poverty and lack of transport or housing options** mean some people cannot leave with animals, and if animals can't be left safely behind, they don't leave at all.
- **Lack of inclusive emergency messaging** — assuming people can or will "leave the animals behind", is both unrealistic and harmful.

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Option A: Status quo**
**AWEM view: Inadequate and outdated.**
This option maintains a system that already demonstrably fails to account for the relational, interdependent realities of many people's lives, especially those who integrate animals into their whānau, livelihoods, or identity.

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**Risks:** Continues to ignore the disproportionate impacts on people with companion animals, working animals, and livestock. Does not include the presence of wildlife or the animal groups such as intensive housing facilities that are more vulnerable than other animal groups. Encourages siloed planning that fragments responsibility and undermines holistic preparedness.

Option B: Develop guidance (non-legislative)

**AWEM view: Useful but insufficient on its own.**

- Guidance can provide much-needed clarity and consistency on how to engage with communities (including animal custodians), but **without legislative teeth**, it risks being overlooked or inconsistently applied.
- **Benefits:** Enables development of good practice and case studies (e.g. co-housing models, culturally safe engagement with animal owners).
- **Risks:** Uptake will vary between CDEM Groups; animal-inclusive planning may still be deprioritised due to perceived complexity or resource constraints.

Option C: Require CDEM Group plans to address disproportionate impacts (legislative)

**AWEM view: Strongly supported.**

- This is the **most powerful lever for systemic change**, especially if 'diverse needs' are interpreted broadly to include interdependence between people and animals.
- **Benefits:** Legally compels Groups to engage with animal-owning communities, rural stakeholders, and those who may be disengaged due to distrust or trauma. Opens the door to co-designed, inclusive risk reduction strategies.
- **Risks:** Without training and support, some Groups may take a compliance-based approach. Requires investment in capacity building and cross-sector collaboration (e.g. with animal welfare services, Iwi, disability advocates).

Option D: Require the Director to consult with disproportionately affected communities (legislative)

**AWEM view: Essential for national consistency and top-down alignment.**

- **Benefits:** Ensures that strategic direction (National CDEM Plan and Strategy) reflects lived realities on the ground. Creates accountability for listening to historically under-represented groups, including animal owners and those with trauma-informed needs.
- **Risks:** If consultation is only symbolic or done with 'usual suspects,' it may not reach those with the least voice. Needs to include trusted intermediaries (e.g. community champions, grassroots animal groups).

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**Preferred Options**

The **most effective response** would combine:

- **Option C (Legislative requirement for Group planning)** and
- **Option D (Legislative requirement for national consultation), supported by Option B (guidance).**
  This trio enables both **bottom-up and top-down accountability**, and makes space for practical implementation support.

Comments on Impacts (Benefits, Costs, or Risks)

**Benefits:**

- Increased trust and engagement from communities who otherwise withdraw from EM planning.
- Safer evacuations and better public compliance when people know animals are accounted for.
- Reduced pressure on emergency services who currently must "make it up on the fly" during crises.

**Risks:**

- Without enforcement or resourcing, legislative changes could become a tick-box exercise.
- If animal-inclusive planning is only framed through enforcement (e.g. pound use), it may backfire.

**Costs:**

- Resource investment needed to build local co-evacuation capacity, train responders, and integrate animal-inclusive messaging, but this **reduces downstream costs** from abandoned animals, delayed evacuations, or unsafe sheltering.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

**Local level:**

- CDEM Group Plans include mapping of disproportionately affected populations, including:
  - Companion animal & livestock custodians, and wildlife representatives
  - Those with cultural, historical, or trauma-related distrust of authorities
  - Those lacking options for co-evacuation and co-housing
- Engagement with trusted community connectors, including animal-related organisations, rural advisory groups, and Māori and Pacific networks

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- Evacuation planning includes animal-friendly shelters and community-led co-housing solutions
- Public messaging reflects diverse household realities, moving beyond the "have a plan" narrative to one of shared responsibility

**National level:**

- National CDEM Plan and Strategy include:
  - A commitment to interdependence: recognising the links between people, animals, and the environment
  - Inclusion of animals in definitions of "community resilience" and "vulnerable groups"
  - Investment in templates, case studies, and tools for trauma-informed, animal-inclusive planning
- Cross-agency collaboration: MPI and AWEM support agencies, CDEM, MSD, and community organisations feeding into national strategy

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**Support for community-led initiatives and champions**
Fund and formalise the role of community champions and animal-inclusive emergency planning initiatives.
Recognise and support **grassroots leadership** already doing the mahi, often informally — in rural, animal, or culturally diverse communities.
Encourage co-designed solutions (e.g. trusted temporary animal shelters run by community orgs, not just pounds).
Avoid over-reliance on council or agency messaging by **resourcing embedded community connectors**.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that the contribution of iwi Māori in emergency management has not been fully recognised or embedded in formal structures. However, we believe the description could go further in acknowledging the leadership role of iwi and hapū, and the importance of enabling Māori-led emergency management approaches through both legislative and operational change.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

From SPCA's experience working alongside iwi Māori during recent emergency events, we have seen the depth of care, coordination, and community mobilisation provided by iwi and hapū. Their roles extend beyond emergency response — they involve ongoing care for people, whenua, and animals; place-based knowledge; and long-standing systems of support that are deeply relational. We defer to iwi Māori on the full scope of these roles but support their stronger recognition within the system.

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We believe the benefits of greater iwi Māori representation and leadership within emergency management structures are significant. It will improve the effectiveness of responses, ensure more inclusive planning, and foster stronger partnerships between government, communities, and organisations like SPCA. The risks lie in under-resourcing this work or approaching it in a tokenistic or compliance-based way, rather than investing in genuine partnership and shared decision-making.

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

SPCA supports legislative requirements to embed iwi Māori representation in CDEM Groups, CEGs, and national-level planning. We also support the establishment of a national Māori advisory group and the requirement for the Director to seek advice on Māori interests and knowledge. These are important steps toward enabling a more equitable, holistic, and connected emergency management system — one that reflects the lived realities of communities and upholds Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Broadly yes. The problem is well described, particularly in terms of the barriers that capable and willing community organisations face when trying to engage with the formal emergency management system. However, from SPCA's perspective, the framing doesn't go far enough in recognising that some community organisations, such as SPCA, are already mandated support agencies under secondary legislation (specifically, within the animal welfare services coordinated by MPI under the National CDEM Plan).

Despite this mandate, SPCA's efforts are often hampered by a lack of consideration for the presence of animals in decision-making and operational planning by other agencies. This is not simply an issue of community offers being missed. It reflects a systemic gap where the interconnection between people and animals is poorly integrated into emergency management doctrine, planning, and response and recovery processes.

Animals matter. Not only for their own welfare, but because they influence human behaviour, evacuation decisions, return timelines, mental health outcomes and are instrumental for food security and biodiversity. When this reality is overlooked, community organisations like SPCA are left trying to fill critical gaps without adequate support, visibility, or integration.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

a. **Status quo**
**Gap**: This option maintains existing barriers and inconsistent engagement. It continues to rely on pre-existing relationships or ad hoc arrangements, which exclude under-recognised yet capable organisations, including those in animal welfare.
**Observation**: The lack of systemic consistency in how communities 'dock in' perpetuates inequality and underutilisation.

**b. Develop and update guidance and strengthen public education (non-legislative)**
This is the most promising and flexible path, especially for integrating animal welfare organisations.
**Strengths:**
Allows for locally tailored relationships without imposing rigid frameworks.
Enables pre-event relationship-building and coordination.
Encourages proactive engagement and visibility of community capabilities.
**Gaps/Enhancements:**

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Guidance must explicitly mention community-based organisations, including those in animal welfare, environmental restoration, rural networks, and iwi/Māori groups, to ensure they're not unintentionally overlooked.
The phrase "public engagement" is vague. It needs to include co-development and power-sharing rather than one-way consultation.

**Opportunity for animal welfare sector:**
Animal organisations could be included in examples or case studies within this guidance. Encourages animal groups to build relationships proactively with CDEM Groups and offers a different perspective to a human-centric approach, using the templates or frameworks that result.

**c. Require CDEM Group plans to state how the Group will manage offers of resources from the public (legislative)**
**Gap**: This may over formalise what should be a flexible, adaptive approach. It could inadvertently exclude grassroots or informal actors who don't meet narrow criteria.
**Risk**: A legislative requirement could lead to 'tick-box' inclusion rather than meaningful engagement. It could even discourage spontaneous support during emergencies if the mechanisms are overly bureaucratic.

We support Option b (non-legislative guidance and public education), but emphasise the need for **whole-of-system solutions** that better integrate animal presence and welfare considerations into emergency management at all levels.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

a) Strengthen guidance to ensure whole-of-system animal considerations

Guidance should explicitly state that animal welfare is not the sole responsibility of MPI and its support agencies, but a shared concern across all levels of emergency management planning, particularly where community well-being and public safety are involved.

This includes:

- Recognising and working with formal animal services support agencies
- Requiring local CDEM Group Plans to identify how animals will be considered across evacuation, rescue, sheltering, transport, and recovery
- Ensuring that public messaging and welfare centres acknowledge and plan for companion animals

b) Include animal-focused organisations in capability and resource planning

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CDEM Groups and local authorities should be supported to map and engage with local animal welfare and veterinary organisations (including SPCA branches) before emergencies occur. This ensures:

- Clear expectations for support roles
- Better integration during response and recovery
- Greater efficiency in the use of trained personnel and resources

SPCA has unique community reach, animal welfare, care and handling expertise that should be recognised and used strategically, not informally or inconsistently.

c) Invest in coordination capability, not just public preparedness

Public education is valuable, but it must be matched with investment in the coordination and preparedness of partner agencies like SPCA. This includes:

- Joint exercises with CDEM and MPI
- Development of pre-agreed protocols
- Clarification of roles, funding, and activation thresholds

d) Promote a joined-up approach to community engagement

SPCA's networks, including community volunteers, animal foster carers, and animal welfare inspectors — are often trusted in places formal responders struggle to reach. Investing in mechanisms that include these networks as part of community engagement strategies would improve local situational awareness and response agility.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

It has been accurately identified that individuals, businesses, and communities are often the first responders in emergencies, especially in rural and other isolated areas where official response capacity is limited. It's also true that some of the most critical life- and property-saving actions are taken before official direction can be sought or given.

**However**, the current problem statement doesn't adequately reflect:

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- The complexity of animal-related decision-making under stress (e.g. evacuating livestock vs. sheltering in place).
- The relationship between people and their animals as integral to wellbeing, which drives decisions and actions during emergencies, often without waiting for official permission.
- The risk of misuse or opportunism, especially by certain groups or individuals acting under the guise of "rescuing" animals but causing harm or distress (e.g. breaking into homes, moving animals without consent or biosecurity checks).

So, while the general issue is correctly framed, the animal dimension adds both vulnerability and risk, and that nuance is currently missing.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

a. **Status quo (no change)**

**Impacts:**

- Continues to discourage well-meaning people (e.g. neighbours with stock trailers, veterinary professionals and animal welfare organisations with emergency experience) from acting early to protect animals or assist others.
- Maintains ambiguity and risk, which can lead to **hesitation in life-saving action**.
- Leaves animal owners or volunteers open to **civil litigation** even for appropriate actions taken in good faith.

**Animal lens:**
This is inadequate, especially when it's well established that people will risk their own lives to save animals. The system needs to acknowledge this and reduce disincentives for humane, responsible action.

b. **Protection from civil liability for actions taken in good faith without direction (legislative)**

**Impacts:**

- **Benefits**: Encourages early action where official directions are delayed; aligns with community-led response principles.
- **Risks**: Opens the door for **vigilante or rouge responder behaviour**, particularly by groups who believe they know better or operate based on ideology rather than coordinated emergency response principles.

**Animal lens:**
Here's where significant caution is needed as highlighted by **real-world examples** where groups have:

- Broken into homes uninvited to remove animals, damaging property.
- Removed livestock without understanding animal welfare or legal implications (e.g. biosecurity, traceability, health status).

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- Ignored animal owners' preferences or wellbeing in the name of rescue.

If this option were legislated without safeguards, it could **validate reckless, harmful behaviour**. "Good faith" is far too open to interpretation and could be weaponised.

**Recommendation**: If this option is pursued at all, it would **require strict criteria**, such as:

- A test of "reasonableness" and proportionality of actions.
- Clear exclusions for actions that breach animal welfare, trespass, or biosecurity law.
- Possibly a registration or credentialing framework for those seeking protection under this provision (i.e. known responders or trained volunteers, not ad hoc actors).

C Enable compensation for labour costs under direction (legislative)

**Impacts:**

- **Benefits**: Supports rapid tasking of skilled individuals or businesses when time doesn't allow for formal contracting.
- Encourages participation in structured emergency efforts.
- Better aligns with the principle of coordinated response, where individuals are brought under the umbrella of official authority.

**Animal lens:**
This is the **most appropriate option** from an animal emergency management standpoint because:

- It supports the activation of veterinary professionals, animal welfare inspectors, animal transporters, and animal control officers who can provide immediate assistance under coordination.
- It promotes safe, coordinated, and ethical responses, rather than unregulated "rescue" activities.
- It allows for the use of specialist skills (e.g. handling large animals, administering emergency care) while recognising and compensating people for their time and expertise.

**However**, there is a risk of abuse (e.g. inflated claims, people seeking compensation for work they would have done anyway). There must be:

- Clear thresholds and criteria for eligibility**.**
- Post-event auditing and recourse mechanisms to manage misuse.

## 20. Are there any other options that should be considered?

Please explain your views.

**Develop a tiered volunteer and responder recognition system**

- Create a framework where trained community members (e.g. animal emergency volunteers, animal emergency response teams, lifestyle block champions) can be

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recognised and deployed under delegated authority. Currently the only recognised teams are NZRT's, surf life savers or the Red Cross (in recovery).
- These individuals could operate under a **pre-approved scope of practice**, giving them some legal protections and compensation eligibility.

**Why it matters for animals:**

- Validates and empowers those who act responsibly and ethically.
- Reduces rouge responder behaviour by defining expectations and limits.
- Encourages **preparedness training** and **community-led capability building**.

**Stronger penalties or oversight for unauthorised harmful actions**

If Option B is considered, it must be accompanied by a framework that:

- Defines what **does not constitute good faith**.
- Allows for **accountability** if individuals harm animals or property through negligence or unauthorised actions.
- Enables **civil remedies** for property owners or animal custodians who suffer harm through the actions of well-meaning but poorly informed people.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Broadly yes but with important gaps from an AWEM perspective.

The issue as described highlights significant ambiguity in command and control during emergencies, particularly where there is no state of emergency declared, or where multiple hazards are involved. It is framed primarily through a hazard- and human-centric lens, overlooking the non-human impact scale and trigger thresholds that disproportionately affect animals, particularly in rural and peri-urban contexts eg wildfires.

From an AWEM lens, the problem is more acute:

- Thresholds for emergency response activation are generally based on human welfare impacts, which often delays or precludes activation of coordinated animal welfare responses. The ratio of animals to people (e.g. 19:1) means consequences for animals may be more widespread or severe, but not trigger activation thresholds based on human impact.
- The status of animal welfare as a function within emergency management is not enshrined in the CDEM Act. It relies on the National CDEM Plan and the CIMS 3 framework, where it is a subfunction of welfare – not a standalone priority. This makes AWEM highly dependent on the priorities of the lead or control agency.
- There is misalignment between operational expectations placed on MPI at a regional and national level – MPI coordinates animal welfare services, but lacks control agency powers in emergencies, especially where animals are central to the response such as in wildfires. At a local level, there is confusion as to who is responsible for the coordination of animals.
- When the hazard agency doesn't have the capacity, capability, or mandate to support animal welfare (as seen in rural wildfires), and thresholds aren't met for the Group Controller to activate, animals and their custodians fall into a governance gap.

Therefore, the current problem framing needs to explicitly include these systemic gaps in activation and leadership for animal welfare as a core component of the issue, not as an adjacent consequence.

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**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Option A: Status Quo**

- **Risks:** Continues to rely on human-centric thresholds; animal welfare needs may never trigger a formal response. Leads to fragmented, inconsistent, delayed or ad hoc AWEM responses.
- AWEM concern: unless the lead agency understands and priorities animal welfare (which many do not or can't under the current legislation), animals may suffer and animal custodians may engage in unsafe behaviours to protect them.
- FENZ could include animal welfare technical advisors in their response frameworks for smaller fires.

⟶ ***Not viable from an AWEM perspective unless provisions are in place to address the animal welfare thresholds.***

**Option B: Hazard Agency as Control Agency**

- **Benefits:** May support clearer, hazard-specific leadership and encourage deeper expertise within hazard agencies.
- **AWEM Concern: Still relies on the hazard agency recognising and initiating animal welfare responses. If the agency doesn't understand AWEM needs or doesn't prioritise them, response gaps will persist. This model also doesn't account for when animal needs escalate before broader welfare thresholds are met.**
- FENZ, for example, is not resourced or trained to coordinate large-scale animal evacuations or welfare assessments.
- If Group Controllers are only in a support role, AWEM still sits on the margins and activation remains dependent on another agency's request, which may be delayed or not occur.
- The figure used to visualise the option shows that the hazard agency is not implementing holistic consequence management. In a wildfire the decisions and actions of FENZ to address the hazard directly impacts animal welfare. If they are not utilising holistic consequence management they will continue to be unaware of how the decisions they make impact animal welfare and the environment unless they integrate technical advisors into their IMT.

⟶ ***May improve decision-making clarity, but still structurally insufficient for AWEM needs.***

**Option C: Group Controller or Director as Control Agency**

- **Benefits:** This centralises decision-making authority, with a broader scope that includes secondary and tertiary consequences, such as animal welfare.
- This could enable earlier and more holistic activation, particularly if animal welfare issues emerge prior to human-focused thresholds being met.

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- **Challenge:** Activation still depends on human-centric thresholds, which may delay animal response. Also, there may be a capability gap – Group Controllers are not trained or resourced to make timely AWEM decisions.

⟶ ***Preferred from an AWEM perspective — but only with structural changes to support earlier activation for animal welfare.***

**Option D: Unified Control Model**
What is described in the discussion document as 'unified control' is not consistent with the CIMS 3 definition. It proposes parallel agency operations with limited coordination, rather than true shared decision-making. This will perpetuate the disconnect between hazard control and consequence management, undermining holistic, adaptive emergency management. The wildfire example highlights this: if FENZ decisions aren't made in collaboration with those responsible for animal welfare and environmental management, the impacts of their actions will continue to be unseen until harm has already occurred.

- **Benefits:** Intends to allow flexibility between hazard-specific and consequence-management responses.
- **Risks:** High potential for siloing, confusion, parallel decision-making, and lack of understanding of holistic consequences — the very issues raised in Cyclone Gabrielle reviews.
- May further obscure impact animal welfare if the presence of animals in not within the scope of the hazard agencies impact decision making.

⟶ ***Least desirable option — could exacerbate current fragmentation.***

**Preferred Option (from AWEM lens): Modified Option C**

- Modify **Option C** to:
  - Include explicit authority to activate AWEM response prior to full emergency declaration thresholds.
  - Recognise animal welfare consequences as a primary, not secondary, consequence that can independently trigger emergency coordination.
  - Ensure MPI (regional and national) and TA's (at a local level) is formally resourced and empowered within legislation (not just the Plan) to activate and lead AWEM functions in partnership with the Controller.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes — a **fifth option** should be explored:

**Option E: Integrated Consequence-Based Control Model**

- **Overview**: Establish a model that allows for consequence-driven activation, regardless of the lead hazard or declaration status. Control shifts or expands based on the scale and impact of welfare consequences, including animals, the environment, infrastructure, etc.
- **Features**:

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- Consequences (including AWEM) can trigger multi-functional coordination under the Group Controller, even in the absence of full emergency declaration.
- This requires new statutory authority or amendments to the CDEM Act to:
  - Empower the Group Controller to coordinate AWEM support without needing a full declaration.
  - Recognise animal welfare impacts as sufficient justification for coordination and control functions to be activated.

- **AWEM Value**: This acknowledges the interdependency of people, animals and the environment and reduces the risk of fragmented or delayed responses.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The current system is still based on a command and control structure derived from military doctrine, designed for hierarchy, compliance, and top-down decision-making. While this model may be useful for tightly defined, short-term tactical operations, it has been repeatedly shown to fail in complex, multi-stakeholder, consequence-driven emergencies.

We must be bold in naming this: command and control, as a default paradigm, no longer serves us. It doesn't accommodate:

- Interdependencies between people, animals, and environments.
- Community-led action and the value of local knowledge and adaptive decision-making.
- The dynamic, non-linear nature of consequences in modern emergencies, especially where impacts cascade beyond the initial hazard

In practice, a command structure often creates bottlenecks, delays, and confusion, particularly where functions like animal welfare fall outside traditional chains of command or sit within agencies not empowered by the CDEM Act. Instead of coordination, we get fragmentation.

It's time to replace the concept of 'control' with one of 'adaptive coordination'.

- One that acknowledges that leadership can and should be shared, based on the nature of the consequence, not the hazard.
- One that values distributed decision-making, trust, and shared situational awareness over compliance to a hierarchy.
- One that enables agencies, communities, and sectors to work alongside each other, not below each other.

The CIMS framework is often referenced as flexible, but in practice, it is applied in ways that default to hierarchy. Unless we challenge the very idea that emergencies must be 'controlled', we will continue to exclude critical functions and perspectives, including AWEM and environmental consequences, until it's too late.

This is not just about improving response efficiency. It's about recognising that our systems should reflect the real-world relationships we are trying to protect. That means

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designing for **integration and a relational approach** and that requires a fundamental shift in our approach to emergency governance.

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, the problem is well described. The rigidity of current legislative processes for updating emergency management plans creates a barrier to timely adaptation. This is particularly problematic in a dynamic and increasingly complex hazardscape, where

Proactively Released

emerging risks, new understandings, or lessons from events (e.g., Cyclone Gabrielle) require rapid integration into operational plans.

From an **AWEM perspective**, this inflexibility compounds existing issues:

- It delays much-needed clarification of roles and responsibilities for animal welfare, especially at the **local level**, where confusion already exists (e.g., over the responsibility of territorial authorities for coordinating AW welfare).
- It limits responsiveness to emerging threats such as pandemics, climate-exacerbated hazards, or community-specific risks

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Option A: Status quo**

- **Risk:** Maintains the current ambiguity and inertia, particularly for underdeveloped areas like AWEM.
- **Cost:** Lessons from emergencies (e.g., Auckland Floods) continue to be lost or slow to be institutionalised.
- **Not supported** from an AWEM or broader adaptive EM perspective.

**Option B: Enable targeted "more than minor" amendments**

- **Benefit:** Provides a pragmatic way to update critical parts of plans (such as roles and responsibilities) without the burden of full reviews.
- **Impact:** Would allow animal welfare coordination responsibilities to be clarified at the territorial level and enable refinement of support agency roles.
- **Preferred option**, especially if changes can be made in partnership with affected agencies and communities to maintain legitimacy.

**Option C: Remove Order in Council requirement but retain legislative status**

- **Benefit:** Introduces useful procedural flexibility and reduces unnecessary formality.
- **Risk:** Could reduce perceived authority or weight of the National CDEM Plan if not managed carefully.
- Could be supported **in combination** with Option B, provided strong consultation mechanisms are retained.

Options B and C, ideally in combination, present the most practical and strategic way forward. However, their success depends on using the flexibility to **clarify and update ambiguous roles** — particularly in complex, cross-sectoral areas like AWEM. Otherwise, flexibility without action risks entrenching current dysfunctions.

A complementary opportunity would be to initiate a **targeted review of roles and responsibilities for AWEM** at all levels — to align legislative intent with operational reality and emerging best practice.

Proactively Released

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes — an **"adaptive update mechanism"** could be considered. This would:

- Introduce a **tiered change process**, where different types of changes (e.g., urgent, technical, strategic) have different thresholds and approval mechanisms.
- Include a **rolling review cycle** for specific sections (e.g., roles and responsibilities), ensuring continuous improvement without waiting for full reviews.
- Be backed by a **transparent rationale and engagement process**, particularly important in under-addressed areas like AWEM to avoid top-down imposition and ensure operational feasibility.

This would support more **responsive and inclusive governance** aligned with the realities of animal welfare emergency management

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Yes — from an AWEM standpoint, there are **persistent structural and operational issues**, including:

- **Ambiguity at the local level**: Territorial authorities are identified as responsible for coordinating animal welfare during emergencies, but many deny this responsibility or lack the capacity to undertake it. This results in inconsistent responses and gaps in local preparedness.
- **Unclear roles for support agencies**: The support agencies listed in plans often have **vague or non-operational descriptions** of their responsibilities. This leads to:
    - Diffusion of accountability
    - Mismatched expectations during emergencies
    - Frustration for responders and communities
- **Fragmented understanding of 'animal welfare' responsibilities**: While MPI has clear national and regional responsibilities, there is no consistent understanding of how this interfaces with local delivery or community engagement. This reflects a systemic **lack of integration** between government, non-government, and community actors.
- **Failure to reflect interdependencies**: Roles and responsibilities are still described in silos — people, animals, and the environment are treated as separate domains. This undermines the resilience of whole-of-community responses and ignores the compounding effects of system failure (e.g., when pet evacuation is not supported, people refuse to evacuate).

Proactively Released

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Partially.**
The description correctly identifies inconsistencies in how CDEM Group plans are developed and integrated across regions, and the disconnect between these and other local government planning instruments. However, it doesn't fully reflect the systemic and legislative fragmentation that underpins this problem. As highlighted by Squance et al 2021 research, the artificial compartmentalisation of human, animal, and environmental interdependencies (h-a-e) across legislation creates structural barriers to truly integrated, risk-reducing planning and implementation.

In addition, sidelining risk reduction to planning legislation (e.g. under the RMA reforms) and removing social well-being and rights of appeal compounds the fragmentation and risks undermining community resilience. This creates a siloed, infrastructure-centric approach to emergency management, out of step with the lived reality of interconnected risk.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Options B, C, and D** have the most potential if they are developed in concert, but none will be effective in isolation if the underlying legislative fragmentation remains unaddressed.

- **Option A (Status quo)** is ineffective. It perpetuates fragmentation and inconsistencies.
- **Option B (Clearer guidance)** is helpful but insufficient on its own, especially without enforcement mechanisms.
- **Option C (Strengthen guidance + QA)** is beneficial and aligns with what's needed to set consistent expectations, but may lack authority without legal backing.
- **Option D (Secondary legislation)** could enforce consistency and quality, but risks being overly prescriptive unless it also enables flexible, locally relevant approaches and h-a-e integration.

Proactively Released

- **Option E (Strengthen Minister's role)** provides accountability, but may face political resistance and doesn't fix the integration issues on its own.

**Preferred: B + C + D combined**, supported by integrated legislation and transdisciplinary policy that reflects the interdependency between people, animals, and the environment. Legislative coherence is a precondition for these options to succeed.

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

A minimum standard set nationally, based on holistic, transdisciplinary risk reduction that includes social, animal, and environmental wellbeing, should be **non-negotiable**.

Within this framework, regional flexibility should be encouraged to reflect local hazard profiles, demographics, and capacity, but not at the expense of integration, collaboration, or consistency with other planning instruments. Flexibility must be earned through demonstrated capability and coherent planning, not assumed.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

- **Legislative misalignment and silos** (e.g., Animal Welfare Act vs. Civil Defence Emergency Management Act vs. Local Government Act vs. RMA)
- **Lack of enforcement or incentive** to coordinate planning instruments.
- **Different planning cycles, languages, and mandates** across agencies.
- **Institutional culture of risk ownership** focused on liability, not collaboration.
- **Absence of multidisciplinary representation** (e.g., AWEM coordinators not embedded in Group planning or IMTs).
- **Limited resourcing and capability** to undertake complex, systems-level planning.

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Consider:

- **Legislative integration**: Ensure emergency management, planning, resource management, building and animal welfare legislation are mutually coherent and reflect h-a-e interdependencies.
- **Mandated transdisciplinary planning teams**: Require inclusion of AWEM, biodiversity, social services, and Indigenous perspectives in the development of CDEM Group plans.
- **Capability and capacity funding mechanisms**: Support smaller local authorities to meet new integrated planning expectations.
- **Practice-led policy development**: Create structured opportunities for innovation and evidence-gathering during emergencies to inform future legislation (as demonstrated in Pigeon Valley and Eastern Bay of Plenty).

Proactively Released

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Yes — fundamentally.**

Local authorities cannot deliver effective hazard risk management under current legislative conditions because:

- The h-a-e interdependency is absent from emergency management and planning legislation.
- Legislation and policy are reactive, not proactive or adaptive.
- Current structures encourage sectoral partitioning and competition, not collaboration.
- Wellbeing has been deprioritised (e.g., in LGA reforms), diminishing the social foundations of risk resilience.
- Siloed plans and policies result in conflict, duplication, or gaps, undermining shared situational awareness and coordinated responses.

Without legislation and policy that reflect the lived, interdependent realities of communities, local authorities will remain constrained by structural barriers rather than empowered to lead systemic, risk-reducing change.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

No — the current description significantly undervalues both the scale and the systemic impact of animal-related issues during and after emergencies. It treats animal loss as unfortunate but peripheral, rather than recognising that animals are central to human wellbeing, decision-making, community resilience, food security and environmental stability.

What's missing is an acknowledgement that:

- **Animals are sentinels** — their needs, suffering, or disappearance often signal broader system failures that affect both humans and the environment;
- The **human life and safety first** framing is **in tension with the reality**: failing to address animal welfare concurrently **increases** risks to human life and wellbeing;
- The **emotional, economic, and environmental consequences of animal loss** are not secondary, they are cumulative, cascading, and deeply intertwined with how communities respond, survive, and recover;
- In a time of accelerating **climate disruption**, continuing to treat animals and ecosystems as optional or secondary considerations is not just outdated, it is dangerous.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The proposed options (guidance, planning expectations, emergency powers) are necessary but insufficient and risk being tokenistic without a broader systems shift, with the continued view that animals can be managed around human needs rather than integrated into holistic emergency strategies. We must stop asking how much we can reasonably do for animals and start asking what happens to our emergency system when we don't.

**Key comments:**

- **(b) Non-legislative guidance** is not enough. Without mandates and accountability, guidance is unlikely to change behaviour or resourcing. Goodwill will not overcome structural gaps.
- **(c) Strengthened planning expectations through secondary legislation** is essential but must go beyond consideration to require the integration of animal welfare into all four Rs — particularly recovery, which is often neglected.
- **(d) Expanding emergency powers to mitigate animal suffering** is overdue and must be matched with training, protocols, and the inclusion of animal welfare

Proactively Released

professionals in response structures at higher levels such as technical experts in the IMT.

**Preferred approach:** These options must be implemented together, but more importantly, they must be underpinned by a legislative and philosophical shift: that animals are not passive victims or property, but active indicators of system health and that their welfare directly affects human safety, resilience, and recovery.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

The framing of animals as property is problematic and misrepresents both their role and their impact on human decisions, food security and biodiversity.

Animals should not be ranked alongside inanimate assets. They are sentient beings as identified in the Animal Welfare Act 1999, bonded to people, central to food systems, biodiversity, and community identity. Their loss is not only traumatic, it triggers risky behaviour, reduces trust in the emergency system, and hinders recovery.

Continuing to separate human and animal safety in planning leads to avoidable harm. In reality, many of the most dangerous decisions people make during emergencies — delaying evacuation, re-entering unsafe zones — are driven by concern for animals. A failure to plan for animals is a failure to protect people.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes and without them, any legislative or guidance updates will fall short. We strongly recommend:

- **Explicit recognition in the EM Act of the role animals play in public safety, food security, biodiversity, and recovery** not just as things people care about, but as critical parts of society and a functioning emergency management system.
- **A systems-level, interagency approach** that moves away from individual responsibility (e.g. pet owners should have a plan) and towards shared capability. It is unrealistic and inequitable to place full responsibility on individuals when even basic human emergency planning has low uptake.
- **Mandatory inclusion of animal welfare planning and professionals** in response and recovery structures, at national, regional and local levels, supported by training, protocols, and exercises that include animal-inclusive scenarios.
- **Investment in community-based approaches**, particularly for rural, peri-urban, and lifestyle-block communities where animals are not just companions, but central to identity, livelihood and land stewardship.
- **Recognition of animals and ecosystems as part of New Zealand's resilience infrastructure** in the face of climate change. Animals are not a niche consideration, they are part of the ecological and social systems we must steward to survive and adapt.

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes. We agree that the current definition of lifeline utilities under the CDEM Act is too narrow and does not reflect the complex interdependencies that underpin modern societal functioning, particularly in emergencies. The exclusion of certain critical services, such as veterinary services, creates systemic blind spots in emergency management. The current framework does not adequately recognise the vital role animal health services play in public health, biosecurity, food safety, and the mitigation of animal suffering.

Animals are early warning indicators of environmental and health risks, including food and water contamination. Veterinary services support surveillance, disease management, and biosecurity, essential components of food safety and supply chain continuity, especially during emergencies. Yet they are not recognised as an essential service, which leads to critical access issues.

For example, during Cyclone Gabrielle, veterinary professionals were denied access to fuel and through road blocks because they were not recognised as an essential service. This impaired their ability to respond to animal welfare needs and potentially increasing public health risks associated with zoonoses and dead or unwell animals. Therefore, the definition doesn't adequately reflect the role of essential animal-related services in emergency response and recovery.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Option A (Status Quo):**
This option is inadequate. Relying on voluntary participation perpetuates a fragmented and inconsistent approach and fails to ensure the continuity of genuinely critical services.

**Option B (Add specific entities to the Schedule):**
This may provide more targeted improvements, but risks being reactive and piecemeal. It lacks the flexibility to adapt as the essential services landscape evolves.

**Option C (Principles-based framework):** A principles-based approach better reflects the interdependent, adaptive systems that emergency management relies upon. It would also

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allow for the formal recognition of veterinary and animal health services as essential infrastructure, which is critical for the following reasons:

- **Public Health Protection:** Animals are often environmental indicators of emerging or existing public health threats (e.g., leptospirosis, salmonella, campylobacter). Veterinary services are crucial in early detection, disease investigation, and intervention. Emergency events can increase exposure to zoonotic pathogens via environmental contamination — yet no formal funding mechanisms exist for disease investigations unless the disease is notifiable in animals (e.g., leptospirosis is notifiable in humans but not animals). This results in a significant public health gap.
- **Food Safety and Security:** Veterinary professionals are integral to safe animal food production systems, especially in rural and peri-urban communities. In emergencies, these systems can become compromised, leading to risks of unsafe animal product consumption or food supply chain disruptions.
- **Animal Welfare and Legislative Consistency:** If emergency legislation is expanded to enable the mitigation of animal pain or distress, as proposed, this intent cannot be implemented unless the services responsible for delivering this function, primarily veterinary services, are also recognised as essential. Without this recognition, they lack priority access to fuel, supplies, logistical support, networks, and movement exemptions, making it impossible to operationalise the legislative intent.
- **Continuity of the Economy and Society:** In many rural and regional areas, veterinary services are a cornerstone of rural economies. Their disruption has a cascading impact on animal production systems, public trust, and the psychological wellbeing of communities reliant on animals for livelihood or companionship.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes. Veterinary services must be included in the list of essential services. They underpin multiple essential outcomes:

- Public health
- Food safety and food system resilience
- Biosecurity and disease surveillance
- Emergency animal welfare
- Community mental health and wellbeing (via the human-animal bond)

Excluding these services leaves a critical gap that was exposed in real-world emergencies like Cyclone Gabrielle.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Veterinary services as essential infrastructure would include:

Proactively Released

- **Personnel** (veterinarians, allied veterinary professionals)
- **Veterinary clinics and hospitals**, including mobile and rural practices
- **Cold chain systems and supply chains** for medicines and vaccines
- **Access to fuel, transport routes, and telecommunications**
- **Digital record and diagnostic systems**
- **Pharmaceutical and medical supply distribution chains**
- **Animal evacuation, sheltering, and triage systems**
- Coordination pathways between **public health, veterinary professionals, agriculture, and emergency services**

This infrastructure supports animal health while also serving as a first line of defence for public health and food system stability.

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. In addition to Option C, we recommend the following be considered:

- A **cross-agency review of essential services definitions** to ensure consistency between emergency powers, public health frameworks, veterinary and animal welfare legislation.
- The establishment of **dedicated funding for zoonotic disease investigations** that may arise in emergencies but fall outside current notification and funding frameworks (e.g., leptospirosis in animals).

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Partially.**
The description captures the surface-level problem (i.e., lifeline utilities and other critical responders being denied access), but it doesn't go deep enough into the systemic and operational gaps that cause these access issues. From an Animal Welfare Emergency Management (AWEM) perspective, key gaps include:

- **Lack of a decision matrix**: Cordons are sometimes placed without understanding the cascading or systemic consequences (e.g., cutting off access to animal care facilities, stranded livestock, blocked lifeline access routes).
- **Exclusion of subject matter experts**: Decisions are often made in silos without input from AWEM or other non-traditional responders who can offer insight into risks and dependencies that aren't visible to generalist emergency managers.
- **Inconsistent communication**: Even when access is granted by the Controller, the information doesn't always reach the personnel manning the cordons, resulting in delays and frustration.

This makes the real problem not just about access, but about inadequate coordination, inconsistent decision-making frameworks, and a lack of real-time communication flow.

Proactively Released

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Option a – Status quo:**

Not supported. Continuing current practices will maintain inconsistent, high-risk access decision-making. It also perpetuates preventable delays in animal welfare response and undermines public trust in emergency management.

**Option b – National guidance and training on managing cordons (non-legislative):**

**Supported, with conditions.** Any guidance must:

- Be developed using a whole-of-system, transdisciplinary approach, including consultation with animal welfare and rural stakeholders.
- Reflect the lessons from wildfire events where lack of coordinated access for animal responders increased risk.
- Include the use of decision-making matrices and real-time communication protocols to guide when and how access should be granted.

**Option c – Prescribe the form of identification passes through regulations (secondary legislation):**

**Cautiously supported.** Identification systems can improve clarity and consistency, provided they:

- Are flexible and allow just-in-time accreditation, not limited to pre-event lists.
- Include clear codes of conduct and revocation mechanisms to uphold safety standards.
- Avoid creating additional administrative barriers that slow down urgent animal welfare or utility response efforts.

Experience from recent wildfire and flood responses shows that accreditation alone does not guarantee safe behaviour. A robust pass system must include conditions for use and consequences for non-compliance.

**Option d – Clarify that access can be restricted to any class or group of persons (legislative):**

**Supported**, but only if paired with appropriate oversight and safeguards. Legislative clarification should not result in blanket exclusions of key responders such as veterinary professionals, animal welfare personnel, or community-based responders. Access decisions must remain proportional, needs-based, and accountable.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Proactively Released

**a) Inclusion of animals in cordon protocols**

Recommendations drawn from wildfire event reviews include:

- Explicit reference to animals and their welfare in cordon protocols.
- Involvement of Animal Emergency Management (AEM) coordinators in cordon planning and operations.
- Deployment of animal welfare representatives at cordon points to liaise with owners and supervise access.

These recommendations were trialled successfully during the Pigeon Valley fires and should be formally adopted.

**b) Structured decision-support tools**

Mandate the use of a **decision matrix** for cordon placement that considers:

- Cascading and compounding impacts.
- Community access needs.
- Animal welfare considerations.
- Equity and rural supply chain impacts.

**c) Inclusion of subject matter experts (SMEs) in decision-making**

Require the involvement of animal welfare, rural access, and utility SMEs in EOC-level decisions regarding cordon placement and access criteria. Their inclusion improves decision quality and outcomes.

**d) Real-time communication between controllers and cordon points**

Breakdowns in communication between the Controller and those managing cordon points have been a recurring issue. A protocol must ensure that decisions regarding access are communicated promptly, clearly, and verifiably to cordon staff.

**e) Post-event evaluation of cordon effectiveness**

Include a requirement for formal **post-event review** of cordon management, covering:

- Impacts on response effectiveness.
- Delays in essential service and animal welfare access.
- Consequences for affected communities.

**Summary**

This issue highlights more than access logistics. It reflects how interconnected systems, people, animals, and communities are during emergencies. Access restrictions, if mismanaged, can result in escalated risk, animal welfare failures, and erosion of community trust.

The SPCA supports changes that:

- Promote flexible, risk-informed access protocols.

Proactively Released

- Recognise animal welfare as an integral part of community wellbeing.
- Embed structured, system-wide decision-making tools and subject matter expertise into emergency management.

Effective reform will enable safer, more timely, and more equitable access to restricted areas, supporting both human and animal welfare during crises.

## Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, we agree that the current legislative wording creates ambiguity around who holds what powers and functions during both a state of emergency and a transition period. The overlap and inconsistent allocation between CDEM Groups, Controllers, and Recovery Managers undermines clarity, accountability, and efficient decision-making. We also support the concern that many of the activities currently listed under "powers" in section 85 are operational in nature and would be better characterised as "functions."

However, the problem description omits an important consideration: the powers and functions must be sufficient not only for managing human-centred consequences but also to mitigate harm, pain, or distress for animals affected by emergencies. Current legislative language is human-centric, and the absence of explicit emergency powers related to animal welfare has consistently created barriers in real-time decision-making and operational response. The functions and powers need to reflect the presence of animals.

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Option a (status quo):** This option perpetuates the current confusion around roles, authority, and accountability. It also continues to exclude necessary legislative support for animal welfare actions, which have been shown to impact both public safety and emergency system efficacy (e.g., refusal to evacuate due to animals, unsafe re-entry, etc.).

**Option b (tidy-up via legislative amendment):** This is essential. Clearly separating functions from powers and allocating them to the individuals or entities best placed to act, whether that be CDEM Groups, Controllers, or Recovery Managers, will improve response efficiency, reduce legal ambiguity, and enhance accountability. This option must include updating the powers to reflect not only the human needs during emergencies but also animal welfare needs, particularly in relation to:

- Who is responsible for coordinating animal welfare services at local and regional levels
- Emergency veterinary care
- Rescue or sheltering of animals
- Safe co-housing and handling logistics

Proactively Released

- Timely disposal of deceased animals with appropriate biosecurity or cultural considerations

Without this, responders remain restricted in their ability to act in accordance with ethical, legal, and practical animal welfare responsibilities, an issue that has surfaced repeatedly in real-world emergencies.

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. While Option b is necessary, it may not go far enough unless it explicitly:

- **Introduces a cross-cutting principle** in the legislation that requires the emergency management system to plan for and respond to both human and animal needs in an integrated manner.
- **Ensures alignment between the powers in section 85 and 94H** so that there is a smooth and consistent transition between response and recovery phases, especially for actions like clearing roads, managing animals, or providing essential supplies.
- **Provides for delegated technical roles** (e.g., Animal Welfare Coordinators) that can act under the authority of Controllers or Recovery Managers to carry out powers or functions related to animals.

These additions would better reflect the realities on the ground, where animal welfare needs are intertwined with human behaviour, recovery trajectories, and emergency system performance.

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

New Zealand requires a fundamental shift in its emergency management system. One that moves beyond outdated, siloed structures and instead embraces a relational and integrated approach, as described in CIMS 3. While this intent is reflected in doctrine, it is not embedded in practice.

This disconnect is particularly evident in **Animal Welfare Emergency Management (AWEM)**. While animal welfare support agencies are formally mandated through secondary legislation (the National CDEM Plan), they are not resourced or funded to deliver on those responsibilities. As a result, animal welfare services during emergencies are largely delivered through the goodwill of support agencies, community organisations, private businesses, and volunteers—**with costs falling where they lie**. This approach is **unsustainable and inherently risky**. The system remains **significantly under-resourced**, **not well supported by the broader emergency management framework**, and

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**fragmented**, placing an unacceptable burden on non-governmental organisations and community actors, and failing to ensure clear responsibility, accountability, or consistent resourcing.

The consequences of this legislative and policy gap are wide-reaching. This is not just an animal welfare issue – it is a **public health and safety, food security, biosecurity, biodiversity, and reputational** risk. New Zealand is home to **more than 100 million animals**, the vast majority of whom are not adequately factored into emergency planning and response. This level of vulnerability should be seen as a **national risk**.

However, **legislation and policy alone will not fix this**. Without education and training that builds the capability and confidence of all organisations to work together in a **whole-of-system way**, the system will continue to revert to familiar, siloed practices under pressure. If people don't know how to do it, they will default to what they've always done.

We risk repeating the same issues identified in previous reviews: that the Act is not used as intended, and that doctrine is not translated into practice. Reform must be bold, practical, and future-focused, taking into account the growing complexity of emergency events driven by the climate crisis and compounding and cascading impacts.

This is a critical opportunity to create a system that truly reflects the interdependence of people, animals, and the environment, and to equip those working within it with the skills, structures, and support they need to uphold that in action.

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HAWKE'S BAY REGIONAL RECOVERY AGENCY

May 2025

**Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation discussion document** – RRA submission

Thank you for the opportunity to submit on the proposals to update the Emergency Management legislation. I am writing this submission in my capacity as the Chief Executive of the Hawke's Bay Regional Recovery Agency (RRA). As such, this submission is focused on the aspects of the discussion document that specifically relate to recovery, rather than the wider Emergency Management reforms.

**Background**

The RRA was established following Cyclone Gabrielle to lead and coordinate recovery efforts across the Hawke's Bay Region, providing coordination between local authorities, iwi and hapū, non-government organisations and government agencies within the region, and coordination with, and assurance and advocacy to, Government. The RRA itself does not possess a statutory function or decision-making role and does not directly plan, lead and deliver recovery initiatives or projects.

**Recovery**

While 'Recovery' is clearly established as one of the "4 R's" of the emergency management system, it is not a strong focus of the legislation as it currently stands or substantively considered as a part of this discussion document on an updated legislative framework.

In the context of this work, it is important to consider the differences between the normal frame of reference for response-dominated Civil Defence Emergency Management-centered work, and the much broader societal and community focus of major scale, longer-term recovery work.

Such a consideration raises a fundamental question about how New Zealand approaches recovery work, compared with emergency response work, and whether it is appropriate for recovery to be part of the CDEM system, or a separate framework with specialised resourcing.

While they are necessarily linked, emergency response work tends to be immediate/short-term in nature and focused on human safety, welfare, and getting infrastructure and systems functionally operative again. In contrast, recovery tends to be longer-term and centered on planning and rebuilding of communities, infrastructure and systems, usually without immediate emergency imperatives. The different areas of work can involve quite different skill sets and areas of focus. Existing recovery settings tend to be focused on the transition period, rather than the longer-term recovery across multiple sectors.

The discussion document identifies the work that the Chief Executive, Cyclone Recovery is undertaking to develop a suite of recovery settings and decision-making tools to assist with the recovery process. While context-appropriate arrangements are essential, having criteria and baseline arrangements as part of recovery planning is also considered highly desirable.

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We welcome this work and have contributed to the consultation process on the draft criteria. While it may address some of the issues around recovery, it is unclear how/whether this work would be incorporated into the wider emergency management reforms, or whether it would sit outside of the emergency management legislative settings under review in this discussion document.

Overall, when considering this area of work, is important to consider the appropriateness and effectiveness of having recovery planning and coordination sitting within the response-dominated emergency management framework. Therefore, it will be important to use the opportunities from this review, as well as the work of the Cyclone Recovery Chief Executive, to ensure it is clear where recovery sits – either as part of the CDEM system, or a separate framework.

**Additional specific points from the discussion document:**

- **Objectives:** Planning for and managing the long-term recovery could be added into the proposed objectives for the reform *(p. 8 of the discussion document)*.

- **Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation:** When considering which option/s best achieves this outcome, suggest that thought should be given specifically to how to enable information-sharing with Māori organisations (as well as other community groups) during the recovery phase, so that information-sharing is not limited to public sector agencies. Some Māori organisations have played significant roles in recovery efforts, as well as response *(p. 14 of the discussion document)*.

- **Accountability for emergency management:** The option of making the chief executive of each local authority hold the role of Recovery Manager needs to consider the significant capacity issues that could be created. While local authority Chief Executives are already closely involved with the recovery, they are also responsible for continuing to run their organisations, deliver council services, work with the elected members, and support their communities. While the ability to delegate functions and powers to individuals could address some of these concerns, it would still be placing a significant amount of responsibility and workload on one individual in a pressured environment *(p. 29 of the discussion document)*.



Ross McLeod
Chief Executive
**HB Regional Recovery Agency**

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Paula Naudé
Manager: Community Development & Emergency Management
Tauranga City Council
s9(2)(a)
s9(2)(a)
Date: 20/05/2025

# Submission on the Emergency Management Draft Bill (May 2025)

## Introduction

This submission draws on operational emergency management experience, lessons from recent civil defence events, and longstanding participation in community resilience planning. It reflects the collective voice of experienced emergency practitioners, CDEM staff, and community partners committed to improving the emergency management system in Aotearoa New Zealand.

While the draft Bill signals positive reform intentions, we are concerned it fails to address persistent and foundational issues that have been repeatedly identified in government reviews, including the TAG (2017) and NISWE (2024) reports. Our submission outlines solutions that are both practical and system-oriented.

## 1. Clarifying Purpose and National Leadership

A major flaw in both the current CDEM Act and the proposed Bill is the absence of statutory clarity regarding the purpose, roles, and functions of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). This continues to result in a lack of national direction, inconsistent training, and fragmented practice across regions.

- **Recommendations:**

Include a "Purpose and Functions" structure in the legislation (as seen in the FENZ and Policing Acts).

- **Statutorily define NEMA's leadership responsibilities for:**

Setting and enforcing national standards.

Developing training programmes and standard operating procedures (SOPs).

Leading the implementation of CIMS as the national coordination model.

- **Suggested Purpose Clause (adapted from FENZ Act):**

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"The purpose of this Act is to reform emergency management law, strengthen the role of communities, clarify the functions of the National Emergency Management Agency, and unify and support local delivery of emergency management services."

## 2. Māori Partnership and Inclusion in Emergency Management

Māori communities bring critical knowledge and resilience, but remain largely excluded from formal emergency planning and governance structures. Effective emergency management must be grounded in Te Tiriti o Waitangi and fully reflect Māori leadership and values.

- **Recommendations:**

Embed Te Tiriti o Waitangi as a guiding principle in legislation.

Require establishment of Iwi/Māori Emergency Advisory Groups within all CDEM Groups.

Mandate the integration of mātauranga Māori and local tohu o te taiao into emergency planning and warning systems.

- **Fund Māori-led initiatives, including:**

Marae-based response hubs and infrastructure.

Whānau-focused emergency planning tools.

Māori-led climate adaptation programmes.

Create Māori Emergency Advisor roles within every CDEM Group.

Invest in Māori workforce development and secondment pathways into emergency management roles.

## 3. National Training, Capability and Consistency

Emergency management across New Zealand is hampered by inconsistent training, inadequate national resources, and a lack of formal qualification pathways for key operational roles.

- **Recommendations:**

Define what "suitably qualified" means, ie. Criteria to be deemed suitably qualified. Suggest developing an "entry to expert" framework that has clear pathways to be deemed qualified.

Establish a national training framework for all EOC/ECC functions, aligned to the CIMS model.

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Provide function-specific training, including for roles like Intelligence, Recovery Manager, Iwi Liaison, and Public Information Management.

Recognise that foundational training with no on-going professional development pathway is inadequate for high performing teams in response.

Engage with CDEM practitioners to co-design national tools, SOPs and professional development standards, as well as determining number of professional development hours should be undertaken annually to remain current.

Empower NEMA to coordinate, not just support, capability-building efforts nationally.

## 4. Clarifying Civil Defence vs Emergency Management

The terms "Civil Defence" and "Emergency Management" are used interchangeably in public discourse and legislation, creating confusion about roles, responsibilities, and expectations during emergencies.

- **Recommendations:**
- **Define the two terms distinctly:**

Civil Defence – Community-led emergency preparedness and response.

Emergency Management – The professional coordination of the 4Rs: Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery.

Use consistent terminology across legislation and public communications.

Support public education campaigns to clarify community and agency roles both before, during and post emergencies.

## 5. Empowering Local Response and Resilience

Smaller councils and local authorities often struggle to meet emergency management expectations due to limited capacity. A centralised approach to standards and training must be complemented by support for localised solutions.

- **Recommendations:**

Clarify and support roles at all levels (national, regional, local) through legislation.

Resource small councils to meet responsibilities, including access to training and response assets.

Enable community-driven planning, including partnerships with marae, schools, and sports clubs.

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Recognise and support solid waste services as critical infrastructure for disaster readiness and recovery.

## 6. Strengthening Risk Reduction and Hazard Management

Despite clear hazard risks, development continues in vulnerable areas, exposing communities to avoidable harm.

- **Recommendations:**

Strengthen powers to restrict development in high-risk zones, supported by the National Hazards Commission.

Require integration of hazard data into urban planning, consenting, and land use decisions.

- Embed the 4Rs (Reduction, Readiness, Response, Recovery) in the Act with dedicated sections outlining:

Outcomes sought,

Responsibilities at each level,

Required actions to achieve national resilience.

## 7. Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) Integration

CIMS is the national framework for emergency coordination, yet lacks adequate statutory support, training, and implementation tools.

- **Recommendations:**

Statutorily mandate CIMS as the national model for emergency operations as not all key stakeholders work according to CIMS which poses challenges during multi-agency responses.

Require all agencies and councils to maintain capability to operate within CIMS.

Align all national training and SOPs with CIMS roles and principles.

## 8. Practical and Operational Enhancements

Recognise innovative tools such as VR flood education resources as part of national preparedness.

Develop a national communications campaign to explain emergency roles and limitations during initial response phases.

Standardise and streamline reimbursement processes for local councils.

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Provide base-level training for marae and community activation (e.g., marae emergency activation courses).

Improve guidance on scenarios where iwi engagement is not possible due to capacity or inter-iwi dynamics.

## 9. Funding

Equitable funding and resourcing are a challenge at local level, hampering resilience work which has the potential to adversely impact response and thereby recovery.

The NEMA resilience fund is insufficient to meet need and should be increased.

## Conclusion

This Emergency Management Bill has the potential to address long-standing issues — but only if it provides clear leadership, equitable inclusion, and strong operational foundations.

- **We urge the government to:**

Define NEMA's leadership mandate in law.

Embed Māori partnership as a cornerstone of resilience.

Support capability development through nationally consistent, co-designed tools.

Clarify operational language, responsibilities, and standards.

Include recovery as a core statutory function with clear mandates and resources.

Without these changes, the Bill risks perpetuating inconsistency, confusion, and underperformance in times of crisis.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Gillian Warren |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) ; s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Ngā Wātene Māori o Aotearoa \| Māori Wardens of New Zealand (NWMoA)<br><br>NWMoA's role is to ensure Māori Wardens across Aotearoa are united, valued and well-supported. We engage with Te Puni Kōkiri, NZ Police and other agencies in our role of representing Māori Wardens. Our board is comprised of representatives from the six Māori Warden regions.<br><br>We work closely with the Māori Wardens' Emergency Response Team (MWERT) who are also making a submission.<br><br>We refer to the two organisations by their acronyms in this document: NWMoA and MWERT. |

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☐ NEMA may publish submissions or a summary of submissions to its website, civildefence.govt.nz. If you **do not** want your submission or a summary of your submission to be published, please tick the box and type an explanation below:

I do not want my submission published on NEMA's website because…

### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because…

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact

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submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Could be specific about the need of disadvantaged people needing to be contacted by people they are comfortable with. Many are not comfortable with a government agency coming to their door, but they are more comfortable when Māori Wardens approach them. This has enabled Māori Wardens to connect with the "hard to reach" and to help people to get government assistance – by being the interface between them and government agencies. Vulnerable people are often more willing to accept assistance

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from Māori Wardens. We have concrete examples of this happening and can provide further information.

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   We understand NEMA is speaking directly with MWERT representatives who have operational experience in emergency response and we support that consultation continuing.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   As above

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

   Please explain your views.

   As above

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

   ☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

   ☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Māori Wardens have played and continue to play a hugely significant role in emergencies. Their pre-existing networks with hapū, whānau, Councils means they are often first on the ground and sometimes have the only effective communications equipment (which is not currently funded).

MWERT and Māori Wardens' regions have operational networks and assets which they deploy to good effect on numerous occasions. This is not mentioned in the discussion document despite the critical role they have played on many occasions.

There is a case for identifying Māori Wardens as making a particularly significant contribution in this respect of being operationally nimble, connected to their communities and able to reach vulnerable people. This is critical role that is not easily replicated.

The use of "iwi Māori" and "Māori associations" is too broad as a catch all and does not recognise the different roles that different organisations play.

NWMoA would like to be consulted on any further work that would define more appropriately the contributions Māori Wardens make and on how the roles are recognised and described.

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The options should recognise formally the role played by Māori Wardens, but not impede their ability to get on the ground and do their mahi. They are currently very nimble, know their people and communities, and are readily trusted by all. They are also highly capable of organising large numbers of wardens at short notice, which is why they are usually first on the ground in a natural disaster.

As noted above, please continue to consult MWERT about operational implications.

In summary, the critical role played by Māori Wardens should be formally recognised and they should be able to continue to work nimbly and without impediment.

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

As explained above, iwi Māori is way too broad. It is like saying "Pākēhā".

The work of Māori Wardens is specifically recognised in the Policing Act as contributing to the delivery of their core functions. Something similar would also be appropriate in the emergency management context. We would like to be consulted on any proposals for change in this respect.

See section 10 of the Policing Act 2008

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**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

There should be a formal partnership with Māori Wardens at the national level. MWERT and NWMoA work closely together. There may be amalgamation in future but for now, please continue to consult with both organisations.

Please consult NWMoA in respect of any legislative proposals given our role of advocating for Māori Wardens generally. We therefore wish to be consulted on any policy proposals early in the process.

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Please continue to consult with MWERT leads in this respect.

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Please continue to consult with MWERT. We can also put you in touch with regional representatives if required.

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Please continue to consult with MWERT leads in this respect.

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Please ensure that Māori Wardens are expressly included in any access provisions so they can continue to their essential work on the ground during emergencies.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Please consult both NWMoA and MWERT on any proposals to change powers and functions may affect the work of Māori Wardens.

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Please continue to consult both NWMoA and MWERT on the proposals. NWMoA is particularly interested in any policy or legislative proposals and how they could affect the work of Māori Wardens. As previously noted, MWERT has considerable experience and knowledge running emergency response operations on the ground.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | s9(2)(a) |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Marlborough Emergency Management |

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I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports the identified objectives for reform.

The objective to strengthen community and iwi Māori participation is particularly of interest for Marlborough, where our diverse communities and Māori population bring valuable local knowledge and resources to emergency management. As a unitary authority, we've witnessed how effective community participation enhances resilience and response capabilities and leads to better outcomes for communities.

The second objective addressing clear responsibilities and accountabilities is crucial but also complex and not necessarily best dealt with through legislation alone. There are also common foundations that need reform (for example Controller accountabilities and liabilities). The issue of controlling authority over a response and consideration of alternative models needs very careful consideration to avoid unintended consequences of CDEM "owning too much" in response while also having little to no control of risk reduction and management where others are mandated and better placed to manage hazard risks.

The objective to enable a higher minimum standard is welcome. Our experience shows significant variation in emergency management capability across different regions, and establishing consistent standards would ensure all New Zealand communities receive

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appropriate protection. However, enabling this through equity of resourcing and investment is of concern in how effect will be given to this ambition.

Minimising disruption to essential services reflects learnings from recent emergencies where infrastructure failures had cascading impacts. For Marlborough, with our geographical spread and isolated communities, maintaining essential services during emergencies is particularly critical, as is a rapid recovery of essential services from hazard impacts.

The objective ensuring appropriate emergency powers addresses practical issues during response operations, particularly around cordons and declaration processes.

As a recommendation, more consideration could be given to explicitly incorporating climate change adaptation within these objectives, as the increasing frequency and severity of climate-related emergencies will significantly shape our future emergency management requirements.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description. Our operational experience confirms that emergencies affect communities differently based on pre-existing vulnerabilities, different needs, and geographical exposure to hazards.

In Marlborough, we have witnessed this first-hand with our diverse communities, including rural and isolated populations, older residents, and those with accessibility requirements. The 2021 flooding events in our region highlighted how these differences manifested in emergency response requirements.

The Government Inquiry findings accurately reflect our local experience where the needs of vulnerable groups were not always adequately planned for or met during emergencies. This is particularly evident in evacuation centres and information distribution, where a one-size-fits-all approach has proven ineffective.

It is also acknowledged that some communities lack the capability to communicate their needs effectively across the 4Rs, which creates additional barriers to equitable emergency management outcomes.

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3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

This is an open ended problem that needs to take into account the diversity of local populations. In addition to the reasons identified in the discussion document, several other factors can contribute to disproportionate impacts. For example:

**Digital exclusion**: Many residents, particularly in rural areas and among older populations, have limited digital literacy or unreliable internet access. This may affect their ability to receive emergency communications and access support services, especially as emergency information increasingly shifts to digital platforms.

**Transient populations**: As a region with seasonal workers in viticulture and tourism industries, we have populations who are unfamiliar with local hazards, evacuation routes, and support systems. They often lack established community connections that provide informal support networks during emergencies and rely on their sponsoring agency for assistance.

**Geographic isolation**: Parts of Marlborough have limited road access that can be quickly compromised during emergencies, cutting off entire communities. This isolation factor compounds other vulnerabilities, particularly when essential services are disrupted.

**Property insurance gaps**: Increasing insurance costs have led some property owners to underinsure or not insure at all, particularly in higher-risk areas, creating financial vulnerabilities during recovery that likely have a disproportionate effect on lower-income households.

**Language barriers**: For residents with limited english proficiency, accessing and understanding emergency information presents significant challenges, particularly for time-critical warnings and evacuation orders, but also during readiness and local education campaigns.

**Local Emergency Management resourcing:** In order to genuinely address the span of diversity, vulnerability and need across our communities, much increased investment will be required to serve this demand. Therefore, current levels of investment are a contributing reason why some communities are disproportionately affected.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

As a unitary authority with both regional and local responsibilities, a combined approach of Options 2 and 3 would likely be most effective, with a weighting towards option 2 in the absence of increased investment to give effect to option 3.

**Option 2 (non-legislative)** would provide valuable frameworks for consistency while still allowing for local adaptation. However, without legislative backing and CDEM investment, implementation effectiveness may remain inconsistent across regions, as we've observed with other non-mandatory guidance.

**Option 3 (legislative)** would reinforce accountability and systematic consideration of diverse needs. On the one-hand, this legislative requirement is welcomed as it provides

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clear authority to prioritise these considerations in planning and resource allocation decisions. On the other hand, enforced requirements implies the requirement for additional investment in CDEM which must compete with other core services of Marlborough District Council, or be centrally funded through other mechanisms.

In principle, the implementation costs would possibly be offset by more effective emergency responses and recovery, but it does require upfront (and sustainable) investment. The current approach generally results in higher costs through reactively addressing unmet needs during emergencies, rather than planning proactively to reduce needs through improved resilience and capacity of communities.

A material risk of Option 3 therefore is that without adequate resourcing, smaller CDEM Groups such as ours may struggle to fulfil newly legislated requirements. Any legislative changes should be accompanied by appropriate funding support, particularly for engagement with diverse communities which requires dedicated time and resources and could be supported with consistency of approach and content from a central source, using CDEM group and local offices as the conduit to these communities.

For Marlborough Emergency Management, the preparation of our CDEM Group Plan already involves consultation with diverse stakeholders, but resourcing this remains a challenge.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

At the local level:

Planning would be co-designed with representatives from vulnerable groups rather than planning "for" them, ensuring their lived experience informs approaches. This would also assist with community capacity building as a concept.

Civil Defence Centre and or Community Hub planning would better address specific accessibility, cultural needs, and considerations (including separate sleeping areas and appropriate facilities and enabling cultural customs).

Communication would incorporate multiple channels and formats to reach diverse audiences, including those without digital access.

Community response plans would identify and map vulnerable and CALD populations while maintaining appropriate privacy protections.

Resource allocation would prioritise areas with higher concentrations of vulnerable populations.

In a more general sense, national and local progammes would be aligned and adequately resourced to deliver an uplift of community capability and resilience in the broadest sense as the foundation of a step-change to truly resilient communities.

Recovery planning would include better targeted support measures for disproportionately affected groups.

At the national level:

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The National CDEM Plan would establish clear minimum standards for inclusive emergency management, as long as these are achievable through resourcing at the local level. This is a key concern. Therefore, funding models would need to recognise the additional resources required to support vulnerable or diverse populations.

Resources and guidance would be developed centrally to support consistent implementation.

Monitoring frameworks would include metrics for measuring outcomes for different community groups.

Cross-agency coordination would be strengthened to leverage expertise from social services, health, and disability sectors.

For both levels, meaningful engagement and relationship-building with vulnerable communities would occur during readiness phases, not just during response. This relationship-building takes time and resources but is essential for improved emergency management outcomes, particularly if the ambition of enabling and empowering communities is to be pursued.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Any options need to fundamentally address the issues of investment and resourcing to deliver the desired improvements at the community level through local mechanisms.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description regarding iwi Māori participation in emergency management. The description accurately reflects the significant contributions iwi Māori make to emergency management while highlighting the gaps in formal recognition and inclusion.

The problem description correctly identifies that Māori expertise, networks, and mātauranga are insufficiently integrated into emergency management structures across New Zealand. Marlborough's experience with Te Tauihu iwi during recent events aligns with the Government Inquiry's finding that some of the most effective emergency responses were coordinated by iwi Māori.

Despite strong relationships with Te Tauihu's eight iwi, the current legislative framework provides no formal mandate for their representation in emergency management governance structures.

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Marlborough Emergency Management supports the need for greater recognition of iwi Māori contributions to emergency management, not just as stakeholders to be consulted but as partners with valuable expertise and resources that benefit wider communities.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management considers that the discussion document has accurately captured the essential roles that iwi Māori play across the 4Rs of emergency management. The description aligns with Te Tauihu iwi contributions observed in Marlborough during recent emergency events.

The description appropriately acknowledges the role of iwi in risk reduction through their kaitiaki responsibilities and traditional knowledge of local hazardscapes. In Marlborough, iwi perspectives on environmental management have provided valuable insights for hazard planning.

The recovery contributions of iwi are also accurately captured, particularly their focus on holistic wellbeing that extends beyond immediate physical needs to encompass cultural, social, and economic dimensions of recovery.

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management views a combination of Options 3, 4 as providing the greatest benefits. Requiring iwi Māori representation on CDEM Group decision-making structures (Option 3) alongside their involvement in CDEM Group planning (Option 4) enables both governance-level input and operational integration. However, mindful of regions' diversity of iwi makeup and relations, it is possibly more appropriate to enable rather than attempt to force iwi participation by softening Option 3. Option 5 is supported as a national level option.

**The benefits include:**

Enhanced emergency preparedness through incorporation of mātauranga Māori and iwi networks into planning.

Improved coordination during responses through established relationships and communication channels.

More culturally appropriate and effective recovery approaches for all communities.

Strengthened community resilience through broader stakeholder engagement.

Implementation costs would largely involve administrative adjustments and relationship development, which should be viewed as investments rather than compliance burdens.

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The most significant cost would be time investment in relationship building and capability development, which would yield longer term benefits.

**Potential risks include:**

Creating expectations without providing sufficient resourcing for iwi participation.

Inconsistent implementation across different regions without clear guidance.

Potential for tokenistic rather than meaningful engagement.

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Iwi Māori should be recognised as partners with statutory standing in the emergency management system, reflecting Treaty principles. This recognition should include:

Explicit acknowledgment in the Act's purpose statement of iwi Māori roles in emergency management.

Designated positions made available on governance structures, although noting this may need to be specific to a region's iwi makeup (eg how are several iwi represented through a single voice, and is this always appropriate?).

Recognition of mātauranga Māori as a valuable knowledge system for emergency management.

Resource allocation to support capacity building and participation.

Recognition of marae as critical emergency infrastructure and community resilience hubs.

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

The relationship should be formalised as a partnership with:

Enabling (as a recognition of diversity of make-up across regions vs mandating participation) iwi representation on CDEM Groups with equal standing to local authority members.

Dedicated funding arrangements, where appropriate, to support iwi participation.

Secondment opportunities for knowledge exchange between iwi and CDEM structures.

Joint strategy development that incorporates iwi priorities.

Regular relationship forums beyond emergency periods.

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Coordinating Executive Groups should include senior iwi representatives who can:

Proactively Released

Provide operational perspectives on emergency management activities, ensure culturally appropriate approaches in planning and implementation, facilitate connections between emergency services and Māori communities, contribute mātauranga Māori to risk assessment and planning processes, and help prioritise resources to address vulnerabilities in Māori communities.

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

The most effective mechanisms would include:

A national Māori advisory group with direct reporting lines to the Director

Regular national hui focused on emergency management approaches

Formal documentation and sharing of case studies highlighting effective iwi-led emergency management practices

Secondment of Māori emergency management practitioners to NEMA and CDEM Groups where mutual capacity allows

Involvement of Māori experts in Director's policy development processes

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Additional options could include:

Creating a dedicated Māori Emergency Management Fund to build capability

Establishing regional pou whenua (dedicated Māori emergency management coordinators) to bridge CDEM and iwi structures

Creating a workforce development pathway for Māori in emergency management

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management believes the problem description regarding community participation in emergency management is too narrow in scope. It focuses on education and guidance along with management of offers of help from the public. A step change in the Emergency Management system would view community as the

Proactively Released

foundation of emergency response and seek to uplift capacity overall through bold, innovative reform.

The discussion document correctly identifies the disconnect between "official" emergency management systems and community-led initiatives.

In Marlborough's diverse communities, particularly those in more remote areas like the Marlborough Sounds, Awatere Valley and inland Marlborough, community organisations and networks are often the first and most effective responders. These communities have developed significant local capacity through relationships but face barriers to effective integration with formal emergency management structures, or enablement to act spontaneously wit the right freedoms, constraints and protections.

The problem description accurately highlights the challenge of enabling communities to offer resources to official response efforts. A lack of pre-established arrangements for volunteer management and resource integration remains a local challenge for Marlborough.

The fundamental premise that community participation strengthens emergency management outcomes aligns with Marlborough's operational experience and planning philosophy; the challenge is to get there.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports a combination of Options 2 and 3, but overall sees that a more involved reform focussing on community capacity building and resilience offers a more robust way forward. However, under the current proposed options:

**Benefits include:**

Creating clear expectations and processes for managing community resources during emergencies, reducing ad-hoc decision making during stressful operational periods, providing communities with transparency about how their offers will be handled, and enabling pre-identification of resource needs that community groups could address.

The implementation costs would be moderate, primarily involving planning processes and relationship development. An increase to baseline funding would be required to improve local outcomes in Marlborough under both option 2 and 3. Cost increases may be offset by increased response effectiveness and enhanced community resilience to some degree but this is hard to qualify and quantify.

**Potential risks include:**

Creating planning requirements without providing guidance on effective community resource management systems, varied implementation quality across different CDEM Groups without clear standards, and potential for community disengagement if processes become overly bureaucratic.

For Marlborough, with its distributed population and geography that can isolate communities during emergencies, having improved and established frameworks for integrating community resources would significantly enhance response capabilities, but this requires a higher level of investment. The issue is particularly important given our

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limited professional emergency response resources in remote areas, where we have a high reliance on informal or multi-faceted community responses. This is where a bolder step-change towards genuine capacity building of our communities as an enabler of resilience, and towards better enabled participation will yield more effective responses and faster recoveries than lower-yield public education alone.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Given the aspirational nature of possible legislative changes, Marlborough Emergency Management suggests the following additional ways for strengthening community participation through concepts would be more aligned towards a step-change to grow community capability and capacity:

**Community Resilience Funding Programme**: Establishing a dedicated funding stream for community-led emergency preparedness initiatives that complement official CDEM activities. This would build capacity where it's most needed and acknowledge communities as partners rather than just recipients of emergency services. Currently, local funding constraints (and presumably national funding constraints are the same) limit this, but under "blue-sky" thinking this should not be discounted – even if it is a surge effort for say a 5-year programme as a catalyst for a step change. Sustainability of such a proposal would be a challenge due to investment needs, so perhaps it is targeted towards the most vulnerable or complex communities to get best return on investment.

**Registered Community Response Teams**: Creating a basic national framework for community response teams with defined training, equipment standards, and operational arrangements or procedures that would enable them to operate semi-autonomously but with official recognition and integration points. Perhaps this could be limited to local controller arrangements at the community / geographic level, as long as the appropriate governance and integration with formal structures is maintained (eg a sanctioned ability to coordinate but not direct?).

**CDEM Community Liaison Positions**: More formally establishing dedicated community liaison roles within CDEM Groups specifically focused on building and maintaining relationships with community organisations during readiness phases.

**Community Emergency Planning Framework**: Developing a standardised but flexible framework for community-level emergency planning that links directly to CDEM Group plans, creating clearer pathways for integration.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description regarding first responders, although thinks there might be an understatement of the complexity of the situation. The document accurately identifies the reality that community members, businesses, and local organisations respond first / early in an emergency and, unless directed by the appropriate authority, may incur risk or liability on themselves or others. This potentially discourages actions that could save lives or prevent further damage.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports the underlying principle that legislation should enable rather than impede immediate community response actions, while maintaining appropriate safeguards against reckless behaviour.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports Option 2 (provide protection from civil liability for loss or damage) as the preferred approach, with Option 3 (enable compensation for labour costs) as a very limited complementary measure if it can be carefully controlled so as to manage the risks of presenting an "open chequebook" that is unaffordable by local government and/or could be taken advantage of.

**Benefits of Option 2:**

Removing a significant barrier to spontaneous community response actions;

Recognising the reality that community members will act regardless of formal direction;

Potentially saving lives and property through improved enabling of immediate response actions;

Aligning with community expectations that people should be able to help others in emergencies.

**Potential risks that would need management include:**

Defining appropriate boundaries for "reasonable and significant" actions to prevent the protection being misused; and

Ensuring the good faith requirement is well understood by the public.

The implementation costs would appear to be minimal so long as unintended liabilities are managed, primarily involving public education about the protections and their limitations.

For Marlborough's geographically dispersed communities, where official response capabilities may take time to deploy, this protection would remove a barrier to the immediate community-led actions that often make critical differences in emergency outcomes.

Option 3 would further support business engagement in emergency response by addressing financial barriers to their participation, particularly for small businesses that may otherwise face significant hardship from redirecting resources to emergency support. However, this option generates significant risks of cost predictability for local

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and central government will likely require a tightly managed scope of implementation if option 3 is to be adopted in any form.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management offers the following additional options to address this issue:

**Emergency Action Recognition Framework**: Establishing a formal, nationalised, culture and values-based recognition system for significant community and business contributions during emergencies, building a positive culture around spontaneous response while providing guidance on appropriate actions.

**Community Response Insurance Scheme**: Creating a government-backed insurance scheme that would cover liability for registered community responders acting in good faith during emergencies before official response capabilities arrive. As outlined above, there is risk of over-participation or advantage taking. The idea of Good Faith is also a subjective one that may be exposed to criticism across or from within the community where relationships and personalities are at loggerheads on an issue.

**Simplified Rapid Authorisation Process**: Developing a streamlined system to quickly grant limited official responder status to appropriate community members during emergencies, extending protections while maintaining some operational oversight.

**Tax Incentives for Business Contributions**: Implementing tax relief measures for businesses that contribute significant resources or staff time to emergency response, offsetting costs while encouraging participation and reducing risk of profiteering.

**Pre-registration System for Response Resources**: Creating a voluntary pre-registration system for businesses and individuals with resources or skills they would be willing to deploy in emergencies, which could include pre-vetting and a basic level of training.

**Graduated Protection Framework**: Developing a tiered protection system that provides different levels of liability protection based on the nature of actions taken and their relationship to formal emergency direction.

While these additional options would strengthen the connection between spontaneous community response and official emergency management systems and potentially remove barriers to effective community action, they also imply an increase in management burden for CDEM which needs to be resourced both in readiness and response. Therefore, implementation of such improvements likely come with a need to increase funding / resourcing at CDEM Group and Local office level to better educate, inform, pre-plan and coordinate with a strengthened response capability from communities, people and businesses. Despite being desirable in terms of capability outcome, this may not be affordable at the local level and / or be seen as another pressure on ratepayers.

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management identifies several additional problems that should be considered:

**Digital Divide Impact**: The increasing reliance on digital platforms for emergency communications creates inequitable access to critical information. Many vulnerable communities in Marlborough have limited digital connectivity, particularly during power outages. Legislative frameworks should address requirements for accessible non-digital communication channels. However, this may come at increased costs for the use of more traditional engagement methodologies and collateral.

**Cross-cultural Communication in Emergencies**: Current emergency communication approaches often fail to account for cultural differences in how risk information is received and acted upon. This creates barriers for diverse communities and reduces effectiveness of emergency messaging.

**Resourcing Disparities**: Community and iwi organisations are expected to participate in emergency management without equivalent resourcing to government agencies. This creates an unsustainable reliance on goodwill and volunteer capacity that diminishes over prolonged emergencies.

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management generally agrees with the problem description regarding command and control ambiguity during emergencies, but believes this is less of an issue of legislation and more one of culture, leadership and stewardship across the CDEM system. We disagree with the statement in paragraph 74 that "Emergencies require a significant and coordinated response that goes beyond agencies' normal powers and resources..." because this aligns more towards the context of declared emergencies and does not appropriately frame the situations of undeclared emergencies.

While ambiguity has been evident during Marlborough's emergency responses, where uncertainty about leadership roles has occasionally led to delayed decision-making and coordination challenges (eg the recent ferry grounding). The Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) provides a framework for agency-specific responses, but does not adequately resolve the question of overall operational control between agencies as complexity of the emergency escalates.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management partially agrees with the proposed options, benefits and risks as outlined in the discussion document, but posits there is not yet one single solution that is appropriate across the spectrum of emergencies. Questions also arise from the options presented that require more careful consideration and testing against scenarios.
For example, the model in figure 3 is appropriate in declared emergencies, but in undeclared emergencies presents CDEM with the risk accountability for failings in hazard risk management where other agencies have the underlying mandate. If CDEM is to be the controlling agency over all hazards in response, what is the obligation on CDEM in readiness and risk reduction? By placing CDEM in control of all hazard responses, is there actually any difference now between declared and undeclared emergencies? If CDEM does not have extraordinary powers then what is the merit of imposing a new control arrangement above an agency responding to a hazard it is already responsible for?

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**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Figure 3 requires further development and detailed testing across a range of scenarios to help inform its full scope and intent more clearly. For example:

What are the extents and limits of Option 3 across the 4 R's, and what is the resource required to give effect to that scope of being in overall control?

Is there intended to be a distinguishable difference between undeclared and declared emergencies under option 3 (with the impression that Option 3 as shown is the status quo under a declaration, with the power to direct)? Is option 3 intended to enable "soft coordination" without the ability to direct if an emergency is undeclared?

Is Option 3 sustainable for CDEM if there are multiple or prolonged hazard events at a lower threshold (eg a wildfire, an earthquake and a biosecurity event) or are such hazard events best managed by agencies with responsibility for the hazards, where coordination of hazard agencies is less of a requirement, but with CDEM coordinating the consequence management?

Culturally, the proposal of Option 3 should be carefully tested with hazard-responsible agencies to determine its acceptability across the wider system and whether there is any belief that it will yield improvements or if there's a sense of over-stepping by CDEM into other agencies' mandates.

This is a very complex problem that requires dedicated workshopping and co-development within CDEM and with other lead agencies before giving confidence that option 3 is feasible, acceptable and a suitable option to resolving control and coordination challenges within the system.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Modern emergency management may require a more networked leadership approach than the current hierarchical control model provides that better enables CDEM coordination outside of declared emergencies. While maintaining clear accountability, the system needs to better facilitate collaboration and informed decision-making that draws on diverse and distributed expertise.

The current model's ambiguity has demonstrably led to coordination failures during significant events. Rather than incremental adjustments, a redesigned system that starts with the realities of modern emergency complexity would better serve the sector and local communities.

Any redesigned system should maintain the principle of locally-led response while providing clearer mechanisms for escalation and enhanced support when local capacity is exceeded.

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## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description regarding overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles. As a unitary authority, Marlborough District Council experiences these challenges in a unique way, having to navigate both regional and local responsibilities within a single organisation, noting there are also benefits of being a unitary authority.

The problem description accurately identifies the current ambiguity in the CDEM Act regarding the respective functions of CDEM Groups and their constituent local authorities.

The description correctly highlights that this lack of clear delineation can lead to inconsistency, duplication, and gaps in service delivery.

The observation that local authorities can act independently of Group decisions is particularly relevant. While Marlborough's unitary structure mitigates some of these issues, we still observe tensions between Group-level strategic priorities and operational implementation at the local level.

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 (requiring CDEM Group plans to state funding and delivery) might create bureaucratic requirements without addressing fundamental role clarity, potentially creating administrative burden without proportionate benefit of clarity.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

This may be best left to other more complex CDEM Groups to consider based on their own experiences.

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**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management believes fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level for several reasons:

**Resource Sustainability**: The current model places significant financial and operational burdens on smaller local authorities while assuming commensurate resourcing. This creates unsustainable expectations, particularly for councils like Marlborough with large geographic areas but limited rating bases.

**Capability Disparities**: Wide variations in capability and capacity between different local authorities create inconsistent outcomes for communities. A more standardised approach with appropriate central support would ensure more equitable service delivery.

**Professionalisation Requirements**: The increasing complexity of modern emergency management requires greater professionalisation and specialisation that cannot be efficiently delivered through 16 separate CDEM Groups, many with limited staffing.

**Integration with Related Functions**: Emergency management is increasingly interconnected with climate adaptation, infrastructure resilience, and social wellbeing - areas requiring more integrated governance approaches than the current CDEM model provides.

**Cross-boundary Challenges**: Many emergencies transcend local government boundaries, yet the current structure creates artificial barriers to seamless coordination. More flexible arrangements that can scale according to event footprints are needed.

**Changing Risk Environment**: Climate change is fundamentally altering New Zealand's risk profile in ways that require more sophisticated risk management capabilities than most local authorities can independently develop.

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The problem description appropriately recognises the tension between regional consistency and local flexibility, which remains a key consideration even within a unitary authority structure such as Marlborough.

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However, the problem description assumes inconsistency is inherently negative, however regional variation can be appropriate or even beneficial given different hazard profiles and community characteristics. Funding capacity for CDEM as a function is also a limiting factor that requires localised approaches. Marlborough's unique geography and hazardscape might require approaches aligned to its community and hazardscape needs.

Marlborough Emergency Management therefore recommends that accountability might be in tension with how best to achieve or deliver on that accountability and that flexibility in organisation and arrangements to best suit local needs remain appropriate.

Underpinning this, however, remains the risk of inequity and inconsistency (in the negative sense) towards best CDEM practices. If consistency is to become a requirement then establishment of centralised resourcing / funding to achieve this ambition for equity will likely be a requirement, particularly for smaller councils with limited rating bases.

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

No

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Consideration should be given to the balance of benefits between conformity and common standards and approaches, vs localised flexibility of implementation to arrive at the required outcomes.

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management generally agrees with the problem description regarding Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs). The document accurately identifies the critical role CEGs should play in implementing CDEM Group decisions and providing technical advice.

Proactively Released

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports Option 2 (providing more specific expectations) and Option 4, remove the ability to delegate unless in specific situations to enable business continuity.

**Benefits:**

Clearer understanding of CEG member responsibilities, including a preferred pathway rather than trying to secure accountability by making the CE a controller.

Enhanced accountability for implementation of CDEM Group decisions

More consistent participation from appropriately senior representatives

Improved quality of technical advice to CDEM Groups

Strengthened relationships between key agencies during readiness phases

**Implementation challenges:**

Potential resistance from agencies (including CE's) with multiple competing priorities

Need for cultural change regarding the priority of emergency management

Integration with existing performance management frameworks

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**Joint Work Programme Requirements**: Mandating that CEGs develop formal annual work programmes aligned with CDEM Group plans, with progress reporting requirements.

**Cross-Regional Coordination Mechanisms**: Creating formal linkages between CEGs in adjacent regions to enhance coordination for cross-boundary events or readiness work programmes; particularly where partner agencies may have overlapping boundaries with two or more CDEM Groups.

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description regarding emergency management plans. The current process for updating these plans is administratively burdensome and not conducive to maintaining current information. In

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Marlborough's experience, the full review process required for even targeted amendments creates unnecessary barriers to updating critical information.

The requirement for a full review before "more than minor" changes can be made has resulted in outdated information remaining in the Marlborough CDEM Group Plan longer than desired. This can create potential risks during emergency events when roles and responsibilities have changed but are not reflected in formal documentation.

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports Option 2 (Enable targeted amendments to CDEM plans) and Option 3 (National CDEM Plan not required to be made by Order in Council).

Benefits of Option 2:

More responsive planning documents that reflect current arrangements

Reduced administrative burden for targeted amendments

Improved alignment between formal plans and actual practice

More efficient use of limited emergency management planning resources

Increased relevance of plans as practical operational documents

**Implementation considerations**:

Need for clear guidelines on what constitutes a targeted amendment

Appropriate consultation requirements for different types of amendments

Public notification processes that maintain transparency while enabling efficiency

For Marlborough, the ability to make targeted amendments would enhance the utility of the CDEM Group Plan as a strategic document and improve the alignment between formal documentation and actual practice over the life of the plan.

Option 3 would provide additional flexibility for the National CDEM Plan, but care needs to be taken that updates are not too frequent that they create a downstream burden on CDEM Groups to update their own plans with limited resources available to do so (eg Marlborough's group plan development is contracted out at a cost).

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**Rolling Review Cycle**: Implementing a continuous review process where different sections of plans are reviewed on a staggered schedule, eliminating the need for comprehensive reviews.

**Automatic Technical Updates**: Establishing provisions for automatic updates to references, technical standards, and contact information without requiring formal amendment processes.

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**Supplementary Operational Annexes**: Creating a framework for operational annexes that can be updated through streamlined processes while maintaining more rigorous requirements for core plan components.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

**Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks**: Current performance measurement for emergency management lacks consistency and comprehensiveness, making it difficult to objectively assess capability and drive improvement. However, appropriately resourcing such a change as this will be critical to its success.

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description regarding the Director's limited mandate to set expectations and monitor performance across the emergency management system. The current Act provides few effective levers to ensure consistent standards nationwide.

The issues identified in paragraph 119 accurately reflect the challenges faced at the regional level, where non-legislative guidelines and technical standards issued by the Director are sometimes inconsistently implemented. This creates an uneven approach to emergency management across New Zealand, compromising overall system effectiveness.

The current reliance on non-mandatory guidance creates uncertainty about what constitutes acceptable performance, particularly when balancing limited resources against emergency management priorities.

The monitoring function limitations described in paragraph 124 align with operational observations in Marlborough, where the fragmented nature of emergency management responsibilities across multiple entities makes it difficult to assess system-wide performance and address gaps.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports a combined approach of Options 2 and 3. This would provide both the technical standards framework and system-wide monitoring capability needed to strengthen emergency management nationwide.

Option 3 (enabling a wider range of mandatory standards through rules) would deliver significant benefits to regions like Marlborough by:

Clarifying expectations across all phases of emergency management;

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Creating consistency in operational procedures that would enhance interregional cooperation during large-scale events; and

Providing clear compliance benchmarks that help justify resource allocation decisions to governance bodies.

The successful implementation of such a strengthened approach will be contingent upon equitable resourcing at the regional and local levels of emergency management. How will such improvement be resourced?

**There are implementation risks:**

Standards must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate regional differences in hazard-scape, capability, and resources (ie funding!) while still meeting core standards;

Over-prescription could create compliance burdens that divert resources from operational readiness for the sake of compliance; and

Clear expectations about how monitoring information will be used should be established to foster a culture of improvement and value-add rather than punishment.

A useful approach would be phased implementation beginning with developing consistent operational standards for high-priority areas like public alerting, evacuation planning, and welfare service coordination. Marlborough Emergency Management expresses strong interest in understanding "how" such improvement arrangements would be resourced, particularly for smaller regions such as ours.

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

From Marlborough Emergency Management's perspective, several aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency and direction:

**Warning systems and public alerting protocols**: Standardised approaches to alerting thresholds, messaging formats, and channel selection would enhance public understanding and response and promote national consistency for our mobile population and visitors. The current variability in warning systems risks causing confusion, particularly for visitors to the region and for residents moving between regions.

**Minimum requirements for evacuation planning**: National direction on evacuation triggers, transportation planning for vulnerable populations, and registration processes would significantly enhance readiness. Marlborough's geographical spread and isolated communities would benefit from clear and consistent guidance in this area.

**Information management systems and data standards**: National direction on information management platforms, data collection, and reporting would enhance situational awareness and coordination. This would particularly benefit Marlborough when dealing with cross-boundary events requiring multi-agency coordination.

**Controller and Recovery Manager competencies**: Nationally consistent qualification and experience requirements would strengthen professional standards and ensure capability across all regions.

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**Business continuity planning requirements for critical service providers**: Standard approaches to business continuity planning would ensure consistent resilience of critical services across regions.

**Community resilience measurement frameworks**: Standardised approaches to measuring and building community resilience would enable better targeting of preparedness initiatives and resource allocation.

**Risk assessment methodologies**: Consistent approaches to hazard and risk assessment would support better cross-regional planning and prioritisation.

National consistency should not, however, extend to tactical response decisions that require local knowledge and context. Any guidance or direction should establish clear minimum standards while allowing flexibility in implementation approaches based on regional circumstances.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management proposes the following additional considerations for strengthening the Director's mandate within the options:

**Graduated compliance framework**: Develop a tiered compliance approach with clearly defined thresholds that would trigger different levels of intervention by the Director. This would create proportionality between performance issues and corrective actions.

**Shared capability building programme**: Establish a national capability development programme that provides targeted support to CDEM Groups to help them meet standards. This could include secondment opportunities, mentoring programmes, and centralised training resources.

**Peer review mechanism**: Implement a structured peer review system where CDEM Groups review each other's performance against standards, facilitated by the Director. This would promote knowledge sharing and foster a culture of continuous improvement.

**Performance-based funding model**: Link a portion of CDEM funding to performance against standards to create positive incentives for improvement.

**Regional centres of excellence**: Designate specific CDEM Groups as centres of excellence in particular aspects of emergency management, with responsibility for developing and sharing best practices nationally. In time, Marlborough could potentially lead in areas like rural emergency management or wine industry resilience.

**Collaborative standard development**: Create a formal mechanism for CDEM Groups to participate in standards development, ensuring practical implementation considerations are incorporated from the outset.

Any option selected should balance the need for consistency with the principle of subsidiarity, recognising that emergency management is most effective when decisions are made at the lowest appropriate level.

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## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description regarding the limited mandate to intervene and address performance issues. The document accurately identifies the constraints in the current legislation that limit the ability to address underperformance in emergency management responsibilities.

The description of the Director's powers to act on default is accurate but correctly identifies that these powers only apply when functions have not been carried out, rather than when they have been performed poorly. This creates a gap in the assurance framework.

The limited options for intervention outside a declared emergency or imminent threat accurately reflects the practical reality faced by emergency management authorities. This can result in performance issues being addressed only after they manifest during an actual emergency, rather than proactively.

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports Option 2 (provide the Director with the power to issue compliance orders) as the preferred approach, with limited support for Option 3 (expand Minister's powers of intervention) as a complementary measure for more severe situations.

**Benefits of Option 2**:

Creating a graduated intervention approach before issues become critical;

Providing a formal mechanism to address identified performance concerns;

Establishing clearer expectations for performance improvements;

Enabling early intervention before emergency events test capabilities; and

Creating appropriate tension for continuous improvement (as long as CDEM Groups are resourced to improve and comply with direction).

**Implementation considerations**:

Need for clear criteria and thresholds for issuing compliance orders;

Appropriate appeal mechanisms to ensure procedural fairness;

Supporting guidance on performance expectations and improvement pathways; and

Resource implications for both NEMA and local authorities in compliance activities;

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The provision of compliance orders would create an important middle ground between informal influence and full intervention, addressing a significant gap in the current framework while maintaining appropriate autonomy for CDEM Groups.

Caution is strongly urged when considering Option 3 as it risks political interference in local operations where perhaps the mandate best sits at the national / Director level to influence improvement locally. In a well-developed assurance system, intervention would take place in Risk Reduction and Readiness stages rather than in Response or Recovery.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**Performance Improvement Framework**: Establishing a structured emergency management performance improvement framework with clear metrics, assessment processes, and improvement pathways before formal intervention becomes necessary.

**Capability Development Partnerships**: Creating provisions for mandatory capability development partnerships between high-performing and underperforming entities as an intermediate step before formal intervention.

**Targeted Support Teams**: Establishing provisions for the Director to deploy targeted support teams to address specific capability gaps without full intervention. This should include being at the request of CDEM Groups where issues are self-identified and self-reported (ie asking for help).

**Conditional Funding Mechanisms**: Developing conditional funding approaches that link central government support to performance improvement requirements (ie use of a carrot rather than a stick to obtain better performance).

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management broadly agrees with the problem description regarding local hazard risk management. The document accurately identifies general gaps in the current approach to hazard risk management at the local level, and the risk of inconsistent integration of CDEM Group plans with other planning instruments.

The description correctly identifies the ambiguity around what constitutes an "acceptable" level of risk and how this should be determined. This creates challenges for consistent decision-making and resource allocation across different hazards and communities.

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However, in Marlborough's situation as a unitary authority, we are better placed to integrate risk management across council functions and therefore have less of an issue than other CDEM Groups with multiple local councils.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports a combined approach of Options 2 (clearer guidance on "acceptable" risk) and limited support for Option 4 (form and content of CDEM Group plans prescribed through secondary legislation).

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

A balance between regional flexibility and national consistency in CDEM Group plans likely involves mandating consistent structure, methodology and core content while enabling regional adaptation in risk priorities, mitigation approaches, and implementation strategies.

**Elements requiring national consistency should include:**

Plan structure and section headings to facilitate cross-regional comparison

Risk assessment methodologies and terminology

Minimum content requirements for each hazard type

Performance measurement frameworks and reporting

Core capability requirements and standards

Integration requirements with other planning instruments

**Areas warranting regional flexibility include:**

Hazard prioritisation based on local risk profiles

Detailed operational arrangements reflecting local government structures

Community engagement approaches suited to regional demographics

Implementation phasing based on regional capabilities (including resourcing) and priorities

Governance arrangements reflecting regional preferences

For Marlborough as a unitary authority, this balanced approach would provide valuable national guidance while preserving the ability to address unique regional challenges such as our isolated communities, maritime risks, and specific hazard profile.

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**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

**Misaligned Planning Cycles**: Different statutory timeframes for various planning instruments (Long Term Plans, District Plans, CDEM Group Plans) create situations where integration opportunities can be missed due to timing mismatches.

