Infrastructure Resilience in Northland

Northland Lifelines Group October 2008



NLG – what have we achieved so far?

- Priority utility sites and routes
- Lifeline utility protocols and debriefs following events
- Hazard assessment workshops pandemic, cyclone
- Emergency communications review
 - Better relationships amongst utilities and with CDEM



'Infrastructure Resilience Outputs'

- An infrastructure 'risk profile' for the region
 - Potential cause of failures
 - Likelihood and consequence of failures.
 - Consequential impacts.
- Overview of our ability to respond and recover
 - Scope of existing planning
- More detailed review of highest risks
 - What are the critical resource constraints
 - Potential mitigation measures
 - Develop contingency plans where required



How will these outputs be used?

- Increased infrastructure resilience
 - information for other orgs risk mgt planning
 - basis for ongoing CDEM planning
 - better regional response to failures, and
 - potential improvements across the '4Rs



Project approach

- Focus on Level 2 5 emergencies
- Start with the helicopter view and then go deeper where the need is greatest
- Work with existing knowledge
- Workshop approach: 2-3 monthly workshops with inputs to be completed by utilities in interim
- Project manager coordination and collation of reports, but most inputs from utilities themselves



Infrastructure Consequences

	Telecomms	Electricity	Fuel	Gas	Transport	Water/
Tsunami	Local sites	Marsden, Bream Bay	Refinery		SH1	Coastal tmt plants
Volcano (Bol)	Kerikeri exch.	Substation			SH1	
Volcanic Ash	Major exchange <mark>Minor site</mark>	Substation Overhead lines	Refinery	Delivery point failures	All roads	Whangarei water supplies
Rural Fire						
Pandemic						
Cyclone	Major exchange <mark>Minor site</mark>	Substation Overhead lines				
Single site fire	Major exchange	Transpower sub- station	Refinery	Gas line / delivery points		
Technology Failure			Refinery		Rail signals.	
Drought	? Cooling					
Earthquake	?	?	?	?	?	?

Infrastructure Risk Profile?

Hazard & Risk	Likelihood	Consequence	Level of Risk
Coastal – Storm surge	А	2	High
Coastal – Tsunami – distantly generated	В	2	High
Coastal – Tsunami – locally generated	D	4	High
Ex-tropical cyclone	Α	3-4	Extreme
Drought - agricultural	С	2-3	Mod-High
Drought – water supply	С	1-2	Low-Mod
Earthquake	D	2	Low
Fire – rural (wildfire)	С	2-3	Mod-High
Flooding	Α	3-4	Extreme
Land Instability	Α	2	High
Volcanic – local volcanic field	Е	2	Low
Volcanic – distant eruption	D	2	Low
Biological – introduced pests and animal diseases	С	3	High
Biological – Human epidemic	С	2-3	Mod-High
Hazardous substances	С	3	High
Mine subsidence	С	1	Low
Infrastructure failure – information technology	С	2-3	Mod-High
Infrastructural failure - electricity	С	2-3	Mod-High
Infrastructural failure – water (urban)	С	2-3	Mod-High
Infrastructural failure – roads and bridges	В	2-3	High
Major Passenger Transportation Crash or Collision – aircraft	С	3	High
Major Passenger Transportation Crash or Collision – marine	С	2	Mod
Criminal Act/Terrorism	D	4	High

Can't just use CDEM probability Probability we need is, for example, that the tsunami hits Marsden Point



Top 5 Risks: Self-rating

Water	Transport	Electricity	Fuel	Telecomms
Loss of Power Flood Drought Pandemic Single Site Fire Only area with solid contingency plans / mitigation measures is	Flooding Land Instability Tsunami / Surge High Winds Chemical Spills <i>Key</i> <i>improvement</i> <i>areas – tsunami</i> / evacuation	Storms/ cyclone Earthquake Tsunami Volcanic Ash Substation Fire	Loss of Power Storm / flooding Single site fire (NZRC) Road Access Land instability - pipeline	Loss of power Loss of own asset (exchange) Road failure (access to site) Flooding / storm Lack of staff <i>Main area with</i> <i>limited planning</i> <i>is loss of road</i>
drought.				access.

Methodology and Programme

• 2008:

- Project Plan
- Regional risk profile
- Mobilise first contingency plan: 'Electricity Failure'
- 2009
 - 'Tsunami'?
 - 'Cyclone-Storm'?



Contingency Plans

- What is each agency doing as the event develops/how are they responding? How is the damage assessment information being collected and disseminated?
- Priority sites vulnerability to this hazard/event (column in priority sites list?).
- How might the response change if it is a 'single utility' vs a 'multi-utility' failure?
- Critical resources what are they, where and how can we get them?
- Considerations for CDEM what agencies need to be involved?
- Longer-term mitigation options whose role?
- Other?

