

# Shared Projects Between Lifelines Groups ..... and Other Updates



#### **This Session**

- Recap on new arrangements for EQC's financial support for Lifelines Groups
- Encouraging as uniform as an approach as possible for vulnerability assessments and interdependency work
- Highlights from Stephanie Chang's recent presentations



# EQC Objectives for Funding of Regional Lifelines Groups

- 1. Encouraging risk reduction as a key element of increasing the resilience of NZ's infrastructure
- Facilitating improved collaboration between individual Lifeline Utilities, and local government, in relation to natural hazard risk that may lie between their respective jurisdictions for planning and risk management
- 3. Promoting the transfer and takeup of hazard and risk knowledge for recovery planning by Lifeline Utilities in order to support EQC's post-disaster response objectives of the timely re-occupancy and repair of residential accommodation





### New Arrangements for EQC's Financial Support of Lifelines Groups

- 1. Additional funding for the National Lifelines Forum
- Supporting those Groups with only nominal funding
- 3. Additional funding for specific projects



# Categorising Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies

- First-order assessment
  - Qualitative/ indicative identification of critical areas
- 'Lifelines Vulnerability Assessment'
  - Qualitative/ systematic assessment of importance and vulnerability
- Integrated risk modelling of regional networks
  - Quantitative/ comprehensive



#### **AELP-2: CRITICALITY DEFINITIONS**

#### Nationally Significant

- Failure would cause loss of utility supply to most of region or loss of supply to another nationally significant site that depends on its service.
- Eg: Auckland Airport, Otahuhu substation, Ardmore/Huia Water Tmt Plant, SH1 / SH16 / SH20


#### Regionally Significant

- Failure would cause loss of supply to more than 20,000 customers or reduction in service across the region or loss of supply to a regionally significant site
- •Eg: Main cellsite hubs and telephone exchanges, Army Bay/Orewa Wastewater Tmt Plant

#### Locally Significant

- Failure would cause loss of supply to more than 5,000 customers or reduction in service across part the region or loss of supply to a locally significant customer.
- Eg: Smaller water supplies (eg: Wellsford) & Wastewater tmt plants (Orewa).


#### Infrastructure Failure Interdependencies (IFIs)




## Barriers to Addressing IFIs

- Organizational interests are narrower than regional interests
- Security concerns impede information sharing
- Infrastructure managers often lack direct experience with extreme events

#### Disaster Resilience




# "Unfolding" - Part 1




<sup>\*</sup> propagating service disruptions

# "Unfolding" - Part 2




# "Unfolding" - Part 3



\* causing extensive physical damage

#### Intervention Points

#### Where can communities most effectively mitigate risk?



- 1. Prevent within-system failures & cascades
- 2. Prevent cross-system interdependent failures
- 3. Prevent second-wave functional deterioration
- 4. Prevent catastrophic
- 5. Enhance societal capacity to cope with disruptions