**Diverse Governance Oversight**: Different committees and governance structures oversee various planning instruments, creating silos in decision-making and limited cross-plan consideration or integration.

**Varied Planning Horizons**: CDEM Group plans typically focus on shorter strategic timeframes while instruments like District Plans and infrastructure strategies have much longer horizons.

**Limited Explicit Integration Requirements**: Current legislation provides inadequate direction on how different planning instruments should reference and align with each other.

**Resource Constraints**: Limited planning resources, particularly in smaller councils, force prioritisation of statutory compliance over cross-plan integration.

**Specialist Knowledge Barriers**: Emergency management specialists and other planning professionals can have different technical languages and conceptual frameworks, hampering effective collaboration.

**Different Statutory Tests**: Various planning instruments operate under different statutory frameworks with distinct legal tests and requirements that can create competing priorities.

**Information Accessibility Challenges**: Risk information is often not formatted or presented in ways that make it readily usable in other planning contexts.

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**Integrated Risk Management Framework**: Developing a statutory integrated risk management framework that explicitly connects hazard risk management across all relevant legislation (RMA, LGA, CDEM Act) with consistent terminology and assessment approaches.

**Regional Risk Registers**: Establishing mandated regional risk registers that provide a single authoritative source of hazard information for use across all planning instruments.

**Cross-Plan Risk Integration Requirements**: Creating explicit statutory requirements for consideration of identified risks in all relevant planning instruments with formal cross-referencing.

**Joint Risk Assessment Processes**: Implementing joint statutory risk assessment processes that simultaneously inform multiple planning instruments rather than conducting separate assessments for different purposes.

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**Risk Information Standards**: Developing mandatory standards for risk information collection, management, and sharing to ensure consistency and accessibility across planning contexts.

**Regional Hazard Coordination Roles**: Establishing dedicated regional hazard coordination positions with explicit mandate to ensure integration across planning instruments.

**Community Risk Communication Framework**: Creating a standardised approach to communicating risk information to communities that is consistent across all planning contexts.

**Risk Management Performance Metrics**: Implementing a national framework for measuring and reporting on risk management performance that applies across all relevant legislation.

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Legislative Fragmentation**: The current fragmentation of hazard risk management responsibilities across multiple legislative frameworks (CDEM Act, RMA, LGA, Building Act) creates inherent coordination challenges that could be better addressed with a more fundamental integration.

**Capability and Capacity Constraints**: Some local authorities may lack the specialised technical capability and capacity to effectively manage the full spectrum of hazard risks. More fundamental changes to capability development and support are needed.

**Climate Change Integration**: The intensifying impacts of climate change fundamentally alter hazard risk profiles in ways that current frameworks are not yet designed to address, requiring more integrated approaches to adaptation and risk management.

**Risk Tolerance Determination**: Current processes for determining acceptable levels of risk lack sufficient community input and transparency, raising questions about equity and intergenerational impacts that require more fundamental reconsideration.

**Financial Sustainability**: The increasing cost of managing hazard risks, particularly for smaller councils with limited rating bases, is becoming unsustainable under current funding models. If improved assurance is sought through improved risk management then alternative funding streams are required if equity across local governments and districts / regions is to be achieved.

**Cross-Boundary Challenges**: Many hazards transcend local authority boundaries, creating coordination challenges that cannot be fully resolved within the current framework.

**Recovery-Risk Reduction Disconnect**: There may be insufficient connection between recovery experiences and risk reduction activities, with limited mechanisms to ensure lessons from recovery inform future risk management.

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## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description regarding consideration of taonga Māori and cultural heritage. The document accurately identifies the limited levers in the current legislation to ensure appropriate consideration of cultural heritage during emergencies.

The description correctly highlights how loss of cultural heritage can compound the negative effects of emergencies on communities and individuals. Marlborough's experience working with Te Tauihu iwi confirms that cultural heritage provides important continuity and comfort during disruptive events.

The recognition of the proactive role cultural heritage can play in building community resilience aligns with Marlborough's observations during recovery from significant events. Cultural practices and connections to place have been important factors in community recovery and adaptation.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports a flexible approach that builds upon existing relationships rather than prescriptive requirements. While Option 3 (strengthen planning expectations through secondary legislation) offers structure, we believe a modified version of Option 2 (develop guidance) would better serve communities with established iwi relationships.

**Our preferred approach would:**

Use guidance and frameworks as enablers rather than compliance tools

Recognise and support existing effective relationship models

Provide national guidance while allowing for regionally appropriate implementation

Build upon the foundation of collaboration already established with Te Tauihu iwi

Marlborough District Council continues to develop productive working relationships with Te Tauihu iwi. These relationships have evolved organically and reflect local context

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and preferences. Overly prescriptive legislative requirements risk disrupting these established channels of communication and cooperation.

**Benefits of a flexible guidance-based approach:**

Leveraging existing relationship strengths rather than imposing standardized processes

Allowing practices to evolve based on partnership principles rather than compliance requirements

Enabling locally appropriate implementation of cultural heritage protection

Supporting different engagement models preferred by different iwi

Recognizing that relationship quality is more important than structural mandates

**Implementation considerations:**

Providing frameworks that support relationship development in regions without established connections

Ensuring guidance is developed with meaningful iwi input at the national level

Creating resources to support capability development in cultural heritage protection

Establishing flexible evaluation measures that recognize different successful approaches

For Marlborough, with its established working relationships with Te Tauihu iwi, this approach would enhance cultural heritage protection while honouring and strengthening existing partnership models.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management proposes additional considerations within the options that emphasise flexible, relationship-based approaches to cultural heritage protection:

**Partnership-Based Planning Model**: Develop a framework that supports co-designed approaches to cultural heritage protection based on existing relationship models. This would enable regions like Marlborough to formalise current effective practices while allowing other regions to establish appropriate engagement mechanisms suited to their context.

**Cultural Heritage Knowledge Exchange**: Facilitate knowledge exchange between emergency management practitioners and cultural heritage experts, including mātauranga Māori specialists. This would build capability while respecting different knowledge systems, acknowledging it may compete with existing resources and priorities unless more resource is forthcoming.

**Capacity Support Framework**: Create a mechanism for supporting iwi to develop their emergency management capability through training, resources, and technical support, rather than focusing solely on participation in formal structures.

**Flexible Integration Options**: Provide multiple pathways for integrating cultural heritage considerations into emergency management planning, allowing regions to select approaches that align with established governance arrangements and relationship models.

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## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description regarding the consideration of animals during and after emergencies. The document accurately captures the gaps in the current legislative framework for addressing animal welfare in emergency situations.

The description of how animal welfare affects human welfare is particularly relevant to Marlborough's rural communities, where livelihoods and emotional wellbeing are closely tied to animals. During recent flooding events, concerns about livestock and companion animals significantly influenced evacuation compliance and recovery priorities for affected residents. This issue was also raised recently during Group Plan public consultation in terms of decision making in response risking worse outcomes.

The discussion document correctly identifies the current lack of formal levers to ensure animal considerations are appropriately integrated into emergency management planning. While Marlborough has developed working relationships with animal welfare organisations, these arrangements lack the formal structure that would enhance consistency and effectiveness.

However, the problem description risks not fully acknowledge the operational complexity for rural areas like Marlborough where livestock management during emergencies involves significant resource implications across far-reaching hazard impacts (eg widespread flooding). The framing might therefore oversimplify the practical challenges of animal management during emergencies, particularly with consideration to the grey area between spontaneous self-organisation of rural communities and the farming sector versus organised CDEM coordination.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports Option 3 (strengthen planning expectations through secondary legislation) as the preferred approach, with elements of Option 2 (develop guidance) to support implementation. We are not opposed to Option 4.

**Benefits of Option 3:**

Creating enforceable requirements for animal welfare consideration in emergency planning

Ensuring consistent approaches to animal welfare across regions

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Providing clear expectations for animal owners and emergency managers

Supporting more effective evacuation planning and compliance

Reducing spontaneous re-entry to evacuation zones

Facilitating better coordination with animal welfare organisations

**Implementation considerations:**

Need for guidance on managing different animal categories (pets, livestock, wildlife)

Resource implications for expanded planning scope

Training requirements for emergency personnel

Balance between prescription and flexibility for regional circumstances and competing priorities with limited resources.

For Marlborough's diverse animal welfare considerations—from extensive livestock operations to aquaculture, companion animals, and significant wildlife—this approach would create an improved structure for enhancing current efforts while allowing appropriate regional tailoring to match the diversity of needs across our district.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

This is a fraught question that is challenging to answer if we consider all aspects of contribution to human wellbeing (including protection of property, economic enablers, and other socio-cultural considerations that might not be immediately apparent or clear).

Marlborough Emergency Management recognises the importance of animal welfare but it can not be considered in "black and white" outside the complexity of hazard impacts across the four environments (Economic, Natural, Built, Social).

We submit the following considerations, without explicitly prioritising animal welfare above other competing response needs:

**Evacuation Effectiveness**: Prioritising animal welfare planning enhances human evacuation compliance, as people are more likely to evacuate when they know their animals are being considered, thereby supporting the primary goal of human life safety.

**Economic Recovery Implications**: In Marlborough's rural economy, livestock and aquaculture animals represent significant economic assets and livelihood foundations. Their protection directly supports economic recovery and community wellbeing.

**Resource Allocation Reality**: Animal welfare considerations cannot be completely separated from property protection, as they often require similar resources and approaches. Integrated planning is more effective than artificial separation.

**Psychological Recovery Support**: Protecting animals, particularly companion animals, supports psychological recovery for affected communities, reducing long-term welfare needs and supporting community resilience.

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**Practical Implementation Sequencing**: In many emergency scenarios, animal protection measures must be implemented earlier than general property protection measures due to mobility and welfare requirements.

A prioritisation framework should recognise different categories of animals (endangered wildlife, livestock, companion animals) and allow for context-appropriate decision-making rather than establishing rigid hierarchies. Animal welfare should be integrated as a core consideration in emergency management rather than treated as an optional add-on.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**Emergency Animal Welfare Fund**: Establishing a dedicated fund for animal welfare operations during emergencies with streamlined activation processes.

**Animal Emergency Response Teams**: Creating provisions for trained animal emergency response teams that can be deployed during emergencies, potentially through a national coordination mechanism.

**Animal Evacuation Zone Designations**: Developing a framework for animal-specific evacuation zone designations that could be implemented in parallel with human evacuation orders.

**Mobile Animal Emergency Units**: Investing in mobile animal emergency response units for deployment to affected areas, particularly for regions with significant animal populations.

**Animal Owner Preparedness Requirements**: Establishing clearer expectations and guidance for animal owners regarding their emergency preparedness responsibilities.

**Animal Welfare Coordinator Role**: Creating a statutory animal welfare coordinator position within emergency management structures with defined responsibilities and authorities.

**Cross-Agency Protocol Development**: Mandating the development of specific arrangements between emergency management agencies and animal welfare organisations for seamless coordination during emergencies.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

**Professional Standards Framework**: There is currently no comprehensive professional standards framework for emergency management practitioners, creating inconsistent capability across regions. A national professional standards framework with appropriate certification requirements would elevate overall system capability, although this would come with the burden of time to achieve and maintain competency which would challenge affordability for Marlborough Emergency Management.

**Exercising and Testing Requirements**: Current exercise and testing requirements lack specificity and enforcement mechanisms, resulting in varied commitment to capability

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validation. More structured requirements with appropriate assurance mechanisms would enhance readiness. Again though, this demands a higher level of investment which may not be forthcoming locally or nationally.

**Public Education Standardisation**: Approaches to public education vary significantly across regions, creating inconsistent public preparedness. National standards for public education content, delivery, and evaluation would improve community resilience. However, a degree of flexibility remains desirable to meet the nuances of local communities and ways of working.

**Knowledge Management Systems**: There are inadequate systems for capturing and sharing lessons from emergency events, resulting in repeated mistakes. Standardised knowledge management approaches would support continuous improvement.

**Volunteer Management Standards**: Current approaches to volunteer management lack consistency, creating potential liability and effectiveness issues. National standards for volunteer management would enhance this critical capability.

**Post-Event Analysis Requirements**: There are limited requirements for structured post-event analysis, reducing accountability for performance improvement. Mandatory post-event analysis with standardised methodologies would drive system improvement.

**Psychosocial Support Integration**: Current emergency management standards inadequately address psychosocial support requirements, despite their critical role in effective response and recovery. Enhanced standards in this area would improve overall outcomes. This includes Emergency Management staff and volunteers as well as people out in our communities.

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management strongly agrees with the problem description regarding the narrow definition of "lifeline utility" in the CDEM Act. The current definition no longer reflects the full range of infrastructure services essential to community functioning and emergency response in contemporary New Zealand.

The discussion document accurately identifies how technological changes have altered service delivery methods and created new dependencies not captured in Schedule 1 of the Act.

The observation regarding digital services is particularly relevant to Marlborough, where geographic isolation makes digital connectivity critical for both routine operations and emergency response. The current definition fails to account for the central role these services now play in coordinating emergency responses and enabling community resilience.

Comprehensive emergency management planning requires the participation of all entities providing essential services - the current narrow definition creates significant blind spots in planning and coordination.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports Option 3 (replacing the lifeline utilities framework with a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure") as the preferred approach, with Option 2 as a potential interim step.

**Benefits of Option 3:**

Creating a future-proofed framework that can accommodate emerging essential services without requiring legislative amendments

Establishing clear criteria for what constitutes an essential service, improving planning clarity

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Ensuring comprehensive coverage of interdependent services that together create community resilience

Enabling more effective emergency coordination by bringing all essential infrastructure providers under consistent obligations

**Implementation considerations:**

Transition costs for newly designated entities should be considered and allowed for over time

A phased implementation approach could minimise compliance burdens, particularly for smaller providers

Clear guidance would be required to ensure consistent application of the principles-based definition

Potential designation levels or tiers could be established based on criticality of service and provider capacity

The main risk of maintaining the status quo is continued inadequate coordination and planning with providers of essential services not currently captured in Schedule 1. For Marlborough, with its distributed population centres and vulnerable transport connections, comprehensive essential service planning is particularly critical.

Option 2 (adding specific additional entities) would address immediate gaps but would require ongoing amendments as technology and service delivery models evolve.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Rural telecommunications services** - Many providers serving rural Marlborough communities fall outside current telecommunications definitions but provide critical connectivity services, particularly during emergencies. These include smaller wireless internet service providers that are often the only connection option for remote communities.

**Primary food production and processing infrastructure** - As a major food-producing region, Marlborough's primary sector infrastructure (including irrigation networks, cool stores, and processing facilities) represents critical infrastructure for both regional and national food security.

**Regional ports and marine infrastructure** - While major ports are listed, smaller regional ports and marine infrastructure are vital for emergency response in coastal communities like Picton, Havelock and the Marlborough Sounds, particularly when road access is compromised. A recent example of this is the development of the Torea bay boat ramp and jetty which is a marine access enabler for remote communities.

**Community pharmacies and medical supply chains** - These provide essential medical services and are critical for continuity of care during emergencies, particularly for managing chronic conditions when hospital services are under pressure.

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**Commercial accommodation providers** - These facilities frequently serve as informal welfare infrastructure during emergencies and should be considered essential infrastructure for effective response.

**Critical government service delivery points** - Physical service centres for agencies like MSD, IRD and local councils provide essential services, particularly to vulnerable populations who may lack digital access.

Regarding potential exclusions, Marlborough Emergency Management recommends a tiered approach rather than complete exclusions, with obligations scaled according to size, criticality, and provider capacity.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

For the additional essential services identified, Marlborough Emergency Management suggests the following infrastructure components should be included:

**Rural telecommunications services:**

- Independent wireless internet transmission towers and equipment
- Community internet access points in rural community facilities
- Rural broadband infrastructure not operated by major telcos
- Local community communications networks (including VHF radio networks)

**Primary food production and processing infrastructure:**

- Water storage and irrigation network control systems
- Cool stores and processing facilities for perishable produce
- Supply chain infrastructure for agricultural inputs
- Food processing facilities with regional significance
- Wine production and storage facilities vital to Marlborough's economy

**Regional ports and marine infrastructure:**

- Small-to-medium port facilities not currently designated
- Marine refuelling infrastructure
- Wharf and jetty facilities in isolated communities
- Marine navigation infrastructure
- Emergency vessel berthing facilities

**Community pharmacies and medical supply chains:**

- Pharmacy premises and distribution networks
- Cold chain equipment for medical supplies
- Medical oxygen supply and distribution systems
- Systems for medication management during disruptions

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**Commercial accommodation providers:**

- Hotels, motels and camping grounds with capacity to accommodate displaced people
- Facilities with emergency power generation capability
- Commercial kitchens capable of mass catering

**Critical government service delivery points:**

- Local government service centres
- Community hubs providing multiple government services
- Service centres providing financial support and welfare services
- Mobile service delivery infrastructure

Each category should be assessed against the principles-based definition to determine application of requirements, with designation potentially limited to providers meeting specific capacity or regional significance thresholds.

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management proposes several additional options for addressing the narrow definition of "lifeline utility":

**Tiered Classification System**: Developing a tiered system of essential infrastructure classification with graduated obligations based on scale, criticality, and capability. This would allow smaller providers to be included without imposing disproportionate requirements.

**Regional Designation Mechanism**: Creating provisions for regionally-significant infrastructure to be designated as essential by CDEM Groups based on local risk profiles and dependencies, supplementing national designations.

**Service-Based Definition Approach**: Moving from provider-based to service-based definitions, focusing on the essentiality of the service rather than the characteristics of the provider. This would capture all entities delivering specific essential services regardless of their size or structure.

**Functional Grouping Framework**: Establishing functional categories of essential services with specific requirements for each category, enabling more targeted and appropriate obligations than the current one-size-fits-all approach.

**Critical Customer Designation**: Creating a framework for identifying and designating critical customers of essential services with specific planning requirements to manage interdependencies.

**Cross-Sectoral Resilience Standards**: Developing resilience standards that apply across sectors based on service characteristics rather than provider types, creating more consistent outcomes without expanding the lifeline utility definition.

**Network Criticality Assessment**: Implementing a methodology for identifying critical nodes within service networks regardless of provider status, enabling targeted resilience enhancements at key vulnerability points.

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These options would address the limitations of the current approach while creating appropriate flexibility for regional circumstances and evolving service delivery models.

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management generally agrees with the problem description regarding lifeline utility business continuity planning. However, the problem description may not adequately acknowledge the challenges faced by smaller utilities in meeting increasingly demanding business continuity requirements. This could be particularly relevant for utilities serving more remote or smaller communities.

The document accurately identifies the limitations in the current framework for ensuring adequate business continuity planning among lifeline utilities.

The document correctly identifies the limited ability of the Director to set expectations or monitor performance in business continuity planning. While lifeline utilities generally make good-faith efforts in this area, the quality and comprehensiveness of plans varies considerably without clear standards or oversight.

The observation regarding the Director's monitoring function is particularly relevant. In Marlborough's experience working with lifeline utilities, the absence of structured monitoring or standardised expectations creates challenges for coordinated planning at the regional level.

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports a balanced approach that combines elements of Option 2 (increase assurance) with limited aspects of Option 3 (detailed requirements through regulations), while expressing caution about financial penalties.

While we recognise the need for improved business continuity planning among lifeline utilities, we have significant concerns about the potential impacts of a penalty-focused enforcement regime:

**Concerns with penalties-based approaches:**

May foster compliance-focused planning rather than genuine resilience improvement

Could create adversarial relationships that undermine collaborative emergency management

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Risk of utilities prioritizing penalty avoidance over effective operational planning

Potential for disproportionate impacts on smaller utilities serving critical community needs

Likely to result in increased costs passed on to consumers, particularly in regions like Marlborough with smaller customer bases across which to distribute compliance costs

**Consumer impact considerations:**

Regulatory compliance costs would inevitably be passed to customers through higher utility charges

For Marlborough's communities, particularly those in rural areas with limited service options, these increased costs could be significant and should be taken into account in the current national economic context

Small providers serving critical needs in remote communities might find comprehensive requirements prohibitively expensive, potentially threatening service viability

The benefits of enhanced planning must be carefully balanced against affordability impacts

**Preferred approach:** Marlborough Emergency Management supports a graduated, risk-based approach that:

Establishes clear expectations through guidance and standards (elements of Option 2)

Implements targeted regulatory requirements for critical infrastructure components (limited aspects of Option 3)

Prioritises capability development and support over punitive enforcement

Scales requirements based on utility size, criticality, and community impact

Focuses on outcome standards rather than prescriptive process requirements

Considers regional context and existing regulatory obligations

This approach would enhance business continuity planning while minimising unnecessary compliance burdens and consumer impacts. It recognises that effective planning emerges from capability and commitment rather than penalty avoidance, particularly in regions like Marlborough where strong relationships between emergency management and lifeline utilities have already been established.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**Maturity Model Approach**: Implementing a business continuity planning maturity model with staged implementation requirements based on utility size, capability, and criticality.

**Peer Review Mechanism**: Establishing a formal peer review process for business continuity plans within sectors to leverage industry expertise and promote knowledge sharing, acknowledging commercial sensitivities may preclude this.

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**Scenario Testing Requirements**: Mandating specific scenario testing requirements for business continuity plans with standardised reporting on outcomes and improvement actions.

**Regional Coordination Requirements**: Creating specific obligations for participating in regional business continuity coordination activities beyond current planning consultation requirements.

**Risk Transparency Framework**: Implementing requirements for transparent reporting of business continuity maturity to customers and stakeholders, creating market incentives for improvement.

**Compliance Incentive Programme**: Developing positive incentives like priority assistance during emergencies for utilities demonstrating excellence in business continuity planning.

### Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description regarding barriers to cooperation and information sharing. The document accurately identifies the challenges in coordinating effectively across lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

The description of pre-existing relationship gaps aligns with Marlborough's experience, where the effectiveness of coordination during emergencies is significantly influenced by the quality of relationships established during readiness. The variability in these relationships creates inconsistent outcomes during response and recovery.

The document correctly identifies information sharing barriers related to commercial and other sensitivities. In Marlborough's work with lifeline utilities, concerns about information use and potential competition issues have sometimes limited the transparency needed for effective coordination.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports Option 5 (strengthen information sharing protections) as the primary approach, complemented by Option 2 (strengthen assurance and develop standards) to provide structure and guidance. We are not opposed to Option 6 although there may be softer options that strike the right balance between compliance, flexibility and ongoing adaptation of data standards.

**Benefits of Option 5:**

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Removing a significant barrier to information sharing during emergencies

Enhancing transparency about service disruptions and restoration timeframes

Supporting more effective coordination and resource prioritisation

Protecting commercial and security interests while enabling necessary information flow

Creating clearer expectations for all parties about information management

Reducing duplication in information requests through greater sharing

**Implementation considerations:**

Defining appropriate boundaries for protected information sharing

Developing clear procedures for handling sensitive information

Creating standardised information formats to enhance utility

Balancing protection with appropriate transparency for affected communities

Coordination with other regulatory frameworks governing information management

71. **Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

**Standardised Information Architecture**: Implementing consistent information standards, formats, and platforms used at all coordination levels to enable seamless information flow without translation or reformatting requirements.

**Nested Coordination Structures**: Designing coordination mechanisms that explicitly link local, regional, and national levels with clear role delineation, escalation pathways, and authority boundaries.

**Distributed Expertise Model**: Positioning subject matter experts at appropriate coordination levels with clear connectivity between levels, avoiding expertise concentration at any single level.

**Scaled Activation Framework**: Establishing triggers and procedures for scaling coordination from local to regional to national levels based on impact scope, complexity, and capacity considerations.

**Common Operating Picture**: Developing systems that enable a shared understanding of the emergency situation at all coordination levels while allowing appropriate filtering and focusing based on relevance.

**Collaborative Planning Requirement**: Mandating collaborative planning between coordination levels during readiness, establishing relationships and shared expectations before emergencies occur.

**Resource Prioritisation Framework**: Creating explicit frameworks for resource prioritisation decisions that span coordination levels, with clear decision authority and consultation requirements.

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**Multi-directional Communication Protocols**: Establishing communication arrangements that support both vertical communication between coordination levels and horizontal communication within each level.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description regarding central government business continuity. The document appropriately identifies the limitations in current arrangements for ensuring continuity of central government services during emergencies.

The observation regarding the narrow definition of "government department" is particularly relevant. From a local government perspective, the artificial distinction between core departments and other government entities creates coordination challenges during emergencies when services from various government organisations are required.

The recognition that emergency events may themselves increase demand for government services aligns with operational experience. During significant events affecting Marlborough, demand for government services often increases precisely when delivery capacity is compromised.

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports Option 3 (apply emergency management planning obligations to a wider range of government organisations) as the preferred approach, potentially complemented by elements of Option 2 (enhanced guidance and monitoring).

**Benefits of Option 3:**

Creating consistent obligations across all entities providing essential government services

Proactively Released

Closing significant gaps in current business continuity arrangements

Supporting more integrated planning for service maintenance during emergencies

Enhancing coordination between central and local government during disruptions

Providing clearer expectations for communities about service continuity

**Implementation considerations:**

Need for appropriate definition of entities covered by expanded obligations

Potential resource implications for smaller government entities

Importance of guidance and support to enable compliance

Coordination requirements between central and local government planning

Transition periods to enable capability development

For Marlborough's communities, enhanced business continuity planning across all government services would hopefully provide greater certainty about support during emergencies and more effective coordination between central and local government response efforts.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**Regional Service Continuity Coordination**: Establishing regional coordination mechanisms for government service continuity that align with CDEM Group boundaries and planning.

**Critical Function Identification Framework**: Developing a standardised approach to identifying and prioritising critical government functions that must be maintained during emergencies.

**Service Dependency Mapping**: Implementing requirements for mapping dependencies between government services to identify cascade failure risks and mitigation strategies.

**Cross-Agency Backup Arrangements**: Creating frameworks for cross-agency backup and mutual support arrangements that enable continuity through resource sharing.

**Distributed Service Delivery Models**: Developing requirements for distributed service delivery capabilities that reduce vulnerability to localised disruptions.

**Community Service Hubs**: Establishing provisions for integrated government service hubs that can be activated during emergencies to maintain essential services through shared facilities and resources.

**Digital Resilience Standards**: Implementing specific digital resilience standards for government services to enhance continuity in increasingly digital service delivery environments.

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

**Restoration Prioritisation Frameworks**: There is currently no consistent framework for prioritising service restoration across different essential services and geographical areas. This creates potential for inequitable outcomes and inefficient resource allocation during recovery. A standardised approach to restoration prioritisation would enhance recovery effectiveness.

**Cross-Border Service Governance**: Services that cross regional boundaries face governance challenges during emergencies, with potential for conflicting priorities from different CDEM Groups. Enhanced coordination mechanisms for cross-boundary services would address this gap.

**Community Service Expectations Management**: Current approaches inadequately address the challenge of managing community expectations about service restoration. More structured approaches to communicating with affected communities about realistic timeframes would improve public confidence.

**Rural Service Resilience**: The specific challenges facing essential services in rural areas receive insufficient attention in current arrangements. Rural / remote communities can experience disproportionate impacts from service disruptions due to limited redundancy and challenging geography.

**Service Provider Scale Disparity**: The vastly different scales of essential service providers create challenges for consistent application of resilience expectations. Large providers have significantly different capabilities than small providers serving critical community needs.

**Last-Mile Service Delivery**: Current frameworks focus primarily on core infrastructure rather than end-user service delivery points. Enhanced consideration of "last-mile" delivery would strengthen community outcomes during disruptions.

**Technical Skills Availability**: Many essential services depend on specialised technical skills that may be in limited supply during widespread emergencies. Workforce planning for critical technical capabilities would enhance service restoration capacity.

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description regarding managing access to restricted areas. The document accurately captures the practical challenges associated with cordons during emergency events. In Marlborough's context, we also face access control / exclusion challenges due to our significant coastline and spread of primary industry, tourism, resident and holiday home infrastructure throughout the Marlborough sounds.

The description of varying cordon types and purposes aligns with Marlborough's operational experience, where different types of access restrictions are needed for different hazard scenarios. The need for flexibility in cordon management while maintaining public safety is a constant operational challenge.

The document correctly identifies issues with access authorisation processes, particularly the resource-intensive nature of case-by-case assessments during active emergencies. During Marlborough's 2021 flooding event, significant operational capacity was dedicated to managing access requests when resources were already stretched.

The tension between safety imperatives and legitimate access needs is well articulated. In Marlborough's experience, this balance is particularly challenging in rural areas where property owners have legitimate needs to access isolated properties to manage livestock welfare or prevent additional loss or worse outcomes.

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports Option 2 (strengthening restricted area access provisions) as the preferred approach, with elements of Option 3 (enabling advance determination of access authorisation) to enhance efficiency.

**Benefits of Option 2:**

Providing clearer legal frameworks for establishing different types of cordons

Creating more consistent approaches to access management

Enhancing enforceability of access restrictions when necessary

Supporting more efficient operational decision-making during emergencies

Reducing potential for conflict at cordon points through clearer authorities

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**Implementation considerations:**

Need for practical guidance on implementing graduated access restrictions

Training requirements for personnel managing cordons

Systems for documenting and communicating access decisions

Balancing safety imperatives with legitimate access needs

Resource implications for administering more complex access management systems

For Marlborough, with its distributed population and challenging geography, enhanced cordon management provisions would significantly improve operational effectiveness during events like flooding, fire, and earthquake response. However, real-world implementation will still rely on a high-trust model with our communities along with improved resourcing to give effect to cordons to achieve the desired outcomes.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description regarding the use of emergency powers at the local level. The document accurately identifies the ambiguity in current arrangements for exercising emergency powers by Local Controllers.

The document correctly identifies issues related to Controller appointment and accountability.

The relationship between Controllers and elected officials is well articulated. This relationship requires careful management to balance democratic oversight with operational independence, particularly when implementing measures that may be publicly controversial but operationally necessary.

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**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports Option 2 (clarify Controller powers and responsibilities) as the most effective approach to address the current ambiguity around emergency powers at the local level.

**Benefits of Option 2:**

Providing essential clarity about Controller authority and accountability

Reducing potential for confusion during critical emergency operations

Creating consistent understanding across different agencies and stakeholders

Supporting more confident decision-making during emergency situations

Enhancing operational effectiveness by removing procedural uncertainties

Improving training and capability development through clearer role definitions

**Implementation considerations:**

Need for clear guidance materials to support transition to clarified arrangements

Training requirements to ensure Controllers understand their authorities and limitations

Appropriate communication with elected officials about revised role definitions

Ensuring clarity about transition arrangements between local and Group levels

From Marlborough's perspective as a unitary authority, clearer delineation of Controller powers would enhance operational effectiveness while maintaining appropriate governance oversight. Our current Controller arrangements would benefit from greater legislative clarity regarding powers and accountabilities, particularly when managing complex emergencies requiring coordination across multiple functions within our unitary structure.

Option 1 (status quo) is inadequate as it perpetuates existing confusion that can hamper effective emergency response. The ambiguity in current arrangements creates potential for delayed decision-making and confusion during critical operations.

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description regarding the declaration process. The document accurately identifies the practical challenges created by requiring physical signatures on declaration documents.

The description of potential delays caused by signature requirements aligns with Marlborough's operational experience, where geographical constraints can make it difficult to obtain physical signatures rapidly, particularly during after-hours emergencies or when key personnel are in remote locations.

The document correctly identifies the inconsistency between modern communication technologies and outdated legislative requirements. Marlborough has developed workaround solutions for these challenges, but these lack the clear legislative foundation that would support operational confidence during critical decision periods.

The observation regarding transition periods is particularly relevant. In Marlborough's recovery experiences, the same signature constraints can create unnecessary administrative barriers to implementing appropriate transition arrangements.

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management strongly supports Option 2 (modernise the declaration process) as the preferred approach. This option directly addresses the practical challenges with the current requirements while maintaining appropriate governance oversight. Option three is also supported for use in-extremis (eg no communication services are available beyond say satellite phone, or radio use).

**Benefits of Option 2:**

Reducing potential delays in implementing necessary emergency powers

Aligning declaration processes with modern communication technologies

Enhancing operational effectiveness, particularly during rapidly evolving situations

Enabling appropriate declaration decisions regardless of decision-maker location

Supporting more efficient administrative processes during high-pressure situations

Maintaining appropriate documentary evidence through electronic means

**Implementation considerations:**

Need for secure and reliable electronic authentication methods

Clear procedures for verifying and recording electronic declarations

Transitional guidance for authorities implementing new processes

Public communication about the validity of electronic declarations

Backup systems for scenarios where digital communications are compromised

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For Marlborough, with its challenging geography, widespread communities, and vulnerability to isolation during emergency events, modernised declaration processes would significantly enhance operational responsiveness while reducing administrative barriers.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

**Conditional Pre-authorisation**: Creating provisions for conditional pre-authorisation of declarations based on specific trigger thresholds, requiring only confirmation rather than full authorisation processes.

**Staged Declaration System**: Developing a staged declaration system with streamlined processes for initial urgent declarations and more comprehensive requirements for extensions.

**Public Notification Modernisation**: Updating public notification requirements to better align with contemporary communication channels while ensuring appropriate accessibility.

**Declaration Decision Support Framework**: Creating standardised decision support tools for declaration decisions to enhance consistency and confidence in declaration processes.

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management agrees with the problem description regarding mayors' role in emergency declarations. The document accurately identifies the ambiguity in the current legislative framework regarding mayoral declaration authority, although notes that arrangements can be clarified in the CDEM Group Plan.

The description of inconsistent interpretation of mayoral powers aligns with observed variations in practice across different local authorities. While Marlborough has established clear local protocols, the lack of explicit legislative direction creates potential for uncertainty with arrangements in other regions that are non-unitary.

The document correctly identifies the tension between democratic representation and operational decision-making. The role of elected officials in emergency management requires careful balance between providing community leadership and enabling timely operational decisions based on technical advice.

The observation regarding potential delays in multi-authority declarations is particularly relevant. In regions with multiple territorial authorities, coordination of declaration decisions can create administrative complexity during time-critical situations.

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**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Marlborough Emergency Management supports Option 2 (make explicit that mayors have primary responsibility to declare a local state of emergency) as the preferred approach. This option provides clarity while maintaining appropriate mayoral authority as the community's elected representative.

**Benefits of Option 2:**

Providing clear legislative authority for current practice in many areas

Enhancing decision-making confidence during time-critical situations

Supporting mayoral leadership role during community emergencies

Reducing potential for procedural questions during emergency situations

Maintaining appropriate democratic oversight of emergency powers

Aligning authority with public expectations of mayoral leadership

**Implementation considerations include:**

Need for appropriate mayoral training in declaration considerations

Clear advisory mechanisms to support informed declaration decisions

Protocols for consultation with emergency management professionals

Considerations for deputy mayors when mayors are unavailable

Guidance on coordinating declarations across local authority boundaries

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Insert response

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

While the draft legislation rightly emphasises the importance of enabling iwi Māori and community participation, it fails to adequately address the specific needs and participation of women, particularly in the context of disaster risk reduction and emergency management.

New Zealand has made clear commitments under international frameworks—including the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Convention on the Elimination

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of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Agreed Conclusions of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)—to ensure that a gender perspective is integrated across all disaster and emergency management laws, policies, and practices. The Sendai Framework in particular calls for the empowerment of women and their participation in all phases of disaster risk governance.

It is therefore of concern that the discussion document does not propose measures to mainstream gender considerations within community engagement, needs assessment, or emergency planning. This omission risks perpetuating gender-blind responses that can have life-threatening implications, particularly for women in vulnerable situations.

A truly inclusive, intersectional approach must also consider the compounded vulnerabilities faced by women within ethnic and other marginalised communities. For example, during the 2023 weather events, public evacuation centres were not responsive to cultural or gender-specific needs—resulting in some women choosing to remain in unsafe homes rather than share mixed-gender sleeping quarters. Without explicit gender-segregated arrangements in emergency shelters, women (not only those from ethnic minorities) may face heightened risks of harm, including gender-based violence.

Recommendations:

1. Require that CDEM Group Plans and national-level emergency strategies include gender-sensitive assessments and planning provisions.
2. Explicitly require the Director and CDEM Groups to consult with women's organisations and gender experts, including representatives of ethnic minority women, during the planning process.
3. Mandate gender-disaggregated data collection to inform emergency planning and response.
4. Include minimum standards for gender-sensitive sheltering arrangements, including safe spaces for women and children.

Failure to address these issues would not only risk violating New Zealand's international obligations but also result in emergency responses that are less effective and potentially more harmful for half the population.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

In addition to the factors identified in the discussion document, gender is a significant and under-recognised factor contributing to the disproportionate impact of disasters on certain groups—particularly women, girls, and gender-diverse people.

Key gendered impacts may include:

1. Increased Risk of Gender-Based Violence (GBV):
   Evidence globally and in New Zealand shows that gender-based violence, including domestic and sexual violence, increases in the aftermath of disasters. This is often linked to heightened stress, breakdown of community networks,

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displacement, and the lack of safe and private spaces—particularly in emergency shelters. Without gender-sensitive planning, emergency responses risk exacerbating harm to already vulnerable groups.

2. Increased Unpaid Caring Responsibilities:
   When schools, early childhood centres, and health services are disrupted, unpaid care and domestic work—disproportionately undertaken by women—significantly increases. This not only adds to women's physical and emotional burdens but also restricts their participation in paid work, recovery activities, and decision-making processes.
3. Heightened Economic Insecurity and Unemployment:
   After disasters, women are more likely to lose employment and face longer-term economic hardship, particularly in informal and care-based sectors. Recovery policies often overlook these dynamics, focusing instead on infrastructure or traditionally male-dominated industries.

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**5. What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

- Gender-sensitive evacuation and shelter planning:

Ensure segregated sleeping areas, privacy, and safety in emergency shelters, alongside access to hygiene products and support services for survivors of violence.

- Inclusive needs assessments and planning processes:

Mandate the participation of women's organisations, gender experts, and caregivers in the development of CDEM Group Plans and recovery frameworks.

- Disaggregated data collection and monitoring:

Collect and analyse gender-disaggregated data to better understand and address how different population groups experience emergencies.

- Support for unpaid caregivers:

Include planning for rapid re-opening of schools and childcare as a recovery priority. Provide temporary childcare facilities at community hubs and evacuation centres.

- Economic recovery programs tailored for women:

Design recovery employment schemes that support women's re-entry into the workforce.

- GBV prevention and response mechanisms:

Integrate GBV risk mitigation into all emergency operations, including ensuring safe

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reporting mechanisms, trained staff in shelters, and coordination with specialist service providers.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The recognition of the crucial role communities play in all phases of emergency management is welcome. However, the discussion document does not appear to adequately consider gender within its approach to enabling community participation. enabling community participation should also involve ensuring that community-based services that women rely on—such as childcare centres, women's health services, and safe housing—are integrated into emergency preparedness and response plans.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Lesley Paris |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | The Hills Radio Trust/ Otago Access Radio (OAR) – A member station of the Community Access Media Alliance |

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The Hills Radio Trust / OAR is the Ōtepoti Dunedin-based member of **Community Access Media Alliance (CAMA)** and one of 12 independently operated, publicly funded stations across Aotearoa. While rooted in our local communities, CAMA stations share everyday infrastructure needs, a strong public interest mandate to facilitate media services **by, for, and about** underrepresented groups, and a proven capacity to support emergency communications.

Established over 40 years ago with the backing of UNESCO, Community Access Media as a sector was created to fill a critical democratic gap, serving diverse, minority, and underserved populations that are often excluded from mainstream media. These are the very communities most at risk of being left behind in an emergency, making CAMA's role in the emergency management system both unique and essential.

CAMA strongly supports the proposed objectives of the legislation, especially the focus on strengthening community participation and minimising disruption to essential services. However, to be effective, these objectives must **explicitly recognise Community Access Media Alliance as a critical partner in emergency communication**, given our sector's trusted role and public service function.

The Government's 2025 strategy, *Strengthening Disaster Resilience and Emergency Management*, highlights the importance of community engagement, transparent and inclusive communication, and integrating Māori perspectives. CAMA stations are uniquely equipped to deliver on all these priorities—broadcasting in over 50 languages, centring te reo Māori and Pasifika voices, and providing culturally attuned, localised information.

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To truly realise the Government's emergency management goals, **CAMA stations must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and integrated into statutory emergency planning frameworks**.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The description captures essential barriers. However, it could go further in highlighting how mainstream communication channels often fail to reach **multilingual, disabled, migrant, and Māori communities**, especially those who rely on **Community Access Media** for culturally relevant and accessible information.

CAMA stations produce over **4,000 hours of local content each month in more than 50 languages**, serving audiences who are traditionally hard to reach and who may be disproportionately affected during a crisis. For more information about our core services, see here: https://cama.nz/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/2024-Reach-your-audience-1.pdf

Globally, agencies such as UNESCO, ITU, and UNDP emphasise the value of community radio (what we refer to as Community Access Media) in disaster risk reduction. Specifically:

- UNESCO recognises community radio as a key actor in achieving the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction's goal of "understanding disaster risk" by providing locally relevant and culturally specific information.
- The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) highlights the reliability of analogue radio in crises, noting it remains accessible when digital or mobile infrastructure fails.
- The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) advocates for the inclusion of community radio in recovery and preparedness efforts, acknowledging their role in amplifying the voices of marginalised people and disseminating life-saving information.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Further factors include: Language and literacy barriers, disability, digital exclusion, isolation, and cultural mistrust of mainstream institutions. Community Access Media plays a critical

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role in overcoming these barriers by offering **trusted, localised multi-platform communication in the languages and formats that communities rely on.**

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the combined delivery of all four proposed options (a–d), particularly **options (c) and (d)**, which require both local and national emergency planning to be informed by the needs of communities that are disproportionately affected.

However, to ensure these needs are effectively met, we recommend the following:

- **CAMA stations must be formally recognised** as communication partners in both legislation and planning guidance.
- **Non-legislative guidance** (Option b) should include the role of Community Access Media and encourage their engagement by CDEM Groups.
- **Local planning requirements** (Option C) should mandate engagement with broadcasters who serve minority and vulnerable groups.

**National planning** (Option d) should involve direct consultation with CAMA as a representative of media providers serving these communities.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

- **Formal partnerships** with CAMA stations to co-design hyper-local emergency messaging.
- **Dedicated funding** for station infrastructure resilience and broadcast continuity.
- **Emergency broadcast testing** and drills in multiple languages and formats.
- **Multilingual Preparedness Messaging Campaigns** that reflect cultural nuances and hyper-local knowledge.

**Representation of CAMA stations** in emergency advisory groups at the local and national levels.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be formally recognised as essential multi-platform communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks. To align with the goals of the Emergency Management Bill, we recommend:

1. **Statutory recognition of Community Access Media** as part of New Zealand's essential communication infrastructure.
2. **Inclusion of CAMA stations in emergency planning and advisory groups** at local and regional levels.
3. **Translation and distribution of all public alerts and warnings** through Community Access Media channels.

**Dedicated funding for multilingual emergency preparedness campaigns**, using Community Access Media networks to amplify life-saving information.

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## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The description appropriately highlights gaps in recognising and resourcing iwi Māori contributions to emergency management. Māori communities are often early responders and offer essential cultural, environmental, and community knowledge.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Māori are deeply embedded in the social fabric of their regions, often providing shelter, food, spiritual support, and communications during emergencies. The role of marae, iwi radio, Māori networks, and, by extension, Community Access Media, in disaster response is significant and under-recognised in national frameworks.

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Recognising iwi Māori as equal partners in emergency governance and planning would improve trust and resilience. The benefits of acknowledging mātauranga Māori and existing networks outweigh any additional coordination costs.

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Formally acknowledge iwi as partners at governance levels, with co-design obligations embedded in legislation and supported through resourcing.

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

CDEM Groups should establish partnership agreements with local iwi and hapū, ensuring Māori representation in decision-making and communications planning.

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**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Formally embedding iwi into emergency governance is essential for upholding the Crown's obligations under Te Tiriti o Waitangi, particularly around equitable access to information and resources.

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Create a national Māori advisory board or panel with direct reporting lines to the Director. This panel should include representatives from iwi broadcasters and local marae who already lead community communication and care.

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that participation is uneven. Many community organisations already play key roles during emergencies but **lack formal pathways, protocols, or resourcing** to be effectively included. This is particularly true for the Community Access Media sector.

CAMA stations are regularly relied upon by local councils and national bodies during civil defence events. For example, **Radio Hawke's Bay** continued broadcasting during recent floods, even without backup power.

Yet, despite their clear value, CAMA stations are **not formally recognised outside of the current Memorandum of Understanding**, and **no dedicated funding exists** to support their emergency role. See CAMA's critical infrastructure case study and presentations for further information:

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**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

OAR strongly supports the proposals to:

- Develop formal arrangements with CAMA stations **before emergencies happen** (Option b).
- Require CDEM Groups to state how they will manage offers of help (Option C).

These would create opportunities for CAMA stations to be **included in emergency planning, with clear roles and expectations, and funding to address any additional capacity needs.**

Our preferred approach combines both non-legislative guidance and legislative requirements, so that stations are not only acknowledged in principle but also woven into planning frameworks.

CAMA also recommends:

- Formal recognition of CAMA stations as **emergency response stakeholders**, similar to existing lifeline utilities.

Mandated consultation with **Community Access Media** in preparedness and recovery strategies.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks. Specifically, OAR backs CAMA's recommendations for

- **Incentivising formal partnerships** between CDEM Groups and local CAMA stations to build shared protocols and ensure resilience.
- **Training emergency responders** to work effectively with Community Access Media as trusted communication partners.
- Establishing a framework that **designates CAMA stations as "approved providers of warnings and notifications"**, building on earlier iterations of the Emergency Management Bill and the current Memorandum of Understanding.
- **Providing readiness grants and capacity-building support** to CAMA stations for emergency infrastructure, backup systems, and multilingual broadcasting capability.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

The description correctly identifies that individuals and communities are frequently first responders during emergencies. However, the current legal, operational, and resourcing frameworks do not reflect this reality for all community actors.

Community Access Media (CAMA) stations often continue broadcasting vital information throughout emergencies, sometimes without backup power or formal emergency direction, placing them in a **grey area in terms of legal liability and eligibility for compensation**.

Simplifying legal frameworks and recognising media resilience as critical infrastructure would ensure stations can act swiftly without risk. This includes ensuring sites, studios, transmission infrastructure, and generators are fit for purpose and subsidised. Operational guidance and funding tailored to media infrastructure resilience should be prioritised.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Improving support for community responders, such as OAR and all CAMA stations, would ensure the faster and more trusted dissemination of life-saving information.

**Benefits:**
- Enhanced community resilience and faster recovery.
- Increased public trust and engagement.
- More equitable access to emergency messaging.

**Risks of inaction:**
- Communication breakdowns for culturally and linguistically diverse communities.
- Continued reliance on overloaded centralised systems.
- Legal uncertainty deterring community-led response efforts.

**Preferred options:**
- Extend **civil liability protection** to media organisations acting in good faith.
- Ensure CAMA stations are eligible for **compensation or reimbursement** for emergency-related broadcasting, especially when acting without direct instruction.
- Introduce **funding mechanisms and asset planning tools** to reflect the infrastructure needs of community media.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes.
- Establish **formal recognition** for emergency responders at Community Access Media stations. This would enable access to critical services, resources, and legal protections during emergency response and recovery phases.
- Develop **templates and technical guidance** for emergency broadcast continuity planning.
- Allocate **dedicated funding** for readiness, including translation and targeted outreach campaigns.

Explore a framework for designating CAMA stations as "**approved providers of warnings and notifications**" to support the national alerting system (in addition to and above the current Memorandum of Understanding).

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. There are still barriers to ensuring that Māori-led and community-led responders—like iwi media and CAMA stations—are integrated as strategic partners. This includes:

- **Formal inclusion in emergency planning frameworks**
- **Resourcing models** that enable the delivery of culturally grounded and locally responsive information
- **Trust-based engagement**, rather than ad hoc consultation.

Failing to recognise these entities as **core partners** risks excluding some of the most trusted and responsive actors in our emergency ecosystem.

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

CAMA stations regularly engage with Civil Defence during emergencies, but inconsistent clarity around who is in charge of communications, along with staff changes, creates challenges. Better direction, control, oversight and increased engagement at the operational level would support consistent messaging, coordination, and quicker responses

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support clearer delegation and communication protocols. The benefit would be improved timeliness and effectiveness of public messaging, especially via local broadcast networks

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Continue to include communication partners, such as CAMA stations, in decision trees and pre-scripted alert processes. Increase dedicated liaison and community engagement roles within CDEM Groups to ensure information flows effectively to local media, such as CAMA stations.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

More centralised coordination and community engagement, combined with clear local implementation pathways, would improve consistency and effectiveness. This includes recognising OAR and all CAMA stations as trusted partners that must be integrated into communication chains and emergency preparedness awareness campaigns.

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

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*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Confusion around responsibilities and staff changes among officials contributes to delays in community messaging and engagement. Clarifying these roles and increasing community engagement efforts will help ensure that information is disseminated quickly and reliably.

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred options include more unified protocols for engagement with community partners. The benefit would be stronger accountability and less duplication.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Create explicit obligations for CDEM Groups to consult, engage, and campaign with locally relevant communications partners (such as CAMA stations).

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The model should be adjusted to prioritise community engagement and communication readiness, including stronger partnerships and emergency preparedness awareness campaigns with local public interest broadcasters, such as CAMA stations.

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Consistent and streamlined structures, along with increased capacity and resources, would improve service delivery and awareness.

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**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred options should strengthen local leadership and clarify responsibilities, particularly in communications planning and outreach, which should include increased public investment in emergency preparedness campaigns.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Ensure that accountability frameworks include engagement with diverse communities and partners, especially communication providers (such as CAMA stations) that have local access and hyper-local knowledge.

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This section discusses how decision-making groups can better implement emergency plans in collaboration with local communities and trusted communication partners.

There is a need for more operational clarity and accountability. Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) are key connectors between policy and implementation—yet they are often disconnected from community-level delivery.

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

OAR supports options that improve the functioning of Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) and enable them to work more directly with local stakeholders, such as CAMA stations. This would benefit public confidence and service responsiveness.

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks. Specifically, CAMA advocates for:

- Requiring Coordinating Executive Groups to establish formal communication frameworks that include designated CAMA partners.
- Allocating further public investment into emergency preparedness awareness campaigns and other strategies.

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## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Plans must keep pace with evolving roles, technology, and community needs. Updating plans and increasing community engagement are essential to effective and inclusive emergency management.

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Faster and more iterative planning updates, along with increased community engagement and outreach campaigns, would allow for the timely integration of new risks and partners, such as social service agencies (including CAMA stations).

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Communication responsibilities are often assumed but not formalised. There is no national or regional clarity on how diverse communities will be reached, nor who is accountable for ensuring emergency communications are inclusive. Formalising partnerships with Community Access Media stations, in addition to the current Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), would address this gap and improve the equity of access to information.

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# Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

## Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The need for stronger national direction is clear. CAMA stations frequently face inconsistencies in engagement, access, and awareness of civil defence information across regions. A more standardised framework (including further investment in awareness campaigns, community outreach, and critical infrastructure) would improve coordination and information dissemination, and ensure equitable treatment.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support options that increase accountability and set national expectations. However, any additional compliance or reporting requirements placed on CAMA stations or their service providers must come with corresponding support or funding.

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

- Definitions of essential communications infrastructure.
- Additional standards and investment in public alerting and messaging.
- Involvement of Community Access Media (and other media providers) in response planning.
- Criteria for designating lifeline utilities, which should broaden to include CAMA stations.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

There must be mechanisms in place to address performance gaps, mainly when failure to act affects vulnerable communities. Too often, local variations result in inconsistent communication during emergencies.

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Strengthening the Director's mandate is appropriate. However, this mandate should include community feedback loops and transparency around interventions.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Current local hazard planning may lack meaningful community input, overlooking communication infrastructure gaps, particularly those experienced by Community Access Media stations. These limitations may directly impact the ability to reach vulnerable communities with critical risk and preparedness information effectively. CAMA stations are an underutilised but essential part of local risk communication networks.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support improvements to planning tools, enhanced public education, and stronger coordination between hazard planners and communicators. A key benefit would be improved public understanding of local risks, more effective messaging, and increased readiness, especially for underserved communities.

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However, recognising CAMA as a key communication partner will require **increased capacity, infrastructure, and coordination at the local level. These new expectations must be backed by dedicated funding**. Otherwise, the burden will fall on already under-resourced CAMA stations. This could undermine the effectiveness of any proposed changes.

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

OAR supports national consistency in the core aspects of hazard identification, risk assessment, and communication protocols. However, regional flexibility is essential for tailoring engagement strategies and using trusted local communication providers, such as CAMA stations with existing community networks.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

- Limited staffing and resourcing.
- Fragmentation between council departments.
- Gaps in training around community-led communication strategies.
- Underuse of locally embedded media platforms.
- CAMA stations are underutilised in the current local and national awareness campaign budget allocations.
- Low awareness of the role Community Access Media can play in risk communication to diverse communities.

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. CDEM Group plans should be required to:

- Formally integrate local communications partners such as CAMA stations.
- Include these partners in risk mapping, planning exercises, and scenario testing.
- Allocate specific funding to support their participation and infrastructure development.
- Develop and increase funded public education campaigns in collaboration with trusted local broadcasters, such as CAMA stations, to improve awareness among vulnerable or hard-to-reach communities.

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Current structures rely heavily on discretionary engagement. There needs to be clearer statutory obligations to involve community organisations, improve data sharing, and integrate communications in risk planning.

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There should be clear statutory obligations for CDEM Groups to engage with Community Access Media as critical communication providers. This would ensure consistent, two-way risk communication, particularly with groups who are often left out of mainstream channels. However, **this will not be effective without adequate resourcing.** CAMA stations cannot take on greater responsibilities in emergency planning without support.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The protection of taonga Māori and cultural heritage is vital during and after emergencies, not only for iwi and hapū but for the nation as a whole. These assets hold deep spiritual, historical, and identity-based value and must be safeguarded through intentional and culturally informed planning. The recognition of such heritage in emergency planning frameworks is overdue and well supported.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support approaches that embed iwi leadership in identifying and prioritising taonga and cultural assets before emergencies occur. The benefit is a system that reflects local values and enhances intergenerational resilience. The risk of inaction is irreversible cultural loss. The preferred option is the development of mandatory protocols for taonga protection in CDEM Group plans.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Require emergency communication partners, including iwi and Community Access Media, to collaborate on cultural asset alert systems and post-event reporting. Ensure CAMA stations are trained (and funded to meet the additional capacity required) to communicate the cultural significance of protected sites and practices during a response.

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Animal welfare is intrinsically linked to human well-being during emergencies. Clear protocols and resources for protecting pets, working animals, and livestock are essential for reducing trauma and supporting recovery.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support options that expand planning requirements to include animal evacuation, sheltering, and public communication. The benefit consists of greater public cooperation and reduced harm.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Animal welfare should be considered second only to human safety, prioritised above property protection. Public communication should reflect this hierarchy, especially in communities that rely on animals for their livelihood and companionship.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Leverage local Community Access Media stations to deliver real-time updates on animal evacuation centres and safety advice. Establish partnerships between animal welfare organisations and CAMA stations to develop emergency content and resource awareness campaigns in advance.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. The communications infrastructure required to deliver culturally inclusive, accurate, and accessible emergency information is not formally recognised, and in some cases, the critical infrastructure required to disseminate information is lacking or inadequate (e.g. obsolete or inadequate generator support, high transmission costs, over-reliance on the internet, AM/FM limited frequency availability). Without this critical infrastructure, community and iwi-led media organisations remain underutilised and under-supported despite being essential to maintaining community cohesion and trust during crises.

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This section is critical to CAMA's submission. The definition of 'lifeline utilities' must reflect 21st-century communication realities, including publicly funded, culturally embedded media services relied on during past disasters.

The current definition of lifeline utilities **excludes key communication services,** such as Community Access Media. While RNZ and TVNZ are recognised, CAMA stations—despite providing trusted, multilingual, and localised content to communities underserved by mainstream media, including Māori, Pasifika, people with disabilities, rural populations, and migrant communities—are not. Although our structures may differ, CAMA stations share the same public service and emergency communication objectives. Our role as signatories to the national Memorandum of Understanding on emergency broadcasting underscores this.

This narrow designation fails to reflect how communities **receive and rely on information** during emergencies. During recent engagements with officials, this omission was raised as a serious concern.

Although the earlier Emergency Management Bill proposed more prescriptive definitions and support for transmission services, the current direction instead **imposes obligations on infrastructure entities without additional funding**. This risks **costs being passed onto CAMA stations** by providers such as Kordia and Chorus, threatening their operational capacity.

A recent Cabinet paper acknowledged the lack of structural or funding reform to address systemic gaps in risk reduction and community resilience. Without formal inclusion of CAMA stations as essential infrastructure, these challenges will persist, **leaving frontline community broadcasters unsupported** in future emergencies.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. CAMA strongly supports **Option C**: a **principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure"** that recognises the importance of community-based public media.
This would:

- Enable inclusion of publicly funded CAMA stations in planning and funding systems.
- Acknowledge their role in business continuity and emergency broadcasting.

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- Reduce reliance on centralised systems by empowering trusted local providers.

Without such inclusion, the system risks **communication failures and inequitable outcomes**, particularly for vulnerable groups.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**Broadcast services from Community Access Media** should be added as critical communications infrastructure. These services:

- Provide life-saving information in over 50 languages.
- Are trusted by local communities across Aotearoa.
- Support Māori, iwi, and Treaty-aligned outcomes in emergency response.
- Have already demonstrated their importance during major events (e.g., Cyclone Gabrielle, Auckland floods, Canterbury earthquakes).

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

**Community Access Media infrastructure**, including broadcast sites, transmission networks, studio equipment, and backup power, should be covered.

This infrastructure:

- Delivers 24/7 localised information across FM, AM, and digital platforms.
- Serves over 1 million people annually via 12 regional stations.
- Serves as a **trustworthy bridge** between emergency services and the community.
- Produces over 4,000 hours of content per month, with a focus on equity and local connection.

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. To meet the Emergency Management Bill's objectives, OAR endorses CAMA's recommendations of the following additional steps:

**1. Formal recognition of Community Access Media as essential infrastructure**, with a role in statutory emergency frameworks.

**2. A tiered framework** that recognises CAMA services as essential at local and regional levels, allowing flexible inclusion in emergency contexts.

**3. Infrastructure and readiness support**, including:

- Transmission and generator upgrades
- Resilience training and emergency planning resources
- Emergency communication templates and multilingual campaign funding

**4. Representation on emergency advisory groups** to ensure equitable planning and delivery.

**5. Dedicated investment** to future-proof the sector, including technical, staffing, and resilience planning support.

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Community Access Media aligns with international best practice, including UNESCO and UNDP guidance, and delivers on Aotearoa's own Treaty, equity, and resilience commitments. Without formal inclusion in emergency management systems, the government risks overlooking one of the most effective, hyper-local, and trusted sources of communication during disaster. **We urge recognition, investment, and inclusion of CAMA as a cornerstone of Aotearoa's emergency response infrastructure.**

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Community Access Media (CAMA) stations play a unique and vital role in providing localised, culturally relevant information during emergencies. However, CAMA stations are currently excluded from the lifeline utility framework, despite being relied upon during crises. While CAMA stations are committed to service continuity, most lack the necessary infrastructure and funding to meet the high business continuity standards expected of lifeline utilities.

CAMA stations are already operating under significant financial constraints and resource limitations, and we urge that any new business continuity obligations come with **adequate funding** to enable compliance.

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

CAMA supports **Option (b): increasing assurance through non-legislative guidance and monitoring**. However, this option must be coupled with **dedicated funding** to enable CAMA stations to meet the infrastructure and resilience standards required for emergency continuity. Without this, there is a risk that smaller broadcasters will bear the costs, which could lead to financial strain and increased service costs for our stations.

We strongly caution against Options (c) and (d), as financial penalties or legislative mandates without corresponding funding will disproportionately burden smaller, underfunded organisations like CAMA stations. The increased transmission costs and compliance requirements could be passed on by infrastructure providers, placing further financial pressure on stations that are already operating on tight budgets.

Without funding support, such measures would effectively penalise essential emergency broadcasters for circumstances beyond their control.

We recommend introducing **safeguards to protect public interest broadcasters** from cost escalation due to new obligations placed on infrastructure providers, such as Kordia.

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**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. In addition to the current options, we recommend:

- **Access to central government infrastructure funding** for the installation of backup transmission systems, off-grid studios, and other emergency readiness tools.
- A **tiered approach** to lifeline utility obligations, recognising the varying capacities of regional and community-based broadcasters and ensuring funding levels reflect these differences.
- The development of **a dedicated funding mechanism** specifically to support the emergency preparedness needs of CAMA stations. This could be managed through the current NZ On Air allocation or a separate funding stream aimed at emergency broadcasting needs.

Recognising the **value of existing MOU partnerships** and integrating CAMA into the national business continuity planning framework.

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The problem is accurately described. Community Access Media stations are often left out of formal emergency coordination forums and education communication campaigns despite playing an essential role in disseminating localised, multilingual, and culturally attuned information.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the development of more formalised coordination structures and information-sharing channels at both regional and national levels. This would ensure CAMA stations can be part of coordinated messaging strategies and awareness campaigns, and quickly access critical information in emergencies. However, to effectively engage in these partnerships, CAMA stations will require **dedicated funding for training, simulation exercises, awareness campaigns, and infrastructure upgrades** to ensure they meet the demands of emergency response roles.

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

We advocate for the expansion of the **national emergency broadcasting MOU,** with clearly defined and resourced **local implementation protocols** between CEMA Groups and CAMA stations. This ensures that CAMA stations can quickly respond to local needs while remaining integrated into the broader national emergency response framework.

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**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be formally recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks. Specifically, CAMA recommends:

- **Embedding information-sharing expectations within service-level agreements** between CEMA agencies and Community Access Media, backed by clear, resourced commitments.
- **Funded joint training, simulation exercises, and awareness campaigns** to strengthen partnerships and ensure readiness for emergency communications.
- **Formal recognition of CAMA stations as essential communications infrastructure**, with corresponding funding to support business continuity planning and emergency preparedness.

Ultimately, essential services must include the communications ecosystem—not just telecommunications providers, but also publicly funded community broadcasters, such as CAMA stations, which act as conduits for critical information. These services are essential to public safety and cohesion during emergencies, particularly for Māori, Pasifika, people with disabilities, migrants, and rural communities.

Business continuity planning must formally acknowledge public messaging as an essential function and provide the resources and infrastructure protections needed to deliver on that obligation. To fully realise the goals of the Emergency Management Bill, Community Access Media must be recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in statutory emergency planning frameworks, not just as a partner, but as an operationally necessary asset.

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree with the problem definition. The COVID-19 pandemic and recent severe weather events have highlighted the critical need for all central government organisations to be prepared to maintain essential services during emergencies. These services include not only operational and infrastructural continuity but also the ability to effectively communicate with the public, primarily through trusted and accessible channels, such as Community Access Media.

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the proposal to expand the scope of organisations recognised in the Act. In particular, we endorse extending business continuity obligations to Crown agents,

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Autonomous Crown Entities, and Independent Crown Entities, as well as requiring all recognised agencies to take account of Director-issued guidance. These changes will increase clarity, improve coordination, and enhance operational resilience across government.

However, **the inclusion of communication-related agencies must be explicit**, especially those that fund or rely on community broadcasters. Community Access Media (represented by CAMA) plays a frontline role in public messaging during emergencies, providing multilingual, localised, and culturally relevant information to vulnerable communities.

While CAMA is currently acknowledged through a discretionary Memorandum of Understanding, this is not sufficient. It lacks enforceability and integration into emergency frameworks. **Formal recognition and obligations are needed to ensure that CAMA can fulfil its essential communications role during a crisis**.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. We recommend the following additional actions:

- **Extend business continuity requirements** to include government agencies that fund, oversee, or depend on public-interest media, such as NZ On Air and the Ministry for Culture and Heritage.
- **Require central government departments** to identify their communications partners (e.g. CAMA stations) as part of their business continuity planning.
- **Include Community Access Media** in inter-agency contingency frameworks for emergency communications.
- **Allocate dedicated funding** to support business continuity planning, readiness, and restoration for the community media sector.
- **Prioritise communications infrastructure** (e.g. studio and transmitter sites used by CAMA stations) for protection and restoration in emergencies.

**Funding and resource needs:**
To effectively integrate CAMA into emergency communications frameworks, additional funding and resources will be necessary. Currently, CAMA stations face significant challenges in terms of staffing, equipment, and infrastructure resilience. The following should be considered:

- **Targeted funding streams** to support CAMA stations in maintaining emergency-ready operations, including staffing, training, equipment, and infrastructure upgrades.
- **Resourcing for community-based outreach and preparedness**—CAMA stations often provide localised information that bridges gaps in national communication strategies. Funding should support these initiatives (and awareness campaigns) in high-risk areas and vulnerable communities.
- **Investment in secure and resilient broadcasting infrastructure**, including backup power systems and transmission equipment that can operate in the event of natural disasters or other emergencies.

**Training and capacity building** for CAMA staff in emergency management, media protocols, and crisis communication.

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. The current framing of "essential services" must be expanded to include **the broader communications ecosystem**, beyond just telecommunications infrastructure. Publicly funded community broadcasters like CAMA stations act as vital conduits of critical information to diverse and underserved populations.

Yet, without formal statutory recognition, these broadcasters remain excluded from the planning and protection frameworks they need to function in emergencies. Their omission puts public safety, community cohesion, and equitable access to emergency information at risk.

To meet the objectives of the Emergency Management Bill, **Community Access Media must be recognised as essential communications infrastructure and included in emergency legislation, not just as partners, but as operationally necessary assets.**

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The process for managing access to restricted areas must be clear, consistent, and adaptable. This ensures safety while allowing essential personnel, including CAMA station staff and content creators, to continue operating. During past emergencies, such as Cyclone Gabrielle and COVID-19, confusion around access restrictions has led to unnecessary disruption of critical communication services. This has hampered the ability of CAMA stations to disseminate vital information to vulnerable communities that rely on them for local, multilingual, and culturally relevant updates.

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support options that provide a more transparent and coordinated process for designating access rights, particularly for media personnel working in public-interest Community Access Media. Preferred options should include clear protocols for issuing passes or access rights to media staff, ensuring that **CAMA stations are explicitly recognised as essential communication services**. The key benefits include:

- **Reduced downtime in the dissemination of critical information**.
- **Improved public trust** through consistent access for CAMA station personnel to serve their audiences during emergencies.

Without a formal accreditation process, CAMA stations may continue to face delays or restrictions in accessing their infrastructure and facilities, which can delay their ability to perform their essential communication role.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. A key recommendation is to **develop a national template for rapidly accrediting essential communication personnel during emergencies**. This framework should explicitly **include CAMA stations** as part of the vital communications infrastructure. Accreditation should guarantee access to broadcast towers, transmission sites, and studio facilities, enabling stations to continue operations uninterrupted during emergencies. Additionally, this framework should ensure that CAMA stations are recognised and protected as critical assets, prioritised for access and repair when necessary.

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The responsibilities for using emergency powers must be unambiguous. Confusion can delay decision-making and negatively impact response time, including the timely dissemination of emergency information through **CAMA station channels**. Without clarity in who holds the authority, **CAMA stations** may face delays in receiving necessary permissions to broadcast vital updates to the public, particularly in areas requiring restricted access.

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the option that delineates authority and promotes consistency across local government boundaries. This reduces confusion and improves confidence in leadership. Clear roles for **CDEM Groups**, **Controllers**, and **Recovery Managers** should explicitly include media, especially **CAMA stations**, in the decision-making process. This ensures **CAMA stations** are integrated into the emergency management ecosystem, reducing the likelihood of disruption to essential communication services during crises.

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, we propose that all local emergency declarations include a **communications liaison officer** tasked with managing the dissemination of information through approved media channels, including **CAMA stations**. This would ensure a consistent flow of critical information and further integrate Community Access Media into the emergency response framework.

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

In a digital era, requiring physical signatures for declarations creates unnecessary delays. Transitioning to electronic methods is practical and increases the agility of emergency response processes. For **CAMA stations**, the lack of timely access to emergency powers or declarations can cause delays in broadcasting critical information. Moving to electronic signatures would expedite decision-making, ensuring that **CAMA stations** can continue providing essential updates to the public without unnecessary delays.

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**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred options should support digital authorisation mechanisms with appropriate checks and balances. This ensures speed without compromising legitimacy. This digital shift would also enable **CAMA stations** to receive timely notifications regarding the activation of emergency powers, allowing them to adjust and broadcast accurate information to the public quickly.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, include an **automated communication protocol** tied to the declaration system that immediately alerts designated media partners, including CAMA stations, when emergency powers are activated. This would ensure that **CAMA stations are promptly informed and can start their crucial role in disseminating emergency information immediately.**

**Funding Consideration:**
Increased reliance on CAMA stations for timely and accurate emergency information dissemination will require enhanced **funding to ensure their capacity can meet the demand**. This includes expanding their ability to cover additional personnel, technological tools (e.g., emergency broadcasting equipment and redundancy systems), and training staff in emergency communication protocols. Therefore, **funding support for CAMA stations should be included in any legislation or policy that enhances their role in emergency management.**

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Mayors hold a visible leadership role and are often perceived by the public as the face of local government. Making their roles more explicit in the legislation would support transparency and help streamline response coordination. This more precise definition can also strengthen the integration of CAMA stations in the local communication framework, as it clarifies who is responsible for directing public information during emergencies.

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support codifying mayors' responsibilities and communication duties, especially regarding public information and local coordination. This would increase public understanding and accountability. Additionally, requiring mayors and **local authorities to include CAMA stations in their communication plans** would **significantly enhance the**

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**dissemination of information, particularly in areas where traditional media are less effective.**

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, provide mayors with **briefing materials** and **communication templates** tailored for multilingual outreach, specifically for CAMA stations and iwi media. This would ensure that **emergency messaging reaches all segments of the population, including underrepresented communities.**

### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Yes. Controllers and Recovery Managers may require the power to requisition or prioritise access to local media infrastructure to ensure the continuity of critical broadcasts. They should also be empowered to directly engage with CAMA stations in planning and message dissemination during the response and recovery phases, particularly when mainstream channels are compromised or less effective for targeted communities.

**Funding Consideration:**

To enhance CAMA stations' ability to contribute effectively in emergencies, funding should be made available for establishing **emergency response capacity**. This would include ensuring that **CAMA stations have the necessary resources to maintain their infrastructure, personnel, and technology, allowing them to operate effectively during emergencies**.

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

**CAMA's role in emergency management**

Community Access Media (CAMA) is a signatory to the national Memorandum of Understanding on emergency broadcasting and has longstanding relationships with emergency management agencies. Despite this, the nature of our public funding and our UNESCO-backed origins, we lack formal recognition as lifeline utilities in emergency management frameworks.

CAMA serves over 1 million New Zealanders annually through 12 member stations. Collectively, we produce over 4,000 hours of locally made content monthly in more than 50 languages. We reach more than 200 community groups through a mix of AM, FM, and digital platforms, with a strong emphasis on **te reo Māori**, Pasifika languages, and languages from ethnic communities.

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**Critical role in emergency response**

CAMA stations are integral to the emergency management system, providing:

- **24/7 broadcast capacity** to ensure the timely dissemination of emergency information.
- **Localised, culturally attuned communication**, including support for communities traditionally underserved by mainstream media, such as Māori, Pasifika, ethnic minorities, youth, disabled, and rural groups.
- An **established trust network** developed through decades of consistent local programming.

In times of crisis, CAMA stations often serve as the **sole source of emergency information**. For example, during the 2023 flooding in Hawke's Bay, radio was the only available platform for crucial emergency information for some residents.

**Funding and infrastructure needs**

Our sector makes a significant contribution to emergency communications. Stations collectively pay **$366,000 annually** in transmission costs, with some stations spending over **$50,000 per year** on transmission alone. Infrastructure and generator costs vary widely, and these disparities represent significant barriers to maintaining consistent emergency readiness across the sector.

While **wages account for over 70% of sector overheads**, many stations operate with minimal staff and rely heavily on volunteers. Despite receiving a **$3.6 million NZ On Air allocation for 2023/24**, the current funding model, which is based on population reach, fails to reflect the **emergency communication value** that CAMA provides. **Additional funding** is essential to support infrastructure upgrades, such as backup generators and transmission systems, and to **enhance preparedness** in meeting the unique needs of the communities we serve.

**Recommendations for strengthening CAMA's role**

To ensure that CAMA can continue its vital role in New Zealand's emergency management framework, we strongly recommend the following:

1. **Formal recognition as a lifeline utility** in the revised framework to ensure CAMA is integrated into emergency planning and receives appropriate support during emergencies.
2. **Dedicated funding** for infrastructure upgrades, including the provision of backup power systems and improved transmission resilience.
3. **Representation on emergency advisory and planning bodies**, ensuring equitable inclusion of CAMA in national and local civil defence strategies.
4. **Funding for training, equipment, and readiness**, as well as **awareness campaigns** to enhance emergency preparedness within communities.
5. **Support for capacity-building initiatives** that promote national coordination and infrastructure investment in resilience planning and training for emergencies.

**Supporting Māori engagement and global best practices**

CAMA stations directly support the government's objectives for iwi engagement in emergency planning, primarily through our **broadcasting in te reo Māori** and our amplification of Māori voices, environmental knowledge, and traditions. Our sector's ability to deliver information in **culturally relevant ways** ensures that Māori communities are prepared and informed during emergencies.

Internationally, community radio (CAMA) is **recognised as a key element of disaster resilience** by **UNESCO, UNDP**, and the **International Telecommunication Union (ITU)**, all of which highlight the unique reliability of radio in reaching underserved and high-risk

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populations. Formal recognition and support for CAMA stations align with **global best practices** for emergency communication and resilience building.

**Conclusion: Ensuring equitable and inclusive emergency management**

CAMA stations are a cornerstone of Aotearoa's **democratic infrastructure** and **emergency resilience**. Formal recognition of our role in emergency management legislation, supported by **infrastructure investment, planning integration, and dedicated funding**, will ensure that our diverse and vulnerable communities are not left behind during times of crisis.

We look forward to working with NEMA to strengthen the system and ensure a more **inclusive, responsive, and resilient** emergency communication framework.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Andrew Livermore |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Beca Ltd |

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### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

There is not a proportionate balance of objectives between improving emergency management and strengthening our infrastructure resilience. Four of the five objectives relate to emergency management, and only *"minimise disruption to essential services"*[35] relates specifically to infrastructure resilience.

The term resilience is also not currently defined in the CDEM Act, and is only mentioned once, under Recovery Activity, with new measures *"to build resilience"*.[1] Infrastructure Resilience therefore needs to be clearly defined, as it spans across the four R's, and is best described as *"the ability to anticipate and resist the effects of a disruptive event, minimise adverse impacts, respond effectively, maintain or recover functionality, and adapt in a way that allows for learning and thriving"*[2].

Given the increasing risks to infrastructure caused by natural hazards and manmade threats, we need to equally ensure our Infrastructure Resilience is keeping pace "*as the scale and frequency of emergency weather events increases*", together with the *existing*

[1] https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0033/latest/whole.html?search=sw_096be8ed81f2eb9a_plan_25_se&p=1#DLM150750

[2] https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/documents/publications/ndrs/National-Disaster-Resilience-Strategy-10-April-2019.pdf



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*"considerable risk from geological related emergencies such as earthquakes, tsunami, and volcanoes"*[3].

Infrastructure organisations are now also increasingly connected through the essential services they provide to each other and for communities, which means communities are also now exposed to the increasing cascading and compounding risks from widescale infrastructure failure caused by emergency events.

For example, during Cyclone Gabrielle, which is described as a moderate scale event[4], 660 cell phone towers of 1600 (~40%) went offline, but only two were damaged, the rest lost power[5]. In Tairāwhiti, 90% of mobile towers were offline over the 14-15 February period. Some parts of the community had to evacuate from the flooding, but the loss and wider interruption of electricity supply meant thousands of people lost cell phone coverage and landlines, impacting EFTPOS which went offline, with costs estimated at *"$474 million over the two weeks"*[171].

Emergencies *"have a high economic cost. International comparisons consistently show that New Zealand has some of the highest exposure to natural hazards in the world"*[35], therefore, our infrastructure organisations must have increased capability in how they identify and mitigate risks. Additionally, due to cascading and compounding risks across infrastructure organisations, they need to collectively share what are their essential assets, and plan together on how they will reduce risks to the community, not just to their assets.

The Government Inquiry[6] states *"As part of a robust emergency management system, infrastructure resilience needs to be improved and invested in* [221]". We must therefore strengthen our Infrastructure Resilience and emergency management, including regulating what is our essential infrastructure locally, and being clear on what are the risks to local communities caused by widespread infrastructure failure. So we can collectively prevent the impact and reduce the consequences, but then also be more prepared to recover faster, lessening the impact of an emergency on the community, and the scale of the emergency management response needed.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

[3] https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2024-02/bim-2023-nema.pdf
[4] https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/Government-Inquiry-into-Severe-Weather-Events/$file/Report-of-the-Government-Inquiry-into-the-Response-to-the-North-Island-Severe-Weather-Events.pdf
[5] https://www.phcc.org.nz/briefing/cyclone-gabrielle-numbers-review-six-months
[6] https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/Government-Inquiry-into-Severe-Weather-Events/$file/Report-of-the-Government-Inquiry-into-the-Response-to-the-North-Island-Severe-Weather-Events.pdf



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*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The description accurately reflects findings from the Government Inquiry into recent emergency events in New Zealand. The disconnect between emergency management organisations and communities has been consistently highlighted. For example, during the South Auckland floods, as noted in the Inquiry report:
*"Local evacuation centres were not responsive to language and cultural needs or faith practices... barriers meant some people chose to remain in their flooded homes, isolated from help and support."*
This clearly demonstrates that diverse community needs are often overlooked, leading to worse outcomes for vulnerable groups.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

**Pre-existing vulnerabilities:** Older adults, disabled individuals, and those with health issues may lack the capacity to prepare for or respond effectively during emergencies. For instance, the Inquiry found that *"the needs of older people and those with dementia were not properly planned or catered for in evacuation centres"*[45].

**Cultural Barriers:** Non-inclusive practices at evacuation centres prevented Pacific peoples and ethnic communities from accessing support. As reported, *"faith practices such as women having to share sleeping facilities with men"* created significant discomfort for some cultural groups.
**Geographic Exposure:** Many marae are located on low-lying coastal land or flood-prone rivers, making them more vulnerable to climate-related hazards. The Bailey-Winiata (2021) study[7] highlights that *"80% of marae are built on flood-prone land,"* exacerbating risks for Māori communities.

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:** Legislative changes requiring CDEM Group plans to address diverse needs would ensure better preparedness across regions. As identified in the Inquiry report, engagement with disproportionately affected communities ahead of emergencies is key to understanding their needs and supporting effective response strategies. This approach could improve outcomes while strengthening trust between agencies and communities.

**Costs:** Additional resources will be required for CDEM Groups to engage meaningfully with diverse populations. However, these investments are necessary to avoid systemic inequities during responses.
**Risks:** Limited capacity among community representatives may hinder engagement efforts unless adequately supported.

[7] https://ref.coastalrestorationtrust.org.nz/documents/understanding-the-potential-exposure-of-coastal-marae-and-urup-in-aotearoa-new-zealand-to-sea-level-rise/



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| **Option 3 (legislative): Require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for** | • More confidence that the risk associated with Option 1 would be avoided, because local government emergency management arrangements would be driven by an understanding of communities' diverse needs.<br>• This should strengthen the preparedness of communities and subsequently improve outcomes in response and recovery.<br>• May strengthen relationships between CDEM Groups and communities in their areas. | • Communities (or their representatives) may have limited capacity to engage.<br>• May be seen as too prescriptive/inflexible to implement. |

**5. What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

**Risk Assessments:** Incorporating demographic data alongside traditional knowledge systems such as mātauranga Māori. Ngāti Kahungunu's mapping initiatives during Cyclone Gabrielle demonstrate how iwi expertise can enhance risk assessments.

**Localised Strategies:** Direct consultation with stakeholders representing vulnerable groups (e.g., iwi leaders, disability advocates) ensures tailored approaches. The Inquiry emphasised this need, stating some people do not have advocates who can share their needs across all stages of emergency management.

**National Frameworks:** Embedding cultural competencies into emergency protocols promotes inclusivity across all disaster phases. As identified in the discussion document [38], a whole-of-society approach requires partnerships with iwi Māori, community organisations, businesses, volunteers, and NGOs before emergencies occur.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

5. Please explain your views.

Develop a Māori Resilience Fund specifically supporting kaupapa Māori-led disaster preparedness initiatives at both local and regional levels. This aligns with recommendations from past inquiries calling for targeted funding mechanisms to empower underserved communities.

Create multilingual communication campaigns tailored to diverse linguistic needs based on lessons learned from Auckland/Northland floods where language barriers hindered timely access to critical information.

*"Marae played a pivotal role during Cyclone Gabrielle but lacked formal recognition or resourcing within CDEM structures."* – Hawke's Bay Regional Council Report.
*"Non-English-speaking populations struggled significantly during the Christchurch earthquakes due to inadequate translation of emergency communications."* – Government Inquiry Report.
*"Rural areas consistently face delayed aid delivery due to poor infrastructural planning highlighted in multiple events including Cyclone Gabrielle and Auckland floods."* – Independent Review on Major Emergency Events.

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## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The description accurately identifies the gaps in recognising iwi Māori contributions to emergency management. The Government Inquiry into severe weather events found that *"some of the most effective and rapid responses were coordinated and carried out by iwi Māori, including manaakitanga, critical equipment, response and wellbeing support."* Despite these contributions, formal inclusion of iwi Māori within local government emergency structures remains inconsistent or non-existent in some regions.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Reports confirm that iwi Māori play significant roles across all stages of emergency management. For example:

**Before Emergencies:** Iwi use mātauranga Māori to understand hazards and risks, as seen in Ngāti Kahungunu's proactive mapping initiatives during Cyclone Gabrielle.
**During Emergencies:** Marae networks provided shelter, food distribution, and coordination during Cyclone Gabrielle. The Inquiry noted: *"Iwi Māori provided facilities for welfare to all people in their rohe."*
**After Emergencies:** Iwi-led recovery efforts often include environmental restoration grounded in kaitiakitanga principles (as highlighted post-Christchurch earthquakes).

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:** Formalising iwi representation strengthens relationships between CDEM Groups and iwi Māori ahead of emergencies, leading to better outcomes during response and recovery phases. The Inquiry emphasised: *"Partnering with iwi Māori is essential to building New Zealand's disaster resilience."*

**Costs:** Legislative changes may require additional resources to support iwi engagement effectively. However, these investments are justified given the proven benefits of iwi-led initiatives during past disasters.
**Risks:** Limited capacity among iwi representatives could hinder meaningful participation unless adequate resourcing is provided.

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| **Option 4 (legislative): Require CDEM Groups to engage with iwi Māori during the development of CDEM Group plans** | • Reinforces existing requirements under the Local Government Act for local authorities to enable contributions to decision-making processes by Māori.<br>• Strengthens relationships between CDEM Groups and iwi Māori, resulting in better outcomes during and after emergencies. | • Not effective if CDEM Groups iwi Māori don't have time, capability or resources to enga |

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Iwi should be formally recognised as equal partners through legislative mandates requiring their involvement at both local and national levels. For example, mandating representation on CDEM Group decision-making structures ensures that *"iwi Māori are hardwired into the emergency management system,"* addressing inconsistencies noted in the Inquiry report.

Establishing a national Māori emergency management advisory group provides a mechanism for incorporating mātauranga Māori into national-level planning.

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

CDEM Groups should collaborate with iwi on equal footing through co-governance models that uphold Te Tiriti o Waitangi commitments. As noted in the Inquiry report: *"Strengthened relationships ahead of emergencies result in better outcomes during and after an event."*

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Coordinating Executive Groups must actively include iwi representatives in strategic planning discussions while respecting their leadership role during disaster responses. For example, marae networks led by hapū demonstrated their capability as coordination centres during Cyclone Gabrielle

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Regular wānanga facilitated by a national advisory group can provide direct insights into mātauranga-based approaches while fostering ongoing dialogue between mana whenua experts and national authorities. The Inquiry suggests establishing such mechanisms to ensure *"Māori interests are formally considered at every level of planning."*

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Develop non-legislative guidance embedding tikanga Māori practices into operational frameworks—allowing flexibility while strengthening relationships ahead of emergencies.

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Establish dedicated liaison roles within CDEM agencies focused on enhancing partnerships with iwi—a recommendation echoed across multiple reviews.

These measures address critical gaps identified by NEMA while leveraging proven strengths of kaupapa Māori approaches during recent disasters.

**Reference Quotes Supporting Needs & Gaps**

*"Some of the most effective responses were coordinated by iwi Māori... providing manaakitanga, facilities for welfare, money, and critical equipment."* – Government Inquiry Report (p. 18).
*"Inconsistent relationships between local authorities and iwi mean contributions are not maximised."* – Government Inquiry Report (p. 53).

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The problem is well-articulated, highlighting the disconnect between community resources and the formal emergency management system. The Independent Review into Hawke's Bay CDEM Group's response to Cyclone Gabrielle noted similar concerns: *"Many private businesses, from helicopter companies to transport and engineering providers, reported that their offers of help were not responded to in a timely way or utilised effectively."*
This underlines the need for clearer processes to integrate community contributions efficiently. Additionally, the Government Inquiry into past events found that *"schools and marae are often used as evacuation centres but lack formal agreements or pre-positioned resources,"* which limits their effectiveness during emergencies.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:** Developing clear guidance and strengthening public education can enhance community awareness and improve trust between CDEM Groups and local organisations. This aligns with findings from past events where *"better relationships enabled more effective responses,"* as highlighted in multiple reviews. For example, marae networks demonstrated their capability during Cyclone Gabrielle by providing manaakitanga and welfare services despite limited integration into formal systems.

**Costs:** Implementing these changes may require additional funding for training and resources. However, such investments are crucial for building resilience and ensuring

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efficient use of community assets. The report emphasised that *"clear processes for accepting offers of resources could reduce inefficiencies during response and recovery efforts."*

**Risks:** Without mandatory adherence, there is a risk that guidance may not be consistently followed across regions, resulting in uneven outcom

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| **Option 3 (legislative): Require CDEM Group plans to state how the Group will manage offers of resources from the public** | • Could improve efficiencies of community involvement in response and recovery. | • Requires CDEM Groups to have time, capability and funding to develop and implement. |

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Establish a centralised coordination platform for managing offers of support from businesses, NGOs, and volunteers during emergencies—addressing gaps identified during the Christchurch earthquakes where *"offers of assistance were not systematically managed."* This would streamline communication pathways and ensure timely utilisation of resources.

Create incentives for CDEM Groups to develop formal agreements with local organisations before emergencies occur, fostering proactive engagement. For instance, schools and marae could be formally designated as evacuation centres equipped with pre-positioned supplies like food, bedding, and communication tools.

Gaps identified:

**Under-utilisation of Community Resources:** Offers of skills, information, or physical resources from private businesses were often delayed or ignored due to unclear processes within CDEM systems (Hawke's Bay Cyclone Gabrielle Review).

**Lack of Formal Agreements:** Schools and marae frequently act as evacuation hubs but lack pre-established arrangements or resourcing plans (Government Inquiry Report).

**Inconsistent Communication Channels:** Independent reports highlighted inefficiencies in matching community contributions with official needs during Christchurch earthquakes due to poor coordination mechanisms.

*"Offers of skills, resources, or information in response and recovery are not always responded to in a timely way."* – Discussion Document (p. 62).
*"Many private businesses reported that their offers of help were not utilised effectively."* – Independent Review into Hawke's Bay CDEM Group's response to Cyclone Gabrielle (p. 41).
*"Schools and marae are often used as evacuation centres but lack formal agreements or pre-positioned resources."* – Government Inquiry Report on past emergency events.
*"Better relationships enabled more effective responses."* – Government Inquiry Report.

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## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The description accurately reflects the challenges faced by individuals, businesses, and communities who often act as first responders during emergencies. The Government Inquiry into Cyclone Gabrielle noted:
*"Many community members who did not have a formal role in the response assisted in rescue efforts using boats and helicopters to bring people to safety."*
However, the lack of legal protection from civil liability for those acting independently can discourage immediate life-saving actions. This gap highlights the need for legislative changes to protect good-faith emergency actions.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:** Providing protection from civil liability (Option 2) would encourage timely independent action during emergencies, recognising the reality that official responses may be delayed. As highlighted in multiple reviews: *"Individuals are often the first to act before formal systems are mobilised."* Enabling compensation for labour costs (Option 3) ensures fairness for those directed by Controllers or constables to use their expertise or resources without prior contractual arrangements.

**Costs:** Option 3 may result in unpredictable expenses for local and central governments. However, these costs are necessary to incentivise skilled contributions during critical moments.

**Risks:** Both options could potentially incentivise unsafe or unnecessary actions if safeguards are not clearly defined.

Preferred Option: Combine Options 2 and 3—provide protection from civil liability while enabling compensation for directed labour costs—to ensure a balanced approach that fosters community participation while minimising risks.

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| **Option 2 (legislative): Provide for protection from civil liability** | • Supports the reality that people, businesses, and communities will often need to deal with an emergency themselves before the official response starts. | • Potentially incentivises unsafe or unnecessary actions. |
| **Option 3 (legislative): Enable compensation for labour costs** | • Consistency of how compensation is applied across a range of emergency scenarios, provided that activities are carried out in good faith.<br>• Supports individuals and communities to assist in emergencies when needed. | • Incurs unpredictable costs on the Government and local government, including administration costs.<br>• Potentially incentivises unsafe or unnecessary actions. |

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Establish clear guidelines defining "reasonable and significant emergency management actions" to minimise risks of unsafe behaviour under Option 2. This aligns with recommendations from past inquiries advocating for *"structured frameworks to guide independent action."*

Develop public education campaigns explaining protections available under new legislation to ensure individuals understand their rights and responsibilities during emergencies.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

**Inconsistent Engagement with Iwi Māori Across Regions:**
The Government Inquiry into Cyclone Gabrielle highlighted that *"the inclusion of iwi Māori in formal emergency management structures is discretionary and, in some regions, non-existent."* This inconsistency limits the ability of iwi to contribute effectively during emergencies. A legislative mandate for iwi representation across all CDEM Groups would address this gap.

**Under-Resourcing of Marae as Resilience Hubs:**
Marae frequently act as evacuation centres but lack pre-positioned resources such as food, bedding, and communication tools. As noted in the Independent Review into Cyclone Gabrielle's response, *"marae provided critical welfare services but were not equipped or formally recognised within the emergency framework."* Establishing formal agreements and resourcing plans with marae would strengthen their role in disaster resilience.

**Barriers to Participation for Underserved Communities:**
Non-English-speaking communities, rural populations, and those with disabilities often face systemic barriers to participating in emergency planning and response. For example, the Christchurch earthquake report noted that *"language barriers hindered effective communication with non-English speakers,"* while rural communities experienced delays due to geographic isolation.

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**Lack of Cultural Competency Training for Emergency Personnel:**
Emergency responders often lack training on tikanga Māori and cultural practices, which can lead to culturally inappropriate responses during crises. Embedding cultural competency training into national frameworks would improve engagement with iwi Māori and other diverse communities.

**Proposed Solutions**

**Legislative Mandates for Iwi Representation:** Require iwi representation on CDEM Group decision-making structures to ensure consistent participation across all regions.
**Formal Agreements with Marae:** Develop agreements that recognise marae as resilience hubs, supported by funding for pre-positioned resources.
**Targeted Communication Strategies:** Create multilingual campaigns tailored to diverse linguistic needs and ensure accessibility for disabled individuals.
**Cultural Competency Training:** Implement mandatory training programs for emergency personnel on tikanga Māori and culturally appropriate practices.

*"The inclusion of iwi Māori in formal emergency management structures is discretionary... limiting their contributions."* – Government Inquiry Report (p. 54).
*"Marae provided critical welfare services but were not equipped or formally recognised."* – Independent Review into Hawke's Bay CDEM Group's Response to Cyclone Gabrielle (p. 41).
*"Language barriers hindered effective communication with non-English speakers."* – Christchurch Earthquake Report.
*"Many community members assisted in rescue efforts using privately owned boats and helicopters."* – Government Inquiry Report on Cyclone Gabrielle (p. 83).
*"Actions taken without direction are not protected despite their importance in saving lives."* – Discussion Document (p. 68).
*"Consistency of compensation across scenarios supports fairness but requires robust administration mechanisms."* – Discussion Document (p. 71).

**Gaps Identified**

**Legal Protections:** Current legislation does not protect individuals acting independently from civil liability unless directed by a Controller or Police constable. This discourages timely life-saving actions, as noted in the Inquiry report: *"Actions taken without direction are not protected despite their importance in saving lives."*
**Compensation Mechanisms:** There is no provision for compensating labour costs incurred by individuals or businesses directed by Controllers during emergencies—creating inequities for those contributing specialist skills or resources.
**Unclear Processes:** The absence of clear guidelines on acceptable independent actions increases uncertainty and risks during emergencies.

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We need to ensure agility and relevancy is paramount in updating these plans, which means there should be no delays or barriers to update these community critical documents. As noted, *"updating these plans is [currently] administratively burdensome, it can be difficult to make changes that reflect lessons from recent emergencies, changing responsibilities, or the latest understanding of the hazard and risk environment"*[112].

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Reducing the administrative burden must be a priority, so local CDEM Groups are fully empowered and responsive to updating plans, especially after local events or from learnings from other national events. Hence, Option 3 would be preferred.

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| **Option 3 (legislative): The National CDEM Plan isn't required to be made by Order in Council, but retains its legislative status** | • May enable the National CDEM Plan to be drafted more flexibly.<br>• Easier to amend than through a full Order in Council process.<br>• Retains legislative effect. | • Balance between flexibility and certainty – more frequent changes to the National CDEM Plan would need to be supported by effective implementation across the system. |

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**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Although regional variability and local content must be maximised in local Group Plans, it would be beneficial to all involved, if all local CDEM Group Plans were also stored and located in a central place (i.e. on the NEMA website). To create central visibility so all involved can see what others are doing, together with including full version control to capture what changes have been made, why and when. If we want to increase our disaster resilience (i.e. reduced harm to people and minimal disruption to our economy), we must increase our transparency and remove any barriers that cause delays or stifle making changes quickly (i.e. let's use these plans to create a centre of excellence, so learning and improvements are openly encouraged and maximised, which benefits everyone involved).

### Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

None

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Although not directly involved in performance aspects relating to the CDEM Act, we do hear comments from others more closely involved, around inconsistencies and opportunities to improve. Additionally, multiple inquiries into disaster events do provide some basis that wider improvements and changes are needed.

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**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

If work has been undertaken and completed to improve performance but "*these documents do not need to be followed*"[122], which is "*leading to an inconsistent standard of emergency management across New Zealand*"[123], then clearly changes are needed. Hence, any change needs to efficiently improve a consistent standard of emergency management and Infrastructure Resilience across New Zealand, and Option 4 is preferred.

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| **Option 4 (legislative): Give the Director the function of monitoring the performance of the emergency management system** | • Would strengthen the mandate of the Director to increase oversight of, identify, and address performance issues across the emergency management system.<br>• Enhances the single point of accountability for overseeing the performance of the emergency management system. | • May require investment to support the Director to fulfil their monitoring and assurance functions.<br>• Need to ensure appropriate mechanisms for oversight and assurance that the Director is also fulfilling their functions. |

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Those organisations directly involved would be better to comment on this.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Do we also need to create an assurance framework for the CDEM Act, which provides regular oversight on the variability and any inconsistency across all CDEM Group Plans centrally?

A Three Lines of Defence model could work well here, allowing each CDEM Group to audit different regions plans each year, and provide commentary. Together with independent auditors validating the process to produce plans, progress reporting, and why there is variability or inconsistency in plans, including agreed recommendations and actions to improve.[8]

A Three Lines of Defence model is used by other New Zealand organisations, as they provide a strategic, structured, and holistic way to manage risks whilst identifying improvements needed. Potential benefits of this approach include improved accountability, better oversight and governance, enhanced risk management, and improved performance.

## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

[8] https://oag.parliament.nz/good-practice/audit-committees/three-lines-model

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**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Although not directly involved in performance aspects relating to the CDEM Act, we do hear comments from others more closely involved, around inconsistencies and opportunities to improve. Additionally, multiple inquiries into disaster events do provide some basis that wider improvements and changes are needed.

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

If "*parties are failing to carry out their functions and duties effectively*" and "*there is limited ability to take immediate action to address performance issues*"[129], then clearly change is needed, hence Option 3 is preferred.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Option 3 (legislative): Expand the Minister's existing powers of intervention** | • Strengthens Minister's ability to seek assurance of performance outside an emergency.<br>• Provides the ability to intervene/direct action.<br>• Could provide a mechanism for intervention of last resort if there are issues of non-compliance.<br>• There is precedent of such powers being available to Ministers through other statutes (e.g. Resource Management Act 1991, Health Act 1956, etc). | • While a new power would have checks and balances to protect against misuse, this could create significant discretion for the Minister to determine adequacy of performance which could potentially be used to override local decision-making.<br>• Requires the Minister to have increased operational oversight, which may not be appropriate in all circumstances. Caveats around what sort of action could not be directed may be required. |

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Those organisations directly involved would be better to comment on this.

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Paragraphs 136-139 summarises the inconsistencies and problems across the CDEM Group plans. However, who additionally needs to support and enable CDEM Groups for the plans that address all the risks in their area? What possible mandated roles should other essential infrastructure organisations play in strengthening local hazard risk management? To

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strengthen disaster resilience (i.e. reduced harm to people and minimal disruption to our economy), we need to increase Infrastructure Resilience and emergency management.

If one of the purposes of the "*CDEM Act is to encourage and enable communities to achieve acceptable levels of risk*" [133], then local essential infrastructure organisations must share what their risks are and the potential consequences to areas. Local authorities may be "*better placed than central government to understand the parts of a river that are likely to flood*" [132], but as experienced in Cyclone Gabrielle, the flooding caused massive damage to the community, but wider impact to the community was the loss of power caused by the flooding of the substation. Flooding creates harm to the community, but damage to essential infrastructure causes cascading and compounding economic losses to the community and nation.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

If the outcome sought is to *"strengthen disaster resilience and emergency management"* [36], then essential infrastructure organisations must be more involved to share their risks so the cascading and compounding risks to local CDEM Group area is known by all. Regional variability will need to be encouraged to ensure local ownership and accountability, as each area faces different hazards, but consistency is also needed on how they identify essential services and what is their local essential infrastructure. Hence, Option 4 would be preferred

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Option 4 (legislative): Enable the form and content of CDEM Group plans to be prescribed through secondary legislation** | • Supports a consistent standard of emergency management across New Zealand.<br>• Provides CDEM Groups with clear expectations about what good looks like. | • There is a balance to strike between local flexibility and national consistency. May not be effective if regulations are so exhaustive or prescriptive that there is no room for regional variability.<br>• Time and cost to NEMA to develop regulations and produce the guidance material to support them. |

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

The legislation needs to strike a balance which creates clear national expectations of the outcomes needed locally but ensure a level of consistency across CDEM Group plan content. It also needs to allow regions to take a risk-based approach on what is most critical in their local area based on their communities and the vulnerabilities in their essential infrastructure.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Those organisations directly involved would be better to comment on this.

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**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

As covered in Issue 8, increase assurance activities to accelerate learning, identify gaps and issues, and drive timely improvements across all CDEM Groups.

Additionally, recovery exercises by CDEM groups are rare, they are typically focused on response preparedness. Local recovery planning exercises, which includes essential service organisations, using a range of possible scenarios, could be useful to build relationships and understanding across organisations before an emergency (i.e. in peace time). The recovery exercises could also focus on how they collectively improve reduction and readiness activities around local Infrastructure Resilience.

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

RMA reform will assist, but the need for a data standard on how we identify and capture our natural hazards on our maps in a consistent way is critical. As above, flooding causes harm to people, but the lack of resilience or increased vulnerability in our essential infrastructure needs to be identified due to the cascading and compounding risks to the economy and people.

Improving our disaster resilience (i.e. reduced harm to people and minimal disruption to our economy) will also increasingly rely upon and build upon data collected in an emergency and non emergency context. Having a suitable data framework including data standards and sharing principles can support the efficient collection, use, and dissemination of information. This framework will help in maintaining consistency, accuracy, and reliability of data across various emergency management activities.

Frameworks also facilitate better coordination and collaboration among different agencies and stakeholders, enabling timely and informed decision-making during emergencies. All parties involved and who need to understand hazards and risks to their essential infrastructure will benefit. This data can also help support councils with defensible decision making to protect New Zealanders when they rebuild after an emergency. Possible examples of data collected to support emergencies include Geotechnical Data, Landslides Data, Underground Asset Data etc.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The problem is accurately captured, highlighting the insufficient mechanisms to protect taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during emergencies. The Government Inquiry noted that *"the response did not consider communities' cultural context,"* which impeded effective collaboration and recovery efforts. Furthermore, under Article Two of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, the Crown has an obligation to safeguard taonga Māori, yet this responsibility is not consistently integrated into emergency management frameworks.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**Benefits:** Strengthening planning expectations through secondary legislation (Option 3) would establish enforceable requirements for considering taonga Māori and cultural heritage in emergency planning. This approach enhances inclusivity and resilience by incorporating mātauranga Māori-led strategies during response and recovery phases. As UNESCO's report on protecting culture in emergencies highlights: *"Cultural heritage plays a proactive role in building community resilience."*

**Costs:** Developing secondary legislation may incur higher costs for local authorities regarding implementation and training. However, these expenses are justified by the long-term benefits of preserving culturally significant assets.

**Risks:** Relying solely on non-legislative guidance (Option 2) could lead to inconsistent application across regions, leaving gaps in protection during emergencies.

Preferred Option: Option 3—Strengthen planning expectations through secondary legislation to create enforceable requirements for integrating cultural heritage into emergency management plans.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Establish dedicated funding streams to support iwi-led initiatives aimed at protecting taonga Māori during emergencies. This aligns with recommendations from past reviews advocating for *"targeted funding mechanisms to empower underserved communities."*

Develop wānanga-based training programs for emergency personnel focused on tikanga Māori and mātauranga approaches to ensure culturally appropriate responses.

**Gaps Identified**

**Lack of Enforceable Mechanisms:** Current frameworks do not mandate consideration of taonga Māori or cultural heritage during emergencies, resulting in inconsistent practices across regions (Government Inquiry Report).

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**Underutilisation of Expertise:** Emergency responders often fail to leverage mātauranga Māori knowledge systems, which could significantly enhance preparedness and recovery efforts (UNESCO Report).

**Insufficient Training:** There is a lack of cultural competency training related to tikanga Māori among emergency personnel, hindering effective engagement with affected communities.

*"The response did not consider communities' cultural context."* – Government Inquiry Report on Cyclone Gabrielle (p. 149).
*"Cultural heritage plays a proactive role in building community resilience."* – UNESCO Report on Protecting Culture in Emergencies (p. 11).
*"There are no base requirements to consider taonga Māori... making it difficult to address these matters during emergencies."* – Discussion Document (p. 152)

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

With increasing urbanisation we now have increasing dependency across infrastructure types which creates cascading and compounding risks for communities and increased risk of economic losses for New Zealand. As described in paragraph 169 and shown in Figure 5, our essential infrastructure is exposed to the fragility of an interconnected system. Where storms now have the potential to cause power outages, loss of telecommunications, compromised water infrastructure[9] (not included in Figure 5), and disrupt supply chains and the ability to purchase goods (i.e. fuel, groceries, medicine, etc).

As also identified in the New Zealand Infrastructure Strategy, *"Our key infrastructure is vulnerable to natural disasters" was rated as 'very important' by 52% of respondents in the Aotearoa 2050 survey of infrastructure issues. During consultation, submitters told us they felt it was important that New Zealand develop a common definition of and framework for critical [essential] infrastructure and then use them to identify this infrastructure"*[10].

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[9] https://www.phcc.org.nz/briefing/water-infrastructure-failures-cyclone-gabrielle-show-low-resilience-climate-change#:~:text=Damage%20to%20reticulated%20drinking%20water,5%20(see%20Figure%201).

[10] https://media.umbraco.io/te-waihanga-30-year-strategy/mmahiykn/rautaki-hanganga-o-aotearoa-new-zealand-infrastructure-strategy.pdf

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Any time and money invested, which increases our disaster resilience (i.e. reduced harm to people and minimal disruption to our economy), is a strategic long-term investment. However, we do need to coordinate and prioritise this effectively and efficiently, based the risks that need to be mitigated, in a fiscally constrained economy.

The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction states that for "*Every US$1 invested in risk reduction and prevention can save up to US$15 in post-disaster recovery. Every US$1 invested in making infrastructure disaster-resilient saves US$4 in reconstruction*"[11].

Additionally, will a voluntary approach be most effective for communities who need to understand the consequences of increasing natural hazard risks and manmade threats? Legislation can be written with timescale expectations and some leeway initially can be applied, allowing organisations time to understand what they need to change and how they might best work with others to comply. Not all legislation needs to add immediate cost, it can set clear expectations of the requirements expected, including the timeframes. Hence, Option 3 would be preferred.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Option 3 (legislative): Replace the lifeline utilities framework with an expanded, principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure"** | • Enables equivalent obligations to apply to any infrastructure entity that provides an essential service. This would enable better management of disruption to essential services than the other options.<br>• Accounts for other essential services that may emerge in the future.<br>• Over time, better alignment could be achieved through other legislation adopting the same principles-based definition. | • Compliance costs for new entities to meet their requirements under the Act.<br>• Implementation costs for CDEM Groups and central government (relative to number of additional essential infrastructure providers). |

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

There are only two options:

1) Define and mandate what times of essential infrastructure organisations must comply, or
2) Provide principles of what essential infrastructure is and ask regions to identify what they consider is and is not in their area.

Guidance will be needed to clarify how you identify essential infrastructure, but also more importantly what is an essential asset? Essential assets could be identified by the number of

[11] https://www.undrr.org/our-work/our-impact



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Equivalent Standard Customers[12] they service. This approach links closely with asset management, around understanding asset usage/demand, so information around which assets are most heavily used or relied on by a community.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Appendix C is detailed, including the potential scope of new essential infrastructure providers.

It will be interesting to see if those listed in Appendix C provide feedback as part of this consultation process, including those directly impacted more recently by Auckland Anniversary Flooding, Cyclone Gabrielle, and the Kaikoura and Christchurch Earthquakes. As the infrastructure damage and consequences to communities from these four events, should form the starting list of what infrastructure provides essential services.

As New Zealand on average is impacted by a major earthquake every ~10 years, and major storms/flooding every ~2-3 years. Hence, broadening who and legislating certain requirements would make sense, to create the step change in how we collectively plan, prepare/prevent, respond and recover faster.

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No other options identified, but updating the legislation can be done in a way that creates increased focus on areas we need to improve on, and with appropriate timescales, so we mature and improve our coordinated approach.

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

[12] https://www.waternz.org.nz/Attachment?Action=Download&Attachment_id=4224




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*"Climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of weather-related emergencies, such as floods, landslips, droughts, heatwaves, and wildfires"*[10]. It is "*important to note New Zealand also faces considerable risk from geological related emergencies such as earthquakes, tsunami, and volcanoes*" [10]. Hence, multiple events and repeated inquiries over multiple decades, coupled with increasing frequency and severity of events, confirms we need a step change to keep pace (see below trend in the Briefing to the Incoming Minister)[13].




This trend profile is like the global profile[14], which reinforces the need for change to improve both our emergency response and Infrastructure Resilience together, especially when we consider that our insurance cover could be <50% across our public assets[15].

**Figure 3: Growth in global natural catastrophe insured losses (USD bn, 2024 prices)**




[13] https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2024-02/bim-2023-nema.pdf
[14] https://www.swissre.com/institute/research/sigma-research/sigma-2025-01-natural-catastrophes-trend.html
[15] https://oag.parliament.nz/2013/insuring-public-assets/part2.htm

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**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

As above, any time and money invested, which increases our disaster resilience (i.e. reduced harm to people and minimal disruption to our economy), is a strategic long-term investment. However, we do need to coordinate and prioritise this effectively and efficiently, based the risks that need to be mitigated, in a fiscally constrained economy.

Regulations we know do help other industries in New Zealand and abroad, to drive consistency and improved performance over time. However, financial penalties should only be used as a last resort, but perhaps we do need to be this bold, and hence Option 3 would be preferred.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Option 3 (legislative): Introduce financial penalties and enable detailed business continuity planning requirements to be set through regulations** | • Regulations would act as a backstop to address systemic business continuity planning issues and achieve greater consistency within a particular class (or classes) of lifeline utilities.<br>• Provides a formal mechanism to address noncompliance with legal requirements.<br>• Regulations provide flexibility to consider any interactions with requirements under other legislation. | • Administrative costs for NEMA to develop regulations.<br>• Compliance costs would be limited to the classes of lifeline utilities covered by regulations and vary based on individual entities' existing level of business continuity planning. |

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The previous proposed changes were very clear on the outcomes that were needed and went further regarding how we can collectively improve our resilience as a nation. Specifically, that Essential Infrastructure entities would share their planning emergency levels of service (PELOS), which would:

- *"help communities prepare based on the realistic expectations,*
- *inform the development of effective readiness and response planning,*
- *enable other critical [essential] infrastructure entities to plan based on interdependencies and expected emergency service levels,*
- *aid the development of innovative solutions where services are severely compromised due the severity of the event scenario".*[16]

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

[16] https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2024-05/dpmc-roia-oia-2023-24-0666.pdf

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**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The information provided summarises the current issues.

The New Zealand Infrastructure Strategy also captures this same issue as a recommendation *"Require regular disclosures of information about critical [essential] infrastructure preparedness and minimum service levels in an emergency"*[17].

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Assessing the purpose of the CDEM Act, and then looking at the current problems identified, we have a significant issue here.

Section 3 of the CDEM Act states that we:

- Encourage and enable communities to achieve acceptable levels of risk by identifying risks and applying risk reduction management practices.
- Provide for planning and preparation for emergencies and for response and recovery in the event of an emergency.
- Require local authorities to coordinate CDEM through regional groups across the '4Rs' and encourage cooperation and joint action between those groups.
- Encourage the coordination of emergency management across the range of agencies and organisations with responsibilities for preventing or managing

Based on the findings of multiple inquiries, is encouraging and sharing information working sufficiently? As each lifeline utility organisation, will have differing views, priorities, strategic goals, and even levels of asset management and information. Hence, how do you regulate them or incentivise them to share more information, and invest more time at their cost for wider more improved disaster resilience (i.e. reduced harm to people and minimal disruption to our economy)?

However, given the cascading and compounding risks we now face, coupled with increasing frequency and severity of events, Option 3 is preferred

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Option 3 (legislative): Explicitly require CDEM Groups to involve the lifeline utilities in their areas in the development of CDEM Group plans** | • Complements the existing duty on lifeline utilities to participate in the development of CDEM Group plans.<br>• Planning process facilitates a common understanding of the interdependencies between the essential infrastructure in the same geographic area. | • Compliance burden on lifeline utilities with national coverage. This could potentially be mitigated through stronger national direction on the CDEM Group planning process or exempting national lifeline utilities from this requirement. |

[17] https://media.umbraco.io/te-waihanga-30-year-strategy/mmahiykn/rautaki-hanganga-o-aotearoa-new-zealand-infrastructure-strategy.pdf

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**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Those organisations directly involved would be better to comment on this.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Similar to our response above, no other options identified, but updating the legislation can be done in a way that creates increased focus on areas we need to improve on, setting clear expectations, so we mature and improve our coordinated approach.

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Central government agencies, due to their scale and the services they provide to the community should also be considered.

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We understand the current fiscal constraints within our economy; hence any changes or improvements would need to be allowed for within existing budget limits. Options that add extra cost to central government agencies are more challenging, with options that promote closer working and increased collaboration more favoured, hence Option 2 is preferred.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Option 2 (non-legislative): Promote best practice business continuity practices** | • Provides an opportunity to educate and inform departments about best practice business continuity planning. Guidance could also be used by other central government agencies.<br>• Guidance material can be amended easily over time. | • The use of non-regulatory tools without appropriate levers to encourage their use risks limited improvements to business continuity planning. As a consequence, managing disruption to some critical functions and services may still be ineffective.<br>• Ongoing implementation cost associated with developing, updating, and promoting the guidance. |

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**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No, none.

### Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Those organisations directly involved would be better to comment on this.

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**77. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**78. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**80. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Insert response

**81. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**83. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**84. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**86. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Insert response

**87. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**89. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**90. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Previously, the proposed legislation changes were similar to other countries, which included an increasing focus around critical infrastructure, taking an all-hazards approach (i.e. which includes, space, cyber and physical threats to infrastructure) to proactively identify risks, prevent the impact of emergencies, and be more prepared so infrastructure recovers faster after an emergency (i.e. increasing the time invested to proactively and holistically understand risks across critical assets).

In particular, Australia has made legislation changes due to increasing risks and threats to their infrastructure, to legislate the requirements that critical infrastructure organisations must:

- Identify material risks to critical infrastructure, taking an all-hazards approach;
- Minimise risks to prevent incidents;
- Post an incident, quickly mitigate the impact; and
- Ensure effective governance and oversight is available and provided.

With increasing urbanisation, increasing aging across our assets, and increasing risks and threats to our infrastructure, we must collectively increase our risk management and asset management together across our critical infrastructure. As cascading and compounding risks are rapidly increasing the cost of each recovery event which we cannot afford to keep paying for, as these reduce available funding to support and enable growing and strengthening our economy. Emergency events also disrupt our

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supply chains, reducing local tourism, which increases costs and inflationary pressure across New Zealand.

We also have a limited tax base, limited ability to increase local rates, and increasing costs associated with insurance (coupled with increasing likelihood of reduced cover), so we must begin working together better, not just producing recovery plans in isolation, but actively sharing and planning together on how we can mitigate infrastructure risks. We also can't afford to increase specifications and build more resilient infrastructure everywhere ahead of increasing natural hazard risks; hence our risk management and asset management must optimise and balance decision making to validate options that reduce risks whilst maximising the benefits on every decision.

As an island nation exposed to increasing weather events, coupled with geological risks, and increasing man made threats, any proactive decisions we make around mitigating risks reduces the harm to our communities and impact to our economy. These proposed changes to our legislation therefore miss the opportunity to provide clear direction around what we need to do to collectively increase our infrastructure resilience, both short term and longer term. With less than 50% of public assets insured, coupled with increasing cascading and compounding risks, we need to urgently begin increasing our capability to improve our risk and asset management.

Infrastructure exists for community benefit, but our communities are now facing increasing events and increased likelihood of harm, together with increasing costs to our economy, hence improvements in emergency management and infrastructure resilience must occur together.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Claire Brown |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | West Coast Emergency Management |

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Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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20 May 20025

Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency
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Tēnā koutou

**WEST COAST EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (WCEM)**
**SUBMISSION ON DISCUSSION DOCUMENT TO INFORM THE DESIGN OF THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT BILL**

West Coast Emergency Management Group (the Group) is comprised of the West Coast Regional Council, the three territorial authorities (Buller, Grey and Westland) and Iwi partners Poutini Ngāi Tahu (Makaawhio and Ngāti Waewae). The Group is a joint standing committee for the West Coast Emergency Management Group office. The West Coast Regional Council is the administrative body and employs staff in the Group office who, among other duties, support the emergency management functions across all three territorial authorities.

The West Coast is a geographically a region with a length of 600km and a population of around 33,000 people. The Group is also responsible for approximately 7-8,000 additional tourist visitors that pass through on any given day that require specific plans and support in the event of emergencies. The drive between the northern reaches of Buller, to Jackson Bay in South Westland is comparable in distance to driving from Wellington to Auckland. Much of the region is public conservation land and national parks. The West Coast economy rests on tourism, dairy farming and fishing, with the minerals industry (including gold and coal mining) remaining vitally important.

We, like other parts of the country are challenged with more frequent and serious natural hazard events. We have a natural hazard risk profile that demands we are future focussed around development and how we keep people and communities safe and resilient. We are conscious of the 75% probability of a catastrophic Alpine Fault (AF8) earthquake within the next 50 years. Our communities are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of being prepared and will require greater support and capability of the group.

Some aspects of our current structure and governance make it difficult to get consistent arrangements across the region. Like all groups, we are subject to local rating base pressures, three-year local government elections, varying 'levels of services' and allocated funding across each of our districts. What is a priority and focus for one district may differ from the neighboring district, with a very different funding model for all.

Our strength is in our relationships across the West Coast, our South Island neighbours as well as the wider emergency management system, communities, businesses and individuals. However, we are also constrained by the challenges many organisations have on the West Coast with a thin layer of representation and resourcing. For example, many of our social and critical infrastructure entities have

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limited resource based on the Coast. This often requires resources to be pre-deployed to the region from across the South Island ahead of events. Our state highway and local road network is vulnerable to natural hazards and often a state-highway closure cuts off the only arterial route preventing travel and traffic through the region with very limited detours available.

The West Coast is not alone in its challenges, and we endorse the efforts of central government to better support the system's ability to respond. We consider the West Coast Emergency Management sector a highly motivated and collaborative network. We work hard to maintain relationships and look for opportunities to team up to mitigate the challenges we all face.

We appreciate the work each Emergency Management Group manager for the regions has contributed to develop the Te Uru Kahika Emergency Management submission. We would like to show our support to the following comments made in their submission as follows:

> *CDEM does not work without staff and funding from regional government. As well as performing the range of EM-related functions … council staff also step in to bolster EM during response and recovery. This ability, and willingness, to provide surge capacity is a crucial part of the EM system; in extended or repeat events, it also places a strain on councils' discharge of other duties – including duties that are important to EM, like river management.*
>
> *Adequate resourcing is essential to the performance of the EM system. All options presented to move the issue of overall responsibility and accountability on have distinct and different resourcing implications. The system does not work without the local government workforce that is required and ready to support emergency management.*
>
> *Neither will the level of required systemic change that is required to meet the challenges EM will increasingly face occur, without a major shift in focus on supporting enhanced capacity of communities towards self-reliance and ability to assist others near to them.*
>
> Emergency Management Special Interest Group Submission, May 2025

Our comments on the discussion document are set out in the pages following this cover letter. In line with the discussion document, we have narrowed our focus to seven issues across four objectives as follows:

Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

- **Issue 2**: Strengthening and enabling Iwi Māori participation
- **Issue 3**: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

- **Issue 6**: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

- **Issue 8.1**: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance
- **Issue 8.2**: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues
- **Issue 9**: Strengthening local hazard risk management

Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

- **Issue 11.2**: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

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Thank you for the opportunity to submit. We greatly appreciated the opportunity to talk with Hon Mark Mitchell and Deputy Chief Executive, John Price, in person when they visited the region on 9 May 2025.

Yours sincerely



Mayor Jamie Cleine - Buller District Council
**Chair, West Coast Emergency Management Joint Committee**

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**WEST COAST EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT – JOINT COMMITTEE SUBMISSION**

This submission focused on seven of the 16 issues set out in the discussion document (DD) are of most importance for our region.

**Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation**

Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We agree with the option that the Director is explicitly required to consult representatives of disproportionately affected communities to inform national planning (option 4). These options should mirror each other at a regional and a national level.

In addition:

Māori are frequently asked to put forward representatives on numerous groups and panels little or no resource support to enable involvement. On the West Coast it is a challenge for Māori to input meaningfully already. We would support consideration on a national and regional resource support model to give effect to this objective.

Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

The discussion document has canvassed the issues regarding community participation, but greater acknowledgement should be made that community participation is constrained by resources and competing priorities.

We agree with the option to develop and update guidance and strengthen public education (option 2); the examples given would all be useful. We note it will be very important to work with local government and CDEM groups to progress this, to identify firstly what guidance is necessary. Secondly, examples of guidance/templates already exist that can be repurposed.

We do not consider the legislative option proposed is necessary i.e. "that CDEM Group plans be required to state how the Group will manage offers of resources from the public" (option 3). It is difficult to imagine what the legislative provisions would look like to achieve this, and how it would be enforced. Instead, the focus should be on developing guidance and templates (option 2) to develop the capacity and capability.

**Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels**

Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We agree that providing distinct responsibilities for CDEM Groups and their local authority members in legislation (option 2) should reduce duplication and ambiguity of roles and help in delivery.

However, we do not agree with Option 3 - that CDEM Group plans should be required to state how each member will fund and deliver on the functions and decisions of the CDEM Group. We are unsure what would be a suitable basis for determining an allocation. Generally, most councils can negotiate at Joint Committee level the relative contributions that individual councils will make. A legal requirement is unlikely to be the fix for any problems that do exist.

Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management.

The discussion document has identified that lines of accountability between the CDEM Group, local authority members, chief executives, emergency management staff, and statutory officers such as Controllers and Recovery Managers may not be in line with what the CDEM Act and guidance intended. We support option 2, that guidance should be updated and models provided, for how CDEM Groups and local authorities could organise emergency management in their region.

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We do not agree with option 4, that the chief executive of each local authority holds the role of Controller and Recovery Manager. The reasons why we do not support this option follow:

- In all events, a council will need to continue to operate and often backfill and support the CDEM response directly and indirectly. The chief executive focuses on providing that bridge. This enables the chief executive to remain flexible to support the more formalised response structure
- The role of the chief executive is as advisor to the mayor, who will be the face of the community's response to any crisis
- Significant professional development is required (time commitment) to be properly qualified as a Controller
- If a chief executive is at the coal face, it is harder to see (and plan for) the strategy
- A chief executive as Controller would break the command-and-control structure from Controller to Group to NEMA.
- The chief executive sometimes needs to shield the EOC from political imperatives.

Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

The discussion document explores options to improve engagement in Coordinating Executive Groups. We are not convinced that a legislative solution is required. The options outlined are:

- Provide more specific expectations on members of the Coordinating Executive Group supported by good practice guidance (option 2)
- Require the Coordinating Executive Group to report to the Director on how and to what extent it has delivered on its functions under the CDEM Act (option 3)
- Remove the ability for Coordinating Executive Group members to delegate membership, or require these entities to have a single, specified delegate (option 4)

We consider it is important to provide flexibility to regions and further, that through guidance and a close relationship with the national agency, much progress can be made. If a legislative fix is progressed, then we would support option 2 as it is important to have clarity around expectations on members of a Coordinating Executive Group.

**Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management**

Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We support the non-legislative option of more guidance and strengthened governance and that this is achieved by working with the local government sector and agencies to determine priorities and develop material (option 2).

We also support enabling legislation to allow rules to be developed through secondary legislation but we consider this needs to be done through working closely with local government and agencies (option 3).

We support giving the Director the function of monitoring the performance of the emergency management system (option 4).

The mandating of a Common Operating Platform across all of Aotearoa would assist with 'raising the bar' for our responses and would also assist with:

- Reporting 'up' during an event
- Sharing of information between Groups
- Helping out-of-region staff get up to speed quicker / with less assistance – 'plug and play'
- Consistency / quality of information

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- Reduced training costs

Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We are very supportive of legislative changes to strengthen hazard risk management through resource management reform and climate adaptation. It is important that the respective legislative frameworks do not duplicate or overlap but have purposes and provisions that are aligned. It is the perfect time to achieve this, given the reviews of relevant legislation and national direction currently underway.

To make gains in risk reduction we support the non-legislative options put forward: provide clearer guidance about what it means to achieve an "acceptable" level of risk (option 2); update guidance and strengthen assurance of CDEM Group plans (option 3). We encourage NEMA to work with local government and with relevant agencies to achieve this.

We also support secondary legislation setting mandatory requirements about the content and detail of Group Plans, including standards that must be followed (such as risk assessment processes) (option 4). To fulfil this option and develop standards it will be necessary to work closely with local government and with relevant agencies.

It will be essential to form a group at a national level comprising local government, relevant agencies and NEMA to agree priorities and oversee the development of guidance and standards across the range of matters identified in the discussion document. This will also help to achieve buy-in from parties.

**Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services**

We support progressing the following:

- Strengthen assurance and develop standards and guidance - non-legislative (option 2)
- Explicitly require CDEM Groups to involve the lifeline utilities in their areas in the development of CDEM Group plans – legislative (option 3)
- Strengthen information sharing protections – legislative (option 5)
- Enable data standards to be prescribed through secondary legislation

Prescribing that lifeline utilities must contribute to national response plans as a legislative option (option 4) needs careful thought given the administrative effort associated with this and, it is assumed, some sort of compliance framework to ensure it happens.
We also support non-legislative options to support business continuity.

**ADDITIONAL AREAS OF CONCERN**

**RECOVERY**
We believe the roles of Recovery is not sufficiently addressed through the options. We support NEMA's role in recovery is further enabled to include and be lead agency for all phases and co-ordination of an 'all of government' recovery programme.

**TOURISM LEVY**
We believe there needs more investigation into how the tourism levy will be managed to support areas of natural significance, and how this translates to supporting those communities and districts who host significant tourist numbers and must assist them in emergency events.

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To: Policy Unit, National Emergency Management Agency

Email: EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

## 1. Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback on the proposed objectives and issues for the reform of the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act. We welcome the Government's intent to modernise and strengthen the emergency management framework in Aotearoa New Zealand. This submission provides commentary on the proposed objectives and issues. It also recommends additional objectives.

## 2. Who this submission is from?

This submission is made by the Northland Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group and its members.

The Group has a long-standing history of effectively coordinating emergency responses and ensuring the resilience of communities across the region. Northland has faced many significant events, including severe weather events, flooding, tsunami threats, wildfires, and infrastructure disruptions. Through proactive planning, strong community engagement, and inter-agency collaboration, the CDEM Group has successfully navigated these challenges. The Group has provided timely support to ensure that essential services remain operational during crises.

As part of its commitment to continuous improvement, the Northland CDEM Group welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the discussion on strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation. With firsthand experience in managing emergencies, the Group understands the importance of legislative frameworks that empower local and regional authorities to act swiftly and effectively. Coordinating resources, implementing response plans, and supporting recovery efforts are central to Northland's approach. This ensures that emergency management is adaptable and responsive to evolving risks.

Our submission provides insights drawn from practical experiences in disaster management. The submission highlights successful strategies, identifies areas for improvement, and advocates for effective legislative support. In providing this submission, the Group seeks to strengthen New Zealand's emergency preparedness and response capabilities. The lessons learned from past emergencies will be crucial in shaping policies that enhance resilience, safeguard communities, and ensure a coordinated national approach to disaster management.

## 3. Background and Context

The Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2002 was designed to establish a comprehensive framework for emergency reduction, readiness, response, and recovery in New Zealand. It set out roles and responsibilities for national, regional, and local authorities. It aims to create a coordinated approach to emergency management. However, despite the Act's intent, its implementation has been inconsistent. This has left critical gaps in the country's ability to effectively respond to large-scale emergencies. Many of the provisions within the Act have not been fully realised due to a combination of structural, funding, and governance challenges. This has resulted in fragmented responses and a lack of cohesion in disaster management efforts. These issues have been highlighted in previous reviews.



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One of the key issues has been the variability in how CDEM Groups apply the legislation across regions. While the Act intended to create a unified national strategy, local implementation has often been dictated by resource availability and regional priorities. This has led to a patchwork approach rather than a consistent, nationwide system. This disparity has meant that some areas are far better equipped to handle emergencies than others. This has creating vulnerabilities in regions which have fewer resources or less experienced personnel.

Uneven implementation has hindered sharing of best practices, making it harder for underprepared regions to learn from those that have successfully managed emergency events. The government Technical Advisory Group review in 2017 highlighted the inconsistencies in CDEM delivery, including disparity in training Controllers, Coordinated incident management variation, a lack of a common operating picture and inconsistency in the delivery of CDEM arrangements across regions.

The gaps in implementing the 2002 CDEM Act have exposed weaknesses in preparedness planning, resource allocation, and emergency governance. These gaps need to be fixed by the effective application of the Act.

Northland has consistently implemented the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2002 consistent with its intent. This has ensured a coordinated and effective approach to emergency management. The region has prioritised maintaining a comprehensive and current CDEM Group Plan. This serves as the foundation for preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.

The CDEM Group Plan plays a critical role in guiding operational responses, resource allocation, and inter-agency coordination. Through regular reviews, training exercises, and public engagement, the region continues to strengthen its emergency management framework, setting a strong example for other CDEM Groups across New Zealand.

**Community engagement** has been a cornerstone of Northland's approach to building resilience, with a strong emphasis on empowering local communities through **Community Response Plans** and **Marae Preparedness Initiatives**. These efforts ensure that communities are actively involved in emergency planning and equipped with the knowledge and resources needed to respond effectively to crises. Northland has worked closely with local groups, iwi, and marae to develop tailored preparedness strategies that reflect the unique needs and strengths of each community. Marae, as cultural and social hubs, play a vital role in emergency response, serving as safe havens during disasters and coordinating support for those affected. By fostering strong relationships and prioritising community-led preparedness, Northland has built a robust foundation for resilience.

The **Northland Lifelines Utility Group** has played a critical role in ensuring the resilience of essential infrastructure and services across the region since its establishment in 2004. The Group brings together key utility providers, including electricity, telecommunications, transport, water, and fuel suppliers and others. It assesses risks, identifies vulnerabilities, and develops mitigation strategies. By maintaining regular meetings and fostering strong interagency relationships, the Group ensures that Northland's lifeline services remain prepared for potential disruptions caused emergencies.

Integrated into **Northland's emergency response framework**, the Lifelines Utility Group plays a vital role in coordinating critical infrastructure support during emergency events. The group members have engaged during emergency responses, particularly in weather emergencies, such as the 2007 storms in March and June, storms in 2014, and more recently Cyclone Gabrielle and the Transpower tower failure in March 2024. In times of crisis, its well-established communication channels and planning efforts enable swift decision-making and resource-sharing, allowing emergency services and utility providers to collaborate seamlessly. The Group's ability to anticipate challenges and develop response



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strategies has been key in maintaining continuity of services for residents, businesses, and emergency responders. By consistently refining its operational plans and conducting resilience assessments, the Northland Lifelines Utility Group remains a cornerstone of regional preparedness effectively.

The **Welfare Advisory Group** has been a vital component of Northland's emergency response framework, ensuring that the welfare needs of individuals and communities are met during crises. The Group has strengthened its capabilities by fostering close collaboration with key agencies, including health services, social support organisations, and iwi representatives. This integrated approach has allowed it to deliver timely and effective welfare support, particularly during large-scale emergencies such as severe weather events and the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic, the Welfare Advisory Group played a crucial role in coordinating essential services, ensuring access to food, housing support, and mental health resources, while also prioritising the needs of vulnerable populations. By continuously adapting its response strategies and maintaining strong community engagement, the Group has demonstrated resilience and leadership in crisis situations, helping Northland communities recover and rebuild.

While Northland has established a strong foundation in emergency management, we recognise that there is always room for improvement and development. The challenges posed by evolving risks, climate change, and the increasing complexity of large-scale emergencies highlight the need for continuous adaptation and refinement of our systems.

By refining existing frameworks and addressing operational gaps, we can ensure that Northland —and New Zealand — can effectively handle future emergencies.

We support the intent of the **Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation** discussion document. This submission makes recommendations that will further strengthen and enhance the legislation.

## 4. Objectives for Reform

The five objectives outlined in paragraph 35 of the discussion document provide a foundation for strengthening New Zealand's emergency management framework. They convey the need for clear roles and responsibilities, improved national coordination, enhanced community resilience, and a more consistent approach across all levels of emergency response. Northland supports these objectives, as they align with the principles that have guided our own emergency management practices.

### Additions to the objectives

**Resourcing and Investment: Addressing the underfunding of Emergency Management**

The group acknowledges the findings of the *Government Inquiry into the Response to North Island Severe Weather Events* (Para.36). These highlight insufficient investment in readiness planning, activities, equipment and supplies. The finding highlights **severe underfunding**, the disparities in capability, and burnout among many emergency management professionals. The Hawkes Bay CDEM Group independent review[1] by Bush International Consulting commented that "The national emergency management system is not fit for purpose and it sets good people up to fail."

[1] Bush International Consulting, Hawke's Bay Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Response to Cyclone Gabrielle, Independent External Review, March 2024



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While the consultation proposes improvements to structure and coordination, **resourcing and funding is not sufficiently addressed**. A legislative reform without a budget and funding risks embedding aspiration without implementation.

We submit that consideration be given to the following**:**

- Introduce baseline national funding for minimum service levels
- Fund training, surge capacity, and capability development
- Require local authorities to prioritise and transparently fund emergency management
- Address regional funding inequities, particularly in smaller or rural communities
- Embed the principle of investment in long-term capability within the new Act.

Apart from welfare costs during response and recovery, the Resilience Fund is the sole source of funding available from NEMA to CDEM Groups. While this fund has evolved from a direct subsidy in 2003 to its current contestable form, its value has remained unchanged. Initially each council received a Government grant based on expenditure to support their CDEM arrangements. Despite subsequent changes to the fund, the available funding value has remained unchanged.

The current level of Central Government funding for regional CDEM arrangements is insufficient.

We recommend that Central Government take a stronger role in funding regional CDEM arrangements.

**International Assistance**

While Northland acknowledges and supports the objectives outlined in the discussion document for the new Emergency Management Bill, we believe a crucial element warrants explicit inclusion: the proactive management of international assistance during major emergencies.

New Zealand's experience with large-scale disasters, such as the Christchurch earthquakes, underscores our reliance on international support for specialised resources. These include search and rescue teams, specialised medical professionals and essential equipment not readily available in New Zealand.

The review following the Christchurch earthquake highlighted significant challenges in effectively coordinating the influx of international rescue teams, including those with whom New Zealand does not have formal diplomatic relations. The review noted that the necessary processes for managing these offers of assistance were time-consuming.

In the context of rapid-onset disasters like earthquakes, the initial 72 hours are critical for saving lives. The ability to swiftly integrate international rescue teams and medical assistance into the immediate disaster zone, without undue delay caused by procedural complexities, is paramount.

Northland strongly recommends that the new Emergency Management Bill provides a framework for receiving and coordinating international assistance.

By proactively addressing the integration of international assistance, the new Emergency Management Bill can significantly enhance New Zealand's capacity to respond effectively and efficiently to major emergencies, ultimately improving our ability to save lives and minimise suffering.

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**Group Offices**

The current objectives and intent do not adequately address a key recommendation from the 2017 Ministerial Review – *Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies (TAG review)*.

The TAG review recommended more formalised shared service arrangements, implemented by regional or unitary councils, to strengthen a Group-wide approach and accountability.

Northland has successfully operated as a regional entity, utilising shared service arrangements across its four constituent councils to deliver emergency management through a single Group Office.

The establishment of Group Offices was initially recommended in the 2003 Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM), now NEMA, guideline to support the CDEM sector. Despite this recommendation, a divergent approach has developed to how Groups are structured and operate. We recommend that this issue be revisited. This would achieve greater national consistency in emergency management structures while preserving effective local delivery within our region.

To ensure consistent emergency management delivery across regions, the Emergency Management Bill should include a regional structure, and specify the roles and responsibilities of Group Managers.

## 5. Feedback on Issues in the Discussion Document

### Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

#### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We fully support **options 3 and 4** under **Issue 1** as they provide a strong framework for improving community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management.

**Consultation questions**

**Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionally affected by emergencies?**

Key reasons why some people may be disproportionately represented in emergency management planning and response:

- **Socioeconomic Barriers** – People from lower-income communities often face challenges in accessing emergency preparedness resources, information, and assistance. Lower incomes restrict their ability to invest in personal preparedness measures. Systemic inequalities can result in inadequate representation in decision-making processes.
- **Cultural and Language Differences** – Diverse communities, particularly those where English is not a first language, may struggle to engage with emergency planning efforts due to language barriers or a lack of culturally relevant communication.
- **Geographical and Accessibility Challenges** – People living in rural, remote, or high-risk areas may have less access to emergency management services, response teams, and infrastructure. Additionally, individuals with disabilities or mobility restrictions may not be adequately represented in planning discussions, leading to evacuation procedures and emergency support structures that fail to meet their needs.

In developing **Community Response and Marae Preparedness Plans** in Northland, we have successfully navigated and overcome these challenges.



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***What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?***

Northland has a well-established history of working closely with communities and iwi to develop robust emergency response arrangements that have been tested and proven effective. Our experience has shown that better-informed planning would achieve these benefits:

- **Community Empowerment and Ownership:** Encourages localised solutions that reflect the unique needs of each community while ensuring individuals, businesses, and local leaders are actively involved in emergency planning and response.
- **Stronger Iwi Māori Partnership:** Recognises the essential role of iwi Māori and marae as critical hubs in emergency response, incorporating traditional knowledge and values to enhance preparedness efforts.
- **Improved Coordination and Resource Allocation:** Establishes clearer communication channels between communities and emergency agencies, reducing fragmentation and ensuring resources reach those in need efficiently.
- **Consistent and Effective Planning:** Supports the development of standardised yet adaptable emergency response frameworks.
- **Long-Term Resilience and Recovery:** Builds capacity for communities to sustain recovery efforts post-emergency, reducing reliance on external support and fostering self-sufficiency.
- **Expediting Assistance and Response:** Advocates for legislation that removes bureaucratic delays in deploying emergency personnel and resources, including international aid, to affected communities.

**Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management**

We strongly support **options 3, 4, and 5** under **Issue 2.** They would ensure meaningful representation and engagement opportunities for iwi Māori at all levels—**Governance, Operational**, and, most importantly, in the development of **Group Plans**. These options reinforce the value of inclusive decision-making and collaborative emergency management strategies.

**Consultation questions**

***Have we captured the role that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?***

We support the discussion document's recognition of the crucial role that iwi Māori play before, during, and after emergencies. The outlined approach acknowledges the leadership, resilience, and community-centred response iwi bring to emergency management, and we endorse the inclusion of these perspectives in shaping a more effective and inclusive system. We endorse what has been outlined in the document in this area.

***How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?***

Iwi Māori should be recognised as key partners in New Zealand's emergency management system, with a formal role in governance, planning, response, and recovery efforts. Their leadership, knowledge, and deep connection to the land and communities make them integral to building resilience and ensuring culturally appropriate disaster responses. Strengthening this partnership will enhance national preparedness, improve community-led recovery, and ensure that emergency management strategies reflect the diverse needs of all people.

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***What should be the relationship between CDEM Groups and iwi Māori?***

The relationship between **CDEM Groups (Joint Standing Committees)** and **iwi Māori** should be built on a foundation of **genuine partnership, shared decision-making, and mutual respect**. Iwi Māori bring invaluable knowledge, leadership, and cultural expertise to emergency management, ensuring that responses are **community-driven and culturally appropriate**. By fostering a collaborative approach, CDEM Groups and iwi can work together to enhance regional resilience, improve engagement, and create emergency strategies that **reflect the diverse needs of all communities**.

We recommend that consideration be given to strengthening this relationship by enabling iwi Māori the option of either:

- full membership
- or observer status within CDEM governance structures.

Full membership would allow iwi representatives to actively participate in decision-making, shaping emergency management policies and strategies alongside local government and response agencies. Observer status would be a more flexible arrangement, ensuring iwi voices are consistently heard without conferring direct governance responsibilities. Whichever model is adopted, ensuring **formal representation** and recognition of iwi Māori within CDEM Groups is essential for a **more inclusive, effective, and regionally tailored** emergency management system.

***What should the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?***

The **Coordinating Executive Group (CEG)** and **iwi Māori** should have a strong, collaborative relationship that ensures Māori perspectives are integrated into operational emergency management. This partnership can be structured in several ways:

- **Formal Representation:** Iwi Māori could have a seat within the CEG, actively contributing to emergency response planning and decision-making.
- **Advisory Role:** Iwi Māori could provide strategic guidance on culturally appropriate emergency response efforts.
- **Flexible Engagement:** Offering iwi either full membership or observer status within CEG, ensuring representation at a level suited to their role.
- A **consistent, structured partnership** between CEG and iwi Māori would enhance **community resilience, operational efficiency, and culturally aligned response efforts**, ensuring Māori communities are well-integrated into emergency.

***What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and matauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?***

The most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director would be through the establishment of a Māori Advisory Board or similar structure. This board could ensure consistent representation and input, allowing iwi Māori to formally contribute their knowledge, experiences, and perspectives to national emergency management policy and decision-making.

A Māori Advisory Board would serve as a dedicated platform for iwi Māori to provide strategic guidance on emergency preparedness, response, and recovery. This would include integrating traditional Māori knowledge (mātauranga Māori), strengthening community-led resilience initiatives, and ensuring culturally appropriate emergency strategies. The board could also facilitate ongoing



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dialogue between iwi Māori and emergency management leadership, ensuring that their expertise is actively incorporated into national frameworks.

**Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management**

We support **Option 2** under **Issue 3.** It emphasises **Community Capability Building** as a vital component of strengthening emergency management. By enhancing local knowledge, training, and preparedness initiatives, we can empower communities to take an active role in disaster response and recovery, ensuring resilience at every level. **Community Capability Building** is a fundamental pillar of **effective emergency management**, helping communities become **proactive, prepared, and resilient** in the face of disasters.

**Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses, and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency**

We support **Option 2**, which strengthens **protection from civil liability** for individuals who act in **good faith** to manage an emergency **before or in the absence of a formal response**. Ensuring legal safeguards for those who take swift, responsible action helps encourage timely intervention, ultimately reducing harm and improving overall emergency management effectiveness.

We have numerous examples over recent emergencies, including in cyclone Gabrielle, in Northland where this protection would be applicable. Often, **local people — neighbours, passersby, and community members** — are the first to act before official rescue teams arrive.

We do not support Option 3 which sets a legislative approach to eligibility criteria for reimbursement of costs incurred by community members. This would be difficult to manage and could lead to uncontrolled or authorised funding issues.

## Objective 2: Providing for Clear Responsibilities and Accountabilities at all levels

**Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during emergencies**

We submit that the proposed options for incident management unnecessarily complicate what should be straightforward arrangement. Specifically, the introduction of the term "Control Agency" in Options 2 and 3 creates potential confusion and deviates from established best practices.

The term "Lead Agency" is well-established and consistently applied within the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) framework for New Zealand. This terminology is widely understood and forms the basis of effective inter-agency collaboration during emergency responses.

Therefore, Northland strongly recommends Option 1. The roles and responsibilities of lead and supporting agencies should be clearly defined within the National Plan.

The current *Guide to the National Plan 2015, Part 4, Appendix 1* already provides a valuable framework by listing hazard types and their corresponding lead agencies at various levels, along with references to their legislative mandates. This existing structure offers a sound foundation for further clarification.

Our experience in Northland has demonstrated the effectiveness of the Group, operating through the Group Controller, in assuming the role of lead agency when appropriate. This approach allows for flexible leadership, with various agencies providing support based on the specific nature and demands of the event.

To ensure clarity and avoid unnecessary complexity, Northland advocates for resolving the definition of leadership roles through specification within secondary legislation, such as the National Plan and its



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associated guidance. This approach will build upon existing frameworks, promote consistent understanding across agencies, and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of emergency responses.

**Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management**

This issue was previously highlighted in the *2017 Technical Advisory Group (TAG) report*, specifically in *Chapter 3: Regional Structure*. The current section of the document appears to address the recommendations outlined in the TAG report, and we support its intent to **strengthen the performance of CDEM Groups and CEGs**.

In our submission to the **TAG review**, we advocated for a more **enhanced and structured regional approach**, recognising its importance in building resilience and improving coordination. Northland has consistently invested in this approach, resulting in **strengthened capability and capacity** across our emergency management framework. While we acknowledge the progress made, we also recognise that **there is always room for further improvement** to ensure the system continues to evolve and effectively meet the needs of communities.

**Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities**

Although this has been highlighted in the review it is not something that we have had to deal with in Northland. Since we have service level agreements and role clarity, there is our arrangements are unambiguous, compared to other regions.

We support the initiative to develop distinct responsibilities outlined in Option 2, ensuring clear definitions of roles, actions, and coordination. Establishing structured guidance on roles will strengthen accountability, efficiency, and emergency response effectiveness.

**Issue 6.2: Providing clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management**

We are aware that Emergency Management Groups operate based on what they believe works best for their region. This has resulted in 16 different groups each implementing emergency management in 16 different ways, despite having the same overarching objectives. This variation has led to inconsistencies in approach, coordination, and resource allocation, highlighting the need for greater alignment and standardisation, while still allowing regional flexibility.

**Option 3** proposes a one-size-fits-all approach to this issue, which we believe is not suitable given distinct regional variations.

**Option 2** is preferable as it preserves the flexibility of groups, allowing them to adapt to local needs while maintaining collaborative working relationships with their constituent councils.

We **do not support Option 4**. Appointing Chief Executives (CEs) as Group Controller and Recovery Manager with delegated responsibility is not an appropriate way to enhance accountability and responsibility. We believe other mechanisms, such as CEG arrangements, group plans, and increased intervention authority for the NEMA Director, offer better solutions.

To ensure successful implementation, clear and directive guidance will be necessary — particularly regarding expectations, resource allocation, funding arrangements, formal agreements, and sources of financial support. Establishing structured but adaptable frameworks will help balance national consistency with regional autonomy.

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**Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups**

We support **options 2 and 4** and agree with the summary outlined in the document. Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) are the backbone of emergency management, ensuring that regional preparedness, response, and recovery efforts function effectively.

Chief Executives (CEs) and councils must actively participate in Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) and ensure **their councils are fully engaged.** The ability to delegate this role and act independently must be removed from the legislation for CE's and other members of CEG's.

Strengthening CEG's is a better option than appointing CE's as Group Controllers and Recovery Managers.

At the forefront of decision-making and coordination, CEGs bring together key agencies — including emergency services, lifeline utilities, health authorities, and local government — to implement the CDEM Group plan. CEGs drive preparedness, overseeing risk assessments, planning frameworks, and capability-building initiatives that strengthen community resilience.

Without strong and engaged CEGs, emergency arrangements risk being disjointed, under-resourced, and reactive. Their leadership is essential to ensure that regional plans function cohesively.

The **effectiveness of the CEG** is a function of its membership and ensuring the **right level of representation** is essential. We strongly recommend that the legislation be amended to **elevate NEMA's role** from an **"observer"** to a **formal member** of the CEG. Furthermore, to ensure NEMA's contribution is aligned with the governance level of other members, the **Regional Emergency Management Advisor** should be replaced with a **more senior executive-level representative**. This would provide NEMA with the **appropriate authority and influence** to effectively engage in strategic decision-making and support regional emergency management efforts.

A similar approach should also be applied to **NEMA's membership within CDEM Groups**, ensuring a **more formal and appropriately senior level of representation**. Strengthening NEMA's role within CDEM Groups will enhance coordination, improve strategic engagement, and ensure that emergency management decisions reflect **national priorities alongside regional needs**.

**Consultation question:**

***Do you think fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at technical government level (for example the CDEM Group -based model) If so, why?***

We recommend that the membership of CDEM Groups, section 13, CDEM Act 2002, be amended to include the District Commander of Police and the Regional Fire Commander.

Our recommendation and experience supports this change. Since its establishment in **2003**, the **Northland CDEM Group Joint Committee** has included the **District Commander of Police** and the **Regional Fire Commander** as key members. No other CDDEM Groups have adopted this approach. Their inclusion has provided **critical expertise, leadership, and operational insight**, significantly strengthening emergency management governance.

These **senior emergency service leaders** have contributed to ensuring that decisions made at the governance level are **informed by frontline experience**. Their involvement has facilitated **stronger interagency collaboration**, streamlined **resource deployment**, and enhanced overall **community safety and resilience**.



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Implementing this change would **significantly enhance** the capability and effectiveness of **emergency management** nationwide. By formally integrating **senior emergency service leaders** into CDEM Group governance, emergency planning and responses would be **more informed, coordinated, and strategically aligned**. This approach would directly contribute to the **strengthening and uplift** of emergency management, addressing the key areas identified for improvement. It ensures that **leadership, expertise, and operational insight** are embedded at the highest levels, resulting in a **more resilient and well-prepared emergency management system**.

Expanding on this approach, **more operational representatives from Police and FENZ actively participate in our CEG**. Their direct involvement ensures that emergency management decisions are informed by **on-the-ground operational expertise**, strengthening coordination between governance and response agencies.

**Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date**

We support **measures to streamline and reduce administrative burdens** associated with updating emergency management plans. However, we are **concerned** that **the National Plan, due for review in 2015, has not been reviewed**, leaving critical gaps in preparedness and response frameworks. We support a combination of options 1, 2 and 3.

Furthermore, the **ability of CDEM Groups to deviate from established guidelines on plan processes and timelines** has contributed to inconsistencies in regional emergency readiness. Given the fundamental role these plans play in delivering effective emergency management, it is concerning that they are allowed to lapse and remain outdated. A structured, **mandatory review and update process** must be implemented to ensure that emergency management plans remain **consistent, current, operationally effective, and aligned with evolving risks and best practices.**

## Objective 3: Enabling a Higher Minimum Standard of Emergency Management

**Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance.**

We the options that promote national consistency in emergency management, a combination of **options 2, 3 and 4.**

The current permissive legislative framework has allowed CDEM Groups to deviate from national guidance, leading to inconsistencies in planning, response, and coordination. This lack of alignment weakens the system resilience. To address this problem, we support actions that strengthen governance, enhance national guidance, and establish a broader range of mandatory standards within legislation.

However, while stronger national standards are essential, we recognise the need for flexibility to allow CDEM Groups to tailor their approaches to the unique needs of their communities. A strengthened and enhanced CDEM system—nationally, regionally, and locally—requires firm leadership and engagement, consistent frameworks, and targeted guidance, ensuring both uniformity and adaptability in emergency preparedness and response.

**Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues**

Northland supports a combination of Options 2 and 3, recognising the critical and urgent need for greater consistency across the emergency management sector nationwide. The permissive nature of the current legislation has led to discrepancies in approach and capability between Civil Defence



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Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups, without any formal mechanisms for intervention or the enforcement of alignment.

Our experience indicates that the Monitoring and Evaluation reviews previously conducted by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) in 2015/16 were valuable in identifying inconsistencies and highlighting areas requiring improvement. However, the absence of explicit authority and a clear mandate meant that the Director lacked the power to compel changes to ensure a uniformly high standard of emergency management practice.

To effectively address this weakness, the ability to review, assess, and enforce improvements must be explicitly and linked to the CDEM legislation and the broader planning process. Therefore, Northland strongly recommends that the new legislation grant the Director a mandate to intervene in situations where there is a significant deviation from the outcomes outlined in a Group's plan or where demonstrable non-performance is identified in a CDEM Group.

Establishing a more structured and enforceable system of oversight will be instrumental in ensuring that national standards are consistently upheld, regional disparities in capability are minimised, and the overall emergency management capabilities across New Zealand are continuously strengthened. This enhanced accountability will foster a more resilient and unified national emergency management framework.

**Consultation question.**

***What aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?***

- **Funding and Resource Allocation:** Implementing **equitable and consistent funding models** to ensure all regions have the **necessary resources, personnel, and training** to maintain emergency readiness.
- **Clear Legislative Authority**: Strengthening legislation to provide **enforceable national standards** and a **mandate** for intervention when there are inconsistencies in emergency preparedness. This mandate should include the authority for the Director to intervene when necessary.
- **Standardised Emergency Planning and Coordination:** Establishing **mandatory national frameworks** for CDEM planning, response protocols, and coordination mechanisms to ensure **alignment across regions**.
- **Risk Assessment and Hazard Mapping:** Ensuring **nationally coordinated hazard identification, risk assessment, and early warning systems** to enable a **uniform approach** to disaster risk reduction.
- **National Training and Capability Development:** Introducing **standardised training** for emergency management professionals and community volunteers to enhance **skills, interoperability, and response effectiveness**
- **Monitoring, Evaluation and Enforcement**: Establishing a **national oversight mechanism** to regularly assess CDEM performance, **identify gaps**, and ensure improvements are **implemented across all regions**.
- **Community Engagement and Public Awareness**: Strengthening **national education campaigns** to **ensure all communities** understand their emergency risks, preparedness steps, and evacuation procedures.

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- **Integrated Response with Iwi Māori and Partner Agencies:** Embedding nationally consistent engagement models with iwi Māori, ensuring cultural perspectives and local knowledge are effectively integrated into emergency planning and response efforts

**Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management**

We recommend **option 4**, as it ensures the necessary flexibility to tailor local hazard risk management plans to the specific needs of each region. Also, we recognise that this approach will be a legislative requirement, requiring enforcement to maintain consistency and accountability. Balancing regional adaptability with clear legislative mandates will strengthen emergency management planning, ensuring both effectiveness and compliance

**Consultation questions**

***What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?***

Achieving the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency in CDEM Group plans requires a structured yet adaptable framework.

To maintain this balance, key considerations include:

- **Nationally Mandated Core Standards**: Establishing **minimum requirements** for emergency planning, governance, and response to ensure a cohesive national approach.
- **Regionally Tailored Implementation**: Allowing CDEM Groups the flexibility to adapt plans to their specific risks, infrastructure, and communities, ensuring practical local application while maintaining compliance.
- **Stronger Oversight and Guidance**: NEMA must provide ongoing monitoring, evaluations, and best practices, ensuring regional plans remain aligned with national objectives.
- **Mandatory Review Cycles**: Enforcing regular updates to keep plans current, effective, and responsive to evolving risks.
- **Equitable Funding and Resource Allocation**: Implementing fair funding models to ensure every region has adequate resources and personnel, while allowing local prioritisation based on unique challenges. Funding models that deliver on the government expectation and appropriately supported by funding from central government.
- **Legislative Strength and Regional Autonomy**: Strengthening legislation to enforce compliance, while ensuring CDEM Groups retain operational flexibility to respond effectively in their regions. Directors' powers to intervene and direct CDEM Groups to implement corrective actions or to complete work is recommended.

***What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Groups from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?***

Several practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Groups from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments, including:

- **Misalignment of Priorities**: Emergency management may not be **fully embedded** into broader local government **strategic planning**, leading to gaps in integration.



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- **Funding Constraints:** Limited or inconsistent funding for CDEM can **restrict collaboration** and prevent emergency management from being prioritised within wider council planning.
- **Legislative Gaps:** The **permissive nature** of current legislation has allowed councils to **overlook** CDEM requirements, resulting in **inconsistent application** of emergency planning guidelines. (The TAG review clearly identified this as an issue).
- **Lack of Clear Mandates for Coordination**: Without **formal requirements**, some local authorities may not see emergency management as an **integral** part of their **planning and governance processes.**

***Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?***

Yes, fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver more effective hazard risk management. Key areas for improvement include:

**Stronger Legislative Mandates**: Current frameworks allow too much discretion. Clearer legal obligations are needed to ensure hazard risk management is treated as a core governance priority. Tsunami readiness and response arrangements are examples of the inconsistency that has arisen, with variations in inundation mapping, inconsistency in tsunami warning and alerting systems from region to region. A standardised national system is recommended.

**Equitable Funding Models**: Many local authorities struggle with limited resources. This adversely affects their ability to conduct risk assessments, mitigation projects, and emergency preparedness programs. A national funding framework should be established to ensure consistent and adequate financial support. Again, a national funding model supported by central government is recommended.

**Improved Data and Technology Use**: Local authorities need access to better hazard mapping, forecasting tools, and risk analysis technologies to proactively manage risks. National investment in data-sharing platforms and advanced predictive modelling would support this.

**Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural herniate and animals during and after emergencies.**

**Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies**

We recommend **option 4.**

We support introducing secondary legislation as it will be essential in ensuring a nationally consistent approach to this critical aspect of emergency management. This framework must explicitly recognise and uphold Te Tiriti o Waitangi, ensuring that Māori perspectives, rights, and responsibilities are meaningfully integrated into decision-making and emergency response structures. Strengthening legislative mechanisms in this way will provide greater clarity, accountability, and equity, ensuring a more cohesive and inclusive national approach.

**Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies**

We recommend **option 2.**

Animal welfare must have clear guidelines to ensure well-defined roles and responsibilities in emergency situations. This will strengthen accountability while maintaining the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) as the Lead Agency, ensuring it retains its planning and response duties. A more



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structured but non-legislated approach will improve coordination, efficiency, and protection for animals, reinforcing the critical role of emergency management in safeguarding animal welfare.

**Consultation questions**

***Noting that human life and safety will be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be priorities relative to the protection of property?***

Given that human life and safety will always be the top priority in emergency situations, the protection of animals should be considered a high priority, recognising their welfare as an integral part of community resilience**.**

**Objective 4: Minimising Disruption to Essential Services**

**Issue 11: Reducing Disruption to the Infrastructure that provides essential services**

We **strongly agree** that our current **lifeline utility arrangements are inadequate** to ensure **the timely restoration of services** following disruption. Furthermore, we recognise the **urgent need** for some **Lifeline utility providers to build more resilient infrastructure** in response to the **increasing risks and consequences** posed by emergencies.

**Issue 11.1: Narrow Definition of "Lifeline Utility"**

We recommend **option 2** and support **amending the definition** to include a **wider range of infrastructure and service providers**, ensuring that **all critical systems essential to public safety and continuity** are recognised within emergency planning. Additionally, we recommend establishing **clear accountability measures** to require lifeline providers to **actively invest in resilience**, alongside national **funding mechanisms** to support infrastructure upgrades and continuity planning.

Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora is indispensable for community safety and well-being during emergencies. Our comprehensive health services, encompassing hospitals, urgent care, mental health support, telehealth, and ambulance coordination, form the bedrock of both daily healthcare and effective emergency response and recovery. The experience of Cyclone Gabrielle starkly illustrated the dual challenge faced by the health sector: while profoundly impacted by disruptions to essential infrastructure like power and transportation, it remains a crucial lifeline for the wider community.

Currently, the lack of recognition of Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora as a lifeline utility under the CDEM Act hinders its full participation in emergency planning and limits its access to the protections afforded to other critical sectors. The proposed shift towards a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure" presents a significant opportunity to rectify this. Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora demonstrably aligns with the intent of this broader definition, providing services fundamental to public health, safety, and societal function.

Formally recognising Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora as essential infrastructure would:

- Enhance its integration into national and regional emergency planning frameworks
- Foster improved collaboration and coordination with other vital infrastructure providers
- Extend the Act's protections and expectations to our crucial health services.

Health New Zealand Te Whatu Ora is not merely a recipient of services during crises; it is a critical facilitator of effective emergency response and community resilience. Integrating Health New Zealand



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Te Whatu Ora within the revised legislative framework will ensure a more prepared, coordinated, and supportive system for all New Zealanders in times of need.

**Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning**

We recommend **option 2**.

Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning is critical to ensuring service resilience, rapid recovery, and long-term stability in emergencies. Some key areas for improvement include:

**Risk Assessments and Resilience Planning**: Lifeline utilities must conduct regular, structured risk assessments, identifying vulnerabilities and integrating mitigation strategies into their continuity plans.

**Stronger Legislative Requirements:** Current continuity planning is inconsistent across providers. Clearer mandates are needed to ensure all lifeline utilities follow nationally defined resilience standards.

**Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing**

We **recommend Option 3** and strongly emphasise the need for an **enhanced level of engagement and collaboration** between lifeline utility providers at both **regional and local levels**. While Northland has developed **strong, operational partnerships** with most lifeline utility providers — built over time through **relationships and goodwill** — this informal approach lacks **legislative backing** to ensure consistency and long-term resilience.

**Formalised Coordination with CDEM Groups**: Lifeline utilities must be **proactively integrated** into regional **emergency response frameworks**, ensuring **seamless collaboration** during crises.

To strengthen these critical relationships, **legislation must mandate structured engagement, strategic planning, collaboration, and information sharing**. A formalised framework will ensure lifeline utilities are **effectively integrated** into emergency management efforts, improving response coordination, infrastructure resilience, and service continuity in times of crisis.

## Consultation questions

**Issue 11.1**

***If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in appendix C?***

If a **principles-based definition** of "essential infrastructure" were introduced, we would support the current list of **essential services and infrastructure** outlined in Appendix C. However, we strongly recommend that **healthcare and hospitals** be explicitly included as **essential services**, given their critical role in emergency response and community resilience.

**If you think other essential services should be included into the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover.**

If other essential services were to be incorporated into the list, they should encompass **infrastructure that directly supports healthcare delivery**. This would include **hospital buildings, healthcare providers, medical supply chains, and supporting facilities** that ensure continuity of care during emergencies. Strengthening the recognition of these services within emergency planning will enhance national preparedness and safeguard public health.

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**Issue 11.3**

***Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination multiple levels?***

Some key elements of multi-level emergency coordination would be:

- **Common Operating Picture (COP):** A shared information system ensuring that local, regional, and national agencies have real-time visibility of an emergency.
- **Real-Time Data Integration and Information Sharing:** Secure, automated data feeds from emergency services and infrastructure networks for fast decision-making.
- **Coordinated Decision-Making and Multi-Level Governance:** Defined roles, responsibilities, and escalation points to prevent duplication and streamline response efforts
- **Stronger Legislative and Policy Frameworks:** Mandatory collaboration requirements to ensure local, regional, and national agencies work within a structured system
- **Interagency Coordination and Public Engagement:** Empowering local responders with decision-making authority while national agencies provide strategic support

**Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity**

We recommend **Option 4** as the most effective approach to ensuring that all government agencies with emergency management responsibilities implement robust business continuity plans. This option provides a structured framework that establishes clear expectations, accountability, and consistency across agencies.

**Objective 5: Ensuring Agencies Have the Right Powers Available When an Emergency Happens**

We **acknowledge and support** the Government's decision to allow **national and local states of emergency or transition periods** to be in place **simultaneously** within the same geographic area. This approach enhances **coordination, resource allocation, and response effectiveness**, ensuring that emergency management efforts at both levels are **aligned and responsive to local and national needs**.

We recommend a minor amendment regarding terminology in current legislation by changing the 'transition period' and renaming to 'Recovery period powers.' The term 'transition' is currently ambiguous, referring both to a specific point in time (the Response to Recovery Transition Report) and a duration (the period during which Recovery/transition powers are active). Furthermore, CDEM Groups and Councils informally use 'transition' in two other ways, creating significant confusion. Changing the name of the period granting Recovery powers would greatly reduce this ambiguity.

**Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas.**

We recommend **option 2** as this would enable a more flexible approach to managing cordons which on occasions is necessary to allow periodic access by residents or rural people to gain access to properties. Existing legislation can be used to restrict entry to areas – i.e. Police and FENZ have such powers.

**Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level**

We support **Option 2** and agree with the summary. We recognise the importance of clarifying the functions and powers assigned to CDEM Groups, Controllers, and Recovery Managers, ensuring clear



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roles, accountability, and effective coordination in emergency management. Strengthening this framework will enhance decision-making, response efficiency, and long-term recovery efforts.

**Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period**.

We support a combination of **Options 2 and 3** to expedite the declaration process and agree with the summary. However, we have concerns regarding some recent emergency declarations, particularly whether they were justified and made for the appropriate reasons. There have been examples in recent years where declarations have been made against the advice of Emergency Management professionals, and for reasons that sit outside the definition of emergency in the CDEM Act.

Currently, there is no threshold that must be met before declaring a state of emergency. We recommend that the Government investigate whether legislation should define such a threshold.

Additionally, a significant concern is that Mayors and other delegated officials have the authority to declare a state of emergency without necessarily consulting a Group Controller or other emergency management professionals. This creates the risk that declarations may be made without expert input or sufficient justification, potentially leading to inconsistent or premature decision-making. Establishing mandatory consultation requirements or clear justification criteria would strengthen the integrity and effectiveness of the declaration process

**Issue 16: Mayor's role in local state of emergency decelerations and transition period notices.**

We support **option 2** which clarifies and minimises confusion.

**6. Conclusion**

This submission highlights several key areas requiring attention to strengthen emergency management frameworks, improve coordination, and enhance community resilience. Three of these areas are:

1. **Strengthening Community Capability and Shared Services**: Communities play a **crucial role** in disaster response and recovery. Strengthening **local training, preparedness, and formalised shared service arrangements** will enhance national and regional resilience.
2. **Legislative and Funding Framework Improvements**: Clear **funding mechanisms**, structured **expectations**, and **better resourcing agreements** will provide stability and continuity for emergency response efforts.
3. **International Assistance:** Including clear **provisions for international assistance**, ensuring seamless **integration** into existing national response arrangements


In reforming the CDEM Act, it is crucial to build on the enabling aspects of the 2002 legislation, while ensuring that the new law strengthens accountability, consistency, and the capacity to deliver on its intent.

**7. Conclusion**

Thank you for taking the time to consider our submission. We appreciate the opportunity to contribute to this important deliberation on strengthening emergency management legislation. Please contact us if you would like to discuss, if seek clarification of, any aspects of our submission.

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Signed:



(Kelly Stratford)

Northland CDEM Group Chair.

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20 May 2025

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**Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation**

## Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback on the National Emergency Management Agency's discussion document. We support the intent to strengthen the current system and agree with the proposed objectives.

WSP is a large engineering professional services consulting firm with over 2,000 employees across 34 New Zealand offices and labs. Our geographical spread and core skillsets around both vertical and horizontal infrastructure means that we are well placed to help our communities when they need our skills the most.

Our staff are skilled and experienced in responding to emergency events. We have Urban Search and Rescue engineers (support and contracted), Tier 1 & 2 trained Rapid Building Assessors and Priority Response Agreements for lifelines and important agencies including Spark NZ, Health NZ, NZTA, Transpower and Ministry of Justice.

WSP have provided input into the ACE New Zealand's submission and have seen the Engineering New Zealand submission. We support both these submissions and wish to reinforce the points below.

## Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have in place and know other organisations have Priority Response Agreements with lifelines providers, whereby we mobilise and respond to events with or without a declaration. We would like to see these arrangements acknowledged and enabled in any proposed legislative changes. This would mean that emergency management system could rely on these arrangements rather than find resource to potentially duplicate response effort.

## Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

### *Protection from civil liability for loss or damage*

We agree that protection from liability is essential, and that the current system requires direction of the Controller or constable. Any legislative changes should balance the need for community response and the need for a command and control, CIMS, structure. We would also like to highlight that any engineering Rapid Building Assessment response could be under either the Building Act or the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act. It is important that both these Acts achieve the desired outcomes.

An example of the importance of this is contained in paragraph, 4.27 of determination 2025/020 issued 15 April 2025 states that "However, it is important to recognise that the purposes and principles of the CDEMA and the Building Act differ, as well as the offences and liability on conviction under the two pieces of legislation."

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*Enable compensation for labour costs*

We strongly support consistency of compensation for specialist skills. The current Rapid Building Assessment system has engineers volunteering their time and losing revenue whilst Territorial Authorities can recover costs. There should be compensation for specialist skills such as engineering.

## Legislative alignment

Both the Building Act and the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act have powers that enable Rapid Building Inspections and Placarding. There are intended differences in these powers that may have unintended consequences for both the response and immediate aftermath of Rapid Building Assessments. The recent determination 2025/020 where Auckland Council's power to issue a Building Act notice in relation to land damage highlights the importance of these differences. Whilst the issue is probably to do with notice status on a council property file, it is symptomatic of public acceptance and understanding of the status quo.

Any new legislation needs to ensure that property *and* land issues can be managed in a safe way for all parties, including acknowledgement of property rights.

## Conclusion

Thank you for the opportunity to contribute towards strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation. WSP have helped develop the ACE New Zealand submission and have seen the Engineering New Zealand one. We support both of those independent industry body submissions. We support the general direction of the discussion document, and whilst we understand that the review is for the Civil Defence and Emergency management Act, there is a wider need to look at all legislation that is used in responding to emergencies.

Should you have any questions please feel free to contact me.

Yours faithfully

**Paul Campbell**
National Technical Leader – Building Structures

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Fran Wilde |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | Submitting as Chair of the Wellington Lifelines Group (WeLG) |

☐ The Privacy Act 2020 applies to submissions. Please tick the box if you **do not** want your name or other personal information to be included in any information about submissions that NEMA may publish.

☐ NEMA may publish submissions or a summary of submissions to its website, civildefence.govt.nz. If you **do not** want your submission or a summary of your submission to be published, please tick the box and type an explanation below:

I do not want my submission published on NEMA's website because...

### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

I support option c to define what is 'essential infrastructure', particularly if this leads to better alignment over time through other legislation adopting the same principles-based definition.

I note that a number of the potential inclusions listed in Appendix C of the consultation document are users of infrastructure (e.g. internet services and payment systems) rather than the providers of infrastructure. These are not infrastructure services, they are users of infrastructure. I therefore do not support the inclusion of such services.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

While WeLG is solely focussed on risk-reduction activities, we recognise that risk-reduction may be achieved through a range of methods including having resilient infrastructure or through infrastructure entities having viable response plans. We therefore work with our members at a high level on some response planning issues. I support 'Option 1: Status quo' because:

- As noted in paragraph 182 of the consultation document, emergency management is almost entirely a collaborative effort. The emergency management sector has very limited resource and can only respond through the efforts of the wider CDEM Group. Success will be achieved through the pre-event planning processes, something in which the Emergency Management sector may be taking a lead, particularly for responses that traverse more than one lifelines sector (energy, telecommunications, transport and water). Imposing penalties on utilities for poor planning would, I believe, not be achieving the goals of collaboration.
- An emergency response plan may be well structured and coherent but may achieve a poor level of service or response. The example you give in Paragraph 179 is good, although giving poor evidence. Most petrol stations are owned by oil companies who can mitigate power outages through the pre-event installation of generators. The petrol station operators may be owners of the franchise that operates the sales operation, and therefore less likely to be aware of the wider infrastructure landscape (hence leading to the lack of knowledge you provide in your example). In the Wellington region, only one fuel company has invested in installing generators at service stations (a total, we understand, of six), leading to a lack of fuel stations that are likely to be operable in a major power outage in the Wellington region. The remaining fuel companies could, feasibly, take the line that they have flexible arrangements for responding to emergencies and will collaborate with key stakeholders in an event. The reality is that there are insufficient generators within New Zealand to keep just the Wellington region's service stations operating (even if they had the wiring arranged to accept a generator). Would the regulating authority take this as a sign of an adequate response plan, of inadequate pre-event planning, or demonstrating the likely economic reality that the generators are likely to be used only occasionally for widespread power outages? This example could be played out across a variety of infrastructure sectors. What I am highlighting is that this dynamic is fraught with issues of interpretation or realistic barriers that are unlikely to be

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fixed within any upcoming Emergency Management Act without collaboration with the relevant regulatory authorities.

Therefore, the imposition of penalties on utilities could only be carried out by experienced units that have a deep understanding of the relevant infrastructure sector and of how emergency management and funding streams are structured. My preference for the 'status quo' does not address the issue that the existing legislation is relatively 'toothless' in addressing actual cases of poor planning, or co-operation. However, this would be best addressed through the legislation covering the individual sectors (energy, telecommunications, transport and water) as enacted by the relevant sector regulators, outlining how emergency management planning should be carried out in their respective sectors. Like wider emergency management, the legislation for emergency management should also reflect the collaboration required between Central Government and the infrastructure sectors.

Rather than trying to impose 'strong' planning on a utility, it would be easier and more accurate to ask the utility what level of service they are planning to achieve in an emergency, and require them to publish it. They know their assets well, they know how to respond to incidents and are well versed in planning. They are therefore best placed to comment on achievable levels of service. If the level of service given by the infrastructure entity is not acceptable to either the regulator or the impacted end-users, they can have a discussion on what level of service, at what cost, would be preferable. (See my other comments, below.)

Regarding information sharing (options given in paragraph 184), I support the status quo, as the other options do not reflect the reality of how information is shared, either pre-event or in an emergency. As above, the potential imposition of penalties on utilities would not advance our collaboration with them.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

'Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services'. Key ways to minimise disruption from infrastructure outages are to have (pre-event) resilient infrastructure or have (during event) effective response plans that mitigate the impacts. Until these things are achievable, the communities should be aware of the potential impact to the essential services from disaster and therefore would be better able to prepare. While I agree with some of your comments in paragraph 166, I note that some of the minimum service quality standards are not relevant to end-users (SAIDI and SAIFI are aggregated figures, as is the Extreme Event standard), meaning that end-users have limited understanding of the nature or length of infrastructure outages that they might be facing. Therefore, collectively we are not managing the expectations of the end-users (including the community) or identifying what they should be preparing for, other than broad statements of 'being prepared'.

Paragraph 181, 'option 4' refers to 'disproportionate compliance costs' on 'specific business continuity arrangements'. One of the fundamental aspects of both a business continuity plan and of a response plan is to have an objective for response. This was included in Clause 58 of the previous Emergency Management Bill, requiring lifelines to state their 'planning emergency level of service' (PELOS), which are, effectively, objectives for response. WeLG ran a project (in tandem with research undertaken by our Project Manager, Richard Mowll) to create a framework of PELOS, in conjunction with our members. WeLG's total budget to create and publish this framework $35,000, or around $2,500 per member of WeLG. Hardly disproportionate. The adoption of PELOS would have no compliance cost during/following an event as it is a planning tool only, not for checking whether or not the individual PELOS were achieved. As such, this framework helps manage expectations of the end-users at minimal cost to the infrastructure entities and provides regulators an insight into whether investment may be warranted to strengthen existing infrastructure. If this Bill is to strengthen New Zealand's overarching management legislation, this would be a good place to start.

Great progress in minimising disruption can be made through investing in resilient infrastructure. This is an aspect that does not seem to be addressed particularly in this consultation document. The Wellington Lifelines Group (WeLG) released a Programme Business Case (PBC) in 2019 ( https://www.wremo.nz/assets/Library/Reports/Wellington-Lifelines-PBC-MAIN-Combined-20191009.pdf ). This PBC was a world-leading process carried out with high levels of collaboration (and funding) from the WeLG members. This PBC demonstrated a compelling case to invest in resilient infrastructure, showing that the cost of investment was less than the loss of GDP from a defined hazard event and was a model in how lifelines resilience can be analysed. The issue we have faced in getting action on such investment was not the collaboration or understanding of the Lifeline utilities, rather it was engaging coherently with Central Government on how such a programme could be delivered. One of the key issues on minimising disruption is therefore how the essential infrastructure entities, and the lifelines groups that facilitate discussion, discuss and prove how and where investment could best be directed to

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minimise disruption. My comments on how regulation between Central Government and infrastructure sectors relates to emergency management, above, relate.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

I support Option 2 (non-legislative), on the condition that the Police (who are legislated to carry out the management of access to restricted areas) are appropriately funded and trained to carry out this function.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**TCF submission on the Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation**

**20 May 2025**

**Introduction**

1. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the discussion document: Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation. This submission is made on behalf of the New Zealand Telecommunications Forum (TCF).

2. The TCF is the telecommunications sector's industry body which plays a vital role in bringing together the telecommunications industry and key stakeholders to resolve regulatory, technical and policy issues for the benefit of the sector and consumers. TCF member companies represent 95 percent of New Zealand telecommunications customers. Our members include network operators, retail service providers and the tower companies that own and operate cell towers.

3. The telecommunications sector provides critical infrastructure and services that New Zealanders rely on. Telecommunications is a lifeline utility under the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 (the Act).

4. Our members prioritise emergency preparedness and response. At the company level this is done through business continuity planning and incident response processes. Each network operator has its own plan for managing risk, minimising impact on customers, and restoring services as quickly as possible.

5. At the sector level, during an emergency, we come together as the Telecommunications Emergency Forum (TEF). The TEF's role is to facilitate effective coordination of emergency response across the sector when emergency events impact national or regional communications. The TEF serves as a conduit between its members and the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and other government agencies, regional lifelines groups, and other critical infrastructure sectors. It is the sector coordinating entity under the

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Act. The TEF is administered by the TCF and has 20 members, including Transpower and InternetNZ. It is not necessary to be a member of the TCF to join the TEF.

**Submission overview**

6. In this submission we provide feedback on several of the issues and options presented in the discussion paper. We also identify issues that have not been discussed in the document that we think need to be addressed through the replacement emergency management legislation.

7. The submission addresses the following issues:

    a. The objectives for reform: we support these and propose an additional objective to improve the overall efficiency of the emergency management system.

    b. Objective one: we support strengthened community participation and reiterate our offer to work with NEMA on community education.

    c. Objective two: in addition to addressing duplication between local government and CDEM groups, the replacement legislation should also address duplication by regional lifelines groups in doing risk and vulnerability assessments.

    d. Objective three: we view the proposals under objective three as applicable to those directly responsible for the management and coordination of emergencies, not to essential infrastructure. We recommend closer alignment between the emergency management and resource management regulatory systems on natural hazards, and having risk identification dealt with in a consistent way across regions.

    e. Objective four: we have questions about the underlying evidence and analysis supporting the BCP proposals. It is unclear if there has been analysis of existing telco or other essential infrastructure sector BCPs, and if NEMA would have resources and expertise to assess BCPs. There is no discussion of barriers to compliance in other regulatory systems (such as resource management). We acknowledge the options outlined in the discussion document are preliminary only and more detailed analysis will be completed as part of the policy development process. However, it is difficult to assess proposals that may implement minimum standards in the absence of any detail on what those standards might be. This is an area where we think further consultation is needed.

    f. Objective five: we welcome changes that will better facilitate priority access to restricted areas to restore networks. We think the most effective and efficient option is to significantly improve guidance and training.

8. The TCF would welcome the opportunity to meet with NEMA to discuss this submission, our questions about the BCP proposals, and how the issues raised in the TEF report into telecommunications issues during the North Island weather events (concerning coordination and access) can be addressed as part of the policy process.

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**Objectives for reform**

9. We support the proposed objectives for reform of the Act, and suggest an additional objective to *improve the overall efficiency of the emergency management system.* Adding this objective to the policy framework for the development of the legislation will help ensure that the final policy proposals:

    a. Reduce duplication across the emergency management system (for example in inputting into regional response plans, dealing with information requests during an emergency, and standardising where that makes sense).

    b. Allocate responsibilities where it is most effective (to ensure it is clear who is in control and can make decisions).

    c. Only progress if benefits outweigh costs.

**Objective one: strengthening community and iwi Māori participation**

10. We support strengthening community and iwi Māori participation. Experience in recent events shows that many remote or isolated communities are not prepared with plans if critical infrastructure is affected.

11. The TCF has offered to work with NEMA on community education, but this collaborative work has not progressed due to NEMA resource constraints.

**Objective two: providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional and local levels**

12. The TCF supports this objective. During an emergency it is vital that responsibilities and accountabilities are clear, supporting effective coordination and decision-making. As a sector we have at times been frustrated by ambiguity in who is responsible at national, regional and local levels.

13. Ambiguity must also be removed in circumstances where there has not (or not yet) been a declared state of emergency, the hazard that caused the emergency does not have a predetermined lead agency, and where the emergency was caused by multiple hazards.

*Issue not identified in the consultation document - regional risk and vulnerability assessments*

14. One of the problems we have experienced, not identified under objective two, concerns the inefficiencies that result from duplicated or overlapping roles at the regional or local level when it comes to doing risk and vulnerability assessments. While we agree that local authorities are often better placed than central government to understand and manage the risks communities face, some things work better with centralised processes and guidance.

15. The following entities have roles in preparing regional risk and vulnerability assessments:

    a. CDEM Groups have obligations under section 17 of the Act to identify, assess and manage relevant hazards and risks

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b. Lifelines Groups have an obligation under section 60 of the Act to provide technical advice to CDEM Groups

c. Councils consider natural hazards as part of their broader resilience (non-emergency management) work, through resource management processes and climate change projects.

16. These entities are making overlapping requests (within and across regions) for information about critical infrastructure. They are asking for information to be provided in different ways and using different GIS viewer tools.

17. It is very time-consuming and resource intensive to respond to multiple requests separately, particularly for the providers of national networks. There are 78 local authorities, 15 lifeline groups, and 16 CDEM groups. It doesn't make sense for these organisations to have separate processes and invest in different GIS tools.

18. This area of inconsistency and variability is not identified under objective two, issue 6.1: resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles.

19. We submit that the issues we raise about regional risk and vulnerability assessments be addressed in the replacement legislation by:

    a. Being very clear about who is responsible for doing the regional risk and vulnerability assessments. We propose the assessments should just be done by CDEM groups, but with input from others. This should be clarified in the Act and in the NEMA guidance for lifeline utilities and CDEM groups.

    b. Requiring all regions to follow a standardised process and requirements for risk and vulnerability assessments. This should include agreed technology standards.

    c. Making NEMA responsible for setting the standardised process and requirements.

20. It is also important that:

    a. Risk and vulnerability assessments are supported by national data and risk modelling that is regularly updated.

    b. Councils and CDEM groups coordinate information requests to essential infrastructure for natural hazard related information. We make a recommendation later in this submission about the need for the emergency and resource management regulatory systems to be better coordinated.

*Our responses to issues identified in the discussion document*

Issue five: clearer direction and control during an emergency

21. The discussion document identifies options for clarifying who has command and control of the overall operational response to an emergency. **We support option three** as it provides a single point of accountability, has the most clarity upfront, and because NEMA is better

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placed to deal with wider emergency response than a hazard agency. It would be difficult for a specific hazard agency to oversee all aspects.

22. However, the success of option three will be contingent on there being additional investment and training for NEMA and CDEM group controllers to carry out this role. The experience of our members is that having well trained emergency management personnel makes all the difference during an event. For the training we ask that:

    a. There is consistency in the training provided, so we can expect a similar and more aligned experience across regions.

    b. That lifeline coordinators receive training on critical infrastructure interdependencies.

Issue six: the regional tier of emergency management

23. We agree that overlapping CDEM group and local authority roles and responsibilities is a problem, and support this being addressed. However (as noted above) the discussion document does not talk about the role of lifelines groups, alongside CDEM groups and councils. The role of lifelines groups should also be clarified as part of this work.

24. For **issue 6.1** (resolving overlapping CDEM and local authority roles) we can see benefits of both options two and three, and do not have a strong preference between them. Legislating the distinct responsibilities would address overlaps, but option three would probably provide greater certainty on how things will work in practice and be paid for (and would better address the issues mentioned in para 91).

25. For **issue 6.2** (providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management) we agree there needs to be greater consistency in how CDEM groups are organised. In addition to the reasons identified in the discussion document, it also makes it easier for national lifeline utilities/essential infrastructure to know how to engage with regional arrangements when needed. While guidance would be helpful, option three would provide more certainty and less regional variation.

**Objective three: enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management**

26. We agree that there needs to be an overall lift in the performance of the emergency management system, and understand that NEMA is still considering which organisations across the "4 Rs" the various proposals under objective three would apply to. Our view is that proposals concerning stronger national direction and assurance and strengthening local hazard risk management, are most relevant to those involved in the management and coordination of emergencies, including local government, CDEM groups and statutory officers such as controllers and recovery managers. We see the issues under objective four as being more relevant to essential infrastructure such as telecommunications. Put another way, the distinction is between those who manage emergencies and response efforts, and those who provide essential infrastructure and services. These are different activities that require different approaches under emergency management legislation.

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*Issue eight: stronger national direction and assurance*

Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

27. For the reasons explained above, our view is that the proposals to strengthen the Director's mandate should not apply to essential infrastructure such as telecommunications. We have, however, made comments about the application of the options to essential infrastructure as we understand NEMA is considering who the expectations might apply to. Our views on the various options are as follows:

    a. **Option two**, increased *guidance,* is a practical starting point. If implemented, the effectiveness of the option should be evaluated with consideration given to whether further intervention is necessary. While our assumption is that the proposals in this section would not apply to essential infrastructure, if that was the intention it would not be appropriate for the National Hazards Board to hold any governance role over privately owned infrastructure.

    b. It is difficult to comment on **option three**, enabling a wider range of mandatory standards to be set through rules, without the detail of the proposed standards and the scope of affected parties. Taking the example from the discussion document - rules to prescribe how CDEM Groups are required to provide, control, and operate emergency warning systems - this seems like an appropriate matter for the Director to make rules about, because NEMA has expertise in this area. However, if the intention was to make rules setting requirements for essential infrastructure, the Director would not have the necessary technical and operational expertise to do this. We therefore do not support option three because of the ambiguity about its scope.

    c. **Option four,** giving the Director a new function to monitor performance of the system, risks becoming a resource intensive and administrative reporting exercise that would divert resources (NEMA and system participants) from actual emergency preparedness work. We do not support option four.

Issue 8.2: strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

28. As noted above, we do not consider the proposals in this section would apply to essential infrastructure providers. For completeness, we do not support the application of **option two** (giving the Director power to issue compliance orders) or **option three** (ministerial power to intervene outside an emergency) to essential infrastructure. This is because those options could result in the Director or responsible minister exercising judgement or making decisions about technical or operational matters which require infrastructure-specific expertise. The Director, NEMA or responsible minister are unlikely to be experts about the operation of telecommunications networks, for example.

29. Enabling the Director to issue compliance orders could also raise similar problems to PELOS (planning for emergency levels of service) which were proposed in the withdrawn Emergency Management Amendment Bill. Our concerns about PELOS were that significant assumptions and caveats that would need to be set around standards that concerned response times, minimum standards are problematic when matters are beyond the control of an essential

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infrastructure provider, the fact that every event is different, and the unintended consequences for prioritising resources during a real event.

30. Further information would need to be provided on the scope and parameters of directors orders, and the "appropriate checks and balances" of the minister's powers, for stakeholders to make informed submissions on these options and for the Government to make decisions about them.

*Issue nine: strengthening local hazard risk management*

31. We support changes to improve local hazard risk management. Before commenting on the proposed options, we have identified a number of additional Issues that need to be addressed. These include:

    a. Having risk identification dealt with in a consistent way across regions, and within regions. This is especially the case for operators of national lifeline utilities. Earlier in this submission we talked about the hazard and vulnerability assessment process, and the need for national consistency with that.

    b. Strengthening local hazard risk management to take a more fundamental approach that considers the emergency management and planning systems side-by-side, as parts of a broader system. There is overlap between the roles, responsibilities and outcomes of the emergency management system and the resource management (RMA) and adaptation planning system. There are significant opportunities for efficiencies and achieving better risk outcomes if the two systems recognise and provide for each other.

    c. The primary sources of natural hazard information. It is critical that councils and privately owned infrastructure have access to nationally consistent data sets of natural hazard information. Until this problem is solved (we understand this is something MFE is working on) efforts to strengthen local hazard risk management will be constrained.

    d. The chicken and egg problem concerning the supply of natural hazard information by councils. The telecommunications sector receives requests from local authorities for information about infrastructure that may be at risk, but often councils (and CDEM and lifelines groups) do not first provide information on the natural hazards in their regions and where they are located.

32. Our views on the options are as follows:

    a. Option two (developing guidance on acceptable levels of risk): determining what is an acceptable level of risk has proved difficult in other government processes. For example the MFE work on the proposed National Policy Statement on Natural Hazards Decision Making has been challenging. One of the difficulties the MFE process has faced is that councils do not have the necessary expertise and funding to identify and make decisions about natural hazard risks for all types of infrastructure (they may know about housing and water, but not about telecommunications and

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electricity). This is why regulation 57 of the National Environmental Standards for Telecommunications Facilities (NESTF) provides that a territorial authority cannot make a natural hazard rule that applies to an activity that is regulated under NESTF. However, developing clear and nationally-consistent guidance on how acceptable levels of risk can be identified is likely to assist CDEM Group plans to appropriately reflect localised risks. If this option is progressed, we:

i. Consider that guidance should focus on having a process for assessing an acceptable level of risk, but not prescribing risk tolerance levels or standards.

ii. Agree it would be important to have alignment across regulatory regimes (RMA and Emergency Management) that deal with hazard risk management.

b. Options three (guidance on CDEM plans) and four (prescribing form of content of CDEM group plans in secondary legislation) could be considered further in the event option two does not result in improvements.

c. Option five: we do not think it's appropriate to involve the responsible minister in such an operational matter.

**Objective four: minimising disruption to essential services**

33. We support objective four, to minimise disruption to essential services. At the moment there is no recognition of the integral role of essential infrastructure such as telecommunications in response and recovery, resulting in problems getting priority for restoration efforts.

34. As noted in the Report of the Government Inquiry into the North Island Severe Weather Events, infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications and electricity are key components of a well-functioning emergency management response. It went on to note that, after addressing immediate risks to safety and providing the necessities of life, restoring telecommunications and power should be the next priority. These utilities enable other aspects of the response to occur. Electricity and telecommunications networks keep phone services and the internet running and allow electronic payment systems to stay online. Telecommunications improve situational awareness and allow teams to coordinate an effective response and share vital information between communities, responders, and officials. Communications also help people confirm that their loved ones are safe, get clarity on the number of people missing and reduce panic and anxiety. The 111 emergency calling service, provided through our networks, is needed to support emergency service communications.

*Issue 11: reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services*

Issue 11.1: the definition of lifeline utility

35. Telecommunications is already a lifeline utility under the Act. We have no objection to other sectors (such as groceries or waste management) being added to the emergency management regime, but we think their role and priority in an emergency is different to lifeline utilities. For example, immediate priority is to get electricity and telecommunications

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restored. Supermarkets will still have food at this point. For this reason we like the idea of having different tiers, and distinguishing between "essential and enabling infrastructure" and "essential services". This difference between lifeline utilities and others has played out at the exercises run by NEMA.

36. We also think that some of the proposed new categories need further thought. For example:

    a. Emergency mobile alerts, proposed to be included in a new category of hazard warning services, are telecommunications.

    b. Internet NZ (the operator of the New Zealand domain name system (DNS)) is already part of the Telecommunications Emergency Forum.

    c. We question whether it is necessary to have a separate category for internet service providers (ISPs).

37. Related to our views on proposed new categories of essential services is the role of sector coordinating entities (SCEs), which are not mentioned alongside the proposal to expand the scope of lifeline utilities. It is not clear whether NEMA intends to retain SCEs under the new legislation, and whether the new categories of essential services require SCEs (in some cases it is not obvious who this would be). We think it is important to retain SCEs as part of the system, and have some consistency in the way SCEs operate, to make cross sector coordination easier. As the industry association and SCE for the telecommunications sector we think our process of bringing the sector together, alongside related organisations such as Transpower and InternetNZ, works well.

Issue 11.2: strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

38. The discussion document notes that lifeline utilities work hard to keep functioning and restore their services when disaster strikes, and says this isn't always supported by strong pre-event planning. The suggested approach is to strengthen business continuity planning. Before commenting on the options we raise some questions and concerns about BCPs as a policy option:

    a. We have not seen the underlying evidence and analysis undertaken to inform the proposals in this section. For example, it is unclear whether NEMA has reviewed samples of BCPs across telecommunications and other essential infrastructure sectors and (if it has), whether it has found them to be substandard.

    b. Are solutions that focus on BCPs appropriate when BCPs address a range of business continuity issues? BCPs often focus on internal business process disruption rather than how organisations need to interact with interdependent infrastructure providers. There are other tools that support strong pre-event planning, such as emergency or incident response plans and processes at the organisation level, and sector response plans (which don't seem to be discussed in the document).

    c. Does NEMA have the expertise to assess BCPs? If not, additional resourcing would be needed to recruit people.

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d. Is the BCP approach based on a regime used in another country, such as the risk management approach in the Australian Security of Critical Infrastructure (SOCI) Act?) If so, we would be interested to hear about it and understand the correlation between new BCP requirements, strong pre-event planning and emergency management outcomes. When we asked DPMC for evidence about the effectiveness of the SOCI Act in lifting resilience, none was provided.

e. Aspects of the BCP approach do not seem consistent with Minister Mitchell's comment, to the TCF, that the Government does not want to get involved in how companies in our sector run their businesses.

f. It is unclear whether analysis has been done to understand the potential for existing regulation to overlap or conflict with the proposed options. This must be completed to inform whether or how options are progressed further. For telecommunications and other essential infrastructure this includes:

    i. The resource management regulatory system, which limits where we can put our infrastructure (to improve resilience) and what we can build in terms of alternative power supply. While some of these issues may be resolved with the long awaited update of the National Environmental Standards for Telecommunications, many issues will remain as we rely on the whims of district plans and council resource consent processes.

    ii. Economic regulation which can limit (for example) spend on network investment and resilience measures, and where there is a strong focus on ensuring investments deliver net benefits to consumers.

g. If the Government did decide on a BCP intervention, we think it should start with guidance on what good looks like. No attempts have been made to talk to the telecommunications sector about BCP planning, that we are aware of. This should be done before legislative approaches are considered.

39. Noting the above, and the limited information provided in the discussion paper to understand the analysis that has been undertaken and the intended operation of the proposed options, we support the status quo. Our views on the other options are as follows:

    a. Option two: if the Government decides to go down the BCP route our preferred option would be a variation of option two, to bring in guidance on emergency management aspects of BCPs and discuss these with sectors. This option might look more like option two for the public sector, which is to promote best practice business continuity practices. Sectors would need to be involved in the development of the guidance to ensure it met their needs. Having NEMA do quality assurance is unlikely to add value if NEMA does not have expertise in BCP planning across the various essential infrastructure sectors.

    b. Option three: including sector specific BCP standards in regulations and introducing financial penalties for non-compliance. We do not support this option for the following reasons:

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i. There is no information on the sorts of standards that are anticipated.

ii. Moving to regulatory standards without first trying guidance and voluntary approaches is a disproportionate regulatory response.

iii. It is unlikely that NEMA substituting its view for that of experts in the sector would result in a better outcome. Telecommunications network operators have significant sector-specific inhouse expertise on business continuity planning, and knowledge of how their networks operate. As privately-owned infrastructure there are additional incentives to do this work, to ensure that businesses can keep operating and consumers remain connected. Questions about NEMA expertise and resourcing to develop standards and assess BCPs are even more important when fines could be issued.

iv. The issues we raised about PELOS in our submission on the withdrawn Emergency Management Bill are relevant, including the significant assumptions and caveats that would need to be set around standards that concerned response times, minimum standards being problematic when matters are beyond the control of an essential infrastructure provider, the fact that every event is different, and the unintended consequences for prioritising resources during a real event.

c. Option four: generic BCP requirements in primary legislation. While we think this option would be disproportionate when we have not yet seen analysis of existing BCP quality and guidance has not been attempted, it would be preferred to option three, as there are less risks around the lack of sector specific expertise. But to give a definitive view we would need information on the sorts of requirements being considered.

40. If BCP requirements are introduced for essential infrastructure, there should be alignment with the approach for public sector business continuity plans for emergencies. One option could be to include the relevant government agencies as essential services.

41. The TCF would welcome the opportunity to meet with NEMA to discuss BCP issues. We also recommend further consultation with essential infrastructure if this policy option is progressed.

Issue 11.3: barriers to cooperation and information sharing

42. We agree there are barriers, or missed opportunities, to cooperation and information sharing.

43. Our experience is that reporting during an emergency can be chaotic, with no agreed process for situation reports and what they should contain, resulting in multiple different agencies requesting various pieces of information and in different formats. In some instances the requests we receive demonstrate a lack of understanding by officials about how telecommunications networks work.

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44. Cross sector coordination has also been an issue. While NEMA has initiated a process for sector coordinating entities to meet in peace time, we are left to try and coordinate across the SCEs during an emergency, whilst meeting the reporting demands up into NEMA.

45. As providers of national networks, our members need a consistent and streamlined approach to input into emergency planning and response. It is not efficient for network operators to engage with all local authorities and CDEM groups (as proposed in option three). We therefore submit essential infrastructure should:

    a. Prepare a sector response plan, which includes how the sector will engage with other sectors. This would inform our contribution to the national response plan.

    b. Contribute to a national response plan, which is designed in such a way that NEMA can template and cascade lifeline utility information to regional CDEM groups to prepare their plans. This would be a more efficient and productive approach than contributing to regional plans separately.

46. We also submit that information sharing requirements should be made explicit ahead of time, with agreed templates or standardised formats for providing it, and a requirement to provide to a central agency (not multiple agencies). The information sought and provided should be information that the entity already holds, and that is related to the emergency situation at hand. Sectors and officials should discuss and agree ahead of time the types of information to be reported during an emergency to avoid requests for information that is not relevant. The discussion document talks about information sharing protections, but does not mention what information should be shared.

**Objective five: having the right powers available when an emergency happens**

Issue 13: managing access to restricted areas

47. Getting access to restricted areas to restore networks was a major problem for telecommunications during the North Island weather events, which had flow-on effects for the wider emergency response. We therefore support changes to better facilitate access.

48. Our comments on the options are as follows:

    a. Option one - status quo: we do not support this option as it will not address the problem.

    b. Option two - national guidance and training on managing cordons: we think this is essential, and it is our preferred option. The guidance could, for example, state that a person with ID from an essential infrastructure provider or contractor is allowed through a cordon to fix infrastructure and restore services, if it is safe to do so. Training and guidance could be a first step that is evaluated and further steps are taken if it is not successful.

    c. Option three - prescribing the form of ID passes through regulations: we are concerned this would over complicate things.

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d. Clarify that access can be restricted to any class or group of persons: we do not think this option will solve the problem.

49. If there are questions about aspects of this submission please contact s9(2)(a) in the first instance.

[submission ends]

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | s9(2)(a) |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | n/a |

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### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Some are on point, others not so much.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

There is no specific mention of rural communities, despite the importance of primary industries for the NZ economy. Rural communities produce our food, meet export demands and contribute manpower and resources during a response, yet are not recognised within the CIMS framework. A primary industries liaison role should be created and added to the CIMS structure, similar to the existing Iwi/maori liaison role.

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3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Rural and isolated communities are not adequately represented in planning. A primary industries liaison would enable all communities to be represented at the planning table, and more effective in an all of community response.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

A lot of groups have spawned to fill perceived gaps in CDEM's community response. Most groups are well-intentioned but not resourced, not trained, and can delay or complicate a coordinated response. Suggest that the CDEM framework includes responsibility for consistent partner agency involvement in every region, across lifelines, rural and community.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 – non legislative

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

14. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

15. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

CDEM groups at the regional level must be instructed to include all communities in the planning stages, rather than relying on splintered and mostly volunteer led community groups during response and recovery. Urban groups are mostly accounted for, but rural regions are not included in the readiness phase.

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16. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 - legislative

17. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

18. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Often the first to respond in a community are farmers with the tools and expertise to assist. Resource consent issues and potential prosecution are significant barriers to the immediate response under current legislation.

19. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 would help provide the reassurance needed for a farmer or other land-based business owner to get stuck into reestablishing lifelines without the fear of being penalised for doing the right thing

20. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

21. **Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

There needs to be consistency and effective collaboration between the local authorities and CDEM Groups. There is too much room for interpretation/error currently. This must be tightened up.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 – CDEM plans must state how the plan will be delivered and funded by outlining responsibilities.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

It all comes back to funding at the local council level and varies greatly across regions. Perhaps councils could be instructed to provide X FTE to civil defence/emergency management based on that area's population and hazardscape, to ensure enough trained personnel are always available. Councils will prioritise many other items before putting money into EM FTE, hence the local responding staff are not always well prepared or supported.

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Overlapping has created inconsistency

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 – CDEM group responsible for clarity and consistency

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**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

CEGs are mostly useless in their current form.

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 4

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 standard across all regions

Proactively Released

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Mandatory gives instruction, as opposed the current system of guidance which is open to individual interpretation

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

This needs to be clarified as currently little to nothing can be done to address poor performance

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 4 sets clear expectations

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Animal welfare must be considered across the 4Rs. A primary industries liaison role would ensure that animal welfare is represented at the planning table.

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**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 4 – animal welfare is critical to families, communities and farming.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

I don't understand this question.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Services such as vets that support animal welfare and primary industries, should be included

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 plus a Primary Industries group should be formalised within the emergency management system to ensure consistency and capability; these groups would ideally operate under the guidance of the CDEM group controller

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 standardised ID, formal notices and messaging across all of NZ, as currently all vary across different councils.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Clear lines of accountability required

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2, remove duplication and address inconsistencies

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

About time this was fixed and modernised

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 to minimise confusion

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

Proactively Released

NEW ZEALAND
Society on Large Dams

Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency
PO Box 5010, Wellington 6140
EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

Thank you for the opportunity to submit on the Emergency Management Reform.

The New Zealand Society on Large Dams (NZSOLD) is a technical interest group of Engineering New Zealand. NZSOLD was founded to advance the technology of dam engineering and support socially and environmentally responsible development and management of water resources. NZSOLD is actively involved with technical, environmental, social, economic, regulatory, and administrative aspects of dams and their safety and promotes cooperation between stakeholders with an interest in dams. This includes technical, regulatory and owner representatives as well as the general public. NZSOLD develops and provides information to members and represents the industry at government level. It actively reviews and shares information on an international stage to best represent dam practice in New Zealand. NZSOLD represents New Zealand at the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD).

Broadly speaking, dams and related infrastructure feature in emergency management in two main ways:

1. Having a role in mitigating flood hazard.
2. The potential risk that dams (namely the contents stored behind them) can pose to the people, property, and environment downstream of them. Emergency preparedness is a large part of recommended and regulated dam safety practice in New Zealand, including involvement with local and regional emergency authorities. Some dams and dam operators are considered lifeline utilities, i.e. those used for power generation, drinking water, wastewater and stormwater, and accordingly have obligations under the current legislation. An issue at one of these dams may also lead to an emergency due to the impact on supply of these services; this is consistent with section 164 of the consultation document.

This submission is focused on a small number of issues that we felt are most relevant to NZSOLD. There are two key themes throughout our submission:

1. The importance of having the right people, in the right place, at the right time. Dams and their operation is a specialised area and it is critical that those who have the right experience and information are in a position to make decisions with respect to how the dams are operated. This is supported by having well planned emergency response procedures with clear roles and responsibilities, and empowering operators to follow the plan.
2. Should the current definition of lifeline utilities be expanded to include other services, there needs to be careful consideration as to how this would work in practice and in particular unintended consequences. Changes should consider the scale and interconnectivity of the infrastructure / service, not just the type. NZSOLD has been faced with a similar challenge for dam Potential Impact Classifications which are required to consider potential impacts to infrastructure that provides essential services. We have shared some of our experiences within this submission.

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Please do not hesitate to get in touch if you have any questions or would like to further discuss any aspect of this submission.

Kind regards,



Andrew Balme
Chair - New Zealand Society on Large Dams

Proactively Released

## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Andrew Balme |
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| Organisation: (if applicable) | New Zealand Society on Large Dams |

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

1. **Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

2. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

14. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

15. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

16. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

17. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

18. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Dam owners/operators, and their technical advisors, are the ones who know the most about the safe operation of their assets. In an emergency, they will be operating in accordance with their operational procedures such as flood management plans, or emergency action plans specific to the dam. Generally this will not be under the instruction of the official emergency controller, so having a means for protection reduces a potential barrier for the dam owner/operator choosing to respond.

The Engineering New Zealand submission discusses the impact on engineers who may be asked to respond in short notice to an emergency event. We support this aspect of their submission, and consider that the same principle applies to many dam owner/operator personnel who may need to make quick decisions with potentially limited information.

19. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

As identified in the options assessment, there is a risk that enabling a level of protection from liability potentially incentivises unsafe or unnecessary behavior. We agree with this statement.

We do not have a preferred option.

20. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

We encourage consideration of the wider aspects of emergency management that can assist in the immediate response. This issue relates to the importance of having clear and agreed plans, that are well understood and well practised.

This issue also relates to having clear roles and responsibilities. When it comes to dams, these are not generally able to, nor should they be able to, be operated by personnel outside of the dam owner. As mentioned earlier in this response, the dam owner and their technical support staff (internal and external) are the best people to be making decisions

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during an emergency, supported by well planned/ practised emergency management plans and operational procedures. Having clarity on roles, and confidence in procedures and plans, reduces the need to make ad-hoc decisions at the time.

Many dams and stopbank assets (although noting that most stopbanks are Council owned) form part of a wider protection system that may spread across multiple asset owners. In terms of flood management, this requires an integrated catchment management approach. As discussed in the previous two paragraphs, effective planning and clearly defined roles and responsibilities are a key part of integrated catchment management and again, can aid in reducing the need for ad-hoc decision making, as well as resulting in the most effective and efficient immediate event response.

## Other problems relating to this objective

21. **Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

22. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

23. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

24. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

25. **Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

26. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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27. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

28. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

29. **Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

30. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

31. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

32. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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33. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

34. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

35. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

36. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

37. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

38. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

39. **Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

40. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

41. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

42. **Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

43. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

44. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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45. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

46. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

47. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

48. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

49. **What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

50. **What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

51. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The NZ Dam Safety Guidelines recommend all dams, and the Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2022 require certain dams (classifiable dams), to have an emergency action plan specific to each dam. As well as having the plan, it is also required to consult with relevant stakeholders and authorities (including emergency management), practice the plan via training exercises, and undertake regular reviews of the plan. The Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2022 are in their infancy but given the increase in compliance based

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requirements for dam owners to consult with emergency authorities, amongst other requirements, it is reasonable to expect that compliance with the Regulations will generally improve the practice of dam emergency management across New Zealand. This should improvethe local hazard risk management for hazards presented by dams.

52. **Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

53. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

54. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

55. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

56. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

61. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☑ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

62. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Fundamentally, we agree with the intent behind the options contained in the discussion document i.e. improving the likelihood of having essential services operating during/after an emergency. However, there needs to be careful consideration as to how this would work in practice and in particular unintended consequences. The CDEMA, as noted in the consultation document, is quite vague as to the level at which lifeline utilities are expected to operate and places most of the onus on the providers as to what is reasonable. Expanding the scope of lifeline utilities by adding additional services, and then increasing the obligations and responsibilities of these providers may capture providers who have no practical means of achieving this. Having specific legislative requirements and penalties also introduces the question of what is "good enough"? That is a particular consideration with how 'reasonably foreseeable' an event is. Is NEMA expecting to set a level of service for each essential service and the providers need to achieve that or risk financial penalty? How will this be prescribed?

If an option is pursued to add additional essential services, care needs to be taken to define the scale at which these services need to remain operable. Dams perform many functions - if a blanket function such as flood mitigation was added as an essential service, that would capture dams and related assets that potentially (clearly context is critical) may only make a difference at the margins and could potentially impose unrealistic expectations for levels of service and post event operations.

As also noted in the submission from Engineering New Zealand, there are a range of reforms happening across Government that utilise a definition of essential infrastructure or something similar. We recommend that wherever possible these definitions are aligned to help reduce confusion and misinterpretation.

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63. **If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Care needs to be taken to define the scale at which these services need to remain operable. We note that the Engineering New Zealand submission recommends that flood protection infrastructure, e.g. dams, stopbanks, pumpstations, are included. This is one such example which may have unintended consequences. Flood protection assets are typically designed to provide a specific level of service - the 100yr Return Period flood event is a common flood protection design standard. Should a flood significantly larger than the design standard occur (the ETC Gabrielle event), it can be expected that damage could occur to these assets, but if they are captured as essential services then this may not align with the expectation or obligations set by legislation. This is an example of where the scale of hazard needs to be carefully considered, and care needs to be taken to define the level at which these services need to remain operable. It would also be prudent to develop an understanding of the potential costs involved in meeting the legislative requirements. This applies to any proposed changes/additions to the list.

64. **If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

65. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

66. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

67. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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68. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Some dam owners are lifeline utilities under the current CDEMA, e.g. those used for electricity generation, water supply, and water treatment.

The following is duplicated from the response to question 51.

The NZ Dam Safety Guidelines recommend all dams, and the Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2022 require certain dams (classifiable dams), to have an emergency action plan specific to each dam. As well as having the plan, it is also required to consult with relevant stakeholders and authorities (including emergency management), practice the plan via training exercises, and undertake regular reviews of the plan. The Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2022 are in their infancy but given the increase in compliance based requirements for dam owners to consult with emergency authorities, amongst other requirements, it is reasonable to expect that compliance with the Regulations will generally improve the practice of dam emergency management across New Zealand. This should improve the local hazard risk management for hazards presented by dams.

Dam owners who have emergency preparedness in accordance with the NZ Dam Safety Guidelines aids in strong lifeline utility business continuity planning.

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

69. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

70. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

As noted earlier, there is potential for unintended consequences of expanding the definition of lifelines utilities too broadly by then expecting those owners/ operators to participate in national emergency planning.

Potential Impact Classification (PIC) under NZSOLD's New Zealand Dam Safety Guidelines (DSG) and Dam Classification under the Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2022 (Regulations) includes assessment of the impact of a hypothetical dam failure on "critical or major infrastructure". The definition of "*critical or major infrastructure*" in the Regulations

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includes "*a building or other infrastructure operated or used by a lifeline utility within the meaning of section 4 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002*".

The emergency management reform discussion document raises a concern with the definition of "*lifeline utilities*" being too narrow i.e., excluding things like hazard warning systems, DNS services, data storage / processing services, IT services, cloud computing services, internet providers, payment services, solid waste services, and grocery distribution.

Notwithstanding, through interacting with the definition for the purposes of PIC and Dam Classification, NZSOLD has found that the definition of lifeline utility can also be too broad in other ways. (This does not necessarily detract from the concern that the definition is too narrow per above). NZSOLD has dealt with the broadness of the definition in the DSG by developing specific guidance (Module 2 page 27, extract below), which may be helpful to those working on emergency management reform.

- Any definition of "*infrastructure that provides essential services*" should consider the scale and interconnectivity of the infrastructure / service, not just the type. For instance, an independent water bore supply water to a few houses is not going to significantly impact national / regional scale recovery from a disaster, and the value proposition (benefit vs compliance cost) for such a provider is dubious. The DSG addresses this by clarifying that critical infrastructure is "*network mains and nodes rather than local connections*". Prioritising regional scale and interconnected infrastructure, rather than all infrastructure of a type, will support effective planning and more targeted use of resources.
- Any definition of "*infrastructure that provides essential services*" should also only capture the subset of infrastructure that relates to the essential services, rather than all infrastructure operated / used by an entity.

71. **Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

72. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

78. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☑ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes. NZSOLD is aware of experiences from its members where dam owners, operators, and contractors have been restricted access to their assets during emergencies. Earlier in this submission we highlighted the importance of having the right people in the right places at the right time.

79. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

An administratively heavy option is not suitable. Even during non-emergency events, for example major road closures on State Highway networks for repair works, NZSOLD is aware of experiences relayed from its members where owners, operators and contractors have been restricted access to their assets due to uncertainty and poorly documented approval processes. The consequences of this during a large scale emergency event could be significant.

80. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

81. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☑ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**DATE:**

May 20, 2025

**TO:**

Te Rākau Whakamarumaru National Emergency Management Agency

**PREPARED BY:**

Dr. Alison Floyd,
Urban Intelligence Ltd.

# Submission to Te Rākau Whakamarumaru National Emergency Management Agency from Urban Intelligence

## Summary

This document provides the views and preferred options from Urban Intelligence on strengthening Aotearoa New Zealand's Emergency Management legislation.

## Response from Urban Intelligence

Urban Intelligence is a New Zealand consultancy, research, and software organisation specialising in geospatial analysis, risk assessment, and planning for natural hazards and climate change impacts. Founded by Dr. Tom Logan (Fulbright Scholar, Rutherford Discovery Fellow, Senior Lecturer in Risk and Climate Adaptation at the University of Canterbury, and Chief Technical Officer at Urban Intelligence) and Dr. Mitchell Anderson (Chief Executive Officer at Urban Intelligence, PhD in "Risk-informed and data-driven adaptation"), our team of over 20 experts have first-hand experience in natural hazard and risk assessments across different sectors and geographical contexts.

Urban Intelligence was founded in 2021 with the express purpose of enabling evidence-based decision-making for a more resilient future. Since 2021, we have had the privilege of leading risk and adaptation work across many local and regional councils, businesses, CDEM Groups, lifeline infrastructure organisations, international research programmes, and central government bodies. We extend our appreciation for the opportunity to provide our insights and expertise on options for strengthening Aotearoa New Zealand's Emergency Management System.

We have limited our response to the following areas as aligned with our experience: Objective 3 Issue 9 and Objective 4 Issue 11. Language from the consultation document is contained in call out boxes below, with responses immediately following. We have also offered a general response to questions beyond our specialisation in risk analysis and resilience.

Thank you for considering our submission.

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**Objective 3 - enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management**

**Issue 9 - Strengthening local hazard risk management.**

This issue recognises that most emergencies happen at a local scale, and local authorities informed by local knowledge are best placed to understand their rivers, communities and infrastructure at risk. CDEM groups and their member local authorities are required to identify, assess and manage relevant hazards, consult and communicate with communities about risk and implement cost-effective risk reductions. Many of these responsibilities are recorded in CDEM plans. Often the CDEM plans are not adequately linked to local district plans, regional policy statements or long term plans.

Rather than selecting options as detailed in the consultation document, Urban Intelligence is choosing to answer the following question.

**Are more fundamental changes needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management?**

It is critical that legislation designed to replace the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2002) reflects how climate change is causing stronger cyclones, hotter heatwaves and more frequent droughts, floods, and wildfires.

The emergency management system considers all hazards, including those caused by natural processes and human activity and takes an end-to-end management approach that requires actions across all four Rs - risk reduction, readiness, response and recover.

One of the biggest challenges in addressing climate change and natural hazards for Aotearoa thus far is our poor and inconsistent understanding of risk – i.e., the metric that underpins all actions for emergency management as we cannot properly inform risk reduction strategies unless we are operating under an informed and consistent understanding of risk. **Understanding risk in a spatially explicit manner under different hazard types, scenarios, and timeframes is foundational to effective and equitable emergency management.** A comprehensive definition views risk as the combination of consequences and their associated uncertainties, with respect to something we value. Consequences arise when that something we value is both vulnerable and exposed to a risk source. Figure 1 explores in more detail risk sources, exposure, vulnerability and consequences.

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



Figure 1: Risk arises where there are consequences and associated uncertainty.

Access to reliable, user-friendly information on climate risks and natural hazards is essential for informed decision-making at all levels. However, New Zealand currently faces significant challenges in this regard, which are hampering our ability to effectively plan for and manage the impacts of climate change.

Firstly, a significant proportion of publicly funded hazard datasets are currently inaccessible or difficult to use. This is due in part to the commercial structures of some Crown Research Institutes (CRIs), which can create barriers to data sharing and collaboration. Additionally, poor national hazard data handling and management practices have led to a fragmented and inconsistent data landscape, making it difficult for decision-makers to access and integrate the information they need. The absence of national data standards for hazard modelling further exacerbates these challenges, severely limiting decision-makers' ability to effectively utilize available information. Urban Intelligence supports the development of consistent national approaches to mapping and modelling natural hazard risks, including implementation of national data standards.

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**To address these issues, government agencies, research institutions, and the private sector must work together to develop and maintain publicly accessible databases and visualisation tools for communicating localised sea-level rise projections, hazard maps, and risk assessments.** These tools should be designed with end-users in mind, providing intuitive interfaces and clear guidance on how to interpret and apply the information.

**Secondly, there is a need to shift the focus of our risk assessment and communication efforts from hazard models themselves to more holistic, risk-based approaches.** While understanding the physical characteristics of natural hazards is important, it is equally critical to assess and communicate the potential consequences of these hazards for people, assets, and systems. This requires moving beyond static hazard maps to dynamic, spatially granular risk assessments that take into account a wide range of social, economic, and environmental factors.

**Next, there is a critical need to address the process of procuring and writing risk assessments for local governments.** Between risk in asset management plans, land use plans, climate adaptation plans and risk assessments, New Zealand councils have spent millions of dollars to curate isolated assessments of risk. The big opportunity in this new act is to outline the expectation (with supporting guidance) of how local authorities should designate one physical risk assessment that is kept current and acts as a foundation to build from within different council functions. This would facilitate cross-functional collaboration among council departments, enabling land use planning teams, asset management divisions, and Civil Defence Emergency Management groups to effectively leverage and build upon each other's risk assessment work..

**To support this shift towards risk-based decision-making, we need to invest in the development of guidance and decision-support tools that help stakeholders to evaluate and compare emergency management options in real time, taking into account their costs, benefits, and distributional impacts.** These tools should be flexible and adaptable, allowing users to explore different scenarios and test the robustness of their decisions under uncertainty. One example, of a handful in Aotearoa, is the recognised ‘hybrid approach’ to risk assessment by the MfE 2024 Coastal Hazard and Climate Change Guidance, as seen in the Resilience Explorer®, a software innovated out of necessity now being used by many councils, businesses, and infrastructure providers to model and communicate risk as a fundamental part to adaptation planning.

The Resilience Explorer® integrates comprehensive datasets on critical infrastructure (such as roads and buildings) alongside multiple hazard scenarios including sea level rise, coastal and river flooding, and landslides.The utility of the Resilience Explorer® to evaluate and compare emergency management options in real time was evidenced by its recent use during a local emergency in Canterbury. On May 1, 2025, Christchurch City Council declared a local state of emergency as heavy rainfall threatened the city and Banks Peninsula with flooding, landslides, and falling trees. During this crisis, Council staff utilized the Resilience Explorer® software to strategically allocate emergency resources. By overlaying the "highly erodible land" layer of data with the roads network, staff could quickly identify which transportation routes faced the highest risk of landslips, allowing them to prioritize response efforts where they were most needed.

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The rewriting of the Civil Defense Emergency Act provides an opportunity for councils across New Zealand to address mis-aligned risk functions, deploy real-time decision-support tools, and integrate high-quality standardised hazard modelling into all aspects of governance.

**Objective 4 - minimise disruption to essential service.** The government wants to minimise the impact of emergencies on essential services. This requires these organisations to understand the risk they face, prepare for disruption and manage it effectively when disaster strikes.

**Issue 11 - Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services.** Recognising that lifeline utilities, as defined under the CDEM, are essential infrastructure needed to continuously operate in an emergency, this issue seeks to understand how we can reduce disruption to these utilities.

**Issue 11.1 considers whether the narrow definition of lifeline activity should be amended to include infrastructure that enables other essential services including:**

- certain digital services
- distribution of groceries to retailers
- cash and payment services
- solid waste management services
- hazard warning systems

Option 3 advocates for replacing the current lifeline utilities framework with an expanded principles based definition of essential infrastructure, where an organisation would be classed as "essential infrastructure provider" if they were responsible for infrastructure components (including assets, networks, information, systems, suppliers, people and processes) necessary to deliver an essential service. Where essential service would be defined as a service that underpins public order, public health, national security or the functioning of the economy or society.

Urban Intelligence is broadly supportive of option 3 as the current regulatory framework does not adequately address cascading impacts or the risk of isolation from natural hazards and climate change. As the inquiry into Cyclone Gabrielle found, outages quickly cascaded across electricity networks, telecommunications, roading, water services and fuel infrastructure. While some grocery stores remained open, the communications network had severed connections to EFTPOS and other electronic forms of banking. Without access to cash machines residents were unable to access grocery stores, even though the stores themselves remained open.

**We would advocate for a broader definition of lifeline activities than exists currently to reflect the reality of the interdependent nature of our infrastructure networks.**

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**Issue 11.3 Barriers to cooperation and information sharing:**

Emergency management relies on strong relationships, coordination, and cooperative planning between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, emergency services, and government agencies. This is a collective action problem – the interdependencies between lifeline utilities mean that one organisation's investment in resilience may end up being ineffective if the essential infrastructure they depend on isn't similarly resilient.

*A cooperative approach is possible under the CDEM Act, and some lifeline utilities have well-established and effective sector coordination arrangements. However, recent emergencies (including Cyclone Gabrielle) have exposed several barriers to effectiveness:*

- *Information about outages and restoration times is key to informing planning during an emergency, but this information doesn't always get shared effectively between lifeline utilities and CDEM Groups or NEMA. This may be because organisations aren't sure what information to share or who to share it with. In some situations, lifelines may be unwilling to share information due to commercial or other sensitivities – including a perceived risk that this may be considered anti-competitive behaviour under the Commerce Act 1986.*

**Preferred Option: Urban Intelligence has elected to reflect on the need for a cooperative approach rather than select from the options available in the consultation document. Too often risk management operates in silos inhibiting the cooperative approach necessary to reduce the risk to lifeline infrastructure. Operating under a shared understanding of risk, with equitable access to high-quality data will help eliminate these silos, enabling communities and infrastructure providers to respond and shift to recovery quicker.**

To address the gaps in sharing information about outages and restoration times, Urban Intelligence supports the approach introduced by Mowll et al, with the PELOS concept, "Planning Emergency Levels of Service" for energy, telecommunications, transport and water infrastructure. The current approach to emergency preparedness fails to adequately address the complex interdependencies between infrastructure sectors. This siloed approach creates dangerous vulnerabilities, as failures in one system invariably cascade into others e.g. power outages impact water treatment, which affects healthcare facilities, disrupting essential services when they are most needed.

Effective emergency response requires a cooperative framework that brings together infrastructure providers, emergency management authorities, and end-users in planning and preparation. The PELOS framework aims to create this shared understanding among all stakeholders regarding realistic service restoration timeframes based on network vulnerabilities.

The success of this approach ultimately depends on transparent communication of PELOS to end-users who must integrate this information into their own preparedness planning. As illustrated by Mowll et al,, entities such as pharmacies that depend on reliable power must understand the potential for months-long outages following major events like earthquakes and prepare accordingly.

The revised legislation should advocate for emergency management agencies to develop targeted education programs that communicate realistic recovery timeframes to different community sectors, particularly those providing essential services. A three-way partnership approach with infrastructure providers sharing realistic service level expectations, emergency management authorities incorporating this information into planning, and end-users implementing appropriate resilience measures, represents a viable path toward minimising disruptions.

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Urban Intelligence appreciates the opportunity to provide our insights and expertise into the rewriting of the Civil Defense Emergency Act. To reiterate our suggestions above, we advise:

- It is critical that legislation designed to replace the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (2002) reflects how climate change is causing stronger cyclones, hotter heatwaves and more frequent droughts, floods, and wildfires,
- Understanding risk in a spatially explicit manner under different hazard types, scenarios, and timeframes is foundational to effective and equitable emergency management,
- Government agencies, research institutions, and the private sector must work together to develop and maintain publicly accessible databases and visualisation tools for communicating localised sea-level rise projections, hazard maps, and risk assessments,
- There is a need to shift the focus of our risk assessment and communication efforts from hazard models themselves to more holistic, risk-based approaches,
- There is a critical need to address the process of procuring and writing risk assessments for local governments,
- We would advocate for a broader definition of lifeline activities than exists currently to reflect the reality of the interdependent nature of our infrastructure networks,
- Effective emergency response requires a cooperative framework that brings together infrastructure providers, emergency management authorities, and end-users in planning and preparation. The PELOS is one option for a framework that aims to create this shared understanding among all stakeholders regarding realistic service restoration timeframes based on network vulnerabilities,
- The rewriting of the Civil Defense Emergency Act provides an opportunity for councils across New Zealand to address mis-aligned risk functions, deploy real-time decision-support tools, and integrate high-quality standardised hazard modelling into all aspects of governance.

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# Emergency Management Bill Submission

## Emergency Management Southland

### Introduction

Emergency Management Southland welcomes the opportunity to provide feedback on the Emergency Management Bill. As practitioners and stakeholders within the emergency management sector, we support the Government's intent to strengthen emergency management through updated and more effective legislation. This submission on "Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation" presents our teams collective position on key components of the Bill and raises additional matters for consideration.

### Response to Specific Provisions of the Bill

Below are our positions on selected provisions of the Bill, aligned with the options provided. Our feedback includes the rationale behind our chosen positions.

### Objective 1: Strengthening Community and Iwi Māori Participation

**Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities**
**Preferred Option:** Blended Options 2 and 3
We support guidance-based flexibility to accommodate diverse community needs while ensuring accountability. Local partnerships should be supported and communities empowered to contribute actively.

**Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation**
**Preferred Option:** Blended Options 3 and 4
We strongly support legislative recognition of Ngāi Tahu within our CDEM area. Ngāi Tahu brings extensive emergency response experience, and their involvement has enhanced outcomes for all communities. We recommend replacing “iwi Māori” with “Ngāi Tahu” for clarity in our context and support full representation in CDEM governance. Appropriate resourcing is essential to support their role.

**Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management**
**Preferred Option:** Option 2
Guidance should foster consistent engagement practices, build trust, and support local preparedness. Community resilience is best supported through strong relationships and practical support.

**Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often first to respond in an emergency.**
**Preferred Option:** Option 1
We support recognising the vital role of individuals and communities as first responders. This recognition should influence planning, training, and support structures.

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## Objective 2: Providing for Clear Responsibilities and Accountabilities at the National, Regional, and Local Levels

**Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency**
Preferred Option: Option 2
Clear designation of control agencies based on subject matter expertise is essential. Supporting agencies must align with this structure.

**Issue 6.3: Strengthening performance of Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs)**
Preferred Option: Option 3
CEGs must be held accountable through reporting and performance expectations. This will enhance their operational effectiveness and strategic role.

**Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date**
Preferred Option: Option 2
Allowing for updates as new information emerges is practical and improves plan relevance.

## Objective 3: Enabling a Higher Minimum Standard of Emergency Management

**Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance**
**Preferred Option:** Blended Options 2 and 3
The Director should have authority to uplift and enforce clear standards across the system. Support must include funding, training pathways, and consistent expectations.

**Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management**
**Preferred Option:** Option 3
National guidance should ensure consistency while allowing for local adaptation based on regional characteristics.

**Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies**
**Preferred Option:** Option 2
We support legislated protection of taonga Māori, building on existing strategies and supporting meaningful engagement with mana whenua. Early planning ensures culturally respectful responses.

## Objective 4: Minimising Disruption to Essential Services

**Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning**
**Preferred Option:** Blended Options 2 and 3
Business continuity planning (BCP) should be mandatory with supportive guidance/templates. Financial penalties may be counterproductive, but expectations must be clearly communicated and monitored.

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**Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity**
**Preferred Option:** Option 5
Central government should lead by example. Agencies must have robust BCPs if this is expected of others.

## Objective 5: Having the Right Powers Available When an Emergency Happens

**Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level**
**Preferred Option:** Option 2
We support clear delineation of local emergency powers to improve understanding and application during events.

**Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period**
**Preferred Option:** Blended Options 2 and 3
The process should be modernised to remove bureaucratic delay and reflect current operational capabilities.

**Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices**
**Preferred Option:** Option 3
We support delegating this responsibility to experienced CDEM professionals to enable faster, more informed decision-making.

## Other Considerations

**Undeclared Emergencies:** These situations continue to suffer from inconsistency in response thresholds, levels of service delivery, and ambiguity regarding legal protections for personnel. While community member liability is addressed in Issue 4, we recommend the Bill also clarify thresholds for coordination and extend protection for authorised personnel acting in their professional capacities.

**Role of Group Managers and Group Offices:** Their roles should be formally recognised and clarified, especially where overlapping responsibilities with territorial authorities can cause confusion.

**Offshore Islands:** We recommend addressing governance gaps for offshore islands where the Minister for Local Government acts as the territorial authority but is not part of a CDEM Group. This gap can create disconnection in emergency arrangements and was evident during the Whakaari/White Island tragedy.

**Transition Periods:** Experience from Cyclone Gabrielle has shown the current monthly renewal of transition notices is insufficient. We propose aligning the initial notice duration with that of Building Act designations to provide adequate recovery timeframes.

## Additional comments

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**Ngāi Tahu Role:** Their involvement has tangibly improved planning and response, benefitting both Ngāi Tahu and wider communities. Their leadership during past emergencies has improved coordination and outcomes.

**Funding and Resourcing:** Legislative changes must be supported with appropriate funding to build local capability, especially for iwi and community groups.

**Papatipu Rūnanga Marae:** These facilities can serve as civil defence hubs and should be formally recognised and resourced accordingly.

**National Engagement:** National Māori Entities must not replace direct engagement with local mana whenua. Place-based decision-making is vital.

## Conclusion

This submission welcomes the opportunity to provide feedback on the Emergency Management Bill and broadly supports the Government's intention to modernise and strengthen New Zealand's emergency management system. We agree that updated legislation is needed to better reflect contemporary risks, support community resilience, and clarify roles and responsibilities across all levels of emergency management.

Our group supports clearer definitions of emergencies, stronger iwi/Māori participation, and a more strategic approach to risk reduction and planning. We also advocate for enhanced training, consistent standards, and greater accountability through robust monitoring mechanisms. We believe that formalising roles like Controllers and Recovery Managers, as well as strengthening NEMA's mandate, will contribute to a more effective and coordinated emergency response.

We also raise key additional considerations, including the need for better volunteer recognition, sustainable funding, climate resilience integration, clearer terminology, and a phased approach to implementation. These elements are critical to ensuring that the proposed reforms are practical, equitable, and sustainable.

With these enhancements, the Bill has the potential to significantly uplift the emergency management system across the country, building a more resilient Aotearoa.

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**From:** Margaret McLachlan s9(2)(a)
**Sent:** Tuesday, May 20, 2025 11:47 AM
**To:** Emergency Management Bill [NEMA] <EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz>
**Subject:** Emergency Management Bill submission

Kia ora and thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback on the proposed options to strengthen Aotearoa New Zealand's emergency management legislation.
Tūao Aotearoa, Volunteering New Zealand (VNZ) is the kaitiaki of volunteering and mahi aroha in Aotearoa New Zealand.

VNZ is an association of volunteer centres, and national and regional organisations with a commitment to volunteering in Aotearoa New Zealand.

VNZ was created in 2001, to coincide with the International Year of the Volunteer. The sector, Volunteer Centres and the Department of Internal Affairs were all part of our creation, reflecting our founding purpose as a national voice for volunteering.

Today, VNZ continues its role as the peak body organisation for the community and voluntary sector, influencing policy, producing sector-relevant research, supporting the sector through its consultancy service, and acting as an advocate for volunteering and volunteers more generally.

**Work to support NEMA 2020 and Cyclone Gabrielle response 2023**
Volunteering New Zealand had a contract for services with the National Emergency Management Agency's Crisis Management Centre during 2020. The key outputs of this were to co-ordinate and provide national guidance to community organisations and the volunteer workforce in response to the Covid-19 pandemic (from 14/04/20 to 22/06/20). During the Cyclone Gabrielle and Auckland Anniversary 2023 adverse weather events, we supported the volunteer centres in Hawkes Bay and Auckland. This included helping them secure funding, to wellbeing, coaching and communications.

**Relationship with Volunteer Centres**
While we support 17 volunteer centres around the motu, VNZ does not speak on their behalf, and therefore this submission represents the views and opinions of VNZ only in its mission to empower and support volunteers and volunteer organisations in Aotearoa New Zealand. The Volunteer Centre Network Aotearoa has made a submission on this discussion document. It is consistent with our view, and we support it.
Please feel free to come back to me directly with any questions about, or clarification of the information I have provided below.

**Summary of our submission**
In general, we have considered the information in this document and believe that NEMA has identified the right objectives for reform: https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/documents/EM-Bill/Discussion-document-Strengthening-New-Zealands-emergency-management-legislation.pdf).
We make specific comments on Objective 1: strengthening community and iwi Māori participation – issue 3 and issue 4.

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We do not have any comments on the additional consultation questions listed on page 69 of the discussion document.

**Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation**

*Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities*

**Our response:** We are happy with how the issue is described, we do not have a preferred option, and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.

*Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management*

**Our response:** We are happy with how the issue is described, we do not have a preferred option, and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.

*Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management*

**Our response:** We support both Option 2 (non-legislative): Develop and update guidance and strengthen public education and Option 3 (legislative): Require CDEM Group plans to state how the Group will manage offers of resources from the public.
We consider that these options would promote ongoing planning, preparation, and relationship building between CDEM groups and local organisations and individuals prior to national emergencies taking place.
This should result in improved coordination and use of local emergency responses when required – in particular from volunteers, volunteer organisations and their partners.
The risks and benefits identified by NEMA make sense, and the risks identified by NEMA (for options 2 and 3) could potentially be managed by providing funding.
We are happy with how this issue is described and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.

*Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency*

**Our response:** We support both Option 2 (legislative): Provide for protection from civil liability and Option 3 (legislative): Enable compensation for labour costs
We consider that these options would support, protect, and reward direct volunteers involved in emergency response situations. (Direct volunteers are individuals who volunteer to help to others in the heat of the moment – these people may not necessarily have relationships with volunteer organisations).
The risks and benefits identified by NEMA make sense.
We are happy with how this issue is described and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.

**Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels**

*Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency*

**Our response:** We are happy with how the issue is described, we do not have a preferred option, and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.

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*Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management*
**Our response:** We are happy with how the issue is described, we do not have a preferred option, and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.
*Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date*
**Our response:** We are happy with how the issue is described, we do not have a preferred option, and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.

**Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management**
*Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance*
**Our response:** We are happy with how the issue is described, we do not have a preferred option, and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.
*Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management*
**Our response:** We are happy with how the issue is described, we do not have a preferred option, and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.
*Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies*
**Our response:** We are happy with how the issue is described, we do not have a preferred option, and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.

**Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services**
*Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services*
**Our response:** We are happy with how the issue is described, we do not have a preferred option, and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.
*Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity*
**Our response:** We are happy with how the issue is described, we do not have a preferred option, and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.

**Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens**
*Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas*
**Our response:** We are happy with how the issue is described, we do not have a preferred option, and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.
*Issue 14: Clarifying who exercises emergency powers at the local level*
**Our response:** We are happy with how the issue is described, we do not have a preferred option, and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.
*Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period*
**Our response:** We are happy with how the issue is described, we do not have a preferred option, and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.

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*Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices*

**Our response:** We are happy with how the issue is described, we do not have a preferred option, and we do not think there are any other options that should be considered.

ENDS

Ngā mihi

**Margaret McLachlan | Communications Manager**

**Volunteering New Zealand**
**P:** s9(2)(a)
**A:** Level 2, 50 The Terrace, Wellington, 6011 (PO Box 27 302)
**Volunteeringnz.org.nz**

Tūao Aotearoa
Volunteering New Zealand

Tūao manaaki whanaungatanga e manawaroa ai. Empowering volunteers to enrich Aotearoa.
*Volunteering of care, of nurturing growth and enduring relationships.*

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Charlotte Brown |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | ResOrgs |

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I do not want my submission published on NEMA's website because…

### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

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### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Insert response

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Tourists and other transient populations (e.g. working holiday visa holders) can be vulnerable in emergencies for a number of reasons. They likely will have decreased access to social and material resources (Wilson & Simmons, 2018) because of their lack of community connections and may be dependent on local communities for support (Fountain & Cradock-Henry, 2020). This can be particularly challenging in rural areas where tourist populations can sometimes significantly outnumber resident populations (Orchiston & Espiner, 2017). They may also be unaware of hazards, lack understanding of correct response procedures (Bird et al., 2010; Hall et al., 2019), and hazard warning systems. They may have optimistic bias in the form of a holiday mentality (Rittichainuwat et al., 2018).

It is also important to consider that individuals' resilience (i.e., their ability to cope with and adapt to challenges) and vulnerability (i.e., relative sensitivity to disruption and coping capacity) are not static (Miller et al, 2010). Groups that may be perceived as quite resilient, such as farmers, can quickly become vulnerable if their ability to generate income or look after their land and animals is severely threatened (Wither, Orchiston, & Nel, 2023). Physical and social isolation can leave farmers in a very vulnerable position in some scenarios.

Building on this, when evaluating or identifying communities that are vulnerable to a given scenario, it is important to look at how both direct and indirect impacts might affect different populations. This can include system characteristics such as geographical isolation, access to critical services, vulnerability of infrastructure, and ways of generating income (e.g. farming).

Our view of vulnerability must be dynamic and nuanced. So perhaps viewing it as a stock rather than an innate characteristic may be more helpful.


Wilson, J., & Simmons, D. (2018). *Building resilience in transient rural communities- a post-earthquake regional study: Fieldwork report* (RNC032:04:01:03).

Fountain, J., & Cradock-Henry, N. A. (2020). Recovery, risk and resilience: Post-disaster tourism experiences in Kaikōura, New Zealand. *Tourism Management Perspectives*, *35*, 100695. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tmp.2020.100695

Orchiston, C., & Espiner, S. (2017). Fast and slow resilience in the New Zealand tourism industry. In A. A. Lew & J. M. Cheer (Eds.), *Tourism Resilience and Adaptation to Environmental Change : Definitions and Frameworks*. Taylor & Francis Group. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/lincoln-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4930645

Bird, D. K., Gisladottir, G., & Dominey-Howes, D. (2010). Volcanic risk and tourism in southern Iceland: Implications for hazard, risk and emergency response education and training. *Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research*, *189*(1-2), 33-48.

Hall, S., Emmett, C., Cope, A., Harris, R., Setiadi, G. D., Meservy, W., & Berrett, B. (2019). Tsunami knowledge, information sources, and evacuation intentions among tourists


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in Bali, Indonesia. *Journal of Coastal Conservation*, *23*(3), 505-519. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11852-019-00679-x

Rittichainuwat, B., Nelson, R., & Rahmafitria, F. (2018). Applying the perceived probability of risk and bias toward optimism: Implications for travel decisions in the face of natural disasters. *Tourism Management*, *66*, 221-232. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tourman.2017.09.013

Miller, S. F., Osbahr, H., Boyd, E., Thomalla, F., Bharwani, S., Ziervogel, G., Walker, B., Birkmann, J., Van der Leeuw, S., Rockström, J., Hinkel, J., Downing, T., Folke, C., & Nelson, D. (2010). Resilience and vulnerability: Complementary or conflicting concepts? *Ecology and Society*, *15*(3). https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-03378-150311

Wither, D., Orchiston, C., & Nel, E., (2023). Using the Living Standards Framework to analyse the drivers of social resilience in a disaster management context, *Policy Quarterly, 19*(1), 58-66.

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Increasing awareness of diversity within and diverse needs of communities is a positive step. Communities are diverse. Providing best practice guidelines to emergency management staff and other council staff could help them understand and include diversity in their plans. Emergency management teams would need more resourcing to do more engagement, including, but not limited to, more time, money, staff, support from upper management, and cultural-awareness and other training.

The assumption that Option 3 makes that including diverse communities in CDEM group plans will translate to greater community preparedness and improve response/recovery outcomes is not guaranteed. It may lead to CDEM groups sharing more information with those communities and raising their risk perception. The process for converting risk perception into changes in preparedness and other risk mitigating behaviours is complex.

Multiple studies have shown hazard awareness and risk perception do not necessarily translate into preparedness actions (Odiase et al., 2020; Paton, 2008). How an individual or group interprets, or understands, a risk is influenced by their personal experience, feelings and values (Eiser et al., 2012), as well as their social or subjective norms (Ajzen, 1991; McLennan et al., 2014). Personal experience with previous similar events, including their recency, frequency, and intensity can also be factors (Kates, 1971). High levels of trust in authorities and experts can sometimes lead people to believe and follow official warnings. It also can sometimes lead people to expect authorities to take care of them rather than taking action to take care of themselves (Wachinger et al., 2013).

Deep engagement, co-creation of understanding and solutions, and empowerment of diverse communities will help to better ensure better outcomes for these communities.

Odiase, O., Wilkinson, S., & Neef, A. (2020). Risk of a disaster: Risk knowledge, interpretation and resilience. *Jamba-Journal of Disaster Risk Studies*, *12*, Article a845. https://doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v12i1.845

Paton, D. (2008). Risk communication and natural hazard mitigation: How trust influences its effectiveness. *International Journal of Global Environmental Issues*, *8*(1), 2-16. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJGENVI.2008.017256

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Eiser, J. R., Bostrom, A., Burton, I., Johnston, D. M., McClure, J., Paton, D., van der Pligt, J., & White, M. P. (2012). Risk interpretation and action: A conceptual framework for responses to natural hazards. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, *1*, 5-16. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2012.05.002

Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50,* 179-211.

McLennan, J., Cowlishaw, S., Paton, D., Beatson, R., & Elliott, G. (2014). Predictors of south-eastern Australian householders' strengths of intentions to self-evacuate if a wildfire threatens: two theoretical models. *International Journal of Wildland Fire, 23,* 1176-1188

Kates, R. W. (1971). Natural hazard in human ecological perspective: hypotheses and models. *Economic Geography*, *47*(3), 438-451.

Wachinger, G., Renn, O., Begg, C., & Kuhlicke, C. (2013). The Risk Perception Paradox-Implications for Governance and Communication of Natural Hazards. *Risk Analysis*, *33*(6), 1049-1065. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-6924.2012.01942.x

**5. What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Incorporating the needs and views of more groups would likely require more collaboration and input than is currently being done. Compensating people for their time and input would likely encourage participation. Some groups may be able to represent themselves, voice their own opinions and help co-create ways in which the community could reduce the risks they face, such as retirement village residents and faith groups. Other groups, who are transient or cannot represent themselves well, may need knowledgeable representatives to speak on their behalf, such as tourists or residents with complex medical needs.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

No comment

Proactively Released

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

No comment

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Participating in CDEM structures, roles, plans and other document review requires significant inputs of time. The options mentioned do not address funding mechanisms for iwi representatives. Iwi deserve to be paid for their contributions and roles. Other personnel, EM, lifelines and non-profit staff, (e.g. St. John's) are being compensated to some degree to be in the meetings. There needs to be funding mechanisms to compensate the iwi representatives for their time, knowledge, experience, and capability.

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Iwi should be recognised in ways that work for them, in consideration with their interest and their capacity to do so. That may vary across the country. Some areas have more iwi while others have fewer. Whatever structure is chosen, needs to account for the possibility that there may be multiple iwi who may want to be included. If they're going to be included, there needs to be a discussion with them about what it will look like.

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

14. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

Proactively Released

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Community participation in emergency management will look different across the 4Rs. While there is some mention of communities and households playing a role in risk reduction, much of this issue in the consultation document actually focuses on community contributions during a response. It may be clearer to specify "community participation/contribution in response" within the bill and if desired, have a separate section on community involvement in risk reduction, readiness and recovery.

It is true that community groups' knowledge, skill and resource are not always fully utilised but this is a CDEM system-capability issue. There are not enough staff to go out and engage with community groups pre-event or to manage offers during an event. If there were more EM personnel, they may be more likely to take time, before or during an event, to figure out how to work with community groups. It takes time and effort to build connections. EM personnel are already spread too thinly as it is.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Clarity is always helpful. Best practice guidance and templates from NEMA can be helpful as long as they are flexible enough to be applied to the diverse communities and social-political settings across the country.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Community involvement in emergency management should be enabled but it is unclear how formal it needs to be. If a formal system is created based on existing community groups, it needs to be flexible enough and have mechanisms to incorporate emergent groups and organisations.

The liability of community group members also needs to be considered (e.g. who is liable for health and safety inductions of community groups). While well-intentioned, there may be times that community groups efforts actually interfere or impede other emergency management processes and efforts. Ways of addressing or resolving those may need to be considered.

Proactively Released

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

No comment

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Protection of civil liability for loss and damage when people are trying to do the right thing is a good thing. After the Canterbury earthquakes, there were a lot of people who saw people stuck in buildings and used whatever equipment they could access to rescue people stuck inside.

Civil Contractors in particular were key to early efforts to rescue people in that event. Their contribution is essential and we would not want fear of liability to prevent their ad hoc support of rescue efforts. Compensation for their efforts is fair given the long hours put in by staff and the operating costs (as well as wear and tear) of plant.

That said, the law should clearly define what activities are covered and/or what level of direction is required in order to receive compensation. Guidance or rules need to be put in place that prevent people from taking advantage of that protection.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

There needs to be due consideration of the role of the Health and Safety at Work Act (HSWA) 2015 in post-disaster settings, both for community members and for contracted personnel. Post-disaster situations may require workers to work in conditions that might expose them to higher levels of risk, e.g. a building engineer assessing an earthquake-damaged building while the risk of aftershocks is still high. Careful consideration needs to be given to what aspects of the HSWA, if any, require adjusting in disaster response and recovery, and for whom.

Proactively Released

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

It would be good to be clear about who is the lead agency but there will always be complex events that do not fit pre-determined categories, e.g., where it is not clear what the hazard is or where there are multiple coinciding issues. Building extensive networks and relationships, pre-event, and having a collaborative attitude make it easier to determine at the time of the event who is the lead agency. Building networks and relationships are key to the efficacy of whatever structure or approach is chosen.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Given the above, Options C and D provides greater flexible in situations where there are multiple events and consequences may be arising from multiple coincident hazards.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

No comment

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Responses are supposed to be locally-led, regionally-coordinated, and nationally-supported. Real interaction with the community happens at the local level. Some communities, such as Napier City after Cyclone Gabrielle and many towns/communities after the predicted Alpine Fault 8.0 earthquake, will require a local response because they will be physically isolated. Regional emergency management staff will not be able to reach them. Additionally, regional staff will not be as familiar with local needs and resources. Regional staff can support locals but they cannot replace them. Local level capacity needs to resourcing and support to be built-up.

The regional level is often an appropriate level for managing resources and supporting local EM capability via planning, exercising and coordination. Strengthening capability and capacity at this level is helpful as part of identifying the most effective balance of roles and responsibilities across regional and local levels.

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Strengthening of the local tier is vital. Clarifying and avoiding overlaps between local and regional is an important part of strengthening both tiers.

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

No comment

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Proactively Released

Please explain your views.

Providing increased guidance or regulation around CDEM group structure should consider the differing situations councils are currently in. This includes the reality that councils have varying resources, and varying capabilities and capacities to effectively conduct locally-led responses. The geographic spread of councils also means some councils have multiple councils nearby who could provide inter-regional support (e.g. staff, material resourcing) in an event while others do not. Councils have wide range of populations bases, geographic size, and internal perceptions and prioritisation of EM responsibilities.

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Yes to Option 6.2D. Designating chief executives of local territorial authorities as controllers could potentially elevate the profile of EM work within council and would hopefully lead to meaningful engagement with the issue. It would also increase accountability from the chief executive about the EM work done.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

### Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.



Proactively Released

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

No comment

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, it is good to keep plans current.

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

Proactively Released

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

No comment

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Some powers to do this exist already but are not being used. People on the ground are crying out for more support to get the resources they need. National standard setting is needed to support local capability. It will require a greater investment of time, money, personnel and attention to create the assurance and enact it. It will be necessary to acknowledge and address the current varying states of EM capability across the country and create appropriate pathways, support and timelines to elevate local EM capability to acceptable levels.

In trying to create greater assurance, ensure opportunities for localisation and not a "one-size-fits-all" approach. Allow for adaptation by local communities based on what they need, what they are comfortable with, and what they have the resources to do.

Assurance programmes should be outcome-focused, not process-driven, so they enact meaningful change and do not become a tick-box exercise.

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

Proactively Released

### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Providing best-practice guidelines and tools is always helpful. Any national level guidance needs to be created in a way that enables local councils to manage risks in a way that makes sense for their communities' resources and risk tolerance. In this case it is likely that guidance should focus on process to enable localisation of management and mitigation options and prioritisation.

Proactively Released

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

As above, national guidance on processes, that allows for local/regional application and adaptation.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Differing roles, responsibilities, timelines, jurisdictions, and personnel

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Local CDEM groups sometimes struggle with identifying and assessing their risks. If these are issues, how can we reasonably expect them to reduce them? CDEM groups do not have the capacity, resources or funding (and likely won't ever!) nor adequate power within the governance structure to enact meaningful risk reduction, e.g. stopping housing developments on flood plains. We propose removing risk reduction from their responsibility. If it can't be removed, consider ways to enable them to advocate in meaningful ways for reduction activities.

One aspect that is missing is involving the community in defining what "acceptable risk" means. Localities need guidance and support in how to determine their own levels of acceptable risk. Guidance (in the form of best practice guidelines, a framework or a process) on how local communities and councils (local or regional) can have conversations about it, define it, and then achieve it would be helpful. Moreover, risk tolerance changes through time, and communities are best placed to adapt to these changing circumstances. For many risks, particularly those where mitigation options have significant impacts on people and property, and where communities are having to prioritise limited risk reduction resources, risk need to be managed locally. For these localised risks, levels of acceptable risk cannot be nationally-defined.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

Proactively Released

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes, these are important emergency considerations. However, many of these are values-based decisions and will be interpreted differently by different people. In any situation they also need to be considered within the hierarchy of other needs, e.g. life safety, protection of property. Other objectives may outweigh them in the response environment. Different controllers may prioritise these issues differently. If they are going to be incorporated into response decision-making, the CDEM group/controller would need to understand the community's values prior to an event and have the values embedded into decision-making processes.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

See box 53

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Guidance on best practice is always helpful.

Proactively Released

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

See box 53. It is likely that these priorities will differ across communities. These values-based decisions or prioritisations should be made at local level.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Quality assurance is needed at the local, regional and national levels. If higher expectations are going to be set, there need to be commensurate funding and training resources provided or enabled.

Proactively Released

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

On balance, Option 2 is preferred as it seems that it would be more manageable. However, an approach like Option 3 would potentially allow for greater flexibility in which providers are included through time. Our main concern over Option 3 is that the net could be cast quite wide with broad service categories. This was evidenced in the rapidly expanding essential service operators designated during the COVID-19 pandemic. While a broad coverage is good, and lifting up the performance of a wider number of organisations is desirable, we don't want focus to be lost from the most critical services.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Yes to digital services, grocery distributers, cash and payment services, hazard warning systems. Pharmaceutical distribution chain should also be added. For solid waste, the service to be maintained should be limited to BAU municipal waste services. This service is easier to define than the post-event disaster waste 'system' (which will emerge post-event, with entities and facilities that do not necessarily manage waste during BAU). Municipal waste management services has more processes in place to manage quality control and standards which make it more suitable to be defined as a lifeline utility.

Proactively Released

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in A3ppendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Business continuity (BC) planning is an important first step in improving disruption readiness; but only 'having plans' is unlikely to be enough to achieve the desired outcomes. Business continuity isn't just about creating a plan but about having an organisational culture of continuity and a broader understanding of where the organisation fits within the system and how they underpin other sectors and communities. It is also vitally important that there is assurance around the quality of the BCPs. We have encountered many that are not fit for purpose.

There is also no current accountability for current infrastructure providers. Accountability in ways that encourage or enable culture change, rather than ticking a box, are important. Financial penalties for not doing BCP is not going to achieve anything more than tick-box compliance. If regulations are put in place, they must be designed in a way that supports cultural change.

In some utility sectors, risk reduction efforts or resilience building is regulated by a national regulatory body. The national regulatory body can determine how much the companies can invest in resilience-building and charge their customers. For example, the Commerce Commission decides how much electricity companies can invest in their network (based on what they are allowed to pass on to the customer). The value/benefit of resilience-building to less-frequent, significant disruptive events is not well understand and often results in a barrier to resilience investment. Entities like the Commerce Commission are primarily focused on costs to the consumer and day-to-day reliability.

On the other hand, some sectors don't have national regulating bodies because they are council-based and are very diffused, e.g. solid waste and local roading. Building resilience for those sectors/lifelines is dependent on investment decisions made by councils and improving disaster resilience competes with other pressing issues.

Proactively Released

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

One issue and lever that is missing is the option to define planning emergency levels of service (PELoS). Establishing and seeking to meet PELoS is a useful bar to help utilities prioritise investment decisions, supports a transparent understanding of dependencies between utilities (and likely outage times) and supports community readiness awareness.

If PELos were to be adopted, it is likely PELoS should only be defined for a very narrow set of utility providers and done in consultation with the local community with a community-disruption point of view. Engagement should be done by considering the nature of assets, hazards, the criticality of the service to the community, and the relative cost of possible solutions. Some lifeline utilities will not be able to offer a viable Plan B for a price the community is willing to pay. Engaging the community will help set expectations for how long they may have to do without the service.

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Enable and encourage information sharing but don't overburden the lifeline utilities with information standards they can't easily deliver. Some of their information is not in easily shareable formats. It could be helpful to work towards that information being in more easily shareable and useable formats pre-event, through supporting shared information platforms that support peace time planning.

Yes, require utilities contribute to national response plans- engaging in the process will help them see the value of it.

Proactively Released

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Conduct exercises and build relationships, pre-event

Greater consistency in approaches across regions will reduce that burden on national infrastructure providers on contributing to planning across multiple region

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Public agencies may respond well to legislative levers, as they did with the earthquake-prone building legislation. The challenge with legislative requirements is that they can become a tick-box exercise and do not create meaningful change. If a legislative pathway is used, consider ways it can enable cultural change and be outcome-based, not process-based.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

As mentioned in Box 66, lifeline utilities need to have conversations with their communities about planned emergency levels of service and what the costs would be to change what they can provide. Communities need to understand what is doable given their specific financial and geographic contexts.

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

More structure, guidance and training on how to manage cordons would be helpful. Option C which prescribes a form of identification would be helpful too, to avoid a bespoke system being set up after every event.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

No comment

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Yes, modernise the process and enable emergency declarations to be done when technology is unavailable or limited.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

It should be a CDEM decision, not a political decision.

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

No comment

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

The National Emergency Management Agency should be subject to quality assurance as well as the local and regional EM personnel and groups.

All of the supporting plans, policies, manuals, Orders, etc… that are out-of-date (e.g. last updated in 2015) need to be updated as soon as possible.

One issue that is not well catered for in the current emergency management system is the management of disaster waste. It traverses response and recovery and often requires bespoke legislative and regulatory changes to support efficient and effective waste management. Internationally regulation changes have been required for to manage the following aspects of disaster waste:

- Leading and coordinating
- Reporting requirements
- Property entry, demolition and property/waste ownership
- Health and safety of workers and community members
- Environmental risks
- Waste transportation
- Waste sorting, treatment and disposal sites (temporary, new and existing)
- Waste levy
- Cost recovery/ expense allocation

Regulatory challenges have been documented in Brown et al., 2010; and Brown, 2012; and have recently been updated for Environment Canterbury/ Canterbury CDEM. A review of how these challenges might be supported (or not) in the revised Bill would be beneficial.

Some key references on DW issues include:

Brown, C. (2012). *Disaster Waste Management: a systems approach*. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/7038

Brown, C., Milke, M., & Seville, E. (2010). Legislative Implications of Managing Disaster Waste in New Zealand. *New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law*, *14*, 261–308.

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Ngāti Rārua
Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Rārua

**SUBMISSION ON THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT BILL**
*That will replace the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002*

**Submitted by:**
Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Rārua
Date: 20/05/2020
Contact: Shane Graham, CEO, Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Rārua

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**Overview of Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Rārua**

Ngāti Rārua descend from the Tainui waka and originate from the western coast of the King Country, Waikato. Our origins are traced back by whakapapa to the eponymous ancestor Rāruaioio, who married Tupahau and bore children from whom Ngāti Rārua is derived. Karewa, son of Tupahau and Rāruaioio, married Rāruatere, entrenching the name, and the children of this marriage came to call themselves Ngāti Rārua.

Ngāti Rārua tūpuna came to Te Tauihu o te Waka a Māui in the 1820s and 1830s, as part of the great southward migration of the Kāwhia and Taranaki tribes. Ngāti Rārua were participants in the series of war parties or tauā that came to Te Tauihu and were involved in the resulting battles against the resident Kurahaupō people. These events were soon followed by Ngāti Rārua heke of occupation, whereby Ngāti Rārua established themselves as tangata whenua down the West Coast and across the top of the South Island.

**Settlement**

By 1840, Ngāti Rārua were resident in the Cloudy Bay and Wairau districts in eastern Te Tauihu. In western Te Tauihu, Ngāti Rārua maintained seasonal and permanent kāinga at Whakatū, Motueka, Moutere, Aorere, and West Whanganui/Taitapu. In addition, they exercised rights of occupation and resource collection down the West Coast of Te Waipounamu.

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**Introduction**

Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Rārua (TRONR) welcomes the opportunity to submit on the Emergency Management Bill. As mana whenua in Te Tauihu o Te Waka-a-Māui, we have a vested



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interest in ensuring that emergency management frameworks recognise and incorporate Māori perspectives, values, and leadership.

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1. Recognition of Māori Roles in Emergency Management

We acknowledge the Bill's intent to enhance Māori participation in emergency management. However, we recommend the following to strengthen this commitment:

- Mandatory Māori Representation: Clause 26 should explicitly require Māori representation on Emergency Management Committees, ensuring full voting rights and decision-making authority.
- Integration of Mātauranga Māori: The Bill should mandate the incorporation of mātauranga Māori in all phases of emergency management—reduction, readiness, response, and recovery.

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**2. Alignment with Te Tauihu Emergency Management Strategy**

The *Te Tauihu Emergency Management Strategy (2022–2027)* emphasizes whānau-centred approaches and the integration of iwi in emergency preparedness and response. To align the Bill with this strategy:

- Support for Marae-Based Initiatives: Recognise and fund initiatives like the *Ipu Ohotata* emergency containers, which equip marae to serve as emergency hubs.
- Capacity Building: Provide resources for training iwi members in emergency management systems, such as the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS), to enhance local response capabilities.

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**3. Recommendations**

We broadly support the five objectives of the proposed Emergency Management Bill:

- Strengthening iwi and community participation
- Clarifying responsibilities and accountability
- Enabling higher minimum standards
- Minimising disruption to essential services
- Ensuring the right powers are available when needed

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We are particularly supportive of the stated intent to enable a whole-of-society approach, which recognises iwi Māori as Te Tiriti partners—not stakeholders—and enables us to exercise mana motuhake in emergency response and recovery.

However, we caution that without statutory guarantees of iwi representation and engagement across all levels, this vision risks being rhetorical rather than real.

To ensure the Bill effectively incorporates Māori perspectives:

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**Recommendation: Establish Co-Governance Models**

- Develop frameworks that allow for shared decision-making between iwi and government agencies in emergency management.

**Recommendation: Resource Allocation**

- Allocate funding specifically for Māori-led emergency management initiatives, ensuring equitable support for iwi and hapū.

**Recommendation: Cultural Competency Training**

- Mandate cultural competency training for all emergency management personnel to ensure respectful and effective engagement with Māori communities.

We strongly advocate for the following to be embedded in legislation (not left to guidance or policy):

**Recommendation: Mandatory Representation**

- Require iwi Māori representation on Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and associated governance bodies.
- These roles should be co-designed with mana whenua to ensure they are meaningful and resourced.
- Previous iterations (under the current CDEM Act 2002) left iwi participation to the discretion of local authorities. This inconsistency has limited our influence and ability to act effectively during emergencies.

**Recommendation: Adopt Option 2 from the Discussion Document**

- Make iwi Māori representation on emergency governance structures a legal requirement—not an optional engagement step.

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**Recommendation : Mandatory Engagement During Planning**

- Local and regional emergency plans must be co-developed with iwi.

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- Engagement must include formal mechanisms for incorporating mātauranga Māori and iwi risk assessments.

**Recommendation:**

- Mandate iwi co-design and co-endorsement of all regional emergency management plans.

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**Recommendation :** Recognition of Iwi Response Capacity

- Iwi have demonstrated capability in COVID-19 response, flood support, and wildfire evacuation logistics.
- Emergency legislation must explicitly recognise iwi response units as part of the national response infrastructure.

**Recommendation:**

- Include iwi and Māori service providers in the definition of "responding organisations," with associated legal protections and access to resourcing.

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**Recommendation :** Integration of Mātauranga Māori

- Plans must protect cultural values (e.g. rāhui, wāhi tapu) during response and recovery.
- Decision-making frameworks must incorporate mātauranga Māori as valid and critical knowledge.

**Recommendation:**

- Require all CDEM plans to include sections on cultural protection and tikanga-based approaches.

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**4. Equity in Funding and Resources**

- Iwi and Māori organisations must have equal access to funding for emergency preparedness, education, and training.
- Currently, funding disproportionately supports non-Māori entities and informal volunteers.

**Recommendation:**

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- Establish a dedicated Iwi Resilience Fund within the NEMA budget and ensure equitable resourcing for Māori-led emergency initiatives.

| Current CDEM Act (2002) | Proposed Bill Intent | Recommended Improvement |
|---|---|---|
| No guarantee of iwi involvement | Suggests iwi participation | Require legal representation of iwi on governance bodies |
| Engagement is discretionary | Encourages partnership | Mandate co-design of emergency plans |
| Limited recognition of cultural protection | Notes consideration of taonga Māori | Require statutory cultural risk and tikanga plans |
| No targeted funding streams for iwi | No clear commitment in draft | Create an iwi emergency resilience fund |

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**5. Feedback on Other Objectives**

- Clear Responsibilities: We support clearer accountability, including the role of iwi as trusted delivery partners. Local leadership must be held accountable for meeting obligations under Te Tiriti o Waitangi.
- Essential Services: Iwi knowledge of local geography, hazards, and whakapapa relationships should be considered essential infrastructure in rural areas.
- Emergency Powers: Decision-makers must include iwi where emergencies affect Māori land, taonga species, or marae.

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**6. Conclusion**

Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Rārua supports the overall direction of the Emergency Management Bill. However, we believe the legislation must go further to meet the spirit and obligations of Te Tiriti o Waitangi by embedding iwi as statutory partners with guaranteed voice, authority, and resourcing.

We welcome further engagement on this kaupapa and are open to participating in co-designing implementation frameworks.

**Shane Graham**
**Pouwhakahaere/ CEO**
**Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Rārua**

**ENDS**

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TRANSPOWER

20 May 2025

Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency

By email: EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

# Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation: discussion document

As the owner and operator of nationally significant infrastructure, Transpower New Zealand Limited (**Transpower**) welcomes the opportunity to comment on *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*, published 15 April 2025 (**Discussion Document**). It is difficult to overstate the importance of planning for events, for communities, lifeline utilities and other infrastructure, and for emergency management organisations more broadly.

Transpower's high voltage network traverses almost every district in the country and provides a key link between the North and South Islands. In addition, the grid supports, and is supported by, telecommunications networks, information and operational technology systems, and the road network for assessment and recovery operation.[1]

Electrical energy is conveyed across the assets of the grid according to how the system operator dispatches the generated energy to meet demand. In an emergency situation, Transpower as the grid owner and the system operator plays a vital role ensuring grid assets are available and that the energy across the system can be restored as quickly as possible (accounting for safety) to a stable state.

Transpower is a lifeline utility under the Civil Defence Emergency Act 2002. We attend local civil defence emergency management (**CDEM**) group meetings, and manage the Electricity Desk of the National Crisis Management Centre on behalf of the National Emergency Management Agency (**NEMA**) and the sector during national civil defence emergencies.

The severe weather events in 2023 provide case studies that illustrate the importance of planning for resilient infrastructure, including electricity infrastructure, and preparing for resilient communities. In the case of the Auckland floods, we were able to demonstrate risk reduction through modern designs that ensured the transmission service was not interrupted even when the substation was inundated to 1.7m. But, the vulnerability of those substations that were flooded was also demonstrated. These vulnerabilities stem from investment decisions made nearly 100 years earlier, and changes to the natural and built environment over this time.

Our people and service providers, the equipment and spares in our warehouses, and our systematic approach (using the Co-ordinated Incident Management System (**CIMS**)) enables us to prepare and respond to events.

[1] The bulk of the fibre we use is owned by other infrastructure operators.

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The Discussion Document is high level, indicating initial thinking in relation to this critical area. Any Bill could have a range of impacts on Transpower, with a range of costs, benefits and administrative burden. We consider it important that Transpower as a lifeline utility is involved in further policy development through discussions with the National Emergency Management Agency (**NEMA**). Further testing of options and policy as they are developed will ensure that the Bill is fit for purpose, and is aligned with (or does not conflict with) existing regulatory settings for managing electricity outages, reliability standards grid performance, and funding regulations. This engagement would also ensure appropriate cost benefit assessment occurs, and that the benefits can be obtained at least cost.

## Our key points on the Discussion Document

Transpower agrees with the objectives of the reform. However, we consider that any reform should proceed on an incremental basis – if a light touch in terms of regulatory change to require adherence to already established frameworks achieves the desired outcomes, no additional regulation should be imposed. In this regard, we support a mix of non-legislative and legislative responses proposed across the issues in the Discussion Document (see the table below for a summary of the option/s we support for each issue).

While Transpower recognises improving resilience as a key area of focus, it is important that any investment is considered on a future biased risk-weighted basis and within the broader investment programme of the business, taking into account the changing natural environment and the energy systems change to be more reliant on electricity. This approach will allow a more optimised planning approach and a more effective delivery of resilience benefits. We do not support minimum standards being imposed, nor do we support CDEM Groups determining the appropriate level of risk for our infrastructure. We consider that we are best placed to determine the appropriate standard. Transpower supports non-regulatory responses to issues 8, 9 and 11.2.

We do not support a regime with fines being developed at this stage – there is no evidence to suggest that a punitive regime is warranted. Fines by their very nature are “after the fact.” We would be concerned if any regime measured the performance of infrastructure post - event. The infrastructure system is complex, with a myriad of interdependencies. Before making decisions on the standard of resilience to apply to a particular asset type/class, an infrastructure operator will consider available hazard and threat data, develop scenarios, consider risks and probabilities and implement mitigations.

We support mandatory information-sharing, as well as interaction with others – both are crucial to improving overall resilience of the infrastructure system. But the sharing and/or development of information must come from central government as well – we need greater national information on hazards and threats, for example through a common data-set. For the system to be resilient, interdependent infrastructure, and our existing regulators, must be working from the same base information.

We consider that a practical approach is necessary for managing access to cordons during an event. Lifeline utilities and their contractors should be able to pass through a cordon as of right and at their risk. Identification should be in the form of vehicle or work identification.

Clarity is required in relation to who the Control Agency is for any event. We oppose Transpower being the Control Agency, where the event stems from an electricity outage. Our focus should be on restoring power as a priority. We would not have the experience or resources to be responsible (in whole or part) for any broader operational response. We also consider it important that the Control

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Agency is clear from the outset, and the makes use of existing systems developed by CDEM Groups and NEMA, where the Control Agency is a different person/organisation. In this regard, we support option 2.

## Option/s supported by Transpower

The table below sets out the option/s supported by Transpower for select issues.

| Issue # | Option supported |
|---|---|
| 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management | Option 2 (non-legislative): Develop and update guidance and strengthen public education |
| 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency | Options 2 (legislative): Provide for protection from civil liability AND<br>Option 3 (legislative): Enable compensation for labour costs |
| 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency | Option 2 (legislative): Require the agency dealing with the specific hazard to be the "Control Agency" (noting Transpower's understanding that it would not be the Control Agency in relation to any electricity failure, and NEMA would have that role). |
| 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management | Option 2 for each of the 3 proposals under this issue<br>**For issue 6.1** (legislative): Provide distinct responsibilities for CDEM Groups and their local authority members<br>**For issue 6.2** (non-legislative): Update guidance and provide models for how CDEM Groups and local authorities could organise emergency management in their region<br>**For issue 6.3** (legislative): Provide more specific expectations on members of the Coordinating Executive Group supported by good practice guidance |
| 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date | Option 2 (legislative) Enable targeted, "more than minor" amendments to the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans |
| 8: Stronger national direction and assurance | **For issue 8.1** Option 2 (non-legislative): Increased guidance and strengthened governance<br>**For issue 8.2** we support the status quo |
| 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management | Option 2 (non-legislative): Provide clearer guidance about what it means to achieve an "acceptable" level of risk |
| 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies | We do not support any of the options proposed, but agree some change is warranted. |
| 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services | **For issue 11.1** option 2 (secondary legislation): Add additional sectors to the CDEM Act's Schedule of lifeline utilities<br>**For issue 11.2** option 2 (non-legislative): Increase assurance of lifeline utilities' business continuity plans<br>**For issue 11.3** Option 3 (legislative): Explicitly require CDEM Groups to involve the lifeline utilities in their areas in the development of CDEM Group plans AND |

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| Issue # | Option supported |
|---|---|
| | Option 6 (legislative): Enable data standards to be prescribed through secondary legislation (in relation to forms to be used during an event). Our support assumes there would be further consultation to comment on the regulation making power in the Bill, and on the content of any regulations under the new legislation (once enacted). |
| 13: Managing access to restricted areas | Option 2 (non-legislative): National guidance and training on managing cordons with the proviso that requirement for templated accreditation is removed. |
| 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period | Option 2 (legislative): Enable authorised persons to use electronic signatures |

## Background – Key features that affect the resilience of the grid

Transpower makes this submission against the backdrop of some key features that affect the resilience of the grid:

- ***Legacy infrastructure –*** Much of the grid is aging infrastructure, built 50 to 70 years ago. The vulnerabilities of the grid in some cases stem from investment decisions (including route selection) made nearly 100 years ago, combined with the changes to the built and natural environment that have occurred in this time. The replacement and refurbishment cycles for this infrastructure are lengthy because transmission assets are – by design – long-lived. In some cases, replacement assets designed to modern standards may be many years away and route or location changes need to navigate planning, property right, resource consent and social licence constraints;

- ***Scope of network –*** Transpower's high voltage network traverses almost every district in Aotearoa New Zealand. The network provides a key link between the North and South Island. The Grid is long and stringy. The investment required to increase security of supply at the edges of the grid, or at key choke points such as the Cook Strait, is significant;

- ***Interdependencies of the grid with other critical infrastructure –*** The grid supports, and is supported by, telecommunications networks, and information and operational technology systems, as well transport networks, not owned or operated by Transpower. For example, the bulk of the fibre we use is owned by other infrastructure operators. There are also dependencies with assets in other parts of the electricity sector – across generation and distribution companies. In a particular emergency situation these other assets may require a quite different response to the most appropriate response for high voltage electricity transmission assets;

- The identification of an asset as critical gives rise to the question of what level of resilience should be provided for that asset – and, where there is a dependency, what level of resilience should be provided for interdependent infrastructure – so that the overall system is resilient. In other words, overall system resilience may be dictated by the weakest link in an interdependent chain. That weakness cannot be compensated for by strength in another link (and strength elsewhere in the chain is wasted investment until such time as the whole

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chain achieves a commensurate level of strength). This reflects the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet's (*DPMC*) focus on "lifting the resilience floor"[2];

- ***Different threats require different responses –*** Different threats to the grid (e.g. earthquakes; floods; volcanic eruptions) require different responses at different locations and depending on the nature and extent of the emergency. For example, if a substation at the end of a spur line were severely damaged as a result of an extreme event, it might take days to weeks to get it back up and running. For an area that has more than one substation or more than one line, the disruption could be less and the restoration timeframe would be much shorter;

- ***Range of hazards –*** The resilience of the Grid to hazards has received increased focus in recent years. This is in part because of the increased severe weather events due to climate change and the emerging science in areas such as seismic or solar hazards. Our cyber defences are frequently tested and enhanced to remain fit for purpose;

- ***Security of supply and resilience are a key focus for Transpower –*** For Transpower, security of supply and resilience of the Grid feature highly in its strategies and day to day operations. Transpower has a high degree of expertise and capability in this area;

- ***Improvement to infrastructure resilience is constrained by other regulatory regimes –*** The regulation of Transpower by both the Commerce Commission and the Electricity Authority already captures (to an extent) the resilience of the grid and places some conditions on Transpower's economic ability to improve it. For example, the Commission determines Transpower's allowable revenue for a five-year period for a range of investment drivers, but also allows re-openers for resilience expenditure where Transpower can show benefits are greater than costs. The Electricity Authority sets the rules for the level of reliability across the country, also an economic cost-benefit analysis for non-core grid areas

- Further, some regulation increases the stress our infrastructure faces - for example, the Resource Management Act 1991 (and the national direction under it), Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and the Electricity (Hazards from Trees) Regulations. This legislation in combination has resulted in trees being planted too close to our lines, adversely impacting the overall resilience of the Grid.

From Transpower's perspective, the policy development for any Bill needs to reflect and respond to these key features.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

The Discussion Document notes that emergency management in New Zealand is based on the principle that everyone plays a role in managing their own risks and helping their families, neighbours, and people in their own networks. We agree with this principle. It is not possible to design and plan for every eventuality – it would result in hardening of assets and levels of redundancy that the country that are not warranted, or cost effective.

[2] In its Discussion Document "Strengthening resilience of Aotearoa New Zealand's critical infrastructure system."

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This issue captures offers of help, including from commercial operators during events, that have not been co-ordinated or responded to in a timely manner. Transpower considers that either option 2 or 3 should be progressed. We consider that there needs to be certainty about the availability of resources within an area subject to an emergency.

During Cyclone Gabrielle, Transpower's contracted helicopters were requisitioned by NEMA and directed to rescue activities. As a result, Transpower had to contract with other helicopter operators - from outside of Hawke's Bay. Had there been an available pool of helicopters within the region for use – and not already contracted to recovery efforts of individual infrastructure operators, a more efficient response could result, avoiding:

- requisitioning contracted helicopters (and other infrastructure) in circumstances where other commercial helicopters are available;
- contracting resources outside a region, when resources are available closer to the emergency.

Transpower prefers a non-legislative response (option 2). We consider that it would help to provide more certainty about the availability of resources within an area subject to an emergency. Guidance can improve the understanding and expectation around critical resources, or personnel, available from commercial entities for lifeline utilities that has not been requisitioned by NEMA. Further, any non-legislative guidance could contain a process check that offered plant/equipment and resources are not already allocated via pre-planning arrangements of lifeline utilities.

**Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency**

This issue touches on first responders carrying out actions prior to a declaration of civil defence emergency being made. It is proposed to expand the limitation of civil liability (option 2) beyond that available now, and extend the ability to claim compensation from the Crown for labour costs (option 3). Transpower supports both options. We note that the ability for limited parties to claim compensation for services required by the Director or CDEM Group, and carried out in advance of (or without) a contract being entered could result in important recovery work being carried out sooner, benefiting any recovery.

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at national, regional and local level

Objective 2, and issues 5 and 6 in particular, seek to strengthen the leadership and other roles of CDEM Group and local government. However, this discussion is devoid of any clarity about the interaction between the CDEM Group and local authorities with lifeline utilities (or the broader class of essential infrastructure or essential services). Options to improve performance across the 4 Rs require a co-ordinated approach. These challenges increase given the interdependences with other infrastructure and the potential for other infrastructure solutions, or community-based solutions.

By way of example, consider electricity supply to the West Coast after a magnitude 8 Alpine Fault earthquake (AF8). The West Coast uses less than 1% of the country's electricity supply – via two separate grid connections over mountainous terrain. In a major earthquake, we expect major slips to cut supply from the grid, as well as the road and rail networks, for weeks and possibly months. It is not feasible to avoid these impacts by hardening the grid assets. It is also likely that an earthquake of this magnitude would reduce electricity demand. As a result, a community response may be more appropriate. This response could involve strategically placed larger diesel generators, and reliance

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on any smaller hydro schemes in the region that are still functioning connecting to Buller or Westpower's distribution network, as both their networks and our own connections into region are rebuilt.

Our response to issue 11.3 discusses the importance of attendance at CDEM Group meetings and sharing of information.

**Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency**

The Discussion Document proposes 3 new options for who the "Control Agency" is during an event:

- the agency dealing with the specific hazard, with NEMA/CDEM Group in support (option 2);
- Group Controllers (local emergency) or the Director (national emergency) (option 3);
- a unified control model between the agency dealing with the hazard and the Group Controller or Director (option 4).

Transpower would oppose any options where we could potentially be considered the agency dealing with the hazard, where an electricity outage is the cause of the event. In such circumstances, we consider our focus should be on resolving the outage and bringing electricity back on as a priority. We would not have the experience or resources to be responsible (in whole or part) for any broader operational response – it would divert us from the task of restoring electricity. We understand that the intention of the Discussion Document is not to broaden the Control Agency to parties such as Transpower.

We note that the status quo, as contained in the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015 (**Order**), lists a number of organisations as Lead Agency in the event of certain emergencies, including Ministry of Health, Ministry of Primary Industries, Fire and Emergency New Zealand, the New Zealand Police and NEMA/CDEM Groups. We support option 2 provided the Control Agency was identified in advance of an emergency. We could support a legislative regime that identified the Control Agency as being similar to the listed bodies in the Order. We note that we would be concerned if there were different Control Agencies for the same type of event.

We consider that option 2 provides clarity for national events that NEMA would be in support, and CDEM Groups for regional events. New systems and processes should not be developed by each Control Agency for each different event.

**Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management**

This issue discusses the relationship between local authorities and councils, and notes some local authorities do not buy into what the CDEM Group decides. The result may be lines of accountability being unclear, overlapping, inappropriate and inconsistent between CDEM Groups.

Transpower has experienced a range of regional approaches. From our experience, when groups such as the Northland CDEM Group are very unified it can speed up responses, improve the prioritisation of effort and avoid inter-agency confusion and conflict. By comparison, disjointed groups lead to much more ineffective emergency response outcomes for their local communities.

As a result, Transpower supports option 2 for each of the proposals:

- Provide distinct responsibilities for CDEM Groups and their local authority members (legislative);

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- Update guidance and provide models for how CDEM Groups and local authorities could organise emergency management in their region (non-legislative);

- Provide more specific expectations on members of the Coordinating Executive Group supported by good practice guidance (legislative).

**Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date**

We consider that there should be the ability to update plans in an efficient manner. Transpower supports option 2. The Discussion Document considers a risk of this option is that some amendments are not sufficiently consulted on (page 34). We consider that this risk could be addressed by a statutory requirement to consult for say 20 working days.

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

**Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance**

The Discussion Document notes that emergency management gives responsibilities to a number of parties across the 4 Rs, including lifeline utilities (paragraph 117).

The problems identified in the Discussion Document (paragraph 119-121) relating to national direction and standards are:

- the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance;
- limited mandate to intervene and address performance issues.

Beyond the reference to lifeline utilities at paragraph 117, this section of the Discussion Document is silent about the impact of stronger national direction and assurance in relation to lifeline utilities. Despite the lack of explicit reference, we are concerned about this issue, as we discuss below.

Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

Three options are proposed to strengthen the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance, in addition to the status quo:

- increased guidance and strengthened governance (non-legislative) (option 2);
- enabling a wider range of mandatory standards to be set through rules (legislative) (option 3);
- giving the Director the function of monitoring performance of the emergency management system (legislative) (option 4).

We do not support mandatory standards and performance rules for lifeline utilities. It is impractical to develop standards and rules that cover the multitude of emergency management scenarios.

The imposition of minimum standards can lead to unintended consequences due to the uncertainties of information and variety of scenarios encountered. What is meant by minimum standards needs context. For example, Transpower's new build design standard (target) for flooding is for a 450-year return period. However, there could be a minimum standard around resilience for flooding that the service can survive a storm event that is a 200-year return period (allowing for climate change). This is different to the minimum standard of return to service time. Note that we specify return periods for seismic performance and most infrastructure providers have design standards they build to.

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There are further reasons for not supporting a prescriptive regime where minimum standards are enforced. In particular, significant parts of the Grid are decades old and were built to different resilience standards than today. Setting a minimum standard could require a substantial part of our current asset base to be upgraded to the latest standards. Not all assets may warrant the same level of upgrade, given their location and purpose. Further, due to the long stringy nature of the Grid, the resilience at the extremities is likely to be lower than where there are a greater number of interconnected assets, such as major urban and industrial centres. For some of our more isolated substations it will be impractical to create a similar level of resilience as for those where we have an alternative nearby. There may be cheaper community resilience options that could meet the need.

Resilience can be improved through a range of investments – both big and small. It is possible to focus on individual assets, such as having a "substations" or "towers" programme. But a linear network needs to be considered as a whole. A resilience regime that focusses on the approach to asset management and risk management will result in a more effective resilience regime.

Minimum standards also cut across the complex nature of the infrastructure system and its interdependencies. An individual asset could be made more resilient by a range of responses – ranging from hardening through to joint or community-side approaches to mitigations. By way of example, it may be more effective to raise a stopbank than to harden each individual organisation's infrastructure behind the stopbank.

Instead of providing a power to set mandatory standards through rules (option 3), we consider that increased guidance about minimum standards may be appropriate. In this regard, we support option 2. For the same reasons, we do not support the Director having the ability to address performance of any minimum standards.

Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

At a broad level, Transpower supports increasing existing powers contained in the CDEMA to any transition period. However, beyond that change, Transpower does not consider that the problem articulated in the Discussion Document requires change beyond the status quo, nor that the options are appropriate.

We also note that any enforcement regime in relation to failure to meet a required standard would need to be clear about what the required standard was. As discussed above, we do not support minimum standards for network utilities being imposed. We are also concerned about the position arising where the Director considered matters needed to be addressed, but our regulator had not approved relevant works. There is also the potential for duplication of existing regulatory functions applying to the electricity sector.

**Question 8** of the Discussion Document asks which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction. In our view, common event situation reporting templates for use by critical infrastructure sectors along with common sector definitions that can be utilised when reporting to local, regional, and national level would be useful. A common and structured data repository for managing an event, its requests, tasking etc would also assist those undertaking NEMA roles or critical infrastructure liaison roles to be able to operate efficiently, consistently and effectively across regions, roles, and shift changes. We also consider that consistency would be useful regarding the level of detail required in plans, how cross-boundary issues between CDEM Groups are addressed, and how interfaces and interdependencies between infrastructure is to occur. Also see our on Issue 9, in relation to better information about hazards

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and threats, and common data sets. We consider that greater standardisation of this information would be beneficial for all involved in emergency management.

**Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management**

The Discussion Document appears to articulate the problem as CDEM Group plans being established to bring different risk management tools together, so they can be used in an integrated and coordinated way, but this role is not occurring (paragraph 136). Comment is also made that some CDEM Group plans are ambiguous regarding what an "acceptable" level of risk should look like (paragraph 137).

This section of the Discussion Document has little discussion about lifeline utilities. In relation to the options, it discusses acceptable levels of risk for communities, and compliance costs for CDEM Groups. There is no discussion about the impacts on lifeline utilities of setting acceptable levels of risk via CDEM Group Plans, nor the associated compliance burden of mitigating the risks.

Transpower considers that the CDEM Group is not best placed to develop acceptable levels of risk, nor to identify the mitigations to those risks, for lifeline utilities. It is important that any decisions in relation to natural hazard risks to grid infrastructure are driven by factors in the wider system. We consider that a lifeline utility is best placed to understand and manage its level of risk. For that reason, we prefer option 2 – that guidance is developed about what it means to achieve an "acceptable" level of risk.

For lifeline utilities, we consider the focus should be on obtaining better information on hazards and threats (including related to risk tolerance, community expectations about resilience of the electricity network, up-to-date climate datasets, probabilistic risks models, flood modelling, and more timely exchange of cyber threat information, as incidents impacting other providers evolve). For a system to be resilient, all parties (including interdependent infrastructure providers), CDEM Groups, local authorities and our existing regulators) must be working from the same base information.

We agree that acceptable levels of risk for communities more generally, and in particular residential and urban development, needs greater attention. The Ministry for the Environment's work on the proposed National Policy Statement on Natural Hazards (**NPS**), should assist with addressing this risk. (For the reasons discussed above, we do not consider that this proposed NPS should address risks for lifeline utilities). The risks to urban and residential development, and the options for addressing those, are quite different from the options available to lifeline utilities. In this regard, a one-size-fits-all approach is not appropriate.

**Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies**

Transpower accepts that loss of cultural heritage can compound the negative effects of emergencies. We also agree that animal welfare, and impacts on other wildlife should be considered.

Again, the Discussion Document focuses on CDEM Group plans, and is silent about the actions of lifelines (and therefore the pros and cons of the options considered).

Transpower considers that more is needed to both protect and enable work that impacts on sensitive environments, including in locations with archaeological sites and native fauna. It is

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important that any expectation to consider such matters is appropriate to the emergency at hand and ensuring that unnecessary legislative barriers are not created that will hinder recovery efforts.

It may be appropriate for the Bill to address the welfare of stock and pets. However, we do not consider it appropriate to broaden emergency management legislation to cover matters subject to existing legislation. Instead, we consider that it would be more appropriate to amend Wildlife Act and Conservation Act (noting the Heritage New Zealand Pohere Taonga Act already contains emergency provisions). We consider that these Acts should be amended to provide for emergency works and obtaining any retrospective approvals, similar to that provided in section 330 of the RMA (noting that section 330 also requires amendment to be fit for purpose).

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

**Issue 11: Reducing disruption to infrastructure that provides essential services**
The Discussion Document identifies 3 key problems that are considered to relate to the restoration of infrastructure in an emergency:

- the narrow definition of "lifeline utility" in the CDEMA;
- inadequate business continuity planning;
- barriers to cooperation and information sharing.

11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"
The Discussion Document proposes options to broaden the scope of entities covered by the legislation. Option 2 proposes expanding the list of entities captured as "lifeline utility" in the CDEMA schedule. Option 3 proposes a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure."

Transpower considers that certainty about what infrastructure is captured by the Bill is important. We do not consider that the principles-based regime proposed by option 3 would provide this certainty, as interpretation is required. We are also concerned about the increase in number of entities that would be captured, and practical implications of increasing the entities that would be attending local regional and national meetings. Already, 30+ individuals attend the national meetings. Further, the greater the number of entities that are attending meetings, the longer they will become, and the more likely that matters discussed will not be central to the existing lifeline utilities. The value of the meetings could reduce as a result.

Instead, Transpower prefers option 2 – the listed lifeline utilities should be extended to include flood protection, data storage, payment services and solid waste. We also recognise the importance of monitoring science, and hazard warning systems. Associated infrastructure and systems could also come withing a broadened definition of lifeline utilities. We consider that other essential services that are critical customers of lifeline utilities, such as health, aged care, emergency services, fast-moving consumer goods, education, corrections, community facilities and major industry should remain outside of the definition within the CDEMA (and its replacement). To the extent that there is value in these broader services being aligned, separate groups could be formed.

11.2 Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning
In terms of strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning, the Discussion Document proposes to:

- increase assurance of lifeline utilities' business continuity plans via non-legislative means (option 2);

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- regulations to act as a backstop to address systemic business continuity issues and achieve greater consistency within a class (or classes of lifeline utility (option 3);
- consistent business continuity planning requirements would apply to all lifeline utilities, together with a formal mechanism to address non-compliance with legal requirements, in primary legislation (option 4).

Transpower does not support legislative approaches that introduce financial penalties on business continuity planning for regulated lifeline utilities. This is an overly prescriptive approach that will lead to compliance burden and investigations that are not in the interests of New Zealand. We have this concern, as the discussion and definition of business continuity planning within the Discussion Document is not entirely clear. Business continuity is normally considered about keeping the business operating, which is different from readiness planning to be able restore services with minimum disruption. Readiness planning can be based on how a lifeline utility responds to a certain type of event, type of asset or for a specific site or location. It can also mean how we choose to reconfigure our network and redispatch generation to maintain service.

We are also concerned about assurance requirements, and what they would entail. The Discussion Document omits any discussion about this matter. Who would be providing this assurance, and what would occur if there were differences between the lifeline utility and any auditor or other person carrying out the assurance function as to what was appropriate for a particular asset?

Transpower considers that there may benefits in "lifting the floor" in relation to emergency management planning, should the Discussion Document be referring this this type of exercise. In this regard, we generally support option 2 - more guidance and monitoring, especially for non-regulated lifeline utilities and for some sectors where maturity is low. Clarity would need to be provided that this guidance applied to emergency management planning, not business continuity planning.

11.3 Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

The Discussion Document notes the interdependencies between lifeline utilities and notes that some CDEM Group plans place little emphasis on infrastructure failure as a hazard to be managed by the Group. Issues with effective sharing of information between lifeline utilities and CDEM Groups or NEMA is noted as not always being effective.

Currently information sharing occurs between lifeline utilities via meetings arranged at a regional level – usually by the local authority that runs the relevant CDEM Group. Neither the need for the meeting, nor attendance at it, is mandated. Instead, they are organised due to community concern should an emergency event occur, with the meetings and attendance at them voluntary.

Some infrastructure operators opt out of attending the meetings and sharing information. This situation may possibly be a consequence of competition or privatisation, or potentially competing priorities.

Further, while meetings with a regional or local focus will be helpful for councils and communities, they are less useful for national providers. Meetings with a much broader, or national, focus would be useful.

We consider that:

- Meetings between interdependent infrastructure operators should be mandated. However, there should be flexibility to determine the frequency of meetings and/or attendance based

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on the interdependence of the relevant infrastructure providers. In this regard, wider infrastructure provider meetings may occur less frequently than meetings between infrastructure operators with a closer relationship (such as Transpower and the generators or EDBs);

- attendance at a minimum number of the meetings should be mandatory;
- provision of key information necessary for inter-dependent infrastructure operators to make decisions about their own resilience should be mandatory.

We can see some benefit in option 6, which would enable data standards to be prescribed through secondary legislation – depending on the level of detail required. The Discussion Document states that these standards would relate to requests and provision of information being provided in a consistent format during an emergency. We support this consistency. However, we would not support any secondary legislation that required extensive scenario testing for all Transpower's assets in order to share relevant data. Such scenario testing would be a significant workstream – and may not provide benefit to interdependent infrastructure operators that justify the time and cost required.

In addition to the above, we support option 3 to legislate that CDEM Groups are required to explicitly involve lifeline utilities in CDEM group plans – which we understand will expand on the existing legislative provisions in section 60. As a national lifeline, we are already involved in a number of CDEM group plans, but legislative expectations will ensure consistency. The burden of the additional time of being involved can be managed if reasonable review periods are set and consistent templating and guidance around CDEM plans and input for those plans is developed.

We do not support a national level response plan (see page 56 of the Discussion Document) for the electricity sector, primarily because most events are regional level and working with regional CDEM groups benefits the development of shared understanding, relationship building and preparedness for that region. As the owner and operator of the national grid we have readiness plans for a variety of national level events and a national response plan will not improve co-ordination and preparedness at affected regions.

We note that any regime in relation to the disclosure of information in relation to cyber risks may warrant a different response in any emergency management regime. In particular, disclosure protection may be warranted for industry and suppliers to better share information and respond to threats/incidents. There may also be a need to centralised support associated with suppliers to force disclosure and share critical information. Legislation may be warranted to force disclosure in a manner that minimises legal/commercial risks, but provides adequate information so that we can respond appropriately and understand our respective risk. The Discussion Document does not address these issues in relation to information sharing.

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

Transpower agrees with the problem identified – restricting access to roads and public places has sometimes hindered the ability of lifeline utilities to respond. Any solution to this problem needs to be practical, recognising the number of people who may need to enter cordons could be extensive and will change as staff commence and end work for the network utility.

We do not consider that any of the options proposed in the Discussion Document will work in practice. We consider that the default should be that lifeline utilities and their contractors (and other representatives under the escort of the lifeline utility) should be to pass the cordon as of right,

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and at their risk. The cordon operator should log and record those passing in and out of the cordon. We consider that requiring a prescribed form that must be carried could be challenging, as it is something extra to carry (that would not as a matter of course be required). Having a sign-written vehicle or work identification should be sufficient to enable entry to any cordoned area. In this regard, Transpower could support option 2, with the removal of the templated accreditation process.

**Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at local level**
**Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period**
**Issue 16: Mayor's role in local state of emergency declarations and transition periods**
It is important that there is no delay in declaring states of emergency. Transpower considers that there should be clarity about who is able to declare an emergency, and the process of declaring an emergency should be modernised. In relation to issue 15, we support Option 2.

## Other matters

Our submission does not contain confidential matters.

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Email: s9(2)(a)
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VOLUNTEER CENTRE NETWORK AOTEAROA

Connecting Volunteer Communities Across Aotearoa

**Submission on the Emergency Management Bill**

May 2025

**Introduction**

Volunteer Centre Network Aotearoa (VCNA) thank Government for the opportunity to submit on the Emergency Management Bill.

VCNA is a collaborative group of 17 Volunteer Centres across Aotearoa. Each centre is an independent charity providing volunteer recruitment, volunteer placement, and training for organisations and communities on volunteering. While each centre is independent of each other we recognise the value of working collaboratively on opportunities that arise nationally, such as submissions on proposals with notable impact on volunteering and the community organisations we work with.

VCNA also has a partnership with Volunteering New Zealand (VNZ) where VNZ is able to provide national and international trends, research, best practice guidelines, and relevant training.

**VCNA submit:**

**Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities**
VCNA strongly support a 'whole of society approach' to emergency management, in particular recognising the local and regional experts in all things volunteering – the volunteer centres that are already embedded in communities throughout the motu with existing relationships and agreements with local and regional businesses, organisations, iwi, and volunteers.

Volunteer Centres have staff and volunteers who are trained in emergency management and prepared to continue to develop this knowledge. Centre staff in the majority of centres are already engaged at a local level with CDEM teams, and some are already working at a regional level with CDEM.

Volunteer Centres are experts in recruiting, onboarding, deploying, and coordinating volunteers – it is what we do in the community every day.

We believe that Volunteer Coordination with recognition of Volunteer Centres should be included in this option.

**Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management.**
VCNA support the concept of the community being prepared and able to participate in an emergency that affects them. A key part of this being successful is the coordination of existing and spontaneous volunteers to ensure that the right support is provided at the right time for the right

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cause. Volunteer Coordination is a key part of the Operations role and Volunteer Centres have the expertise to provide this coordination.


VCNA support Option 2) however would like an addition to "require local government emergency plans to state how they will manage offers of assistance from the public" to be reworded to "require local government emergency plans to state how they will work with existing community experts, including Volunteer Centres, on managing offers of assistance from the public".

**Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency**

VCNA support Option 2 " b, Provide for protection from civil liability for loss or damage (legislative): People would be protected from civil liability if they caused loss or damage while undertaking reasonable and significant emergency management actions in good faith, in circumstances where they were unable to seek or be given direction by a Controller or constable."

**In summary:**

Recognition and strengthening of the resources and experts that already exist across the motu for volunteer recruitment, onboarding, training, deployment, coordination, and community knowledge/relationships through including VCNA and Volunteer Centres as stated partners across national, regional, and local emergency management planning, response, and recovery.



Kate Aplin

Manager

Whatunga Tūao Volunteer Central on behalf of VCNA

VCNA members:

Volunteering Northland
Volunteering Auckland
Volunteering Waikato
Gisborne Volunteer Centre
Volunteering Services (part of SociaLink)
Volunteering Hawkes Bay
Volunteering New Plymouth Te Tuari o Ngamotu
Volunteer Great Lakes Taupo
Whanganui Volunteer Centre
Volunteer Wellington Te Puna Tautoko
Whatunga Tūao Volunteer Central
Volunteer Kāpiti
Volunteer Nelson
Volunteer Marlborough
Volunteering Mid & South Canterbury
Volunteer South
Volunteering Canterbury

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20 May 2025

Via email: EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

Tēnā koe,

**FEEDBACK TO THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY ON STRENGTHENING NEW ZEALAND'S EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION DISCUSSION DOCUMENT**

Thank you for the opportunity to present this feedback from Queenstown Lakes District Council (**QLDC** o**r Council**) to the National Emergency Management Agency (**NEMA**) regarding its discussion document Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency management legislation.

QLDC welcomes the proposed reforms and supports efforts to build a more resilient, equitable, and locally responsive emergency management system. Council's feedback draws on practical experience managing a range of emergency events and reflects strong support for the position expressed in the submission by Taituarā – Local Government Professionals Aotearoa.

As a fast-growing district with a unique combination of geographical isolation, high visitor numbers, and a diverse, mobile population, QLDC faces distinctive emergency management challenges. It supports the overall direction of the proposed reforms and emphasises the importance of:

- recognising and preserving the critical role of local government;
- embedding meaningful iwi participation across all levels of emergency management; and
- ensuring sustainable resourcing and capacity-building at the local level.

QLDC appreciates the opportunity to contribute to the development of a stronger, more inclusive emergency management framework and look forward to continued collaboration with NEMA and sector partners to improve outcomes for our communities.

Nā māua noa, nā,

**Mike Theelen**
Chief Executive

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# FEEDBACK TO NEMA ON STRENGTHENING NEW ZEALAND'S EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION DISCUSSION DOCUMENT

## QLDC context

0.1 Queenstown-Lakes District (QLD) is a district with an average daily population of 80,910 (visitors and residents) and a peak daily population of 121,365. By 2055 this is forecast to increase to 146,646 and 219,969 respectively[1].

0.2 The QLD is one of the fastest-growing in New Zealand and is characterised by a highly mobile, multicultural population with a significant number of migrant workers, international visitors, and residents with limited English proficiency. The district has the fourth busiest airport in the country with over 2.5M passenger arrivals in 2024[2].

0.3 The district also has several communities in remote or geographically isolated locations (e.g. Glenorchy, Makarora, Kingston) and a large daily transient population of tourists (e.g. day trips to Milford) and outdoor recreationists exploring remote and hard-to-access locations (e.g. Department of Conservation hikes). The combination of these factors places unique challenges on QLDC in terms of natural hazard risk reduction, community resilience development and emergency management planning.

0.4 QLDC is a partner council within Emergency Management Otago, which is the operational arm of the Otago Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group. This regionally coordinated model provides support for emergency planning, response, and recovery efforts across the region.

0.5 In addition to partnering in the Group CDEM structure, QLDC also delivers local emergency management services to its community through the local Emergency Operations Centre (EOC). QLDC and EMO staff work together to ensure there is professional capability and capacity to activate the EOC, as well as working collaboratively on BAU work programmes focused on community preparedness, hazard risk reduction, and response readiness that are tailored to the unique needs of the Queenstown Lakes District.

0.6 QLDC maintains a close partnership with Kāi Tahu as mana whenua of the district. QLDC is committed to working in partnership with the seven Papatipu Rūnaka with shared interests in the district, to strengthen their role in emergency management planning, response, and recovery.

0.7 This submission has been structured in order to directly respond to the issues that NEMA has highlighted as part of this consultation process.

## OBJECTIVE 1: STRENGTHENING COMMUNITY AND IWI MĀORI PARTICIPATION

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

1.1 QLDC acknowledges the importance of ensuring that New Zealand's emergency management system is inclusive, equitable, and responsive to the diverse needs of our communities. It is

[1] https://www.qldc.govt.nz/community/population-and-demand

[2] https://www.queenstownairport.co.nz/facts-figures



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vital that emergency planning and response systems are designed with these diverse needs in mind to ensure safety, inclusion, and effective communication during emergencies. This extends to embedding the principle of equity within core response and recovery objectives.

1.2 For issue 1, QLDC recommends that improvements are delivered through a combination of options 2,3 and 4. The combination of these legislative and non-legislative approaches will strengthen capability and ensure accountability for delivery of improved equity outcomes:

- **Option 2** (non-legislative): Develop guidance on meeting diverse needs.
- **Option 3** (legislative): Require Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for.
- **Option 4** (legislative): Require the Director to consult with representatives of disproportionately affected communities to inform national planning.

1.3 In addition, QLDC recommends that NEMA also places a focus on the necessary resourcing, funding and professional development required by Group CDEM and local authorities to deliver a more inclusive and equitable emergency response.

1.4 The National Disaster Resilience Strategy[3] places significant focus on a 'whole-of-society' approach to emergency management, which needs to be activated locally but with centralised support. QLDC and Emergency Management Otago have invested significant resource into this space through the development of the Community Resilience Group network, which consists of volunteers from communities across the district as well as the QLDC Welcoming Communities Plan[4], which includes a focus on emergency management preparedness for migrant communities.

1.5 These groups can provide an important service in terms of connecting within communications, targeted outreach, and education programmes. However the resources and tools that these group share to support greater inclusion and equity such as translated resources and accessibility upgrades for readiness and response information are complex and costly to deliver at a local and regional level. These would benefit from the economies of scale and professional capability that can be accessed through central government.

**Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management**

2.1 QLDC recognises the importance of upholding Te Tiriti o Waitangi principles and ensuring that iwi, hapū, rūnaka, and Māori communities are active partners and decision-makers in emergency planning, response, and recovery. This is crucial for achieving equitable, culturally appropriate, and community-led outcomes.

2.2 Mana whenua such as Kāi Tahu have long-standing relationships with the land and communities. Their knowledge, leadership, and tikanga are invaluable to building a resilient emergency management system that reflects the needs of all our people.

2.3 QLDC recommends that improvements are delivered through a combination of options 2 and 3:

- **Option 2** (non-legislative): Address the roles of iwi Māori in plans, guidance, and other policy settings

[3] https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/resources/publications/national-disaster-resilience-strategy/

[4] https://www.qldc.govt.nz/community/welcoming-communities/our-welcoming-plan/



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- **Option 3** (legislative): Require iwi Māori representation on CDEM Group decision-making structures

2.4 Further, the following are recommended to support effective Māori participation:

- Provide dedicated training, and resources to iwi, hapū, rūnaka and Māori organisations to support their participation in planning and operational roles and ensure they are not taken for granted as welfare hubs.
- Reform Section 33 of the Guide to the National CDEM Plan to ensure there is a culturally appropriate funding mechanism for marae and iwi to access for timely reimbursement of welfare emergency response costs without unnecessary administrative barriers.
- Allow flexibility to tailor iwi engagement to regional and local contexts, recognising the distinct identities and governance structures of iwi across the motu.
- Include iwi as partners in scenario planning, training, and emergency exercises to strengthen operational integration.

**Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management**

3.1 QLDC strongly supports the intent to strengthen and better enable the vital role that communities, local organisations, and individuals play before, during, and after emergencies.

3.2 While voluntary engagement and local initiatives are valuable, the system needs greater structure, consistency, and visibility to ensure communities are not just willing, but equipped and prepared to enable a **whole-of-society** approach to emergency management.

3.3 QLDC recommends that improvements are delivered through a combination of options 2 and 3:

- **Option 2** (non-legislative): Develop and update guidance and strengthen public education.
- **Option 3** (legislative): Require CDEM Group plans to state how the Group will manage offers of resources from the public.

3.4 The development and promotion of non-legislative tools such as guidance, templates, and community education resources can help clarify how community offers of support can be coordinated and integrated, what kinds of pre-event agreements need to be established, and set expectations around how reimbursement or liability can be managed clearly and fairly. Importantly, such resources should be co-designed with local government, iwi, and community organisations to ensure they are practical, adaptable, and locally relevant.

3.5 The adoption of legislative requirements around community participation will also help reinforce the principle that emergency management is a whole-of-society responsibility.

**Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency**

4.1 QLDC acknowledges that local community members are often the first responders in emergency events, providing essential support in the immediate aftermath of a crisis. Empowering this community action is critical to improving the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and equity of emergency management across New Zealand.

4.2 This is particularly relevant in the QLD, where geographic isolation, tourism infrastructure, and limited emergency services in some areas mean that community resilience and self-reliance are an accepted and necessary part of emergency response activity.

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4.3 QLDC supports proposals to extend protection from civil liability to individuals and businesses who take reasonable, good-faith actions during an emergency where there is no time to seek formal direction from a Controller or constable. We agree that the current framework requiring direction for protection to apply does not reflect the operational reality of many emergencies, particularly in remote or fast-evolving events.

4.4 QLDC recommends that improvements are delivered through a combination of options 2 and 3:

- **Option 2** (legislative): Provide for protection from civil liability.
- **Option 3** (legislative): Enable compensation for labour costs.

4.5 By providing enhanced legal protection for community responders, a potential deterrent to early action can be removed, and legislative settings brough into alignment with public expectations and operational practice.

4.6 Similarly, broadening compensation eligibility to include reasonable labour costs incurred by individuals and businesses who are directed by Controllers or constables will help remove potential barriers to operational delivery. For example, a contractor with specialist skills or heavy machinery may incur significant opportunity costs in responding to a Controller's direction. Without fair compensation, these businesses may be reluctant or unable to offer their support during future events.

4.7 QLDC recommends that any changes in liability or compensation be accompanied by clear public guidance on what protections apply and in what circumstances, to avoid confusion during an already stressful time.

## OBJECTIVE 2: PROVIDING FOR CLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACCOUNTABILITIES AT THE NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND LOCAL LEVELS

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

5.1 QLDC supports the intent to clarify and strengthen direction and control arrangements during emergencies. Greater clarity will support more effective, timely, and coordinated responses especially when emergencies span multiple jurisdictions or involve concurrent hazards (e.g. flooding and landslides).

5.2 The QLD is exposed to multiple hazards, including seismic, severe weather, wildfire, and infrastructure failure. Coordination between the local authority, regional and national controllers, as well as the different emergency services agencies who have a role in leading the response must be seamless, especially during complex, time critical events.

5.3 QLDC supports:

- **Option 2-** Require the agency dealing with the specific hazard to be the "Control Agency".

5.4 This option ensures that the agency with the greatest subject matter expertise in controlling or suppressing the hazard (e.g. Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) for wildfire or NZ Police for a terrorism act) are the control agency who are charged with making time critical decisions

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and holding operational accountability. This provides clarity of decision-making authority and accountability during the critical time period when the community are at risk.

5.5 It is acknowledged however that all control models rely heavily on the question of who is lead agency prior and post a declared Local State of Emergency (SoE). If a SoE is not declared, then both FENZ and NZP will likely be the lead agency under the examples listed above. This would then likely shift to CDEM after a SoE is declared. A SoE by its nature is only declared if the emergency services agency leading the response is overwhelmed, so they may not be in the best position to continue to be control/lead at this is point. This is a critical shift that must be judiciously evaluated based on the context of the event and the balance of which agency has the greater challenge to meet. The context of this response requirement should therefore dictate who is the lead/control agency rather than pre-determined designations.

5.6 To help improve the performance of response control for multi-agency events, QLDC recommends the following be considered:

- Require joint planning, scenario exercises, and relationship-building between key leadership roles prior to events to reduce confusion during response.
- Ensure direction and control structures are flexible and scalable based on event magnitude, location, and impact, while maintaining local knowledge at the core.
- Establish clear protocols and systems for real-time information sharing between all levels of response leadership and stakeholders.

**Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management**

6.1 QLDC supports the intent to strengthen the regional tier of emergency management and recommends that this be done in a way that maintains strong local input, resourcing equity, and community responsiveness. While greater regional consistency and coordination can improve efficiency and capability, it's important that any reform avoids creating overly centralised model that diminishes the flexibility, responsiveness, presence and visibility of emergency management at the local level, especially in geographically large and diverse regions like Otago.

6.2 A balance between regional coordination with local delivery should be aimed for, that avoids over-centralising of functions that are more effective when delivered locally, such as community engagement and public education.

6.3 The current CDEM Act 2002 sets out that local authorities are both individually as well as jointly responsible for emergency management. The CDEM Group and each local authority member have the same functions in emergency management with little distinction between what the CDEM Group is responsible for (local authorities jointly) and what each local authority is responsible for individually. While regional coordination is beneficial, there can be a lack of clarity between local and regional roles, particularly in operational response and public communications, which can result in confusion or delays.

6.4 For issue 6.1, QLDC supports:

- **Option 2** (legislative) - provide distinct responsibilities for CDEM Groups and their local authority members.

6.5 This option will help define the operational, planning, communications, and funding responsibilities of CDEM Groups, regional councils, and territorial authorities. It will also clarify the role of the Administering Authority. As an example, ORC administers EMO, but



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operational responsibility in emergencies often rests with territorial authorities. Clarifying these dual roles would ensure that each party has full clarity on the boundaries of responsibility and accountability.

6.6 Although legislative changes to clarify responsibilities are preferred, QLDC has concerns over the use of legislation to control the organisation and accountability of locally delivered emergency management. A one-size-fits-all legislative model is unlikely to succeed as regional and local authorities require flexibility to accommodate different regional arrangements.

6.7 For Issue 6.3, QLDC supports:

- **Option 2** (non-legislative) -Update guidance and provide models for how CDEM Groups and local authorities could organise emergency management in their region.

6.8 NEMA is well placed to develop guidance on best-practice governance models and local-regional partnerships to help guide decision-making over which model to adopt and how to benchmark performance.

### Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

7.1 QLDC supports the need for a more structured and responsive approach to updating emergency management plans at both the local and national levels. In a rapidly changing environment with increasing climate-related risks, evolving community expectations, and emerging technologies, it is essential that emergency management plans have the flexibility and agility to be regularly updated.

7.2 QLDC recommends that a more agile approach is delivered through:

- **Option 3** (legislative): The National CDEM Plan isn't required to be made by Order in Council, but retains its legislative status.

7.3 To help improve the quality of emergency plans across the country it is suggested that NEMA publish standardised templates and best-practice guidance, as well as facilitating access to latest scientific data and modelling to help ensure consistency and clarity in plan structure and content. Clear review triggers could also be adopted to require plan updates following major events, legislative changes, or significant shifts in local hazardscape, population, or infrastructure investment.

7.4 Funding and resourcing should also be reviewed. Plan updates require time and expertise. Additional resourcing or co-funding from central government may be needed to support councils and regional CDEM Groups with this activity.

## OBJECTIVE 3: ENABLING A HIGHER MINIMUM STANDARD OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

8.1 QLDC supports the intent of developing stronger assurance mechanisms to ensure parties with responsibilities under the CDEM Act 2002 are meeting them at the expected level. Local authorities, including QLDC, rely on national guidance to align planning and capability development with best practice and statutory requirements. Given the increasing scale and complexity of emergencies, particularly climate-related events, there is a clear need for NEMA

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and the Director to play a stronger leadership role in setting expectations and monitoring performance. A clear and robust mandate for the Director can lift system performance, ensure greater national consistency, and drive continuous improvement across the sector.

8.2 For Issue 8.1, QLDC supports:

- **Option 3** (legislative): Enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set through rules.

8.3 QLDC stresses that the Director's oversight role should enable rather than constrain local innovation and responsiveness, and any strengthened mandate must be carefully implemented to respect the devolved nature of emergency management, and the autonomy and accountability of local authorities.

8.4 For Issue 8.2, QLDC supports the Taituāra position that more work is needed before a new compliance framework can be established for CDEM, and that performance improvements to the national emergency system will be driven through the enabling measures within the new CDEM Act.

**Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management**

9.1 QLDC strongly supports the proposal to strengthen local hazard risk management. The increasing complexity and frequency of natural hazards, including those driven by climate change, demands more robust, integrated, and proactive risk management at the local level. Local authorities like QLDC are already involved in significant natural hazard planning and management, but these would benefit from clearer roles and responsibilities, improved access to data and modelling, and enhanced coordination across sectors.

9.2 Local authorities also have a vital role in building community resilience for those who live in close proximity to natural hazards and must be supported with tools, funding, and guidance to deliver on this more effectively.

9.3 Any new legislation must enable and incentivise integrated risk management planning with land use, climate adaptation, and infrastructure investment and have provide clearer thresholds around the acceptable level of risk.

9.4 QLDC supports:

- **Option 2** (non-legislative): Provide clearer guidance about what it means to achieve an "acceptable" level of risk.

9.5 This guidance should focus on the respective responsibilities of local authorities, CDEM Groups, regional councils, and national agencies in hazard risk management, and remain flexible to accommodate the challenges of areas with a highly complex hazard scape like Queenstown Lakes. Opportunities should also be explored to align hazard risk management obligations across the emergency management, climate adaptation, RMA, and infrastructure planning systems.

**Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies**

10.1 QLDC supports the proposals under Issue 10 and acknowledges that protecting taonga Māori, cultural heritage, and animals in emergencies is an important part of a people and values-

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centred emergency management system. The increasing frequency of emergencies makes it essential that these values are considered in emergency planning and response as well as recovery. However, any new obligations must be clearly defined, resourced, and balanced alongside the imperative to preserve life and ensure operational effectiveness during a response.

10.2 The pre-identification of important sites, cultural practices, or assets along with agreed protection protocols prior to emergencies is required to ensure the best response and recovery outcomes are achieved.

10.3 For Issue 10.1, QLDC supports:

- **Option 2** (non-legislative): Develop guidance on considering taonga and other cultural heritage.

10.4 For Issue 10.2, QLDC supports:

- **Option** 2 (non-legislative): Develop guidance on considering animal impacts.

## OBJECTIVE 4: MINIMISING DISRUPTION TO ESSENTIAL SERVICES

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

11.1 QLDC agrees that reducing the risk and improving the resilience of interdependent essential services, such as water, power, transport, and communications is a critical concern for emergency response and community recovery, especially in geographically remote and hazard-prone areas like the QLD. To help enable this, QLDC supports the need for national legislation to expand the existing narrow definitions and outdated terminologies.

11.2 QLDC notes that the term "essential infrastructure" has appeared to replace the term "critical infrastructure", which had been adopted in the reform programme led by Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC). QLDC questions the value of this, as it resets the significant progress that has been made to replace the outdated phrase "Lifeline Utilities" with "Critical infrastructure". QLDC expresses its preference to commit to the term "critical infrastructure".

11.3 For Issue 11.1 QLDC supports:

- **Option 3** (legislative): Replace the lifeline utilities framework with an expanded, principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure".

11.4 QLDC also recognises the importance of strengthening business continuity planning and supports a legislative response to drive greater levels of compliance and accountability, noting that non-legislative interventions have historically failed to drive progress in this space.

11.5 For Issue 11.2, QLDC supports:

- **Option 3** (legislative): Introduce financial penalties and enable detailed business continuity planning requirements to be set through regulations.

11.6 It is noted that considerable investigation has been undertaken by the DPMC around a Planned Emergency Levels of Service (PELOS) framework which sets pre-defined targets for infrastructure providers on how they will deliver services during and after an emergency. This framework may be a suitable starting point for the development of a business continuity focussed regulatory programme.

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11.7 Conversely, QLDC supports a non-legislative approach to improve cooperation and information sharing. Strong relationships and trust underpin effective partnerships which are critical to the delivery of emergency management, and these can be eroded through a legislative model that dictates the requirements for cooperation.

11.8 For Issue 11.3, QLDC supports:

- **Option 2** (non-legislative): Strengthen assurance and develop standards and guidance.

11.9 This option will help set clearer expectations and drive improvement between organisations while not impacting on their autonomy to adopt best practice voluntarily.

## OBJECTIVE 5: HAVING THE RIGHT POWERS AVAILABLE WHEN AN EMERGENCY HAPPENS

### Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

12.1 Like many local authorities, QLDC notes the disparity in business continuity requirements placed on local government in the CDEM Act 2002, compared with those placed on central government agencies. Unlike many key agencies, local government has a legislative requirement to function to the fullest possible extent, during and after an emergency[5].

12.2 QLDC therefore strongly supports the introduction of a minimum legislative standard of business continuity planning for central government agencies that reflects the expectations already placed on local government.

12.3 To deliver this requirement, QLDC supports:

- **Option 4** (legislative): Extend current business continuity requirements to a broader group of central government organisations, with a mechanism to exempt specific Crown entities.

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

13.1 QLDC supports the proposal to clarify who has the authority to restrict access to certain areas and under what circumstances. Clearer legislative language will reduce ambiguity and enable better coordination among agencies and emergency responders.

13.2 QLDC recommends that the revised legislation acknowledges the role of local authorities in decision-making around managing access . Local councils have critical knowledge of infrastructure, community needs, and potential downstream consequences of providing access to key locations and local assets.

13.3 QLDC supports a combination of options 2, 3 and 4:

- **Option 2** (non-legislative): National guidance and training on managing cordons.
- **Option 3** (secondary legislation): Prescribe the form of identification passes through regulations.
- **Option 4** (legislative): Clarify that access can be restricted to any class or group of persons.

[5] CDEM Act 2002 s64(2)

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13.4 The combination of guidance and training, along with prescribed identification forms and clear legislation around restricted access provisions will significantly improve the management of this important operational activity.

13.5 QLDC recommends that work also be undertaken to exploring the development of a nationally consistent digital permitting or accreditation system to streamline access for accredited personnel, media, and other essential entities during emergencies.

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

14.1 QLDC acknowledges the importance of removing duplication, confusion and inconsistencies around functions and powers of CDEM Groups, Controllers and Recovery Managers.

14.2 QLDC therefore supports**:**

- **Option 2** (legislative): Tidy up existing functions and powers related to CDEM Groups, Controllers, and Recovery Managers.

14.3 In the discussion document this is framed as an administrative correction and will not involve changes to the scope and assignment of powers. Should this approach change, more detailed consultation would be required.

### Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

15.1 QLDC supports efforts to modernise the process of declaring a state of emergency or entering a transition period. It is recognised that fast, clear, and legally sound decision-making is critical in times of crisis. However, the current system can be administratively cumbersome and does not always support the speed and clarity needed in escalating emergency situations.

15.2 QLDC supports:

- **Option 2** (legislative): Enable authorised persons to use electronic signatures.

15.3 This change will enable a more agile, reliable, and modern process for entering both states of emergency and transition periods. QLDC also recommends that NEMA investigate the development of a standardised electronic form for declaring local states of emergency to complement this change in signature format.

### Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

16.1 QLDC supports the continuation of the status quo, where the mayor (or an elected representative of the local authority) and an authorised representative of the CDEM Group (in Otago this is the Chairperson of the regional council) can declare a local state of emergency and issue a transition period notice under the CDEM Act 2002.

16.2 The status quo provides a practical, democratically accountable, and well-understood framework for emergency declarations at the local level, which provides balance, accountability and contingency between the two signing parties. QLDC sees no compelling reason to alter this arrangement and supports its continuation.

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## GENERAL COMMENTS

16.3 QLDC supports the intent to modernise the emergency management system to ensure it is more effective, people-centred, and better aligned with community expectations. However, it is vital that the proposed reforms are implemented in a way that supports, rather than overburdens, local authorities. QLDC also urge NEMA to provide sufficient transition time, funding, and capability-building support to give effect to the proposed changes.

16.4 QLDC reiterates the view expressed by Taituarā that the proposals, while well-intentioned, will have significant resourcing implications. A full cost impact assessment should accompany any legislative change. Without adequate central government funding, there is a real risk that councils will be unable to deliver on the proposed new responsibilities.

16.5 QLDC supports initiatives to professionalise the emergency management workforce, but notes that the implementation of mandatory competency standards must be proportionate and supported with funding and training, especially for councils that rely on staff undertaking emergency roles alongside their core responsibilities.

16.6 The scale and complexity of major emergency events mean that the local government sector will never have the full capacity to meet all response and recovery needs. As such, the sector is heavily reliant on central government to lead a narrative shift that positions emergency management as a 'whole-of-society' responsibility, as detailed in the National Disaster Resilience Strategy[6]. Embedding a message that emphasises proactive emergency preparation and community empowerment is essential to ensuring that families, neighbourhoods, and communities take the necessary steps to support themselves and each other, while councils activate and deliver on their formal emergency management duties. QLDC has proactively invested in this space through its focus on developing its Community Resilience Group network across the district.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

R1. Support both legislative and non-legislative options to meet diverse community needs. Fund outreach, translation, and accessibility at the local level. *(Options 2, 3 & 4 – Issue 1)*

R2. Require iwi Māori representation on CDEM Groups. Support iwi roles with funding, partnerships, and kaupapa Māori planning tools. *(Options 2 & 3 – Issue 2)*

R3. Strengthen community participation. Require CDEM Plans to show how public offers of support will be managed. *(Options 2 & 3 – Issue 3)*

R4. Extend legal protection and compensation for people and businesses who act in good faith during emergencies. *(Options 2 & 3 – Issue 4)*

R5. Assign control during emergencies to the most relevant agency (e.g. FENZ for wildfire). Plan and exercise joint scenarios ahead of time. *(Option 2 – Issue 5)*

R6. Clearly define roles of CDEM Groups vs. local councils. Avoid over-centralisation and maintain local flexibility. Use NEMA guidance (not legislation) to help regions choose suitable governance models for emergency management. *(Option 2 – Issue 6.1 & Option 2 – Issue 6.3)*

[6] https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/resources/publications/national-disaster-resilience-strategy/

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R7. Allow faster plan updates by removing the Order in Council requirement. Provide templates and support from NEMA. *(Option 3 – Issue 7)*

R8. Allow the CDEM Director to set rules for national standards. Respect local innovation and decision-making. *(Option 3 – Issue 8.1)*

R9. Give clearer guidance on acceptable hazard risk. Align with climate and land use planning systems and the efforts of local government to build community resilience. (Option 2 – Issue 9)

R10. Develop national guidance for protecting taonga Māori, heritage, and animals. Include protocols and training. *(Option 2 – Issues 10.1 & 10.2)*

R11. Replace "lifeline utilities" with "critcal infrastructure "and seek to future-proof how services are defined and included. Require detailed business continuity plans for infrastructure. Support voluntary cooperation through guidance, not law. *(Option 3 – Issue 11.1, Option 3 – Issue 11.2 & Option 2 – Issue 11.3)*

R12. Support the introduction of a minimum legislative standard of business continuity planning for central government agencies. *(Option 4- Issue 12)*

R13. Clarify who has the authority to restrict access to certain areas and under what circumstances. *(Option 2,3,4- Issue 13)*

R14. Correct existing functions and powers related to CDEM Groups, Controllers, and Recovery Managers. (*Option 2- Issue 14)*

R15. Enable electronic signatures for emergency declarations. Create standardised digital forms for faster processes. *(Option 2 – Issue 15)*

R16. Keep the current system where Mayors and CDEM Groups can declare emergencies.*(Support for status quo – Issue 16)*

R17. Ensure reforms do not overburden local councils, particularly smaller ones.

R18. Provide adequate transition time, funding, and capability-building support.

R19. Undertake a full cost impact assessment before any legislative change.

R20. Fund and support the implementation of mandatory competency standards, especially for councils with dual-role staff.

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# ENA submission on the discussion document: Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation

## Submission to the National Emergency Management Agency

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DATE
**13 May 2025**

NAME OF SUBMITTER
**Electricity Networks Aotearoa**

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ähuarangi. kiritaki. mahi ngātahi. climate. customers. collaboration.

# Contents


| | |
|---|---|
| Introduction | 3 |
| Appendix A – ENA comments | 5 |
| Appendix B – ENA Members | 19 |


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# Introduction

Electricity Networks Aotearoa (ENA) appreciates the opportunity to make a submission to the National Emergency Management Agency on the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation.*

ENA represents the 29 electricity distribution businesses (EDBs) in New Zealand (see Appendix B – ENA Members) which provide local and regional electricity networks. EDBs employ 7,800 people, deliver energy to more than two million homes and business and have spent or invested over $6 billion in the last five years.

EDBs are critical to New Zealand's emergency response and recovery capabilities. As providers of essential infrastructure, EDBs play a critical role in maintaining public safety and restoring community function following disasters. We support the intent of this legislative reform and welcome the opportunity to contribute to a more resilient, better-coordinated emergency management system.

## Executive summary

Clear chains of command and coordination within the civil defence structure are essential for EDBs to operate and restore their networks effectively during emergencies. We support the proposed reforms aimed at clarifying responsibilities within civil defence groupings during both local and national emergency responses. For EDBs, delays or confusion about who holds decision-making authority can undermine the effectiveness of actions to protect public safety and restore electricity network services. Some EDBs (mainly the larger EDBs) have adopted the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS)[1]. A consistent, unified approach to civil defence leadership and direction, which integrates with EDBs' existing operational protocols and safety requirements, will significantly enhance response capability.

We support the intent of Objective 4 to minimise disruption to essential services. EDBs already operate under detailed asset management and resilience frameworks, and we welcome efforts to better integrate these with emergency management planning. However, any new obligations—particularly around resilience planning, service continuity and restoration expectations, or data sharing—must be practical, clearly defined, and aligned with existing regulatory requirements. The effectiveness of these measures depends on ensuring they are proportionate to the risks and issues they mitigate, and not administratively duplicative.

We strongly support proposals to provide civil liability protections for people acting in good faith during emergencies. EDB field staff are often among the first to respond to hazards, taking urgent action to safeguard the public and infrastructure before formal states of emergency are declared. Legal clarity in this area will enable confident, timely responses and reduce risk aversion in critical situations.

We also support proposals to improve collaboration between infrastructure providers and emergency management agencies, particularly at the regional level. EDBs are committed to engaging in joint planning and coordination efforts. However, these engagement processes must remain manageable, and outcome focused. Two-way communication, clear expectations, and respect for commercially sensitive information are essential for this collaboration to be effective and enduring.

[1] Energia Limited. (2023, July 13). *Electricity distribution sector Cyclone Gabrielle review report* (Report prepared for the Electricity Networks Association), 28. https://www.ena.org.nz/assets/ENA-EDB-Cyclone-Gabrielle-Review-Report-ISSUED-13-Jul-23-1197.pdf



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ENA's responses to the specific consultation questions raised in the discussion document are provided in **Appendix A** of this submission.

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# Appendix A – ENA comments

| QUESTION | ENA COMMENTS |
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| *1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?* | ENA supports the proposed objectives, particularly the emphasis on minimising disruption to essential services and ensuring appropriate powers are available during emergencies. |
| Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities | |
| *2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | Yes. Although the discussion document does not specify what is meant by different 'needs' or that communities may value resilience/readiness, investment or recovery options differently for reasons unrelated to demographic or geographic population differences or hazard differences |
| *3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?* | Yes, some consumers are medically dependent on electricity. |
| *4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | ENA supports both **Option 2: Develop guidance on meeting diverse needs** and **Option 3 (legislative): Require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for**.<br><br>ENA recommends the development of a national guidance framework that can be utilised by CDEM Groups, iwi, and other stakeholders, promoting consistency and a more inclusive approach to emergency management planning. |
| *5. What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?* | Planning should acknowledge that rapid restoration isn't always possible in large scale outages. It would be great if planning required collaboration with electricity distributors (alongside other critical infrastructure providers) as this will ensure plans and expectations are realistic for those disproportionately affected by emergencies. |
| *6. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management | |
| *7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?* | Iwi Māori contribute significantly to local electricity resilience as often marae serve as emergency hubs with backup generation. Some EDBs work with iwi Māori on resilience planning before emergencies such as co-developing distributed energy solutions for isolated or high-risk communities. |
| *9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have* | The focus should be on improving planning, coordination, and mutual understanding at the regional level, rather than creating new structures that might inadvertently add compliance costs or complicate infrastructure response efforts. We support approaches that strengthen |

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| *identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | collaboration while respecting the operational realities of emergency response and infrastructure restoration.<br><br>We see merit in **Option 4: requiring CDEM Groups to engage with iwi Māori during plan development** and **Option 5: requiring national-level Māori input into strategy**, provided that these mechanisms focus on improving planning and coordination, not creating unrealistic service expectations. |
| *10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *14. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management | |
| *15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | We would also encourage the description to emphasise that pre-event engagement and planning are where community contributions can be most effectively integrated as no matter how well organised the system, trying to manage offers in the heat of a response effort is much more challenging. |
| *16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | ENA is supportive of the goal to better integrate and enable community participation in emergency management.<br><br>In terms of the options presented, ENA prefers **Option 2: Develop and update guidance and strengthen public education**. This option strikes a balance between fostering community participation and maintaining flexibility for CDEM Groups to manage resources and offers in a way that reflects the unique needs and circumstances of each emergency.<br><br>Community organisations, marae, schools and local businesses are already partners in resilience at the grassroots level through informal arrangements for backup power generators and local welfare support. Strengthening guidance to help formalise these arrangements without imposing rigid legislative requirements would help improve coordination. |

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| | ENA would recommend that this guidance be developed in close collaboration with CDEM Groups, iwi, businesses, and other key stakeholders, ensuring that it is practical, inclusive, and aligned with existing emergency management frameworks. |
| *17. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency | |
| *18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | It would be useful to clarify that even where communities have skills and resources to offer, EDB infrastructure restoration work must only be carried out by EDBs as it is subject to strict safety, operational and technical requirements. |
| *19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | ENA supports **Option 2: Provide for protection from civil liability for loss or damage (legislative)** in principle. However, it is critical for our sector, that this is clearly limited to those who are acting under the direction of the electricity distributor – as they are employees or contractors of the EDB.<br><br>When damaged or disrupted, EDB infrastructure can present a significant public safety risk and actions must comply with regulatory requirements (e.g. under the Electricity Act, Electricity (Safety) Regulations and relevant Electrical Codes of Practice). Liability protections in relation to electrical work on EDB infrastructure must be explicitly limited to EDB employees or authorised contractors. Allowing members of the public with general electrical knowledge to intervene may pose serious health and safety risks.<br><br>ENA also supports **Option 3: Enable compensation for labour costs (legislative).** |
| *20. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency | |
| *22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | The lack of clarity around command and control during emergencies is challenging for EDBs who often work across agency boundaries.<br><br>Ambiguity about who is leading the operational response, especially during the early stages of an emergency or when no state of emergency has been declared, can delay action.<br><br>We particularly agree with the observation that the current model does not always work well in complex, multi-hazard, or multi-region events, or where the wider consequences (such as welfare or infrastructure impacts) require just as much attention as the hazard itself. |

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| *23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | ENA sees benefit in **Option 3 (legislative): Require Group Controllers (local emergency) or the Director (national emergency) to be the "Control Agency".** Having a single recognised entity with overarching responsibility improves clarity especially when multiple hazards and agencies are involved. However, considering a broader range of emergencies like pandemics, we consider that others beyond the CDEM Groups or the Director would be more appropriate leaders. CDEM Groups or the Director would take more of a supporting role in the instance of a pandemic, with the relevant central government organisation leading the response. Where this is the case, **Option 2** may be more appropriate. |
| *24. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities | |
| *26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | Yes. |
| *27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | We support a move away from the status quo and see clear benefits in adopting **Option 2: (distinct responsibilities for CDEM Groups and local authorities)** alongside aspects of **Option 3: (accountability for funding and delivery of CDEM Group decisions).** To maximise the benefit of either option, we recommend clear definitions of responsibilities and accountability mechanisms; formalised requirements for CDEM Groups to engage with critical infrastructure providers in the development and review of Group Plans; assurance that infrastructure realities (e.g. service restoration priorities, constraints and risk tolerances) are considered and acknowledged in planning. It should also be clarified that any "levels of service" expectations in emergencies are aspirational, not performance guarantees. |
| *28. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?* | Stronger direction on roles, and accountability for responsibilities is required for all local authorities and lifeline utilities at the regional level. CDEM contributing members need to be accountable for their role and delivery of their duties. |
| Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management | |

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| *30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | Yes. |
| *31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | Our preferred option is **Option 3: Make the CDEM Group responsible for organising emergency management functions (legislative)**. This would create consistent structure across regions which would help EDBs (who operate across multiple regions) better engage with the Group. ENA |
| *32. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups | |
| *33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | Yes. |
| *34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *35. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date | |
| *36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | ENA supports **Option 2: Enable targeted, "more than minor" amendments to the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans (legislative).** On its own this option makes updates easier but it doesn't guarantee that updates will happen. We recommend adding a defined review cycle into this option. |
| *38. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?* | An additional issue that should be considered is the lack of a structured time-bound review cycle linked to operational readiness assessments and major event reviews. Plans fall out of date with the latest information on evolving risks and without a review cycle any lessons learned and latest information may not feed into the planning process. |
| Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance | |
| *40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | ENA has no comment to make. |

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| *41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | Given that many EDBs are already subject to price-quality regulation, it is important to recognise that the imposition of additional mandatory standards under **Option 3: Enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set through rules** could increase regulatory burden. At the same time, EDBs that are not subject to price-quality regulation are held accountable through alternative mechanisms, such as consumer and community trust governance structures, which provide strong oversight and a direct line of accountability to customers. Both types of EDBs are subject to high expectations regarding reliability, performance, and resilience — either through formal regulatory settings or through governance obligations.<br><br>We support both **Option 3: Enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set through rules** and **Option 4: Monitoring performance**, assuming a robust process to identify and develop relevant rules that add value not cost, and to clarify obligations on all parties to support monitoring. However, care must be taken to avoid duplicating existing accountability frameworks. |
| *42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?* | ENA sees that standardising methodologies risk assessments and hazard mapping would improve comparability and coordination across local and national planning processes. Having a single authoritative source of data and methodology would help local authorities and CDEM Groups make better, evidence-based decisions without needing to duplicate efforts or commission bespoke risk assessments. |
| *43. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues | |
| *44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | The problem is not clearly described.<br><br>EDBs are already subject to robust performance oversight through existing regulatory frameworks, such as the Commerce Commission's Information Disclosure and DPP/CPP regimes, which cover resilience, asset management, and service quality.<br><br>We do not see a clear need for additional intervention mechanisms targeting EDBs under the Emergency Management Bill. Any perception of underperformance by EDBs should be addressed through the established regulatory system, or energy trust processes, not through duplicative or conflicting mechanisms under emergency legislation. |
| *45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | Options that introduce new intervention powers, particularly compliance orders (Option 2) or expanded Ministerial direction (Option 3), risk duplicating or undermining existing regulatory obligations for EDBs. This could create confusion, regulatory overlap, and potential legal uncertainty about which standards apply during or after an emergency event.<br><br>If these powers are introduced, they should be explicitly limited in scope to avoid applying to regulated infrastructure providers already overseen by an independent regulator. |

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| | Our strong preference is to maintain the status quo for regulated infrastructure providers such as EDBs. Performance concerns related to infrastructure services are already well-managed through the Commerce Commission and should not be second-guessed through a parallel emergency management framework. The focus should be on setting clear expectations and monitoring performance. |
| *46. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management | |
| *47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | As mentioned previously in this submission, there are overlaps with current regulations, standards, and planning processes for essential services like electricity. Effective CDEM planning requires strong coordination between local government and essential service providers, but this is hindered by differing legislative and planning frameworks. Another contributing factor is the inadequate sharing of information about hazards, risks, and response measures. |
| *48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | We support non-legislative improvements first, including:<br>• Option 2 (clearer guidance on "acceptable" risk) and<br>• Option 3 (updated plan guidance and strengthened assurance processes).<br>Clear expectations, aligned with risk management practices under other legislation (e.g. RMA, Building Act, Commerce Act), will help drive consistency without undermining regional flexibility.<br>It should be noted that during Cyclone Gabrielle affected EDB networks had inherent redundancy in critical areas, and those areas stood up well during the cyclone. This shows the benefit of EDB security and network hardening investment planning.[2] Strengthening local hazard risk management must reflect the regulatory environment and cost–benefit realities many EDBs face.<br>We have concerns about Option 4 (prescribing plan content via secondary legislation) and Option 5 (strengthening Ministerial powers). These carry risks of over-centralisation, inflexibility, and unintended duplication of existing responsibilities — especially for regulated infrastructure providers. Any regulatory prescription would need to avoid setting static or overly detailed requirements that don't account for local nuance or practical delivery constraints. |
| *49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?* | National guidance should set minimum expectations (e.g. consistent approaches to risk assessments, critical infrastructure coordination, and integration with other planning instruments), but should not prescribe uniform solutions. |

[2] Energia Limited. (2023, July 13). *Electricity distribution sector Cyclone Gabrielle review report* (Report prepared for the Electricity Networks Association), 3. https://www.ena.org.nz/assets/ENA-EDB-Cyclone-Gabrielle-Review-Report-ISSUED-13-Jul-23-1197.pdf



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| *50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?* | Misaligned planning cycles make integration with long-term plans and district plans difficult. There is also no mandate or accountability mechanism to ensure integration occurs in practice. |
| *51. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies | |
| *53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | We **support Option 2: Develop guidance on considering taonga and other cultural heritage (non-legislative)** as a practical and low-barrier first step. This would:<br>• Help clarify expectations for how infrastructure providers and emergency planners can work with iwi and hapū in ways that respect cultural heritage during response and recovery.<br>• Support better coordination between CDEM Groups and infrastructure providers (like EDBs), by embedding a shared understanding of cultural risk considerations.<br>• Promote more meaningful partnership with Māori without imposing inflexible or prescriptive compliance obligations.<br>**Option 3 Strengthen planning expectations through secondary legislation (legislative)** could be appropriate over time. |
| *55. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | Establishing a shared cultural risk register, maintained with iwi/hapū input, to help identify and proactively protect critical heritage sites or practices at risk in an emergency. |
| Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies | |
| *56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top* | ENA has no comment to make. |

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| *priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?* | |
| *59. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services | |
| Currently, there is a lack of clarity and alignment in sector-specific regulations (notably, the Electricity Industry Participation Code) about the powers and responsibilities of EDBs to manage such network emergencies, including issuing operating limits and coordinating load management with retailers and aggregators.<br><br>We suggest that the Agency use the Emergency Management Bill to set a clear expectation that agencies with sector-specific regulatory powers (such as the Electricity Authority) manage their legislative instruments in a way that is consistent with the objectives of the Bill.<br><br>For example, this could include encouraging the Electricity Authority to:<br><br>• Update the Code definitions to clearly distinguish between network emergencies and system (grid) emergencies and ensure that both are treated as legitimate triggers for emergency powers and coordination obligations.<br><br>• Clarify that distributors have the authority to proactively manage all forms of controllable load and distributed energy resources during network emergencies — not just traditional hot water load.<br><br>• Align Code provisions with the broader emergency management framework so that critical infrastructure providers can take prompt and proportionate action to prevent small-scale incidents from escalating into larger service disruptions.<br><br>We note that we have previously made related recommendations to the Electricity Authority through its Code Review Programme (Programme 6 – Proposal 2)[3]. In our view, the Emergency Management Bill presents an important opportunity to reinforce the need for consistent and future-fit emergency management powers across all infrastructure sectors, including electricity.<br><br>Encouraging sector-specific regulators to manage their legislative instruments in a way that is consistent with the objectives of the Bill would have significant benefits. EDBs affected by Cyclone Gabrielle spent $149m on vegetation management over FY2018 to FY2022 but out-of-zone trees remain a major constraint on resilience. The current rules (Electricity (Hazards from Trees) Regulations 2003) make it difficult for lines companies to act early to prevent tree-related power outages — and don't require landowners or forestry operators to remove trees they own that clearly pose a risk to power lines. The result is what we saw during Cyclone Gabrielle where the largest cause of outages was out-of-zone tree damage to overhead lines. These out-of-zone tree outages interrupted supply to 68,000 customers at the | |

[3] Electricity Networks Aotearoa, *Submission to the Electricity Authority on Code Review Programme Number Six: September 2024*, 1 October 2024, available at: https://www.ena.org.nz/assets/DMSDocuments/2024-10-1-code-review-six-submission.pdf



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| cyclone's peak.[4] Minister Watts announced changes to these regulations in April 2025; however further changes are needed.[5]<br><br>We continue to advocate for large tree-owning entities—such as councils and commercial forestry owners—to carry full legal, financial, and operational responsibility for managing vegetation that poses a risk to critical infrastructure, such as power lines. | |
| Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility" | |
| *61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | We support **Option 3: Replace the lifeline utility framework with a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure"**. The current list captures core lifeline utilities but should be expanded to reflect the interdependent and digitised nature of modern infrastructure systems. However, we would caution that the definition should only be broadened slightly. Too many organisations being required to attend CDEM Group meetings and an increase in topics that need to be considered (especially where some topics are not of critical significance), may hinder productivity of the group. |
| *63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?* | Electricity distribution should remain explicitly listed as an essential service in Appendix C. EDBs are responsible for delivering electricity to over 2.2 million connections across New Zealand, as well as being integral to the functioning of other critical services, including healthcare, water supply, and telecommunications. The 2023 review of the sector's response to Cyclone Gabrielle affirmed the importance of EDBs in emergency situations and their role in maintaining societal functions. Therefore, their inclusion as essential services is justified and necessary. |
| *64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *65. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA supports the comments made by Powerco in their submission on this question. |
| Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning | |
| *66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | Broadly, yes. However, the description could better recognise that many lifeline utilities — including EDBs — have already made significant investments in continuity planning, and that current performance is not uniformly weak across sectors. The problem statement could differentiate between lack of capability in some sectors or organisations versus lack of visibility and coordination at a system level. |

[4] Energia Limited. (2023, July 13). *Electricity distribution sector Cyclone Gabrielle review report* (Report prepared for the Electricity Networks Association), 26. https://www.ena.org.nz/assets/ENA-EDB-Cyclone-Gabrielle-Review-Report-ISSUED-13-Jul-23-1197.pdf

[5] New Zealand Government. (2025, May 14). *Protecting New Zealand's energy infrastructure* [Press release]. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/protecting-new-zealands-energy-infrastructure



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| *67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | ENA strongly prefers **Option 2: Increase Assurance Through Non-Legislative Measures**. This option offers the greatest opportunity for targeted improvement and proportional oversight while maintaining the flexibility necessary for each utility to respond to their unique operating environments and risk profiles. EDBs vary significantly in size, geography, customer density, and exposure to natural hazards. A non-legislative approach enables sector-specific and risk-based guidance, rather than a "one-size-fits-all" mandate that may not be appropriate or feasible for all EDBs.<br><br>Introducing financial penalties or prescriptive legal standards (as in Options c and d) would likely impose significant administrative and compliance costs, which could ultimately be passed on to consumers. Many EDBs already integrate continuity planning into asset management, cyber security, and regulatory disclosures.<br><br>We support greater national coordination and visibility of business continuity risks — particularly given the growing interdependence between sectors (e.g. energy, telecommunications, water, transport). However, this can be achieved through enhanced reporting, national guidance, and strategic monitoring without prescribing rigid legislative standards.<br><br>• The Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management could, for example, publish an annual State of Lifeline Resilience report, highlighting trends, systemic issues, and lessons learned, without naming individual utilities unless warranted.<br><br>• This would improve transparency while avoiding unnecessary reputational risk or duplication of regulatory oversight already performed by agencies like the Commerce Commission. |
| *68. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing | |
| *69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | ENA supports **Option 3: Explicitly require CDEM Groups to involve the lifeline utilities in their areas in the development of CDEM Group plans.** |
| *71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective* | ENA considers that effective coordination between local and national levels in emergency management is critical to reducing the duration and impact of disruptions to essential services such as electricity. Coordination mechanisms must be clearly defined, consistently applied across regions, and embedded in emergency management legislation and practice. While EDBs already work with CDEM Groups in many regions, the nature and quality of these relationships varies considerably. Legislative requirements for EDB involvement in Group |

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| *way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?* | planning and Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) would help standardise this practice and ensure essential expertise is available during planning, response, and recovery phases. |
| *72. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity | |
| *73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | Yes. While EDBs are incentivised to operate their networks in a safe, efficient, and reliable manner, they cannot guarantee continuous electricity supply, even to critical facilities. Government agencies must:<br>• Identify and assess their critical infrastructure dependencies<br>• Invest in backup systems (e.g., diesel generators, UPS units)<br>• Maintain fuel supply contracts and testing protocols<br>• Engage with their local EDB about outage priorities and restoration protocols |
| *74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *75. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?* | Yes. One significant issue is the increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events, which challenge the resilience of electricity distribution networks. |
| Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas | |
| *78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | Yes. ENA strongly supports reforms that clarify and facilitate timely access for EDBs to restricted areas during and after emergencies. Access is often the single most critical enabler of network restoration following major hazard events. Without it, crews cannot assess damage, prioritise work, or safely restore power to communities and other lifeline services. While there are informal arrangements between some CDEM Groups and EDBs to allow access for essential restoration work, these practices are not standardised or guaranteed. |
| *79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | ENA sees **Option 3: (prescribing the form of identification passes through regulations)** as the best choice. This option provides a clear, enforceable system for managing restricted access during emergencies, ensuring that only accredited personnel from essential services, such as EDBs, are granted access to restricted areas.<br>During Cyclone Gabrielle access restrictions (due to the roading network's failure) made restoring electricity supply to the last 5% of |

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| | customers difficult and time-consuming.[6] The establishment of a formal accreditation and identification pass system addresses this need for rapid, unimpeded access to restore electricity services in emergency situations. By making it an offence to falsely claim accreditation, this option helps mitigate the risk of unauthorized access, ensuring that resources are prioritised for essential service restoration. Additionally, the regulatory framework ensures consistency and certainty across regions, which is crucial for EDBs operating in multiple areas. While there may be some administrative burden associated with obtaining accreditation, the benefits of a well-defined, legally recognised process far outweigh the potential delays, enabling quicker restoration of services and a more efficient response in emergency situations.<br><br>ENA also supports **Option 4 (legislative): Clarify that access can be restricted to any class or group of persons** as this could explicitly provide powers for all electricity distributors and their contractors. |
| *80. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level | |
| *81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | Yes. |
| *82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | We support the proposed legislative changes under **Option (2): Tidy up existing functions and powers through legislative reform** as a necessary and pragmatic step to modernise the CDEM framework. Clarity in who does what — and when — will reduce delays, improve coordination with lifeline utilities, and ultimately lead to faster and more effective emergency response and recovery. |
| *83. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period | |
| *84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | Yes. |
| *85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | ENA supports **Option 2 (legislative): Enable authorised persons to use electronic signatures** as a first step. If internet supply is disrupted, then **Option 3 (legislative): Enable authorised persons to declare a state of emergency verbally** should be enabled. |
| *86. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |

[6] Energia Limited. (2023, July 13). *Electricity distribution sector Cyclone Gabrielle review report* (Report prepared for the Electricity Networks Association), 19. https://www.ena.org.nz/assets/ENA-EDB-Cyclone-Gabrielle-Review-Report-ISSUED-13-Jul-23-1197.pdf



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| Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices | |
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| *87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *89. Are there any other options that should be considered?* | ENA has no comment to make. |
| *90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?* | ENA supports granting Controllers and Recovery Managers specific powers to facilitate rapid restoration of essential services. For instance, during widespread outages, expedited access to affected areas and the ability to coordinate with utility providers are crucial. |
| Other comments | |
| *91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?* | ENA has no comment to make. |

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# Appendix B – ENA Members

Electricity Networks Aotearoa makes this submission along with the support of its members, listed below.

- Alpine Energy
- Aurora Energy
- Buller Electricity
- Centralines
- Counties Energy
- Electra
- EA Networks
- Firstlight Network
- Horizon Energy Distribution
- MainPower NZ
- Marlborough Lines
- Nelson Electricity
- Network Tasman
- Network Waitaki
- Northpower
- Orion New Zealand
- Powerco
- PowerNet (which manages The Power Company, Electricity Invercargill, OtagoNet and Lakeland Network)
- Scanpower
- The Lines Company
- Top Energy
- Unison Networks
- Vector
- Waipa Networks
- WEL Networks
- Wellington Electricity Lines
- Westpower

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Submission by

**Z Energy**

to the

**National Emergency Management Agency**

on

**Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation**

20 May 2025

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## Introduction

Z Energy (Z) welcomes the opportunity to provide feedback on the National Emergency Management Agency's (*NEMA*) consultation document, *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation.*

As a major fuel supplier and operator of essential infrastructure across New Zealand, Z plays a key role in supporting fuel resilience and security. Furthermore, as a lifeline utility, Z is committed to supporting a robust, inclusive, and future-focused emergency management framework that strengthens our collective ability to coordinate and respond in the event of an emergency.

Z agrees that recent emergencies such as Cyclone Gabrielle, and the subsequent Government Inquiry have highlighted the importance of ensuring legislation and response frameworks appropriately address how Aotearoa New Zealand manages risks, responds to, and recovers from emergencies.

Z supports the Government's intention to strengthen New Zealand's overarching emergency management legislation and inform the design of a new Emergency Management Bill (*the Bill)*. In principle, Z broadly supports the five objectives set out in the consultation document and believes that:

- Clearer national direction and control during an emergency is needed. This includes a clear definition of roles and responsibilities at multiple levels that better enables clear, timely communication and instruction; and

- It is important that the Bill recognises the invaluable contributions iwi Māori make during regional and national emergencies. Z notes that iwi Māori are best placed to advise on the relationship between CDEM and iwi Māori.

More detailed responses to consultation questions can be found in Appendix A below.

Z would value the opportunity to participate further in the development of the policy and regulatory process as work progresses.

If there is any further information that would be of use to NEMA, please do not hesitate to contact us.

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## Appendix A – Z responses to consultation questions

| General questions |
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| **Objectives for reform**<br>**• Have we identified the right objectives for reform?** |
| Z agrees that recent emergencies like Cyclone Gabrielle and the subsequent Government Inquiry into the response have highlighted the importance of ensuring legislation appropriately addresses how Aotearoa New Zealand manages risks, responds to, and recovers from emergencies. Considering this, we support the Government's proposed objectives for reform of the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2022. |
| **Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation** |
| **Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities**<br>**• Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**<br>**• What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?** |
| Given Z's size, scale and role within the communities in which we live and operate across Aotearoa New Zealand, Z recognises there are a wide range of people and communities with diverse needs - all of which will be affected by emergencies in different ways.<br><br>Z supports **Option 4** – *require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for* – within the development of the National CDEM Plan and Strategy. Z sees this option a pragmatic way to meaningfully address the challenge of responding to disproportionately affected people and communities.<br><br>Z's support for Option 4 is informed by our experience in previous emergency response situations whereby the resourcing, experience and local planning of local CDEM groups is incredibly varied and has a significant impact on the local response.<br><br>Z saw this play out in the response to Cyclone Gabrielle, where for example, there were disproportionate impacts on the communities of Gisborne and Wairoa. Both communities were cut off due to bridges or roading issues, and didn't have equipment like generators installed.<br><br>More specifically, Z's experience was that Gisborne's response was much more controlled via the local-CDEM group, with limited oversight and coordination at a national level. Specifically, the local Council instructed local service stations (including Z) to impose a $40 fuel limit to manage local supply. Neither Z nor NEMA (via the Fuel Sector Coordinating Entity) were aware this request had been made, and Z and NEMA were first informed via media reports. |
| **Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management**<br>**• Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**<br>**• How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**<br>**• What should be the relationship between CDEM Groups and iwi Māori?**<br>**• What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?** |
| Z strongly agrees with the Government Inquiry's recommendation to recognise and enable iwi Māori contributions in emergency management. Z acknowledges that iwi Māori are kaitiaki |

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(guardians) of their respective areas and believes that partnering with iwi Māori is essential to building Aotearoa New Zealand's disaster resilience.

In relation to the nature and shape of the relationship between CDEM and iwi Māori, Z believes that iwi Māori are best placed to advise on this to help ensure the relationship settings and mechanisms reflect their expertise, are fit for purpose and effective during emergency response situations.

**Other problems relating to this objective**
**• Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Z believes it is important the new Bill recognises the invaluable contributions iwi Māori make during regional and national emergencies, and so, that any plans or systems created should be with Māori consultation and input.

**Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels**

**Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency**
**• Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

Z supports **Option 3** – *Require Group Controllers (local emergency) or the Director (national emergency) to be the "Control Agency".*

Z is supportive of change that ensures a single overarching 'control agency' in charge of the emergency event, including hazards and consequences. Z's experience is that the current model of a national body and local control of incidents causes confusion in an emergency event.

For example, during Cyclone Gabrielle it was unclear who was leading or coordinating the response, i.e. local vs. national CDEM. From Z's perspective, this lack of clarity delayed decisions and confused communications, and meant Z's response team was required to participate in multiple "local" agency calls, SITREP requests (i.e., to both local CDEM groups and to NEMA via the FSCE) and was asked to respond to multiple requests for the same information but from different bodies (i.e., both national and local level authorities).

**Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities**
**• Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

Z agrees that the status quo has caused inconsistency, duplication and gaps in how emergency management is governed, planned and funded in each region.

Z is supportive of strengthening the regional tier of emergency management to bridge between national and local level authorities. **Option 2** – *(legislative): Provide distinct responsibilities for CDEM Groups and their local authority members* – would enable national lifeline utilities, such as Z, to work with the most appropriate regional CDEM group during emergency events, particularly at a regional level.

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Note Z's belief that the introduction of a regional tier of emergency management should not conflict with the option selected to address Issue 5, i.e. when an emergency is declared, there should be a single overarching 'control agency' in charge of the emergency event.

**Other problems relating to this objective**

**• Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Z has no further comments.

**Issue 7: Keeping Emergency Management Plans up to date**

Z has no further comments.

**Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management**

**Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance**

**• Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

As a lifeline utility provider, Z agrees that in some cases, an inconsistent standard of emergency management across New Zealand has resulted from a lack of standard setting and assurance across the system. Therefore, Z would support both:

- **Option 4** – (legislative) *Give the Director the function of monitoring the performance of the emergency management system]* as a means to increase oversight of issues across the emergency management system and the ability to address them in a timely manner; and
- **Option 2** – (legislative) [*Provide the Director with the power to issue compliance orders.*

Given the nature of our business, Z has considered the National Fuel Plan (*the plan)* in detail and identified opportunities to refine the plan to support greater resilience and prompt actions during a crisis response. Our recommendations are set out below:

| | |
|---|---|
| **1. Clarity on MSO Guidelines** | Establish clear guidelines and protocols around:<br>• Who has the authority to make decisions on when MSO stocks can be drawn down;<br>• What is the prioritisation of use; and<br>• What are the replenishment conditions<br>Adopt higher frequency of MSO review (e.g., every 3 years) to ensure timely response to demand changes |
| **2. Clarity on fuel specification relaxation during crisis** | Establish fuel specifications by product (petrol and diesel) and timeframes that fuel importers need to adhere to during a crisis to support identification and establishment of relationships with potential alternative markets. |
| **3. Plan to stand up trucking labour during domestic crisis** | Establish clear guidelines and protocols around:<br>• Prioritisation and authorities for repurposing trucking resources (assets and labour) to support during a crisis (e.g., NZ Defence Force, industries carrying dangerous goods)<br>• How industries with trucking assets will cooperate during a crisis.<br>• Transport rules during a crisis, e.g., prioritisation of dangerous goods on ferries, maximum truck weight, and ability to use Lyttelton Road tunnel. |

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| | |
|---|---|
| **4. Clarity on risk practices and compliance for critical assets (e.g., RAP, MP wharf)** | Establish clear guidelines and protocols around:<br>• Industry obligations to operate assets in line with best-in-class operations, especially for assets where redundancy options are infeasible due to cost and timeframes (e.g., Marsden Point Wharf, RAP pipeline)<br>• Risk practices and compliance requirements to minimise likelihood of outage e.g., ensuring shipping practices around minimum water depth are adhered to; pipeline inspections done at correct frequencies, etc. |

**Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management**
**• What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**
**• Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

Z believes there is an important balance to strike between local flexibility and national consistency. However, based on the need to have greater national consistency, we support action to strengthen local hazard risk management.
Z supports **Option 4** – (legislative) *[Enable the form and content of CDEM Group plans to be prescribed through secondary legislation* – to help achieve this.

**Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies**
**• Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Z is not best placed to comment on this particular question.

**Other problems relating to this objective • Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Z has no further comments.

**Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services**

**Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"**
**• If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C?**
**• If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Z is supportive of **Option 3** – (Legislative) *Replace the lifeline utilities framework with an expanded, principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure"* – and having an expanded, principles-based definition for essential infrastructure services and providers. However, Z requests that if the definition is expanded, clear guidelines and definitions are provided on the type, and size, of essential services which are included.

Additionally, Z is comfortable with the essential services included in Appendix C.

**Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning**

*Z supports **Option 2** – Increase assurance of lifeline utilities' business continuity plans.* In this context, Z requests that:

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- advisory resources (e.g. Business Continuity Plans Subject Matter Experts (BCP SMEs)) be provided by the government to support compliance, provide clarity and assistance to lifeline utilities to facilitate a consistent approach. Of note, these resources would complement the guidance provided.
- any information published is restricted to a thematic nature and does not specifically identify lifeline utilities by name or publish details of individual plans. Z has commercial sensitivity and operational safety concerns regarding information being published (where the CDEM Director has concerns) and as consequence protecting this information is important.

Z welcomes the approach taken in Option 2 where guidance is provided rather than a prescriptive approach which would have regulatory or legislative requirements.

If NEMA were to pursue Option 3 or 4, Z sees it as important there is a reasonable lead-in compliance period of 3 years, with any financial penalties applying after that period. Furthermore, Z would encourage an approach to penalties where the focus was on penalising 'frequent' non-compliance by lifeline utilities rather than one-off non-compliance.

**Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing**
**• Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Z supports **Options 3** [*Explicitly require CDEM Groups to involve the lifeline utilities in their areas in the development of CDEM Group plans*] & **Option 4** [*Require lifeline utilities to contribute to national response plans*]. Whilst Z supports the requirement of lifeline utilities contribution to regional and national plans in principle, Z has some resourcing concerns with these options and requests additional information to determine the impact.

In respect of **Option 5** – *Strengthen information sharing protections* – Z welcomes sharing information, provided requests are managed via one central point of contact. This would help to avoid the need for multiple requests on lifeline utilities during emergency events which divert resources from responding to emergencies. Additionally, Z requests due consideration is given to potentially commercially sensitive information requests between similar lifeline utilities.

**Other problems relating to this objective • Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Z has no further comments.

**Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens**

**Other problems relating to this objective • Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Z supports **Option 3** – *Prescribe the form of identification passes through regulations.* Z requests prior accreditation for lifeline utilities, which would enable Z to meet its obligations in a timely manner and prevent delays caused by applying, and waiting, for accreditation during an emergency event.

**Conclusion**

**Other comments**

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| • Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation? |
| --- |
| • Z agrees that recent emergencies like Cyclone Gabrielle have highlighted the importance of ensuring legislation appropriately addresses how Aotearoa New Zealand manages risks, responds to, and recovers from emergencies. Considering this, we acknowledge the importance of ensuring the duties of lifeline utilities are clear and measurable.<br>• Furthermore, it is important that the Bill clarifies who uses emergency powers at the local level for the rationing of fuel and how those decisions are communicated to key stakeholders. Z's experience during the Northland flood event saw an order being made to prioritise fuel at priority sites for local emergency services. However, it was not clear at the time who made this order, and Z was requested to provide assurance that we could meet this order. Z eventually confirmed that the request had come from Northland CDEM.<br>• We believe a balance must be struck in the Bill, such that lifeline utilities play their part in appropriately managing risks and responding to emergencies, without being subject to inefficient or unduly onerous obligations, which may in turn affect resourcing and impact costs to end users. Z believes that in the fuel sector, focusing on regional and national capability in partnership with Government to manage risks, respond to and recover from emergencies, would be better at increasing resilience. |

**ENDS**

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Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency
PO Box 5010
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20 May 2025

## Submission by Porirua Pacific pandemic and emergency management Alliance

In June 2024, because of Eastern Porirua residents' experiences of COVID-10, a Pacific forum was held at Freedom Church, in Cannons Creek Porirua to discuss the concerns by Pacific leaders relating to the perceived lack of emergency preparedness for communities in Eastern Porirua.

From this forum, a Porirua Pacific pandemic and emergency alliance has been informed. The group operates as a non-legal entity but has members from community providers and groups who have a legal status.

More information about the Alliance is provided in Appendix 1 of this submission.

## What is the basis for our submission?

Emergency preparedness programmes and policies that are not designed with minority perspectives in mind heighten the risk of excluding the very communities they aim to empower. A more inclusive and culturally responsive approach is essential to ensure equitable outcomes and meaningful engagement across all communities.

## Submission Objectives

This submission focuses on the following objectives:

- Strengthen community and iwi Maori participation in emergency management.

The issues discussed in this submission relate to:

- Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities.
- Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management.
- Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management.

## Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities.

Consultation questions: Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?

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## A. Causes of Disproportionate Impact During Emergencies

1. **Underrepresentation of Pacific Perspectives**
   There is a significant underrepresentation of the lived experiences and perspectives of Pacific peoples across the emergency management sector. This lack of inclusion limits the system's ability to respond effectively to the needs of these communities.

2. **Underrepresentation of Pacific youth in emergency management systems.**
   Children and young people under the age of 30 make up over a quarter of Porirua's population, placing them at the heart of the city's future resilience.

   When disasters strike, they are often the first and hardest hit, facing severe impacts on their physical and mental health, nutrition, education, and economic opportunities. Many are also at increased risk of violence and other long-term consequences that limit their potential.

   Those living in poverty or vulnerable circumstances bear even greater risks—risks that are only intensifying as climate change increases the frequency and severity of disasters worldwide. Meeting the specific needs of children and youth, and ensuring their voices and ideas are included in disaster risk reduction planning, is essential. It is not only a matter of building safer communities—it is a matter of upholding their rights and investing in a resilient future for all.

   Despite being among the most affected by disasters, the role children and young people can play in strengthening our emergency response remains underutilised. They bring valuable perspectives, energy, and creativity—yet their involvement is often overlooked in formal preparedness and response strategies.

   To address this gap, emergency planning and disaster risk education must be reintroduced into the school curriculum. Equipping children and youth with knowledge, skills, and a clear understanding of their roles in emergencies not only enhances their safety but also empowers them to become active contributors to community.

   Pacific youth and young in general bring leadership, energy, resilience, and a strong sense of community to any challenge they face. In the context of emergency management, these strengths are invaluable. Tech-savvy and quick to mobilize through digital platforms, youth are well-positioned to support emergency preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.

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Their ability to adapt, communicate, and lead—especially in times of crisis—makes them critical partners in building more resilient communities. Recognizing and empowering Pacific youth as active contributors, rather than passive recipients of aid, is essential for effective and inclusive disaster management across the region.

3. **Underrepresentation of Māori, people with disabilities, new migrant and rainbow communities**
   While this paper primarily advocates for Pacific peoples, we acknowledge that other minority and marginalised groups are also disproportionately disadvantaged by systems that fail to consider their unique worldviews, cultural values, and lived experiences. We advocate for these groups as a Pacific alliance, because we also served their needs during COVID-19.

4. **Systemic Inequities**
   The absence of meaningful representation contributes to systemic inequities in emergency support frameworks, disproportionately affecting Pacific and minority communities.

5. **Disconnect from Community Institutions**
   Emergency systems often lack meaningful engagement with Pacific churches and community providers—institutions that hold strong, trusted relationships with Pacific families. It is reported that there are approximately 100 Pacific churches across the Wellington Region.

6. **Inadequate Training Approaches**
   Current emergency management training and education programs frequently overlook cultural knowledge and protocols. These programs often exclude Pacific leadership and community groups, resulting in a disconnect between formal systems and community realities.

7. **Lack of Cultural Humility**
   Cultural humility is largely absent in current systems. The sector must undergo a philosophical shift toward shared governance, co-leadership, and inclusive planning, emphasizing a co-design approach with Pacific communities, with a commitment to move away from one-size-fits-all approaches. According to Gottlieb (2020), cultural humility requires: Continuous self-awareness and reflection, supported by diverse colleagues. An open, teachable mindset. A strong understanding of the structural factors shaping community realities.

8. **Health Vulnerabilities in Emergencies**
   Grid failures and power outages pose serious risks to individuals relying on electrically powered medical devices, such as ventilators, dialysis machines, and oxygen

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concentrators. Interruptions in medical support during emergencies can exacerbate chronic health conditions and pose life-threatening risks for individuals requiring critical care and medication management.

9. **Community Involvement in Health Emergency Planning**
   Te Whatu Ora has developed a Health Emergency Plan for the Wellington region. However, it remains unclear how communities were engaged in its development and whether key health issues—particularly among vulnerable groups—were considered.

10. **Perceived Disparity in Support**
    There is a perception that Pacific communities in the Pacific Islands receive more tailored emergency preparedness support than their counterparts in New Zealand.

11. **Cross government collaboration – the critical role of Pacific leadership**
    Insights and learnings from the COVID-19 pandemic, Auckland Anniversary Floods and Cyclone Gabrielle response identified fundamental gaps where no formalised or dedicated plan for Pacific peoples was established in the event of a communicable /notifiable disease outbreak (e.g. measles, COVID-19) and environmental emergency (e.g. flooding, cyclones).

12. **National Public Health Directorate, Pacific Outbreak/Emergency Response and Communications Plan**
    Findings from the *Health Sector Response to the 2019 Measles Outbreaks Repor*t and the *Rapid Insights: Hawkes Bay Response to Cyclone Gabrielle Report* identified three key themes and recommendations for an effective, fit-for-purpose and sustainable future outbreak and emergency response for Pacific communities, this includes:

    - *A culturally appropriate response is needed in infectious disease control to achieve equitable service outcomes with a focus on Māori and Pacific populations who continue to bear the heaviest burden of infectious disease outbreaks in New Zealand.*
    - *Consider the role of Pacific leaders and providers that are already working effectively with communities at risk of infectious disease outbreaks with the appropriate cultural and linguistic competencies.*
    - *Translated information about of infectious disease outbreaks are made available for the public in a timely manner.*

    The Health NZ | National Public Health Service, Pacific Public Health Directorate have recently launched a Pacific Public Health Outbreak/Emergency Response Framework (Wansolwara Framework) to provide equity focused direction, recommendations and solutions to strengthen the way the entire health and social services system responds

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and delivers to the needs of Pacific peoples during emergency responses. Rather than reinventing the wheel, the Wansolwara Framework builds off existing and effective Pacific community initiatives and approaches that already work well for Pacific communities. The Wansolwara Framework acknowledges what Pacific communities have been telling us for over some time – about the importance of: Pacific values, Pacific –led solutions, and the crucial roles our families, Pacific communities (including churches) play when it comes to preparing for and responding to emergencies and outbreaks. Our priority is to ensure that Pacific communities, providers, NGOs and wider Pacific workforce feel, and are, heard and vital recommendations are delivered on.

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B. **Consultation question: What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

1. **Demographic Shifts**
   As of 2023, Pacific peoples comprised 9.1% of the Wellington region's population—up from 8.4% in 2018. This increase underscores the need for inclusive and culturally informed emergency planning.

2. **Proactive approach by Pacific communities in Porirua**
   Pacific leaders in Porirua have been proactive in establishing the Porirua Pacific pandemic and emergency management alliance (see Appendix 1). Challenges in relation to capacity to run this Alliance is a factor in its ongoing work.

3. **Partnering with Trusted Agencies**
   Addressing the needs of Pacific communities in emergencies requires collaboration with trusted community organisations. The goal is for NEMA and similar agencies to build trust and become credible partners.

4. **Role of the Ministry for Pacific Peoples**
   It is unclear whether NEMA and CDEM has meaningfully collaborated with the Ministry for Pacific Peoples and the Pacific team in the National Public Health Directorate in developing emergency policies and frameworks—an area that warrants urgent attention.

5. **Leveraging COVID-19 Lessons**
   The National Public Health Directorate's Pacific Team developed a National Pacific Communications Plan based on lessons from COVID-19. Integration of this plan into regional emergency planning by NEMA and Civil Defence groups should be prioritised.

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6. **Limitations of Current Consultation Models**
   The "Initial Assessment of Options" (page 12) rightly calls for community consultation. However, Pacific communities often report their feedback is misinterpreted or misrepresented in policy development, leading to superficial outcomes.

7. **Capacity Building for Representation**
   While the current proposal acknowledges the limited capacity of some communities to engage, it must also ensure meaningful investment in diverse leadership at the CDEM level to ensure authentic representation and accountability.

8. **Rebalancing Power and Resources**
   To genuinely empower Māori and Pacific communities, resources must support institutions they trust—such as marae, churches, and mosques—as key hubs during emergencies. These venues have long served as culturally appropriate and effective response centres.

9. **Beyond Tokenism**
   While the discussion paper commendably emphasises the inclusion of diverse communities, the proposed options risk being perceived as tokenistic. Authentic engagement requires deeper structural and policy-level changes.

### Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management.

Māori iwi, hapū, leaders, and communities must be central to the planning, governance, and delivery of emergency management across Aotearoa New Zealand. Their leadership, local knowledge, and deep-rooted connections to whenua and whānau place them in a unique and vital position to enhance the resilience of all communities.

Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) must actively deepen its engagement with local marae and Māori communities, not as stakeholders, but as partners. Marae should be formally recognised and resourced as critical distribution and welfare hubs, particularly during crisis events. During Cyclone Gabrielle, marae across the country provided shelter, coordinated supplies, and delivered vital support to both Māori and non-Māori alike demonstrating their capacity, manaakitanga, and leadership.

In rural areas, Māori communities often have intimate knowledge of their whānau and neighbours' locations and needs, positioning them as essential actors in localised emergency responses. This insight must be leveraged in emergency response planning and operational delivery.

To achieve meaningful Māori participation, iwi, hapū, and Māori organisations must be represented at every level of the emergency management system, including:

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- Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (CDEM Groups)
- Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs)
- National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) governance structures

This representation must not be symbolic. It must be supported by investment in capability development and resourced roles that ensure Māori have genuine influence over decision-making processes. To provide strategic oversight and enforce accountability, NEMA and CDEM must embed Māori capability at the executive level. Only through shared leadership and enduring partnerships can the sector uphold Te Tiriti o Waitangi obligations and deliver equitable, effective emergency responses for all.

Maori Iwi, leaders and communities must be at the forefront of emergency planning and management for all communities throughout Aotearoa. Civil defence must deepen their engagement with local marae and Maori communities. Marae must be utilised as distribution and welfare hubs. Marae have supported extensive efforts in the Cycle Gabrielle event providing shelter and support for all people.  In rural communities, Maori know where their families are located.

Iwi, Maori and Hapu capability requires representation across CDEM, coordinating Executive Groups. To ensure this happens, capability is required at the highest level in NEMA, at the executive to ensure there is strategic oversight and accountability.

### Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

If Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) continues to operate under its current structure, it must prioritise the inclusion of community knowledge holders—individuals with direct, trusted relationships and lived experience within local communities. Their involvement is essential not only during emergency response but, more importantly, in the planning, training, and preparedness phases. Failing to embed this expertise in early stages risks undermining the very resilience CDEM seeks to build.

**Pacific Community-Led Initiatives in Porirua**

Pacific communities in Porirua have proactively initiated several preparedness measures, demonstrating leadership and a commitment to community resilience:

- **Establishment of the first Pacific church-based community emergency hub**, offering a culturally relevant and accessible centre for response coordination.
- **Ongoing negotiations to enhance emergency preparedness within the Atafu Tokelau community**, ensuring tailored support based on specific cultural and logistical needs.

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- **A formal partnership with Hono – the Māori Emergency Management Network**, fostering collaboration and shared learning between Māori and Pacific emergency efforts.
- **Formation of the Pacific Pandemic and Emergency Management Alliance** (see Appendix 1), aimed at providing strategic coordination and policy advocacy.

These efforts have been actively supported by the Porirua City Council Emergency Management team and the Community Advisor from the Wellington Regional Emergency Management Office. Their collaboration reflects a promising model of local government partnering with Pacific communities.

**Key Challenges**

Despite these positive developments, several critical challenges persist:

1. **Limited Capacity and Resourcing**
   Pacific leaders contributing to emergency management efforts are frequently overextended, balancing their responsibilities with demanding professional roles. Dedicated capacity funding is urgently required to support the ongoing administration, coordination, and development of this vital work.
2. **Youth Engagement**
   There is a critical need to involve Pacific youth in emergency preparedness planning and activities. Engaging young people ensures intergenerational knowledge transfer and builds future leadership.
3. **Training Gaps**
   Existing emergency management training programs are outdated and often not suited to community contexts. A refreshed approach is needed—one that builds local capacity, enhances understanding of region-specific hazards, and includes practical exercises in emergency planning, response, and recovery.
4. **Lack of Awareness of Community-Led Successes**
   There is an abundance of successful examples of community-led emergency preparedness—through residents' associations, neighbourhood support groups, and grassroots networks. These models should be highlighted and replicated, as they demonstrate the power of community engagement in building resilience.

Recommendations:

1. That the review of the EMA be explicit in its definition of the term communities and include in their definition “minority and at-risk communities’ to ensure that the voices of Maori, Pacific, youth people with disabilities, new migrant and rainbow are represented.

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2. That the development of the new legislation as it relates to how CDEMs operate, consider how CDEM will be informed of how their decisions must consider the impact on Maori, Pacific, youth, people with disabilities, new migrant, and rainbow communities.

3. That the allocation of resourcing of community capacity and capability is specific to ensuring Maori, Pacific, youth, people with disabilities, new migrant and rainbow communities are supported in their way, to build their emergency capability within their communities and for others, and that capability is embedded in the overall emergency response planning.

4. Participatory Planning includes the development of tools like community workshops, listening sessions, and co-design processes would be standard, allowing affected groups to share their experiences, knowledge, and needs.

5. Disaggregated Data Collection and Analysis will provide Granular Data: Emergency planning would rely on detailed, disaggregated data (by age, gender, race, disability status, etc.) to understand vulnerabilities and design targeted responses.

6. Risk Mapping: Geographic Information Systems (GIS) would be used to identify high-risk populations and locations (e.g., flood-prone areas with high elderly populations), such as Eastern Porirua, Mangere, Manukau etc.

7. Tailored Communication Strategies will ensure that Language and Accessibility Communication plans would include translated materials, sign language interpreters, plain-language alerts, and formats accessible to visually/hearing-impaired populations.

8. Trusted Messengers: partnerships with local organisations, faith leaders, and community groups that already have the trust of underserved populations.

9. Resource Allocation and Infrastructure Investment will implement a Equitable Funding: Emergency resources (e.g., shelters, food, medical supplies) would be pre-positioned in underserved areas and funding would be directed to community-based organisations that serve vulnerable groups.

10. Resilient Infrastructure: Investment would prioritize resilient infrastructure in areas with high social vulnerability (e.g., backup power for public housing, flood defences in informal settlements).

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11. Workforce and Training Reforms

    Diverse Representation: Emergency planning and response teams would be diverse and culturally competent, reflecting the communities they serve. Specialised Training: First responders and planners would receive training in trauma-informed care, cultural sensitivity, and anti-discrimination practices.

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
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## Appendix 1: Porirua Pacific pandemic and emergency management alliance.

The Alliance will:

1. Prepare familiies to respond to a pandemic or emergency with confidence.
2. Provide information to our communities to support them through a pandemic or major emergency.
3. Work with local partners and agencies to understand what is happening and respond in a unified way.
4. Ensure there are safe gathering places for community to access if they are unable to remain at home.
5. Support community to support each other.

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Kia orana, Noa’ia, Talofa lava, Mauri, Mālō e lelei, Tālofa, Ni Sa Bula Vinaka, Fakaalofa lahi atu,
Mālō ni, Mauri, Halo Olketa, Halo Olgeta

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# Porirua Pacific (and all communities) Pandemic and Emergency Management Alliance (Est. 2024)

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# Why has an Alliance been established




- COVID-19 evaluation
- Emergency management is a complex system
- Adding community-led value to current WREMO emergency support and education.
- Vulnerability of communities living within Porirua City at risk of not receiving support.
- Community coordination of activities across all levels, community, local government, central government.
- Changes to government investment and public sector leadership.
- Local solutions by local people and communities.

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# What has happened so far...




- Informal working group established
- Community provider workshop held at Freedom Church in June 2024
- Thematic analysis of feedback has developed underpinning values, draft TORs and focus areas for the development of the Alliance.
- Working with WREMO Maori and Pacific advisor to align our work.
- September 2024 Pilot of Pasifika CIMS (Coordinated Incident Management System) training partnering with National Public Health Pacific team, Massey University and Ahikaea (Hinemoa Katene).

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# Vision and Mission



- **Vision:** Strong Pacific and all families in Porirua City are prepared, well-resourced, and capable of living independently or accessing local support during pandemics and major emergencies.
- **Mission:** Establish an emergency management community alliance to coordinate a unified approach to pandemic and emergency preparedness.

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# Underpinning Values and Focus Areas




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# Draft TORs aims and objectives

In partnership with WREMO, the Alliance will:

1. Prepare families to **respond confidently** to pandemics and emergencies.
2. Provide our communities with **vital information** to support them during pandemics and major emergencies.
3. **Collaborate with local partners** and agencies to ensure a unified response.
4. Ensure **safe gathering places are available for community** members unable to remain at home.
5. Foster **community support networks** to help members support each other.

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# Who have engaged in our process to date?

- Pirianga Alofa Pacific and Community Services
- EKFS church
- Atamu Incorporated
- Whitireia Polytechnic Bachelor in Nursing Pacific programme.
- Porirua City Council
- WREMO
- National Public Health Pacific team.
- Ahikaea
- Ministry for Pacific peoples
- Te Whatu Ora
- Toa Rangatira
- NZ Police
- Le Fale Jobs and Skills Hub
- Wellington Free Ambulance
- Atafu Tokelau Association
- Pasifika Futures
- Vaka Atafaga, Pacific Nurse-led service
- OASIS community support
- Massey University School of Geography

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# What are the benefits of your organisation being involved?

- As a first point, we aim to support you and your family to be prepared so you can help others.
- Build and develop our knowledge so everyone knows what everyone is doing
- Be involved in testing systems so we know what to do.
- Consider ways that you can support the families on your caseloads to be prepared before a big event (water, medical supplies, food).

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# Questions and Answers

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Sean Stewart |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | New Zealand Red Cross - Rīpeka Whero Aotearoa |

☐ The Privacy Act 2020 applies to submissions. Please tick the box if you **do not** want your name or other personal information to be included in any information about submissions that NEMA may publish.

☐ NEMA may publish submissions or a summary of submissions to its website, civildefence.govt.nz. If you **do not** want your submission or a summary of your submission to be published, please tick the box and type an explanation below:

We are happy for our information to be shared

### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

We are happy for our information to be shared

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Insert response

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

New Zealand Red Cross agrees with how the problem has been described. Our operational experience across recent emergencies also confirms that disproportionately impacted groups, including elderly people, persons with disabilities, migrants, former refugees, and those with limited English proficiency amongst others, may often face more barriers to accessing timely, appropriate, and culturally relevant support.

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We also agree with the Inquiry's finding that these needs are frequently overlooked during readiness and recovery planning, and that proactive, pre-emergency engagement is critical to improving outcomes. While some of these communities have their informal support networks, gaps in formal mechanisms to integrate their perspectives into planning and preparedness continues to produce uneven and inequitable outcomes. New Zealand Red Cross believes that meeting the needs of all people in an inclusive and anticipatory way is fundamental to the legitimacy and effectiveness of any emergency management system.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Yes. In addition to the factors already acknowledged, New Zealand Red Cross considers that a range of structural, social, and systemic factors could contribute to the disproportionate impact of emergencies and disasters on certain people and groups in New Zealand.

Some additional factors include:

- People with limited or no English proficiency, low literacy, or who rely on non-digital communication methods may not receive information or have the ability/understanding to apply for and access support (for example, during TC Gabrielle we found some grassroot community organisations required support and mentorship to access and complete grant funding opportunities) in a timely or accessible way, particularly in rapidly evolving emergency contexts.
- In remote areas and among economically disadvantaged populations, lack of access to reliable connectivity, devices, or media tools may inhibit access to warnings, updates, and support services, especially during power outages or network failures. (for example, during the TC Gabrielle response power and communication connections were disrupted in some locations further exacerbating impact on already vulnerable people and communities).
- Some migrants, asylum seekers, and individuals with irregular immigration status may avoid contact with emergency services due to fear of detention, deportation, or loss of entitlements, even when their safety is at risk.

These additional factors, particularly when overlapping, create compounding vulnerabilities that are not always visible to emergency management planners and responders. New Zealand Red Cross recommends that the Bill and associated policies explicitly require CDEM Groups and other responsible platforms to undertake intersectional vulnerability assessments and to engage meaningfully with those most at risk, including through partnership with NGOs and community-led organisations that work directly with these groups.

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

New Zealand Red Cross supports Option 3 as a critical minimum standard. However, we recommend that the proposed legislation go further by requiring that CDEM Group Plans not only explain how they "address" needs but demonstrate: how they will identify disproportionately impacted communities/groups, how they will engage directly with those communities/groups, and how they will resource and operationalise inclusive approaches across all four Rs.

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**5. What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Planning that is genuinely informed by the needs of groups disproportionately affected by emergencies would be equity-driven, community-led, inclusive, and systemically embedded across all levels of governance. At both national and local levels, emergency management planning would recognise how combined factors , like age, gender, disability, ethnicity, migration status, language, and housing or socio-economic conditions interact. These assessments would be integrated into hazard and impact analyses, supporting planning processes to identify specific needs and barriers faced by marginalised groups and to design targeted risk reduction and response strategies accordingly. This approach supports NEMA's Whole-of-Society model and Red Cross's Community Engagement and Accountability commitment, which together emphasise the importance of inclusive and sustained engagement with communities before, during, and after emergencies.

Planning frameworks would formalise operational partnerships with community-based stakeholders/networks and humanitarian organisations that possess expertise and experience in delivering emergency management services to diverse groups, including iwi Māori, persons with disabilities, youth, and migrant communities. This includes using structured mechanisms for collaboration with these stakeholders/networks to co-design community-based emergency management plans, culturally appropriate welfare delivery models, and accessible communication systems. At the local level, planning would also involve the mapping and integration of community assets, such as marae, churches, and community hubs, as essential operational components of the emergency management architecture. Response strategies would be tailored to ensure access for all. Practically, this would require these elements to be woven through emergency management functions like information dissemination, sheltering, evacuation, and relief support, ensuring that individuals facing language, cultural, physical, or legal barriers are meaningfully included, enabled and supported.

To further enhance the inclusiveness and effectiveness of planning for disproportionately affected groups, it is essential that the emergency management system leverages a robust and shared Common Operating Picture (COP). A well-maintained COP facilitates real-time information sharing across agencies as well as private and not for profit organisations and enables early identification of emerging needs, particularly among marginalised populations.

**6. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

New Zealand Red Cross support the direction outlined in Options 3 and 4 and believe these provide a strong foundation for addressing the identified problem. However, their success will depend heavily on how they are implemented, monitored, and supported in practice.

To ensure their effectiveness, Option 3 should include specific legislative expectations for CDEM Group plans to demonstrate not only intent, but also the mechanisms, partnerships, and resource allocations through which inclusive planning will be achieved. This includes formal engagement with community-based organisations, culturally responsive approaches, and the use of disaggregated data to inform planning.

In our view, the focus should now shift toward embedding these provisions within a legally binding and systemically accountable framework, with clear reporting obligations, resourcing commitments, and capacity-building support across the 4 Rs.

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## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

New Zealand Red Cross agree with the way the problem has been described. The recognition that iwi Māori bring significant capability, leadership, resources and cultural insight to emergency management is both timely and necessary. The 2023 North Island Severe Weather Events, for instance, again highlighted what has long been evident to many in the sector: iwi Māori are not only responders, but proactive leaders in readiness, response, and recovery.

The current discretionary nature of iwi Māori involvement in emergency management structures can be described as inconsistent in its application across the country. New Zealand Red Cross believes the emergency management system must move beyond consultation to a model of meaningful partnership, where iwi Māori are recognised as critical stakeholders in any decision-making and planning. Embedding iwi Māori participation at all levels of the emergency management system will enhance the cultural relevance, legitimacy, and inclusivity of New Zealand's emergency management system.

**8. Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

The description reflects the breadth and depth of the roles that iwi Māori play across the emergency management spectrum but not necessarily the scale of iwi Māori mobilisation before, during and after an event (particularly from an iwi Māori supporting iwi Māori perspective). During significant emergency events, iwi Māori often activate autonomously and are able to mobilise resources quickly and effectively due to their embeddedness within communities and strong relational networks. They play an essential role to achieving equitable and locally led outcomes and New Zealand Red Cross supports the need to formally recognise and integrate these roles overtime through enduring partnership and leadership mechanisms.

**9. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

New Zealand Red Cross supports the implementation of options 2, 4, and 5, however believe there would need to be more consideration to the legislative nature proposed in options 4 and 5

Option 4 focuses on the role and responsibility for CDEM groups to engage with iwi Māori during the development of CDEM Group plans which we agree should be a minimum standard.

Option 5 formalises a similar arrangement at the Director level and again we agree that this should be a minimum standard that is formed on robust relationship management practices.

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New Zealand Red Cross agree that the risks associated with implementing these options is the capacity for iwi Māori to participate and the intersecting nuances between CDEM boundaries and iwi boundaries. Therefore, the mechanisms for engagement and participation should be carefully considered to ensure that any engagement is meaningful.

New Zealand Red Cross also agree with option 2, in addressing the broader strategic question of the role of iwi Māori in plans, guidance and other policy settings. This will allow the Emergency Management system to work with Māori in defining their roles and responsibilities whilst continuing to focus on building cultural capability across CDEM groups and strengthening relationships with iwi Māori.

**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

New Zealand Red Cross recommends that any emergency management legislation should ensure that engagement and participation of iwi Māori as a key stakeholder across all phases of emergency management is foundational. The role of iwi Māori, with deep local community-based knowledge and network and leadership capacity, should be meaningfully acknowledged and appropriately leveraged within the emergency management system. This includes recognising the unique contribution iwi Māori can make in supporting community preparedness, enabling culturally appropriate response and recovery programming, and enhancing resilience. Legislation should therefore promote inclusive mechanisms that enable iwi Māori can participate actively and effectively in emergency management planning, decision-making, and operations at all levels – national, regional, and local.

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

The described problem highlights that relationship between CDEM Groups and iwi Māori should be grounded in the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, embedded within legislative intent, and operationalised through effective participation and partnership.

At a structural level, it is encouraged that iwi Māori arrangements be streamlined and integrated to support more efficient use of resources and people capabilities. Iwi Māori should be recognised and empowered to provide leadership during response and recovery within their communities, for instance, formalising the use of Marae and other iwi-controlled assets during emergencies.

From New Zealand Red Cross's perspective, the future emergency management system should view iwi Māori not simply as support providers but should further invest on their strategic partnership and leadership, strengthening both the cultural capability and operational effectiveness of the emergency management architecture.

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

New Zealand Red Cross believes that the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups (CEGs) and iwi Māori should be Treaty-grounded and centred on participation, partnership and reciprocity. Given the critical role that CEGs play in advising CDEM Groups, setting regional priorities, and coordinating multi-agency responses, it is essential that iwi Māori are well engaged throughout the process to adequately support these bodies. Consideration for iwi Māori participation and representation in CEGs should reflect both their capacity and the nuances between CDEM boundaries and iwi Māori boundaries.

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Participation should be genuine, whereby iwi Māori have an influence over priority setting, planning, and the integration of mātauranga Māori into emergency management systems and practices.

Ensuring coordination with and participation of iwi Māori at the CEG level is not only consistent with the obligations of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, but it also enhances the system's capacity to deliver culturally grounded, community-led, and locally responsive emergency management outcomes. From New Zealand Red Cross's perspective, such integration and participation are essential to building trust, managing hazard risks, and improving resilience across New Zealand.

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

New Zealand Red Cross believes that the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga to be provided to the Director is through the proposed integration of iwi Māori within the emergency management system itself. Simplified, this is allowing the integration of iwi Māori participation and partnership at local, regional and national levels (nationally within an advisory capacity).

In the mid to short-term, the integration of iwi Māori into the emergency management system provides the capability and knowledge that can influence initial priority setting whilst identifying future capability requirements.

New Zealand Red Cross agrees in principle with the concept of a national advisory body that provides access to cultural advice and support for the Director, however, emphasise that this should not 'short-cut' meaningful engagement at a local and regional level. That the building block and flow of advice should begin at a local level which is consistent with concepts such as mana motuhake.

Several organisations / agencies have already established this type of national advisory mechanism - examples include NZ Police and FENZ. It is important that if a national advisory body is established to support the Director and the emergency management system, that it is established with the broader sector in mind (e.g. inter-agency/ inter organisation access) which in turn makes it simpler for iwi Māori to participate.

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Emergency Management legislation should be accompanied by an obligation on CDEM Groups and NEMA to provide resourcing, capacity development, and logistical support to iwi Māori participating in emergency management. Without resourcing, legislative mandates risk becoming burdensome and driving minimum requirements rather than empowering.

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

New Zealand Red Cross agrees that the problem has been accurately described. The gaps between community capability and formal emergency management systems remains a challenge on the effectiveness, agility, and equity of emergency response and recovery programming across New Zealand. From our operational experience, we observe that communities consistently demonstrate the willingness and ability to contribute valuable skills, resources, facilities, and contextual knowledge throughout the emergency management cycle. However, gaps in a clear and pre-established framework for coordination and structured engagement often leads to underutilisation of these contributions. This sometime results in duplication of effort, inefficiencies, and missed opportunities to leverage the critical assets and insights held by local communities, community-based organisations, and informal volunteer networks.

In our view, meaningful community participation cannot be achieved through consultation alone, it must be resourced, enabled, and systemically embedded. Strengthening community capability requires sustained investment in local leadership, training, and coordination structures, which often exceeds the internal resourcing capacity comes from local communities and community-based organisations. As such, the legislative framework should anticipate and enable structured partnership arrangements with humanitarian and community-based organisations, such as New Zealand Red Cross, that possess the operational expertise, community reach, and established trust to effectively support community-centred emergency management. While specific funding mechanisms may fall outside the Bill's scope, the legislation should provide for collaborative and delegated delivery models that formally recognise the role of strategic partners in empowering communities and extending the reach and depth of the emergency management system.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

New Zealand Red Cross supports Option 3 and recommends that legislation go further by requiring each CDEM Group Plan and other components of emergency management system to:

1. Establish protocols and mechanisms for receiving, assessing, and integrating community-led offers of assistance (including from humanitarian organisations, iwi Māori, and spontaneous volunteers).
2. Provide guidelines for coordination, information sharing and recognition of community members and stakeholders.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Formalise Strategic Partnerships with Humanitarian and Community-Based Organisations: Mandate and provide platforms for CDEM Groups and other components of emergency management system to develop and maintain arrangements such as MOUs, or operational agreements with humanitarian and community-based organisations, such as the New Zealand Red Cross, for emergency management related services and capabilities.

Promote Locally Led Action as a Core Principle of the Bill: New Zealand Red Cross recommends the inclusion of a legislative principle affirming that local communities and locally based organisations are often the first to take life-saving action when emergencies occur and should be

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enabled by formal emergency management systems. This aligns with the NEMA's stated objective to achieve a whole-of-society approach to resilience.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

New Zealand Red Cross agrees that the problem has been well described and acknowledges the reality that individuals and communities are frequently the first to take life-saving action in the early stages of an emergency, often before any formal response is activated. This reflects a fundamental truth of emergency management: local people are the first responders. In support of this position, we see our first aid programmes as contributing to the preparedness of communities in a first responder capacity.

The absence of legal protection for those acting reasonably and in good faith presents a barrier to early and potentially life-saving intervention. In our view, this not only discourages appropriate community action but undermines the principle of empowering people and communities to take responsibility for their own preparedness and response, as envisaged under the current CDEM framework.

New Zealand Red Cross believes that the system must actively support and legitimise the role of community-led action by establishing policies and arrangements for those who act with humanity and reason, particularly during the critical time before a formal declaration or official direction is issued.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

New Zealand Red Cross supports the legislative option to provide protection from civil liability (option 2) for individuals and community members undertaking reasonable emergency actions in good faith where they are unable to obtain direction from a Controller or a Police Constable. This reform and development would be essential to empowering individuals and communities to respond without hesitation during the critical early stages of an emergency.

The primary benefit of this option is the removal of legal uncertainty that may currently discourage people from acting to protect life and health in the absence of formal authority. Such an arrangement would affirm the legitimacy of community-initiated action and reinforce the principle of subsidiarity, that emergency response should begin at the most immediate and local level.

We acknowledge that any extension of civil liability protection must be clearly framed to avoid misuse. For this reason, New Zealand Red Cross supports the application of reasonable and good faith thresholds, with protections limited to actions that align with broadly accepted emergency response behaviours (e.g., evacuating people, providing immediate aid). The inclusion of such standards could mitigate the risk of unintended consequences or exploitation of the provision.

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With respect to the labour cost compensation provision (option 2), New Zealand Red Cross recognises its importance for businesses or technical assistance directed by responsible agencies. However, there is opportunity to update current claims process. For example, presently, local authorities are eligible for central government funding to care for affected people (inclusive of accommodating, transporting, feeding, clothing people as a result of an emergency), but this does not cover the cost of support agencies coordination costs nor costs associated with having resources available (for example New Zealand Red Cross providing trained responders/surge support and shelter equipment and Civil Defence Centre supplies). Compensation for costs associated with having resources available and deployable would support agencies in readiness and ability to support.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No additional options at this stage. The options identified, particularly the legislative provision for civil liability protection for individuals acting in good faith (option 2), are appropriate and aligned with the objective of enabling and recognising community-based response and resilience building.

However, the effectiveness of these options will depend on the clarity of their scope, the quality of their legislative framing, and the extent to which they are communicated to the public and integrated into emergency management education and planning.

New Zealand Red Cross emphasises that any new provisions must be supported by public information campaigns and practical guidance to ensure individuals and communities understand when and how legal protections apply. This will be particularly important for those in isolated, remote, or high-risk areas who are most likely to act before official responders arrive.

We also encourage NEMA to ensure that protections for good-faith responders are complemented by training and preparedness opportunities, enabling communities to respond safely, responsibly, and deliberately when emergencies occur.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

International Disaster Response Law and Humanitarian Principles: New Zealand Red Cross recommends inclusion of a legislative preamble acknowledging humanitarian principles and alignment with international obligations under International Disaster Response Law, such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. Humanitarian principles – such as the impartial access to disaster response – could also be cited in a preamble.

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

New Zealand Red Cross agrees with the problem description. The current framework for direction and control can, at times, lead to confusion, duplication, or delay, particularly where multi-agency coordination is required. New Zealand Red Cross supports the need for greater legal clarity on who holds operational control during an emergency and under what circumstances that control may shift between local, regional, or national authorities. Perhaps is would also be helpful to consider also including the need for increased clarity outside of a state of emergency including in BAU settings and when the Director can/should intervene? Ie when the situation is evolving quickly. We also think there's benefit in appropriate powers and authority provided to fulfil an assurance function to drive standards and nationwide consistency across functions.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No comment

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No comment

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

See above comments

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

New Zealand Red Cross broadly agrees with the description of the problem regarding overlapping roles and responsibilities between CDEM Groups and their member local authorities. The identification of inconsistent governance, coordination, and role clarity across local government entities is accurate and reflects operational challenges encountered in previous emergencies.

However, the current problem framing is limited in that it views emergency management primarily through the lens of public service agencies. It does not sufficiently acknowledge the role of support agencies and auxiliary humanitarian organisations such as ours, who have mandates and roles in emergency management and whose contributions are essential to the delivery of support and services across the 4Rs.

We recommend that the problem description be reframed to explicitly acknowledge the gaps in structured engagement with support agencies, not only as a matter of equity and inclusion but as a strategic imperative for system effectiveness and resilience. This recognition is consistent with NEMA's Whole-of-Society approach and would lay the groundwork for more integrated and accountable nationwide coordination models.

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No comments

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No other views

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

New Zealand Red Cross recommends that the legislation not only clarify the respective roles of CDEM Groups and local authorities but also require them to formally and explicitly integrate community-based partners, such as New Zealand Red Cross, which has mandates and roles in emergency management, into the operational delivery of the emergency management services.

Such a requirement would represent a a requirement to ensure the system is resourced to meet its obligations. From a NZRC perspective this would require humanitarian organisations like us to be resourced to support the system. Providing the resources to fulfil any agreed community-based mandate is consistent with NEMA's stated commitment to a whole-of-society model of resilience.

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## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

New Zealand Red Cross understands that the problem description remains narrowly focused on institutional and statutory agencies, particularly local authorities and CDEM Groups, without recognising the implications of those inconsistencies for support agencies and the community-based organisations. We recommend that the problem statement be broadened to explicitly recognise the downstream consequences that the structural inconsistencies impose on critical partnerships with community-based and humanitarian stakeholders. Addressing governance and accountability must include provisions to strengthen how support agencies are recognised and engaged across all planning and operational tiers.

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No other comments come to mind at this time.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No other options come to mind at present.

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Happy with the problem description.

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No further comments at this time.

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**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

None come to mind at this time.

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

New Zealand Red Cross agrees that the current legislative settings do not enable emergency management plans to remain sufficiently current or adaptive. In a rapidly evolving disaster risk context, the ability to review and update planning documents outside statutory cycles is essential for ensuring relevance, agility, and operational effectiveness.

While the core issue has been well described, we believe it is also critical to recognise the role of humanitarian and community-based organisations as enduring partners in the emergency management system. New Zealand Red Cross encourages the legislative frameworks to embed inclusive and structured planning mechanisms that explicitly recognise and integrate the capabilities, capacities, and local knowledge of humanitarian and community-based organisations. Doing so would strengthen the practical utility of plans and help deliver on the system's commitment to a whole-of-society approach.

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

New Zealand Red Cross supports Options 1 and 2. Together, these options offer a practical and necessary shift toward a more agile and accountable planning system.

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

New Zealand Red Cross recommends that the legislation explicitly require mandated partner consultation processes for all reviews and amendments to the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group Plans. These arrangements should, at a minimum, define the process, scope, and timing of consultation with partners, particularly support agencies with established roles in emergency management. Embedding such a requirement would enhance consistency across regions and strengthen the operational application of a whole-of-society approach to emergency management.

Proactively Released

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

None come to mind at this time

Proactively Released

# Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

## Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

New Zealand Red Cross agrees that the current framework does not provide sufficient levers to ensure that responsibilities under the CDEM Act are consistently met to an appropriate standard. This is true both in business-as-usual periods, where gaps in direction can impact planning and readiness efforts, and during emergency events, where inconsistent and inflexible direction can affect the quality of response and recovery programming. These gaps not only affect public service providers but also have implications for support agencies and community-based organisations such as New Zealand Red Cross, who should navigate inconsistent engagement and expectations across the country.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No comment.

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

New Zealand Red Cross considers that greater national consistency and direction would benefit across emergency management spectrum. Areas where fragmentation currently undermines interoperability, equity of service delivery, and the effective integration of support and community-based organisations. This includes but not limited to coordination of welfare services delivery, partner engagement frameworks, and implementation of readiness activities including community engagement and community resilience building. These are central to success of emergency management system and programming but are currently approached unevenly leading to variable standards. Strengthening national direction would enhance system coherence, reduce avoidable inefficiencies, and enable partners such as New Zealand Red Cross to contribute more predictably and effectively providing emergency management services.

Proactively Released

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No comment.

### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

No comment.

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No comment.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No comment.

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Yes, the problem is well described

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

In support of formalising our own role in EM we prefer Option 4 and 5 which we would see as providing a more uniformed, consistent approach to the planning processes.

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**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

No comment.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

No comment.

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No comment.

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

New Zealand Red Cross believes that more changes are required to move beyond a public service provider–centric model and towards a genuinely inclusive and partnership-based approach to hazard risk management. While strengthening the capacity of CDEM Groups and local authorities is essential, emergency management legislation should also explicitly recognise the roles of support agencies and community-based organisations in understanding, communicating, and mitigating hazard risks at the community level.

To deliver effective hazard risk management, the legislative framework must go further by:

- Formally acknowledging the role of support and community-based organisations in hazard risk management.
- Mandating structured collaboration with these partners in the development and application of local risk assessments and Group Plans.
- Ensuring equitable resourcing and access to data, so that community-level stakeholders can meaningfully contribute to risk reduction and preparedness initiatives.

An inclusive and well-resourced framework, underpinned by a whole-of-society approach, will enable more effective, locally relevant, and equitable risk reduction outcomes.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

This makes sense at a practical level, and is a concept that several organisations have applied, or are in the process of applying: particularly in relation to mapping and understanding cultural values and taonga Māori (wāhi tapu) – e.g. Department of Conservation.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No comment.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No comment.

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

No comment.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No comment.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

No comment.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No comment.

Proactively Released

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

No comment.

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

No comment.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No comment.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

No comment.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

No comment.

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No comment.

#### Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

No comment.

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No comment.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No comment.

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

No comment.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No comment.

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

No comment.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No comment.

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## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

No comment.

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No comment.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No comment.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

No comment.

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

No comment.

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No comment.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No comment.

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

No comment.

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No comment.

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No comment.

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

No comment.

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No comment.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No comment.

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

No comment.

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

No comment.

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

No comment.

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

No comment.

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

We have no other comments at this time.

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National Emergency Management Agency
Te Rākau Whakamarumaru

# Submission template: Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) is seeking feedback on options to strengthen New Zealand's emergency management legislation.

The deadline for submissions is **5pm, 13 May 2025**.

You can find the full discussion document and more information about the legislative reform process on NEMA's website. Your feedback will inform decisions about the proposals. We appreciate your time and effort to respond to this consultation.

Emergency Management Bill consultation

## How to make a submission

To make a submission, you will need to:

1. Fill out your name, email address and organisation on the next page. If you are submitting on behalf of an organisation, please ensure you have the authority to represent its views.
2. Fill out your responses to the questions in this document. You can choose to answer some or all of the questions. Where possible, please provide evidence to support your views. For example, references to independent research, facts and figures, or your experiences.
3. If your submission has any confidential information:
    a. Please state this in the email accompanying your submission, setting out clearly which parts you consider should be withheld, and the grounds under the Official Information Act 1982 (Official Information Act) that you believe apply. NEMA will take this into account and will consult with submitters when responding to requests under the Official Information Act.
    b. Indicate this in your submission. Any confidential information should be clearly marked within the text of your submission (preferably as Microsoft Word comments).
    c. Note that submissions are subject to the Official Information Act and may, therefore, need to be released in full or in part. The Privacy Act 2020 also applies.
4. Once you have completed this form, you can send it by:
    a. email (as a Microsoft Word document) to EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

    **OR**

    b. post to:

    Policy Unit
    National Emergency Management Agency
    PO Box 5010, Wellington 6140

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Steve Riden |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | NZ Airports Association (NZ Airports) |

☐ The Privacy Act 2020 applies to submissions. Please tick the box if you **do not** want your name or other personal information to be included in any information about submissions that NEMA may publish.

☐ NEMA may publish submissions or a summary of submissions to its website, civildefence.govt.nz. If you **do not** want your submission or a summary of your submission to be published, please tick the box and type an explanation below:

I do not want my submission published on NEMA's website because...

### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

1. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

   ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   The problem description gels with our experience

2. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Option 3 is supported. Airports require a wide range of supporting services and inputs to operate. Without a broader and flexible definition process of essential services, airports response will be severely hindered.

3. **If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

   ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Airways NZ. Air navigation services are essential for aircraft operation. Airways is a SOE so may not be captured unless included as an essential service

4. **If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

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5. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

6. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

7. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 is preferred. It provides the necessary legislated requirement but has sufficient flexibility to recognise the elements tht are already underway.

Airports already have many elements of BCP due to the system expectations and rules within Civil Aviation.

8. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

9. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

10. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Preferred options are 3 and 4.

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The key weakness in the current CDEM system is the varied levels of forward planning and engagement by different actors and in the different parts of the system. Obligations to do so would be very useful.

Staff turn-over is a constant drain of the expertise and knowledge required to cope effectively with complex situations. Organisations need the obligations.

Information sharing by airports has no commercial risk, but could have a security risk if it exposed infrastructure vulnerabilities to hostile actors.

**11. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

It would be logical to decide the optimal coordination level depending on the flow of required resources to deal with the emergency.

If all the resources are available locally and the need is local, it is difficult to see what national co-ordination would add but also there could be greater risk of delays or mismanagement.

On the other hand, if resources had to enter the local area from other regions, or the emergency was across multiple areas and priorities had to be decided, then national co-ordination would be required. Insert response

**12. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**13. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**14. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 4 – central government agencies are too important to a functioning economy and society to leave out of having obligations to have BCP. Would also cover risks other than natural hazards.

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Exemptions would ensure this is not too onerous or captures unnecessary agencies

**15. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**16. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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NZ AIRPORTS ASSOCIATION

**SUBMISSION TO THE DISCUSSION DOCUMENT: STRENGTHENING NEW ZEALAND'S EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION**

## Introduction

1. The New Zealand Airports Association (NZ Airports) welcomes the opportunity to respond to the *Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation* discussion paper, focusing specifically on **Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services** and **Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services**.

2. NZ Airports represents 48 member airports across New Zealand, including the 21 currently designated as Lifeline Utilities under the CDEM Act 2002. Representing 21 different Lifeline Utilities gives NZ Airports a very broad view of the Lifeline Utilities system.

3. Airports are critical nodes in regional and national resilience, enabling emergency transport, freight continuity, medical evacuations, and acting as spontaneous welfare hubs during major disruptions.

4. Our submission draws on insights from earlier contributions on the Emergency Management Bill (2023), the DPMC's Critical Infrastructure Resilience Consultation (2023), and the Ministerial Review into Civil Defence Responses (2017). NZ Airports also followed its members' response and experience of the Cyclone Gabrielle and Auckland Anniversary weather events.

5. Broadly speaking, NZ Airports would support the Director having greater powers to compel planning, action, and information provision by all individuals and entities within the emergency management system.

## Airports' Existing Resilience and Legal Frameworks

6. It is inherent in the safety focus of aviation that airport activities, equipment and infrastructure operate at a very high level of availability and reliability. Disruption to operations and inability to operate creates risks to aircraft and lives, and this approach to reliability benefits emergency management preparation.

7. Airports already operate within a highly regulated resilience framework. Certification under the Civil Aviation Act 2023 (previously the Civil Aviation Act 1990) and adherence to Civil Aviation Rules (Part 139), ensures that airports have Aerodrome Emergency Plans (AEPs), secondary power supplies for aeronautical purposes such as runway lighting and navigation aids, and operational contingency arrangements. Each airport's emergency planning and readiness are contained in its official

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Wellington 6142
New Zealand

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Wellington 6011
www.nzairports.co.nz

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exposition document, which must be signed by the CEO (or equivalent). Business Continuity Planning is inherently included in this process.

8. This regulatory requirement inherently provides high levels of operational resilience preparation, including biennial full-scale emergency exercises with emergency services. It should be recognised that the existing resilience standards for airports meet or exceed those envisaged for Essential Infrastructure Providers (EIPs) under the proposed emergency management reforms.

9. Smaller, non-certificated aerodromes do not have emergency planning requirements under Civil Aviation Rules. The great majority of these aerodromes are owned and operated by local authorities so can be directed by their owners to take on whatever role the local authorities – which are responsible for local emergency management – see fit.

**Key Points on Objective 4 and Issue 11**

**Recognition of Airports as Essential Infrastructure**

10. NZ Airports strongly supports the proposal to modernise the definition and designation of EIPs.

11. We emphasise that the role of airports as critical enablers of logistics, emergency transport, and community support must be explicitly recognised in any essential infrastructure lists, regulations, and guidance.

12. The EIP designation should be tiered, recognising that different airport sizes vary as do their regional and national significance. Smaller regional airports are essential for isolated communities but may require scaled expectations.

13. In previous submissions, we supported having an expanded principles-based definition. We would additionally recommend that there be flexibility in the legislation or designation process so that the unique circumstances or potential acute need for particular infrastructure could be recognised and hence be designated at an EIP even if it sits outside of a category.

**Interdependencies Must Be Explicitly Mapped and Managed**

14. The resilience of an airport EIP during and after an emergency is fundamentally dependent on the resilience of other infrastructure sectors, including:

(a) Electricity (for lighting, navigation aids, and terminals)

(b) Fuel supply for the emergency backup generators and for aircraft operations

(c) Telecommunications (at a minimum to other parts of the aviation system)

(d) Water and wastewater systems

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(e) Ground handling services and other aviation-related service providers

(f) Airways (as the national air navigation service provider)

(g) Government agencies such as Police, Customs, MPI, and AvSec

15. We recommend that the reformed legislation:

(a) Mandate a sectoral and inter-sectoral mapping of dependencies, not just an asset-by-asset resilience approach.

(b) Require coordinated resilience planning across essential infrastructure sectors, particularly addressing the dependencies between airports and these essential services.

**Support for Smaller Airports**

16. While major airports can absorb regulatory and operational resilience requirements, smaller airports will need government support to meet any substantial new obligations if they become designated as EIPs. This could include:

- Assistance with funding emergency generators, communications systems (e.g., Starlink or equivalent), and backup supplies.
- Support to participate in joint exercises and planning forums where smaller operators might otherwise be excluded due to resource constraints.

17. Government should acknowledge the disproportionate burden on smaller airports' resources for resilience investments that serve national and regional emergency response capabilities. A realistic and pragmatic approach to determining the required capabilities at smaller airports and aerodromes – if designated EIPs - would be sensible.

**Information Sharing and Governance**

18. Information-sharing reforms are welcome, but they must be:

- Purpose-driven and proportionate, to avoid burdening airports with non-essential reporting.
- Integrated with existing aviation and emergency management information channels, rather than duplicative.

19. Moreover, NZ Airports recommends reconsidering the assignment of resilience oversight roles. Sector regulators such as the Civil Aviation Authority should not be

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expected to shoulder both regulatory and resilience monitoring responsibilities. This should be the responsibility of a dedicated resilience agency.

20. While CAA does receive the airport's documentation of its emergency planning and readiness, the CAA is not expert in infrastructure resilience nor necessarily tied in closely to the local and regional CDEM structures.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

21. In summary, NZ Airports recommends that:

(a) Airports are explicitly recognised as Essential Infrastructure Providers with appropriate, tiered expectations.

(b) Infrastructure interdependencies are mapped and managed through integrated resilience planning.

(c) Government support is provided to smaller airports and aerodromes to meet any new resilience equipment requirements.

(d) Information sharing requirements are clear, proportionate, and purposeful.

(e) Resilience oversight is assigned to a dedicated resilience agency, not sector regulators.

22. NZ Airports stands ready to assist the Government in developing detailed policy, implementation plans, and guidance for the new legislation.

**Contact point:**

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New Zealand Airports Association

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**Date**: 20 May 2025



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## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform of the CDEM Act are to:

1. strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
2. provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
3. enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
4. minimise disruption to essential services
5. ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

These objectives are informed by the Government's vision to strengthen disaster resilience and emergency management, past reviews and inquiries, and issues raised in select committee submissions on the previous Emergency Management Bill.

**Q1: Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

Ngā Iwi o Taranaki: Yes. This feedback document from Ngā Iwi o Taranaki will focus on Objective 1 (strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management) and their corresponding issues and options.

---

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

*The Problem:*

- Emergencies affect different people and groups in different ways. These communities' needs aren't always well understood or considered when agencies prepare for, respond to, and recover from emergencies.
- Some people with diverse needs have groups and support networks that advocate for their needs, while others do not. Of those who don't, some may not have the capability or capacity to share their needs and concerns across the 4Rs.
- The Government Inquiry found that the emergency management system needs to do more to meet the increasingly diverse needs in New Zealand's communities. It acknowledged that there are communities and individuals who are more at risk to the negative impacts of disasters than others and that engaging with these communities before an emergency event is key to better understanding and supporting their needs in response and recovery.

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*Options to address these issues:*

- **Status quo:** CDEM Groups are not explicitly required to identify, engage, recognise, or consider how emergencies can disproportionately affect some groups.
- **Develop guidance on meeting diverse needs (non-legislative):** This could include national level development and promotion of emergency management guidance tailored for the diverse needs of people and communities.
- **Require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for (legislative):** This includes explicitly requiring CDEM Groups to identify the diverse needs in their areas and engage with people and communities with diverse needs to inform Group plans.
- **Require the Director to consult with representatives of disproportionately affected communities to inform national planning (legislative):** This includes explicitly requiring that the Director consult these communities as part of the development of the National CDEM Plan and the National CDEM Strategy.

**Q2: Are there any other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

**Q3: What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Ngā Iwi o Taranaki:

- We recommend developing guidance on meeting diverse needs and require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for. By implementing both options, the system can begin to act at a local level in a timely manner, while changes are made at a legislative level where the system can be held to account and continue to enable flexibility and geographical relevance within the regions.
- While there needs to be some consultation to the Director at a national level, methods should ensure that voices are sought from across the country, reflect the consensus of diverse communities and the consequential solutions and/or resources are delivered in an equitable way.
- The diversity of communities goes beyond race, culture, sexual orientation, language, religion, health and disabilities, age. The emergency management system must also consider the diversity of the following communities:
    - **Socioeconomic disparities:** People living in poverty or low-income households often lack the resources to prepare and recover from emergencies. This includes transport, financial savings and safe housing.

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This is especially relevant in areas of Taranaki that have high depravation levels.

    - **Rural and isolated communities:** People living in rural and remote areas experience delayed emergency response times and limited access to essential services and infrastructure.
    - **Housing vulnerability:** Many people live in overcrowded, damp or poorly insulated homes that are susceptible to damage in emergency events like floods or earthquakes. Some also live in temporary housing with limited protection or have inadequate insurance for their accommodation.
- Emergency planning, whether at local or national levels, must be holistic by involving diverse communities. This helps to recognise and plan for complex needs and fill the gaps in service delivery of the current system, while also opens opportunities for these communities to contribute to the planning and overall resilience of a region. This may see improvements around communications and welfare delivery, but could also impact other areas such as, risk reduction.
- At a local and national level, planning could be led/co-led by representatives of these diverse communities so that not only are they being consulted, but they are being consulted in an appropriate way where they can engage effectively. For example, a marae may host a consultation wānanga with whānau/uri and form a collective voice on behalf on the community. It is important to note that utilising those in the community must be supported by the system to do so.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

*The Problem:*

- The willingness, expertise, and capability of iwi Māori in emergency management is not fully acknowledged and drawn on to make the emergency management system more effective for all New Zealanders.
- The Government Inquiry found that iwi Māori provided some of the most effective and efficient responses to the 2023 severe weather events. Despite this, the inclusion of iwi Māori in formal local government emergency management structures is discretionary and, in some regions, non-existent.
- Several reviews and inquiries have also identified the significant contribution of iwi Māori in emergency management to the benefit of all people in New Zealand. The Government has accepted the Government Inquiry's recommendation to recognise and enable this contribution.

*Options to address these issues:*

- **Status quo:** Iwi Māori are not currently legislatively required to be represented in local government emergency management decision-making structures (CDEM Groups and Coordinating Executive Groups). In some areas, iwi Māori have been

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appointed as advisors to CDEM Groups or co-opted as members of Coordinating Executive Groups.

- **Address the roles of iwi Māori in plans, guidance, and other policy settings (non-legislative):** This could include updating plans, guidance, and other policy settings to ensure iwi Māori are embedded into the emergency management system at an operational level.
- **Require iwi Māori representation on CDEM Group decision-making structures (legislative):** Iwi Māori representation could be required on CDEM Groups or Coordinating Executive Groups.
- **Require CDEM Groups to engage with iwi Māori during the development of CDEM Group plans (legislative):** This includes explicitly requiring that CDEM Groups engage with iwi Māori in their areas to inform CDEM Group planning before emergencies.
- **Require the Director to seek advice on Māori interests and knowledge to inform national level planning (legislative):** This includes explicitly requiring the Director to seek advice on Māori interests and knowledge when developing the National CDEM Strategy and the National CDEM Plan. For example, the Director could establish a national Māori emergency management advisory group.

**Q4: Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

**Q5: How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

**Q6: What should be the relationship between CDEM Groups and iwi Māori?**

**Q7: What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

**Q8: What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Ngā Iwi o Taranaki:

- It must be recognised that the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies range from technical and scientific advice, operational delivery, welfare coordination and delivery, community preparedness and advocacy, and governance and decision-making.
- Marae in particular often activate during or following an emergency to provide welfare and communications, yet are not formally recognised or supported by the system.
- Iwi Māori representation needs to be reflected throughout the structure and prioritised at all levels. To set a precedent, it needs to start from the top down by making the necessary legislative changes to require iwi Māori representation on CDEM decision-making structures, such as Coordinating Executive Groups and

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Joint Committees. However, there needs to be some flexibility on how regions achieve this at regional and local levels.

- Providing iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga to the Director can be achieved by capturing the information at a regional level by requiring CDEM groups to engage with iwi Māori during the development of CDEM Group plans. This will inform national level planning and can ensure that iwi Māori voices are sought and heard from across the country.

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

*The Problem:*

- One of the purposes of the CDEM Act is to encourage and enable communities to achieve acceptable levels of risk, and to provide for planning and preparation for emergencies and for response and recovery to these. However, there are situations where communities and community organisations who can and want to offer their knowledge, skills, or resources to support responses to emergencies being unable to connect with the formal emergency management system.
- For example, offers of skills, resources, or information in response and recovery are not always responded to in a timely way or used to the best effect. This is exacerbated when the process to dock into the formal emergency management system is unclear. This can mean some skills, information and resources are under-utilised or not adequately valued before, during and after an emergency.

*Options to address these issues:*

- **Status quo:** Communities' ability to connect with the "formal" emergency management system is varied.
- **Develop and update guidance and strengthen public education (non-legislative):** For example, NEMA could produce guidance or templates relating to:
    - developing formal arrangements with local organisations before an emergency
    - processes for accepting offers of resource from the public, including being clear about what the CDEM Group will or won't pay for
    - public engagement during the development of CDEM Group plans.
- **Require CDEM Group plans to state how the Group will manage offers of resources from the public (legislative):** CDEM Groups would need to define when and how they will accept offers of resource from their communities.

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Ngā Iwi o Taranaki:

- Further to the problems listed under this issue, communities do not fully understand the responsibility of CDEM, therefore do not realise how or why they need to participate. Strengthening and delivering public education would greatly help with this, as well as developing guides on how communities can participate. The public education plans and strategies and how the Group will manage offers of resources need to be reflected within the CDEM Group plan.
- There are strengths within every community, and the system could benefit from engaging with communities to understand how they would best participate. Strengthening public education is a way of doing this, however they would require information about how offers of resources can be managed, which requires legislative change.
- Marae are a prime example of the strength and resource that a community can offer, yet there is no formal entry point for marae to enter the emergency management system and no consistency on how they engage or work with it.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

*The Problem:*

- People, businesses, and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency. They may need to take immediate action to help other people themselves before the official emergency management response starts. These actions may save lives or property or stop the emergency from getting worse. People and businesses may also need to use personal property to save lives before official responders arrive (for example, using privately owned inflatable boats to rescue stranded people).
- If these actions aren't directed by a Controller or Police constable, there is no protection from civil liability for loss or damage. This may deter people from acting to save lives or prevent damage to property (where it is safe to do so) before the official response has started. This could be before a state of emergency has been declared.
- Several written submissions on the previous Emergency Management Bill suggested that people should be protected from civil liability if they cause loss or damage to other people's property when undertaking actions to protect life or property during an emergency.

*Options to address these issues:*

- **Status quo:** Protection from civil liability and compensation for loss or damage is not available for people who undertake actions in an emergency without direction from a Controller or constable.

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- **Provide for protection from civil liability for loss or damage (legislative):** People would be protected from civil liability if they caused loss or damage while undertaking reasonable and significant emergency management actions in good faith, in circumstances where they were unable to seek or be given direction by a Controller or constable.
- **Enable compensation for labour costs (legislative):** Persons undertaking actions at the direction of a Controller or Constable would be eligible for compensation for labour costs in certain circumstances. For example, if a person or business such as a civil contractor with specialist skills is directed to do something in circumstances where there is not time to contract the use of their time (labour).

Ngā Iwi o Taranaki:

- Providing protection from civil liability for loss or damage and enabling compensation for labour costs should happen to deliver timely responses with a whole-of-society approach. As well as specialists, this also needs to apply to marae and other community groups (i.e., churches, schools) that activate as civil defence centres or welfare hubs. Oftentimes, civil defence centres cannot be activated by CDEM in a timely manner, marae will follow tikanga to activate and operate the marae as a welfare centre. This frees up emergency management resources (staffing), yet resources are not necessarily provided to responding marae.

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Nelson Tasman Emergency Management Group

Policy Unit

National Emergency Management Agency

Wellington 6140

Via email to: EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

**Discussion Document: Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation - Submission from Nelson Tasman Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Group**

This submission is provided by the Nelson Tasman Emergency Management (NTEM) Office on behalf of the Nelson Tasman CDEM Group in relation to the content of the Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation discussion document April 2025.

This submission has been reviewed by senior management within Nelson City Council and Tasman District Council and submitted by the Nelson Tasman Emergency Management Office on behalf of both the Nelson Tasman Civil Defence Emergency Management Coordinating Executive Group (CEG) and the membership of the Nelson Tasman Civil Defence Emergency Management CDEM Group. Retrospective approvals will be sought during the next round of Group meetings in July 2025.

The Nelson Tasman CDEM Group welcomes and is grateful for the opportunity to provide this submission

Position statement

In general, the Nelson Tasman CDEM Group is supportive of the need for change to modernise New Zealand's emergency management system. The requirement for this change was evident with the outcomes from the review of the response and recovery to the Canterbury earthquakes of 2011, and further endorsed in the many subsequent reviews including the 2017/18 Ministerial Review: Better Responses to Natural Disasters and Other Emergencies in New Zealand, and more recently the Auckland Flood Response Review undertaken by Bush International Consulting and review findings pertaining to the 2023 responses to and recovery from Cyclones Hale and Gabrielle.

Whilst the Nelson Tasman CDEM Group is generally supportive of many of the proposals within the discussion document, it believes that a) more work is needed to deliver an integrated, fit-for-purpose emergency management framework that possesses the capacity, capability and competency to respond to the increased frequency and severity of emergency events; b) Better support regarding the integration and practical implementation of both reduction and recovery activities is required; d) Further consideration should be given to checking that definitions used within the discussion document are integrated and aligned with terminology within other legislation to avoid ambiguity or conflict in actions; and d) the scale of work required is greater than the current emergency management sector capability and capacity. As a result, increased funding, support and resourcing will be required to achieve the uplift required. Such resource is not currently budgeted for and may be challenging to fund given current fiscal pressures. Moreover, the existing potential for wider Local Government system reforms may further impact the ability of local authorities to give effect to and support the intent of the changes contained within the discussion document.

CDEM Group offices, via administering authorities annual and long-term planning processes, are routinely seeking resources from CDEM Group Joint Committees and subsequent administrating

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authorities to fund Emergency Management activities. Funding comes from rates and there is continued pressure in a cost of living crisis to manage rates increases. We consider the provisions within the discussion document are likely to require significant additional resourcing and funding to give effect to the intent and thus further draw on funding. To date, resourcing has not visibly been considered and discussed in detail in the legislative review process and thus we advocate that this takes place with some urgency. We do want to stress that there is very real situation present, that while everyone desires consistency nationally, there is a genuine ability to pay issue between those regions with larger ratepayer bases, versus the smaller Regions/Unitary Councils.

Given the Nelson Tasman CDEM Group is broadly aligned with the content of the submission from the CDEM Special Interest Group (comprising of the 16 CDEM Group Managers), this submission is structured in a manner that seeks to support and highlight a number of overarching themes for consideration.

## 1. Overarching themes

*Funding and resourcing*

1.1 To implement the necessary system changes and enable improvement will require an uplift in capacity and capability, and thus a question exists as to where the funding for this uplift will come from.

1.2 There will likely be a limit to the additional (if any) capacity and capability that local government can contribute, and while there remain significant differences in local authorities, CDEM Groups, and funding, the lack of consistency in delivering outcomes will remain. Local government and public sector entities all appear to prioritise emergency management activities differently.

1.3 As already noted, insufficient capacity and capability appear to be the single largest issue for most councils. This has been a core theme of reviews and features prominently in the review undertaken by the National Emergency Management Agency 'Review of Reviews – 2023 North Island Weather Events'. Consequently, it is prudent to ascertain how an enhancement in local delivery will be supported.

1.4 Additionally, resourcing CDEM alone may not suffice in delivering the intent of the discussion document. An uplift may be required within council resources to enable councils to meet their obligations to provide infrastructure and intelligence to support the CDEM effort. Intelligence streams, such as hydrological, form a key aspect in the delivery of sound and informed decision making and the resourcing of these structures should not be overlooked. Given the financial pressures being experienced by both central and local government, any proposals that impose costs should be subject to a robust cost and benefit business case.

*Responsibility and accountability*

1.5 As CDEM Groups cannot determine local authority and elected official's investment decisions, there is a question if CDEM Groups should be held responsible/accountable.

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*CEG representation*

NTEM supports consideration being given to strengthening the seniority of agency and partner representation and the amending of current legislative terminology accordingly. It is understood that the intent of the Executive is that, in order to adequately fulfil its purpose, it comprises of the most senior strategic representatives from across partners and agencies and thus wording to the effect of 'a senior employee, volunteer, or contractor' is detrimental to achieving this purpose. Wording akin to 'the Regional Chief Executive or equivalent' may be better placed across all Emergency Management Co-ordinating Executive attendees. Additionally, NTEM suggests the option for NEMA to have a voting member on the CDEM Group Joint Committee is worthy of consideration.

*Coordinated Incident Management System*

1.6 The lack of consistent application of the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) across agencies and partners has been identified in previous reviews as an issue. In its present form, we do not perceive the discussion document adequately addresses this issue. As such, NTEM advocates that this be addressed, and a statutory mandate be outlined.

*Controller liability /Protection for CDEM responders*

1.7 The issue of liability protections for both authorised and community persons in the circumstances of an undeclared emergency warrants further consideration. A fundamental question remains regarding the protection of authorised persons fulfilling their mandated roles within a lead agency construct in situations where the thresholds for a declaration have not been met.

1.8 We strongly advocate that this item be given consideration, with a particular focus on Controllers that are external to council undertaking their appointed duties in circumstances where CDEM is the lead agency though the need to access powers under the CDEM legislation and therefore declare doesn't exist i.e. the threshold for a declaration has not been met.

1.9 The current Act only offers legal protection for these people during a declared state of emergency. There is no protection for CDEM staff operating in good faith either before or after the formal declaration period. The lack of protection for staff and decision-makers is a significant and important issue that should be addressed.

1.10 Additionally, the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 may benefit from review and alignment to ensure that it does not penalise or disincentivise volunteers from responding, especially in the immediate aftermath of an emergency event occurring.

*Incentives for delivery*

1.11 We agree that local government and the public sector prioritise emergency management activities differently. As such, ensuring mechanisms exist to encourage the desired levels of engagement and investment across the system are required to truly deliver the intent of the discussion document.

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1.12 A consequence feedback loop within an assurance reporting pathway may be an avenue to achieve this. This, coupled with the development of standards reporting to Coordinating Executive Groups and CDEM Group Joint Committees, may serve as a constructive step forward across the sector whilst also supporting assurance reporting to the Director.

*Risk reduction and planning*

1.13 We generally favour national consistency for both natural hazard management within the resource management system, and consequence management within the emergency management system. A prescribed national framework/methodology that allows for some local and regional flexibility would be beneficial

1.14 Additionally, we note the increasing expectation for the undertaking of planning activity and associated workstreams, the increasing scrutiny that said planning is subject to following emergency events and the consequence if that planning is either a) substandard; or b) nonexistent. Given the CDEM mandate covers all hazards across all four Rs (Reductions, Readiness, Response and Recovery) this is understandable. However, it is prudent to highlight the nuances and differentiation between strategic planning and operational planning and the role of Group Plans within that spectrum.

1.15 As previously alluded to, a continuing limitation in this space is having the planning resource to undertake the work required. The growing demand on planning time presently has to be balanced against other time and costs associated with other equally important activities, some of which are contained within this consultation. Nationally developed planning templates or draft planning documents that CDEM Groups can then regionalise would assist, especially in the likes of fuel, fast moving consumer goods or cordon management.

1.16 NTEM also advocates that terminology be included in the Bill that highlights the continued responsibilities outside of formal CDEM planning (i.e. private sector planning, whānau planning) to plan and prepare for emergency events.

1.17 NTEM notes and supports the need for a framework to enable greater information sharing with local government before, during and after emergency events. As an example, lifeline and critical infrastructure providers engage with the emergency management system to varying degrees. There is often a reluctance to share information not only for response and recovery, but also for risk reduction and readiness activities. This presents a significant barrier to the ability of CDEM Groups to gain situational awareness across the four Rs, and implement subsequent planning arrangements.

*Barriers to cooperation and information sharing*

1.18 Challenges currently exist where legislative reform would significantly help councils in their recovery work.

1.19 Presently the Local Government Act (LGA) has very specific requirements for consultation on any proposed new areas of activity or expenditure. We have received clear advice from our lawyers that proposals to buy-out homeowners whose

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properties are uneconomic to repair, triggers the LGA requirements for changes to Long Term Plans.

1.20 The practical consequence of this is that it adds tens of thousands of dollars of costs and many months of delays often, from our experience, resulting in additional anguish and uncertainty for the families concerned.

1.21 The previous Government overcame this problem from Cyclone Gabrielle by passing special legislation that bypassed the LGA consultation requirements.

1.22 As such, it would be appreciated if future Emergency Management legislation include clauses to enable the Minister for Emergency Management on the request of a Council to be exempted from specific LGA requirements for recovery activities. The provision could be limited to events where a local state of emergency was declared. This would save the need for special legislation and enable Councils and communities to get on with recovery work. The benefit of the Minister exercising the power is that it would act as a check on Councils stretching the definition of recovery works.

1.23 Potentially the Resource Management Act and/or any replacement legislation may benefit from being amended in a similar way. Emergency works are ok, the problem is in the recovery phase where it delays work and adds costs.

*Health and safety*

1.24 While there is unquestionable value in community involvement in response to emergencies, there is also an accompanying risk and liability for CDEM: As soon as we 'task' a community group, we assume Health and Safety liability for them. This puts unreasonable accountability on CDEM decision makers and could have the perverse consequence of reducing community engagement with CDEM because of the increased level of risk controllers become exposed to.

*Role of CDEM Group offices in general*

1.25 In order to ensure a consistent approach across the motu, NTEM notes that narrative exists to address the functions and duties of local authorities. However, we note that it does not reference the function and roles of CDEM Group offices. This is a gap that would benefit from the inclusion and definition.

*Definitions and Scope – in general*

1.26 Furthermore, further clarity is required regarding the term 'engage'. This can be interpreted in different ways. Regardless, it is foreseen that this clause has the scope to place significant additional responsibility on CDEM Groups and will have associated resource implications.

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*Unitary Authorities*

1.27 The delivery of CDEM within a unitary authority construct appears to work well. To that end, we would not be in favour of or support legislative changes that would be to the detriment of this model to continue effectively.

*Enabling Multi-agency and partner collaboration*

1.28 Lastly, noting that legislative reform is only a part of the solution to achieving the desired end state, NTEM promotes a collaborative lens be cast across proposed future legislation. Namely, regardless of legislation the EM system needs to collaborate and work together across all hazards and across the 4Rs. As such, the manner in which the legislations is applied is key, and thus we would advocate that enabling and incentivising clauses and language are used to give effect to this.

1.29 For example, "Emergency Management - Engaging Professional Services", is a project aimed at improving coordination between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM), organisations, and professional services. There have been numerous emergency events and subsequent reviews outlining common threads akin to:

- Events are increasingly frequent and with greater severity.
- There are a limited number of civil engineers trained in Emergency Management and available to respond during an event, particularly with national events.
- There is limited collaboration across private and public collaboration for preparedness.
- There are limited established relationships between Civil Defence and private sector specialists (Infrastructure, lifelines, and logistics)

1.30 The project provides recommendations for CDEM groups, organisations, and professional services during the readiness and response phases to improve coordination, integration, and allow for prioritisation and scalability during the response. The project does not replace any existing agreements or legislative requirements, though projects such as this would benefit from the presence of enabling and incentivising language within future legislation. A consequence feedback loop within an assurance reporting pathway across emergency management partners and agencies may be an avenue to achieve this.

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20 May 2025

Policy Unit
National Emergency Management Agency
PO Box 5010, Wellington 6140
By email: EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

Tēnā koe,

## Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

Powerco is one of Aotearoa's largest gas and electricity distributors, supplying around 360,000 (electricity) and 114,000 (gas) urban and rural homes and businesses in the North Island. These energy networks provide essential services to around 1 million kiwis and will be core to Aotearoa achieving a net-zero economy in 2050. As a regulated electricity and gas distributor we are a lifeline utility as defined in Schedule 1 of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act. We are also a contributing member of the National Lifelines Council. Further information about Powerco is provided in Attachment 1.

We welcome the opportunity to be involved in the development of a reformed emergency management system. We have followed the Agency's submission template (Attachment 2) and make three overarching observations about priorities for the future regime:

| | |
|---|---|
| **Improved coordination across agencies and utilities** | • Improved coordination between local government and essential service providers is a critical enabler for community level emergency planning and response<br>• Defining roles and obligations of key parties is essential to minimise unnecessary effort and provide a clear structure for directions, responsibilities and communications<br>• Limit information requests to the relevant and meaningful, aligned to clear control structures, to minimise demands during or after an emergency. |
| **Information sharing before, during and after emergencies** | • Develop a system for mandatory sharing of information on hazards, risk and responses - between lifeline utilities and both local and national agencies (in all directions)<br>• Automated data systems and mandatory data standards will streamline information sharing for emergency management planning as well as during an emergency, and have potential for broader application in coordinating works programmes across infrastructure providers<br>• Powerco could lead an industry pilot with the Taranaki lifelines group to test coordinated sharing of information on assets and works programmes<br>• Consistent reporting standards should streamline and clarify multiple reporting expectations. |

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**A wider range of mandatory standards to lift performance**

- Build on existing frameworks and guidelines to set standards in key areas. Clearer direction on expectations, and holding parties to account for their role in deliver, is needed to lift performance
- A framework for more consistent framing of hazards across hazard type including definitions of 'hazards' to be addressed in network resilience vs scale of 'event' to be addressed as emergencies
- Consistent design solutions would benefit lifeline utilities and communities eg more consistent use of equipment or assets and sharing of resources across infrastructure providers.

We are always keen to meet, discuss and develop the ideas in our submissions. In the meantime, if you have any questions or would like to talk further on the points we have raised, please contact Irene Clarke s9(2)(a) This submission does not contain any confidential information and may be published in full.

Nāku noa, nā,



**Emma Wilson**
Head of Policy, Regulation and Markets
**POWERCO**

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# Attachment 1 – Information about Powerco and our network

## Providing an essential service


We bring electricity and gas to around 1 million kiwis across the North Island. We're one part of the energy supply chain. We own and maintain the local lines, cables and pipes that deliver energy to the people and businesses who use it. Our networks extend across the North Island, serving urban and rural homes, businesses, and major industrial and commercial sites. We are also a lifeline utility. This means that we have a duty to maintain operations 24/7, including in the case of a major event like an earthquake or a flood.

The cost of operating our business is not dependent on the amount of gas or electricity we distribute in our networks. These costs reflect the need to maintain the safe operation of the network and are mostly driven by compliance with safety regulations. This includes replacing assets when they reach their end of life. Additional costs to grow the size or the capacity of the network are often met by customers requiring the upgrade or new connection.

Under Part 4 of the Commerce Act, Powerco's revenue and expenditure are set by the Commerce Commission as part of monopoly regulation. We are also subject to significant information disclosure requirements, publicly publishing our investment plans, technical and financial performance, and prices. The regulatory regime allows us to recover the value of our asset base using a regulated cost of capital (WACC) set by the Commission, and a forecast of our expenditure. Every five years, the Commission reviews its forecasts and resets our allowable revenue. This process is designed to ensure the costs paid by customers for us to manage and operate our network is efficient given we are a monopoly and an essential service.

## Our electricity customers

Powerco is New Zealand's largest electricity utility by the area we serve. Our electricity networks are in Western Bay of Plenty, Thames, Coromandel, Eastern and Southern Waikato, Taranaki, Whanganui, Rangitikei, Manawatu and Wairarapa. We have over 29,000 km of electricity lines and cables connecting around 360,000 homes and businesses. Our place in the electricity sector is illustrated below.





Our network contains a range of urban and rural areas, although is predominantly rural. Geographic, demographic, and load characteristics vary significantly across our supply area. Our development as a utility included several mergers and acquisitions that have led to a wide range of legacy asset types and architecture across the network.

Powerco is one of 29 electricity distribution companies. Our customers represent around 13% of electricity consumption (similar in magnitude to the Tiwai aluminium smelter) and around 14% of system demand.

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Powerco's network is almost three times the size of Transpower's in terms of circuit length. The peak demand on our combined networks (2023) was 974 MW, with an energy throughput of 5,225 GWh.

## Our gas customers





Powerco is New Zealand's largest gas distribution utility. Our gas pipeline networks are in Taranaki, Hutt Valley, Porirua, Wellington, Horowhenua, Manawatu and Hawke's Bay. We have over 6,200 km of gas pipes connecting to around 114,000 homes and businesses. Our customers consume around 8.1 PJ of gas per year.

Our industrial customers are less than 1% of our customer base and consumer approx. 40% of gas on our network. Our residential customers are 97% of our customer base and consume approx. 35% of gas on our network. The remaining 25% of gas is consumed by our commercial customers.

Around 30% of our larger customers are in the food processing sector, around 20% in the manufacturing sector and around 10% in the healthcare sector.

## Our network footprint

Our network represents 46% of the gas connections and 16% of the electricity connections in New Zealand. We operate assets within six regions and across 29 district or city council areas.




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National Emergency Management Agency
Te Rākau Whakamarumaru

# Submission template: Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

## Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

### Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Powerco supports the general direction of the objectives identified, noting the following clarifications to ensure the objectives fully address the priorities for our future emergency management system:

1. Objective 1 needs to have a scope wider than participation. It is importantly about the way that community responses, values and needs are incorporated into emergency management at a community level. The objective should be to "*strengthen how emergency management responds to community and iwi Māori needs and values through participation and local planning*"
2. Objective 2 needs to provide for both clear responsibilities and accountabilities, but also for the critical coordination between those roles and responsibilities (across sectors) at a national, regional and local level. The objective should be to "*provide for clear responsibilities, accountabilities and coordination at the national, regional and local levels*".

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## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that there is a diversity of needs and a one-sized-fits-all approach will not meet the needs of some groups or communities. People with vulnerabilities (such as older New Zealanders) or with different needs during an emergency (such as cultural practices) contributes to this diversity. The discussion document does not clearly describe what is meant by different 'needs' or that communities may value resilience/readiness, investment or recovery options differently, which may be unrelated to demographic or geographic population differences or hazard differences. For example, one rural community may prefer to invest in hardening electricity lines to increase resilience, whereas another rural community may prefer not to make such as investment even if this results in reduced electricity reliability and instead make provision for off-grid community hubs for times of extreme events. Understanding these different needs and preferences will be an important part of local community planning.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

See response in question 2 above. In addition, we note that different communities may be subject to different hazards (eg earthquake vs flood risk), and there may be differences in risk reduction or readiness, not because of the type of hazard, but because the data, standardisation, and understanding of different hazards varies.

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options? (page 12-13)**

Please explain your views.

If local emergency management planning reflects local community needs and values, this may result in higher or lower investment in essential services. This section of the document is focused on the cost/benefit of more targeted community planning and should also assess the potential consequential cost/benefit for investment in essential services. Geographical equity issues are a relevant consideration if different communities prefer different standard of service for essential services.

Our preference is for a legislative expectation for local resilience and emergency planning to assess and respond to local vulnerabilities, needs and values in identifying risk reduction and response options (option 3). This will require local CDEM (or equivalent) groups to work with communities and coordinate with local infrastructure and essential service providers for a plan based on local risks, needs and preferences.

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5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

More targeted local planning would drive improved coordination across communities and infrastructure providers in identifying relevant risks and coordinating response.

Both legislative and non-legislative options for meeting local community needs will require improved data and coordination of data across agencies.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The introduction to issue 2 in the discussion document provides a description of the unique iwi Māori knowledge, skills and resources that could contribute across the 4 Rs. The problem definition on page 14 defines the problem more narrowly as the "willingness, expertise and capability" of iwi Māori not being fully drawn on to make the emergency management system more effective. We would encourage both the problem definition and the options to strengthen and enable the iwi Māori role in emergency management to take a broader scope on the opportunities, for example the potential contribution through networks, connections, facilities and community hubs.

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

See comment on question 7

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support an option which requires engagement with local iwi Māori during the development of local plans (options 2 and 4 together).

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**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support national guidance and education, and local CDEM group providing clarity/ direction on how offers from local organisations will be managed and coordinated with the formal emergency management arrangements during an event. Option 2 (non-legislative) is most relevant here but CDEM group plans should provide direction on the local approach in order that this is developed as a part of an integrated CDEM group plan. If legislative direction (option 3) is necessary to achieve this, then we encourage that option in addition to the guidance and education.

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**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We do not have any comments on this issue as described. However note that electricity and gas infrastructure recover works generally must only be carried out by qualified energy contractors due to the safety and technical aspects of the work.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We do not oppose civil liberty or compensation options in principle. However, any options progressed must address the types of response activities this is directed at, and avoid any risk of an interpretation that members of the community may undertake energy infrastructure activities.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

# Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

## Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that an overarching and clear command structure to which all participants subscribe is critical.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support option 3 with the group controller having the overall control. We see a risk with other options that it may not be clear who the 'control agency' is, or there may be multiple control agencies. It is our experience that it will almost always be more relevant for regional direction of response. It is also our experience that a 'unified control' carries risks with duplication and unnecessary communications or expectations between organisations.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The options assume that the control of the regional group controller or national CDEM director will be an either/or scenario depending on if the event is a regional or national emergency. Our experience is that the different roles are not always this clear. While this is not an additional option, we endorse a refined option which also makes clear the role of the national CDEM director in the case of a regional (or multi-regional) event, and vice versa, including clearly identifying the lead role, and the powers available to the other role. We have experienced in Cyclone Gabrielle response, and other recent events, that even where the controller is the regional group controller, the national agency or director assumes a power such as requesting reports or information. The status of this is not clear when the requestor is not the controller. We can be extremely stretched during a major event and need clarity when a request is a directive and the requestor has the power to make such a request, or if it is a 'nice to have' that does not require an immediate response.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Clarity in direction and control is important. The proposed options, or variations or them, have the potential to achieve this.

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

Proactively Released

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support improved clarity of responsibilities for regional level emergency management, as well as coordination of the responsibilities of different organisations involved in a regional emergency management group including local authorities. Powerco operates across 6 regions and 29 territorial local authority areas. We endorse a consistent approach to the roles of CDEM groups and their local authorities (option 2). We also endorse transparency in funding agreed CDEM activities to strengthen performance in delivering on agreed activities. If legislation is required to achieve this transparency (option 3) then we would support that.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

In our view, stronger direction on roles, and accountability for responsibilities is required for all local authorities and lifeline utilities at the regional level. The CDEM group-based model is sound but the contributing members need to be held to account for their role and delivery. We endorse more directive legislation to achieve this.

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Powerco operates across 6 regions and experiences different approaches to regional emergency planning and management.

Proactively Released

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support option 3 (CDEM group is responsible for organising emergency management functions) as it is the only option to provide for consistency across regions.

In our experience, emergency management is more effective where there is a permanent CDEM structure and staff or facilitators at a regional level, rather than just when an event happens. A consistent staffing provides continuity and improved communications. For example, in the storms of 1-2 May 2025 there was not a declared emergency in the Wellington region, but Powerco kept in touch with the regional CDEM group about the impact of high winds on our infrastructure. There was no direction for Powerco to act. Meanwhile a regional council staff member rang Powerco's general enquiries phone line to make contact about being on standby for an emergency declaration, even though the CDEM group is aware of the Powerco emergency liaison contact point.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Meaningful engagement of coordinating chief executives is important for regional planning, agreement on activities, and delivery of a regional group plan. We support an option that will provide stronger directive for involvement and performance of coordinating executive groups. We support both option 3 (reporting on delivery) and option 4 (clarify one appointed person, which may be one delegate, to provide consistent membership of the coordinating executives group).

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We support options to streamline the review and update processes for CDEM group plans

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support option 2 for legislation to enable targeted amendments to CDEM group plans with a more streamlined process. While targeted amendments may not follow the same process as a full review of the plan every 5 years, a 'targeted amendment' must be subject to engagement with parties affected by that amendment. For example, an amendment to add a new hazard and related responsibilities, must involve engagement with relevant lifeline utilities operating in a region.

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The current Act requires a review of regional group plan at least every 5 years. In our experience, this review cycle is not adequate to optimize lessons learnt from actual events, new processes or technologies available, or new information on risks. We would endorse an option where a targeted review is mandatory within 12 months of a major event, to ensure lessons learnt are fully reviewed at a regional level, not just within individual organisations, and incorporated into regional group plans.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

There are some sector specific regulations outside of the CDEMA which set powers and responsibilities relevant in emergencies eg the Electricity Industry Participation Code sets requirements and processes for electricity distributors managing network emergencies, including issuing operating limits and coordinating load management with retailers and aggregators.

The Emergency Management Bill is an important opportunity to ensure that agencies with sector-specific regulatory powers (such as the Electricity Authority) manage their legislative instruments in a way that is consistent with the Bill and in addition, that both the Bill and related regulation reflects the changing nature of some sectors, such as electricity, which alters relevant roles in emergency management.

In preparing the Bill, amendments to complementary regulation should be fully investigated. For example, the Bill may instigate a need for:

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- Updates to Code definitions to clearly distinguish between network emergencies and system (grid) emergencies and ensure that both are treated as legitimate triggers for emergency powers and coordination obligations.
- Clarification that distributors have the authority to proactively manage all forms of controllable load and distributed energy resources during network emergencies — not just traditional hot water load.
- Align Code provisions with the new emergency management framework so that critical infrastructure providers can take prompt and proportionate action to prevent small-scale incidents from escalating into larger service disruptions.

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The assessment of benefits, costs or risks does not acknowledge that potential standards may be addressed, or overlap, or duplicate existing standards in other related legislation. For example, resilience related to known hazards and threats are already accounted for in our regulated network planning and reliability approach.

In principle, we support standards or reporting to lift performance, and mechanisms to ensure those with responsibilities are meeting expected performance. However, this will require careful scoping and consultation so any standards are linked to what customers want, are targeted in the areas that will actually make a difference across the system, and are not forcing unnecessary spend or regulatory burden. Agreeing on what good practice is in emergency planning and management will be challenging and should be the first step before considering standards. This will help avoid an outcome where considerable effort in developing and implementing a standard does not actually improve resilience or recovery.

We support both option 3 (setting rules) and option 4 (monitoring performance), assuming a robust process to identify and develop relevant rules that add value not cost, and to clarify obligations on all parties to support monitoring.

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**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

We have identified the following areas where greater direction (regulations, rules or standards) could assist in improved performance:

- Directing a consistent approach to hazard and risk information, source, use, and mapping. This could include direction on relevant hazard scenarios (which may differ by region) and mapping dependencies or criticality
- Directing a consistent approach to event management, eg regulating use of the CIMS framework so this is used consistently across regions (currently it is not)
- Setting definitions for example for 'hazards' to be addressed in network resilience vs scale of 'event' to be addressed as emergencies
- A framework for more consistent framing of hazards across hazard type (eg applying seismic/wind loading band approach to other hazard risk such as landslip)
- Reporting standards to streamline and clarify multiple reporting expectations. This should not be a new reporting standard, but rather using existing good practice (eg the Powerco event "SitRep" template has been identified by NEMA as a good template which could be rolled out for wider use, but this has not occurred as far as we are aware) or confirming use of existing reporting models such as XRB reporting as a baseline for annual reports.
- Consistent design solutions where this may enable more consistent use of equipment or assets and sharing of resources across infrastructure providers. For example standardisation of widely used equipment between electricity distribution companies would allow sharing of resources during extreme events[1] or maintaining a centralised critical spares inventory
- Expectations of new consumer devices in resilience, for example the battery life in phones or electric vehicles, or back up capacity for a fridge.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The problem is not clearly described. We are not aware that this issue, or the stated options are a priority.

[1] Inconsistency in equipment was a barrier in some out-of-region EDBs assisting during Cyclone Gabrielle.



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**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The legislative options appear to be overreaching, as it not the actual issue, or how/when these powers of the Director/Minister may be used. We suggest to retain the status quo here, and instead encourage a focus on the options under issue 8.1 to strengthen setting of clear expectations and monitoring performance.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The problem definition identifies the unclear links between CDEM group plans and other local government planning instruments. As noted for issue 8, there are also overlaps with existing regulations, standards and planning processes for essential services such as electricity and gas services. Coordination between local government and essential service providers is critical for effective CDEM plans, and the different legislative and planning requirements is part of this problem. A further aspect of this problem is poor sharing of information on hazards, risk and responses.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support clearer guidance for CDEM groups in what it means to achieve an acceptable level of risk (option 2), and guidance on what a CDEM group plan should address (option 3). We do not support the legislative options as it will be difficult to get the right proportionality and balance between regional flexibility and national consistency.

Each region will be different in the nature, scale, location of risks, and response needed. Guidance could assist with the processes in each CDEM group to establish and share acceptable levels of risk, without defining this in one way nationally. There will be particular value in developing a model to assess consequence/ likelihood for interdependent essential services. Mapping critical dependencies and locations would be beneficial and we know some regional lifeline groups do this already.

Any guidance to assess level of risk across a region, must only be a tool for investigation purposes and not impose where or how investment occurs, as this will be a local decision and depend on local factors. For example, we know that many customers or communities already have their own planned response to enhance resilience or are working towards this with support from infrastructure providers. Mechanisms to

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understand, such as where an industrial customer has their own 48 hour back up for a power outage, or where a community centre has the right facilities to provide a community hub for services in an emergency, are factors to consider in identifying community level resilience and response options.

There is significant opportunity for improvement in sharing of information on hazards, risks and responses. Infrastructure providers are assessing hazards and risks based on their own approach to defining risks and independently obtaining hazard and risk information. An agreed source of information could provide significant efficiency, as well as the opportunity to improve management of critical interdependencies and response for essential services.

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Our response on issue 8 is also relevant here. The application of principles and frameworks should occur regionally. National guidance can assist in setting up the frameworks to be applied regionally, for example:

- Guidance on use of hazard information and scenarios, such as consistent use of the same flood hazard scenario and data for the purpose of risk assessment and asset resilience
- Availability of climate data for all essential service providers in a form that can be easily integrated into data systems, rather than each building their own data set, such as file types easy to add to GIS systems
- One accessible mapping platform containing hazard and asset information that can be used by the CDEM group, councils, essential service providers and customers. Visibility of all information in one place, and a standard data format would assist transferring and integrating between councils and essential service providers.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

As noted above, integration is wider that local government planning instruments. Coordination and integration with essential service providers and their planning instruments is also relevant. As noted above, consistent data sources and compatible data platforms are current barriers.

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We agree that consideration of cultural heritage in an emergency management context is an important part of regional CDEM group plans. This consideration could be improved through either, or both, option 2 (guidance) or option 3 (legislative requirement) in CDEM planning.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We do not have comments on this issue.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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58. **Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

59. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

60. **Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

61. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that the infrastructure that enables essential services is becoming broader, and increasingly interconnected and interdependent. There is a distinction between essential and enabling infrastructure (generally lifeline utilities), and essential services (customers such as hospitals). It would be beneficial for the problem description and the options in response to reflect this distinction and use clear terminology in defining essential services.

62. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support the option to more broadly define 'essential and enabling infrastructure'. Clarity will be required on which infrastructure, services and organisations are part of each CDEM group plan to ensure efficiency in planning and response processes, hence option 2 is preferred. Applying emergency management principles and obligations

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across a broader range of infrastructure providers would assist where there are critical interdependencies, for example between electricity distributors and IT service providers.

The benefits of including broader infrastructure and services in emergency management will only be realised if processes and expectations for coordination are clear. We have commented previously about coordination, including sharing of information and regional planning.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We support a principles-based definition, and a clear list, as per Appendix C. In particular we note the important inclusion of managed information technology services, cloud computing services, internet service providers.

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

We encourage consideration of a hierarchy of types of essential services. We are concerned that if all essential services in Appendix C are included, this will significantly increase the number of organisations involved in group plans and event management. Coordination is already complex and inadequate in most cases and CDEM groups may become too occupied with participation rather than community outcomes. We would suggest a refined option which focuses CDEM responsibilities on core lifeline utilities, but incorporates broader essential services into planning and event management processes.

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The problem description does not identify differences between regulated and non-regulated infrastructure providers (although it is mentioned in the assessment of options table). Better understanding this aspect of the issue may help with understanding the implications of the options proposed, and options to build on existing practice (and avoid duplication).

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**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support a non-legislative option (option 2) to minimise duplication. Powerco has structured business continuity plans in place already to ensure that the business is resilient and will support on-going operation of our networks in an event. Our business continuity plan relates to a number of regulatory and operational requirements including our approach to the 4Rs, how we will interact and coordinate with emergency agencies and local emergency management groups in line with CIMS methodology.

Any business continuity plan expectation should enable use of existing plans and avoid any prescription for an additional plan to be prepared. Financial penalties (option 3) or prescriptive requirements (options 4) would likely impose significant compliance costs for Powerco, which could ultimately be passed on to consumers.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

We understand that the concept of planning emergency levels of service (PELOS) in the previous Emergency Management Bill was generally not supported, and while our submission supported the general concept we did also highlight a number of issues to be resolved. We still see merit in giving this concept further consideration as part of business continuity plans or regional emergency management plans. For public essential services to highlight their planned level of service (eg how quickly they aim to get the power back on) is an important communications piece to support regional coordinated event response, and clear community expectations. We encourage further consideration of how a process to identify and share appropriate levels of service could be part of the emergency management planning landscape.

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree with the several aspects of this issue identified.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support multiple options to improve data sharing - which will drive cooperation. We have already commented on coordination, information sharing and standards in response to earlier questions. Improved cooperation will enable community emergency management, rather than individual provider or sector-based planning.

There is significant opportunity for improvement in sharing of information on hazards, risks and responses. We have commented on this for issue 9 above, including suggestions for data frameworks which could be either non-legislative data standards

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(option 2) or legislated data standards (option 6). It is an option for data standards to only apply during an emergency (option 6) but the standards for sharing information are equally relevant in emergency management planning.

During an emergency, improved methods of sharing of information on location and status of essential services, would enable all infrastructure providers to have the same information on the status of criticality, degrees of self-resilience and short or longer term resilience needs, for example wastewater facilities, hospitals and rest homes.

We strongly encourage building on existing data systems and information exchange being automated wherever possible.

We support option 3 to explicitly require CDEM Groups to involve all lifeline utilities in the development of CDEM Group plans. Powerco operates across 6 regions, but we would not see this as a compliance burden, rather a process to improve coordination and ultimately reduce administrative burden in emergency management. In our experience, there needs to be more regulatory onus for all relevant organisations (local government and lifeline utilities) in a region to be part of CDEM group planning and also to be held to account for their role in delivery of the plan.

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

We appreciate that coordination may be needed at multiple levels and caution to carefully define expectations to minimise duplication and unnecessary effort. It will be necessary to clarify the expectations and build on existing systems rather than create new ones. For example clarity in the types and form of information anticipated to be shared during emergencies will enable lifeline utilities (and other control agencies) to align systems and processes to streamline this. Based on experience, we strongly encourage information requests to be relevant and meaningful as resources can be very stretched during or after an emergency. Information sharing is important not just one-way between lifeline utilities and national agencies, but also in the other direction and between lifeline utilities.

We endorse clarity on structures, regional controls and standards (issues 5, 6 and 8) which will inform clarity on direction between local and national levels. Coordination mechanisms must be explicitly embedded in the legislated structures, responsibilities and standards.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

We support option 6 to enable data standards to be prescribed, noting the actual form of such standards would need careful scoping on feasibility. One form of data sharing with considerable potential benefit is a form of "common operating picture" through GIS situational viewers. This solution would provide one picture of lifeline data during an emergency (eg power outages and road closures) but would also be invaluable in coordinating and getting efficient sequencing in resilience work programmes and post-event recovery works. A number of lifeline groups have been trying to establish a shared viewer but there are technical and organisational barriers. For example, we have been looking into technical issues with sharing Powerco's outage map into a common viewer.

We propose a pilot information (mapping) sharing project in one region. If NEMA were to support a pilot in one region, this option could support a significant step up in



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coordination and information sharing. Powerco has been investigating options in the Taranaki region and we would be more than willing to lead a pilot project with the CDEM group and NEMA in Taranaki. An industry led pilot would be invaluable in identifying opportunities as well as areas where either non-legislative or legislative responses would assist.

### Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support options to improve business continuity planning by central government facilities that have critical interactions with essential services, such as hospitals reliance on energy supply.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**77. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Insert response

**78. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support an approach to streamline identification of lifeline utility workers for prompt access during an emergency. Prescribing individual CDEM identification passes is not efficient and may do the opposite of streamlining when we consider the number of Powerco staff and contractors who may require access during an event.

We support option 4 to explicitly provide powers of access to a class of people or an organisation. For example, powers for all electricity and gas distributors and their contractors. This would enable lifeline utilities and contractors to be identified through their company rather than some type of specific emergency identification pass. During Cyclone Gabrielle, electricity distribution contractors from around New Zealand travelled to the emergency regions to assist. Should individual access identification passes be issued locally, there is risk this may prevent such broader workforce options.

**79. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**80. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Clarifying legislated functions vs powers at a local level would be appropriate. We would also support looking at national vs local powers to ensure emergency powers at a local CDEM group level extend far enough. See our response to question 89.

**81. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We support improved clarity in the functions and powers of CDEM group, controllers and recovery managers, as well as ensuring local powers extend far enough (see question 89).

**82. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**83. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We do not have a view on this issue or proposed options.

**84. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**86. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We agree that there is currently not enough clarity in the roles for declaring an emergency.

**87. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Currently a local emergency can be declared for a district or ward. In our experience, there would be benefit in options for declaring an emergency at a level more localised than a ward. For example Powerco recently needed to close off a small section of the gas network in Wellington to make safe, and this was handled as an emergency situation. However, as it was very localised it was not declared as an emergency, and the

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powers during and after the event were therefore not clear. The option for a mayor to declare a very local, sub-ward, emergency should be incorporated into the legislation.

### Other problems relating to this objective

**89. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Clarifying legislated functions vs powers at a local level (issue 14) would be appropriate. We would also support looking at national vs local powers to ensure emergency powers at a CDEM group level extend far enough. For example, during Cyclone Gabrielle, it became apparent that neither national or local powers extended to enabling EDBs to deliver a key response measure - sharing of workforce into the worst affected areas was hampered as there was no ability to secure seats on limited regional flights, even though there was a state of emergency. Such powers of intervention would be expected but are not currently available.

## Other comments

**90. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

More could be done to improve resilience and emergency management at a community level. We support reforms that will facilitate resilience outcomes and response mechanisms in a targeted, proportional, and streamlined way. We support reform of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act as one part of a broader suite of regulatory and non-regulatory measures for improved outcomes across the 4 Rs .

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# Submission to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) on the Discussion Document: Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation

By email to EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

**Date:** 20 May 2025 (revised deadline)

**Submitter information**

**Name:** s9(2)(a)

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**Organisation:** Access Matters Aotearoa. See www.accessmatters.org.nz for more information on who we are.

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Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website. You do not need to answer all questions.

Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

## Introduction

The Access Matters Aotearoa submission has been greatly enriched by the thoughtful collaboration and shared insights of Parents of Vision Impaired New Zealanders, Go Eco, Manaaki Matakāoa, the Disabled Persons Assembly NZ, and others. We are especially grateful for the opportunity to align on key themes, identify areas for mutual support, and adopt common language to amplify our collective impact. This spirit of partnership reflects the strength and unity of our shared commitment to accessibility and inclusion. In December 2024 we hosted the Kōrero for Change webinar on Emergency Preparedness. Direct quotes from participants are included in this submission.

Links to transcript and recording.

1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?

☐ Yes

☒ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

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Q1: No. non-Māori disabled people and tāngata whaikaha Māori – disabled Māori, must be explicitly recognised in the objectives of the proposed emergency management legislation. The evidence outlined below demonstrates the disproportionate impact of disasters on disabled people and the systemic exclusion they experience in emergency planning and response.

1. Demographic Context

Disabled people constitute approximately 17% of the population in Aotearoa New Zealand, and 26% of Māori identify as disabled. This means tāngata whaikaha Māori are significantly overrepresented in disability statistics. 900,000 New Zealanders—one in six—identify as disabled. This is not a fringe concern. As our population ages, the number of people with impairments will only grow. By 2028, over a million New Zealanders will be aged 65 and over; by 2050, that number will climb to 1.5 million. We must act now to future-proof our systems, so they can support everyone, regardless of age or ability, when disaster strikes.

2. Greater risk due to systemic inequity during Disasters

International and national research has consistently shown that disabled people are disproportionately affected by emergencies and disasters. These crises amplified existing inequalities, with disabled individuals often disproportionately left behind. Lessons from past emergencies in New Zealand show that accessible communication, inclusive planning, and targeted support are not optional extras- they are lifesaving necessities. For example, after the Christchurch quakes, “74% of disabled respondents (in one survey) agreed that emergency information did not take account into account the needs of disabled people”. Contributing factors include lack of accessible infrastructure, exclusion from planning processes, and inaccessible emergency communication systems.

3. Impact on tāngata whaikaha Māori

Disabled Māori face compounded risks due to the intersection of colonisation, systemic exclusion, and social inequities. These risks are further magnified in emergency contexts where disabled Māori are not actively involved in co-design or planning efforts.

International research (Alexander & Sagramola, 2014; Popovski, 2023), alongside experiences in Aotearoa New Zealand (e.g., Christchurch earthquakes, COVID-19 pandemic, Cyclone Gabrielle, Auckland floods, and East Coast floods) confirm that disasters disproportionately impact disabled individuals and their families. Highlighting the importance of disability-inclusive policies in all phases of disaster management

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directs that the voices of our most vulnerable people are included in emergency planning.

Persons with disabilities are among those most impacted by natural hazards and climate induced disasters, yet more likely to be excluded from disaster risk reduction (DRR) related decision-making and practice (Twigg, Kiett & Lovell, 2018).

Inclusive efforts require making disaster responsiveness a shared agenda. This means increased multi-stakeholder collaborations and partnerships among governments, I/NGOs, UN agencies, OPDs, and civil society actors, as well as encouraging resource and capacity sharing (Gvetadze & Pertiwi, 2021).

Lessons Learned from Past Emergencies: Recent national emergencies have underscored systemic gaps in how our emergency management system serves disabled people. In this section we reflect on three major events – the Christchurch earthquakes, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Cyclone Gabrielle – and the key challenges disabled people faced in each. These lessons illustrate why disability inclusion must be a cornerstone of any strengthened emergency management legislation.

Christchurch Earthquakes (2010–2011): The devastating Canterbury earthquakes revealed many accessibility failings in disaster response. Disabled people reported widespread barriers in receiving emergency information and services. In one study of quake-affected disabled individuals, only 2 out of 34 surveyed said they experienced no barriers to accessing emergency information, meaning the vast majority struggled to get crucial updates.

Communication formats were often inappropriate – Deaf people were given information via telephone calls, while blind or low-vision people received written notices they couldn't read.

"Agencies ignored requests for accessible forms of communication." (Kōrero for Change participant)

Additionally, evacuation centres and emergency shelters largely failed to accommodate disabled people's needs (e.g. lack of ramps, sign language interpreters, or quiet spaces for those with sensory sensitivities). Many disabled residents had difficulty evacuating safely or accessing relief services due to mobility challenges, inaccessible transport, or loss of assistive equipment. Personal support networks were disrupted – some people lost contact with their support workers or caregivers in the chaos. As a result, disabled people experienced greater isolation, anxiety, and hardship. It became clear that

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“information provided did not cater for their needs and ... communication and transport [were] major issues.” (Kōrero for Change participant)

The Christchurch experience taught us that standard emergency approaches often overlook disabled people, with life-threatening consequences. It highlighted the need for alternate communication methods (e.g. radio, SMS, social media, door-to-door checks) and pre-planned disability supports in any emergency response.

COVID-19 Pandemic (2020–2022): The global pandemic was an entirely different kind of emergency, yet it too exposed inequities for disabled New Zealanders. On the positive side, New Zealand’s early elimination strategy and public health response “undoubtedly saved countless lives” among high-risk populations including disabled people.

The commitment to televised daily briefings with NZSL interpreters and captions set an inclusive communications precedent. However, COVID-19 also “exacerbated existing inequities for disabled people and tāngata whaikaha Māori”, as noted by the Disability Rights Commissioner. (Kōrero for Change participant)

Pandemic measures often failed to account for disabled people’s unique circumstances. For example, lockdowns and social distancing disrupted home care services, personal support, and routine healthcare for many disabled individuals. Some could not access grocery delivery or essential supplies due to lack of disability-friendly processes. Early on, information was not always provided in accessible formats like Easy Read or audio, causing confusion – especially for those with intellectual or sensory disabilities. There were instances where disabled people felt decisions about vaccine access or medical care did not adequately involve or prioritize them.

An inquiry into the pandemic response found that many support recommendations “were not acted on or…extensively delayed,” causing distress and putting disabled people at risk.

In short, disabled people and their whānau often felt invisible in the pandemic planning, until advocates spoke up. The lesson from COVID-19 is that authorities must proactively include disabled perspectives in emergency planning – during a crisis is too late. Clear protocols for maintaining disability support services (e.g. allowing caregivers as essential workers, providing assistive technology or medication deliveries) and for accessible public communication must be established before the next public health emergency. We also learned the value of data: the lack of disaggregated data on disabled people’s outcomes hindered timely adjustments. Going forward, collecting

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disability-specific data during emergencies is critical to ensure no group “falls through the cracks.” (Kōrero for Change participant)

Cyclone Gabrielle (2023): This severe cyclone and flooding disaster in Te Ika-a-Māui (the North Island) has been called an “inequality amplifier” for the way it impacted vulnerable communities. Disabled and elderly people were often deprioritised or forgotten in evacuations and relief efforts.

In hard-hit regions like Tairāwhiti (East Coast), responders later recounted harrowing examples: “Some [elderly disabled residents] couldn’t move out… they just stayed in their room until somebody turned up”, and one “lady who was stuck in her wheelchair… by the time people found her, the water was at her neck”. (Kōrero for Change participant)

These stories highlight fatal risks when emergency services fail to identify and evacuate disabled people in time. Many disabled residents also lost power, communications, and access to medication or dialysis when roads washed out. Being isolated from healthcare and support networks for days greatly heightened anxiety and health dangers.

In summary, these events taught New Zealand hard lessons about the cost of excluding disabled people from emergency preparedness. Time and again, we saw that “one-size-fits-all” approaches fail those with different needs.

Conversely, when disabled people and Māori disabled people are included – for instance, when information is delivered in NZSL, or community networks organize to check on vulnerable neighbours – outcomes improve dramatically. Strengthening emergency management legislation is our chance to apply these lessons, so that future emergencies do not repeat the same mistakes. Disabled New Zealanders deserve to have equal chance to survive and recover from disasters, and that requires systemic changes addressed in the next section.

Recommendation:

That the objectives of the proposed emergency management legislation include explicit recognition of disabled people, particularly tāngata whaikaha Māori, to ensure inclusive, equitable, and effective disaster preparedness and response.

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Citations:

Alexander, D., & Sagramola, S. (2014). Including People with Disabilities in Disaster Preparedness and Response. www.coe.int/europarisks

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Human Rights Commission. (2020). Disabled people's rights in Aotearoa New Zealand: Submission to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Retrieved from https://www.hrc.co.nz

King, D., Gledhill, K., & Petherick, L. (2014). Disaster risk reduction: What do people with disabilities think? GNS Science Report 2014/52. Retrieved from https://www.gns.cri.nz

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Twigg, J. Kett, M. Lovell, E. (2018). Disability inclusion and disaster risk reduction: Overcoming barriers to progress.

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## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation.

Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities.

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency. Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.

2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?

☐ Yes

☒ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

Q2: No. We agree that the current system does not adequately protect the rights, safety, and inclusion of disabled people in emergencies, and strongly support the overall direction of the proposed reforms. However, it is unclear if this specifically includes tāngata whaikaha and their whānau. Disabled Māori have specific needs in disaster responses.

The NZ Civil Defence failed to adequately support disabled people and their families in both Christchurch earthquakes because they weren't included in Civil Defence plans. The mitigation and support plans for managing the Auckland floods did not include persons with physical disabilities, people with mobility challenges, or those with long term health conditions.

There is a need to specifically mention and work with both Māori disabled in culturally appropriate ways, and with non-Māori disabled. Different disabilities have different requirements for access and support. The documentation does not specifically mention disability or disability communities.

New Zealand cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of the past. The Christchurch earthquakes, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Cyclone Gabrielle have each laid bare a dangerous truth: when disabled people are overlooked in emergency planning, the consequences can be devastating—and too often, life-threatening.

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Accessibility, inclusive communication, targeted supports, and genuine partnership with disabled people and their organisations are not optional. They are foundational to a fair, effective, and resilient emergency response system.

In comparison, while Australia has implemented national frameworks for disaster resilience that explicitly recognise and address the needs of disabled people, New Zealand has a unique opportunity to lead globally. By embedding mandatory accessibility and disability inclusion standards into our emergency management legislation, we can build a system that protects all lives—equally.

The question is not whether we can afford to do this. It's whether we can afford not to.

This submission sets out practical recommendations for embedding disabled people's voices, ensuring minimum accessibility standards, safeguarding critical services, and upholding human rights through emergency powers.

(Consultation Questions 1–6)

1.Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?

Q1: Yes. Disabled people often face barriers such as inaccessible communication, lack of transport, disconnection from support services, and assumptions of dependency that delay their inclusion in planning and response. The discussion document identifies disproportionately affected groups but does not address the root causes of vulnerability, such as systemic ableism, poverty, colonisation, and rural isolation.

2.What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?

Q2: It would be co-designed with disabled people, involve DPOs, and include tailored communication, accessible shelter and transport, and a registry for those with high support needs. Plans must fully integrate the needs of people experiencing disability, poverty, rural isolation, and colonisation. Planning must shift the burden of engagement from communities to emergency management agencies by resourcing outreach, accessible formats, physical accessibility, and building trusted relationships.

3.Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?

Q3: Yes. Engagement mechanisms must be resourced, and emergency planning should specifically include tāngata whaikaha Māori as a distinct group. Disabled people



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and disabled people's organisations must be included as full partners alongside Māori and other community stakeholders. Existing community support networks that are trusted and experienced should be leveraged and resourced. Emergency management should acknowledge that many disproportionately affected communities, including marae and rural communities, are structurally exposed to risk and excluded from planning.

Emergency preparedness advice must be realistic about the resources available to low-income and disabled households. Information and evacuation procedures must be accessible to all people, including D/deaf, blind, low vision, and people with learning disabilities.

From a class and Indigenous perspective, emergency management often mirrors broader societal inequities. Planning must acknowledge both vulnerability and resilience, recognising how communities have adapted where systems failed.

Planning must explicitly include disabled people in culturally appropriate ways (for both Māori and non-Māori disabled people) and recognise that different disabilities require tailored responses.

"Disabled people are often missing from planning tables, even though they are the ones most at risk when disaster hits." (Kōrero for Change participant)

Recommendations:

- Mandatory engagement with DPOs in planning.
- Establish Disability Advisory Groups within each CDEM Group.
- Recognise tāngata whaikaha Māori needs through partnerships with iwi.
- Implement legislative Option 4 to require national-level consultation with disabled representatives.
- Prioritise high-risk, low-income and Indigenous communities in adaptation funding.
- Prohibit construction of infrastructure in flood-prone or geologically unstable areas.
- Link this legislation with the National Adaptation Framework and Resource Management reforms.
- Apply a climate justice lens and equity-based universal design to emergency legislation.

4.Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be is proportionately affected by emergencies?



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Q4: “We need to ensure that our emergency preparedness plans are inclusive and accessible to all, especially disabled individuals who are often disproportionately affected during crises.” — Dr. Michelle Villeneuve, Centre for Disability Research and Policy, University of Sydney (Kōrero for Change participant)

Accessibility features may be limited. For example:

- Evacuation: Emergency shelters, transportation, and evacuation procedures are traditionally not accessible. This includes mobility, sensory, and cognitive disabilities. People with physical disabilities or mobility issues typically rely on specialist equipment, carers, family members, specialist vehicles or vehicles with adaptations to mobilise. None of these supports may be available in a disaster.

- Communications: Emergency alerts and updates are often in inaccessible formats. This consultation document is a classic example of an inaccessible format – tables are not generally very accessible, neither are they necessary in a template (you will note that I have taken out the tables as they were quite difficult to navigate).

Support systems are often disrupted. For example:

- Loss of caregivers or services: Emergencies can interrupt access to essential support, such as personal care attendants, therapists, or routine medical care. How would a family know if the emergency centre has a refrigerator for medicine storage? What if the care workers live in a different city/suburb, will they still be able to manage providing care? If not, who will provide personal cares?

- Informal networks: Many disabled persons rely on friends or family for help. These networks may not be formally recognised but often meet access and support needs. These family may also be affected or unable to assist during a crisis.

- Separation from assistive devices: In the chaos of evacuation, people may be separated from wheelchairs, hearing aids, medications, communication devices, and other equipment. Some of this equipment is necessary to sustain life and comes with specialist adaptors for charging. How will these factors be accounted for and mitigated?

Socioeconomic factors compound and exacerbate challenges:

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- Higher poverty rates: Disabled individuals and their families are more likely to experience economic poverty. This limits their resilience to disaster, and results in a reduced ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters.

- Housing vulnerability: Many disabled individuals and their families live in less safe or more disaster-prone housing. Affordable housing is currently being built on flood plains in Auckland – it is likely that disabled people will live here.

Health-related vulnerabilities impact in the following ways:

- Chronic health conditions: It is not uncommon for disabled people to have additional an/or multiple medical needs. These needs can worsen without consistent access to healthcare or medication during an emergency. "Without my ventilator and my caregiver, I don't just lose my independence—I lose my life." (Kōrero for Change participant)

- Increased stress and trauma risk: Emergencies can have a more severe psychological impact, especially when autonomy or dignity is compromised.

Discrimination and stigma towards disabled people make things more difficult:

- Systemic bias: Emergency responses tend to prioritise the general population, with disabled people seen as “less urgent.” The immediate response to the Christchurch earthquake completely ignored the needs of people who were blind or had low vision. This was largely in part due to this population group not being included in disaster management planning, so no one in the Civil Defence team knew where they lived or how to contact them. "Recovery is not just about rebuilding roads and houses — it’s about rebuilding lives inclusively." (Kōrero for Change participant)

- Inadequate training: Emergency personnel often have limited and/or inadequate training in how to assist individuals with disabilities respectfully and effectively. There is a general lack of investment in this area for Civil Defence. Staff turnover impacts on this also, with staff leaving resulting in a knowledge gap for remaining staff.

Exclusion from planning: Disabled individuals are often excluded from planning and decision-making processes. This has flow in impacts. For example, not including disabled persons in the design and planning of social housing has impacted on resilience for older people.

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"Disabled people are often missing from planning tables, even though they are the ones most at risk when disaster hits." (Kōrero for Change participant)

“It's crucial that we involve disabled people in the planning and decision-making processes for emergency preparedness to ensure their needs are adequately met.”

— Mojo Mathers, Chief Executive, Disabled Persons Assembly (DPA) (Kōrero for Change participant)

4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?

Framing preparation activities for disaster as a cost is rather problematic. We view it as an investment into communities to mitigate risks for both infrastructure and people.

"We (disabled people) need to know who is responsible for us when everything else falls apart." (Kōrero for Change participant)

5. What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?

Emergency planning would be fully informed by the needs and insights of disabled people through co-designed strategies that prioritise accessibility and inclusion. Communication during emergencies would be provided in accessible formats, including New Zealand Sign Language (NZSL), Easy Read, and other formats tailored to a range of access needs. Emergency shelters would be designed to accommodate mobility, sensory, and other disability-related requirements. "Accessibility isn’t an extra - it’s fundamental to survival." (Kōrero for Change participant)

Disabled people can contribute their significant knowledge (for example advising on accessible evacuation routes or communication needs, the plans will be more effective and equitable.

All emergency personnel would receive comprehensive disability awareness training, and accessible transport options would be available for safe and efficient evacuations. Plans would include provisions to ensure continuity of care, timely access to assistive devices, and the inclusion of carers as essential to support.

Local response efforts would be informed by accurate data on disabled populations, enabling targeted and effective action. All initiatives would be grounded in Te Tiriti o Waitangi and aligned with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with



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Disabilities (UNCRPD), ensuring responses are equitable, culturally responsive, and uphold the rights and dignity of all disabled people during emergencies.

6. Are there any other options that should be considered?

Some disabilities and long-term health conditions require highly specialised equipment that emergency planners and response centres may not be aware of. It is unrealistic to expect that even well-trained personnel will automatically know where to go or who to contact in every situation. For example, individuals with spinal cord injuries rely on two national centres for acute care, located in Auckland and Christchurch. Access to the correct catheters, batteries, pain relief, mattresses, and cushions can be lifesaving and must be secured as quickly as possible.

Peer support organisations affiliated with these acute centres played a crucial role during recent floods, working alongside hospitals to support affected individuals. Ideally, these organisations should be directly connected to regional emergency centres to ensure people with spinal injuries who are evacuated can be promptly identified and assisted.

Two key priorities are: ensuring the resilience of communication infrastructure and minimising the number of steps required to get the correct equipment to the right location from the appropriate distribution centre. Ongoing collaboration with disabled people, individuals with long-term health conditions, and their representative organisations is essential to maintaining emergency preparedness—especially given that medical and disability equipment and supply needs often change at least every two years.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand. Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.

7. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?

☒ Yes

☐ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

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(Consultation Questions 7–11)

Q7-Q11: Tāngata whaikaha Māori and whānau are disproportionately disadvantaged by disasters. As such it is important that tāngata whaikaha are specifically identified from the outset in all emergency planning. The same for disabled persons in general.

8.Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?

☒ Yes

☐ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

Māori communities play a significant role in disaster preparedness and are often involved in planning and recovery in ways that central and/or local governments are not.

The initial options do not adequately address the basic needs of disabled people. Disabled communities routinely face unacceptable barriers during emergencies. These barriers include inaccessible communications, evacuation plans that overlook mobility and sensory needs, and critical delays in receiving assistance. These are systemic failures that place disabled lives at risk. There is a need for the explicit and enforceable inclusion of disabled people across all stages of disaster planning. Without this, resilience efforts will continue to exclude those most at risk.

Preferred option: Introduce mandates that necessitate disability-specific planning across all emergency systems. This must include direct consultation and genuine co-design with disabled people, tāngata whaikaha Māori, and disability service providers. Anything less will continue to marginalise and endanger a significant portion of our population.

Local iwi and marae are critical partners – noting that many whānau include disabled members, and tāngata whaikaha Māori with distinct cultural needs that should be respected in emergency responses. Inclusive participation is not just fair – it improves outcomes, as community networks can reach those government services might overlook. Iwi Māori should be recognised as equal partners in emergency management, grounded in Te Tiriti o Waitangi, just as disabled people and their families should be included in recognition of Braille, NZSL and East Read to meet communities disproportionately impacted by disasters. Their role must reflect not just engagement but actual decision-making power at all levels — local, regional, and national.

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CDEM Groups should formalise their partnerships with iwi Māori through Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) to ensure that iwi Māori perspectives are incorporated into all emergency phases: preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. "We need to know who is responsible for us when everything else falls apart."

Roles and Responsibilities

Knowledge and Partnership Emergency management must go beyond recognition and actively embed mātauranga Māori and tikanga as foundational knowledge systems in climate resilience and disaster planning. A genuine Crown–Māori partnership in this space requires shared power and shared resources. The current discussion document still frames Māori participation in passive terms like "seeking advice" and "engaging with" rather than committing to true partnership under Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

The climate crisis is not coming. It is here. And it is not a weather problem, but a justice problem. Communities, hapū, and nature-based organisations are ready to lead. But we cannot do it with ad hoc grants, top-down systems, and legislation that still centres control over care.

Resourcing and Relationships

None of the proposed options include tangible commitments to resourcing iwi Māori participation, despite acknowledging current capacity constraints. Our research shows that the strength of iwi Māori emergency response often stems from deep community relationships and pre-existing networks. These must be recognised and supported before emergencies occur. The role of groups like Hono (the Māori Emergency Management Network) and other kaupapa Māori initiatives should be acknowledged and uplifted.

Language and Representation

The terminology used in the discussion document — such as “iwi Māori” — does not fully reflect the localised realities of Māori emergency leadership, including hapū and marae-led responses. Furthermore, phrases like “addressing roles” or “engaging with” fall short of the expectations of tino rangatiratanga and Te Tiriti obligations. Advice provided by Māori partners should be required to be meaningfully integrated into emergency planning and response.

8.Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency?

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Q:8 Yes. There must be clarity on who is responsible for ensuring accessibility and support for disabled people across different phases of response.

9.Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?

Q9: Yes. Disability inclusion responsibilities must be written into law and not left to interpretation or goodwill. "We need to know who is responsible for us when everything else falls apart." (Kōrero for Change participant)

Recommendations:

- Assign specific responsibilities for disability inclusion.
- Name Whaikaha – Ministry of Disabled People as a key emergency management agency.
- Integrate Disability Liaison Officers into Emergency Operations Centres.
- Include evaluation of disability support in post-event reviews.
- Introduce minimum standards of emergency management.

(Consultation Questions 12–16)

Q12-16: Burden of Responsibility: The current options in the discussion document place the burden on communities to connect with formal structures rather than requiring the formal systems to support and enable community leadership. Ensuring that disabled people and disabled people's organisations/service providers and networks are empowered and enabled as full partners in emergency situations, working alongside other community stakeholders.

Proactivity vs Reactivity: Rather than addressing the causes of these communication failures, the discussion document focuses on reactively "managing offers" from communities.

Address Disempowerment, Commit to Resourcing: The discussion document fails to acknowledge how previous policy changes have undermined community response capabilities. For example, previously, volunteer Community Resilience Groups received basic support from Civil Defence that assisted in their operation—this has since diminished. The discussion document expects communities to perform similar functions without addressing this previous disempowerment.

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The options provided contain no commitment to resources for community resilience, despite the government response explicitly committing to “direct a greater share of emergency management investment in community resilience initiatives.”

Recommendations:

- Mandate CDEM Groups to co-design plans with tangata whenua and disability advocates.
- Fund targeted community engagement led by those communities most impacted.
- Ensure that evacuation, information systems, and recovery services meet universal accessibility standards.
- CDEM plans must include precise, resourced mechanisms for recognising and integrating: Volunteer networks; Local food and water security systems; Ecological restoration networks; Citizen science and hapū led local monitoring hubs.
- Make information available in accessible formats for all communities, i.e., D/deaf, learning disability, blind and low vision, etc.

Accessibility is still treated as discretionary. Accessible communications, inclusive evacuation planning, shelter accessibility, and continuity of support services for disabled people.

Recommendation:

- Embed mandatory national accessibility standards into the law.

Comparative Note:

Australia has strong frameworks but relies largely on voluntary adoption. New Zealand can lead internationally by embedding enforceable minimum standards for accessibility into law. "Accessibility isn’t an extra - it’s fundamental to survival." (Kōrero for Change participant)

Recommendations:

- Make it a legal requirement that CDEM Group plans address disabled people's support needs.
- Establish national standards for accessible communications, inclusive evacuations, and accessible shelters.
- Mandate disability inclusion training for emergency personnel.

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12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?

Q12: Coordinating Executive Groups are best to have designated Māori representatives with equal authority and clear responsibilities. These representatives are best selected by iwi, not appointed by agencies.

13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?

Q13: Iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management should be formally embedded into CDEM planning through advisory panels, mandated reports, and funded positions within NEMA and other bodies. Regular hui should feed into national planning processes.

14. Are there any other options that should be considered?

Q14: A dedicated team within emergency management focused on vulnerable populations (disabled, Māori, ethnic minorities, rural communities) should be established and funded. The new law to explicitly require engagement with disabled people and tāngata whaikaha Māori and Iwi Māori in emergency planning. This will ensure that the unique risks faced by disabled people are identified and planned for at both local and national levels.

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management.

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response. Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.

15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?

☒ Yes

☐ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

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Q15: It is heartening to read such a comprehensive response, and it is well time for a co-ordinated approach to emergency management. Central and/or local government typically do not have the capacity or capability to respond to all emergencies, and even less when disasters occur on weekends or holidays. Disabled people and their families are disproportionately impacted on both during and after a disaster. Organisations, businesses and iwi are relied on by disabled people to mitigate their limited resilience.

16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?

Q16: It is important to identify vulnerable populations, and to ensure their voices are included and heard. This will improve their resilience in a disaster.

17. Are there any other options that should be considered?

Recommendations:

- Establish regional disability liaison officers embedded within CDEM Groups.
- Establish key disability advocates from Council and Community Disability Advisory Groups and Organisations who are connected to existing specialist disability networks. For example, Blind Low Vision NZ, Deaf Aotearoa, People First NZ, etc.

Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency.

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency. Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.

18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?

19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?

20. Are there any other options that should be considered?

Q18-Q20: Disasters often occur suddenly and in locations where formal emergency services may be delayed in arriving. In such situations, community organisations frequently serve as the first and only immediate support—especially for isolated individuals or those with high and complex needs. Disability Information Centres are well-positioned to assist, given their established networks and local knowledge.

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If disabled people, their families, whānau, and support networks are not actively included and empowered through emergency preparedness programmes, they will continue to experience disproportionate harm and disruption during emergencies. To address this, a regional register of disability support organisations—including Disability Information and Advisory Services (DIAS) and spinal support organisations—should be established and integrated into Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) systems.

Additionally, formal mechanisms should be created to enable rapid funding for non-governmental organisations already providing critical support to disabled communities during emergencies, ensuring continuity of care and timely response.

Other problems relating to this objective.

21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?

As noted earlier, disability-specific planning is absent in most local emergency strategies. This is an international challenge. Changing this requires making disability inclusion a core performance indicator.

Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels.

Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who oversees the operational response to an emergency. Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.

22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?

☒ Yes

☐ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?

24. Are there any other options that should be considered?

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25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?

Q22 – Q25: yes, the problem is described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities.

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management.

Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities.

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for. Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.

26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?

☒ Yes

☐ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?

28. Are there any other options that should be considered?

29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?

Q26 – Q29: Yes, the problem is described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management.

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We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability. Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.

30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?

☒ Yes

☐ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?

32. Are there any other options that should be considered?

Q30 – Q32: Yes, the problem is described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups. Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.

33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?

☒ Yes

☐ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?

35. Are there any other options that should be considered?

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Q33 – Q35: Yes, the problem is described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date.

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities. Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.

36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?

☒ Yes

☐ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?

38. Are there any other options that should be considered?

Other problems relating to this objective.

39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?

Q36 – Q39: Yes, the problem is described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management.

## Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance.

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We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system. Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.

40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?

☒ Yes

☐ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?

42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?

43. Are there any other options that should be considered?

Q40-Q43: Yes, the problem is described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

National minimum standards must include disability-inclusive emergency planning, and minimum standards for accessibility. For example, Aotearoa New Zealand can learn from Australian Minimum Accessibility Standards in Emergencies, specifically drawing from their Disability-Inclusive Disaster Risk Reduction (DIDRR) framework and national guidance:

While Australia has national frameworks for disaster resilience that recognize disabled people's needs, New Zealand now has an opportunity to lead internationally by embedding mandatory minimum standards for accessibility and disability inclusion directly into emergency management law.

New Zealand should adopt Australia's proven emergency management disability-accessibility standards as enforceable minimum standards in the new legislation. This includes accessibility standards for shelters, as well as accessibility standards for

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communication (e.g., NZSL interpreters, easy-read alerts). Integration of Australian Accessibility Standards in Emergencies

We strongly recommend the adoption of mandatory Disability-Inclusive Emergency Planning Standards, like those implemented in Australia. These standards should be embedded in both national and regional emergency management frameworks to ensure consistent, enforceable, and inclusive practices across Aotearoa New Zealand.

Recommended Reference Standards from Australia: Australia has taken meaningful steps to embed disability inclusion in emergency management through:

- The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (2011), which recognises the need for inclusive planning.
- Disability-Inclusive Disaster Risk Reduction (DIDRR) Framework and Toolkit, developed by the University of Sydney's Centre for Disability Research and Policy and Queenslanders with Disability Network (QDN).

Australian Standards for Accessible Public Transport, Emergency Shelters, and Communications, which specify requirements for:

- Shelter access (e.g., ramps, sensory-friendly spaces, accessible toilets).
- Emergency communications (e.g., AUSLAN interpreters, Easy Read formats, screen reader-friendly alerts).
- Continuity of disability support services.
- Participation of disabled people in co-design and evaluation.

Why this matters for New Zealand?

- Consistency: Clear standards ensure that all regions respond equitably and appropriately.
- Accountability: Minimum requirements remove ambiguity in planning and resource allocation.
- Preparedness: Standards support emergency services to pre-plan for disability-related infrastructure and resource needs.

Recommendations:

- Align with Australia's "Person-Centred Emergency Preparedness (P-CEP)" planning tools, which enable tailored planning for individuals with specific support needs.

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- Adopt standards from the Emergency Management Australia Manual and the Inclusive Community Engagement Framework, which outline inclusive sheltering, evacuation, and communication protocols.
- Fund development of Aotearoa-specific guidance aligned to these standards and train Civil Defence personnel accordingly.
- Embedding these standards into New Zealand's legislation would represent international best practice and fulfill our obligations under the UNCRPD, particularly Article 11 on situations of risk and humanitarian emergencies.

Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues.

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently. Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.

44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?

45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?

46. Are there any other options that should be considered?

Q44-Q46: Yes, the problem is described correctly, but disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

National minimum standards must include disability-inclusive emergency planning, and minimum standards for accessibility. This includes accessibility standards for shelters, as well as accessibility standards for communication (e.g., NZSL interpreters, easy-read alerts).

Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management.

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups, and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively. Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.

47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?

☒ Yes

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☐ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?

49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?

50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?

51. Are there any other options that should be considered?

52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?

☒ Yes

☐ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

Q47 – Q52: As noted earlier in this consultation document, there is an urgent need for more consistent and disability-inclusive risk management. Planning for local hazard risk management must be accessible in the first instance, and secondly, it must consider the specific vulnerabilities of disabled persons, and the adaptive strategies needed.

Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies.

Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies.

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately. Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.

53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?

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☒ Yes

☐ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?

55. Are there any other options that should be considered?

Q53 – Q55: Yes, we agree with how you have described the problem, and we strongly support the recognition of taonga Māori and other cultural heritage.

Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies.

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately. Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.

56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?

☒ Yes

☐ No

☐ Not sure / no preference

57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?

58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?

59. Are there any other options that should be considered?

Other problems relating to this objective.

60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?

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Q56 – Q60: Yes, we agree with how you have described the problem. For disabled people, assistance animals are critical for survival and well- being. In emergencies, support animals such as guide dogs must be accommodated alongside their disabled owners in shelters.

We also recommend that there is mandatory inclusion of disability support animals in emergency planning, and that it is made very clear that emergency shelters must allow service animals without question.

Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

Q61 - Q76: As mentioned across this consultation document, essential services and infrastructure must include services that disabled people and their families rely on, such as specialist medical suppliers, wheelchair repair services, pharmacies, and personal care support.

Infrastructure and essential service providers must plan for the needs of their local disabled population, not just the general public. This will require working with disabled people and local/national disability groups.

Disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens.

Q78 – Q90: as mentioned across this consultation document, disability needs to be embedded explicitly not folded into generalities. Unless disability is explicitly named and addressed, emergency responses will continue to fail disabled persons and their families.

Clear, prompt decision-making is vital. However, disabled individuals and their families must have equitable access to information about cordons, emergency powers, and changes during emergencies. This must be provided in the necessary accessible formats.

We strongly recommend that emergency communication protocols meet universal design standards, and that there is representation of vulnerable populations in local Emergency Operations Centres (EOCs) during disasters and subsequent responses.

Other comments

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There is a need for specific, proactive inclusion of disabled people and their families. Without this intentionality, disabled persons and their families will continue to face unnecessary hardship and risk during emergencies.

We advise that the following will go a long way to addressing the issues outlined in our consultation response:

1. Safeguard essential services and disability rights during emergencies.
2. Embed disability leadership across all CDEM Groups.
3. Implement Option 4 to ensure national-level consultation with disabled people informs emergency management policy and planning. (make it a KPI)
4. Mandate accessibility as a key feature (make it a KPI).
5. Mandate disability inclusion as a core requirement in national and regional plans (make it a KPI).
6. Set enforceable minimum accessibility standards. (make it a KPI)

Adequately fund a range of national and local level disability organisations as key partners in resilience building and emergency response management.

We support bold, inclusive reform that places disabled people's rights at the heart of emergency management. When we plan for the most vulnerable, we strengthen resilience for everyone. We thank you for considering our submission and are ready to assist further.

Kia kaha, kia haumaru tātou — stay strong, and let us all be safe.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Jonathan Stockley |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | I am a member of Hastings District Emergency Hub Leaders Group so my answers are from an informed position rather than reflecting the opinions of our group. Hastings District Council has helped to establish over 40 emergency hubs in our area. |

☐ The Privacy Act 2020 applies to submissions. Please tick the box if you **do not** want your name or other personal information to be included in any information about submissions that NEMA may publish.

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### Does your submission contain confidential information?

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I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because…

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Largely, yes, however the issue of funding for all of these potential changes does not appear to have been considered in sufficient detail. Adequate and appropriate funding at all levels, especially at a community level, is vital for any proposed changes to have any meaningful effect. Funding may come from central or local government and local communities themselves and must address the significant need for capital and operational expenditure in both long- and short-term. Please see my comments at the end of this submission

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

The description of this problem appears to be largely accurate

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. Option 2 offers flexibility which, in reality, is likely to encourage a disregard for the diverse needs of the community for expedience. Option 3 would be my favoured option as it makes identifiable people accountable and is most likely to ensure that the needs of groups disproportionately affected by an emergency are met. This is an essential role of a civilised and supportive society

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I have no alternative options

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

During ex-tropical cyclone Gabrielle and its aftermath, Māori and their maraes played an impressive, invaluable and beneficial role for their communities and others. In many ways, Māori demonstrated the very best of preparedness, community support and community service. As far as I am aware, this was not appreciated or understood at a CDEM level in our region and therefore was not able to play as active and effective role for our whole community. As a community leader myself I have learned many lessons from my Māori friends and colleagues as to how we might prepare and perform better

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in the next emergency. I also feel strongly that CDEM Groups have a lot to learn and gain from a closer relationship with Māori.

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The description of this problem appears to be largely accurate.

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Options – as a pakeha person I feel unable to comment in more detail about the remaining options other than to say that Māori must play a major part in deciding which option/options are best to adopt.

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Please see my answer in 9 above.

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Please see my answer in 9 above.

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Please see my answer in 9 above.

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Please see my answer in 9 above.

14. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I have no alternative options.

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## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The description of this problem appears to be largely accurate and reflects the reality of the situation as it was before ex-tropical cyclone Gabrielle affected our region (Hawke's Bay) and probably is in many other parts of the country.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 whilst providing flexibility, allows, and may enable, CDEM Groups to ignore or pay lip-service to the badly needed changes; and local authorities to avoid adequately funding the required changes. Option 3 is most likely to generate the desired change and would force the appropriate authorities to provide the necessary funding and is my preferred option.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

An option not considered is to require representation from community level (e.g. rural villages) to have a role in the governance organisations associated with CDEM Group management.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This is an important but difficult issue to legislate for. In an emergency it is unlikely that community members responding to emergency needs in their community could or would seek approval from a 'controller' before acting to save life or property. Communications are likely to be swamped or unavailable; controllers would be

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overwhelmed and, if required, timely approval and action would probably not occur. ACC offers an example of how claims can be avoided if harm is done to a person – is there any way an equivalent, emergency-related organisation could be set up to cover this in the CDEM and community response area?

19. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

    Please explain your views.

    Option 1 is not acceptable. Option 2 does not go far enough. Option 3 offers the best solutions but still requires approval from a controller which is likely to be difficult or impossible to get in a community-level emergency response. Option 3 is my preferred option.

20. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

    Please explain your views.

    I have no additional options to suggest.

## Other problems relating to this objective

21. **Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

    Please explain your views.

    Insert response

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Responsibility and especially accountability are essential if an emergency response is going to be effective and efficient and the description of the problem appears to be largely accurate.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. I reluctantly believe that Option 3 is likely to be the most effective option. I am reluctant because I have seen first-hand here in Hawke's Bay how ineffective and unprepared a local controller has been in a major emergency. For this option to be effective, governance standards need to be far higher than they are currently. Without expert advice or information, I feel unable to comment on Options 2 and 4.

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I have no additional options to suggest.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Strengthening of the regional tier of emergency management is essential if our national system is going to be effective.

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. Option 2 would be my preferred option as flexibility of operation appears helpful. Option 3 appears too prescriptive.

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I have no additional options to suggest.

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Adequate funding for emergency management at local government level is essential and must, to some extent, come from central government and reflect what is expected by the legislation ultimately adopted.

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The description is broadly correct.

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**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 appears to offer the best opportunity for change and to retain flexibility. Strengthening the expectations of the appropriate councils and Coordinating Executive Groups to get clear arrangements in place might help.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I have no additional options to suggest.

### Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. Option 2 is my preferred option. See my comment in 31 above.

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I have no additional options to suggest.

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. Option 3 is my preferred option.

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I have no additional options to suggest.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

At national and regional levels both responsibilities and accountability must be clearly defined and described. At a local, community level expectations should be used rather than responsibilities and expectations because the reality at this level is that any response will be carried out by volunteers, many of whom will be untrained and simply doing their very best for each other.

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups is essential.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. Option 2 is my preferred option because it retains flexibility but encourages accountability. This option may incur additional costs, but the huge changes required will inevitably involve additional costs which should be shared between local and national government. (See my general comments later).

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I have no additional options to suggest.

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Insert response

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. Option 4 is my preferred option provided adequate funding for the system is provided at all levels.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I have no additional options to suggest.

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Emergency plans must be relevant, understandable, affordable, practical and kept up to date at all times.

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. Options 2 and 3 should be combined to achieve maximum effectiveness.

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Whatever the high initial costs may be, they will almost certainly be lower than the outcome of another disaster striking without any changes being in place.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Poor local oversight by the management committee. Departments and organisations working in 'silos'. Poor communication between organisations.

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**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I do not have any additional options.

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This issue is of fundamental importance to an effective and inclusive response to any emergency. It is likely to encourage a more effective and satisfactory recovery to the event.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. Not being enforceable, Option 2 would be likely to be disregarded or only paid lip-service to. Option 3 appears to offer the most effective ways of overcoming the problems identified.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I do not have any additional options.

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Regarding animals, Option 1 is not acceptable. Option 2 is my preferred option as it provides flexibility and, with good governance, is likely to be effective.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Animals must receive significant priority because we are a civilised society. Many people will risk their own lives for their animals – pets or farm livestock.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I do not have any additional options.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This issue is another fundamental requirement in new legislation.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. Option 3 is my preferred option as it provides flexibility and does not have significant costs associated with it.

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I do not have any additional options.

#### Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. Option 3 is my preferred option.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I do not have any additional options.

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. Option 3 is my preferred option.

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

As described in the discussion document, the establishment of good working relationships between all relevant organisations is at the heart of this issue.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I do not have any additional options.

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## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. Option 3 is my preferred option.

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I do not have any additional options.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. Option 3 appears to offer the best solutions provided the level of training for those managing cordons is enhanced so as to allow more sensible on-site decision making.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I do not have any additional options.

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is not acceptable. Option 2 is my preferred option.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 appears to offer the best solution provided this is accompanied by the expert knowledge and/or experience of others being available before or during an event. The preparation by and briefing of, the mayor will be critically important.

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

I do not have any additional options.

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Updating of this legislation is essential.

- In his foreword the Minister includes "I want to ensure there is effective leadership, clear accountability, and stronger relationships between the "formal" emergency management system and the communities it serves. All parts of our society have a role to play. Communities bring different strengths, local knowledge, resources and networks. We need to identify how best to draw on these strengths and understand how to support those who are most at risk in an emergency." He is absolutely correct on the importance of 'community' in each and every response to an emergency event. Community-led approaches will be the most effective ones and ones most likely to be followed by those affected.
- Many of the changes suggested are good and many have cost effects. For significant change to occur, these changes must be supported by adequate funding from local and central government, and this means the rate-payer or tax-payer. For this to be acceptable, the Civil Defence system must show itself to be effective and accommodating and not a rigid set of rules.

Funding – following recent natural disasters, central government and others have provided significant grant funding to many community and other bodies and organisations. This has been of huge value, but it only supports capital expenditure and not operational expenditure. Most examples of capital funding will, for the organisation supported, create additional operational expenditure such as generator maintenance; solar panel cleaning; solar battery replacement; higher insurance costs; monitoring of expiry dates for first aid supplies, food, etc. Central and local government must bear this in mind when considering grant funding to support community and other resilience projects. Rural communities are frequently the worst affected by an emergency but are also the most resilient and resourceful. Proper funding of resilience and preparedness at a very local level is essential as many communities, especially rural ones, do not have the population needed to provide the full financial support needed at a community level. By providing proper, balanced funding from both local and central government communities will be able to provide the "strengths, local knowledge, resources and networks" that the Minister has identified as being of fundamental importance.

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National Emergency Management Agency
Te Rākau Whakamarumaru

# Submission template: Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) is seeking feedback on options to strengthen New Zealand's emergency management legislation.

The deadline for submissions is **5pm, 13 May 2025**.

You can find the full discussion document and more information about the legislative reform process on NEMA's website. Your feedback will inform decisions about the proposals. We appreciate your time and effort to respond to this consultation.

Emergency Management Bill consultation

## How to make a submission

To make a submission, you will need to:

1. Fill out your name, email address and organisation on the next page. If you are submitting on behalf of an organisation, please ensure you have the authority to represent its views.
2. Fill out your responses to the questions in this document. You can choose to answer some or all of the questions. Where possible, please provide evidence to support your views. For example, references to independent research, facts and figures, or your experiences.
3. If your submission has any confidential information:
    a. Please state this in the email accompanying your submission, setting out clearly which parts you consider should be withheld, and the grounds under the Official Information Act 1982 (Official Information Act) that you believe apply. NEMA will take this into account and will consult with submitters when responding to requests under the Official Information Act.
    b. Indicate this in your submission. Any confidential information should be clearly marked within the text of your submission (preferably as Microsoft Word comments).
    c. Note that submissions are subject to the Official Information Act and may, therefore, need to be released in full or in part. The Privacy Act 2020 also applies.
4. Once you have completed this form, you can send it by:
    a. email (as a Microsoft Word document) to EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

    **OR**

    b. post to:

    Policy Unit
    National Emergency Management Agency
    PO Box 5010, Wellington 6140

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Jo Adams |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | n/a |

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I do not want my submission published on NEMA's website because...

### Does your submission contain confidential information?

☐ I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential and have stated my reasons and the grounds under section 9 of the Official Information Act that I believe apply, for consideration by NEMA.

I would like my submission (or parts of my submission) to be kept confidential because...

### Use of information

Submissions will be used to inform NEMA's policy development process and will inform advice to Ministers. Your submission (including identifying information) may also be shared with other government agencies working on policies related to emergency management. NEMA may contact submitters directly if we need clarification on their submission or would like further information from them.

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

There is no specific mention of rural communities.

Proactively Released

3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Rural and isolated communities are not adequately represented in planning.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Option 3

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

   ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

   ☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

   Please explain your views.

   Insert response

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

   Please explain your views.

   Option 2

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**10. How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Within the command and control structure.

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Through the iwi / maori liaison role

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Some of the paid staff do not understand the requirements within the community. This cannot be taught in a classroom.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

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**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

There needs to be consistency and effective collaboration between the local authorities and CDEM Groups. There is too much room for interpretation/error currently. This must be tightened up.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 4 to ensure correct knowledge is in control, in line with responding agency

**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

#### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

Insert response

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2

**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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### Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 4 – animal welfare is critical to communities

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

??

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2

**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☒ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

#### Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 4

**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 4

**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2, give the right powers to the right people

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Insert response

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Disabled Persons Assembly NZ

May 2025

**To National Emergency Management Agency**

Please find attached our submission on Discussion Document: Strengthening New Zealand's Emergency Management Legislation

For any further inquiries, please contact:
Chris Ford
Policy Advisor – Southern and Central
s9(2)(a)

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# Introducing Disabled Persons Assembly NZ

**We work on systemic change for the equity of disabled people**

Disabled Persons Assembly NZ (DPA) is a not-for-profit pan-impairment Disabled People's Organisation run by and for disabled people.

**We recognise:**

- Māori as Tangata Whenua and Te Tiriti o Waitangi as the founding document of Aotearoa New Zealand;
- disabled people as experts on their own lives;
- the Social Model of Disability as the guiding principle for interpreting disability and impairment;
- the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as the basis for disabled people's relationship with the State;
- the New Zealand Disability Strategy as Government agencies' guide on disability issues; and
- the Enabling Good Lives Principles, Whāia Te Ao Mārama: Māori Disability Action Plan, and Faiva Ora: National Pasifika Disability Disability Plan as avenues to disabled people gaining greater choice and control over their lives and supports.

**We drive systemic change through:**

**Rangatiratanga / Leadership**: reflecting the collective voice of disabled people, locally, nationally and internationally.

**Pārongo me te tohutohu / Information and advice**: informing and advising on policies impacting on the lives of disabled people.

**Kōkiri / Advocacy**: supporting disabled people to have a voice, including a collective voice, in society.

**Aroturuki / Monitoring**: monitoring and giving feedback on existing laws, policies and practices about and relevant to disabled people.

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## United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities

DPA was influential in creating the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD),[1] a foundational document for disabled people which New Zealand has signed and ratified, confirming that disabled people must have the same human rights as everyone else. All state bodies in New Zealand, including local and regional government, have a responsibility to uphold the principles and articles of this convention.

The following UNCRPD articles are particularly relevant to this submission:

- **Article 9 – Accessibility**
- **Article 11 – Situations of risk and humanitarian emergencies**

# The Submission

## Introduction

Disabled Persons Assembly (DPA) welcomes this opportunity to feedback on the Government's proposals to strengthen New Zealand's emergency legislation as this is an area of high priority for disabled people and our disability community.

## Demographics

Statistics New Zealand's Household Disability Survey 2023 found that 17% of New Zealanders (n=851,000) or 1 in 6 people were disabled. Tāngata whaikaha Māori disabled people experienced a high disability rate of 26% followed by Pacific people (16%) and Asian people (9%).[2]

The survey also found that disabled people reported higher levels of unmet need in terms of accessing supports for education, health and accessibility. When it comes to natural disasters, this is relevant as gaps within support systems play a key role in

[1] https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-persons-disabilities

[2] https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/disability-statistics-2023/

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the multiple levels of disadvantage faced by disabled people in our society, which is amplified in times of emergency.

## DPA and disabled people's experiences of emergency management

Emergency preparedness for disabled people has been an area of high priority for DPA for many years. Following the North Island weather events of 2023 DPA members identified a need within our community for greater access to information around emergency preparedness for disabled people.

At a regional level DPA has been working with local civil defence teams in both Christchurch and Dunedin to run emergency preparedness forums tailored for disabled people. These forums have also provided insights to civil defence into the barriers that disabled people face both during and before an emergency. Subject to funding we would like to roll out our forums to other regions.

In this submission, we will cast a disability lens over the discussion paper's proposals around the need to reform our emergency management laws.

DPA agrees with the consensus that emerged from several government inquiries into the civil defence response to the North Island weather events of 2023[3] that the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2002 needs to be overhauled. We also agree with the Government's Covid-19 inquiry findings that the Act needs to be updated to deal with health emergencies.[4]

International and national research has consistently shown that disabled people are disproportionately affected by emergencies and disasters. This growing body of research has shown that disabled people are at higher risk in emergencies due to

[3] https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/Government-Inquiry-into-Severe-Weather-Events/$file/Report-of-the-Government-Inquiry-into-the-Response-to-the-North-Island-Severe-Weather-Events.pdf

[4] https://www.covid19lessons.royalcommission.nz/reports-lessons-learned/main-report/

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our needs not being prioritised or planned for. These factors have arisen due to disabled people's voices not being heard around planning for emergencies.

DPA supports Access Matters' submission which contains a wide range of references to some of the key research on disabled people and emergencies.

DPA's own work in this space has focused on three areas:

1.) Making submissions to central and local government on including disabled people in all facets of emergency planning, management and response.
2.) Building the capacity of disabled people to prepare for emergency situations alongside their families whānau and support networks through running our 'Be Emergency Prepared!' Workshops in partnership with local civil defence teams .
3.) Work is also underway to ensure that DPA is supporting our members and disabled people to access the right information in emergencies. Recently two of our staff have been appointed onto local civil defence welfare committees.

The response of regional councils to our submissions around the need for disabled people to be involved in CDEM planning has varied with some councils taking great interest while others have shown minimal interest.

Where councils have shown an interest in ensuring that our voices are heard on CDEM, we have engaged in collaborative projects, such as running our 'Be Emergency Prepared' workshops alongside regional emergency management team representatives, as has been the case in Christchurch and Dunedin.

When it has come to practical support, DPA was very active during the Covid-19, Auckland Anniversary Weekend and Cyclone Gabrielle emergencies.

During the first two years of Covid-19 pandemic the Ministry of Health requested that DPA take on the role of issuing face coverings exemptions to disabled people and people with health conditions who couldn't wear face coverings.

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This process meant that DPA got to hear what disabled people's experiences were through both this process and working alongside the then Office for Disability Issues (now part of Whaikaha Ministry of Disabled People) to run online surveys of disabled people about their experiences during Covid-19.

The feedback we received from disabled people during these emergencies was eventually relayed back to key government agencies including the Ministries of Health, Social Development and Disabled People leading to more effective responses after some delay.

Research conducted by Laking, et al (2024) on the health and wellbeing impacts of adverse weather conditions carried a story from Cyclone Gabrielle which really highlights for us and should do with all emergency planners about the very real greater risks that disabled people face in emergencies.

This story concerned Tairāwhiti (Gisborne) based responders who encountered "Some [elderly disabled residents] who couldn't move out… they just stayed in their room until somebody turned up", and one "lady who was stuck in her wheelchair… by the time people found her, the water was at her neck".[5]

Recently, we also shared in another emergency management plan submission how some disabled people were evacuated using a tow truck, which was not a safe option.

These factors lead us to our first and core recommendation:

**Recommendation 1:** That any emergency management legislation must include specific recognition of disabled people, particularly tāngata whaikaha Māori, as an at risk demographic to ensure inclusive, equitable, and effective disaster preparedness and response.

[5] Laking G, Caddie M, Thorpe H, et al. 2024. Te Weu me Te Wai – Research into health and wellbeing impacts of adverse weather conditions. Te Weu Tairāwhiti: Te Tairāwhiti

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Specifically referencing population groups at high risk of having unmet needs in emergencies, including disabled people, is imperative if the needs of all New Zealanders are to be met in disaster situations.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

**1. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

Yes, the discussion paper largely described the issues facing disabled people. These include that disabled people don't have the capacity to share their needs and concerns across the four Rs (Reduction, Readiness, Response, Recovery.)

The paper also correctly pointed out that some people and groups have different needs that cannot be met using a 'one size fits all approach' to emergencies, including disabled people, Pacific peoples, ethnic communities and rural communities.

In our view, the paper is right in identifying that our emergency management system needs to better meet the diverse needs of New Zealand communities and that certain communities and individuals, including disabled people, are at greater risk in disaster situations.

However, from a disability perspective, there is one significant group excluded from this conversation – tāngata whaikaha Māori and their whānau given that disabled Māori have specific needs in disasters.

Civil Defence authorities failed to adequately support tāngata whaikaha and their whānau during the Christchurch earthquakes because they were not specifically included in official plans.

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DPA recommends that the Crown fully recognise the needs of Māori under Te Tiriti O Waitangi in the new legislation as partnerships are needed between tangata tiriti and tangata whenua when it comes to emergency management and planning, and this must include tāngata whaikaha Māori and their whānau.

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| **Recommendation 2:** That the Crown fully recognise the needs of Māori, including tāngata whaikaha Māori, under Te Tiriti o Waitangi in the new emergency management legislation. |

**Q2) Are there other measures that maybe cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

There are multiple reasons why disabled people are disproportionately affected in civil emergencies.

Accessibility in emergency situations is often hampered for everyone in affected communities. However, disabled people face greater barriers when navigating disasters and recovering from them.

DPA and Access Matters have identified the eight most common barriers:

1. **Evacuation:** Emergency shelters, transport, and evacuation procedures are often inaccessible. This impacts on the needs of people living with mobility and sensory impairments who often find that when they reach centres that there are no level entrances or ramps to access them through. People with mobility impairments rely on specialist equipment, for example, wheelchairs, walking frames and adapted vehicles to mobilise. Also disabled people and people with health conditions may need to carry medical equipment with them, meaning the need for evacuation centres to have plenty of power connections available. Some shelters don't allow animals meaning that some officials may not be aware of the laws allowing disability service animals into public buildings.

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2. **Communications:** We alluded earlier to the communications barriers encountered by disabled people during Covid 19. One of the principal barriers concerned emergency alerts and updates being distributed in inaccessible formats. As the official inquiry into the North Island storm events noted, some weather and emergency response messaging during them was not communicated in plain language, creating barriers for both disabled and non-disabled people alike in understanding what was going on.

   Similarly, receiving information in Easy Read formats, especially during Covid-19, was a real issue for people with learning disabilities and some neurodiverse people who rely on this style of communication where information is conveyed through plain words and pictures.

   Blind and low vision people accessing emergency websites during the weather events also found it difficult to navigate information presented in table formats which are not easy to navigate when using audio description and/or screen readers.

   Alternative communications methods need to be deployed more too as traditional standard emergency approaches often overlook disabled people, sometimes with life threatening consequences. An example of this is that in the aftermath of the Christchurch earthquakes, it was found that alternative communication methods, for example, radio, SMS, social media and door-to-door checks were more effective in getting information to disabled people and that pre-planned disability supports worked best.

   We acknowledge that New Zealand Sign Language (NZSL) interpreters were extensively used during media briefings to communicate messages to NZSL users during these crises.

3. **Disability support systems interrupted:** Disabled people rely on a wide range of supports which can be interrupted during an emergency. These include access to personal care, therapy or health care. Consequently, issues

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can arise in terms of, for example, do evacuation centres have refrigerators to store vital medicines? What if people need to live further away from their care workers? If carers can't readily come to a disabled client, will this mean that the family whanau of a disabled person will have to provide their personal cares?

4. **Natural supports interrupted:** Disabled people who rely on informal, natural supports from families whānau and friends may not be able to access these so readily in a crisis. Civil defence advises that in the event of disaster, it will be neighbours that people need to turn to first in their community before families whānau when disaster strikes. However, families whānau and friends will more likely understand the needs of disabled people. Ensuring that the new emergency legislation prioritises the restoration of vital infrastructure, including roads, faster will enable people to access these supports again more quickly following disasters.

5. **Separation from assistive devices:** Disabled and D/deaf people who rely on supportive equipment including wheelchairs, hearing aids, medications, communication devices, breathing apparatus and electronic beds may well be separated from these in the throes of an evacuation. Some of the equipment listed is necessary to sustain life and often rely on specialist adaptors for charging.

6. **High disability poverty rates:** Disabled people experience greater poverty and socioeconomic deprivation compared to non-disabled people. Statistics New Zealand's Disability Survey found that over half of disabled people (53%) lived in households where there was not enough or only just enough income to meet basic needs.[6] This means that many disabled people do not have the income required to purchase the additional food, clothing and medicine recommended for emergency kits or to survive in their own homes following a

[6] https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/disability-statistics-2023/

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disaster. From our perspective, this places disabled people at greater risk of going hungry or not taking their full medications during an emergency

7. **Additional needs of people with health conditions:** Disabled people and even people who identify as non-disabled can experience multiple health conditions which can worsen without ready access to healthcare or medication during an emergency. People living with psychosocial disability/mental distress also face an increased risk of stress and trauma while living through emergencies due to being unable to access the mental health services and supports they usually rely on.

8. **Housing:** Many disabled people and their families whānau are more likely to live in less safe, accessible and more disaster-prone housing. The 2023 storms highlighted the double whammy of the ongoing housing crisis and the lack of accessible dwellings as when emergencies strike, there are few alternative options for disabled people to turn to, especially if their homes are rendered uninhabitable. Following Gabrielle, there were stories about disabled people not being able to return home due to repair delays including one example we heard about where the family of a disabled person was still living in emergency accommodation 12 months after they were forced to leave their home during the Auckland floods.

All the abovementioned barriers encountered by disabled people in civil emergencies boil down to systemic bias and inadequate training.

Systemic bias in emergencies stems from when responders tend to prioritise the general, i.e., non-disabled, population over disabled people who have been traditionally viewed as a lower priority for assistance. As we elaborated above, this cannot be further from the truth.

An example of this is that post-Christchurch earthquakes, authorities largely ignored the needs of blind and low vision people, due to this population group not being

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included in disaster planning, meaning that local Civil Defence teams didn't know where they lived or failed to contact them.

This systemic bias carries over into the inadequate training of emergency personnel at both national and local level. Civil Defence has failed to invest in staff and volunteer training in disability responsiveness over the years. High staff turnover within civil defence has contributed to this issue, meaning that when staff who have disability knowledge leave there is a knowledge gap for any remaining or new staff.

**Q3) Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Framing disaster preparation activities as a cost rather than an investment is highly inappropriate.

The need to preserve life, services and communities in the wake of disasters is crucial. For this reason, we believe that investing money, time and resources into mitigating the impacts of disasters is key to successful response and recovery.

**Q4) What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Emergency planning needs to be informed by the perspectives of disabled people through co-design partnerships built around accessibility and inclusion.

When it comes to accessibility and inclusion, disabled people and disabled people's organisations can contribute knowledge to planning processes around, for example, the use of accessible communications in emergencies, suitable evacuation points/shelters, evacuation procedures, welfare responses and supporting disability responsiveness training for emergency personnel.

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**Recommendation 3:** That the new emergency powers legislation specifically reference the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), particularly Article 11 on the rights of disabled people in emergency situations.

## Q5) Are there any other options that should be considered?

DPA recommends that priority be accorded in the legislation to maintaining health and disability services in emergencies.

Sitting under this would be a legislative requirement to ensure that the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and local CDEM, in partnership with disabled people, disabled people's organisations, disability service providers and health agencies plan, manage and coordinate the supply of disability support and specialist equipment before, during and after emergencies.

**Recommendation 4:** That priority is given in the new emergency powers legislation to maintaining health and disability services in emergencies.

**DPA's preferences for Issue 1:**

**Recommendation 5:** We favour both Option C (requiring CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities who are disproportionately affected will be planned for) and Option D (requiring the CDEM National Director to consult with representatives of disproportionately affected communities to inform national planning).

DPA prefers these two options as they would give legislative teeth to the need for involving disproportionately affected communities, including disabled people, as active partners in all facets of disaster planning and management.

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The requirements mean that disabled people and disabled people's organisations should be directly represented on all planning and advisory groups within both NEMA and local CDEM Groups.

**Recommendation 6:** That disabled people and disabled people's organisations representatives should be appointed to all NEMA and CDEM advisory groups – alongside representatives of other at-risk groups – under the new legislation.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling Māori participation in emergency management

**Q6) Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

Yes, as we pointed out earlier, tāngata whaikaha Māori and whānau are disproportionately impacted by disasters.

**Q7) Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

Yes, we agree that Māori bring capacity in terms of their tikanga and matauranga when it comes to emergency preparedness. This should be recognised through the building between NEMA and Iwi Māori of relationships grounded in Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

**Q8) Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Tāngata whaikaha Māori representatives must have a full seat at the table when it comes to emergency management and planning.

This must include giving iwi and tāngata whaikaha networks the ability to appoint disabled Māori representatives to both NEMA and CDEM planning groups.

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Ensuring direct representation for tāngata whaikaha Māori would mean that consultation and co-design would be enabled involving NEMA, CDEM, tāngata whaikaha Māori and disability service providers.

This would give voice to the needs of 26% of the disabled population who identify as tāngata whaikaha.

**Q9) How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Local iwi and marae are crucial links for tāngata whenua in their communities, including tāngata whaikaha Māori.

This is why Iwi Māori should be recognised as equal partners in emergency management, sharing this power at the local, regional and national levels.

**Q10) What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

DPA recommends that CDEM Groups should formalise partnerships with iwi Māori through Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) to ensure that iwi Māori perspectives are fully interwoven into all emergency planning phases: preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation.

**Q11) What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Coordinating Executive Groups should have designated Māori representatives with equal power, authority and responsibilities. All iwi representatives should be appointed by iwi, not the Crown.

**Q12) What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

As noted earlier, Iwi Māori matauranga in emergency management should be fully embedded within all NEMA/CDEM planning processes through, for example, advisory panels, reports and the creation of Māori advisory positions within NEMA and local CDEM around the country.

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**Q13) Should we consider other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation**

All emergency management groups at the national and local levels should employ team members whose focus would be on liaising with at risk populations (disabled people, Māori, ethnic communities, rural communities, older people). These positions should be fully funded through NEMA.

Some local authorities, for example, Auckland Council already work successfully with at risk communities to plan and manage emergency events.

This brings us to our next recommendation:

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| **Recommendation 7:** That the new legislation require engagement with disabled people and tāngata whaikaha Māori and Iwi Māori in emergency planning. |

**DPA's preferences for Issue 2**

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| **Recommendation 8:** We favour Option C (Require iwi Māori representation on CDEM group decision making structures); Option D (Require CDEM Groups to engage with iwi Māori during the development of CDEM Group plans; and Option E (Require the Director to seek advice on Māori interests and knowledge to inform national level planning. |

Incorporating these options into the new legislation would create the conditions for building Treaty-based partnerships between Māori and the Crown across all aspects of emergency management.

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional and local levels

**Q14) Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way in which direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

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**Q15) Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level?**

**Q16) Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional and local levels?**

Our response to questions 14-16 is as follows:

DPA supports the need for a more streamlined national direction for CDEM operations through the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), balanced with continued operational freedom for councils and responder organisations (i.e., Fire and Emergency New Zealand) to manage local emergencies.

DPA agrees with the discussion paper's assessment that there has been increasing conflict between NEMA and local CDEMs during emergencies. At the ground level, we understand that this has resulted in a lack of communication, duplication and delayed responses, especially for disabled people and other at-risk communities.

Conversely, local CDEM are best placed to plan and manage emergencies at the regional and local levels as they possess the community knowledge and contacts required to execute responses.

During local emergencies, the NEMA Director should be legally required to work in partnership with relevant regional CDEM teams so that local responders can be supported from the centre in a clear, coordinated way during emergencies – this will help avoid conflict and unnecessary duplication of roles.

In national emergencies, the NEMA Director should have joint responsibility alongside the agency handling the relevant hazard/risk which had prompted its declaration, for example, the Ministry of Health in a pandemic, for managing it. Doing so would enable a more seamless national response to evolve.

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| **Recommendation 9:** That the NEMA Director be legally required to work in partnership with regional CDEM during local states of emergency. |

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**Recommendation 10:** That National NEMA and its Director be given joint responsibility for the management of national emergencies alongside the agency handling the hazard/risk which had prompted it.

## Objective 3: Enabling a higher standard of emergency management

**Q17) Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency and direction?**

DPA agrees with the need to give the NEMA Director more power to monitor and improve the performance of all CDEM across the country.

Greater monitoring by the Director would provide an assurance that the CDEM system was working effectively and ready to respond in times of emergency.

**DPA's preferences for greater oversight**

**Recommendation 11:** DPA favours Options C (Enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set through rules) and Option D (Giving the Director the function of monitoring the performance of the emergency management system).

Giving NEMA Directors greater authority to monitor the performance of the entire CDEM network should mean that key performance indicators can be added through which the public can judge the level of readiness of the system.

DPA recommends that one of the KPIs for the Director of NEMA would be to more effectively plan, manage and respond to the needs of at-risk communities in emergencies, including disabled people.

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**Recommendation 12:** That one of the key KPIs for the NEMA Director would be the need to plan, manage and respond to the needs of at-risk communities, including disabled people.

**Q18) What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

One of the main concerns we have in the emergency management and climate change space is the number of buildings located on geologically risky sites around the country.

Our main concern is with those buildings located on land at high risk from the effects of climate change through erosion, inundation and flooding.

In our submissions to councils around the country on the issue of climate resilience, we have asked that they ban the construction of any new buildings, including housing, retail, industrial and farm buildings on land assessed as at high risk from climate change.

DPA supports the creation of red zones for building on the basis that for many disabled, older and low-income people, the costs of having to constantly move following a disaster are immense.

As noted earlier, disabled people are at greater risk of losing their homes due to living in more disaster prone, less safe housing. This factor means that disabled people find it more difficult and costly if they need to move after a climate related emergency, especially if they need accessible housing which is often in short supply.

For these reasons, disabled people and non-disabled people alike would benefit from having both the new emergency management and resource management laws include clauses giving councils the authority to red zone any area they deem to be at high risk from climatic and geological factors.

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Local authorities could then incorporate these bans into district plans and other by-laws as necessary.

**Recommendation 13:** That the new emergency management and resource management laws give councils the authority to ban all building activity in areas deemed to be at high geological or climatic risk in emergencies.

**Q19) Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

DPA agrees that local authorities are best placed to manage local risks as they are better placed than central government to do so.

We understand that the current CDEM Act encourages and enables communities to achieve acceptable levels of risk through existing CDEM Group Plans.

However, we also accept that there is a need to better link local CDEM Plans with relevant local government planning instruments including district plans, regional policy statements and long-term plans.

DPA supports this being done through all the options listed in the discussion paper on local hazard risk management, including legislatively prescribing what hazards must be listed by local CDEM in regional emergency plans and providing for ministerial intervention if any shortcomings are identified.

**DPA's preferences for better local hazard risk management**

**Recommendation 14:** DPA favours all Options A. (status quo); B. (Providing clearer guidance about what it means to achieve an "acceptable" risk level; C. Update and strengthen guidance and assurance of CDEM Group plans; D. Enable the form and content of CDEM Group plans to be prescribed through secondary legislation; E. Strengthen the Minister's role in the CDEM Group planning process.

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**Q20) Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

This is a significant issue for disabled people as an increasing number have service animals.

For blind and low vision people, guide dogs are important for enabling community participation and inclusion.

Service animals in the form, for example, assistance dogs play vital roles in the lives of people with mobility impairments who use them to help perform essential tasks like opening doors.

Service animals can also perform other functions in that they can detect that seizures are about to happen in people living with epilepsy or ease the anxiety of people living with psychosocial disability/mental distress.

For all the abovementioned reasons, service animals are crucial supports, including when disasters strike.

We noted earlier that some evacuation centres don't admit animals meaning that some emergency officials may not understand the legal requirement to admit service animals/guide dogs into all public buildings, including evacuation centres.

We see the opportunity for any new emergency legislation to accord priority to all service/guide animals to be evacuated and supported alongside their owners, if practicable.

However, we are aware that some marae which serve as evacuation centres ban animals, including service animals from their premises.

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These types of issues would be best resolved through having each local CDEM group discuss these issues with impacted marae and ensuring that they have the support necessary to fulfil their legal obligations to the owners of assistance animals in emergencies.

**DPA's preferences for animal management in emergencies**

**Recommendation 15:** We support Option B. (Develop guidance on considering animal impacts); Option C. (Strengthen planning expectations through secondary legislation); and Option D. (Expand emergency powers to enable mitigation of pain or distress to animals).

**Q21) Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

DPA members have supported the idea of having voluntary registers of at-risk people hosted by local CDEM.

This would give local CDEM the ability to access information about, for example, disabled people, older people and people living in remote communities so that they can be checked on, supported and assisted to evacuate if necessary.

These registers would be entirely voluntary in that people can register their details with local CDEM via the internet, phone or in-person.

Currently, some CDEM around the country do give people the ability to register their details while others don't.

This brings us to our next recommendation.

**Recommendation 16:** That the new legislation require all local CDEM throughout New Zealand to create voluntary registers for at-risk people in emergencies.

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

**Q22) If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C?**

DPA supports the creation of a principles-based definition of essential infrastructure.

We agree that this would enable wider organisations or classes of organisations to be recognised as essential infrastructure providers if they are responsible for components such as, for example, telecommunications, information technology, electricity and food distribution.

We also support the definition contained in the document of an essential service as being those that underpin public order or safety, public health, national security, or the functioning of the economy or society.

These definitions broadly encompass all the components of health and wellbeing which impact on everyone's lives, including those of disabled people.

However, we recommend that the new legislation add one new category to the essential services list - disability support services.

Disability support services should be defined as those provided to disabled people and/or their families/whānau via publicly or privately funded (i.e., insurance-based) sources. These services would include household management, personal care, community participation, housing modifications, equipment management, communication support and NZSL interpreter services.

**Recommendation 17:** That disability support services be added to the essential services list within the new emergency legislation.

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**Q23) Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

We refer to our responses to questions 16-18 concerning the greater need for national-local collaboration and NEMA support for local emergency efforts.

## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

**Q25) Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of a recovery more effectively?**

CDEM Controllers and Recovery Managers should be given more authority, albeit, with oversight and support from NEMA, to manage emergencies in local areas.

Any additional authority should include a legislative requirement for controllers and recovery managers to better manage the health and wellbeing needs of at-risk communities, including disabled people both during and after emergencies.

This brings us to our final recommendation:

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| **Recommendation 18:** That Emergency Controllers and Recovery Managers ensure that priority is given to the needs of at-risk communities, including disabled people, during both emergency and recovery phases. |

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20 May 2025

National Emergency Management Agency
Wellington
Via email EmergencyManagementBill@nema.govt.nz

Tēnā koutou katoa

**Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation - discussion document**

Water New Zealand (Water NZ) welcomes the opportunity to submit on the issues and policy development included in the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) discussion document: Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation.

Water NZ is a national not-for-profit organisation which promotes the sustainable management and development of New Zealand's three waters (drinking water, wastewater and stormwater). Water NZ is the country's largest water industry body, providing leadership and support in the water sector through advocacy, collaboration and professional development. Its ~3,300 members are drawn from all areas of the water management industry including regional councils and territorial authorities, consultants, suppliers, government agencies, academia and scientists.

Noting our role representing the water sector on New Zealand Lifelines (Utilities) Council and our members' interests, our submission focuses on water infrastructure and services, in the context of emergency management. We respond to areas and questions raised in NEMA's discussion document, along with contextual comments to inform the scoping of the proposed legislation.

## Our position

In summary, we recommend a co-designed national framework which allows for local flexibility to support emergency planning and readiness, response and recovery. We support that a new Emergency Management Bill be introduced to replace the Civil Deference Emergency Management Act 2002.

We suggest greater focus on emergency preparedness and readiness activities – undertaking exercises, setting up relationships, and developing an understanding with partners and preparing response and recovery plans – as these will ensure more effective responses.

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We request any future policy has clear arrangements, accountability, associated funding, and stronger recognition of the water sector.

Water NZ ask through this consultation and resultant legislation the duplication and uncertainty of the sector coordinating entities (SCE) and Lifelines utilities roles are addressed. We recommend scrapping the SCE and amalgamating intent, roles, functions and coordination into the Lifelines utilities approach.

## Preamble

- Water is considered one of New Zealand's four Lifeline Utilities Sectors under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (the Act). Lifeline utilities provide essential and enabling infrastructure and services that support commercial and domestic activity. Schedule 1 of the Act recognises drinking water, wastewater, and stormwater services.
- While access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene is the most basic human need for health and well-being, the water sector often appears to be an after-thought or not considered, relative to other utility sectors.
- Unlike the other utility sectors, water has no national infrastructure or network, no single overarching legislation, minister or agency. Instead, water and its emergency management is localised, buried within councils and CDEM group structures, across 67 councils, with no national framework or oversight.
- There is need and opportunity to increase the maturity of the water sector across the four Rs of emergency management (reduction, readiness, response and recovery). There is also a legislative requirement for a Water National Response Plan to be developed.
- Sector Coordinating Entity (SCE) have been established for the four lifeline utility sectors as a means of national scale emergency management planning and coordination.
- Water New Zealand has long been involved with the New Zealand Lifelines Council representing the water sector. Since 2017, Water New Zealand has had an informal arrangement with NEMA[1] to operate as the water SCE, to coordinate the water sector response if, and when, a regional or national event is declared.

[1] Via an email between a staff member at NEMA and Water New Zealand. This has never been formalised, nor funded. As a consequence, this role is not appropriately resourced and not well understood across the water service providers, regional Lifelines or Groups.



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- The Water Services Authority – Taumata Arowai's (the Authority) became informally involved in the water SCE as a result of former government policy. Their position as the lead of the water SCE was semi-formalised by the Department of Internal Affairs in 2024 in a letter to the Authority. However, the Authority has indicated it is not structured, funded or resourced to undertake the SCE role.
- An SCE needs to be appropriate and work for its sector. The Authority and Water NZ have taken the lead on ad-hoc basis, but work is needed to increase the water sector emergency management maturity and formalise the water SCE obligation beyond existing arrangements.
- Water NZ ask through this consultation and resultant legislation, mandate is established beyond existing arrangements, with clear accountability with associated funding, effective leadership, and stronger recognition of the water sector.

## Our feedback

### Modernising emergency management

**Objectives for reform -** *Have we identified the right objectives for reform?*

- We support the objectives and strengthening New Zealand's disaster resilience. We recommend aligning the future emergency management framework with the approach of the National Disaster and Resilience Strategy[2].
- We appreciate the acknowledgment that other threats affect our riskscape and vulnerabilities beyond natural hazards. These include mega-trends faced domestically and globally – including climate change, national security risks, fragmented global economy, and rapid technological change. We suggest a missing trend is capability and capacity of the workforce to deliver on business as usual, not including emergency management - it has been recognised the water sector needs 5,849 to 9,260 staff -an ~80% increase in the size of the water workforce over 30 years[3].
- With 26 inquiries into emergency management events since 2019, with little progress or change, it is heartening the proposed policy and legislation is giving effect to the Government Inquiry into the North Island severe weather events. However, for the water

[2] https://www.civildefence.govt.nz/cdem-sector/plans-and-strategies/national-disaster-resilience-strategy

[3] https://www.dia.govt.nz/diawebsite.nsf/Files/Three-waters-reform-programme/$file/deloitte-report-summary-final-economic-impact-&-affected-Industries-A3.pdf



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sector this is alarming: the terms of reference -and therefore the report back of the severe weather events inquiry was silent on all three waters. Water services must be included in any future emergency response inquiry terms of reference.

**Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation**

**Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities**

*Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies? What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?*

Help communities proactively reduce their vulnerability and increase their resilience

- Local authorities are closely connected to their communities and therefore well-placed to undertake risk assessments, develop emergency plans and activate delivery in ways that suit local circumstances and communities' needs, whatever the emergency.
- However, small communities, with decreasing rate bases, are struggling to afford to increase their resilience without government funding.
- As such we support CDEM Groups engaging to identify the needs of disproportionately impacted communities within their CDEM region across the 4 Rs and developing plans to address these needs. This must take into account the considerable work that has gone into Group Welfare Plans already.

Recommendations

- The Government must work closely with CDEM Groups to identify a reasonable timeframe for developing these plans and working through the issue of who will fund their development.
- NEMA develop equity policies to prioritise helping places that have no alternative source of funding, such as rural towns and communities with lower average incomes.

Household preparedness for water and wastewater during an emergency

- Water NZ recognises the importance of enabling, empowering, and supporting community resilience. This includes building community awareness of their household

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preparedness for drinking water and managing wastewater during an emergency (this includes 'safe' self-supplied drinking water and onsite wastewater).

Recommendations

- NEMA work with current regulators on ensuring resilience and emergency planning for Lifeline utilities, specifically drinking water and wastewater services.
- NEMA support consistent, national community education and preparedness for drinking water and managing wastewater during an emergency. For example, Wellington Regional Emergency Management Office's the two-bucket toilet system advice.

**Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management**

*Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?*

Partnering with iwi Māori is essential to building disaster resilience

- We strongly agree that mana whenua need to be brought into the emergency management framework, given the critical role that many Māori groups already play in manaakitanga (support) in emergency management responses.
- In recent years, additional to event responses, the recovery actions delivered by iwi Māori for their marae, trusts, incorporations and whānau resilience have been the most effective and rapid responses of any agency or organisation. This includes solar pumps, water treatment stations and multiple water tanks. The resilience in equipment and facilities benefits all people in their rohe.
- We agree that willingness, expertise, and capability of iwi Māori contributions they can make to managing an emergency event is significant – but not fully utilised. This unique knowledge, skills, and resources should be communicated to the wider CDEM Groups and communities.
- We support the Government's commitment to the strengthened recognition and status of tangata whenua as kaitiaki in their rohe and their central leadership role for iwi Māori in the emergency management system including:
    - Establishing a new national body - Māori Emergency Management Advisory Group – in legislation
    - Including roles for iwi/Māori entities in the National CDEM Plan

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- Providing for centrally funded iwi/Māori representation on joint committees and
- Involvement in the development of CDEM Group Plans.

Recommendations

- Engage in meaningful conversations with iwi Māori to ensure they have the capacity, and desire, to participate in the system in the manner that is envisaged and that enables mana motuhake.

- Build capacity within hapū and iwi to design, deliver, articulate and evaluate, and to partner CDEM Groups that enable resilient outcomes for Māori as well as fulfilling the requirements of national policy.

- To co-design, co-deliver and monitor Māori interests and knowledge in national emergency management strategy and policy, the director should engage with their counterparts at Te Puni Kōkiri, where appropriate Te Arawhiti, and the National Iwi Chairs Forum, and other established Māori bodies with emergency management and local government interests for example – Te Maruata (LGNZ's Māori advisory group) and Te Ura Kahika's Ngā Kairapu.

**Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management.**

*Are there any other impacts or options that should be considered?*

Develop formal arrangements with local organisations before an emergency

- Changing the CDEM approach to understand a community's capability and capacity to respond in an emergency is critical to increasing community resilience.

- Schools [and marae] are often used as community hubs or evacuation centres during emergencies. Many rural schools and marae are considered small self-suppliers for drinking water, meaning they rely on their own water sources (e.g. bore or roof tank) for drinking purposes, rather than being connected to a reticulated water supply. Not all self-supplying schools and marae meet their legal requirements for the provision of safe drinking water[4].

[4] Refer Taumata Arowai Drinking Water Regulation Report 2023



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- Supporting rural schools with safe drinking water in peace time is crucial so the public health risk during an emergency is minimised. However, schools typically lack the resources for adequate water storage, training, and support to function treatment systems effectively in activations. Ensuring these schools are trained and well-equipped can significantly enhance community resilience and safety during emergencies.[5]

- Auckland Council's Healthy Waters Rural Settlements initiative is an example of sensible planning before an emergency event. The programme has commenced working with rural marae, papakāinga and Council owned rural community halls to ensure that three waters in these properties are maintained and upgraded, and over time at a service level suitable to support a community over the first 72 hours of an emergency and the water assets have improved flood protection.

Recommendation

- Government support for schools, marae and papakāinga to prepare them to support their community in times of crisis. This includes, but not limited to, resourcing such as water tanks, solar panels and associated batteries, generator and generator plugs and Starlink to increase their hazard preparation and resilience

- NEMA, along with the Authority, develop and update guidance and education around emergency water supply responsibilities at community hubs. Including developing formal arrangements for maintenance and upkeep with local organisations before an emergency.

## Better community awareness of what to do before and after an emergency.

- Ongoing grassroots engagement with communities by CDEM Groups and local authorities is critical to growing their understanding of risks and potential impacts, in complementing a top down "educate the community on the risks" approach.

- NEMA could work with lead agencies to develop nationally consistent key messaging for the water sector- for example – with the water sector develop Auckland Emergency Management's 'Don't: Enter or drive through flood water" campaign.

- We encourage any legislation to recognise and include community volunteers for emergency management responses. Smaller councils' responses rely heavily on

[5] Water New Zealand has a Schools Water Supplies 101 digital training badge designed to support staff and board members to understand their obligations.



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established relationships with trained community volunteers with local knowledge and experience.

Recommendations

- Future legislation aligns community participation and education with the third objective of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy (enabling, empowering, and supporting community resilience).
- NEMA work with Lifeline utilities in the first instance to develop nationally consistent key messaging for this sector.
- Thought should be given to how CDEM Groups and local authorities can be supported to undertake this important community engagement and education mahi.
- The proposed policy must change to understand and utilise communities and volunteer groups.

**Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency** *Are there any other impacts or options that should be considered?*

Protections from civil liability for undertaking emergency management activity in good faith

- As an industry body, Water NZ are not recognised under the CDEM Act. Emergency powers under the CDEM Act 2002 enable CDEM Groups, controllers and department directors to, among other things:
    - exercise any power, if a state of emergency is in force or otherwise
    - have protection from liability
    - be able to incur expenses, recover debts or seek or pay compensation, requisition property, land or equipment.

Recommendation The proposed legislation establish mandate and resourcing appropriate for the water sector to undertake emergency management activities, if necessary, without liability risks.

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**Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels**

**Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency** *Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?*

## Dependencies and interdependencies

- The provision of water services, as we saw during Cyclone Gabrielle, has dependencies and interdependencies within and between other critical infrastructure providers ability to operate. This reinforces the need for relationships and roles to be established and exercised before an emergency. Prior planning and understanding of interdependencies, resources and relationships will allow quick mobilisation and multi-function support. Recognising that across these fields there will be public and private providers.

- Water NZ welcomes clarity on roles, responsibilities, and lead agencies for emergency preparation, as well as during activation, between water service providers, lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups and NEMA. This will help to support strong multi-agency coordination, planning, response, and recovery.

## Lead Agencies

- It should be noted that Lead Agencies only come into being when an event is declared an emergency. We support the proposal to include clear statutory definitions for lead and support agencies across the emergency management system, including clarification of roles and responsibilities across all 4Rs as per the National CDEM Plan definition. This should include agencies such as NZ Police, FENZ, and contractors that act as support agencies.

<u>Recommendations</u>

- We do not recommend the lead agency for water related emergency management is the regulator – the Water Services Authority- Taumata Arowai.
- We suggest NEMA be given delegated authority and requisite funding to support water, wastewater and stormwater providers during both regional and national emergency management events. With Water NZ acting as an expert advisor where required.

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- Clarification of roles and responsibilities could easily be achieved through the production of a simple wiring diagram, which could build on the CDEM Takatū training material.

**Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities**
*Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?*

## Who is the lead agency for water?

- The national state of emergency Cyclone Gabrielle and response exposed weaknesses in the water sector's national and local level coordination, involvement, inclusion, systems, tools, leadership and relationships. In some cases, this led to suboptimal information to support situation understanding, public safety messages, works programming and decision making.

- Other Lifeline sectors have clearly understood and identified roles, responsibilities, and reporting lines, at all levels, from the local teams up to national lead agencies, and vice versa. This was demonstrated in the 2023 wet weather events by the speediness of situational understanding of the asset damage encountered, services disrupted, resources needed and estimates of costs and timeframes to restore services for roads, energy and telecommunications.

- The water SCE was first activated during the Gabrielle Response. As SCE chair Water NZ provided the point of contact and sector liaison between the NCMC and the affected councils and coordinated resources across the sector. (Noting, the Authority, parallel to the SCE, worked with the CDEM regional Lifeline Groups to gather situational intelligence, not through the SCE.)

- In these events, as with previous emergency events – earthquakes, water quality incidents or flooding - multiple water staff and equipment from across the county are mobilised to affected areas to assist in response and recovery. This is not mandated in legislation or formalised in an agreement or MOU, but demonstrates the ability, understanding and camaraderie that underlie and drives the water sector to respond in a collaborative way to events.

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Recommendations

- Confirm the lead agency for three water services.
- Mandate Lifelines utilities, regional lifelines and New Zealand Lifelines Council in the proposed legislation

## The approach needs to be appropriate and work for a given sector

- Water NZ do not agree that there is a fundamental misunderstanding of roles, lack of coordination or clear hierarchy between the individual duties of local authorities and collective functions of CDEM Groups. We do agree clarification and reconsideration of the roles and responsibilities for water between the Lifelines utilities framework and the SCE specified under the CDEM Plan is required.
- We do acknowledge potential for disconnect, overlap, inappropriateness and consistency between local authorities and CDEM Groups decisions, especially concerning water service provision, between business as usual and during an event.
- Water service provision is unique when compared to other Lifelines utilities; with 67 plus service providers and no national network or agency or oversight.
- Recent experiences and events, ranging from the last government's NTU's work programme and structural waters reforms to Havelock North water contamination incident and the 2023 extreme wet weather events, have highlighted the water sectors relative emergency management immaturity – especially its national coordination level.
- Some water service provider's experiences during the 2023 floods - and Cyclone Gabrielle - were that NEMA did not provide national guidance and leadership during the flooding response or recovery stages. This was also the case for other Lifeline utility operators across the country.
- Water NZ acting as SCE attempted to bridge the information gap. However, co-operation was on a goodwill and prior relationship basis. As discussed, as a non- government organisation we have no powers, resources or funding.
- Socialising the distinction of what a CDEM Group is responsible for and what each local authority is responsible for individually would be sensible. As would requirements on a Group to report their funding and delivery.

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- Clarity on how lead agencies and Group controllers work together, their roles and responsibilities would be welcomed. We support a unified control model between NEMA dealing with the hazard and the group controller or director.

Recommendations

- Through this consultation and resultant legislation, mandate is established beyond existing arrangements, with clear accountability and effective leadership, of the water sector.

- NEMA should provide national guidance and leadership in a formal capacity in future nationally declared events, with Water NZ acting as an expert advisor where required.

- We suggest NEMA be given delegated authority and requisite funding to support water, wastewater and stormwater providers during both regional and national emergency management events.

**Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management**

**Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance** *Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?*

Being proactive costs a lot less money than being reactive

- Studies show proactive risk mitigation and emergency preparedness helps avoid significant costs and can reduce the overall damage. For every $1 invested in preparation, avoids between $4 and $11 in losses.

- Proactive planning and preparedness such as upgrading vulnerable and or aging infrastructure and moving communities out of flood zones to higher ground, avoids risks. This includes reducing risk to life of responders rescuing people from flood waters or public or reducing environmental health risk of wastewater treatment plants overflowing when it rains.

- When emergencies happen – flooding, earthquakes, cyclones etc - central government pays for the majority of the damage, including rebuilding public infrastructure like roads, as well as helping individuals who lose their homes. Storms, inundation and wildfires are becoming more intense and frequent as the climate gets hotter. In the face of these escalating hazards, planning, preparedness and resilience programmes have a better return on Crown investment than after emergencies happen.

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Recommendation – We suggest greater focus on emergency preparedness and readiness activities – undertaking exercises, setting up relationships, and developing an understanding with partners and preparing response and recovery plans – as these will ensure more effective responses.

### Multi-agency coordination and involvement in readiness, response and recovery activities

- Ideally CDEM Groups should collectively engage in readiness activities-including training- and prepare response and recovery plans. However, some local authorities have chosen to do emergency management independently of the Group or a Group has been unable to progress initiatives as their priorities differ from the council.
- Similarly, across the motu some Groups have developed strong partnership with Lifeline utilities, but other Group's experience engagement difficulties and limited support from public and private Lifeline utilities. This negatively affects pre-identifying partners and developing relationships before an event.

Recommendations

- Resolve the duplication of SCE and Lifelines roles. We recommend scrapping the SCE and amalgamate roles, functions and coordination into the Lifelines utilities approach.
- Clarify the roles responsibilities, reporting and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels between Lifeline Utilities, regional lifeline coordinators, National Lifelines Council and NEMA.
- Mandate involvement and cooperation for emergency preparation, response and recovery between water service providers, Lifeline Utilities, NEMA and CDEM Groups.

**Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management**

*What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans? What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?*

**Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies**

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## Taonga and other cultural heritage in planning for emergencies.

- Māori have an enduring relationship to their whenua, water and other taonga. Article te Toru (Article Two) guarantees Māori the right to make decisions over the resources and taonga they wish to retain.

- Mana whenua expect involvement in decision-making processes and monitoring, including mātauranga Māori-led approaches. However, Māori leaders are not waiting to be contacted by the Crown. They are already demonstrating rangatiratanga, exercising mana motuhake for their takiwā, providing resilience, safety and wellbeing of their whanau before, during and after an emergency and for future generations.

## There are many examples of whanau, hapu and marae led action.

- The concept of wai rangatiratanga (sovereignty of water) refers to Māori leadership and authority over water resources. In terms of emergency management planning, embracing the wisdom of tikanga Māori and concept of oranga (strength and health of communities and places), it empowers iwi, hapū and mana whenua who are preparing for and adapt to natural hazards and climate change.

- Existing Māori-led systems to protect taonga include kaupapa Māori disaster risk reduction frameworks, developing prioritised strategies and response plans[6], construction of stop-banks to protect kāinga and retreat and relocation of whare to higher ground away from the flood risk or increasing the resilience of marae and kāinga.

- A notable example is Northland Regional Council working with Te Tai Tokerau's 35 most vulnerable marae to increase their flood resilience - which for some marae may mean shifting location[7].

- Some hapu have relocated their whare both historically and more recently. This is extremely challenging for some given the whenua kaupapa (enduring connections to a place), and for some relocation may not be an option, due to not necessarily having land to relocate to, and the costs involved.

[6] For example, Te Rūnanga o Ngai Tahu climate strategy, Ngaa Rauru Kiitahi and Maketu Iwi Collective emergency response plan

[7] https://www.nrc.govt.nz/our-northland/story/?id=80297

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### Upskilling, planning for the future

- Many iwi Māori are increasing their resilience by building capacity and capability amongst their people. Training rangatahi, finding skills present within iwi members, developing leadership skills, partnering with agencies to access a broad range of skills and expertise and collaborations sometimes researchers to protect impacted places or plan for adaptation.

Recommendations

- Enable mana whenua to build Māori capacity within hapū and iwi to design, deliver, articulate and evaluate, and to partner CDEM Groups in ways that enable resilient outcomes for Māori as well as fulfilling the requirements of national policy.

- Co-design, co-develop and co-create marae emergency preparedness and adaptation plans, that recognise taonga Māori and tāngata whenua as kaitiaki.

- Future emergency management policy must build on the ample number of examples addressing the effects of the climate crisis and enhancing community resilience to natural hazards.

**Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services**

**Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"**

### A principles-based approach to essential infrastructure is not supported

- Water NZ support the option to add additional entities to the CDEM Act's Schedule of Lifeline utilities, such as solid waste management services.

- The proposal to replace the Lifeline utilities framework with an expanded, principles-based definition of essential infrastructure, based on the proposals introduced in the DPMC critical infrastructure resilience programme, is not supported in its current form.

- As part of the DPMC's Critical Infrastructure Resilience working group, Water NZ queried the threshold approach for being considered 'essential'. The proposed approach was to use the number of connections to a network, as opposed to recognising critical assets, services or customers in a network. While this approach may be reasonable for electricity or telecommunications, it is not appropriate for water services. The definition for water and wastewater essential services suggests >25,000 drinking or wastewater connections.

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This arbitrary figure of 25,000 connections would exclude any reticulated network smaller than New Plymouth from being considered essential.

*Are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C?*

## Urban stormwater differs from flood protection

- Water in the current context of Lifeline utilities includes drinking water, wastewater and stormwater.
- Floods are New Zealand's most frequent and most significant natural hazard. Between them, urban stormwater and flood protection schemes underpin the integrity of public and private assets, provide resilience and security to communities and their investments.
- Urban stormwater, is considered as an essential infrastructure in the discussion document. However, it is silent on flood protection. The risk from river flooding is managed by regional councils' flood protection schemes. These 367 schemes protect around 1.5 million hectares of land or 5% of New Zealand's land area. The replacement cost of flood protection schemes throughout New Zealand are estimated to be $2.3 billion.
- Urban stormwater networks are managed by local authorities. Stormwater networks are more complex than drinking water or wastewater systems, with most comprising a primary piped network as well as above-ground, watercourses and secondary overland flow paths.
- As the 2023 rain events and Cyclone Gabrielle emphasised regional council's flood protection schemes are vital to protect economic, environmental and social wellbeing. The 2023 government review of the management of the Wairoa River bar[8] found legislation for flooding needs addressing, citing it confusing and spread over several different Acts.
- Whilst we are pleased to see stormwater be considered an essential infrastructure, to truly modernise, provide coordination and improve the resilience of our emergency

[8] https://environment.govt.nz/publications/review-of-the-management-of-the-wairoa-river-bar/



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preparedness and response, flood protection must be included as an essential infrastructure.

- Including flood protection as an essential infrastructure sector, will bring all schemes across the motu into the CDEM structure, training, systems, and tools. This will support strong multi-agency relationship building, understanding, and testing of their response arrangements, resulting in a more coordinated responses and recovery.

Recommendation expand the definition of essential infrastructure to include river control and flood protection schemes, including their flow and rain gauge monitoring network.

**Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing** *Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?*

### Strengthening Lifeline Utility business continuity planning

- Aotearoa New Zealand needs to stop being siloed and adopting a reactive approach to emergency management.

- Water NZ support any initiative to increase participation of Lifeline utilities and CDEM groups in planning and exercising at the regional or national levels. Pre-existing relationships and common understanding of respective challenges and priorities, the interdependencies and clarity of roles and responsibilities is the best preparation for an emergency and will enable a more coordinated and timely response.

- We support the proposal that all Crown agencies and central government organisations and agencies (such as Health New Zealand or New Zealand Police) that provide critical functions and services to public service agencies should be subject to business continuity planning requirements.

Recommendation NEMA work with current regulators on any business planning, monitoring and reporting requirements they have for Lifeline utilities, and ensuring the obligations are reflected and consistent with the proposed legislation.

### Information sharing

- The CDEM Act currently requires CDEM Groups to prepare response and recovery plans. In preparing these plans some CDEM Groups have developed partnership approaches

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with Lifeline Utilities agencies, but others experience difficulties getting engagement and support from public and private sector Lifeline Utilities. This can lead to a lack of information sharing to support planning.

- Water NZ broadly supports the need for specific policy, regulatory or non-regulatory options to agree roles and responsibilities for information sharing between Lifeline Utilities and CDEM Groups. This will help to support strong multi-agency planning.
- We recognise the benefit of data standards, developed with Lifeline utilities in "peacetime", to provide information in a consistent format during an event. For example, preparing a template water situation report, which suits both water service providers, Lifeline utilities, CDEM Group and NCMC needs.
- We support the proposal of Lifeline utilities contributing to both regional and national response plans. However, any options for plan development and information sharing should recognise existing Lifelines utilities capacity, networks and relationships.

**Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens**

**Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas**

### Lifelines utilities and their contractors need cordon access

- There are numerous examples of where Lifelines utilities and their contractor's repair crews are denied access at emergency cordons, where cordons are accessed by other emergency vehicles.
- Water NZ **recommends** that future legislation includes Lifeline utilities and their contractors and recognises the necessity for cordon access to carry out response and recovery activities.

### Declaring Emergencies

- Water NZ support the proposals for modernising the declaring of emergencies.

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
## Conclusion

We thank the NEMA for opportunity to comment on the proposals to inform the design of a new Emergency Management Bill.

We would like NEMA to take the opportunity to establish a mandate beyond existing arrangements effective leadership, clear accountability, and stronger recognition of the water sector.

We look forward to continuing to work with NEMA to support and contribute to improving the emergency management settings and operational efficiency for Lifelines infrastructure, specifically for the water sector.

Ngā mihi nui



Nicci Wood
Technical Lead Regulatory

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## Appendix -possible water sector levels of service or standards during and after an event

| Critical Infrastructure | During level of service | Post level of service |
|---|---|---|
| Water supply system, including bulk water supply network, treatment plants storage lakes, reservoirs, pump stations and reticulation | Community to store enough water to provide 20 litres per person per day, to last seven days. | Eight days following a major event community water stations are activated.<br><br>Provide 80 per cent of customers, within 30 days of a reasonable seismic event, with 80 per cent of their normal water needs. |
| Wastewater / sewage collection, treatment and disposal system, including the sewer network, pump stations and treatment works | "For at least 30 days following an earthquake, you'll need to self-sufficient for sanitation." | "For at least 30 days following an earthquake, self-sufficient for sanitation." |
| Stormwater (land drainage system, including the stormwater pipe network, waterways, and retention areas | Asset condition data for all stormwater assets will assessed annually, follows the process defined in the AMP and is consistent with the NAMS International Infrastructure Management Manual (IIMM, 2015). | Emergency Action Plans (EAP) have been developed and implemented (to limit the effects of an asset failure on people, property and the environment.) |
| Flood protection assets on a region's major waterways, including stopbanks, barrage gates, control works | Meets the criteria and standards prescribed for an earthquake or a flood of a particular intensity or flow rate in the dam safety prescribed by regulations 10 to 18 of the Building (Dam Safety) Regulations 2022 | Emergency Action Plans (EAP) have been developed and implemented (to limit the effects of an asset failure on people, property and the environment.) |

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Stantec New Zealand

*20 May 2025*

## Stantec Submission: Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation

**Background:**

Stantec is a large professional services firm with global and national expertise across the transportation, energy, infrastructure, climate resiliency, and environmental infrastructure sectors.

We operate fourteen local offices around Aotearoa New Zealand and have significant and longstanding experience in the response and recovery of a range of supply chain disruptions in the form of significant weather events and natural disasters. We work with our local government clients to increase preparedness where we can and support during declared events and often lead recovery programs.

**Opening Comments:**

Stantec welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the development of the Emergency Management Bill and supports the Government's commitment to strengthening New Zealand's emergency management system. We commend the recognition that improvements are needed and see this reform as a valuable opportunity to build a more resilient, better-prepared Aotearoa.

We believe this Bill presents a strong foundation, however with further refinement, it could deliver the change required to meet the current issues and address the increasing risks our communities face. There is a significant opportunity to elevate the system from one that is reactive to one that is proactive, well-resourced, and future-ready.

To achieve this, we encourage a broader and more ambitious approach—one that embeds preparedness and recovery as core pillars of emergency management. A key opportunity lies in establishing a national recovery framework that supports long-term efficient restoration outcomes. We recommend expanding NEMA's role to lead recovery efforts, drawing from models such as the Queensland Reconstruction Authority. A permanent, centralised recovery function would help ensure consistency, reduce complexity, and support better outcomes across the country.

We also see potential to:

- Strengthen the focus on personal, community, and regional preparedness through a layered approach.
- Integrate emergency management legislation with other key frameworks, such as the Building Act, to ensure alignment during a response and seamless transitions to recovery.

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- Embed professional services planning and resourcing into response frameworks, supporting initiatives like Nelson Tasman Emergency Management's NEMA Resilience-funded Professional Services project.

This reform is also an opportunity to ensure that emergency management professionals are empowered with the resources, authority, and support they need to deliver on their responsibilities. Many already have the knowledge and capability—what's needed now is the investment and structure to enable action.

We encourage the Government to view this legislation not just as a regulatory update, but as a catalyst for meaningful change. With the right funding, implementation support, and community engagement, this Bill can help New Zealand become a global leader in disaster resilience.

Ultimately, success will be measured by tangible improvements in preparedness, response, and recovery. We believe this reform can meet—and exceed—community expectations, provided it is backed by a clear implementation plan and sustained investment.

**Objectives in Reform:**

The current four objectives cover a wide range of reform required. However, we believe there are four critical areas that are currently underrepresented and should be included to ensure the legislation delivers meaningful and lasting improvements:

1 Minimise the Economic and Social Impacts of Natural Disasters

While the current objectives acknowledge the importance of minimising disruption to essential services, they do not go far enough in recognising the broader economic and social consequences of disasters. Social impacts—such as displacement, trauma, and community disconnection—are often overlooked in planning, yet they carry significant long-term costs. Research such as *The Social Impact of Natural Disasters: At What Cost?* (VCOSS, 2016) demonstrates the economic burden of unaddressed social impacts.

Incorporating this objective would ensure that emergency management planning considers the full spectrum of impacts and supports more holistic, equitable recovery outcomes.

2 Strengthen Community and Regional Preparedness

Preparedness is the foundation of resilience. While the Bill acknowledges the role of communities as first responders, there is a significant opportunity to go further by embedding preparedness as a standalone objective. Many communities remain under-prepared, which increases inefficiencies and risk during emergencies.

We recommend the development of national community resilience programs that promote education, training, and sustained behaviour change. With the right support, communities can become more self-reliant, reducing pressure on emergency services and improving outcomes across all phases of emergency management.

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3 Prioritise Investment

New Zealand has a unique opportunity to shift from a reactive to a proactive emergency management model. Currently, more government funding is allocated to recovery than to preparedness or resilience building. This imbalance results in escalating and unnecessary costs for our country.

The Wellington Lifelines Project is a compelling example of how targeted investment can define risk and identify a pathway to mitigation. Unfortunately, the actions resulting from this project are not funded and other such projects also remain unfunded. Embedding investment in emergency management and infrastructure asset management resilience would reduce the impact of disasters and accelerate recovery.

4 Establish a National Recovery Framework

We strongly recommend that the development of a national recovery framework be elevated to a core objective. Recovery is often the most complex and prolonged phase of emergency management, yet it is inconsistently planned for and resourced across the country.

As a professional services provider, we have seen first-hand how the absence of structured recovery planning during the response phase leads to delays, inefficiencies, and missed opportunities to restore levels of service appropriately. A national framework would provide consistency, clarity, and a platform for resilience improvements. We also recommend expanding NEMA's role to lead recovery efforts, similar to the Queensland Reconstruction Authority model.

**Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities**

We agree that the changes proposed are warranted here.

**Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management**

Stantec supports the intent to strengthen iwi Māori participation in emergency management and sees this as a vital opportunity to embed iwi leadership and mātauranga Māori into preparedness planning—not just response. We acknowledge the significant progress being made by some regional and remote iwi, whose approaches offer valuable lessons for wider communities. To ensure meaningful and coordinated engagement, there needs to be clarity on how multiple iwi in a region will be collectively represented within emergency management structures. Given the critical role marae play as places of refuge and the deep ancestral knowledge iwi hold of their whenua, iwi Māori must be recognised as essential partners in building community resilience well before emergencies occur.

**Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management**

Stantec supports the intent to strengthen community participation in emergency management and recommends a more nuanced approach that distinguishes between individuals, community groups, and private sector entities. Each plays a different role and requires tailored engagement. For example, CDEM establishing pre-event agreements with private companies would significantly streamline response activities.

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Community resilience is often under-recognised and underutilised; CDEM should have a clear mandate to identify, support, and integrate local resilience initiatives before emergencies occur. This would reduce pressure on emergency services during events, assess and highlight regional vulnerabilities, and promote equity. A tiered model—starting with personal preparedness, then community, and escalating to regional and national support—will be essential in a large-scale disaster where resources and connectivity are limited.

Finally, cost allocation must be addressed. Uncertainty around reimbursement slows decision-making and risks poor outcomes. Pre-approved funding mechanisms and clear cost-sharing arrangements would enable faster, more confident responses and ultimately deliver better outcomes for communities.

**Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency**

Stantec strongly supports the recognition that individuals, communities, and businesses are often the first to respond in an emergency. We are currently working with Nelson Tasman Emergency Management to develop a professional services engagement guideline that complements the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS). This initiative, shaped by lessons from the Nelson August 2022 storm response, aims to improve coordination, integration, and scalability of professional support during readiness and response phases. It is being developed in collaboration with south island CDEM groups, local lifeline utilities, and a ACE NZ working group, and is designed to ensure that professional services can be engaged quickly and effectively when needed—without duplicating existing agreements or legislative requirements.

A critical enabler of this approach is legal clarity and protection. Liability concerns are a major barrier to self-initiated participation, particularly for businesses. While individuals often act instinctively and altruistically in emergencies, businesses must weigh the risks of operating outside their usual frameworks, often without access to the information or tools they would normally rely on. For example, a geotechnical engineer responding to a landslide in the field, whilst being pelted with rain and poor visibility, cannot be expected to meet the same standards of documentation or information analysis as in a business-as-usual environment. Without clear protections, businesses may hesitate to act—even when their expertise and equipment could save lives.

We believe the legislation must clearly differentiate between personal and business liability and provide appropriate protections for both. Individuals acting in good faith should be protected from civil liability, and businesses that contribute to emergency response should be supported through pre-event agreements that clarify roles, expectations, and cost recovery. This would not only reduce hesitation during critical moments but also encourage more proactive engagement from the private sector in preparedness planning.

Empowering communities and businesses to act confidently and safely is essential. In a large-scale disaster, local capacity will be the first—and potentially only—line of defence. National resources will be stretched, and delays in external support are inevitable. By enabling and protecting those who are willing and able to help, we can build a more resilient, responsive, and connected emergency management system that truly reflects the strengths of Aotearoa’s people and places.

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**Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency**

Stantec supports Option 3, where the Group Controller (or Director at the national level) is the designated Control Agency, as it provides clear leadership and coordination across agencies. We recommend that Controllers set high-level priorities—particularly in large-scale events—while individual agencies retain responsibility for operational delivery aligned to those priorities. This approach, supported by local risk vulnerability assessments, would enable faster, more informed decision-making. Consistently designating CDEM as the lead agency would also allow for clearer role definitions within the CIMS framework, reducing ambiguity and improving interoperability. While we support local leadership during emergencies, we recommend a model where NEMA leads nationally, with local Controllers adapting based on hazard type—for example, enabling FENZ personnel to assume the Controller role during wildfire events.

We note a critical gap in the current framework through the lack of clarity around recovery leadership. The Act should define who leads recovery operations post-transition, as the current ad hoc approach—often involving newly created agencies—undermines continuity, relationship-building, and long-term planning at both national and local levels.

**Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management**

Stantec supports greater national consistency in emergency management strategy, standards, hazard mapping, and resilience planning, led by NEMA. Local risk and vulnerability plans must be developed, regularly updated, and—critically—resourced to ensure they are actionable. There is a clear need to better map and manage interdependencies across agencies and lifeline asset owners to improve coordination and reduce systemic risk. To support this, CDEM's role should be strengthened through increased funding, including local mechanisms that allow for not-for-profit fundraising and greater community and business involvement in preparedness and response. This would empower local communities while ensuring alignment with national priorities.

**Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date**

Stantec supports a more streamlined and flexible approach to updating emergency management plans. The burden of implementing amendments—particularly those of a technical or administrative nature—should sit primarily at the national level, where there is greater capacity and consistency. Local government often lacks the resourcing to carry out full-scale reviews, which can delay important updates. Allowing for targeted, minor amendments without triggering a full review process would reduce administrative overhead and ensure plans remain current and actionable. This approach would improve responsiveness while maintaining alignment with national strategy and standards.

**Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance**

Stantec supports the need to raise expectations and strengthen assurance across the emergency management system, but this must be matched with appropriate and sustainable funding. In our view, the implementation of current legislation and regulation has often been under-resourced, limiting its effectiveness and the ability to measure performance meaningfully. Structurally aligning CDEM under NEMA would give the Director clearer oversight and enable more consistent monitoring of CDEM Group

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performance. Importantly, any new responsibilities or expectations introduced by NEMA must be accompanied by a clear funding mechanism to ensure they are achievable.

We also recommend that the Act include a requirement for a formal independent review following every declared State of Emergency. These reviews should serve a dual purpose: to recognise and celebrate effective collaboration and outcomes, and to identify lessons learned for continuous improvement. Acknowledging the efforts of responders and volunteers is essential, as their contributions are often overlooked. At the same time, localised, constructive reflection offers far more value than large-scale, punitive inquiries, which can delay progress and add unnecessary complexity without improving outcomes on the ground. A culture of learning, not blame, is key to building a more resilient and responsive system.

**Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues**

Stantec supports Option 2 as the preferred approach—providing the Director with the power to issue compliance orders where performance issues are identified. However, if compliance is to be mandated, it is essential that CDEM Groups are adequately resourced to meet these expectations. Without sufficient funding, compliance risks becoming a burden rather than a pathway to improvement. We also highlight the need for a more equitable funding model, potentially through centralised funding mechanisms, to ensure all regions—regardless of size or ratepayer base—can meet national standards. Funding challenges are a consistent theme across local government, and any new obligations must be accompanied by sustainable financial support to ensure success and fairness across the system.

**Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management**

Stantec observes that local hazard risk management remains underdeveloped in many regions, primarily due to ongoing funding limitations. To address this, we support the creation of a centralised, NEMA-led framework for identifying, managing, and reporting on preparedness and risk mitigation/reduction. This would enable a consistent, standardised approach across the country and empower NEMA to drive implementation more effectively—particularly if local CDEM functions were more structurally integrated. Additionally, interdependencies between lifeline utilities are poorly mapped and coordinated, leading to significant variation in scenario planning and risk assessment across regions. We believe mandatory planning requirements, backed by dedicated funding, are essential to ensure equitable, effective, and proactive hazard risk management nationwide.

**Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of “lifeline utility”**

Stantec supports expanding the definition of essential infrastructure to reflect the evolving interdependencies between services and the increasing complexity of risk. A nationally consistent framework—led by NEMA—is needed to identify and manage these interdependencies across agencies and lifeline asset owners. Without this, regional efforts remain inconsistent, and critical gaps in scenario planning persist. We recommend a principles-based approach that enables mandatory planning and ensures dedicated funding for preparedness, allowing for more equitable and effective infrastructure resilience across the country.

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**Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning**

Stantec recommends that regional risk, vulnerability, and interdependency mapping be made compulsory for all regions and reviewed locally on a quarterly basis. These assessments would provide a critical foundation for lifeline utilities to develop coordinated and informed business continuity plans. By aligning continuity planning with region-specific risk profiles and interdependencies, utilities and agencies can better anticipate disruptions, prioritise investments, and respond more effectively during emergencies. A consistent national framework for this process, led by NEMA, would ensure alignment, accountability, and improved resilience across the country.

**Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing**

Stantec sees a clear and urgent need for nationally coordinated tools, data standards, and digital infrastructure to support emergency management. Currently, significant duplication of effort and voids exist across the sixteen CDEM Groups, particularly in the development of digital tools, leading to inefficiencies and inconsistent capabilities. Intelligence gathering is critical during emergencies, and failures in this area have directly impacted the effectiveness of recent responses—delaying decision-making and resource deployment. To address this, the science and engineering sectors, both public and private, must be formally recognised as partners within the legislation. Furthermore, the digital systems that enable data capture, management, reporting, and decision-making should be classified as critical infrastructure and essential services. Without standardisation and interoperability, poor data capture during response phases severely hampers recovery efforts. In contrast, high-quality, accessible data can significantly accelerate recovery and improve outcomes. A national framework for digital tools and data sharing is essential to ensure consistency, reduce duplication, and enable a more effective, coordinated response and recovery system.

**Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period**

Stantec strongly supports modernising the process for declaring a state of emergency and agrees that requiring an in-person, physical signature is no longer appropriate or practical. An automated, digital process should be implemented, with pre-approved delegations in place to ensure continuity if a signatory is out of reception or otherwise unavailable. In today's environment, delays in declaring a state of emergency are unacceptable and can have serious consequences. It is essential that the process is streamlined, robust, and fit for purpose—without introducing unnecessary layers of approval or complexity that could hinder timely action.

**Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices**

Stantec recommends that the Coordinating Executive Group (CEG)—comprising chief executives and CDEM Group managers—be empowered to declare a local state of emergency, with a requirement to inform the mayor as part of the process. In practice, mayors already rely heavily on advice from this group or CDEM staff when making such decisions. While mayors play an important leadership role within their communities, they are not trained emergency response professionals, and their close community ties may make it difficult to maintain the level of operational objectivity required in high-pressure situations. Empowering the CEG to make declarations would ensure that decisions are made

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by those with the technical expertise and situational awareness necessary to act swiftly and effectively, while still keeping elected officials informed and engaged in their community leadership roles.

**Closing Comments**

Stantec supports the urgent need for reform in New Zealand's emergency management system and believes that, with the right legislative changes and funding support, this reform can deliver meaningful improvements to national resilience. As outlined in our opening comments, legislation alone is not enough—any new roles, responsibilities, or expectations must be matched with appropriate resourcing. Embedding CDEM Groups within a nationally coordinated NEMA-led structure would enable greater consistency, while still allowing regional flexibility to meet local needs. National standards for hazard mapping, digital tools, information sharing, and performance monitoring are essential to lift system-wide capability. Importantly, this reform must also recognise and empower the vital role that everyday New Zealanders and local businesses play during emergencies. Their contributions save lives, and they must be supported through preparedness initiatives and protected from liability when acting in good faith. Investing in community readiness now will significantly reduce the burden on local and central government in future events—an upfront cost that will pay dividends in reduced response and recovery impacts.

Please contact the undersigned if you would like to know more.

Yours sincerely

**Stantec New Zealand**



**Grant Maxwell**
New Zealand Infrastructure Resilience Lead
s9(2)(a)

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Jon (Mitch) Mitchell, Dr Raj Prassana, Dr Julia Becker, Kelvin Tapuke |
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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

If emergency management in Aotearoa New Zealand is going to continue to improve and eventually realise its intent of achieving a more resilient society, economy, infrastructure, and environment, a comprehensive fully risk-based 4R (risk, readiness, response, and recovery) approach needs to be developed and applied.

Although the discussion document suggests the approach taken is inclusive of all aspects of "emergency management", the almost exclusively response, marginally readiness, and only very occasionally recovery-focused approach of the discussion document does not provide a particularly sound basis for either a more resilient nation or appreciably more effective responses.

The government's intended approach to RMA reform and the development of legislation to manage "risks from natural hazards", while emphasising private property rights, along with the paucity of mechanisms to reduce the likelihood or consequences of any hazards in this discussion document is a matter of significant concern.

It now has to be asked if the 4Rs approach has now been departed from in the intended approach for the Emergency Management Bill as described in the discussion documented, and what is the real direction for emergency management in Aotearoa New Zealand.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

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## Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

While it is encouraging to see vulnerable and diverse communities recognised explicitly, the discussion of the vulnerabilities of the diverse communities focuses almost exclusively on response and, to a lesser degree, on readiness for response within our various communities. A considerably more broad approach is essential to providing the basis for an all of society approach to be achieved.

**3. Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

The discussion document emphasises the responsibilities of CDEM Groups, rather than local authorities and other agencies and organisations individually. This delivers a message to those stakeholders in comprehensive emergency management that tends to absolve local authorities and other organisations of their responsibilities in this area. This has been significant impediment to the full adoption and maturation of emergency management at the local and community levels in Aotearoa New Zealand.

**4. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 1 is clearly not resulting in the levels of risk awareness, resilience, readiness, response, and recovery needed.

Option 2 is little different from the status quo. Most organisations, including local authorities, government agencies, iwi and hapu, and other organisations do not consistently deliver to expectations of this sort unless there is a statutory requirement for them to do so, and the resources are available for them to.

Option 3 is the only option that has any likelihood of achieving the desired outcomes, although the emphasis on response and recovery is far too narrow. Where a higher quality, regularity, and continuity of input and outcomes is imposed there needs to be requisite increases in access to local and regional funding or funding mechanisms than is currently the case.

Option 4 is untenable, as it is impossible for national-level organisations to achieve level community knowledge, engagement, mana, and resultant support and delivery.

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5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Standards and guidance for community groups, iwi/hapu, local government, regional CDEM Groups, partner agencies, to develop, review, and apply comprehensive or phase-specific emergency management plans will be essential for the game to be lifted across the board. This will only be successful if it enabled by the parallel development and delivery of high-quality education and training for all who will be involved in managing and delivering the respective training. This planning capability development should be developed and delivered by tertiary education providers to standards set collaboratively by the emergency management sector under the stewardship of NEMA.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The response to COVID-19 and the North Island extreme weather emergencies, as well as all other significant emergencies since the CDEM Act was passed, demonstrated at the narrow response-focused membership of coordinating executive groups is inadequate to provide a basis for risk knowledge development, reduction/resilience, readiness, response, and recovery. The membership of coordinating executive groups in each region should be extended to include iwi, MSD, ambulance services, tertiary education providers, and major regional industries within each region/unitary authority.

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This section is overly generalised. Although "iwi Māori" is intended to be shorthand for the far more nuanced and variably layered reality of contemporary Māori, applying a more inclusive description at all times will help Māori see a place for themselves at the organisational level they are comfortable with. A more inclusive term would be "iwi/rūnaka/hapu/Māori".

The descriptions for Māori as "iwi" are insufficient. Iwi are commonly now referred to as Post Settlement Entities (PSGE). PSGE are currently very understaffed and lack capability to cover all areas in their respective rohe. They have adopted structures that align to government contracts. Most PSGE's have disestablished there environmental and, where previously established, emergency management teams in the current central government funding context.

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8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The emphasis on iwi response capabilities, without recognising that iwi, hapu, whanau, Māori businesses, and other enterprises, should have in understanding risks, building resilience to them, and recovering from them, does a dis-service to Māori and wider society. A more inclusive and broad approach to emergency management is essential to future risk management and more effective response and recovery efforts.

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

A combination of Options 2 to 5 will be the most effective approach.

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

It is critical that the planning and comprehensive emergency capabilities are enhanced in Māori communities, building on their inherent indigenous capabilities and knowledge. Also more inclusive and comprehensive, social-capital-based approach to comprehensive planning and resilience and capability building is required if real change toward an all of community reality is to be realised. Responsibility for this should be given to local authorities, coordinated collaboratively at a regional level by Emergency Management Groups.

The membership of regional/unitary Emergency Management Groups, at joint committee, coordinating executive group, local authority, and operational levels, should be adjusted to include iwi / hapu governance and management representation.

The National Iwi Chairs have recently devolved to Regional Iwi Chairs as the National Iwi Chairs forum is too cumbersome. There is no mandated person who represents the National Iwi Chairs Forum.

Te Upoko o te Ika Regional Iwi Chairs as in the Greater Wellington Region have met and are leading their own CDEM direction with the intent of adding to the local Emergency Management communities and capabilities. A similar approach has been successfully in place for almost two decades in Te Tau Ihu – the Top of the South iwi collective, across the Nelson-Tasman and Marlbrough Emergency Management Group areas.

Recognition of the real movers in Maori communities is still the extensively interconnected marae/hapū. The inclusion of the NZ Maori Council, Maori Women's Welfare League, and marae/ hapū in Emergency Management plans is essential. Minuted regular meetings from these entities would provide evidence of accountability and quality of engagement.

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**11. What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Iwi should be encouraged to establish iwi resilience councils at local, regional, and national levels, based on existing iwi partnerships, to work alongside and contribute to local authorities, Emergency Management Groups, and central government at the national level. Local authorities, Emergency Management Groups, and NEMA, along with other national agencies, should be required to incorporate iwi into all aspects of their emergency management programmes.

Each regional Emergency Management Group joint committee should include senior iwi governance representatives, with voting rights.

Local authorities, community boards, and local boards in the case of Auckland, will ideally include local iwi or hapu representation at elected members committee level and management representation in risk and 4Rs committees as well as in Emergency Operations Centres and Recovery Management Offices where these are established during response and recovery respectively.

**12. What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Each regional or unitary Coordinating Executive Group should be required to include representatives of their respective regional iwi resilience councils, with full voting rights, proportionate to the number of Māori residents or other meaningful formula in the Emergency Management Group area. Representation should be determined by iwi collectively or individually, in an appropriate manner depending on their own context.

Where the local authority and iwi or hapu organisational boundaries and populations are sufficient to warrant iwi or hapu representation on local authority resilience committees, or similar, local authorities should be required to include them.

**13. What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

At the national level iwi representation would most effectively reflect regional-level cooperation and coordination, with political coordination achieved at iwi chairs/leaders forum and ministerial level, and executive coordination through links to the director and chief executive of NEMA.

**14. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

It is essential that the same comprehensive emergency knowledge, readiness, response (including CIMS), and recovery capability standards applied to other organisations within the emergency management system are applied to iwi/rūnaka/hapu/Māori involved. Funding should be provided for this at local, regional, and national levels. The emergency management ministerial advisory panel established previously has significantly improved the representation of iwi/rūnaka/hapu/Māori interests at a

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national level, although this has detrimentally been unduly isolated from the rest of the emergency management field.

The lack of recognition of and senior connection to the role and importance of other ethnic communities in some localities, regions, and nationally is becoming increasingly apparent as engagement with iwi/rūnaka/hapu/Māori has improved. A more holistic approach that retains and supports in crucial role of iwi Māori in resilience and emergency management would reflect a continually maturing model.

## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The response-focus of this section is not helpful. For all of community involvement in emergency management to be meaningful it has be in all components of resilience and emergency management, not just response as this section appears to rely on. The framing is also not useful in general, implying that communities are failing to "take" up what is offered, when the approach should ideally be development of a two-way relationship.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

None of the options would make any significant impact on future levels of resilience in communities, businesses, local and regional economies, and the natural environment.

The options provided only suggest the development of guidance for improved one way information flows for building awareness of how to respond to an emergency (important, but can only fix a small part of a much wider problem) and/or discuss a niche area of "managing resources" with the public. Neither of these options address the main issue which is how to improve how communities most effectively and consistently develop their own resilience and response capabilities, and understand and engage with regional and local emergency management, before, during and after a disaster.

**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Local and regional resilience councils should be required to be established and maintained by regional Emergency Management Groups, local authorities, and NEMA respectively, based on the social/cultural, economic, infrastructure/built, and natural

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environment sectors well established in the emergency recovery context and recently added to Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) version 3.

**These groupings, with requisite sub-sectors, should be used to form the basis of local, regional, and national risk reduction and resilience targets, strategies, and capabilities for the risks relevant to their respective level of reference.**

**Standards for resilience councils should be adopted nationally, following substantial local, regional, and national co-design.**

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This section is incorrect in its claim that there is no protection when actions are taken during emergencies other than under the direction of a Controller or constable under the CDEM Act. The section is also deficient in that it hasn't included the protections afforded to actions carried out by anyone acting under the direction of a Recovery Management under a Transition Order, or under the direction of authorised persons under the Fire and Emergency New Zealand Act, Building Act, and International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act.

The well-established Common Law "Principle of Necessity" provides considerable protection to individuals taking extreme measures in emergency situations including and far less severe than the standards required for a State of Emergency under the CDEM Act to be countenanced.

The retention of emergency powers in the hands of any Police constable during a State of Emergency should be reviewed, as Police officers are not well versed in the CDEM Act, its emergency powers, or emergency management more generally. The powers have seldom been used and where they have significant risk of conflict with the direction of "suitably trained and experienced" appointed CDEM Controllers has arisen.

If the power is retained it would be very helpful if a condition was added that if telecommunications are available or the an appointed Emergency Management Controller is in the vicinity any Police officer using any of the powers should do so under the direction or in agreement with the Controller.

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Reflecting the Common Law "Principle of Necessity" in the Emergency Management Bill, with the proviso that any such action should not be inconsistent with the direction of a

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Local, Group, or National controller, would enable any questions about the appropriateness of any actions taken to be dealt with by the District or High Court, depending on the seriousness of the action taken. This would enable members of the public to take urgent action with some legal control remaining in place, consistent with the recent extension of the ability to carry out citizens arrests under the Crimes Act.

Extending the provision of the existing CDEM Act 2002 for potential compensation for property requisitioned (s 107) or lost or damaged (s108) could be achieved relatively easily to enable members of the public, commercial enterprises, non-government organisations, etc., that take actions prior to, during, or subsequent to emergency situations to apply for compensation for reasonable costs incurred. Conditions could be developed for these circumstances to ensure that compensation provisions are not exploited and that only actions clearly necessary in the circumstances would potentially qualify for compensation.

The risk of privatisation of emergency management response and recovery capabilities by-stealth is significant here, with some players in the emergency management community in New Zealand having attempted in the past – successfully in the case of the Rangiora Express helicopter relief services during the Christchurch earthquake response, and at least one individual in the animal rescue / welfare community who has been attempting to privatise aspects of those functions for almost two decades – to the detriment of collaborative working and the wellbeing of others involved in animal welfare / rescue.

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

A comprehensive review of all emergency management legislation with compensation and liability protection provisions should be carried out prior to the Bill being completed, to enable a consistent, effective, and balanced approach to these situations in all emergency contexts.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Clarification of the intent of community hubs, and the establishment of standards for their initiation, development, and action in readiness, response, recovery would be very helpful. The model currently in used in one metropolitan region, where the establishment of hubs is predominantly a regional-level emergency management office function largely leaves local authorities and their emergency management responsibilities out of the equation. This approach also largely avoids using existing community groups and their inherent "social capital" as the basis for hubs, diminishing their mana, sustainability, and effectiveness.

Hub or hub-like models elsewhere have either been in place for several decades or adopted recently, where community hubs or community emergency response groups have been established based more on existing community groups or at least self-coalesced and managed groups with a focus on resilience, readiness, and response.

Establishing standards for community hubs/emergency response teams, requiring them where-ever possible to be based on existing community groups, associations,

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rūnaka/hapu, businesses, appropriate to the locale, etc., ensuring they are connected to local Emergency Operations Centres and other emergency organisations, and that operating procedures and capabilities are in place within local authority and other agency response capabilities to support and make the most of community emergency hubs irrespective of hazard type, would be preferable to groups more artificially created by a local authority, Emergency Management Group, or related organisation.

The term "Civil Defence Centre" should be retired with the removal of "Civil Defence" from the title of this legislation and the lexicon of Emergency Management. Replacing it with the term "Community Emergency Centre" or "Evacuation Centre", depending on the primary purpose of the facility, to reflect the intended enhancement of the recognition that communities should be at the centre of emergency readiness and response in the future.

## Objective 2: Providing for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels

### Issue 5: Clearer direction and control during an emergency

We have identified options to make it clearer who is in charge of the operational response to an emergency.

*Refer to pages 20–25 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**22. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Using the Hawkes Bay CDEM Group's response to Cyclone Gabrielle to generalise from across the entire emergency management system as the basis to inform the shape of future response roles, responsibilities, and capabilities is dubious at best.

As mentioned in the reviews of the Hawkes Bay response to Cyclone Gabrielle, and publicly announced and carried by the media in the few years leading up to that emergency, the Hawkes Bay CDEM Group and its member local authorities had adopted a highly centralised response coordination model prior to Cyclone Gabrielle, with member local authorities largely abandoning their individual organisational response management capabilities. Neither the CDEM Group's ECC, consequently a primary single point of failure in the Hawkes Bay context, nor local authority EOCs in the region, had the necessary quality and depth of high-level CIMS training, exercising, experience, or capability at the time of the cyclone.

The description of the context for Objective 2 has not included consideration of the concept of "unified control" introduced in version 3 of the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS) in 2019.

The description lacks depth in how un-fit for purpose the current "lead agency" doctrine is in Aotearoa New Zealand. The inadequacy of respective lead agencies in dealing with significant emergencies such as the Port Hills wildfires in 2016, Christchurch mosque shootings response 2019, the Pike River mine explosion response 2011, the response to the

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Whakaari White Island eruption 2019, and the MV Rena grounding 2011. In none of these responses was the respective "lead agency" able to carry out its overall lead responsibilities because the agency was focused almost entirely on dealing with the focused response to the hazard itself. Suggesting that lead agencies will be able to deliver overall coordination of the response, including managing any social, infrastructural, and/or environmental consequences, by way of legislative change is unrealistic and unachievable.

Rather than attempting to solve a perceived problem with a mechanism that will not address the issue it would be more effective to require the "unified control" provisions of CIMS version 3 to apply, with the "hazard lead" agency/ies leading the response to the hazard and the respective local, regional, or national emergency management Controllers working alongside the "lead agency" Controllers to provide wider coordination, manage the response and relief to consequences of the hazard(s), and manage the transition to Recovery with the designated (local and/or regional (Group) Recovery Manager(s)).

Experience in the only high-level CIMS-based emergency response and recovery leadership development programmes leads us to conclude that confusion within senior staff of partner agencies, particularly FENZ and NZDF, in the Hawkes Bay and Auckland severe weather responses were due more to most of the senior personnel from those agencies lacking high-level training in the application of CIMS version 3 in major emergency contexts.

The confusion is not from the system itself, but from an organisational cultural aversion to building leadership capabilities in New Zealand's now considerably more mature incident management system in challenging, multi-agency, multi-region response contexts.

Several of the reviews of the responses to North Island severe weather emergencies identified a distinct lack of understanding of CIMS within NEMA's National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC), significantly inhibiting the effectiveness of the NCMC during that and other responses, including the COVID-19 response. It is increasingly apparent that the CIMS or CIMS-based training being delivered within NEMA, as much of an advance it may be on what has been delivered in that context in the past, is not adequately developed to prepare function staff, managers, and Controllers sufficiently to carry out their roles with the confidence and mana necessary to project and support leadership across major responses.

Rather than attempt to spread "Control Agency" responsibilities across all current "Lead Agencies" it would be considerably more beneficial to develop standards for the training and accreditation of all incident-site, local, regional, and national level controllers, as well as all CIMS functional managers and staff, at each level respectively, and include these in sector-wide assurance management in future.

The current National CDEM Plan makes reference to CIMS and its application that are not particularly helpful, while the CDEM Act makes no reference to it at all. Reference to CIMS "framework" or "structure" leads readers and those intended to use or be aware of CIMS to conceive of the system a rigid structural approach, when flexible application of the principles (significantly refined in CIMS version 3), functions, processes, language, tools, and collaborative, community focused ethos of CIMS are what is far more important.

**23. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

A flexible and clearly stated application of options 2 and 3 would be the advantageous and relatively readily achieved.

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**24. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The confusion that all too often arises in emergencies of this sort is due more to the peculiar insistence that "local" emergencies and "local" responses are, by virtue of the governing legislation, both local and regional in nature. That there are only two levels of emergency declaration under the CDEM Act, "local" and "national", but there are at least three levels within "local", being a ward or a district at "local" authority level, or a ward, district, or entire region in a "local" state of emergency declared at CDEM "Group" level. This desperately needs to be clarified.

It would make considerably more sense to provide for at least four levels of declaration, "major incident", "local", "regional", and "national", indicating the level of "control" that has primacy in the response. The role of "Group" (more accurately "regional") level of response and respective Controllers would be clearer if the term "Group" was replaced with the term "regional" to reflect the geographical and organisational level of response and recovery coordination they provide.

It would be clearer for all involved if emergency management organisations, controllers, and recovery managers for smaller unitary authorities, such as the Chatham Islands and Marlborough, were referred to as "local", while larger unitary local government-based emergency management groups, such as Nelson-Tasman, Gisborne, and Auckland were referred to as "regional". The latter would more readily allow for "local" command and control/coordination to be established within larger unitary groups where that is deemed necessary.

A "major incident" level of response "control" would better support emergency service and other "lead agency" "control" to be applied to responses to emergencies in more focused areas than a ward or local authority area. This model is used effectively in other jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom. Several "major incidents" could also be components of a geographically or administratively larger local, regional, or national emergencies, with designated "lead agencies" being responsible for "command and control"/"coordination" of response to the incident, while emergency management Controllers being responsible for higher-level command, control, coordination and intelligence (C3I) – consistent with the intent of CIMS version 3.

Much clearer (primary and secondary) legislative requirements that all organisations involved in emergency readiness, response, and recovery will build and maintain capability to collaboratively contribute to and lead in the emergency management system using the principles, concepts, processes, tools, and ethos of CIMS is essential for more enhanced capabilities, outputs, and outcomes in the future.

It is worth noting however that the use of "command and control" in this discussion is not consistent with the reality of the legal, CIMS version 3, and practical context of emergencies, declared or not, where "Controllers" can only do that in relation to other agencies. Controllers can "control", "coordinate", "influence", and "lead" other agencies, their executives, and staff and resources. They cannot, by definition, also "command" those elements of response.

**25. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way direction and control works during the response to an emergency? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

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Please explain your views.

More well-informed consideration and application of the world-leading principles and processes of CIMS version 3, and their continual improvement, within and providing shape and substance to emergency management in Aotearoa in New Zealand would be a significant step forward.

## Issue 6: Strengthening the regional tier of emergency management

### Issue 6.1: Resolving overlapping CDEM Group and local authority roles and responsibilities

We have identified options to ensure it is clear what CDEM Groups and each of their local authority members are responsible for.

*Refer to pages 26–28 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**26. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The complex difficulties of this context are relatively well captured and articulated in the description for this objective.

The past insistence that regional (Group) and local roles and responsibilities be covered by the same statutory, National CDEM Plan, and director's guideline descriptions has been a major impediment to establishment of consistent, high-standard, and sustainable capabilities and relationships withing each regional CDEM Group, between regions and unitary CDEM Groups, and between local and regional/unitary emergency management and national agencies including (MCDEM and now) NEMA, since the CDEM Act was introduced in 2002.

The description of the funding arrangements doesn't however adequately capture the range of approaches, both in terms of funding and organisational responsibility within multi-local authority CDEM Groups and makes no mention of the arrangements within single or joint unitary authority CDEM "Groups".

**27. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The focus here on the local government aspects of the emergency management system alone, without reference to the roles, capabilities, and structure of emergency services, critical infrastructure providers, health services, iwi, regional industries, local and regional tertiary education providers, etc., is not helpful.

Similarly, ignoring the scale of the various regional and unitary emergency management groups and their member local authorities leaves out key factors in any meaningful discussion of the structure, roles, and responsibilities of local government in emergency management now and, more importantly, into the future.

A significantly modified Option 3 would deliver more meaningful, measurable, and sustainable change.

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**28. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Funding is key to effective emergency management at regional and local levels as it is at the national level.

The most efficient and least contentious funding model within multi-local authority CDEM Groups is where the respective regional council collects a regional rate for the regional level of management, control, coordination, and support, while respective local authorities fund their own local capabilities and responsibilities from local rates. This model has been in place in Canterbury since 2002.

The locally and regionally contributory models used in many other groups are often contentious as member local authorities have to justify rating for both local and regional emergency management.

The creation of a nation-wide standard of separate regional and local emergency management rate-based funding should be introduced.

As iwi often struggle to fund meaningful emergency management capabilities of their own it would be helpful to make legislative provision for regional and unitary emergency management groups to also rate to contribute to the cost of developing and maintaining iwi Māori emergency management within their region.

**29. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to the way emergency management is delivered at the local government level (for example, the CDEM Group-based model)? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The stark lack of consistency of approach, organisational structure, and regional versus local roles and responsibilities is highly problematic. That many CDEM Groups do not match the organisational boundaries of Police and FENZ regions and districts, or health regions and areas, is confusing and time consuming for all concerned.

Serious consideration should be given to reshaping regional emergency management groups so that they are more consistent with the boundaries of partner agencies at regional scale. This will likely require adjustment of emergency services and other organisational boundaries.

Combined Otago-Southland and Nelson-Tasman-Marlborough emergency management groups, for example, would be more efficient and make more sense than the current separate regions, at least for respective partner agencies. Establishing multi-region emergency management groups, where each regional/unitary council is required to maintain resilient response facilities and capabilities, would also add a layer of considerable redundancy within the group, as well as enabling sufficient depth and breadth of trained and experienced readiness, response, and recovery personnel.

The current 16 CDEM Group arrangements are well beyond the internationally accepted span of control. A rationalised, standardised, regional model of multi-agency risk and emergency management would provide a considerably more effective organisationally balanced coordination, command and control posture that the current disparate, unbalanced, highly inconsistent model.

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A new legislative requirement for Auckland Council to provide for local district-level coordination with its respective three Police, FENZ, and health districts within Auckland, would help the agencies of the super city considerably more effectively meet the risk and emergency management needs of 1/3 of the nation's population. The current single "Group" ECC is unable to provide effective coordination of a regional city the size of Auckland, and the addition of a plethora of local boards supposedly coordinating responses, are well beyond the limits of span of control.

The recent acquisition of incident-level command vehicles in the Auckland context is a flexible step in the right direction, however this development would significantly benefit from the added ability to appoint statutorily appoint "Local Controllers" to provide a manageable span of control within major responses in the Auckland area.

At the other end of the spectrum, legislatively requiring the Chatham Islands to formally become an active part of reshaped mainland emergency management group would significantly enhance the resilience and emergency management capabilities available to our most Easterly communities.

## Issue 6.2: Providing for clear and consistent organisation and accountability for emergency management

We have identified options to ensure CDEM Groups are organised effectively, with clearer lines of accountability.

*Refer to pages 28–31 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**30. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The focus on response roles, responsibilities, and capabilities in the discussion document belies the reality that readiness and recovery capabilities are at least as inconsistent and confused.

Readiness investment and capabilities provide the foundations for current and future resilience, response and recovery capabilities. The current disparity between approaches to readiness, as well as to response and recovery models and capabilities, would benefit significantly from the development, enablement, and assurance of nationwide standards.

Relying on the narrow recommendations of one review, such as that local government CEOs be made primary emergency management controllers and be responsible for emergency management in their area, is dubious. A similar recommendation in the Independent Review of the Civil Defence Response to the Canterbury Earthquake (2011) suggested that mayors be given the same powers and responsibilities, based on the submission of one mayor. That recommendation was thankfully not adopted and has since been forgotten and ignored.

Although it would be a positive step to make local and regional/unitary authority CEOs clearly legislatively responsible for emergency management in their respective jurisdictions, supported by unambiguous standards for what acceptable local government emergency management looks like, requiring CEOs to also be local or regional Controllers is not a necessary addition. It would be an unsound assumption to make that all CEOs are "suitably trained and experienced" to also be local or regional emergency management controllers.

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CEOs, where carrying out their role effectively, act as an important executive line of support, coordination, and protection between local and regional controllers and their respective senior elected members, in particular mayors. It would be more helpful if the respective roles and responsibilities of CEOs, mayors, regional council and emergency management group chairs, and other elected members were spelled out in the new legislation, reiterating that the critical separation of governance and management required in the Local Government Act extends for emergency management in all of its phases, especially during response,

**31. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

As local authorities, emergency services, and government agencies are literally entities created, shaped and controlled by statute, it is essential that the respective roles, responsibilities, relationships, and therefore organisational arrangements are determined by primary and secondary legislation.

Option 2 would introduce significantly more, not less, role confusion and potential and real conflicts within and between emergency management organisations, including local authority members of emergency management groups.

Option 3 is clearly the only option that would make a meaningful contribution to clarifying the situation. This only be achieved if emergency services, iwi, and other risk and emergency management stakeholder organisations are also required to be actively involved in risk and emergency management in their respective local, regional, and national contexts.

**32. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Although, as the analysis on page 30 suggests, guidelines are not mandatory, roles, responsibilities, and organisational relationships or structures provided for in the National CDEM Plan Order (and guide) are regulations and are therefore mandatory. As would standards that this discussion document has suggested the Director of Emergency Management will be able to introduce in the future. Despite the fact the Director has been able to make relatively binding "codes and technical standards" (section 9) since the CDEM Act was created.

## Issue 6.3: Strengthening the performance of Coordinating Executive Groups

We have identified options to strengthen how Coordinating Executive Groups provide advice to and implement the decisions of their CDEM Groups.

*Refer to pages 31–32 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**33. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The description of the variable functionality of Coordinating Executive Groups, particularly when considered along with the coordination issues addressed in Issue 5, doesn't go far enough and lacks historic context. When the CDEM Act was first

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published it described as "consortia of local authorities based on existing regional council boundaries, working in partnership with emergency services".

That definition has since been expunged from the Act, as a far more local-government-focused approach to CDEM has been allowed to creep in, to the detriment of collaborative multi-authority, multi-agency work across the risk-based 4Rs.

The events of the COVID-19 response and recovery from major domestic emergencies, including the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010-11, Kaikoura earthquake of 2016, and the North Island severe weather emergencies of 2023, and the broader multi-agency "regional leadership forums and recovery entities established to manage them, demonstrated very clearly that the current membership of regional CEGs is far too limited to local authorities and a very small selection of emergency services to be effective in readiness and response, let alone across the broad scope of risk-based emergency management.

**34. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

A mix of all of the proposed active options, 2 to 4, as well as the additional features suggested below is necessary to bring about the step change in engagement and accountability necessary to lift risk awareness, resilience, reduction, readiness, response and recovery arrangement, capabilities, cultures, and capacities to the necessary standards.

**35. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

For CEGs to be more consistent and effective their statutory membership has to be broadened to include iwi Māori, MSD, MPI, regional economic development agencies, and regionally important critical infrastructure providers, as well as other organisations as the Act currently provides. CEGs could also be required to establish and maintain local government focused sub-committees, as is currently practiced by a small proportion of Emergency Management Groups now.

## Issue 7: Keeping emergency management plans up to date

We have identified options to make it easier to update the National CDEM Plan and CDEM Group plans, reflecting changes to roles and responsibilities.

*Refer to pages 33–34 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**36. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Given the broad geographic scale of many of the regions that constitute current CDEM Groups, the plans statutorily produced and reviewed at this level cannot be meaningfully regarded to be "local", other perhaps than in the case of the Chatham Islands and Marlborough District.

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The contradiction of regionally-focused CDEM Groups, "local" emergencies, and the role of predominantly locally-focused mayors, while local emergency management plans are the exception and certainly not the rule, is a serious flaw in the system.

Reviews of the responses to the 2023 severe weather emergencies, as well as other significant emergencies, including COVID-19, Whakaari White Island, the Canterbury earthquakes, and Pike River, make abundantly clear that, other than some CDEM Groups, only the Ministry of Health and hospital and health services are the only government agencies that have been meeting the expectations of the CDEM Act that agencies will plan for emergencies consistent with the National CDEM Strategy, Plan, and CDEM Group Plans. As identified to a limited extent in reviews of the responses to Cyclone Gabrielle and COVID-19, agencies that have not met that expectation include Fire and Emergency New Zealand, NZ Police, MPI, MBIE, MSD, and DIA. The respective agency-specific sections in the National CDEM Plan do not constitute "planning".

Although NZDF maintain their national plan, "Op Awhina", this document is treated as classified, is not collaboratively maintained or tested, and it is not generally available to national, regional, and local stakeholder to inform their planning and operations.

The NZDF Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief – Domestic and Offshore Aide Memoire, Edition 2, August 2021, is a considerably more useful, useable, and accessible document.

In summary, the problem statement and suggested options for this issue are concerningly superficial and somewhat confused. To be at all credible a considerably wider and more inclusive systems approach has to be taken.

**37. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The argument that the National CDM Plan is required to be written as a regulation and to go through the Order In Council process seems weak. Other regulations aren't said to be inhibited by these conventions. The alternative of having the documents go through a full Parliamentary process would be several orders of magnitude more complex.

In reality the lack of a stable cohort of emergency management planning expertise and leadership within NEMA, DPMC, and partner national agencies, the since discontinued parallel "trifecta" approach to updating the Act, Strategy, and Plan since about 2018, continued shifting between national risk and security systems paradigms, and planning and other ke staff often being drawn into response roles, have been the significant inhibitors to credible progress being made in this space.

The options outlined in Table 10 appear to be only marginally related to the introduction and problem statement for this section.

The lack of any significant mention of the role of the National CDEM/Resilience Strategy, and its previously important role in providing ambitious, longer-term consideration of Aotearoa New Zealand's risks, global trends, domestic strengths and vulnerabilities, opportunities, and even targets for risk-based resilience into the future is concerning.

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**38. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The legislation should be strengthened to make it explicitly clear that all stakeholder agencies are required to collaboratively develop and review their own national, regional, and local emergency management plans, operating procedures, doctrine, standards and training, consistent with future National Emergency Management strategies and plans, as well as regional and local emergency management plans.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**39. Should we consider any other problems relating to responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels?**

Please explain your views.

The lack of any statutory requirement to develop and maintain actually "local" plans for their local authority area has been demonstrated to be a major impediment to effective emergency management in multi-local authority regions and in the super city of Auckland. More geographic and scale-meaningful plans, led by local authorities, supported by their respective regional emergency management office, in conjunction with local emergency services, iwi Māori, community associations, ethnic and faith groups, chambers of commerce, significant local businesses, education providers, and other local stakeholders, are essential if community focused emergency management expectations are to be at all realised. This simply cannot be achieved at regional scale.

Adequate guidance, regional and national support, and high-quality education and training in community, local, regional, and national-level comprehensive emergency management planning, making best use of existing tertiary education providers with speciality in these fields, is essential for emergency management planning to be lifted to the standards necessary to meet our collective needs into the future.

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The exclusive focus on the national level of assurance leaves out the legislative requirement of CDEM Groups to also carry out a "monitoring and evaluation" responsibility. A more inclusive at least national and regional approach will be more conducive to enhancing resourcing, cultures, capabilities in the future, rather than an exclusively nationally led approach.

For any system assurance programme to be at all meaningful the definition and scope of the "system" need to be inclusive of all elements, including in this case the emergency services, government departments including DPMC and the National Security System, iwi Māori, civil society, and economic stakeholders, as well as the narrower NEMA and local government lens that has been increasingly applied to emergency management system over the past decade.

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

All three active options, 2 to 4, are necessary to bring about the step change in assurance and comprehensive, sustained capability improvement across the board.

International analysis of emergency management assurance programmes in Australia, USA, Canada, and the European Union, was carried by the Joint Centre of Disaster Research in 2022 for the Incident Management Reference Group and NEMA. This work identified that assurance programmes in this space are only effective where co-design of the assurance programme occurs, enabling buy-in from all contributing stakeholder organisations to the resultant standards and maturity-model based assurance processes, where participation in a staged programme of baseline self-review, capability enhancement plan development, peer review, and continual improvement, is compulsory.

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**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

For any system assurance programme to be at all meaningful the definition and scope of the "system" needs to be inclusive of all elements, including emergency services, government departments including DPMC and the National Security System, iwi Māori, civil society, and economic stakeholders, as well as the narrower NEMA and local government lens that has been increasingly applied to emergency management system over the past decade.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The challenge of NEMA/the Director being a senior emergency management operator, leader, standard setter, and steward of the emergency management system, as well as assessor and assurer of capabilities across the system deserves considerably more attention. The role confusion and potential conflicts between these roles have been realised in other jurisdictions, with separations between the operational and assurance functions introduced to reduce confusion and to deconflict the situation.

The highly successful establishment of independent Directors General of Emergency Management in Australian states, independent commissions to review standards and performance within government sectors and services in the United Kingdom, as well as the Independent Policy Review Authority and Health Disabilities Commission in Aotearoa New Zealand, are examples that should be considered and learned from to benefit our emergency management system and the safety and wellbeing of our communities.

## Issue 8.2: Strengthening the mandate to intervene and address performance issues

We have identified options to better ensure those with legal emergency management responsibilities are meeting them sufficiently.

*Refer to pages 37–39 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**44. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The lack of options for NEMA or the Minister to provide direction or other intervention in underperforming organisations in the emergency management ecosystem has enabled some local authorities, CDEM Groups, emergency services, critical infrastructure providers to not meet their statutory obligations, to underinvest risk and emergency management capabilities, and to respond hesitantly, unilaterally, not at all, or to leave others to respond instead when hazards become imminent or emergencies occur.

However, rather than put all of these responsibilities in the hands of the Director or Minister, it would be more efficient and reflective of the hierarchy of the emergency management system if regional Emergency Management Groups and regional Directors/Controllers were also empowered to require and enforce national standards at regional and local levels.

Proactively Released

**45. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The likely negative impact on the power relationship between the Director and Minister, on one hand, and government agencies, emergency services, Emergency Management Groups, local authorities, and potentially iwi Māori, of becoming what will seen as an "auditor" needs to be given serious consideration.

Options 2 and 3 are both necessary, with considerably more development, for an assurance programme to have any real effect between and during emergency response and recovery contexts.

**46. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

As discussed in Issue 7, the establishment of an Inspector General of Emergency Management would help to deconflict much of what would otherwise unavoidably become a tense and conflictual assurance and enforcement environment.

We strongly recommend that establishing an Inspector General of Emergency Management role be created by the new legislation, responsible for assurance, review, and independent oversight of the entire emergency management system.

## Issue 9: Strengthening local hazard risk management

We have identified options to strengthen the way CDEM Groups and their members manage the risk of hazards in their areas, including by using CDEM Group plans more effectively.

*Refer to pages 39–42 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**47. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The locally focused analysis of the problem for this issue is not reflected options proposed.

As discussed elsewhere in this submission, a fundamental flaw in the current CDEM Act is conflation of community, local, and regional scales of reference and responsibility at the almost exclusively regional CDEM Group level. This is never going to deliver to the expectations of Parliament as reflected in the current Act, let alone a more "all of community" approach envisaged for the Emergency Management Bill.

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**48. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

A combination of Options 2 and 4 is likely to be most effective in bringing about the necessary enhancements in regional-scale planning, however local and "all of community" planning logically sits at local government level.

Therefore, an additional option has to be to require local authorities to develop locally risk-based 4Rs "Local Emergency Management Plans", linked to their respective district plans (under planning legislation extant at the time) and their long-term plans (under the Local Government Act 2002), and consistent with the respective Regional Emergency Management where relevant.

Emergency services, government departments, iwi Māori, NGOs, critical infrastructure providers, industry sector groups, and other stakeholders should also be required to participate in these risk-based planning programmes at local, regional, and national levels.

**49. What is the right balance between regional flexibility and national consistency for CDEM Group plans?**

Please explain your views.

The structure, scope, risk appetite, and desired cultural approaches for local, regional, and agency planning can be established in standards and guidance, with feedback and approval authorities introduced at regional-level for local plans, and at national-level for regional and agency emergency management plans.

**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

While the regionally-focused approach to emergency management, in place since 2002, has improved risk and emergency management capabilities in some regions and local authority areas, the removal of the requirement for local response plans, let alone comprehensive risk-based emergency management planning, has tangibly taken the nation and local resilience backwards in many ways.

Reinstating regional and national plan support, feedback, approval, and intervention to local and regional planning respectively is essential to a proactive and consistent approach to building all of society resilience and response and recovery capabilities.

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Local authority member organisations of multi-authority Emergency Management Groups should be required to develop comprehensive risk-based 4Rs emergency management plans for their organisation, communities, economy, and natural environment of the local authority area, consistent with any regional emergency management plan relevant to them, the National Emergency Management Strategy and Guide, and plan standard and rules issues by the Director of Emergency Management.

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**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The predominantly regionally focused, permissive approach to risk and emergency management responsibilities, planning, and capability development has proven inadequate to lift resilience, capabilities, cultures, and outcomes. A more standards, rules, and directive-based approach is clearly necessary across the entire system – not just the local government component of it.

Assumption and even claims that hazard-specific lead agencies are adequately mandated, trained, resourced, and culturally-focused to contribute to and, where appropriate, lead local, regional, and national 4Rs emergency management is not substantiated by the inputs and outcomes of recent significant emergencies. As exemplified in the COVID-19 response, Pike River mine explosion, Whakaari White Island eruption, the series of recent large-scale wildfire emergencies, the MV Rena grounding, and the North Island severe weather emergencies.

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Although including taonga Māori and cultural heritage in one issue is understandable, lumping the wellbeing of animals into the same issue is difficult to reconcile.

The focus on response and recovery, and not the risk, resilience, reduction, and readiness aspects of emergency management is also unhelpful.

Each of these three topics have significant complex contexts of their own that are impossible to discuss particularly meaningfully together, other than to say that they should be clearly articulated aspects of the new legislative environment in all phases of risk and emergency management.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The analysis of the status quo is historically and factually incorrect. The CDEM Act 2002 differed from the preceding Civil Defence Act 1983 in its extension of the purpose of

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Emergency Management to include the protection of property as well as lives and public safety. This analysis reflects an understanding of emergency management, including within the most senior government agencies with national security and emergency management responsibilities that is not consistent with the legislative context in question.

Partly because of the lack of understanding of the need to include taonga Māori and cultural heritage in all phases of emergency management at local, regional, and national levels, it is apparent that Option 3 is the minimum required to these crucial aspects of society, culture, and economies are given due attention in the future.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

It is increasingly apparent that all staff, managers, executives and governance members with emergency management responsibilities are not adequately or consistently informed of the legislative context within which they are operating, let alone the historic trajectory that brought emergency management in Aotearoa New Zealand is today or developments in other jurisdictions relevant to ours.

Emergency management sector minimum knowledge standards and accredited qualifications, delivered and quality controlled by tertiary education providers, are clearly needed to overcome the biases and knowledge gaps. The vocational approach taken by NEMA recently is not consistent with the significant and increasing number of NEMA and staff from with emergency management responsibilities from a wide range of other departments and organisations pursuing academic qualifications in emergency at Massey University and other tertiary providers.

We strongly recommend that the new primary and/or secondary legislation enables and if necessary requires an accredited degree programme as part of the professionalisation of emergency management in Aotearoa New Zealand, as all other professions do.

We also recommend that the new legislation recognises the crucial role of universities and research entities in continually better understanding hazards, consequences, and comprehensive emergency management to mitigate those hazards and their associated risks,

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Given the crucial role of farmed animals, marine life, and native and introduced wildlife in our national culture, economy, and natural environment, it is concerning that animals don't receive significantly more attention in the existing emergency management legislative, guidance, and practice contexts, as well as this discussion document.

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Lessons from recent large-scale marine mammal stranding, oil and other toxic material spills from wrecked marine vessels, Mycoplasma Bovis and Avian Influenza, the North Island Severe Weather Emergencies, and other emergencies at home and abroad, make it abundantly clear that the wellbeing of wild, farmed, domestic, and companion animals has to begin significantly higher recognition in the Emergency Management Bill and future planning, capability building, and response and recovery.

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The step-change necessary to lift the wellbeing of companion, productive, and wild animals in all phases of emergency management can only meaningly fully be achieved through Option 3, supported by Option 2.

Without further clarification Option 4 is not currently justified, although it may well be in future, once the work in Options 2 and 3 are progressed.

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

This question is perplexing as it doesn't reflect the statutory intent, or international and Aotearoa New Zealand animal welfare in emergencies policy, planning, and practice, where the wellbeing of humans is inextricably linked to the wellbeing of animals in a wide range of contexts – directly or indirectly.

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The agency-focused approach suggested in Option 2, where Fire and Emergency New Zealand's implied animal rescue role could be expanded, does nothing to encourage and enable an all-of-society approach to animal wellbeing in business as usual, individual or small group animal incidents, and more importantly risk analysis and awareness, resilience, reduction, readiness, response and recovery to larger scale local, regional, or national emergencies.

Supporting and enabling animal-focused businesses and collectives, and animal rescue and welfare-focused NGOs, to develop and maintain effective capabilities would be more effective and efficient than attempting to load more responsibility and considerable expense on agencies that are not structured, funded, or mandated for those roles.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

A more joined-up approach to animal wellbeing should be established in Aotearoa New Zealand's emergency management context. The current location of animal "welfare"

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and, perhaps arguably, animal rescue within the overall CIMS "Welfare" function doesn't give the wide-ranging practice and subject of animal wellbeing in risk and emergency management planning and 4Rs sufficient attention. This is particularly true when other than companion animals are significant parts of the risk and 4Rs context.

The mandates for MPI, DoC, and local authorities to be responsible for animal wellbeing in the productive, natural environment, and domestic settings respectively should be expanded on significantly in the Emergency Management Bill, with a significant community-focused, collaborative approach required.

Large land animal rescue would benefit from much more of an industry-owned and driven approach than the implicitly Fire and Emergency NZ mandate at present, with MPI taking substantially more responsibility than is currently the case. With NEMA, CDEM Groups, and local authorities having support and assurance roles at their respective levels.

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## Objective 4: Minimising disruption to essential services

### Issue 11: Reducing disruption to the infrastructure that provides essential services

#### Issue 11.1: Narrow definition of "lifeline utility"

We have identified options to extend emergency management responsibilities to a broader range of infrastructure that provides essential services.

*Refer to pages 50–52 and Appendix C of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**61. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The desire expressed to expand the definition of "critical infrastructure", and abandon the idiosyncratic "lifeline utilities" title, is essential to future resilience-building and 4Rs emergency management in relation to critical infrastructure.

Use of the term "business continuity planning" is very narrow and fails to capture the broader focuses needed in relation to reduction, readiness, response and recovery. Having the most well developed business continuity plans possible, no matter how good, will not protect infrastructure of the communities dependent on them from the impact of significant hazards.

Given many of the entities, their infrastructure and services, and those who use them are not commercial in nature, raining the question if "business" is an appropriate term either. This has been grappled with for some time in the USA where the more inclusive and active term "Continuity of Operations" or "Continuity of Operations Planning" has been developed. "COOP" for short, so as to avoid confusion with "COP" or "Common Operating Picture". The emphasis being on finding more robust solutions to continuity risks than the traditional BCP approach.

https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org/ncp/coop_brochure.pdf

Emphasis on critical infrastructure and services themselves, and building resilience and redundancy within them risks missing the need to identify, enable, and celebrate efforts, cultural shifts, and investments by communities, households, businesses, and other organisations to establish and maintain their own alternatives and resilience to the potential loss of access to critical infrastructure and services.

Grocery retailers should be regarded to be critical infrastructure at the local and regional level at least, rather than only the logistics chains leading to retailers.

**62. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 3 is the only option with any possibility of bringing about the changes necessary.

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**63. If we introduced a principles-based definition of "essential infrastructure", are there any essential services that should be included or excluded from the list in Appendix C of the discussion document?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**64. If you think other essential services should be included in the list in Appendix C, what kinds of infrastructure would they cover?**

Please explain your views.

Fuel and grocery retailers

**65. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.2: Strengthening lifeline utility business continuity planning

We have identified options to ensure lifeline utilities have planned effectively for disruption to their services.

*Refer to pages 52–54 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**66. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The approach taken to this issue puts all of the responsibility for energy, transport, water services, groceries, fuel, telecommunications, and financial service providers exclusively with individual operators, with little if any emphasis being put on communities, businesses, and others dependent on critical infrastructure services, including other critical infrastructure providers.

The emphasis on "business continuity plans" represents very much outmoded thinking, when requiring comprehensive risk identification and resilience investment has been demonstrated over the past few decades to produce far more effective and sustained improved resilience outcomes. The approach taken in the section reflects the overly response focused mindset, rather than further embedding and enabling comprehensive, collaborative risk management approaches that have proven to be highly successful in several CDEM Group areas.

**67. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The draconian approach suggested is unlikely to result in the desired enhanced resilience any more than a public-facing resilience assurance programme. Critical infrastructure providers would be more sensitive to reputational risk from not measuring

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up to current, aspirational targets, and progress toward enhanced resilience than they would be to financial penalties.

NEMA imposing penalties on underperforming providers would not be at all conducive to building the relationships necessary across the 4Rs.

A modified, assurance-based version of Option 2 is likely to be the most constructive, effective and efficient available to improve resilience across an expended critical infrastructure sector.

**68. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 11.3: Barriers to cooperation and information sharing

We have identified options to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between lifeline utilities, CDEM Groups, and other agencies.

*Refer to pages 54–57 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**69. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Generalising from one CDEM Group area and one emergency response is not necessarily a valid basis for nationwide system changes such as those discussed here.

Many regions have considerably more cooperative, trusted, and effective critical infrastructure risk and emergency management partnerships than were in place in the Hawkes Bay region at the time of Cyclone Gabrielle. These more effective partnerships have been developed over decades of committed leadership, giving life to the critical infrastructure resilience aspects of the CDEM Act.

If any organisation didn't meet the critical infrastructure expectations of the CDEM Act in that context, it was more the CDEM Group and its member authorities in enabling a relatively laissez faire approach to critical infrastructure in their region.

**70. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Combination of Options 2 to 5, ideally developed and planned to be further developed and deployed across the 10-year timeframe of the next National Resilience Strategy. Detailed initiatives could then be included in a properly planned, socialised, and resourced progressive resilience and capability maturity development and assurance plan appended to the Strategy and reflected in the new National Emergency Management Plan.

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**71. Because emergencies happen at different geographical scales, coordination is often needed at multiple levels (local and national). Do you have any views about the most effective way to achieve coordination at multiple levels?**

Please explain your views.

A considerably more mature local, regional, and national, even international, approach is essential for effective critical infrastructure resilience and broader risk emergency management outcomes to be achieved. The current practice of "local" meaning with hyper-local, local, regional, or meta-regional, and potentially all of these at once is confused and confusing for all involved. A properly layered and networked approach to critical infrastructure, local and regional economies, and communities of interest, is essential in the complex interconnected world that we all inhabit.

A complex set of systems requires a properly systems-based approach and methodologies.

**72. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 12: Strengthening central government business continuity

We have identified options to ensure central government organisations have planned effectively for disruption to their services. This includes options to expand the range of central government organisations recognised in the Act.

*Refer to pages 57–60 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**73. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The problem has been relatively well outlined.

**74. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

A comprehensive solution applying all Options 2 through 5 are likely to be necessary within a five year programme organisational education, baseline assessment of current continuity of operations capabilities, development of staged maturity target to be achieved by participating organisations, peer agency assurance, and finally independent assessment against requirements under the auspices of the Director and Minister, or a newly created independent Inspector General of Emergency Management.

A staged programme of developing, socialising, adopting, and implementing the options proposed would provide a sound and progressively affordable approach to enhancing business continuity capabilities and overall organisational and system resilience.

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**75. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

The assurance component of the solution is another function where an independent expert assurance, in the form of an Inspector General of Emergency Management, would likely be able to be more objective and constructively critical than the Director of Emergency Management.

## Other problems relating to this objective

**76. Should we consider any other problems relating to minimising disruption to essential services?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 5: Having the right powers available when an emergency happens

### Issue 13: Managing access to restricted areas

We have identified options to improve the way cordons are managed.

*Refer to pages 61–63 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**78. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Providing verified and verifiable simple IDs for each of the wide range of activity types likely to be necessary in emergency readiness, response, and recovery will be a significant exercise, but one which will be worth the investment.

**79. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Options 2 to 4 are essential to improving this situation, with the identification of critical service providers being a priority so that are available for use in a wide range of emergency situations, not only states of emergency under the Emergency Management Bill sooner rather than later.

Significantly improved accredited cordon management training for range of agencies and NGOs will be essential for IDs to realise their potential value. In that sense, Option 2 alone could make a significant difference in its own right.

**80. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Local government, NEMA, DPMC, Police, Fire and Emergency New Zealand, Emergency Response Teams, NZDF, Red Cross, and critical infrastructure personnel with field response personnel and response planning, coordination and management personnel should be required to have acquired accredited qualifications in emergency management that include cordon and security planning, management, and delivery.

Training programmes for this and a wide range of other functions should be developed and delivered by training and education providers. Informed by experience in, reviews of, and research into cordon and security management in emergency contexts.

### Issue 14: Clarifying who uses emergency powers at the local level

We have identified options to ensure emergency powers sit with the most appropriate people at the local government level.

*Refer to pages 63–65 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

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**81. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The current assignment of emergency powers to CDEM Groups, who must then delegate those powers to Group, and where appointed, Local Controllers is a clumsy and unnecessary anomaly in the legislation.

The description provided for this issue doesn't go far enough in that is doesn't capture the clear and present risk of the currently being no effective standards for the appointment, retention, continuous learning, and retirement of Controllers and Recovery managers.

The issue description also lacks coverage of the role of Police officers who have the same powers of Controllers available to them during declared states of emergency, without consistent standardised training in the function, or any requirement for Police officers likely to be in a position where they will have recourse to those powers to establish and maintain relationships with respective local, regional, or national controllers.

Similarly, and potentially of more concern, the emergency powers available to "authorised officers" under the Fire and Emergency New Zealand Act, and "authorised persons" under the Building Act, during emergency situations, including declared states of emergency, are matters of significant potential conflict and confusing. As the powers of the "authorised" individuals are enshrined in their respective legislation is essential that the new Emergency Management legislation clarifies the respective relative roles, responsibilities and powers.

There is often confusion between the status of "local" emergencies or transition periods declared at the level of one or more local authority, with Local Controllers and or Recover Managers leading the respective efforts, and potentially a wider state of "local" emergency or transition period also being in effect, with regional-level Group controller and recovery managers leading at that level.

**82. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Option 2 is the recommended approach from our perspective, but a substantially more significant approach a "tidy up" is required.

The addition of at least two other levels of declaration are also required: "major incident" and "regional emergency". With a "major incident" able to be declared by local, regional, or national senior management of the respective hazard lead agency/ies.

**83. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Create new classes of state of emergency and recovery at the regional level, removing the deep-seated confusion caused by the term "local" being applied to micro-local, local, multi-local, and regional scale emergencies and their respective declarations.

As significant small-scale but serious incident necessitating significant coordinated response, and potentially lead and controlled by a lead hazard agency other than a "Local Controller" could be entitled a "major incident" as they have been successfully for around a decade in the UK.

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Multi-local authority or otherwise more significant emergencies within a region, or affecting one or more regions, would best be entitled "regional emergencies".

## Issue 15: Modernising the process to enter a state of emergency or transition period

We have identified options to remove the requirement for a physical signature to declare a state of emergency or give notice of a transition period.

*Refer to pages 65–66 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**84. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

This is a perennial problem that can easily be resolved with the application of technology already available.

**85. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

The benefits of the approach proposed in Options 2 and 3 would far outweigh any risks posed.

**86. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 16: Mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices

We have identified options to make mayors' role in local state of emergency declarations and transition period notices more explicit.

*Refer to pages 66–68 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**87. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

The description provided does not cover the range of potential and actual complications and points of conflict in the current declaration arrangements.

The limitation of declarations being required to be based on a ward or district fails to take into account the reality that emergencies do not respect local government boundaries.

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**88. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

A more refined application of Options 2 and 3 would be optimal.

**89. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Mayors, deputy mayors, and at least one other delegated elected member should be empowered to declare "local" states of emergency for their district or unitary authority, wards, or smaller defined areas.

While the regional Emergency Management Group chair, deputy chair, and at least one other delegated member should be empowered to declare a "regional" state of emergency or transition period where more significant emergency is likely to or has occurred, where the need for regional-level coordination leadership and leadership exercised by a "Regional" Controller is necessary or desirable.

### Other problems relating to this objective

**90. Are there any circumstances where Controllers or Recovery Managers may need other powers to manage an emergency response or the initial stages of recovery more effectively?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other comments

**91. Do you have any other comments relating to reform of New Zealand's emergency management legislation?**

Occasionally during emergencies mayors and occasionally councillors take on an overly operational or management-focused role that inhibits the mana and effectiveness of statutorily appointed Local and Group Controllers and Recovery Managers, to the detriment of the cohesion and effectiveness of response efforts and recovery programmes. Sometimes to the extent that lives and broader well beings are put unnecessarily at risk.

It would be helpful for all concerned if the leadership role of elected members, including mayors and regional Emergency Management Groups chairs, was outlined in the new Emergency Management Bill, to better ensure that elected members stay in their governance lane and not unduly involve themselves in management or operations, and that partner organisations, the media, and the public can more readily and better understand the role of governance in emergency management as well.

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## Submitter information

Any information you provide will be stored securely.

### Your name, email address, and organisation

| | |
|---|---|
| Name: | Stacy Vallis, Chairperson, ICOMOS Aotearoa New Zealand |
| Email address: | s9(2)(a) |
| Organisation: (if applicable) | ICOMOS Aotearoa New Zealand (ICOMOS ANZ) |

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# Consultation questions

These questions relate to the issues and options raised in the discussion document *Strengthening New Zealand's emergency management legislation*. You can find the full discussion document on NEMA's website.

**You do not need to answer all questions.**

## Objectives for reform

The Government's proposed objectives for reform are to:

- strengthen community and iwi Māori participation in emergency management
- provide for clear responsibilities and accountabilities at the national, regional, and local levels
- enable a higher minimum standard of emergency management
- minimise disruption to essential services
- ensure agencies have the right powers available when an emergency happens.

*Refer to pages 8–9 of the discussion document to answer the question in this section.*

**1. Have we identified the right objectives for reform?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We consider that the necessary improvements in the protection of cultural heritage, particularly in emergency preparedness, response and recovery, relate to, and can be addressed under this set of objectives.

## Objective 1: Strengthening community and iwi Māori participation

### Issue 1: Meeting the diverse needs of people and communities

We have identified options to ensure the emergency management system better meets the diverse needs of communities, with a particular focus on those who may be disproportionately affected during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 10–13 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**2. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We particularly support recognition of the issue as described in Issue 1, paragraph 40, p.10-11.

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3. **Are there other reasons that may cause some people and groups to be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

In terms of cultural heritage, we note that sites of significance to Māori such as archaeological sites, urupā and marae are often located in coastal areas. Therefore, in the case of some types of natural events, cultural heritage may be particularly vulnerable.

4. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Options 1 and 2 would have very limited impact. Option 3 – which would require CDEM Group plans to include how people and communities that may be disproportionately affected will be planned for – needs to be more than a plan, and more of an active programme, in order to be effective. CDEM Groups need to work to build relationships with and build the capacity of communities in question, and in regards to cultural heritage, input of heritage professionals (as appropriate) may be necessary assist with work to identify and prioritise cultural heritage, the risks to cultural heritage, and risk reduction measures, as well as response planning. Option 4 – some disproportionately affected communities may be appropriately consulted at the national level, so options 3 and 4 could effectively work together.

5. **What would planning look like (at the local and national levels) if it was better informed by the needs of groups that may be disproportionately affected by emergencies?**

Please explain your views.

Planning would be more targeted, informed by community priorities, and more specific to the needs of each relevant group.

6. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 2: Strengthening and enabling iwi Māori participation in emergency management

We have identified options to recognise the contributions made by iwi Māori in emergency management, to the benefit of all people in New Zealand.

*Refer to pages 13–16 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

7. **Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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8. **Have we accurately captured the roles that iwi Māori play before, during and after emergencies?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Another aspect is iwi Māori undertaking effective risk reduction and emergency response for their cultural heritage, informed by traditional knowledge and expertise.

9. **Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

10. **How should iwi Māori be recognised in the emergency management system?**

Please explain your views.

There should be formal recognition and a formalised role at regional and national levels. We support establishment of a national emergency management advisory group. We support options 3, 4 and 5. Options 1 and 2 would be ineffective in addressing the issue. In an emergency response, policies and guidelines do not hold much weight – but embedding a role for iwi Māori into the functional emergency management system ensures a seat at the table and would guarantee the option for participation. Funding and support may be necessary to support iwi Māori in their role.

11. **What should be the relationship between Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

12. **What should be the relationship between Coordinating Executive Groups and iwi Māori?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

13. **What would be the most effective way for iwi Māori experiences and mātauranga in emergency management to be provided to the Director?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

14. **Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Issue 3: Strengthening and enabling community participation in emergency management

We have identified options to improve communities' ability to participate in emergency management. This includes making it easier for individuals, businesses, and other community organisations to offer resources to the "official" emergency response.

*Refer to pages 16–18 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**15. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

We support the intent to strengthen the participation of communities in emergency response and recovery. This is of particular relevance to cultural heritage because of the knowledge, stewardship, connection communities have to heritage places.

There is a strong link with community participation in emergency management and cultural heritage places that is not articulated. The document doesn't make the link between a community's role (as guardians of cultural heritage who can undertake risk reduction and response and contribute their knowledge) and the important role of heritage to community wellbeing and sustainable recovery. Many cultural heritage places are cared for by volunteers, and members of the local community. Whilst they hold important information on their heritage places and collections, they may lack the expertise and resources to identify and reduce risks in advance of events and to plan and undertake the emergency response. There is available guidance and expertise in the heritage sector to support community participation in heritage emergency management to support the recovery of heritage.

We note, for example, the active ICOMOS scientific committee - ICOMOS Australia/Aotearoa New Zealand Joint Scientific Committee on Risk Preparedness (JSC-ANZCORP), which includes local experts in risk reduction and resilience for heritage places.

**16. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

We can see benefit in Option 2 if it were to address the specific requirements of cultural heritage risk reduction and response, informed by the heritage sector. We note the existing HNZPT Guidance for Preparing Heritage Risk Management Plans as an example of excellent existing guidance that is underutilised. https://hnzpt-rpod-assets.azureedge.net/cmdnw500/guidance-preparing-heritage-risk-mgt-plans.pdf Guidance alone is not sufficient however – there needs to be an active sharing of information and a roll out programme with support to owners and stewards of heritage places.

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**17. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

ICOMOS is UNESCO's principal advisor in matters concerning the conservation and protection of historic monuments and sites. ICOMOS ANZ has access to local, national and international guidance on disaster risk management for cultural heritage.

We note that in Japan, emergency response is part of the culture, with communities actively involved in risk reduction and response. For example, community members in wooden historic districts practice using fire-fighting equipment regularly. Heritage places are used as evacuation centres. Heritage and community are embedded into emergency response.

## Issue 4: Recognising that people, businesses and communities are often the first to respond in an emergency

We have identified options to address barriers that may stop people, businesses, and communities from acting during an emergency.

*Refer to pages 18–19 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**18. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**19. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**20. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Other problems relating to this objective

**21. Should we consider any other problems relating to community and iwi Māori participation?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Objective 3: Enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management

### Issue 8: Stronger national direction and assurance

#### Issue 8.1: Strengthening the Director's mandate to set expectations and monitor performance

We have identified options to enable a wider range of mandatory standards to be set, and strengthen the Director's ability to provide assurance about the performance of the emergency management system.

*Refer to pages 36–37 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**40. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**41. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**42. Which aspects of emergency management would benefit from greater national consistency or direction?**

Please explain your views.

Heritage emergency response would benefit from greater national consistency and direction. For example, in terms of locational data and information available on heritage places of importance (e.g. architectural plans) can help structural engineers identify buildings that are at risk of collapse after an earthquake. A national programme and digital platform for document collation has been identified as a necessary tool through meetings by an MBIE led Building Management in Emergency Heritage Technical Working Group. National training and guidance on the assessment and temporary stabilisation of heritage buildings was also identified as a gap through this process. Initial findings of the Technical Working Group are summarised in an NZSEE conference paper - *New Zealand emergency management of built heritage: Insights and recommendations from a gap analysis study* that we have attached to this submission.

We also note that many centres and parts of the broad heritage sector (GLAM, HNZPT, TLAs, NZCCM) have developed guidance and run training on aspects of heritage emergency management – however this is not currently nationally coordinated.

**43. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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**50. What practical barriers may be preventing CDEM Group plans from being well integrated with other local government planning instruments?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**51. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**52. Do you think more fundamental changes are needed to enable local authorities to deliver effective hazard risk management? If so, why?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

## Issue 10: Strengthening due consideration of taonga Māori, cultural heritage and animals during and after emergencies

### Issue 10.1: Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on taonga Māori and other cultural heritage is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 43–45 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**53. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☒ Yes ☒ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

There is more we would like to expand on in terms of the problem. ICOMOS is an international non-governmental organisation that has access to international guidance and training on disaster risk management for heritage places.

We note that the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 recognises the role of cultural heritage as a component of disaster risk management, and highlights the importance of protecting sites of historical, cultural heritage, and religious interest in the aftermath of a disaster.

We are concerned that the New Zealand emergency management framework lacks a formalised role for heritage experts and note that this contributes to the avoidable loss of heritage buildings – see for example the international case study of Christchurch following the Canterbury Earthquakes ('Analysis of Case Studies in Recovery and

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Reconstruction', ICOMOS-ICCROM, 2020 https://www.iccrom.org/publication/analysis-case-studies-recovery-and-reconstruction-volumes-1-and-2-and-reports).

In New Zealand, we note the lack of a legislative, policy or procedural base to support the role of heritage experts in emergency management or in the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) in a nationally consistent manner despite cultural and historic heritage assets bring recognised as one of eleven response objectives in the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015 (Part 8. Response, S.113).

ICOMOS Aotearoa NZ acknowledges that Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga (HNZPT) has an identified role in response and recovery through the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015 (S.80), but we note that the heritage sector is broad and includes a range of experts and agencies (engineering, architecture, archaeology, conservators, the GLAM sector, TLA heritage advisors) who have the potential to make a valuable contribution to emergency response and recovery. Additional capacity beyond that contained within HNZPT is likely to be required for significant events which impact large numbers of heritage places. In addition, community heritage identified and protected in District Plans often goes beyond what is recognised on the HNZPT List.

Within Aotearoa New Zealand, we consider a formalised role for the heritage sector in emergency response would assist in improving the capability and capacity for civil defence emergency management, as sought by outcome 2 of Ministerial Review Terms of Reference – Better responses to natural disasters and other emergencies in New Zealand (1 June 2017) 'Agencies with specialist capabilities...are knitted into the fabric of a response'.

There are examples of international initiatives that address disaster risk management and the role of heritage experts and professionals in emergency management internationally, for example through a nationally co-ordinated specialist heritage response team that if employed locally, could make a positive contribution to emergency management responses, heritage retention and, in turn community recovery.

Assessment guidelines and procedures specific to built heritage are necessary in order to appropriately provide for cultural heritage in emergencies. Cultural heritage has historic materials, and non-standard construction details, which requires a different understanding and approach to standard structural damage assessments of more contemporary buildings and structures after an event. This was strongly evident in the case of the Christchurch earthquake (2010/11) response.

There is also a need for a collaborative approach between the heritage and emergency management sectors during the emergency response phase, which could be enabled through formalised roles for heritage specialists in emergency management, through relationship building, and provision of information and training in advance of emergency events.

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A team of New Zealand heritage professionals have reviewed international best practice and developed a project to improve the current post-disaster emergency response for built heritage. This is outlined in two papers presented at the NZSEE conference, in 2024 and 2025.

- *Improving post-earthquake emergency management for built heritage*. C. Caponi et. al., New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering NZSEE Conference paper, 2025 https://repo.nzsee.org.nz/bitstream/handle/nzsee/2759/Caponi.pdf?sequence=1
- *New Zealand emergency management of built heritage: Insights and recommendations from a gap analysis study*. C. Caponi et. al., New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering NZSEE Conference paper, 2025

These papers have informed our submission and are attached for your reference.

In 2024, an MBIE-led Building Management in Emergency Heritage Technical Working Subgroup undertook gap analysis to identify key areas for improvement of the emergency response management of heritage buildings. The 2025 NZSEE conference paper attached to our submission details the gap analysis and outlines goals and milestones for six possible areas of improvement in the New Zealand regulatory framework. System improvements in the collation and sharing of geospatial data in relation to heritage assets were identified as one of the key factors to enhance inter-agency collaboration in disaster recovery. The actions proposed in the 2025 NZSEE Conference paper would allow Building Response Managers to improve efficiency and maintain effective operational pacing in future emergency response events.

**54. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

ICOMOS NZ supports Option c. for Issue 10.1 Considering taonga Māori and other cultural heritage during and after emergencies – to strengthen planning expectations through secondary legislation. We consider this could be undertaken in conjunction with Option b. – developing guidance on consideration taonga and other cultural heritage.

A mix of legislative and non-legislative actions are set out in two recent NZSEE conference papers referred to above and attached to our submission.

In particular the attached NZSEE papers identify actions to build the capability and capacity of the emergency management workforce (one of the five focus areas identified in 'Strengthening Disaster Resilience and Emergency Management: Legislative Implications', para 11) by provision of heritage expert advice and processes to provide for the specific requirements of heritage buildings and places in emergencies.

**55. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

- Consider establishing a heritage technical advisory group, given the established importance of heritage to community resilience, recovery and wellbeing.

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- Reinstate Heritage EQUIP funding as this made a significant contribution to reducing seismic risk for earthquake prone (EPB) heritage buildings

The following options are from: New Zealand emergency management of built heritage: Insights and recommendations from a gap analysis study. C. Caponi et. al., New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering NZSEE Conference paper, 2025

- Introduce processes to enable temporary securing works for heritage buildings during emergency response.
- Deploy heritage experts to undertake or support Rapid Building Assessment activities.
- Work with HNZPT/ TLAs/Heritage professionals to undertake prioritisation of heritage places in advance of an event.
- Clarify HNZPT's role and functions within the emergency response framework.
- Reinforce effective collaboration between HNZPT, TA heritage advisors, CDEM and RBA personnel in emergency response.
- Allocate public funds in advance of events in order to support heritage building assessments, strengthening/repairs options and feasibility studies in the response phase.

## Issue 10.2: Considering animals during and after emergencies

We have identified options to ensure the impacts of emergencies on pets, working animals, wildlife, and livestock is considered appropriately.

*Refer to pages 45–47 of the discussion document to answer the questions in this section.*

**56. Do you agree with how we have described this problem?**

☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Not sure / no preference

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**57. Do you have any comments about the likely impacts (benefits, costs, or risks) of the initial options we have identified? Do you have any preferred options?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**58. Noting that human life and safety will always be the top priority, do you have any comments about how animals should be prioritised relative to the protection of property?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

**59. Are there any other options that should be considered?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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## Other problems relating to this objective

**60. Should we consider any other problems relating to enabling a higher minimum standard of emergency management?**

Please explain your views.

Insert response

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NEW ZEALAND SOCIETY FOR EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING

# Improving post-earthquake emergency management for built heritage.

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## ABSTRACT

The emergency response to a natural disaster is one of the most challenging activities for local and national authorities. They must act quickly and effectively – as delays and mistakes could cost lives and prolong recovery time. The success of the emergency response relies on clear regulation, well-established procedures, and the availability of trained personnel with access to effective technology.

New Zealand's emergency response framework, which is currently under review, is characterised by a lack of assessment guidelines and procedures specific to built heritage. This was one factor that contributed to the loss of almost half of the central city's protected heritage buildings in Ōtautahi-Christchurch following the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. Overseas experience demonstrates the benefits of integrating heritage expertise within the disaster risk management response to facilitate better informed decisions. This paper, for example, considers the Italian system as a possible exemplar model.

Due to their heritage values, historic materials, and non-standard construction details, the assessment of built heritage presents additional complexity when compared to the assessment of more contemporary buildings and structures. This paper outlines a proposed pathway to bridge the current gap in the New Zealand regulatory framework and develop emergency response procedures to facilitate the effective emergency management and rapid assessment of built heritage. Improvement in New Zealand's regulation and industry practice would help reduce the loss of built heritage following future seismic events.

# 1 INTRODUCTION

The emergency response is one of the most challenging activities for local and national authorities responsible for providing post-disaster support (e.g. National Emergency Management Agency, Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups, Fire and Emergency New Zealand, councils, and central Government). They must act quickly and effectively to avoid delays and mistakes that could cost lives and disrupt recovery. Success relies on clear legislation, well-established and tested procedures, well-trained personnel, and effective technical tools.

These elements become crucial during an emergency to maximise efficiency in a process that, by default, may involve multiple iterations. The response operations are complex and may require, for example, different site inspections to be performed for the same site - initially to check for people who are injured or trapped, and to carry out rescue. Then to perform rapid damage assessment, and again to install temporary securing works (if required). In the case of earthquake sequences, inspections may be required after each subsequent seismic event.

While the current New Zealand emergency response framework is world-leading in many respects, it lacks assessment guidelines and specific procedures for built heritage. Due to their heritage values, non-standard construction details, and historic materials, the assessment of built heritage presents a higher level of complexity when compared to the assessment of contemporary buildings and structures.

In 2021, a group of heritage professionals developed a project to address this gap in New Zealand's regulation and operational framework, and to improve the emergency response procedures for the assessment and management of heritage places. The project group consists of heritage engineers, council officers, Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga (HNZPT) heritage advisors, and conservation architects, and currently includes the authors of this paper, along with Fiona Wykes and Win Clark.

The project proposal is based on training, research, and first-hand local and overseas field-experience in post-disaster response. It includes international best practice for disaster risk management of cultural heritage; particularly, advice from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the International Centre for the Study and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), ICOMOS Australia/Aotearoa New Zealand Joint Scientific Committee on Risk Preparedness (JSC-ANZCORP), and Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga (HNZPT).

This paper is intended to present the project proposal to the wider engineering industry:

- To socialise the underlying principles.
- To gather feedback to guide refinements to the proposal.
- To seek support from those involved in disaster risk management in Aotearoa New Zealand.

## 1.1 Background information

In the last decade, New Zealand has refined its emergency response procedures, and in 2015 the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) released new post-earthquake rapid assessment forms and field guidelines. The post-earthquake rapid assessment forms were revised again in 2022 and a new template was released in 2023 (MBIE 2023). Forms, guidelines, and procedures were, however, generally tailored to suit the assessment of ordinary structures – such as residential and commercial buildings built in the late 20$^{th}$ and early 21$^{st}$ centuries – with little provision for built heritage. This is problematic, as historic structures are usually characterized by a complex seismic response, and their emergency management may require input from multiple agencies who work within the Building Act 2004, Resource Management Act 1991, and the

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Heritage New Zealand Pouhere Taonga Act 2014. This apparent gap in the New Zealand's emergency response operation processes and procedures may result in the irredeemable loss of heritage monuments and buildings in future seismic events.

Retrospective post-disaster analysis demonstrates that response procedures can have a detrimental effect on built heritage that exceeds the damage from the disaster itself (Stevens 2015). A recent example is Christchurch, where hundreds of historic buildings were demolished in the emergency response following the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. In the absence of specific emergency response procedures, inspectors with little or no experience of historic constructions were put in the unenviable position of having to assess the structural capacity of heritage buildings without suitable technical support or training (Marriot 2011) (McLean et al 2012) (Sage 2013) (Stevens 2014) (Forbes 2017) (ICOMOS 2021). This contributed to a conservative approach that generally favoured demolition over possible alternatives – which could have been based on a more realistic estimation of the residual seismic capacity of the structure and the possibility of installing prompt temporary stabilisation works. In most cases valuable debris (heritage fabric) and building contents were disposed of in general waste, losing their inherent value and the possibility for sustainable re-use.

## 1.2 Why protect our built heritage?

Heritage is a legacy from the past, that is valued today, and is preserved for the use and enjoyment of future generations (ICOMOS 2010) (MCH 2018) (CCC 2019). Experience from around the world shows that cultural heritage forms part of our shared sense of identity and fosters community resilience. Heritage can play a fundamental role in the recovery process – as a focal point for communities to gather, grieve, and find the strength to rebuild (Craigo 1998a) (Spennemann 1999) (Preserve America 2008a) (Al-Nammari & Lindell 2009) (Jha et al 2010) (UNESCO 2010) (CERA 2012) (Jigyasu et al 2013) (MacKee 2013) (NEMA 2019) (CCC 2019). Heritage plays an important role in resilience and urban regeneration, providing a tangible connection to our shared past. The survival of built heritage can encourage people to return to urban areas once regeneration is complete (FEMA 2005) (World Bank 2008) (Stevens 2014). A local example in Christchurch is New Regent Street, a historic site which became a "reef" of social and economic resilience within an area of cleared brown-field sites, and attracted new development at its margins (ICOMOS 2021).

The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction *Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030* (UNIDDR 2015) recognises the role of cultural heritage as a component of disaster risk management, and highlights the importance of protecting sites of historical, cultural heritage and religious interest in the aftermath of a disaster.

As the significance of heritage for community resilience and recovery has become internationally recognised in the last decade, new legislative policies have been developed to provide for heritage in emergencies. In New Zealand these include:

- Protection of heritage assets is a primary response objective in the *National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015* (Part 8 Response, Section 113).
- The *National Disaster Resilience Strategy* (NEMA 2019) which outlines a vision and goals for civil defence emergency management. It specifically recognises the importance of culture to resilience.
- The National Adaptation Plan (MfE 2022) identifies the need to minimise threats to cultural heritage from climate change, to increase the resilience of cultural heritage, and improve disaster management.
- The *Emergency Management Bill 2023* has a purpose to "improve and promote the sustainable management of hazards in order to contribute to the social, economic, cultural, and environmental well-being and safety of the public and also to the protection of property" (Part 1, S3. Purpose).



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### 1.3 How can we protect our heritage places?

Preventive strengthening works are certainly the best way to protect existing heritage buildings against potential damage induced by earthquake events (ICOMOS 2021). Nevertheless, adopting adequate rapid assessment procedures represents a key factor to safeguard heritage places from unnecessary loss after a major disaster (UNIDDR 2015).

## 2 BEST PRACTICE – OVERSEAS EXAMPLES

When considering the design of an effective emergency framework for heritage, the project group considered overseas models and examples. International best practice for heritage emergency response is included in key publications by organisations such as UNESCO, ICOMOS and ICCROM. A summary of these publications is considered by Stevens (2014 and 2015) and forms the basis for Table 1. Steven's original tabulated results have been updated, and the table also considers recently released guidelines and standards, including:

- ICCROM's *First Aid to Cultural Heritage in Times of Crisis Handbook*, (Tandon, 2018)
- HNZPT's *Guidance for Preparing Heritage Risk Management Plans,* (Maclean, 2022).
- ICCROM / INSARAG/ OCHA / UNESCO *Guidance Note on Urban Search and Rescue at Heritage Sites,* (Tandon, 2023)
- The Italian Emergency Response Framework as outlined in the current DPC Standards and MiBACT Guidelines (DPC 2013, 2020, and 2023), (MiBACT 2015), (CSRS2016, 2020).

ICCROM's *First Aid to Cultural Heritage in Times of Crisis Handbook* (Tandon 2018) is now one of the most important international resources and details the planning and implementation of a coordinated heritage response. The handbook includes a logical workflow of assessment, temporary securing, and recording and salvaging heritage materials. It advocates for:

- The collation of heritage data.
- Management of sources of supplies for heritage first aid.
- Creation of rapid and detailed assessment forms and templates
- Identification, training, and opportunities for multidisciplinary teams to engage in emergency response scenarios prior to an event.

The ICCROM methodology has been widely implemented by national and local teams in over 70 risk-prone countries and has been taught to over one thousand practitioners from the heritage and emergency management sectors since 2010.

A second recent publication by ICCROM – in collaboration with International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and UNESCO – is *The Guidance Note on Urban Search and Rescue at Heritage Sites*, (Tandon 2023). This document is a response to an international collective commitment to addressing the unique challenges of urban search and rescue operations at heritage sites, and was developed by heritage and emergency management specialists. It provides practical procedures and critical information for Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams, emergency management, and heritage authorities involved in operations at heritage sites affected by disasters, within the context of the International USAR Response Cycle.

Although the focus of Figure 1 is on published international guidance, the literature review for the project outlined in Section 3 of this paper is also based on the experience and training of the project team, and on international case-studies. Each emergency provides new lessons, and these are widely and actively shared in the international heritage community through in-person and online symposiums and published proceedings, with the aim to improve methodologies and continue to close knowledge and practice gaps.



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Recent case study collections covered by our literature review include Kealy, de Marco, Hadzimuhamedovic, Marchand, Gregory and Ploteau (2020), ACCU (2021 and 2022), ICOMOS (2021).

The literature analysis summarised in Figure 1 supports the need for a collaborative approach between the heritage and emergency management sectors during the emergency response phase and was used to establish the project methodology – described in Section 3 of this paper.

*Table 1: Planning for Response - Recommendations from international best-practice guidance on the emergency response for heritage places. This is adapted from Stevens (2014 & 2015).*

| Project Task | Recommendations. | UNESCO (Pichard 1985) | ICCROM (Feilden 1987) | National Trust for Historic Preservation (Nelson 1991) | California Preservation Foundation (Eichenfield 1996) | ICOMOS/ ICCROM/ UNESCO (Stovel 1998) | (Preserve America 2008) | NZHPT (McClean 2009) | World Bank (Jha et al 2010) | ICOMOS/ICORP (Jiguasu 2011) | California State Parks (CSPOHP 2014) | ICCROM (Tandon 2018) | HNZPT (Maclean et al 2022) | ICCROM (Tandon 2023) | Italian emergency framework |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| All | Involve conservation practitioners in emergency response planning. | • | | • | • | | • | • | • | | | • | | • | • |
| 2,3,4,6, 7,8 | Develop appropriate building condition assessment processes. | | | | | | • | | | • | | • | | • | • |
| 2,3 | Prepare and test "damage and risk assessment forms" tailored to local cultural heritage and provide for these to be collated and stored | | • | | | | | | | | | • | | | • |
| 2,3,4 | Develop a range of standard details for temporary repairs. | | | | | | • | | | | | | | • | • |
| 2,4 | Develop an appropriate property and material salvaging process. | | | | | | • | | | • | | | • | • | • |
| 4,5 | Identify conservation practitioners. Keep a list of contacts. | | | • | • | • | • | • | | • | • | • | • | • | • |
| 4,5 | Train conservation practitioners and emergency responders. | | • | • | | • | • | • | | • | • | • | • | • | • |
| 5 | Develop a peer-review system for rapid heritage building assessment | | | | | | | | | | | | | | • |
| 6 | Develop procedures for managing safeguarding cultural heritage activities for USAR. | | | | | | | | | | | | | • | • |
| 6 | Develop an appropriate demolition permitting process. | | | | | | • | | | • | | | | | • |
| 7 | Prepare an inventory of historic properties | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | • | | • | • |
| 7 | Prepare and maintain geo-locations of all significant heritage places. | | | | | | | | | | | • | | • | • |
| 7 | Prepare document files on each historic property for reference during emergency response (Significance/ values, floor plans). | • | • | • | | | | | | | | • | | • | • |

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## 2.1 Case study – Italian emergency response framework

The Italian emergency response (DPC 2013) (DPC 2020) (DPC 2023) (MiBACT 2015) (CSRS2016, 2020) is an advanced and effective framework that supports the local population and safeguards cultural heritage in a highly earthquake prone country. It achieves each criterion noted in Figure 1, and is an exemplar of an emergency response framework. An overview of the Italian emergency response for heritage is summarised as follows:

### 2.1.1 Italian emergency response framework

The Italian response framework consists of inter-institutional coordination centres that manage the main emergency response stakeholders: Civil Defence Department (DPC), Ministry of Heritage, Culture and Tourism (MiBACT), National Fire and Rescue Services (VV.F.), Territorial Authorities (TA), Armed and Police Forces, and volunteer services.

Coordination centres can be activated at different geographical levels depending on the scale of the disaster and the number of Territorial Authorities involved. When a Regional or National State of Emergency is declared, the DPC can activate the Local Emergency Management Authority (LEMA) and set up national coordination centres (DI.COMA.C.) on site.

This geographical modularity allows the Italian framework to be flexible and agile with response operations calibrated to the scale and extent of each emergency. The modular system ensures unity and consistency of the emergency response across the entire Italian territory. Heritage is embedded at each level, and there is support for good heritage outcomes for places that would otherwise be poorly resourced.

### 2.1.2 Emergency response main phases and stages for heritage

The coordination centres (COC, CCS and DI.COM.AC) implement the procedures and protocols developed for the three main phases of emergency response: rescue and immediate assistance to the population (PHASE I), rapid building damage assessments and building usability evaluation (PHASE II), installation of temporary securing works and reconstruction stage (PHASE III). The following is a summary of each phase with a focus on the response for heritage places.

- PHASE I is led by the VV.F. who undertake reconnaissance, triage, and assign a colour code, confirm safe and usable roads, provide access to critical zones, and begin the rescue operations.
- PHASE II is led by the DPC who, in coordination with the MiBACT, plan and arrange for rapid building assessments and usability evaluations. A summary of this phase includes that:
  - The MiBACT is responsible for the assessment of heritage and monumental structures, religious and cultural buildings (e.g. churches, theatres, cinemas, etc.), buildings housing heritage and cultural collections (e.g. archives, museums, libraries, palaces, etc.) as well as for their own (government owned) portfolio of buildings and assets.
  - The assessment of heritage places is generally assigned to teams with a diverse skillset (usually consisting of one MiBACT, one VV.F. and one or more National Technical Register (NTN) members).
  - Once assessments are complete, they are validated, and the results are sent to the TA. The TA informs building owners of the outcomes; confirms the building usability status (usable, partially usable, or not usable); and notifies any requirements for urgent temporary securing work.
  - The VV.F installs temporary securing works for some high-priority places.
- PHASE III is led by the MiBACT (for heritage places).

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- The MiBACT nominates teams of internal and external technical experts to inspect heritage sites and advise on stabilisation and repair. Methodologies and costs are reviewed, and MiBACT decides whether to install temporary securing works or to move directly to the design and installation of permanent strengthening solutions.
- The MiBACT manages collections, cataloguing, storage, and re-housing of valuable building debris (historic fabric) and movable historic items or collections.

### 2.1.3 The success of Italian emergency response framework: key-factors

The success of the Italian Emergency Response relies on the following factors:

- Deployment of technical heritage experts to undertake rapid building inspections and the establishment of a robust peer-review system to review and validate their assessment.
- Adoption of Rapid Building Assessment forms and comprehensive technical manuals specifically developed for each main heritage building typology.
- Development of an emergency database and information systems to provide, acquire, process, and share the data collected among the different government agencies and services.

### 2.1.4 Highly skilled and well-trained personnel

In Phase II, the DPC manages and oversees the Rapid Building Assessments (RBA). Assessor teams are created deploying specialised personnel from DPC, MiBACT and the National Technical Register (NTN). The NTN comprises technical experts and skilled professionals trained in post-disaster rapid assessments and whose competencies have been tested and certified. Depending on their level of training and expertise, the NTN members are divided into four tiers:

- TIER 1 – basic training on emergency response.
- TIER 2 – specialised technical training on the assessment of ordinary buildings and structures.
- TIER 3 – specialised technical training on the assessment of heritage monumental buildings and large-scale industrial/commercial buildings and structures.
- TIER 4 – advanced training on management and coordination of emergency response.

While TIER 1 is an open level, TIER 2, 3 and 4 are generally reserved for chartered professionals and national/international technical experts (e.g. university researchers or professors, etc.). The assessment of heritage buildings is only assigned to qualified and trained experts (NTN - TIER 3). This recognises the complexities associated with the assessment of built heritage and the importance of reliable results. Once completed, each assessment is peer-reviewed and validated by technical committees led by senior members of the DPC, MiBACT and NTN. The peer-review process ensures high standards for public safety, dependable outcomes, and consistency in the evaluation of the level of damage assessed by the different assessor teams.

### 2.1.5 Rapid Building Assessment forms and comprehensive technical manuals

To facilitate the assessment process and support good outcomes for heritage buildings, a suite of standardised Rapid Building Assessment forms (Schede AeDES) has been developed by the Italian Government and MiBACT. These forms address:

- Initial estimates of the scale of damage.
- Damage assessment and associated building usability status.
- Design, peer review, and installation of temporary/permanent repair, and strengthening solutions.



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- Protection of movable heritage items/collections during emergencies.

Tested in several real disasters, these standardised forms have proven to be invaluable in the management of buildings in emergencies. The use of these forms:

- Ensures consistency in the assessment process.
- Reduces the risk of omissions.
- Collects data to inform the decision-making process in the following emergency stages.
- Act as the official record for Government, TAs, and owners.

The effectiveness of the Italian Rapid Building Assessment (RBA) forms has been recognised worldwide and the forms have been adopted by many European countries as a reference model.

### 2.1.6 Emergency database and information systems

During the last few decades, the Italian TAs have commenced the migration of their building property archive, district plans, and emergency plans into a digital format – along with relevant data from DPC, MiBACT and VV.F. In preparation for disasters, these databases are used to define strategic actions to improve the preparedness of the various TAs against natural and anthropogenic (human-induced) hazard. During emergencies, these databases provide VV.F., DPC, MiBACT and NTN with information to plan and organise their operations. Shared information systems enhance collaboration and communication among government agencies during the emergency response. This allows government agencies to oversee emergency operations, monitor results, extrapolate potential trends, and identify upcoming issues in a timely manner.

## 3 PROJECT SCOPE

Based on national and overseas experience, and a review of international best practice, a team of New Zealand heritage professionals have developed a project to improve the current post-disaster emergency response for built heritage. The project is focused, initially, on improving the emergency response procedures for earthquake events. Once the main general tasks are completed, the proposed procedures can be adapted for use following other disasters, such as geophysical (e.g. landslides, tsunamis and volcanic activities), hydrological and climatological (e.g. avalanches and floods), and meteorological (e.g. cyclones and storms/wave surges) events. The main aim of this project is to:

- Advance collaboration between authorities and organizations involved in the emergency response. To agree mutual processes and goals, and to enhance the protection of heritage buildings.
- Assist MBIE to update current operation processes and procedures framework to include specific clauses for the assessment, stabilisation, and protection of heritage buildings during time of emergences.
- Develop post-earthquake rapid assessment forms and field books for heritage buildings and cultural sites.
- Arrange training courses on how to assess, document and stabilise damaged heritage buildings.
- Create a register of practitioners specifically trained to undertake rapid post-earthquake site inspections on heritage buildings.
- Create an electronic database reporting the most relevant information currently available on New Zealand heritage buildings.
- Develop a digital application to perform rapid post-earthquake assessment inspections using mobile devices.

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## 3.1 Project tasks

A first overview of the project tasks is proposed in the following paragraphs:

**TASK 1: Emergency and Post-Earthquake Rapid Assessment**

Adapt international best practice to create a heritage emergency response system for New Zealand for:

- The management and protection of heritage buildings in times of emergencies.
- Post-earthquake rapid assessment and stabilisation techniques.
- Salvage, rehousing, and storage of valuable debris and movable items.
- Documentation of heritage buildings and sites in case of partial or complete demolition.

**TASK 2: Typical seismic response and failure mechanisms for heritage buildings**

Classify the most common typologies of heritage buildings in New Zealand, considering typical construction techniques and architectural features. For each class, identify typical seismic response(s) and potential failure mechanisms. Summarise research outcomes in synoptic tables to provide comprehensive and accessible data on local traditional construction techniques for use by assessment teams.

**TASK 3: Post-Earthquake Rapid Assessment forms and field-book.**

Based on the outcomes from Task 1 and Task 2, develop new post-earthquake rapid assessment forms and field-books for the most common categories of heritage sites, including:

- Built heritage.
- Museums, libraries, archives, and other buildings that house significant collections.
- Other historic structures, monuments, archaeological and historic sites.

**TASK 4: Guidelines and training courses.**

Develop guidelines for the assessment of heritage places and risk management during state(s) of emergency. Arrange training courses for engineers, architects, conservators, and other heritage professionals. The training courses should include but not limited to the following topics:

- Health and safety and emergency evacuation.
- Damage assessment.
- Estimation of residual capacity of built heritage to withstand potential aftershocks.
- Structural stabilization, temporary securing works, weatherproofing.
- Documentation and rapid assessment forms.
- Salvage, rehousing and storage of historic fabric and movable items.
- Communications and team building.
- Real-time simulation of emergency scenarios.

**TASK 5: Post-Disaster Heritage Response Team**

Set up a register of practitioners for deployment in the event of a disaster. The practitioners enrolled in the register should have completed the training course outlined in TASK 4 and demonstrate proficiency in carrying out Rapid Post-Earthquake Assessment Inspections of built heritage. Establish a Post-Disaster Heritage Response Team to assist local and national authorities, by:

- Organising assessor teams to inspect heritage buildings and structures.
- Peer-reviewing and validating assessments carried out by inspectors.



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- Suggesting actions to manage the risk and protect heritage places during emergencies.

**TASK 6: Legislation and Policy Framework**

Assist MBIE in updating the current operation processes and procedures framework to include new procedures for the management of built heritage during emergencies. The new framework should regulate, but not be limited to, the following activities:

- Assessment of heritage places.
- Stabilisation and temporary securing works.
- Partial or complete demolitions.
- Collection and management of historic fabric and movable items.

**TASK 7: Heritage Electronic database**

Create an electronic database of heritage places and sites listed in the New Zealand Heritage List Rārangi Kōrero, scheduled in district and regional plans, and/or otherwise formally documented. The electronic database should collect information currently available for each site, including but not limited to:

- Location.
- Significance and heritage values.
- Building typology and year of construction.
- Plans, elevations, and sections.
- Relevant physical features.
- Materials, construction details.
- Significant moveable items or collections housed at the site.

The database should also include a catalogue of the construction techniques and construction details established in TASK 2. This would support the rapid assessment of sites where no specific information is available.

**TASK 8: Rapid Post- Earthquake Assessment for built heritage: digital application**

Develop a digital tool for Rapid Post-Earthquake Assessments using mobile devices. The application would allow users to:

- Complete assessment forms and record seismic status of the buildings assessed.
- Populate an electronic database that is accessible in real-time by all the authorities and parties involved in the emergency management.
- Establish damage trends and track the speed of the assessment process.
- Monitor the location of inspectors allowing early warnings to the rescue teams in case of aftershocks.
- Allow a faster review/validation of the assessments undertaken.

## 4 CONCLUSIONS

Although the emergency response framework in New Zealand is world-leading in many respects, it lacks assessment guidelines and specific procedures for built heritage. This gap in regulation and industry practice may result in the loss of built heritage and historic collections, which could in turn, impact community recovery following future disaster events.

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International literature identifies that heritage can play a fundamental role in the recovery process. Research on this topic has led international organisations such as UNESCO, ICOMOS and ICCROM to publish guidance on disaster risk management for heritage places, including for emergency response. Some countries have developed advanced and effective frameworks to safeguard cultural heritage in areas with high seismicity. This is the case of Italy, whose emergency framework has been discussed as a case-study in this paper.

This paper presents the work of a group of New Zealand heritage professionals, who propose a pathway for emergency response procedures that are specific to our shared cultural heritage. The project proposal is arranged into eight key tasks - from developing new tools for rapid assessment, to assisting MBIE in updating the current legislation and policy framework. The creation of procedures for the emergency response management of heritage places allows New Zealand to align with international best-practice – not only for the seismic design of new buildings and structures – but also for the post-disaster response management for its existing historic and heritage buildings.

We look forward to discussions on how to implement this proposed post-emergency response, which has been based on international best practice and tailored to fit New Zealand's heritage places.

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